Corruption in UK prisons: a critical evaluation of the evidence base

Article  (Published Version)


This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/96923/

This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version.

Copyright and reuse:
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.

Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.

Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Effective police and prison collaboration
Jason Hogg, Paul Crossley, Robert Barrington, Jack Silverman and Marie Hutton

Corruption in UK Prisons: a critical evaluation of the evidence base
Robert Barrington, Jack Silverman and Marie Hutton

Speaking truth to power: a review of the field of Intelligence Analysis
Professor Julian Richards

‘L.A.C.E.S’: Introducing a new framework to enhance professional standards around Use of Force
Dr Grant J Bosworth and Sarah Ashcroft

Understanding the security profession: Interview with Professor Alison Wakefield
Dr Alison Wakefield interviewed by Dr. Jamie Bennett

Book Review
Competing for control: Gangs and the social order of prisons
David Pyrooz and Scott Decker

The Editorial Board wishes to make clear that the views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the Prison Service.
Printed at HMP Leyhill on 115 gsm and 200 gsm Galerie Art Satin
Set in 10 on 13 pt Frutiger Light
Circulation approx 6,500
ISSN 0300-3558
© Crown Copyright 2019
This special edition of *Prison Service Journal* focusses on prison security. Despite the centrality of security to prison life, this is not a theme that has often been explicitly explored in PSJ. Indeed, this special edition has been prompted by a belief that security practices have been relatively under-theorized and researched generally and in prisons in particular. Instead, there has developed a set of assumptions and traditions that have guided thinking and actions. Predominantly, it has only been in the face of significant failures, such as high profile escapes, that there has there been prominent and systematic examination of security. In attempting to address this gap, this edition of PSJ draws upon expertise within prisons and the wider field of security in order to examine some critical areas of practice.

In the opening article, Professor Mark Button Professor of Criminology at University of Portsmouth, in which he considers how existing and emerging research in the wider security field can be applied to prisons in a strategic way so as to improve practice. This article sets out an agenda that we are keen to encourage. This is followed by an interview with Claudia Sturt, Director of Security Order and Counter Terrorism in HM Prisons and Probation Service. In this interview, she describes the security threats faced by prisons and discusses the new approaches that have been developed over recent years to professionalise and enhance practice so as to effectively respond to the threats. In her interview, Claudia Sturt, particularly emphasises that the purpose of security is to create a foundation for the rehabilitative work of prisons.

One of the threats that have intensified in recent years is that of organised crime and ongoing criminality in prisons, in particular facilitated by developments in technology, particularly mobile phones. Dr. Kate Gooch and Professor James Treadwell offer an analysis of the extent and nature of this problem in prisons. This is followed by a study conducted at HMP Holme House prison by Dr Victoria Bell and Dr Maggie Leese of Teeside University. This study describes the effectiveness of the approach taken to tackling drug supply. This approach integrated security and a broader drug treatment regime, and security practice consciously incorporated an emphasis upon procedural justice. This is an example of the potential synergy of security and rehabilitative cultures.

An interview with Jason Hogg, Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, considers the effective working relationship between prisons and the police in tackling and preventing crime. As the national lead for policing in prisons, he has particular expertise and insight into what this means across a range of activities.

Three articles follow that provide detailed assessments of critical security practices. Professor Robert Barrington, Jack Silverman and Marie Hutton from University of Sussex offer an account of the development of counter corruption activity in prisons. After a slow start, recent years have seen greater acknowledgement and action to respond to the threat of staff corruption. Professor Julian Richards of University of Buckingham provides an overview of security intelligence practices. This draws upon the use of intelligence in a range of settings including law enforcement and military and speaks to prison intelligence as part of this wider profession. Dr Grant Bosworth and Sarah Ashcroft discuss recent work in prisons to improve the governance, scrutiny and research of the use of force. As the use of force by state actors is sometimes necessary, but is also one of the ultimate exercises of power. Given this context, the considered attention provided by this article is to be welcomed.

The final contribution is an interview with Alyson Wakefield, Professor of Criminology and Security Studies at the University of West London and Chair of the Security Institute. The security Institute is the leading professional body for people working in security. In this interview she describes the importance of security work and the cross-sector efforts to developed excellence in practice, and to nurture a more diverse workforce.

This edition of PSJ attempts to offer a dedicated examination of security practice in prisons. It is not intended to be definitive, but rather it aims to draw closer attention to this field of practice, draw upon a broader range of academic expertise, and encourage further engagement. Security can be a highly technical field, which has an element of specialism. Those who work in security need to have a command of the tools available and understand how to deploy them to their best effect. It also, however, involves the application of generalist skills including leadership, planning, governance, analysis and, interpersonal interactions. The way security is practiced has wider implications for prisons as a whole. Security can contribute to safety internally and for the wider public. Yet this needs to be conducted in a way that is integrated with the broader strategic objectives, including nurturing a fair, decent and respectful environment; tackling inequality and disproportionality; creating openness and trust, and; supporting opportunities for people to experience personal growth and change. Reconciling and integrating these aims is a sophisticated and highly complex task. This is what is required from effective prison security.

---

**Editorial Comment**

Three articles follow that provide detailed assessments of critical security practices. Professor Robert Barrington, Jack Silverman and Marie Hutton from University of Sussex offer an account of the development of counter corruption activity in prisons. After a slow start, recent years have seen greater acknowledgement and action to respond to the threat of staff corruption. Professor Julian Richards of University of Buckingham provides an overview of security intelligence practices. This draws upon the use of intelligence in a range of settings including law enforcement and military and speaks to prison intelligence as part of this wider profession. Dr Grant Bosworth and Sarah Ashcroft discuss recent work in prisons to improve the governance, scrutiny and research of the use of force. As the use of force by state actors is sometimes necessary, but is also one of the ultimate exercises of power. Given this context, the considered attention provided by this article is to be welcomed.

The final contribution is an interview with Alyson Wakefield, Professor of Criminology and Security Studies at the University of West London and Chair of the Security Institute. The security Institute is the leading professional body for people working in security. In this interview she describes the importance of security work and the cross-sector efforts to developed excellence in practice, and to nurture a more diverse workforce.

This edition of PSJ attempts to offer a dedicated examination of security practice in prisons. It is not intended to be definitive, but rather it aims to draw closer attention to this field of practice, draw upon a broader range of academic expertise, and encourage further engagement. Security can be a highly technical field, which has an element of specialism. Those who work in security need to have a command of the tools available and understand how to deploy them to their best effect. It also, however, involves the application of generalist skills including leadership, planning, governance, analysis and, interpersonal interactions. The way security is practiced has wider implications for prisons as a whole. Security can contribute to safety internally and for the wider public. Yet this needs to be conducted in a way that is integrated with the broader strategic objectives, including nurturing a fair, decent and respectful environment; tackling inequality and disproportionality; creating openness and trust, and; supporting opportunities for people to experience personal growth and change. Reconciling and integrating these aims is a sophisticated and highly complex task. This is what is required from effective prison security.
Introduction

Security is one of the fundamental needs in society for both individuals and organisations. Delivering security and consequences of those modes have stimulated some significant academic debates and research. However, applied security, particularly the performance of security tools and effectiveness of security systems, in comparison to other disciplines, has been under-researched. An engineer, a medical doctor, a human resources specialist would have a substantial body of knowledge to consult when examining the different ‘tools’ of their trade and the merits of their use vis-a-vis a security manager. Given the importance of security in prisons one might expect this might be an exception in the broader field of security studies; but here again there is a sparse base of scholarship. There is a body of research that investigates the culture of the prison, which considers the nature of security, exemplified by Sykes’ seminal work. Some of the sparse research which exists, is listed next to some important security issues:

- Categorisation of prison inmates for various purposes;
- The effectiveness of prison security staff;
- Prison escapes; and
- Perimeter security.

Considering prison escapes have been the subject of numerous dramas and movies from The Great Escape, Escape from Alcatraz to the Shawshank Redemption it is interesting to juxtapose the interest of creative writers with their academic equivalents. Although prison escapes do often result in official enquiries, which will be an issue this paper will return to later.

The brief potpourri of research identified above does not identify the totality of prison security related research and it is not the intention of this article to identify all of the extant literature. Rather this article intends to consider the issue of prison security from a security scholar perspective. It will begin by exploring the importance of security in prisons. The paper will then move on to consider the importance of professional security managers, before setting out some of the issues of research which should be developed further by security and prison researchers.

The importance of security in prisons

Security in prisons is a very important issue for a variety of obvious reasons. First and foremost many prisoners are dangerous or high risk of committing further crimes and it is important to keep them from society to prevent further incidents, which requires security to keep them there. Even if they are not a risk, offenders are sent to prison as a penalty and it is important they remain there to maintain the integrity of the punishment. Second prisoners are also potentially offenders within prison and it is also essential to have

References

effective security to protect staff, other prisoners and visitors. Third the nature of the population and the strict rules within them regarding consumption of alcohol, drugs and access to items such as mobile phones means it is important to prevent such items from being smuggled in. For all these reasons maximising the effectiveness of security in prisons is a very important issue. Highly effective security therefore look like in prisons:

- Very low risk of prisoners escaping;
- Very low levels of further offending within prisons; and
- No contraband getting to prisoners.

But these must also be delivered by a security system that does not disrupt the wider core aims of prisons, such as provide a regime that also rehabilitates offenders, among many others. Thus the challenge of achieving these aims cuts to one of the central dilemmas of security in any context. A retailer could easily enhance security to prevent shoplifting, by for instance, placing security staff checking all those who enter and leave, but this might be at the cost of less customers coming to the store - undermining the purpose of the retailer. For a prison the dilemma is balancing a reasonable prison regime for inmates against an appropriate level of security. In addition to this is the issue of cost. Politicians and taxpayers do not generally like paying taxes for prisons and in most cases higher security equals higher costs. High walls, fences, CCTV, drones, security staff etc all cost money. Prison managers therefore face the following challenge of balancing:

**High Security versus Reasonable Prison Regime for inmates versus Cost**

This is a very difficult balancing act and it highlights where research can play an important role. The scarce resources of prison managers need to be deployed to their maximum and research can help them to make smart decisions. However, this assumes decision-makers focused upon security have a professional approach, built upon research based decision-making and that there is a body of knowledge to consult. As the next section will show, general security management until recently was not generally wedded to such a methodology.

**Professional security managers**

The professionalisation of security managers in general has been undergoing a significant transformation over the last 30 years. From a role traditionally associated as a second career for ex-police and military staff, with no specialist qualifications where what was considered ‘relevant’ experience was central to recruitment, there has been a move to a much more professional approach. Degrees, Masters and other professional qualifications in security are now much more central to recruitment - although the new recruits to security management are still dominated by the ex-police and military they do at least generally come with higher relevant qualifications too.

Security management, however, still differs from other ancillary professions such as Human Resources, Health and Safety etc where choosing a career in it on leaving university is common. The core requirements of a ‘profession’ are still not completely there. There are still gaps in the traits associated with a profession such as a clear body of knowledge, clear entry standards to the profession, a code of ethics all work to to name some.

And perhaps one of the most significant identifiers of a profession in the UK - receiving Chartered Status from the Privy Council - is still lacking in the security industry.

The gaps in the UK security professional infrastructure have probably in part propelled the UK Government to create its own security profession from scratch built upon physical security, personnel security, cyber security and technical security, which was launched in February 2020. This profession is built

---


upon extensive standards that go from entry to high level managerial positions. These and the wider industry developments to a more professional infra-structure are welcome and likely to lead to better security within government. They are also likely to lead to increased demands for knowledge on security drawn from the highest quality research.

It is here where there is a gap, we have already referred to. Medical doctors, engineers and human resource management specialists can point to dozens if not hundreds of journal in some cases publishing research on issues which may be very useful in the decision-making of appropriate tools to deliver. In the security world there are only two specialist journals: Security Journal and the Journal of Applied Security Research and only a handful of articles on prison security can be found. Wider criminological journals also contain a few. These illustrate the small and dispersed body of knowledge dedicated to the security effectiveness of tools and systems in prisons. There is an extensive body of generic crime prevention based research and some of this will be useful, but it is not necessarily transferable to prison contexts or easily discovered. 13

Policing has in recent years also been gradually embracing more professional approaches to the development of policies. The creation of the College of Policing, extensive research activity and evaluations rooted in random control experiments have yielded an evidence base showing strategies that work, which have then been implemented. 14

Both policing and crime prevention have various initiatives that clearly bring together these important bodies of knowledge to enable practitioners to make use of them (see footnotes 13 and 14). Such approaches for security in general and prison security specifically would be beneficial if all relevant knowledge was brought together in a user friendly hub. However, there is also a need for more research. Some critics might immediately think this is just academics calling for more research and therefore funding. This is in part true, but research can also be done by practitioners as part of their normal way of working and there are also many ways for research to be stimulated by others to undertake through relatively low cost options such as students studying degrees through to PhDs. The next section provides a snapshot of areas where the author believe there should be a priority for prison security research, it is not exhaustive and there are many more areas security professionals would consider. This is just a starting point.

Security failure

Security failure is an act that breaches what the security system is designed to prevent. This could be a criminal act, such as a robbery, burglary, theft and so on; or a lesser act, such as trespass or breach of organisational rules. 15 Thus in a prison context it could be an escape or a prisoner to making alcohol in their cell. Security failure therefore encompasses a wide range of potential incidents that take place in different nodes and the consequences of which vary greatly. Failures of security in aviation have resulted in the catastrophic events of 11 September 2001, while security failure in a supermarket might mean no more than the loss of £50 worth of razors. Another consequence might be nothing more dangerous than huge embarrassment and bad publicity, such as in the incident in which a member of Fathers 4 Justice breached security at Buckingham Palace to reach the Queen's balcony in a Batman outfit in order to highlight the organization's campaign for greater access for separated fathers to their children.

Security failure occurs all the time despite the millions of pounds spent to reinforce security systems. As Zedner 16 argues:

...absolute security ... is a chimera, perpetually beyond reach. Even if security were today obtainable ... the potentiality for new threats means that the pursuit can never be said to be over .... Just as the capa-bilities and intentions of potential adversaries are unknowable, so there may be unknown vulnerabilities, revealed only when they are exploited. The central issue here is that security is not and can never be an absolute state. Rather it is a

---

13 See for example https://popcenter.asu.edu/
14 See for example https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Research-Map/Pages/Research-Map.aspx
Security failure, however, is not an easy subject to study. First, the embarrassment of security failure can be such that the breach is never actually publicised (many frauds for example). Second, in order to minimise the chances of similar breaches happening again, detailed information of what went wrong is often not made publicly available. Consequently, the study of security failures is restricted to cases where information is available, which may well be a biased sample in the first place. Nevertheless, particularly in the public sector, when there is a major breach there is often some form of enquiry. Sometimes the media carry articles that shed light on security failures, both reports from journalists and, in some cases, from the perpetrators themselves some years later. Finally there are also evaluations of particular security products, which can shed light on the causes of security failure and which can be used to further our understanding.

Understanding why security failures have occurred is central to improving security, as Button has noted drawing upon the research of Toft and Reynolds on disasters, which can be applied to security failure. Organisations can reduce adverse events such as disasters and security failures from occurring by engaging in three types of learning. First, there is organisational learning where individuals within an organisation draw their own lessons from an event. For example discovering a new means of a visitor smuggling in contraband into a prison should provide learning for all others in that organisation to prevent further breaches.

Second, there is isomorphic learning in which an incident (that occurred in another place, at an earlier time, or to another business or organization) is studied by other similar groups. The intention of scrutinizing ‘someone else’s incident’ is to identify and assess potential risks that might apply to your own systems or procedures and to eliminate them. Thus in this context prisons should be scanning more widely and if for example a new smuggling technique is uncovered in an airport, prisons should be considering whether it is an issue for them.

