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Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress

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posted on 2023-06-21, 06:01 authored by Corine BessonCorine Besson
In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll’s Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism.

Funding

Expressivism Generalised: the scope of non-descriptive thought and talk; G1453; SWEDISH RESEARCH COUNCIL (VETENSKAPSRADET)

The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity; G2568; RIKSBANKENS JUBILEUMSFOND; P17-0487:1

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Philosophy

ISSN

0031-8191

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Volume

86

Page range

35-62

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2019-09-13

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2019-09-13

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2019-09-13

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