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The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in wage negotiations
This paper characterizes the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution when firms and unions negotiate over wages alone, and firms set the level of employment in order to maximize profits given the agreed wage. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is analysed for the case that the wage elasticity of employment and the union's risk aversion are both constant. In this case there is a simple relationship between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Journal of the Operational Research SocietyISSN
0160-5682Publisher
Palgrave MacmillanExternal DOI
Issue
8Volume
43Page range
779-786Department affiliated with
- Business and Management Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-09-26Usage metrics
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