Finally, there is ‘iconic’ learning where simply being informed of a negative event is considered a learning event in itself. An example might be hearing that in another organisation an employee clicked on what they thought was a job opportunity sent to them by email, but actually it was malware which triggered a ransomware attack which led to serious damage to the organisation.

Toft and Reynolds argue that while the first and third types of learning are important, the most significant is isomorphic. What does this therefore mean for prisons? First prisons should be gathering data on all security failures that occur within them. This should capture as much data as possible relating to circumstances and causes. This data should be regularly analysed and used to fine tune security systems to reduce risks. The wider prison security management network should also be embedded, receiving analysis and feeding into the data. However, prisons should also be looking beyond prisons to conduct isomorphic learning and also feeding this knowledge into the adapting their security systems. Security failures in other contexts related to smuggling, searches, perimeters to name some offer important knowledge. These activities can be undertaken “behind the wire” of the prison system without compromising revealing important security knowledge to prisoners. The opportunities from big data associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) could also be applied to such data gathering.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Security

There are a wide range of traditional security tools, strategies and systems where more research is required on their effectiveness from CCTV in specific contexts through to searching procedures. However, the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) holds the potential for a wide range of new methods and approaches to security that presents for a more pressing priority for research and experimentation. The 4IR is used to describe a variety of technological advances proceeding at pace, around three broad areas:

- Physical: autonomous vehicles, 3d printing, advanced robotics and new materials.
- Digital: ‘the internet of things’, block-chain, big data etc.
- Biological: genetics, synthetic biology.

Schwab has argued:

*We are at the beginning of a revolution that is fundamentally changing the way we live, work, and relate to one another. In its scale, scope and complexity, what I consider to be the fourth industrial revolution is unlike anything humankind has experienced before.*

The application of the technologies of the 4IR to security are also emerging. For instance drones and robots are increasingly used to conduct surveillance; and digital advances are enabling big data to better profile risks and deploy mitigations to manage them. There is huge potential to utilise some of the technologies of the 4IR for prison security and to evaluate their success. Some of the technologies could yield more effective security at lower costs in the long term. Beyond the obvious benefits of using drones and robots to patrol perimeters and other important areas there is the potential to use big data to monitor and predict risks, such as risk of self-harm, violence, insider threats etc. Indeed the latter issue is very important in prisons and utilising big data to identify potential threats could be beneficial. In finance such data is being used to predict potential fraudulent transactions with high degrees of accuracy and the UK is already pursuing such approaches in the prison sector. The most important aspect of utilising these new approaches is using research to evaluate their effectiveness.

The mental health and well being of prison staff

Working in prisons in general is a stressful and potentially dangerous occupation. Those officers with security roles face particular risks and with those risks come the potential for impacts on the mental health and well being of staff. Research conducted by the author on private security staff – who probably face less risks than prison officers – has highlighted significant problems with levels of well being and the mental health of such operatives. These problems ultimately impinge upon performance and as research has illustrated in security failure, often the human element of security systems is the reason security failure occurs. There has been research in the past in the UK on this issue and in other countries, but much more work needs to be dedicated towards this. Maximising the effectiveness of prison officers given their importance in security systems is an important objective and research can be utilised to develop the most effective workforce.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article has briefly introduced some of the emerging thinking in security more general and applied them to prison security. It has, in particular, identified some of the broad themes of research which should be

---

22. Ibid., p1.
a priority for prison security managers. Central to the model identified is the need for professional security managers rooted in the traits associated with a typical profession such as grounding in a suitable high level qualification and working using techniques that there is an evidence base of their proven success. The lack of an extensive body of security knowledge in general and particularly to prisons requires much greater attention should be applied to security managers commissioning and conducting research. They should also be utilising isomorphic learning to scan for evidence from within their prisons, the wider prison sector and other relevant sectors to integrate that knowledge into their strategies. There are many areas where research should be priority and of varying levels of sophistication there is no doubt research already occurring in the UK. This article has stressed the importance of understanding security failure, which is a founding knowledge base for prisons; using and evaluating some of the emerging techniques associated with 4IR; and finally the mental health and well being of security operatives within prisons. There are many more, but the foundations of this approach can yield more effective security decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the essence of this approach.

This article will end with an agenda for prison security managers to enhance security and they can judge to what extent they are fulfilling this agenda with new Government initiatives to professionalise security in the public sector and wider industry developments.

- Recruitment of managers of security who have been educated and trained in the discipline and who recognise the importance of and use research;
- The pursuit and commissioning of research where there are gaps to expand knowledge of what works;
- Active learning within prison security;
- Building a body of knowledge through a an easily accessible repository of knowledge; and
- Building a network to share that knowledge.

There are many other aspects to developing a profession beyond the scope of this article. These steps, however, are the most pertinent to developing a professional approach to security that maximises effectiveness.

Figure 1. Foundations of good security decisions
Leading prison security
Interview with Claudia Sturt, Executive Director for Security, Order and Counter Terrorism

Claudia Sturt is Executive Director for Security, Order and Counter Terrorism in HM Prison and Probation Service. She is interviewed by Dr. Kate Gooch, Associate Professor at University of Bath.

Claudia Sturt is the Executive Director for Security, Order and Counter Terrorism in HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). She was the first person to undertake this role after it was created in 2016. Her responsibilities include leading services across prisons, probation and youth custody tackling violent extremism, serious organised crime and corruption. Her team also lead on the management of intelligence and the development of security policies and practice, including new technologies and countermeasures. In addition, she manages teams that respond to serious incidents.

Prior to taking on this role, Claudia Sturt was a successful prison manager. She governed for prisons: Erlestoke, Dartmoor, Winchester and Belmarsh. She was also a Deputy Director between 2010 and 2016, responsible for leading all of the prisons in the Thames Valley area.

This interview took place in October 2020.

KG: How would you describe prison security?

CS: Security can be understood as the protection of an organisation, its mission and objectives against hostile activity. The mission and objectives of HMPPS are to protect the public; reducing reoffending and building positive lives. What Security means in that context is ensuring the sentence of the court is carried out, but then enabling prisons to be places where rehabilitation can happen and people can lead safe, well ordered lives in our custody. You won’t get much meaningful rehabilitation within prisons that are chaotic and dangerous, because people in there are just too busy surviving. I see Security as creating the bedrock for rehabilitative cultures and opportunities, rather than just something for its own sake. The traditional view of prison security was dominated by preventing escape. Of course that’s still our pre-eminent responsibility, but it’s no longer enough. In former days, when you incarcerated somebody behind a big high wall, their offending behaviour either stopped or was at least put on hold while they were in custody. All you had to do to protect the public from prisoners was to stop them escaping- because as long as they didn’t escape, they couldn’t carry on their criminal activity. That’s clearly not the case any longer, with the proliferation of digital technology. We’re not able to eradicate this or completely prevent its use, and for that reason many offenders still manage to maintain their networks and criminal activity while they’re in custody. Therefore, in order to protect the public and reduce reoffending we have to curtail ongoing criminal activity; prison Security now is as much about tackling the illicit economy and ongoing criminality as it is about preventing escape.

KG: Do you think that changes the daily practice of security within a prison?

CS: Yes, I think it needs to. We best protect the institution, its mission and objectives by, first of all, understanding the threat- the nature of things that can go wrong, let’s say in our context escape, ongoing criminality and extremism. Then we need to understand the level of risk- by which I mean the likelihood that those things will go wrong. Then we have to find ways to mitigate those risks. We protect the organisation by building its resilience, by reducing the rewards of hostile activity and by increasing the jeopardy attached continued offending. You can’t do those things in isolation from other partners across the law enforcement and national security landscape. I think much more of our focus now is more upstream than it used to be. So traditionally, I think prisons have looked at the way the threat manifests itself in relation to individual prisoners’ behaviour. For example, you observe prisoner X passing something to prisoner Y, and you might drug test one and search the other — that’s dealing with the downstream manifestations of the threat. If you look upstream, and you’re willing to be partnership-minded and work with other agencies, then you start being able to tackle the threat at source. You can start looking at the criminal groups who are supplying prisons rather than the individual who’s handing it out across the wing. You can start disrupting and degrading the supply chain. By using strategic intelligence you can begin to get ahead of the problem rather than only ever dealing with the symptoms of it.
If as a SOCT (Security, Order and Counter-Terrorism) team we are sitting around the table with the right agencies, we can be contributing to their understanding and they can be contributing to ours and we jointly start filling the knowledge gaps. This Directorate has got to be a knowledge-based economy.

KG: Has that involved cultural change either on the part of the prison service or the police or both?

CS: Yes, certainly some fundamental changes were necessary. We had to make a strategic choice to be at the table with law enforcement and national security partners, rather than working in isolation. Traditionally, the Prison Service was a little bit closed and had a mindset that the outside world didn’t really understand us. We would just plough our own furrow— and you can get away with that, but you won’t make any headway— so part of the shift for us is having more of an open, outward- facing mindset that says, ‘we’re partners not competitors’, so we can build a joint response. Our partners also had to recognise that we had a really valuable part to play and that we could be trusted, so that they would choose to work with us. I think we are now treated with a lot more respect and consideration by our partners in law enforcement and national security. We’re seen as part of the solution, not irrelevant or just something to be worked around.

KG: One of the things that has happened in the last couple of years is that prison security has attracted a lot of investment, which in terms of the context of the last decade, is quite unique. Do you think that the new capabilities are making a difference and bringing better outcomes for individuals, for prisons or the Service as a whole?

CS: I think you’ll see a big difference. That investment was made possible by a couple of things. I spoke about intelligence; the strategic intelligence picture we developed gave us an evidence base to establish what our critical threats were. In place of anecdote we had for the first time an authoritative articulation of our threat picture with powerful enough evidence to open the Treasury purse-strings. Developing a partnership approach was the second thing that was necessary. One of the reasons why we got the investment was because the Home Office wanted us to have it and wanted to work with us on the case management of high harm individuals. If they hadn’t supported our bid, I don’t think we would have been successful, so it’s a real tangible example of the benefits of facing outward. And of course, we were lucky with the timing— a new Government keen to tackle crime just as we were producing our threat assessment. The £100 million investment will strengthen our resilience from multiple directions, starting with enhancing gate security. I spoke earlier about increasing the jeopardy and reducing the profitability of criminal supply operations, so one way you reduce the profitability is to increase the number of consignments that don’t get delivered, so that the profit-loss equation is shifted. If you can also identify who is people bringing contraband into the prison, you’re increasing their jeopardy. What I am working towards is that people no longer see prisons as a worthwhile or lucrative marketplace because too many of their trades go wrong and they run too high a risk of getting caught themselves. Enhancing gate security is a critical aspect of that because it makes it much harder to get the items in quantities through the gate. We are investing in new technologies, such as X-Ray body and bag scanners and metal detector portals, with SOCT staff working directly with the manufacturers to develop the best possible specifications for prison use. We are also increasing searching staff and dogs so that anything that comes through the gate is scrutinised in a really credible way. We are able to do this in about 50 new sites that don’t already have those measures. I’d love to go further, but it’s a great start.

As part of the Security Investment programme, we are also developing a digital forensics lab. The purpose of that is to access the information downloaded from SIM cards and mobile phones that we recover. Those mobile phones have often been places that are not very bio-secure so we need to be able to handle the items properly. And then we are replacing the Mercury intelligence system with a new digital platform that will give us the opportunity to interrogate data not just process it, then use our intelligence much more proactively.

We are developing our multi-agency responses to serious organised crime, investing in a powerful joint case management, control and disruption approach for high harm and serious organised criminals to make it as near impossible as we can for them to continue their activities in prison and after their release too — that’s why the Home Office wanted us to have the money for that.
The other area where we are going to be investing quite heavily is on counter-corruption work. We recognise that if you close down other supply routes for contraband, crime groups and individuals will increasingly target our colleagues, so we are helping to build resilience of staff against being corrupted. Organised crime is absolutely ruthless, and they will exploit whatever weakness they can find, whether that is people who have debt, or those who are lonely or insecure, who are uncertain about their status at work or think that colleagues don’t value or support them. Very few people join the job with a view to working corruptly; a small number might, but generally speaking, those people who get corrupted are singled out and manipulated because criminals see a chink in their armour.

The Security Investment Programme is a combination of measures—technological and human factors—and from both a staff and offender perspective, that will make a significant difference, but that doesn’t mean it will be job done. One of the unfortunate realities that we are working with is that serious organised crime is ruthless, entrepreneurial, adaptable, greedy, and as long as they see an attractive market and they think that the cost:benefit ratio is in their favour, they will keep trying to exploit it.

**KG:** Do you think that threat has changed whilst you’ve been in the role, or perhaps in the Prison Service?

**CS:** Certainly, during my time in the Prison Service, it is hardly recognisable from the days of trading lavatory paper and phone cards. It will have developed even since I’ve been in this role, but I think what has really changed is our ability to know what it looks like. Previously you were just working blind about what happens outside the prison. But now we have improved our ability to see. Digital technology of course is changing everything—and the illicit economy in prison is no different. The most significant change is that people can grow very rich without ever getting their hands dirty and they can have victims that never meet—they can have victims on another continent and that’s a massive game changer. With the dark web and digital technology, there’s now a market place where you never have to meet the person who is supplying you.

We recognise that if you close down other supply routes for contraband, crime groups and individuals will increasingly target our colleagues, so we are helping to build resilience of staff against being corrupted.

**KG:** And in some ways, that’s the change with mobile phones in prison; you don’t have to meet the victim or be in direct contact...

**CS:** A lot of people ask, why can’t we relax a little bit about mobile phones in prison because prisoners are just trying to keep in touch with their loved ones, speak to their kids before bedtime, and they’re doing it on a mobile phone because it’s private, cheaper, and easier than speaking on a landline on prison landings. Most of the people in prison come from a generation where they spend most of their time with a phone in their hand so it just feels unnatural not to have a mobile to text and call with. But because all those mobile phones have to be trafficked in, they are all feeding the illicit economy, and the debt and violence that goes with it. It may be true that nearly three quarters of calls on illicit mobiles are made to people we are happy for them to contact, but that still leaves 25-30 per cent of calls to friends, associates or victims who we are not happy for them to speak to—and we have evidence or that figure, by the way.

**KG:** And when they are calling family members there can sometimes be an indirect link to the illicit economy because family members are repaying debts or being coerced directly...

**CS:** Absolutely. To say we are happy for them to talk to their family doesn’t always mean we would be happy with the content of what they are saying.

**KG:** I guess that speaks to some of the difficult tensions when trying to balance those things that we know support rehabilitation and desistance, but also being alive to the things that might constitute a threat or create an element of risk, and that balance is never perfect.

**CS:** Yes, one of the things that was wrong with our response traditionally has been how we categorised people, so we’ve been reliant on sentence length to establish someone’s security category as a shorthand, which doesn’t take into account that risk of harm and sentence length don’t necessarily go hand in hand. Plenty of people who are immersed in serious criminality don’t get long sentences, either because they are well represented in court or because law enforcement is unable to prosecute them for the
The new generation of prisons are designed to be all about reducing reoffending and to give people an opportunity to be busy in a constructive way, to behave responsibly and live positive lives in custody.

