A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO

Heyes, Anthony and Oestreich, Andreas Marcel (2018) A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 54 (3). pp. 219-243. ISSN 0922-680X

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Abstract

We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: University of Sussex Business School > Economics
Depositing User: Anthony Heyes
Date Deposited: 07 Dec 2018 13:10
Last Modified: 23 Nov 2019 02:00
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/79883

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