Moral natural norms: a Kantian perspective on some Neo-Aristotelian arguments

Deligiorgi, Katerina (2019) Moral natural norms: a Kantian perspective on some Neo-Aristotelian arguments. In: Giladi, Paul (ed.) Responses to naturalism: critical perspectives from idealism and pragmatism. Routledge, New York, pp. 1-21. ISBN 9781315180854

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Abstract

This chapter is concerned with a contemporary Aristotelian position in the philosophy, defended originally by Philippa Foot and subsequently by Michael Thompson, that aims to put this fact at the heart of the people's philosophical reflections about morality. Kant begins his ethics with the good. Clearing the ground for a metaphysics of the morals, he states that it is “impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that could be considered good without the limitation except a good will”. Anscombe offers a subtle diagnosis of modern moral philosophy, because of her brevity of expression, some care is needed in reconstructing her argument. Self-legislation, or more accurately, rational self-legislation, is a metaphor for rational order of moral norms. The traditional concern with Kantian ethics is its non-naturalism. Practical syllogism is not about choice of ends.

Item Type: Book Section
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Paige Thompson
Date Deposited: 03 Dec 2018 10:43
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2020 12:47
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/80553

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