This includes, for example, downloading data from captured drones or recovered mobile phones, and using that as part of a wider law enforcement effort. We have been able to get convictions for drone pilots by getting data off drones that were recovered, and that was never previously possible. The Regional Intelligence Units are very important to us now because they help join the dots and synthesise the local intelligence, and see the associations and networks that you can’t necessarily see when you are just looking within a single establishment or group. Where those Regional Intelligence Units now partner up with Regional Organised Crime Units, that starts both contributing to, and drawing on contributions from, agencies such as the National Crime Agency, the Police, HMRC, Borders and Immigration and so on. We can therefore see a much more complete picture about how the illicit economy operates. Crime Groups are completely agnostic about how they make money, they look for the best opportunities for profit and power. One week it might be supplying steroids to a gym in a prison, the next week perhaps trafficking sex workers or moving cryptocurrency on the dark web — they don’t care how they do it, it’s about whatever is most profitable and least risky.

**KG:** The theme that has come up during the interview is about law enforcement. Do you think that’s a change in philosophy, strategy or practice for prison officers or prison managers?

**CS:** I think traditionally, people working within prison have almost had to choose which hat they are going to wear — whether they are focused on security or rehabilitation. I came to this job having never worked in a security related role. I was always about reducing reoffending and decency in prisons, and I wouldn’t necessarily even say that I had a positive view or expert understanding about the role of Security. Sometimes it even felt like Security saw their job as stopping me doing mine, although I’m sure from their perspective they were just watching my back. What I absolutely urge people to think about is that you don’t have to choose, because security serves rehabilitation. Good Security should be helping the rehabilitation effort to happen safely and making a reality of it, not stopping it. We should have people working in prison who are interested in both simultaneously and see how they can

---

**KG:** One of the recent changes has been to introduce financial investigation units, and to invest in both regional and national intelligence units — how important has this been?

**CS:** It’s probably the first time that we’ve made a real effort to be knowledge based and that knowledge isn’t just about what happened locally, but goes beyond establishments, beyond criminal justice and even beyond U.K. borders. Some of the new capabilities have been really important to that. We have increased the number of prison-based intelligence staff, and professionalised their role so they are qualified to the same level as law enforcement analysts. Better local intelligence provides the building blocks for better regional and national analysis. The use of data is a shift.

---

**CS:** We always have a significant proportion of known organised crime group members in custody at any given time, with the majority still held in relatively low security conditions. For some of them, that’s appropriate because they might be coming to the end of their sentence and we should be trying to get them successfully resettled. For many, though, they will make their way to medium or low security conditions because their short sentences mean that they are automatically categorised as Category C or Category D, or they are skilled at shaping how we see them, very good at becoming cleaners, orderlies and in trusted positions on the Prison Council and so on. They do well out of the decisions that are made about them by prison staff. So if you can change how you categorise people to reflect actual risk, than you can be much better at making sure that those who need genuinely need rehabilitative support don’t have those opportunities ruined by the activities of organised criminals trying to control the establishment for their own profit. The new generation of prisons are designed to be all about reducing reoffending and to give people an opportunity to be busy in a constructive way, to behave responsibly and live positive lives in custody. If we make sure that people in those prisons are the ones who need and won’t abuse it, that’s an important service. It also creates a degree of leverage for the people who are currently doing really well out of the system but are not desisting from criminal activity.

...
We want to develop intelligence and ask questions about how things go wrong, not to attribute blame but to understand so that we can improve the response next time.

KG: So, it’s about building resilience without designing out human capacity and skill?

CS: It is absolutely. I’m long enough in the tooth now and I am a Historian so I’m bound to think back to HMP Whitemoor and HMP Parkhurst and the escapes in the 1990s, and the lessons that we learnt very painfully then which were about inadequate process. We had prison staff who were conditioned and intimidated into not doing their job, and the organisational response to that was to codify every requirement with a regime of auditing to make sure that each task had been completed and couldn’t be missed or avoided. It was probably an important corrective at the time, but we became over reliant on it and a successful Security Audit became the test of whether a prison was deemed to be secure or not. I wouldn’t want to see the audits go all together but it has to be balanced by having an intelligent and enquiring approach to what our threats are, be they places, problems or people; understanding what those threats are and how they operate and then thinking about how best they can be mitigated.

KG: What makes you proud about the work that you do or that you see in others?

CS: I was very lucky to have an opportunity to create something almost from scratch; you don’t often get that and certainly not with the combination of investment coupled with space to innovate and make a real difference. My colleagues and I have been able to build something new; a Directorate where the culture, capability, partnership, and the outcomes make me very, very proud. I’m proud that it is a Directorate that’s not afraid to do things differently, that isn’t constrained by the way we have always done things. Because it’s fresh and interesting and exciting work, we’ve been able to attract some brilliant people to join SOCT. I don’t have words for how proud I am of the work that they do, though some of it I can’t talk about, which is very frustrating. When I see the sheer inventiveness and quality of the work that some of my colleagues do, I’m incredibly proud. They are not simply doing it because I’ve told them to; I’ve built the clock and wound it up but they’re doing it and working it out for themselves. I’ve got people in SOCT who have enormously greater security experience than I have. I don’t have all the answers on this at all. I’ve brought a mindset and way of looking at an issue, but other people have developed things, so I’m proud of them. I see successful operations from the capabilities and relationships that my colleagues have built. I know that there are people walking around alive on the street today because of a piece of work that was done in SOCT, and that’s not an exaggeration. I know that we are putting holes in the illicit economy because of our activity, and I know that we are keeping the public safer, and people who live in work in prisons and probation safer. I’m really proud of that, and it’s been probably the greatest privilege I’ve ever had, to be able to create this Directorate.

KG: How would you describe your experience as a female senior leader working in a male-dominated security world?

CS: People used to always ask me this question when I was a Governor, but my response was always, ‘It’s not a male dominated environment, it’s a Claudia
dominated environment.’ I was not completely joking. As a leader, you set the tone and culture by what you do and what you put up with. I don’t ever feel that I’ve suffered from being in a world that is numerically dominated by men because the work I’ve done has been determined by me and the people I’ve got around me. For a young directorate, SOCT has a good track record in attracting senior female leadership to pivotal roles. Both men and women in SOCT have brought their talents to bear on the problems that they’ve seen and they’ve been brilliant at it. There might be more men than women in the Security arena, I think we are going in the right direction and the SOCT Directorate is a good counterbalance for that- although like other parts of HMPPS gender is not the only area where we would benefit from greater diversity.

KG: Could you name one person who has influenced you?

CS: I’ve been lucky enough to work for some great leaders — Martin Narey and Michael Spurr come to mind immediately, of course. And I learn so much from people who work within my Directorate. But another person who had a really profound influence on me, and who I really miss now, is Dr Ruth Mann, not just because she was also a really passionate servant of rehabilitation and always wanted to find ways to make things better, but she taught very powerful lessons about evidence, about not approaching questions with pre-formed assumptions or believing that you already have all the answers. She taught us about having an open mind and to be evidence based, which is important in every part of our work but especially so in the world of Security. Ruth was a person of genuine goodness; without ever making you feel harassed she always advocated strongly for hope, dignity and humanity in a way that was impossible to ignore. She’s not someone we can easily replace but her influence and legacy are powerful and enduring, and they live on after her.

KG: What are your future hopes for SOCT Directorate?

CS: The next challenge for SOCT, which I think will make a huge difference, will be to help the organisation to understand better what we can offer. People don’t necessarily know enough about what we do for us to have maximum impact. Before COVID, our primary objective for this year was bridging the gap between SOCT and wider operational capability so that people who work in prisons and probation can have a greater share of the knowledge capital that we have built up. It is no good at all having all these fantastic capabilities if they’re not being used, or they are only being used for the things we can spot. We’ve created the capabilities, and I really want them harnessed to the maximum effect which requires operational colleagues to be actively aware, lobbying for and exploiting them because that’s what will make prisons safer, stable and more law abiding, and more decent and rehabilitative.
It doesn’t stop at the Prison Gate: Understanding Organised Crime in Prison

Kate Gooch is Associate Professor of Criminology at University of Bath and James Treadwell is Professor of Criminology at Staffordshire University

Introduction

‘What happens out there, happens in here.’ (Category B Local)

In July 2020, the National Crime Agency and the Metropolitan Police announced that they had made 746 arrests and seized £54m in cash, 77 firearms, over two tonnes of Class A and Class B drugs, and over 29 million pills of street Valium. Operation Venetic — as it was dubbed — centred on the use of EncroChat, an encrypted communication platform that could be discreetly accessed on smart phones and had facilitated instant messaging between associates of a criminal network spreading across the UK and within Europe. When announcing the outcome of the operation, Chief Constable Steve Jupp, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s Lead for Serious Organised Crime, announced:

Serious organised crime is complex but working together with our Regional Organised Crimes Units and the National Crime Agency we have achieved an unparalleled victory against the kingpin criminals whose criminal activity and violence intimidates and exploits the most vulnerable. By dismantling these groups, we have saved countless lives and protected communities across the UK. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that organised criminal activity ceases when suspects are in custody, that criminal networks are permanently disrupted, and that communication between associates ends. As Van der Laan states, ‘at first glance, prison would seem to be a prime example of a location with strict supervision, where offenders are separated from potential targets by walls of a prison.’ However, prisons are places where some individuals continue to offend and where organised crime can be initiated and become embedded in the very routine activities of prison life. Such activity has become increasingly more pronounced within prisons in England and Wales over the course of the last decade. The possibility that organised crime groups and networks might seek to expand into ‘new territories’ has been observed in the community across a number of jurisdictions and, as Varese argues, such transplantation is more likely to be successful where there is a demand for protection and/or a desire to maximise the economic opportunities regarding the sale of illegal goods, particularly where the state has failed to manage those markets.

Quite why organised crime has become increasingly well-established within the English and Welsh prison system merits careful attention, as does the forms of criminal exploitation represented (both within prison and extending into the community), the ways in which criminal networks continue or even expand, and the particular forms of organised crime within the British context (which bear little resemblance to some of the more notorious and iconic expressions of organised crime elsewhere). Despite a significant

---

1. Many thanks to Matt Hopkins (University of Leicester), Jamie Bennett (HMPPS) and Mick McNally (HMPPS) for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
3. Ibid.
growth in prison studies, and a well-established body of literature on organised crime within the community and across national borders, very little research considers the emergence or continuation of organised crime within prison. Even the Oxford Handbook of Organised Crime excludes from its remit a specific focus on organised crime within prison. Those studies that do exist retain an international, rather than a British, focus.8

This article begins to address this gap. It begins by setting out the complexities in defining ‘organised crime,’ before discussing the relevance of the gang trope in England and Welsh prisons and offering an overview of reasons why organised crime has expanded into prisons in England and Wales. Finally, the article explores the extent to which those individuals participating in criminal exploitation, criminal networks and organised crime are identifiable within prison and to what end. In so doing, this article challenges the orthodox view that harmful group behaviour in prison is principally the preserve of ‘gang’ members. Rather, it argues that harmful group behaviour and criminal activity is better understood as organised crime. A continuum exists between criminal activities requiring organisation and those forms of organised crime where individuals and groups are seeking to usurp or corrupt prison authorities and operate with power, control and influence. Critically, this article argues that organised criminal networks and activities have become an embedded feature of prison life over the last decade, primarily because more sophisticated groups have been able to take advantage of the market opportunities created by a flourishing prison illicit economy, by exploiting weaknesses in State governance, and by accessing digital technology to communicate, trade and organise themselves (often without necessarily leaving the prison cell). As crime and criminality has changed in both the community and in prison, traditional local and internal responses within prisons cannot adequately address these new challenges, nor can a reliance on ‘disruptive’ moves or a focus on whomever is left holding contraband (who is not necessarily the real instigator). Rather, a more nuanced, agile, intelligence and evidence-based, and regional (sometimes national) response is required, one that focuses on law enforcement and public protection in the widest sense, recognising that criminal exploitation extends from the prison to the families and partners of prisoners and to vulnerable persons in the community.

Methodological Note

This article draws on the findings of five separate but overlapping key studies. The first study focused on the incidence, prevention and responses to prison violence. This ethnographic and qualitative study of three prisons (a Category B Local, a Category C prison and a YOI) revealed the extent to which prison violence was underpinned by economic imperatives, how and why the illicit economy had flourished in some contexts, the criminal networks that such economic activity was linked to, and how organised crime had emerged in some prisons but not in others.9 The second is a study of Crime in Prison, commissioned by

A continuum exists between criminal activities requiring organisation and those forms of organised crime where individuals and groups are seeking to usurp or corrupt prison authorities and operate with power, control and influence.


the Police and Crime Commissioners of West Mercia Police, West Midlands Police, Staffordshire Police and Warwickshire Police. As part of this study, we have been able to further explore crime in prison from a prison perspective, but also from the perspectives of police representatives, court representatives, the Crown Prosecution Service, the National Probation Service, the Regional Organised Crime Units and from the Regional/National Intelligence Units. In this study we have been better able to understand trends in the nature and dynamics of crime in prison, the offences committed and by whom, the wider context within which these offences occurred, the penalties applied, and how the criminal justice response could be improved. The third study — with Professor Nathan Hughes and Dr Isla Masson — is a study of the experiences of care leavers in prison, involving semi-structured interviews in two Category C/YOIs and a women’s prison. In this study, our interviews demonstrated how connections to criminal networks and criminal exploitations develop prior to imprisonment and how they manifest within prison, and the extent to which any harmful group behaviour could be defined or constructed as ‘gang behaviour’, ‘organised crime’ or ‘crime that is organised.’ The fourth study represents the first empirical, systematic study of prison homicide in England and Wales. This mixed-methods study not only draws on qualitative interviews with those who have perpetrated fatal or near-fatal offences in a range of prison settings, but also includes ethnographic and qualitative research within in a Category A prison. The final study is a comparative international study of prison violence in Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and England. This study is ongoing but has allowed us to explore and test the differences in organised crime and gangs from an international perspective, and explore regional variations in the forms and dynamics of harmful group behaviour, harm and crime in prison.

There is in excess of 150 academic, policy and statutory definitions of organised crime, all of which vary significantly.

‘Organised crime’ is an ambiguous and ill-defined concept. There is in excess of 150 academic, policy and statutory definitions of organised crime, all of which vary significantly. The most consistently used definition is that provided by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which stipulates that an organised criminal group is ‘a group of three or more persons existing over a period of time acting in concert with the aim of committing crimes for financial or material benefit.’ The emphasis on ‘a group of three or more people’ has achieved a statutory footing as part of the Serious Crime Act 2015. However, as Levi explains, such slippery definitions

In addition to the formal research projects, we have benefitted from the insights gained from invitations to visit a much wider range of prisons — either as part of specific research projects or to offer support or training on specific issues. We have also learnt much from an ongoing dialogue with representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Home Office, and HMPPS. This dialogue, coupled with the ability to draw on the experiences from a much wider range of prisons, has allowed us to — as best we can — test the generalisability of our findings, and better understand where organised crime has become more embedded, and where it has not, for what reasons, and how such trends are changing over time. Although each of these studies listed above focused on a slightly different aspect of prison safety and security, our continued presence in the field over the last seven years allowed us to observe, understand and to begin to articulate the transformations in prisoner society and within prisons themselves. It was significant to us that one such transformation that we observed — and that was confirmed to us throughout all the studies above — was the emergence of organised crime and the relative absence of ‘gang behaviour’.

Defining ‘Organised Crime’

13. University of Sheffield
14. University of Leicester
mean that ‘organised crime’ can ‘mean anything from Italian syndicates to three menacing burglar and a window cleaning business who differentiate by having on as a look-out, another as burglar, and a third as money launderer.’

