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A new argument for pragmatism?
Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
PhilosophiaISSN
0048-3893Publisher
Springer VerlagExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
36Page range
227-231Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
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- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-11-01Usage metrics
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