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Artificial consciousness, meta-knowledge, and physical omniscience
Previous work [Chrisley & Sloman, 2016, 2017] has argued that a capacity for certain kinds of meta-knowledge is central to modeling consciousness, especially the recalcitrant aspects of qualia, in computational architectures. After a quick review of that work, this paper presents a novel objection to Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (KA) against physicalism, an objection in which such meta-knowledge also plays a central role. It is first shown that the KA’s supposition of a person, Mary, who is physically omniscient, and yet who has not experienced seeing red, is logically inconsistent, due to the existence of epistemic blindspots for Mary. It is then shown that even if one makes the KA consistent by supposing a more limited physical omniscience for Mary, this revised argument is invalid. This demonstration is achieved via the construction of a physical fact (a recursive conditional epistemic blindspot) that Mary cannot know before she experiences seeing red for the first time, but which she can know afterward. After considering and refuting some counter-arguments, the paper closes with a discussion of the implications of this argument for machine consciousness, and vice versa.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and ConsciousnessISSN
1793-8430Publisher
World Scientific PublishingExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
7Page range
199-215Department affiliated with
- Informatics Publications
Research groups affiliated with
- Centre for Cognitive Science Publications
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2021-03-15First Open Access (FOA) Date
2021-08-06First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2021-03-15Usage metrics
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