To complicate matters further, concern with organised crime has, in both academic and policy discourse, been somewhat superseded by references to Transnational Organised Crime (TNOC). TNOC is a term in common usage but is ‘especially problematic,’ lacking a shared definition for operational or research purposes. Broadly speaking, TNOC represents the transnational variant of organised crime — activity that is devised and carried out across geographical or jurisdictional boundaries. Links are often made to a diverse range of criminal activities, including: the more established global trade in narcotics; the greater illegal movement of people, goods, money and data across international borders; cross-border money laundering, bribery, corruption and the financing of criminal and terrorist activities; modern slavery; transnational sexual exploitation; and the trade in counterfeit identities and goods. However, as Hobbs argues, ‘the global/transnational obsession that has dominated recent British organised crime discourse is difficult to justify.’ Rather it is more helpful to ‘identify local units of activity that are linked via networks’ and are taking full advantage of an illegal market that represents a ‘form of unlicensed capitalism.’

The best empirically informed accounts of organised crime establish it as a set of activities, rather than placing emphasis on the logistical and hierarchical structure of criminal groups. Such activities include, for example, the provision and transport of illicit goods and services such as security and protection. This is critical since British organised crime does not replicate the formal and highly structured hierarchies typical of the Mafia and ‘Outlaw Motorcycle Groups’. Much of what is considered professional and/or organised crime within the British context is, in reality, the antithesis of good management and coordination — it is messy, chaotic and disorganised.

It is also prudent to distinguish between ‘organised crime’ and the ‘organisation of crime,’ with the latter requiring a degree of association and co-ordination but remaining diffuse, informal, and lacking the ‘visible hand of violence and corruption which affects persons and events as evidence of an organising force behind ‘organised crime’. Levi further argues that ‘organised crime’ is distinguishable from other sorts of criminal activities due to four essential characteristics: 1) violence; 2) corruption; 3) continuity; and, 4) variety in types of criminal conduct engaged in. He suggests that there may be value in sustaining a distinction between those who generate (sometimes affluent) livelihoods from crime — professional criminals — and those who fit this fourfold criterion and who are ‘organised criminals’. For Levi, the true social definition of

organised criminals’ is that set of people whom the police and other State either regard, or wish us to regard, as ‘really dangerous’ to the State’s essential integrity.\(^{30}\) In addition, by introducing the dimension of profit and illegality, it is possible to see the role of (sometimes extreme) violence — or the threat of violence — in regulating an illicit market that is not constituted through legally enforceable contracts.\(^{31}\) Furthermore, organised crime should be viewed as one end of a continuum of business and enterprise that extends between, and often blends, legitimate and illegitimate business activities.

**Mafia Myths and Legends: Understanding the British Context**

Beyond the definitional dilemmas, the phenomenon of organised crime is understood differently, and has different origins, across the globe. Failing to understand these essential differences can cause, as Finckenauer argues, unduly simplistic and incorrect assumptions about the presentation of organised crime, with many viewing ‘organised crime and what they know to be the mafia [as] synonymous terms and synonymous concepts.’\(^{32}\) Certainly in the U.S. context, the ‘myth of a powerful and centralized mafia organisation’ was politically attractive and served to justify increased law enforcement powers and resources.\(^{33}\) Organised crime was seen as an imported problem, traceable to immigration of Irish, and particularly Italian-Sicilian, communities.

Organised crime was seen as an imported problem, traceable to immigration of Irish, and particularly Italian-Sicilian, communities. The US construction of organised crime contrasted rather starkly with the dominate forms of ‘organised crime’ within the UK in the aftermath of World War 2. While the US were expressing concern about Cosa Nostra, organised crime in England and Wales was synonymous with violent young men raised in the shadow of the Blitz who had matured through boxing gyms, street fights and petty instrumental criminality to more ambitious criminal ventures. The allure of both business and protection money gave these British ‘firms’ (to use the vernacular) their logic. Unlike the US concern of an ‘alien’ threat, British organised crime was very much a homegrown problem — a mixture of street heavies, hard men and sometimes more specialist criminals and corrupt businessmen. The Kray Twins became synonymous with just such a group, and embodied something of the status, celebrity and infamy that the ‘family firm’ appeared to enjoy.\(^{34}\) However, the lesson that many had taken from the Krays was that it was important to be business savvy. As a consequence, armed robbery gradually ceased to be chosen source of income for the criminal elite. Those individuals with reputations to violence, criminal networks and access to firearms, gradually moved into the drug trade — a trade which was increasingly offering far greater financial rewards.\(^{35}\)

By the 1990s, professional criminals had moved towards an ‘entrepreneurial trading culture driven by highly localized interpretations of global markets.’\(^{36}\) Those men versed in the heavy end criminality of commercial and armed robbery, became savvy and more business orientated.\(^{37}\) New opportunities such as the homegrown business of cultivation of cannabis were profitable and less risky than importation.\(^{38}\) The interconnected processes of de-industrialization, globalization, and neo-liberalism had normalized some criminal activity that was previously the exclusive prevail of a more professional criminal elite, with organised criminals increasingly depositing and cleansing their money in legitimate businesses, property portfolios, pubs, garages and car dealerships.\(^{39}\) Cash businesses also fared well, as did those sports that had purchase in the working class milieus, increasingly adding a veil of legitimacy to the cash flowing form the...
drug trade. Drug dealing became increasingly ‘normalised,’
offering an accessible ‘alternative sphere of enterprise to
deciding opportunities in traditional
male employment.’
These changes occurred within a
context where online banking, online markets, the dark
net, and digital technology were reshaping everyday
life, culture and communications. These markets are
underpinned by ‘discreet, action-based networks that
informally connect individuals.’ During the last decade
(2010s), these networks have increasingly taken root
and continued to operate from within the prison walls
in ways that suggest that the gang trope is misleading
and outdated, and only able to explain harmful group
behaviour in very particular contexts.

From Prison ‘Gangs’ to the ‘Prison Firm’

'It depends what jail you’re.
Like in Dispersals, you have
Muslim gangs. Then you
have other gangs where it
depends what area you’re
from. I think London is a lot
more gang orientated. More
Manchester and Liverpool, I
think it’s just about making
money and the fact you’re
from Liverpool obviously it
gives you that bit of a head
start. But I would say still
London, obviously it’s
organised crime and there’s
less gangs. On the news they show a lot of
these Black kids in London stabbing each
other, like what about these guys that are
getting executed on motorways and that?
Like organised gangs, you never see that on
the news. I know a couple of stories about
people in like organised crime executions and
things, they don’t say anything about that on
the news.’ (Category C)

To date, explanations of harmful group behaviour
within prison have routinely employed a gang narrative,
erroneously importing a construct from countries such as
the United States, Brazil and New Zealand where
prison gangs arguably have a greater symbolic and
physical presence. Given the growing concern about
youth violence and urban street gangs in the UK over
the last 20 years, it is perhaps unsurprising that ‘prison
gangs’ have become an explanatory framework for prison
disorder within the UK.

Despite the longstanding, international interest in prison gangs, the
literature on gangs in prison is not well developed and it is for
this reason that prisons are described as the ‘final frontier in
gang research.’ In the context of Texan prisons, Pyrooz and Decker
argue that ‘gangs occupy an important place in the social
order of prisons,’ adding ‘Gangs are responsible for a
disproportionate share of violence and misconduct and
maintain a grip on contraband markets in prison.

Similarly, Skarbek describes prison gangs in California as

Normalisation of the Drug Supply: The Social Supply of Drugs as the “Other Side” of the History of Normalisation,’ Drugs: Education,
42. Ibid, p.233.
NACLA report on the Americas, 46(3): 341-34; Biondi, K. (2016) Sharing This Walk: An Ethnography of Prison Life and the PCC in
gangs in an international perspective,’ Trends in Organised Crime
49. Ibid, p.2.
It is highly doubtful that English and Welsh prisons ever witnessed the particular forms of highly structured, well organised and formally constituted gang behaviour described in the US or elsewhere. Those research studies that claim to have demonstrated the presence of gang activity within English and Welsh prisons have suffered from important definitional and methodological weaknesses. For example, research by Woods and colleagues claimed that both prisoners and staff believed that prison gang behaviour was widespread within male prisons. However, Wood defined prison gangs as ‘a group of three or more prisoners whose negative behaviour has an adverse impact on the prison that holds them.’

It is questionable whether this definition was sufficiently robust to create clear distinctions between ‘gang’ behaviour and the behaviour of groups of men who may have no affiliation with gang activity and whose association may be fleeting. It is also unclear whether it is because of these conceptual weaknesses, or despite them, that she ‘discovered’ gang related violence in the prisons surveyed. Maitra has subsequently argued that ‘prison gangs are now a reality within the English prison system.’ However, it is far less clear whether Maitra simply means that gang members are present in prison in greater numbers or if he believes such individuals are acting with the same level of power, influence and control described in the U.S. context, or making the same contribution to prison violence. Maitra also appears to employ the gang narrative too readily and without offering any conceptual definition of ‘gang’. His arguments contrast starkly with his own earlier publications from the same two-week study which concluded that ‘the lives of most prisoners were not defined by gang membership.’ He not only appears to overstate very loose — and as he himself describes — ‘amorphous’ peer groups with gangs, but also conflates the settling of community ‘beefs’ with gang activity. Yet, as we found, resolving such disputes can occur independently of any gang association and often has little or no association with ‘gangs’.

Notably, and by way of contrast, Phillips found that the ‘organised and violent gangs depicted in the US research’ were ‘seemingly absent in the UK context.’ Moreover, violent incidents ‘began...'

52. Ibid, p.65.
53. Ibid, p.65.
54. Ibid, p.72.
typically as individualised one-on-one masculine contests and while they might escalate with the involvement of supporters, they were not influenced by organised gang allegiances.64 Such findings correspond with our own research, which found little sustained ‘gang’ activity, even within a historically significant context where two high profile gangs — and their affiliated splinter groups — had dominated the local Metropolitan area over a 20 year period.65 Our continued research on crime in prison across a range of prisons and involving police representatives has further confirmed the absence of entrenched gang activity within most English and Welsh prisons. References to ‘gang’ were significant only in two specific contexts — YOIs and High Security Prisons — albeit for slightly different reasons.

Within the YOI context, ‘gang activity’ was associated with a small number of young men who had a postcode or regional affiliation and whose associations contributed only to a minority of incidents characterised by retaliatory ‘tit for tat’ violence. However, such gang activity did not structure the prison experience, nor were there any attempts to usurp or corrupt State authority. Within prison, there was also some conflation between the sort of fraternal groups loosely connected by geographical affiliations and those people who have ‘imported’ and sustained gang activities within prison:

‘It’s not even really gangs because I’m not in a gang but I just grew up in a certain area so I don’t get along with a lot of people from other areas but I’m not in a gang. A lot of people think that I’m in a gang but I’m not in a gang. [People who associate with certain groups] are probably just around a bunch of people or friends or probably not even friends, probably associates, but they’re just like this person has got my back.’ (Category CYOI)

It is fairly typical for young men to form loose acquaintances with young men from the same area, partly because it offers some familiarity, reassurance and sense of solidarity.67 Great care needs to be taken to ensure that young men identifying with friends or individuals from the same regions are not mis-identified as constituting a ‘gang’. It is also possible that approaches such as ‘keep apart lists’ create rather than mitigate a gang problem since young people may feel more compelled to identify with a particular group for the purposes of safety, identity and protection. For those young men who did have a more sustained association with a ‘gang’ or street group, such activity could, however, act as an entry point for more sophisticated and organised criminal activity as young men matured and moved into adult prisons, primarily because they were developing their networks and moving into criminal activities that brought them into contact with more experienced and criminally active individuals.

In the High Security Estate, studies have identified concerns regarding a small number of prisoners operating in ‘Muslim gangs.

In the High Security Estate, studies have identified concerns regarding a small number of prisoners operating in ‘Muslim gangs.

71. Ibid, p.67.
presented a problem when trying to explore differences between the (supportive) Muslim brotherhood and the (suppressive) ‘Muslim gang’. One of the difficulties is that, as Phillips also identifies, ‘Muslim solidarity’ creates a strong power base and a ‘collective identity’ that may result in Muslim brother defending each other against officers, or the collective defence of a Muslim prisoner against a non-Muslim prisoner(s). This could engender fear, contempt and resentment amongst non-Muslim prisoners. However, Phillips found that the ‘gang label’ can function as a racialised Othering device and as a repository for feelings of envy and frustration which abound in prison life. For prisoners in Liebling et al’s study, there were ‘new fears about misrepresentation,’ especially since ‘laughing too loud or ‘having fun’ ran the risk of being ‘written up’ for gang-related behaviour.’ Those who imported gang membership into the prison believed that they were monitored accordingly, but these prisoners assumed that ‘staff would stereotype them as members of a ‘Muslim gang’ by conflating a criminal past with present religious denomination.” Moreover, prisoners believed that ‘helping and supporting someone who is in need, acting in accordance to Islamic principles was misinterpreted and exaggerated due to a misguided perception of what a gang was.’ Liebling et al add: ‘Every close knit peer group was potentially a ‘gang’.’

Helping and supporting someone who is in need, acting in accordance to Islamic principles was misinterpreted and exaggerated due to a misguided perception of what a gang was.

...helping and supporting someone who is in need, acting in accordance to Islamic principles was misinterpreted and exaggerated due to a misguided perception of what a gang was.

The relative absence of ‘gang’ activity within English and Welsh prisons is not only indicative of important distinctions between British gang structures and contexts, and those of the North America, South America, Asian, Australia, and New Zealand context, but also reflects a much wider shift in criminal activity in the community. The evolution of street drug dealing into a ‘county lines business model’ and to a more ‘entrepreneurial’ approach has served to move (street) youth criminal associations from urban ‘gangs’ or street groups to a form of drug dealing and enterprise that needs little or no connectivity with a gang. The ‘county line’ represents the use of a mobile phone line to co-ordinate the supply of drugs from a city hub into villages and towns, often well beyond regional boundaries (such as from London to the Bournemouth or Plymouth). Such criminal activities offer flexibility, often involve the exploitation of more vulnerable individuals, and allow individuals to profit more directly from their ‘graft’.

Whittaker et al found that over a ten year period, there had been a noticeable and significant shift away from the use of violence to defend postcode territories — as previous studies of street young gangs had described — to the defence of (drug) marketplaces. Young people were described as more ruthless but focused on the expansion of new
drug markets beyond the confines of a specific postcode and into other towns, replacing the ‘emotional sense of belonging’ to a gang with a more ‘business orientated ethos’.86 ‘Gangs’ were more ‘organised’ and had rejected ‘visible signs of membership as ‘bad for business’ because they attract unwanted attention from law enforcement agencies.’87 Thus, even amongst youth street groups, there has been a drift towards more organised forms of criminality. Given these shifts, it is questionable whether the ‘gang’ remains the correct construct for criminal group behaviour. Our contention then, is not that ‘gang’ members do not exist within prisons, but that constructing prison disorder, violence and drug supply within prison as ‘essentially a problem of gangs’ is an exercise flawed on empirical, theoretical and methodological grounds.88 Ultimately, as Hallsworth and Young argue, ‘gang talk … runs the risk of misrepresenting what it claims to represent — the reality of violence street worlds.’89

Explaining the Emergence of Organised Crime

Criminal activities within prison may include: organising the murder or violent assault of an individual in the community, homicide within prison, jury tampering and intimidation, harassment, blackmail, conspiracy to supply, money laundering, conveyance and/or possession of contraband, prison mutiny, assisting an escape or abscond, fraud, false imprisonment, sexual assault, physical assault, ‘pottings’ (throwing urine or faeces at or over someone), use of boiling/hot sugar water to injure, criminal damage, arson (including the destruction of cars in staff car parks) as well criminal participation (under the Serious Crime Act section 45). Although the vast majority of criminal activity is perpetrated by prisoners, staff may also be implicated in the conveyance of contraband (in amounts worth tens of thousands of pounds), assault, and in behaviour that may fall under the banner of ‘misconduct in a public office,’ such as forming inappropriate and sexual relationships with prisoners. Some such crimes — whether involving prisoners or staff — can be isolated incidents, disconnected from wider criminal networks and not constituting a form of ‘organised crime’.

