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Realism beyond correspondence

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posted on 2023-06-08, 13:38 authored by Michael Morris
This paper argues that correspondence theories of truth, despite claiming to be realist, are in fact best understood as idealist. They take propositions to be made true by states of affairs or tropes, things which have to be understood in terms of sentential structure. I argue that the only defensible explanation of the view that propositions and the world share sentential structure is that the world has this structure because it is the structure of language, which is idealist. I argue that a realist should abandon correspondence theories, and I defend the idea of a non-correspondence realism from some objections

History

Publication status

  • Published

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Page range

49-65

Pages

16.0

Book title

Truthmakers: the contemporary debate

Place of publication

Oxford and New York

ISBN

9780199283569

Series

Mind Association Occasional Series

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Editors

Julian Dodd, Helen Beebee

Legacy Posted Date

2012-11-14

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