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Deontology in ethics and epistemology
In this article, I consider some of the similarities and differences between deontologism in ethics and epistemology. In particular, I highlight two salient differences between them. I aim to show that by highlighting these differences we can see that epistemic deontologism does not imply epistemic internalism and that it is not a thesis primarily about epistemic permissibility. These differences are: (1) deontologism in epistemology has a quasi-teleological feature (not shared with moral deontologism) in that it does not require that one abide by epistemic duties for the sake of (and not merely in accordance with) those very duties; and (2) in ethics, the relevant options we speak of are whether someone acts or does not act; in epistemology, we have an analogous further option: we can speak of whether someone believes that p, fails to believe that p, or withholds judgment about that p
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
MetaphilosophyISSN
1126-1068Publisher
Blackwell PublishingExternal DOI
Issue
4-5Volume
39Page range
530-545Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-11-14Usage metrics
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