However, criminal activity may require a network of acquaintances and associates to, for example, threaten, blackmail, rob, assault, or murder an individual in the community whilst the organising individual or co-conspirator is in prison. Clearly this requires communication, co-ordination and organisation — and, using Levi’s characterisation of organised crime requiring violence, corruption, continuity and variety — it is possible that such acts can represent either ‘criminal activities that are organised’ or ‘organised crime’ depending on the extent to which such activities may reflect an enduring network of criminal association and a variety of activity. For example, arranging the murder of an individual in the community will require organisation between a prisoner and his co-conspirator(s) but may be a relatively isolated incident. By contrast, the murder may constitute a ‘hit’ or retaliation between organised crime groups where homicidal violence is only one form of criminal activity that these individuals engage in. Thus, in seeking to identify those acts that might constitute ‘organised crime’, it is prudent to consider ‘the way criminal activities are carried out,’ how individuals interact with other accomplices, and the extent to which such networks are seeking to amass and use power.90 Inevitably, there will be a ‘continuum’ between ‘market-based crimes’ (e.g. drug supply) that require some degree of organisation and communication to ‘what could be termed…’control-orientated,’ ‘regulatory’ or ‘governance’ crimes involving the setting and enforcing of rules of conduct and the settling of disputes in the absence of effective government regulation.89 In the latter case, alliances form to not only gain ‘a share of illegal profits’ but also to exercise power, to ‘govern’ and to regulate behaviour between prisons (and to some extent prison staff).

87. Ibid, p.4.
89. Ibid, p.177.
91. Ibid, p.31.
Prison based criminal entrepreneurs require networks and associates beyond the prison walls. Increasingly the smuggling of contraband, the associated transfer and recovery of payments, reflects something more sophisticated than an isolated incident of ‘crime that is organised’, typically involving criminal networks that spread across the country and into more than one prison. For example, serving prisoners at HMP Hewell were able to orchestrate drone deliveries of drugs, weapons, and mobile phones by drawing on a wider network of accomplices both within prison and the community. These drone deliveries spread across prisons within the Midlands, the North West, Lancashire and Scotland.92 This is not an isolated example, and whilst the supply route may vary, the involvement of a wider network does not, nor does the possibility of co-ordinating or communicating with associates either via mobile phones or pin-phones/in-cell telephony:

‘It’s 100 per cent business for me, nothing else, and it was set up as a business with a tier of people with me at the top as your chief exec, if you like, and then you’ve got people beneath you that are running the thing. So, you’ve got a lad that drives and picks it up, you’ve got a lad that holds it, you’ve got a lad who holds the money, you’ve got people that move it. It’s just purely business.’ (Category C)

Notably, the criminal exploitation of vulnerable individuals in the community — such as female partners or associates and/or care experienced individuals — can represent a form of modern slavery, where vulnerable individuals are coerced into driving criminal associates, transporting contraband, conveyancing contraband into prison (including through visits, throwovers or drones) or collecting payments. In addition, prisoners are active in recouping debt payments not just from fellow prisoners, but also members of their family.93 Efforts to co-ordinate and profit from the supply of drugs within prison, and to more deliberately corrupt state authority, may come in the form of the partners or associates of individuals affiliated organised crime group entering the workforce. Such ‘plants’ may be operating as ‘sleepers’ or may be very actively involved in criminal activity.

For some individuals, imprisonment was unwelcome, but did not serve to halt their criminal activities:

‘Say someone’s convicted on the outside of organised crime — of a massive drugs, money laundering type of thing, drug smuggling, huge, worth a lot of money, and then they come into jail, they carry on the illegal activities because they know they right people, they’re able to. It is more coordinated, it’s less violent, but it’s more financially beneficial if you know what I mean.’ (Category C)

‘[Drug dealing] puts food on a lot of lad’s tables out there and in here, you get me? We need to keep earning, and there are ways to do that. Big money, as much money as can be earned on the out, on road [in the community]’ (Category B Local)

In some cases, imprisonment was less an occupational hazard than a business opportunity since they were able to make more money within prison than in the community:

‘I know a lad who does nothing but little silly sentences. He’ll go and do a stupid shoplifting just so he’ll come in plugged up to make his money again, so he’ll come back out and take the missus to the Bahamas and stupid holidays, so it’s serious money. Well, one Kinder egg94 full of spice can make you anything up to £4,000 or £5,000, so if you’ve got three of those inside you that’s £15,000.’ (Category C)

There was remarkable consistently across prisons both in the amounts that could be gained by selling the illegal contents of a Kinder egg, but also the possibility that individuals might commit minor offences or be deliberately recalled to prison. In some cases, this was a voluntary act, but in other cases, individuals were coerced into returning to prison with contraband:

‘It’s not that all recalls are earning money. There are muppets, sad cases, debtors, they are being put up to it. They are […] not the ones making any money off of it, they are paying back the debts they have been driven into. It’s a business model, they come back in to pay their debts.’ (Category C)

The possibility that someone may deliberately jeopardise their freedom illustrates something about

the power and control that some prisoners — and their associates in the community — are operating with.

The possibility that the prison serves as a key marketplace and site for organised crime activity seems counter-intuitive. Individuals not only need to navigate prison walls or fence lines, but also the restrictions on freedom of movement, social contact and communications. How and why organised and serious criminality appears to have increased within prison over the last decade merits attention. As Varese illustrated, organised crime groups can and do expand and transplant into new territories:

‘The critical factor [in the emergence of Mafias] is proximity to a sudden market expansion that is not properly regulated by the State and the presence of people who can step in and regulate such markets. In a nutshell, opportunities in the market economy bring about mafias.’

Whilst Varese focuses specifically on ‘Mafias’, the principles apply equally well when considering the structural conditions that make the expansion of organised crime within prison possible. His findings also correspond with Skarbek’s research which found that prison gangs provide ‘extra-legal governance’, protection and security when individuals cannot rely on officers to provide the governance they require, but in so doing, they ‘govern crime’ and allow prisoners to participate in the illicit economy.96 Taken together, these studies suggest that whether it is a ‘prison gang’ or the ‘Mafia’, such groups flourish when there is a lack of State governance, where individuals cannot rely on the State to regulate or resolve market disputes, and when there is the opportunity to invade or expand a market. In these cases, the Mafia and the prison gang serve to create order as much as they can destabilise order.

It is, therefore, no surprise that prisons in England and Wales became vulnerable to increased organised, serious, and ongoing criminal activity over the last decade. First, ‘sudden market expansion’ was possible due to increased demand and greater ease of supply. Limited time out of cell, a lack of meaningful activity, a growing sense of hopelessness and feeling ‘stuck in the system’ contributed to increased demand for drugs.97 In addition, supply routes diversified as drones became available. This diversity of supply methods — which includes reception, visitors, mail, staff, throwers, and escorts — meant that individuals could change and switch supply routes in response to security tactics or measures. In addition, drones were cheaply available, offering an additional supply route, one that could be directly exploited when conditions were poor (and a delivery could be flown straight to a cell window) or supervision was lax. Crucially, though, the possibility of spraying psychoactive substances onto domestic or legal mail meant that drug supply and consumption was far easier — and incredibly profitable. The exploitation of the market was easier due to technological advances. Those individuals who imported or expanded their network in prison could run operations from the prison cell using mobile phones. In addition, online banking, social media and crypto currencies means that financial transactions can occur outside of the prison and in ways that are difficult and resource intensive to investigate and track. Poor prison conditions and the inconsistent or inadequate supply of basic items compelled individuals in some prisons to engage in the illicit economy simply to, for example, have sufficient underwear, access a television remote, have sufficient bedding and toiletries. At the point of entry into the economy, individuals may not necessarily be trading contraband but they are quickly in debt, the repayment of such may involve doing the bidding of more dominant and controlling individuals (including holding contraband, assaulting staff or assaulting prisoners).98 The exploitation of illicit markets in prison can, therefore, ‘be understood as evocative of the crude market rationality.’99
Second, prisoners cannot rely on staff to arbitrate disputes over financial transactions, primarily because of the nefarious nature of such activities. Thus, intimidation, threats and the actual use of violence serve to generate compliance and regulate behaviour. As market activity increases, there are of course more disputes to resolve, further cementing the role of those willing to resolve conflict and govern conduct. Third, prisoners have not always been able to rely on the State to provide the governance they need, to supervise them effectively, to define rules and boundaries, and to protect them when needed. A combination of too few officers, too many inexperienced officers and managers, physical withdrawal by officers to the back-room spaces and offices, and a lack of the competent, consistent and legitimate use of authority have served to create the fertile conditions for sophisticated, domineering and powerful in some prisons. It is undoubtedly true that State governance has been inconsistent and unreliable as a direct result of efforts to reduce financial resources beyond a threshold where it is possible to meaningfully maintain the moral, legal and ethical performance of the prison. Thus, the combination of technological changes, changes in the drug economy, the diversification of supply routes, poorer prison conditions, impoverished regimes, changes to the composition of the workforce, structural hopelessness caused by long and IPP sentences, and the increased use of recall have creating the ideal conditions for organised criminals to expand their activities and exploit the market that emerged.

The ‘Screw Boys’ and the ‘Businessmen’: The Organisation of Organised Crime in Prison

Prior to, and during, the 1990s, the ‘faces’ of the most notorious criminals — such as the Krays — were well-known, occupying the position of the self-avowed criminal elite. Today, serious and sensible criminals increasingly prefer to perform the faceless role of chief executive and to maintain some distance from frontline operations. Moreover, not all organised crime requires direct coercion or violence — involvement in the latter may, for example, frustrate business activities by bringing unwanted attention. Organised crime groups merely want compliance, so they can and will express power in more subtle ways — the business is never all about the money, but a chaotic world of complex interactions and drivers, where acquisition and dominance can feature as clear motives. Similarly, within prison, the ‘Businessmen’ who are coordinating activities often operate at a distance from every day ‘operations,’ keeping their hands away from the ‘dirty work’ and avoiding suspicion:

‘You’ll find lads in prison, you’re sorting out logistics, you’re sorting out product, you’re sorting out buyers, you’re sorting out sellers. You’re sorting out, in effect, a massive industry. You’ve got to go under the radar, haven’t you, so you’ll find they’re very business-orientated.’ (Category C)

‘In my hierarchy, I’ve done all that [drug dealing], but since I’ve been in this prison, I just send an order down, because shit rolls downhill. So if I just send it downhill to the Middlemen and they would send it out to the Foot Soldiers and that. … There’s about another three or four here on this wing that I consider at the top, and they know it as well. But they’re not above me.’ (Category C)

The ‘Businessmen’ recognise the importance of developing a network of people, with the ‘Middlemen’, ‘Foot soldiers’ and ‘Runners’ remaining primarily responsible for trafficking, holding and distributing


104. This terminology was used by both prisoners and prison staff/managers.
contraband, as well as punishing non-repayment, holding debt lists and bank account details, and sending threatening notes, texts or phone calls when needed. This might lead us to erroneously conclude that criminal activities are difficult to observe and identify within prison. However, much organised crime within prison hides in plain sight. The names are barely hidden from those who need to know them. Careful observation of — for example — who is associating with who, commonalities in terms of visitors or pin phone contacts, who volunteers to push the servery/kitchen trollies, who is trying to access wings/residential units for no other explicable reason, who has a plentiful supply of ‘canteen’ and ‘exclusive’ items, who wants to be ‘padded up’ with who, who is passing to who, who is in debt to who, who assaults staff and for what reason, who holds the ‘respect’ of their peers (whether through fear or respect based on admiration):

‘They can see who’s grafting. It's like when you see them on the wing and they’re running around, you can see who's selling drugs. [...] So, when they're running around, in and out of pads, it's obvious who's doing what, do you know what I mean? I think some of it is the thrill of the chase. [...] You know, obviously, you can have a better existence.’ (Category C)

The Businessmen often operate from positions of responsibility — such as peer support, mentor or representative roles — and continue on ‘Enhanced regime’ for periods, appearing convivial, polite and charismatic with staff and able to exert pressure on staff should there be any hint of a negative report or ‘nicking’ (adjudication report). This is, of course, the path of least resistance, scrutiny, and oversight, ensuring that they can enjoy greater freedom (including more time out of cell and unescorted movements), can progress and can move to a lower security prison at the earliest opportunity. Rather than being governed ‘tightly’, they both exploit the advantages offered by the State whilst operating their ‘drug empires’ from within. They don’t try to ‘beat the system’ but have learnt to ‘play the game’. In so doing, they are able to effectively manage the vertical relationship with State agents and the horizontal relationships with peers. Balancing a legitimate front with the co-ordination of criminal activity was familiar behaviour to those who had been involved in the organisation of drug importation or distribution in the community and knew how to compartmentalise activities:

‘You were getting up in the morning and going to work, you were looking after the kids, you were taking them on holiday so the kids had their time, [the wife] had her time, the business had that time, the drugs had that time, and you had your time.’ (Category C)

Those who had been caught typically gave reasons such as ‘getting greedy’ or ‘getting lazy’ by, for example, forgetting to take the same safeguards with vehicles, mobile phones and taking other shortcuts that they would have been careful to avoid in the earlier days of those operations. Notably, for those who were connected with organised crime but did not occupy a leadership role, those key individuals continued to exert power and influence from other prisons or other prison wings:

‘Because I’m here and I work with psychologists and I say, ‘Yeah, I really want to get away from all that bollocks to do with all the firm I'm with and having to worry about what they think and…’ But at the end of the day, I do need to worry about what other people think, because I can easily be whacked in prison if I do something that pisses them off, do you know what I mean, someone can easily come after me that knows them. [...] I’m more worried about what my firm think of me and what I’m doing, than anyone else.’ (Category A)

In such cases, even those individuals who were subject to bureaucratic forms of power — such as being the focus of regular risk assessment, psychological assessment and psychological intervention — their chief concern was not how penal power ‘gripped’ them, but how they were perceived by more senior members of their criminal network and how reprisals and punishment could still be organised and exacted.

Although the ‘Businessmen’ sought to exploit the available opportunities and freedoms for their own benefit, prisoners made distinctions between those who were operating as ‘Businessmen’ but with a
legitimate ‘front’, and those who sought responsible roles for genuine motives or to support and evidence their attempts to desist from criminal activity. Those men who were seen to be willingly and uncritically complying with penal power, and enjoying ‘close’ relationships with staff, were dubbed ‘Screw Boys’ by others and did not enjoy the same level of status, power and control as the ‘Businessmen’:

‘I’ve got four jobs. I’ve got unsupervised worker on my card, I’ve got more jobs that entitle me to free movement, do you understand? So, I’m supposed to be treated like a man. I’m a person that abides by the rules. […] When I was downstairs, I was probably one of the main ones that was pro-social to the staff. So, basically, what I do, I’ll have my coffee and then I’ll sit on my table with my paper, or whatever. A lot of the staff members would come and sit around and have a talk. A lot of lads took a disliking to this. They were, like, ‘Oh, screw boys, blah-de-blah.’ Not to my face, just behind it but, you know, you’d hear about it.’ (Category C)

To be named a ‘Screw Boy’ was a slur, but it is not always apparent to the individual concerned that his peers were describing him as such. Some such ‘screw boys’ remained relatively unaware and were happy to maintain some distance from wider wing politics. For those who engage in peer support or volunteer for positions of responsibility for benevolent reasons or to earn a positive report from staff, they became frustrated when their motives were misunderstood and their integrity questioned. The argument here is neither that prisoners operating in positions of responsibility should not be empowered to operate with some degree of trust and autonomy, nor that staff should be immediately cynical or suspicious of all prisoners. Indeed, evidence suggests that such roles and schemes (e.g. the Listener Scheme) can have a range of significant benefits, including personal transformation, development of a ‘positive self-image’ or new identity, developing a sense of purpose, a sense of achievement, having a chance to ‘give something back’, acquiring new skills and ‘earning the trust of others’. Rather, we argue that such roles need to operate within a context of the confident, competent and consistent of legitimate authority by prison staff, ‘intelligent trust’, and the ability to engage in dynamic, agile and responsive assessments of risk are required. Those ‘Businessmen’ who operate with either direct or inadvertently permitted. Much criminal activity can be prevented when staff (and managers) ensure that they are present, engaged, neither too ‘light’ nor too ‘heavy’ in the use of power, observant, reward positive behaviour, challenge poor behaviour, and operate with a curious and open mind. When prisoner support, mentoring and ‘representative’ roles function in a context where power is imbalanced and prisoners are poorly or ineffectively supervised, a Faustian pact can occur when organised criminals exert influence in prisons and are able to help to ease managerial pressures on a prison establishment itself.

