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Strategic bargaining with destructive power
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola ManziniThis note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Economics LettersISSN
0165-1765Publisher
ElsevierExternal DOI
Issue
3Volume
65Page range
315-322Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2017-11-08Usage metrics
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