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Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception
Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of “predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies” (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and objecthood, and (3) refine the phenomenological target by differentiating between perceptual presence and the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or “phenomenal unreality.” It turns out that this requires blue-sky thinking.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Cognitive neuroscienceISSN
1758-8928Publisher
Taylor and FrancisExternal DOI
Issue
2-3Volume
6Page range
111-117Department affiliated with
- Informatics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2015-08-18Usage metrics
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