Faustian pact can occur when organised criminals exert influence in prisons and are able to help to ease managerial pressures on a prison establishment itself.


for more sophisticated, entrepreneurial, or organised criminals to fill the power vacuum left by staff.\textsuperscript{113} Whilst staff may achieve some temporary sense of physical or psychological safety by using prisoners to reduce violence, handle disputes or put prisoners ‘back in line,’ this can ultimately benefit those involved in, and profiting from, the supply of contraband. Organised crime and corruption have a complex relationship, one that can benefit both criminals and, in some instances, the prison and its staff. The corruption that supports organised crime activity does not necessarily always come in the form of staff acting at the requests of criminally active prisoners, but can come in the form of the inadvertent or indirect abdication of responsibility. Once the balance of power is distorted, it is harder to regain control than if it had never been lost in the first place. Such a rebalancing can only occur when the staff group as a whole acts consistently — those officers who try to do the right thing alone may find themselves the target for assault and ‘pottings’, acts which are ultimately aimed at humiliating them and reasserting power and control.\textsuperscript{114} The response to such incidents by the officer group — not just managers and criminal justice agencies — indicates whether efforts to undermine a staff member are successful in the long-term.

\textbf{Concluding Thoughts}

Crime does not stop at the prison gate, and incarceration alone is not a barrier to ongoing and serious organised criminal activity. Digital technology makes it possible to arrange, co-ordinate, continue and develop criminal networks and activities without leaving the prison cell. Organised individuals can adapt to changes in security and disruption ‘tactics’ with the effect that supply routes are adjusted when needed by, for example, diverting from throw-overs and drones to the corruption of staff, or from the use of legal and domestic mail to greater use of visitors and people arriving in Reception. The traditional response has been to arrange a ‘disruptive’ move of those individuals who generate the greatest concern for staff. However, such moves either create opportunities for other individuals to function in their absence or serve to expand criminal networks across the prison estate. Transfers do not automatically end communications between individuals within and/or across different prisons, or with community associates and accomplices. Similarly, moving vulnerable prisoners who are being exploited or victimised does not necessarily mean that the threat is mitigated or harm averted — more controlling individuals can continue to not only arrange ‘hits’ from other prison wings or prisons, but also directly contact, intimidate or victimise family members. Thus, prison-based organised crime is not solely a prison problem, nor can it be dealt with purely at a local level. Yet, just as with the investigation of EncroChat, prison based organised crime is ultimately detectable, prosecutable and preventable. Effective prevention, investigation and legal or disciplinary responses require regional and national solutions — those that draw on multiple stakeholders and law enforcement agencies, and that take seriously the safeguarding responsibilities to those in the community, not just the prison. Indeed, the Serious Violence Bill — if implemented — will put the safeguarding responsibilities of prisons to those in the com munity on a statutory footing. In this respect, public protection is as much about law enforcement within prison and the protection of victims of prison-based offences as it is about those offences committed in the community (either prior to imprisonment or on release). Whilst there is a tendency in prison scholarship to view forms of State power with suspicion, cynicism and as ‘inherently damaging’,\textsuperscript{115} this article serves as a corrective — seeking to illustrate the ways in which the legitimate, judicious, ethical and competent use of power and authority by prison staff and by wider law enforcement agencies can serve to reduce the pains and burdens of imprisonment. Indeed, our argument here is that it is in the absence of effective State governance and material provision that organised crime networks and groups can operate most effectively. Thus, prisons can only be safe, secure, decent, orderly, and rehabilitative when they operate in the context of the rule of law, moral order and effective governance.


\textsuperscript{114} Gooch, K. (2020) \textit{Understanding Staff Assaults – A Research Briefing}. Bath: University of Bath.

Increased security measures in a drug recovery prison: Disrupting the drug supply

Dr Victoria Bell is a Principal Lecturer in Criminology and Sociology at Teesside University.

Dr Maggie Leese is Head of Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Teesside University.

Background
Drugs remain a key issue for prisons, with 78 per cent of people who entered prison in 2017/18 testing positive for illegal drugs, compared with up to 9 per cent of adults in the general population admitting to having taken drugs in the last month. Furthermore, HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) stated that between 2012/3 and 2017/18 the rate of positive Random Drug Tests (RDT) in prisons increased by 50 per cent, meaning that drug use within prisons is ‘widespread’. This paper reports on the qualitative findings of a research study that explored the perceived impact of the increased security measures that were implemented as part of the Drug Recovery Pilot. The findings, in combination with analysis of open access data, suggests that the increased security measures put in place are having a positive impact on the prison environment however they also raise further challenges for consideration by HMPPS.

The Drug Recovery Prison programme (DRP) in HMP Holme House (a male, local, category C prison) started in April 2017 with the aim of reducing demand through ‘recovery’. The programme was aligned to the 2017 Government Drug Strategy, with the purpose of ‘get[ting] everyone living and working in the prison to collaborate, to create better chances for people in recovery to change and feel hopeful and optimistic about their future’. In order to do this, the programme enhanced the local security measures in an effort to reduce the known supply routes into the prison. The changes focused on ‘activities to deter, detect and disrupt illicit items entering the prison by enhancing physical, procedural and interpersonal security’.

Drug use and the concept of recovery

The concept of recovery can be defined in a number of different ways that include complete abstinence from a substance, to more dynamic and inclusive definitions that identify the importance of the individual experience and the aspirational process that underpins the journey. There are a number of models that have attempted to explain the concept of recovery including the CHIME model that identified five elements that are central to supporting the process of recovery: connectedness, hope, identity, meaning, and empowerment. This represented a shift away from viewing recovery as the point at which a person abstains from using alcohol or drugs to a more self-motivated process that views recovery as a journey. The Social Identity Model of Recovery (SIMOR) places importance on social groups and networks, signifying a change in attitude and the internalisation of a new set of personal values. This shift to a more pro-social

model which enables the individual to see a positive alternative future can result in both changes to behaviour, leading to a transition of identity. In order to promote recovery within the prison it was essential to reduce the availability and use of drugs within HMP Holme House.

Drug use within prison can have an impact on prison regimes, and while this is not a new issue, the changes in drug use and availability, especially the increase of new psychoactive substances (NPS) that imitate the ones found in cannabis, presents a range of challenges for the prison estate. NPS such as ‘Spice’ has increased in popularity, largely due to its low cost. It is well documented that the buying and selling of drugs form part of the informal prison economy which can be linked to internal hierarchies, enhancing status, and producing economic rewards.

Wheatley suggested that there are ‘five possible explanations for drug use in prison’: self-medication; time management; a social network; acquiring and enhancing status; and, economic status and rewards. Other factors can include an existing reliance on substances when a person is sent to custody, as an attempt to forget their current surroundings and in an effort to manage underlying mental health issues.

Despite the reason for illicit drug use in prisons, it is agreed that it brings with it an increased level of risk to both the prisoners and the staff. In order to reduce harm, there needs to be interventions that reduce drug use and therefore reduce the overall risk within the prison setting. During 2017, the issues with drugs within HMP Holme House, particularly psychoactive substances (PS), was widely reported in the media. This issue was acknowledged by Peter Clarke, Chief Inspector of Prisons, in the 2017 HMP Inspectorate Report for Holme House where he commented on levels of drug use and availability within the prison:

‘...at the heart of our concerns was a very serious problem with drugs. Mandatory testing suggested a positive rate within the prison of 10.45 per cent, which was bad enough, but this rose to nearer 36 per cent when synthetic cannabinoids or new psychoactive substances (NPS) were included. Nearly 60 per cent of prisoners thought it was easy to get drugs in the prison, and a quarter suggested that they had acquired a drug problem at the prison.’

The 2020 Inspectorate also acknowledged that in 2017 ‘...the availability of illicit substances [...] had been almost out of control’. This report recognised that measures to tackle the availability of illicit substances ‘had delivered some impressive reductions’.

Data available from the Ministry of Justice reflects the issues that the prison was facing with a peak of drug finds in 2018. The data also identifies decreasing numbers of mobile phone finds and an increase in alcohol finds:

Drug finds in HMP Holme House by (calendar) year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of finds (all drugs)</th>
<th>Number of finds (PS) (per cent of all drugs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33 (36 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>48 (37 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>160 (43 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>62 (25 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020*</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2 (5 per cent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jan/Feb/March data only available

Other finds in HMP Holme House by (calendar) year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Alcohol finds (Number)</th>
<th>Mobile phone finds (Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jan/Feb/March data only available

One of the methods that the prison service use to gain information on drug use and to deter prisoners from consuming illicit drugs is the targeted or random mandatory drug test (MDT). Testing for PS was not rolled out across the prison estate until October 2016, with the range of PS tests being expanded in June 2017\(^7\). Again, this data is publicly available and contributes to building a picture of the efficacy of the Drug Recovery Prison pilot at HMP Holme House. Between 2016 and 2020 (year ending March) the prison service carried out an average of 53,369 MDTs, at HMP Holme House this average was 707 per year. A further breakdown of positive random mandatory drug tests over the last five years at HMP Holme House can be found in the table below.

HMP Holme House random MDTs, including percentage of positive PS tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ending March</th>
<th>Number of tests administered</th>
<th>Positive tests all drugs (incl. PS) (per cent)</th>
<th>Positive tests (PS only) (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>66 (9 per cent) does not include PS</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-2018</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>202 (32 per cent)</td>
<td>158 (25 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2019</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>128 (17.4 per cent)</td>
<td>65 (8.8 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019-2020</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>39 (5.4 per cent)</td>
<td>2 (0.3 per cent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prison, Drug Policy and the Drug Recovery Programme

The recent Prison Drug Strategy 2019\(^8\), acknowledges that reducing supply and demand is not a simple case of abstinence, arguing that the issue ‘requires a coordinated effort to […] encourage people away from drug misuse towards positive and productive activities, and support those requiring treatment’. This builds on previous policy that focused on recovery and harm reduction, with the emphasis on individual journeys, rather than a single approach to drug


\(^8\)HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) see note 3 (p.1).
As such, the Prison Drug Strategy has three main objectives for tackling drug issues in prison: restricting supply; reducing demand; and building recovery. The ‘restricting supply’ objective is most relevant for discussion here, with the three main ways that this is to be tackled set out as:

1. “Minimise the supply of drugs into prisons through guidance, processes and technology.
2. Find drugs that do enter prisons using searching, intelligence and drug testing.
3. Disrupt the trade of drugs within prisons, working with law enforcement, sharing information, and tackling corruption”.

These three objectives are focused on five areas, all of which can play a part in the reducing drug use and supply and these are:
- People: Staff awareness; Staff training
- Procedural: Searching; Visits; Prisoner reception; Drug testing
- Physical: Dogs; Perimeters; Technology; Physical security
- Population: Prison safety; Visible deterrence
- Partnerships: Law enforcement; Intelligence; Information sharing.

The Prison Drug Strategy states that procedural processes within prison should be ‘clear, fair and effective’. This informed the work of the DRP at HMP Holme House prison and included the setting up of a new team, the Drugs and Crime Reduction Unit (DCRU). This team lead procedural security at the prison, working both reactively and proactively to support safety and security with the overall aim of making the prison environment safer and more rehabilitative. Staff in this unit were trained in procedural justice to ensure that they were ‘carrying out the duties of law or authority in a way that is perceived as fair by those [they] are dealing with’.

These specially trained officers have the ability to carry out intelligence-led searches and use a range of equipment, including mobile phone detectors, to interrupt the supply of drugs within the prison. In addition to this, increased security measures were implemented as part of the DRP included millimetre wave scanners placed in visits and an I-Scan full body scanner placed in the prisoner reception where prisoners arrive and leave the prison. Finally, as part of the DRP there was an increased and more systematic searching of staff, including limitations on certain items being taken into the prison, increased restrictions on prisoner post and restriction of personal property, such as clothing, entering the prison.

**Study methodology**

The findings presented here are relate to the perceived impact of increased security measures on staff, prisoners, and visitors at Holme House. The study utilised qualitative data, including interviews with staff and visitors, and focus groups with prisoners. The sample was not randomly selected and members of staff from the DRP programme acted as gatekeepers, organising interviews, and promoting the research to participants within the prison. While recognising that this was not ideal, it was necessary given the time constraints of the project. The staff also negotiated access to the visitor centre, where researchers were able to speak to members of the public prior to their visits with friends and relatives within the prison. Data collection was carried out between February and April 2019.

Interviews were semi-structured in nature, ensuring that all participants were asked the same range of questions, with prompts and probes used where appropriate. Interviews ranged from fifteen minutes to one hour. The number of interviews carried out with visitors and staff were as follows: visitor (n=11) and staff (n = 26), staff were from a range of roles involved in the DRP, including the Drug Crime Reduction Unit (DCRU), prison reception staff; managers of the DRP programme, and prison officers working on the residential units. Focus groups were held with groups of four prisoners over three occasions (n=12) and they were asked the same questions as the staff interviews. The DRP staff invited a larger number of prisoners to the focus groups, with 12 agreeing to take part in the day.

The qualitative data from the individual staff interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and anonymised. The group interviews with prisoners and the visitor interviews were captured in note form by the researchers and then written up in full directly after the data collection had taken place. The transcription of the staff interviews was carried out by an HMPPS approved transcription service. All qualitative data was entered into NVivo, a computer software package that supports the analysis of large amounts of qualitative data, and thematic analysis was undertaken. All data has been treated confidentially and stored securely and

---

31. HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) see note 3 (p.5).
32. Wheatley (2019) see note 5.
anonymously. In order to maintain the anonymity of staff participants, specific roles have not been attributed to comments.

Findings

Overall, the findings suggest that the participants perceived that since implementation of the new security measures, there has been a decrease in the number of illicit drugs within the prison. This perception by participants in this study is reinforced by the data reported earlier in this paper.

Staff and prisoners who took part in the study were largely in agreement that since the introduction of security measures linked to the DRP, availability of illicit drugs within the prison estate has reduced, thus disrupting the supply. Whilst this reduction has had a positive impact on the prison regime, it was also suggested that a complete cessation of drug use and supply within any prison environment would be almost impossible to achieve:

**Oh, I think it's definitely interrupted it. To a big extent. I think if you speak to the staff, you speak to the men — you're never probably going to be able to close off all avenues — but it's absolutely disrupted it.** (Staff)

**I would say 90 per cent has stopped, but they'll never stop that ten per cent. If you want something, you’re going to get it in, they will always find a way [because] it stems from other problems.** (Prisoner)

Restricting the supply of illicit drugs has resulted in a reduction of erratic and violent behaviour, however the perceived ‘ten per cent’ still finding its way into the prison.

