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Strategic bargaining with destructive power

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola Manzini
This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Economics Letters

ISSN

0165-1765

Publisher

Elsevier

Issue

3

Volume

65

Page range

315-322

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2017-11-08

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