Restricting the supply of illicit drugs has resulted in a reduction of erratic and violent behaviour, however the perceived ‘ten per cent’ still finding its way into the prison.

Scanner technology was attributed to successful detection of contraband, and staff also considered that this scanner located in reception acted as a potential deterrent to those arriving at HMP Holme House from other prisons:

**When the prisoners are coming from [HMP] Durham, they know now they're going to get scanned so that's, like, you know: ‘Am I going to get caught? Am I not going to get caught?’ 50/50 chance.** (Staff)

The inspection of the prison carried out in 2020 also highlighted efficacy of the scanners for disrupting the supply of illicit substances and the reduction in positive drug test, but also questioned some of the procedures that were used in conjunction with this. It stated:

**Intelligence was managed well, and an effective use of technology disrupted the supply of illicit items. Positive drug testing rates had dropped significantly. However, some procedural security measures were disproportionate for a category C prison.**

The prison made excellent use of a body scanner to detect illicit items, but all prisoners were also routinely strip searched without risk assessment.”35

Whilst the technology was detecting contraband, there was also a suggestion that with further training,

the scanner could be more successful with additional staff training:

I think there’s a training need there for [all staff who] are using the scanner […] those that have been trained have expressed that once they’ve been trained they know how and what to look for, and it’s made a massive difference in using the scanner and actually identifying what’s in the human body. (Staff)

This point was reiterated by prisoners who, whilst agreeing that the scanner in prison reception could act as a deterrent, did question the efficacy of the scanner to locate contraband:

I don’t think it’s worked. I know friends with phones inside them and they’ve come back with them. (Prisoner)

Millimetre Wave Scanners were trialled in the visiting area; these scanners are similar to those used in airports and detects items that have been concealed under a person’s clothing. Whilst these scanners were initially considered a successful deterrent, they were quickly considered unreliable because their main purpose is detecting metal, rather than organic material such as drugs that may be entering the prison estate and so were removed from use:

[O]ne of the scanners, the millimetre wave scanner, after twelve months of recalibrating it and making improvement in the sensitivity, still wasn’t quite correct for a prison environment. It’s better for the airports, but certainly not for us. (Staff)

Staff members noted that although they thought that this particular scanner was not appropriate, there was the need for a scanner within the visit area as it was suggested that this is probably one of the main ways that drugs can enter the prison. One staff participant highlighted plans to get a replacement scanner that would be for the prisoners when they are exiting visits, with the aim of identifying and removing any restricted items.

We are replacing [the millimetre wave scanner] with a full, a body x ray not a full body one but just a torso scanner… so we will have one in reception and one in the exit to the visits area… we’re just trying to stop the supply getting back into the residential units. (Staff)

Visitors spoken to were largely not concerned about the presence of the scanner, saying that they understood the need for the prison to implement searches such as this. However, several commented on the impact of the scanner on their allotted visiting time. It was suggested that if the prison were to implement new scanners in the visit area, that visitors would prefer to be scanned prior to rather than during visiting times as this could limit potential time spent with family and friends, especially for those who had to travel some distance to the prison:

It just stalls it, it takes longer to get in […] Taking longer to get in means you have less visit time — visiting time should start once you’re in the visit room. (Visitor)

The Drug and Crime Reduction Unit (DCRU) carry out a range of intelligence-led activities based on procedurally just processes, with the aim of restricting, reducing and disrupting illicit drug supply and use within the prison. Intelligence is gathered from a range of sources and, from the perspective of the staff spoken to, this has made a positive contribution to the aims of the DRP:

We basically work off intelligence led information coming off the house blocks or staff, other prisoners, members of the public, you know […] We work off that and we target the people who have the drugs. We gather as much intelligence as we can, and it seems to work really well. (Staff)

Alongside intelligence-led searches by the DCRU, routine searches have continued, and the DCRU also use technology that enables them to analyse drug finds and to investigate confiscated mobile phone data. All of these measures are an improvement on past practice and have made a significant contribution to reducing contraband items within the establishment. Furthermore, in several interviews, staff suggested that working in a more targeted way, using intelligence-led interventions, was proving positive for fostering positive relationships with prisoners, resulting in a better, safer environment for everyone:
We’ve got a good relationship with the guys [prisoners], that’s what we go around and do, a lot of cell searching on an intel base, we don’t go ‘willy nilly’. (Staff)

As well as searches of prisoners, staff are now subject to more stringent and systematic searches as they enter and leave the prison. Although for some this was frustrating due to the time it could sometimes take to get into and out of work (similar to comments made by visitors), overall, this was seen by all those who were interviewed as a positive procedural process. The necessity of this was also highlighted, with some staff acknowledging that a small number of staff could be involved in bringing in restricted items, including drugs.

Staff members commented that the searching of staff on a regular basis has acted as a deterrent and while they acknowledged that during busy times you might not be searched, the chance that you could be is enough to deter staff:

[I]f there is corruption there, one of the ways to help reduce it or stop it, is to put that search in place because […] even the random side of things, puts that doubt into their head as to whether they will get searched or not. So it’s a deterrent, a massive deterrent (Staff).

Staff also discussed the use of dogs, and commented that these should be used more routinely, but understood that this was often not possible due to the dogs not being deployed solely at Holme House. The use of sniffer dogs for alerting staff to drugs was discussed by some of the visitors, but because they had noticed that the dogs were not used consistently, they questioned the efficacy of this approach:

They do have sniffer dogs occasionally when you’re waiting in the queue but it’s not all the time (Visitor).

Well it’s a bit of a joke really because they use the dogs but then if it gets busy and it’s getting late, they stop using the dogs halfway through (Visitor).

Other changes in procedural practices include the photocopying of mail (prisoners receive the photocopy rather than the original) and limiting personal belongings that prisoners are allowed to bring into the prison. Due to the practice of impregnating paper with NPS, the procedure of photocopying mail was considered by those who took part in the study, to be one of the main ways of disrupting the supply of this substance entering the prison:

I think, because they’ve started photocopying the mail, you’re not getting the problems with the spice coming in. (Staff)

They’ve stopped 90 per cent coming through, by photocopying letters etc., but they will never stop all of it. That 90 per cent has made a difference. (Prisoner)

Prisoners no longer receive original cards, pictures and photographs sent to them by family and friends — this was described by the prisoners spoken to as limiting access to family and friends.

Prisoners compared their experiences in HM Prison Holme House with that of other prisons and the current levels of security. The deterrents discussed above — the body scanner in prisoner reception and the photocopying of mail — were identified as the two major differences in relation to security; they then attributed these measures to contributing to the reduction in the supply of drugs in HM Prison Holme House.

Despite the acknowledgement that the photocopying of mail had restricted the drug supply, the prisoners also discussed the negative impact of this new security measure on their daily lives. Prisoners no longer receive original cards, pictures and photographs sent to them by family and friends — this was described by the prisoners spoken to as limiting access to family and friends, particularly with regard to cards and pictures that children may have made. Photocopying was also raised as an issue by visitors to the prison, not only due to lack of original correspondence, and the cost of alternatives, such as using an online card service (e.g. moonpig.com, funky pigeon.com) where the expense of using these services can be difficult for families on limited budgets, but also in relation to the time-lag of writing and prisoners receiving the post, and for one visitor, this has resulted in her stopping writing:

Letters have to be photocopied and he gets the photocopy but that can take three weeks, so I don’t bother. It’s not right. (Visitor)
As described in the findings, the reduction in personal belongings appeared to be a positive step in reducing supply of drugs, visitors raised concern about their friend or family member's access to clean clothes. The men are only able to purchase goods through the approved supplier, but this can be prohibitively expensive for some and could have a negative impact on the person's well-being and self-esteem.

Discussion

The findings of this study suggest that the new security measures that have been implemented since the establishment of the DRP are perceived to have been successful in reducing the quantities of illicit drugs entering the prison, resulting in a perceived decline in personal risk. This perception is supported by the data from the Ministry of Justice that clearly demonstrates a reduction in finds, and a reduction in positive MDT's. This is a crucial step in HMP Holme House's endeavour to bring about a positive change in the prison environment in order to promote a recovery-focused approach to drug rehabilitation. As positive as these results are the 2020 HM Inspectorate report36 noted how the reduction in drug finds, had also coincided with an increase in finds of illicit alcohol within the prison.

In 2019 the Government announced £100m to increase security in prisons including a number of measures that have been used in HMP Holme House.37 In 2020 HM Inspectorate stated that the funding had been used effectively to improve the prisoner's outcomes and this included the use of searching, technology and control of goods coming in. However, whilst it appeared that the technology was successful in detecting contraband, there was also a suggestion by participants, particularly staff, that further training on staff awareness and use of the scanner could result in more contraband being found. This supports the suggestion in the Prison Drug Strategy (2019) that staff awareness and staff training both contribute to restricting drug supplies entering the prison.

It is important to state that staff training should go further than the use of the security systems and needs to engage with the concept of procedural justice. As described by Mann, specialist staff training in procedurally just process can help foster relationships and garner understanding between staff and prisoners. From the findings it was clear that the staff on the DCRU team were selected for these roles based on previous experience and have received the specialist training.

Staff explained that these searches are only carried out based on intelligence and not, as one participant phrased it ‘willy nilly’. Whilst this may be the case, these searches can cause tensions as the perception from some of the men was that sometimes individuals are targeted based on hearsay, rather than legitimate authority based on intelligence. Striking the balance between security and decency is not easy and a lack of information about the role of the DCRU and how it operates can result in the men feeling victimised. Cell searches and searching of individuals, for whatever reason, can raise tensions but sharing information clearly and regularly about the process of searching individuals and cells, could reduce some of the negative perceptions from prisoners.

Conclusions

The study was designed to explore the perception of the men, staff and visitors on the use of increased security measures within the DRP and to understand key stakeholder views about how these have succeeded in the aim to reduce the drug supply into the prison. The study findings revealed that the participants strongly perceived that the changes in security measures had led to a decrease in the availability of drugs within the prison, which in turn has led to a more positive environment, with fewer instances of disruption to the regime. Having an environment that has less erratic and violent behaviour will hopefully open up more opportunities to implement the third element of the Prison Drug Strategy41, building an environment that supports and fosters recovery. Overall, the presence of the scanners and the photocopying of mail appears to be the most successful in both detection and deterrence of contraband entering the prison, however this was not always well received. The men and their visitors appeared to understand the need for these security measures, however they discussed ways that these can impact negatively on their daily lives. In conclusion, the new security measures implemented as part of the Drug Recovery Prison appear to have had a positive impact in the prison and this is evident in both the Ministry of Justice statistical information and the qualitative data from this study.

Acknowledgements

38. HMP Holme House inspection report (2020) see note 25.
40. Mann (2019) see note 33.
42. Thank you to Mike Wheatley and Rachel Moore for facilitating this study.
Effective police and prison collaboration

Jason Hogg is the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police. He is interviewed by Paul Crossey, Deputy Governor at HMP The Mount.

As Deputy Chief Constable, Jason Hogg is responsible for the three counties of Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire. Jason joined Thames Valley Police in June 2016 as an Assistant Chief Constable (Crime and Criminal Justice) before moving to be the Chief Officer lead for the South East Counter Terrorism Unit and Regional Organised Crime Unit.

Jason previously worked for Hampshire Constabulary where he held a number of roles as a Chief Superintendent including Head of Crime and Head of Prevention and Neighbourhoods. He started his police career at Cleveland Police in 1995 before transferring to Hampshire in 2001.

Jason has spent most of his career working in Criminal Investigation roles, serving as a Detective in every rank. He spent a significant part of his career investigating homicide offences and has delivered training on the National Senior Investigation Officer (SIO) development programme. During his career Jason has been on extended secondments with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) working overseas in Iraq. He is currently the National Policing lead for a number of areas including Prisons, Lifetime offender Management and Detective Resilience.

The interview took place in June 2020.

PC: What do you most enjoy about your work and how does it compare to other areas of policing?

JH: As the Deputy Chief Constable for Thames Valley Police, I act as Chief Operating Officer for a £450 million organisation and all the diversity that comes with such a large organisation. My role is to ensure that our front line teams are making a difference, keeping our communities safe and working hard internally to provide appropriate support to our those staff. I value that no day is ever the same in this role. As the National Policing Lead for Prisons, I enjoy building close working relationships with Her Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS) and giving a voice for policing in prison settings. I also enjoy acting as an advocate for the HMPPS in liaising with Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners, with a view to increasing awareness about some of the challenges HMPPS faces and establishing what the Police can do to assist.

PC: Leaving aside the Coronavirus pandemic, could you describe the relationship between HMPPS and the Police? How has this changed in recent times?

JH: I understand that in the past, at times there was a somewhat tense relationship between the Police and HMPPS. I have heard stories of meetings between Home Office and Ministry of Justice officials and ministers, where the Police and HMPPS have turned on each other to blame each other for issues and problems. I have received feedback that relationships in general have improved significantly. I would now describe the relationship as having a significant degree of trust and understanding, at a senior level, between the Police and HMPPS. I now regularly receive telephone calls from somewhere in HMPPS around a particular difficulty that the local police force might be able to assist with. I think that overall, the relationship is as good as it ever has been.

PC: What has been the impact on this relationship and your work during the current Coronavirus pandemic?

JH: I believe that COVID-19 has seen limited impact on the relationship between HMPPS and the Police so far. Although prisons on an individual basis have had to significantly change how they work, there have been very few people being sentenced to custody through the impact of the pandemic on courts. This has allowed us the opportunity during this time, to work in the background on improving our outcomes as a partnership. Personally, I have been involved with the National Criminal Justice System Gold group, which is chaired by HMPPS, and my team have been active in working with Prisons and Probation on the End of Custody Temporary Release (ECTR) scheme, which focused on delivering early release plans to decant prisoners from custody who were coming to the end of their sentences. The good relationships that we have built in the preceding years have provided the foundation to allow us to work effectively together on this project, and in particular I was able to represent the views of local police forces at an early stage of the concept. The final model that was agreed on and implemented, from a policing perspective, was sound including the relevant checks, balances and risk
management around early release, and ensured that local forces could effectively manage those people in the community.

The pandemic has caused some tensions and stresses with other partners besides HMPPS, but reflecting on the work we are engaged in with HMPPS, I do not believe there will be a long-term negative impact. All parties will have to develop different ways of working in the medium to long term, and potentially there may be discussions to be had around the size of the prison population in response to the pandemic. Nationally, a number of police forces have been using the lockdown period to solve historic crime. For example, my own police force have significantly increased the arrest rate during lockdown, mainly due to officers being able to locate suspects much easier than before. As these cases progress forward through the justice system, that is likely to create further pressure for the prison service. It is therefore strategically important to ensure that each agency’s efforts are joined up and there is mutual understanding of the impacts on each other. This is applicable to either releasing prisoners early or having more or fewer prisoners in custody.

PC: The level of assaults against prison staff is very concerning. In a number of cases, prisoners appear to be engaging in these acts as a means to an end, rather than a targeted attack based on a specific grievance. What is being done in HMPPS to assist successful prosecutions in these circumstances and are prosecutions a meaningful deterrent?

JH: There is a significant challenge within prisons around the extent of violence and violent offences are at an all-time high. From the figures that I have seen there has been a more than 50 per cent increase in assaults on prison officers over the last three years. I think this is something we should all be concerned about not just those working within the prison sector because there are significant risks for the whole of the criminal justice system being undermined.

There are two key areas of work in relation to this. Firstly, in relation to assaults on prison officers, there are parallels with policing. Three or four years ago the attitude of police forces towards officers being assaulted was ‘it’s just part of the job’. However, as a result of pressure and complaints from the police federation, forces now deal with assaults on officers much more seriously. We have developed a national seven-point plan about the minimum level of service an officer who is assaulted should expect to receive. I have shared this plan with HMPPS colleagues who have now developed and recently published an eight-point plan for HMPPS. I think HMPPS need to develop a culture whereby assaulting a prison officer is viewed as totally unacceptable and when it does occur, to ensure that the ‘wrap-around’ support is in place. I am not suggesting that policing has necessarily got everything right, especially when you consider the media reports highlighting the significant increase of assaults on police officers as a result of the pandemic lockdown. However, I do believe that the mind-set within forces in relation to officers who are assaulted has changed and that police officers now receive a better service than in the past.

Secondly, in relation to the wider issue of violence in prisons in general, a Crime in Prisons Protocol was agreed in 2019 between the CPS, the Police Service and HMPPS. This protocol sets out minimum standards about the types of crime police forces should investigate and which cases the CPS should be taking to court. I am very confident that when partners at a local level follow the guidance in that document, violence within prisons will undoubtedly be prioritised and will receive a more consistent service, with more offenders being brought to justice.

Clearly, for this to be a deterrent the outcome needs to be effective. Previously, what we found anecdotally is that there were some individual prisons that were over reporting crimes to the police, some of which could have been dealt with far more effectively through the adjudication system. For example, if somebody is already serving a long sentence, then spending time, resources and money through the police, CPS and court services, to secure a small number of days added to a sentence, would have a limited impact. However, we have also noted prisons who report very little crime to the police, quite possibly because of a lack of confidence based on the service they have received in the past. I believe there needs to be a deterrent and I think it’s important, especially for more serious offences, that there is a clear sanction.

The pandemic has caused some tensions and stresses with other partners besides HMPPS, but reflecting on the work we are engaged in with HMPPS, I do not believe there will be a long-term negative impact.
through action taken internally by the prison service or by the police. Prisoners who seriously assault prison officers should expect to be charged and receive substantial sentences regardless.

**PC:** The government has pledged £100 million to improve prison security, most notably by introducing airport style screening processes in a number of prisons. In your view will this have an impact on security, crime and the illicit economy and what more needs to be done?

**JH:** It will undoubtedly assist in this area and I am very confident that, with the right funding, many of the routes by which contraband enters prisons could be ‘designed out’. Clearly, the measures proposed will act as a deterrent and make it more difficult for, for example, visitors smuggling contraband into prisons. However, we know that prisoners are remarkably innovative when it comes to servicing the illicit economy and very effective at exploiting any vulnerability in the system. Therefore, we need to ensure for all agencies involved, that we have a dynamic, ongoing plan to quickly address emerging trends as prisoners find ways of working around the new security measures.

Remaining one-step ahead is a challenge but is not all about money. Even though I think with appropriate funding we could design out a majority of the issues, it is also about getting the basics right. In 2019 we published a report of best practice as a result of findings from the Drugs Task Force that visited prisons across the estate. The task force included a senior police officer seconded in to offer expert advice. For example, ensuring routine searching, joint operations with local police forces, sharing of visitor lists between the police and prisons and the examination of mobile telephone data to understand the criminal networks that are in operation, could all assist in us jointly using our resources more effectively and significantly impacting the supply of contraband. A good example of this was a prison that had agreed with a local police force to routinely park a police car outside the prison at visiting times. This car did not need to have an officer present, however, they did find that the number of visitors that arrived against those planned dropped between a third and half. After considering all other factors, they concluded that by that one car being there they reduced the number of attempts at trafficking with nil cost. I think that overall by having close working relationships with individual police forces and individual prisons, we can make a difference without significant costs, just by working together more effectively.

**PC:** Serious and organised criminals use mobile phones, money service businesses and corrupt staff amongst other techniques to continue their criminality whilst in custody. Considering the challenges of maintaining the basic fabric of some sites, do HMPPS and the Police have the technical capability, flexibility and funding to meet this evolving challenge in prisons?

**JH:** I am unable to go into significant levels of detail, however, there have been significant strides ahead and enhancements within HMPPS around how serious organised crime is tackled. We now have the HMPPS Serious and Organised Crime Teams (SOC) in place across the country, with specialist capability in a number of areas such as financial investigation. Those HMPPS SOC teams align with the nine regional police Regional Organised Crime units which assist partnership working at a local level. Furthermore, within the last twelve months we have signed a new memorandum of understanding around corruption cases and intelligence including how intelligence is shared between the police and HMPPS and how we work together to manage corruption. Those two things in themselves are leading to a much more joined up approach in how we tackle serious and organised crime linked to the prison estate. I am very confident in terms of progress we have made and certainly some of those cases the teams are starting to resolve.

**PC:** Prison staff corruption can undermine trust from prisoners, colleagues and the public in the effective operation of prisons. What more can be done to protect vulnerable staff and deter or catch those determined to engage in misconduct in this way?

**JH:** The relationship between prisoner and prison officer is quite unique and very different from the relationship that police officers have with offenders.

The relationship between prisoner and prison officer is quite unique and very different from the relationship that police officers have with offenders.
It is crucial to take a two-fold approach. Firstly, it is important for good order and discipline that prison officers endeavour to have professional relationships with prisoners, particularly those deemed dangerous.

PC: Given the recent change in legislation to extend the custodial element of terrorism related offences, what work is being undertaken across HMPPS and the Police to prepare for the eventual release of these prisoners?

JH: We have seen several terrorist attacks in recent months linked to prisons or recent prison releases. Counter terrorism work has led to the police, prisons and probation services developing extremely strong links and established working practices. The release of prisoners is managed through the Pathfinder process, which is reviewed every time there is a terrorist incident linked to prisons, to identify learning and how we can develop the system further. However, the main issue is the problems associated with lone actors who present unique challenges and one of the highest risk areas around the terrorism threat. However, I am very confident that there is an absolute commitment to the agencies working together to make ongoing improvements in relation to the pathfinder process.

PC: How should HMPPS respond to the issue of those prisoners who are prepared to become martyrs during violent attacks, potentially whilst in custody, when the basis of good order and discipline in prisons is based on good relationships between staff and prisoners?

JH: It is crucial to take a two-fold approach. Firstly, it is important for good order and discipline that prison officers endeavour to have professional relationships with prisoners, particularly those deemed dangerous. Having those relationships is an opportunity in itself to gather intelligence on prisoner mind-sets and behaviour. Secondly, there is a need to be proactive at gathering intelligence on their backgrounds and associations. We then have a more complete picture of the mind-set and ideology of terrorist prisoners. Clearly, predicting how an individual is going to behave is very difficult and in some ways counter terrorism is no different from other areas such as sex offenders. In reality the people who tend to reoffend and commit further serious offences are not the high-risk individuals. The reason for this is that those high-risk individuals have a significant amount of resources invested in them, providing support and ongoing monitoring. The very serious offences tend to be committed by medium risk offenders and clearly with the resources we have you cannot give the same level of service to every single nominal. Therefore a joint, overt approach and covert approach I described above, is the best way to really understand the mind-set of these individuals.

PC: Thousands of Police officers in the community have been issued with Tasers for over ten years. Based on this experience and recent serious incidents in prisons such as HMP Whitemoor, what are your views on the planned introduction of PAVA spray and rigid bar handcuffs? Would you advocate the use of Tasers in a custodial environment?

JH: It is not appropriate for me to advise HMPPS on what protective measures need to be put in place in individual prisons. However, there is a difficult balance between equipping staff to ensure they are protected...
appropriately, without creating an environment where high levels of force are used routinely. Any increase in the levels of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or protective measures need to be matched by ongoing governance of use of force to make sure confidence is retained in the individual prison and the system. When it comes to Tasers, despite what we often see on social media, their actual use is surprisingly rare by the police. In the majority of occasions where it is used, the officer points it at someone and never actually deploys it, yet that remains an effective deterrent in itself. I could envisage a Taser being used in an extreme case on a single violent offender and that's where it tends to be effective. However, that would need to be considered very carefully because of the risks involved in effectively having weapons within the prison estate.

PC: Sexual assaults that occur in prisons could well be one of the most underreported crimes in prisons. Given the difficulty of prosecuting sexual crimes in the public and the 'prisoner code' of not informing or appearing to be 'weak', how can prisons best support potential victims?

JH: I think there may be some learning from the police service. The police approach to managing offences of rape and other sexual offences has developed significantly in the last thirty years, based on academic research and insights from organisations who support survivors of abuse. As an example, my own force (Thames Valley) use behavioural economics research to encourage the ongoing engagements of survivors of rape with the police. It is important that we work with support organisations to lead awareness campaigns to improve confidence in reporting sexual offences. We have seen a significant rise in reports of rape across the UK over the last ten years and these reports continue to increase as a result of increased confidence amongst survivors to report those incidents. When there are cases within the custody estate, it is important to publicise clear messaging to demonstrate what will happen when someone does report an incident. I think using those cases for ongoing communication and publicity is really important to help build that confidence.

PC: The police are recruiting intensely to meet targets set by the prime minister on officer numbers and anecdotally a number of prison officers are leaving to take up these roles. What can the prison service learn from the police to help recruit and retain our staff?

JH: I think that it is fair to say that the Police Service does not have a problem recruiting sufficient numbers of officers. Most forces will open their recruitment windows for a short space of time and regularly receive ten to twenty times the number of applications that are needed to fill vacancies. The challenge the police have is recruiting people who are representative of local communities. A number of police forces are sending dedicated teams of officers into some of our most diverse communities and building greater trust, encouraging people to apply, putting positive action measures in place and providing more support to applicants from BAME backgrounds to help them through the application process. That is showing some early signs of being effective. There are some communities that are hard to reach and we have to invest resources and work harder if we really do want a representative workforce.

A far bigger challenge than recruitment in the police is retention. Police officers gain highly marketable skills as part of their training, which can encourage them to consider other professions. Therefore, it is ever more important, not just in policing but in the wider public sector, to create an organisation where people feel valued at work. Everybody joins the police service or the prison service because they want to make a difference and make society a better place. I believe that it is important to keep reminding people of this and make sure people feel recognised, thanked for their work, that there's proper training, personal protection, flexible working opportunities and ongoing career prospects. There is a great deal of research, which highlights the value of giving people a sense of autonomy in the work place as well as opportunities to develop their career. This certainly applies in the public sector, where sadly our pay is not what it is in the private sector, therefore we need to work hard at retaining our staff by making sure that the working environment is supportive and people are given development opportunities.

PC: In February 2020 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) said the public is increasingly losing confidence in reporting crime to the police.

as they struggle to investigate all crimes. Is this the case for prisoners and staff in custody or are there differences?

JH: The recently developed HMPPS Crime Data tracker will provide more accurate statistics to address this issue. However, anecdotal data suggests that there is significant disparity in the reported crimes from individual Prisons. I believe that results from a mixture of some over reporting of crime that could be more effectively dealt with via internal means using the adjudication system, and a lack of confidence in the police and CPS being able to produce results when crimes are reported. That is why the Crime in Prison Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was agreed in 2019 is so important. I am confident that if individual prisons and police forces follow the principals of that MOU, it will significantly improve the issue around consistency. We already know what works and best practice in this field include those police forces that: have dedicated crime surgeries on a regular basis; meetings between dedicated prison staff and investigators who understand how to investigate crime in prisons; ensuring workloads are regularly reviewed; assessments are made about how to make referrals; victims receive regular updates; and any issues around prisoner transfers and prison officer statements are addressed.

PC: Professor Dame Carol Black’s recent report suggested that the illegal drug supply cost the UK £20 billion with only a small fraction of that spent on treatment and prevention. She suggested that enforcement activity can have unintended consequences. Is there more that could be done by enforcement in prisons and is there anything prisons can learn from the police and wider community to help prevent illegal drug supply and demand in prisons?

JH: HMPPS staff often tell me that drugs are the root cause of the violence in prisons. We know that 20 per cent of prisoners who have random drug tests test positive and approximately some prisoners report leaving the prison estate with a drug problem. At the same time drug seizures in Prisons (prior to COVID) the highest that it has been since records began. Across government and the effected agencies there is an increasing appreciation that prosecution as a sole solution, will not work to tackle the problem of drugs. Dame Carol Black’s report discusses how the importance of more investment in treatment and recovery, in line with the Government’s Drug Strategy, will reduce the need for enforcement and supply. Within police forces there is a greater emphasis on a public health-based approach to drug possession. My own force, Thames Valley Police, are part of an initiative where we do not arrest individuals who are found in possession of drugs, including class A drugs, and instead divert them to a health-based drug advisory service. I would encourage a similar approach within prisons. The clear aim for prisoners to stop taking drugs and we need to be open to any approach that is effective in making this happen. I feel that a health-based alternative is more likely to be more effective in the long term. I believe enforcement will always have a role because there will always be some people who are not prepared to be helped and it is important to restrict the supply by targeting those smuggling drugs into prison.

PC: In his last annual report, the chief inspector of prisons said that ‘last year...too many of our prisons had become unacceptably violent and dangerous places. The situation has not improved — in fact it has become worse’. What are the key solutions to the prison crisis and can we learn anything from policing? Are the solutions financial, strategic or moral?

JH: Many of the prison officers I speak to would agree with the findings from the chief inspector of prisons around prisons being violent places to work in. There are no easy solutions to this and there is no one thing that would solve the problem. Firstly, I believe that with appropriate funding we could design out some of the violent behaviour. Secondly, I think there needs to be a way of controlling the extent of the violence so that prison officers have the time and space to focus on the rehabilitation of offenders. If that is not possible, prison officers will spend their time fire-fighting

There are no easy solutions to this and there is no one thing that would solve the problem. Firstly, I believe that with appropriate funding we could design out some of the violent behaviour.

demands, dealing with drugs and violence constantly. There is an issue about the wider criminal justice system being undermined if violence is allowed to continue unchecked. We cannot prosecute our way out of this problem and often these offenders are already serving long sentences.

However, targeting police action can help. For example, in the South West region there was a particular problem of prisoners carrying weapons. By utilising the Crime in Prison Protocol, that issue became a local priority for individual prisons in that region. The local police force(s) prioritised investigating those cases where prisoners were found in possession of weapons which lead to a decrease in violence in those prisons because prisoners knew with certainty that they would face swift punishment if they were caught. This approach was effective because it was used in a more focussed way on investigating priority crimes, rather than trying to investigate all crimes of violence.

More widely, the main learning from the police approach towards managing violence in our communities, is an offender management approach and in particular our dedicated offender managers managing our high-risk offenders. We have become better at predicting the times and places where violence occurs and identifying those individuals that pose the most risk in terms of violence. I am aware that this happens in prisons already, but it is crucial to invest in improving understanding of prisoners who are likely to behave in a violent way and having more bespoke plans that prevent violence occurring.

PC: The Lammy review pointed to evidence that safety in prison and reoffending rates can be improved if all prisoners feel that they are being treated fairly. How can we improve trust in prisons for BAME prisoners in light of the issues surrounding the Black Lives Matter protests?

JH: This is a significant challenge not just for HMPPS or the Police but also wider agencies across the nation. Firstly, we need to ensure that we are representative of the communities we serve. There is a great deal of research that links trust and confidence in public sector organisations and with levels of representation. People need to look at the police or the prison service and see themselves represented there to have confidence that they will be treated fairly. That requires a great deal of proactive work. In policing, initiatives over the last 20 years to support this have not delivered the progress we would have liked, so we need to be more innovative in finding different ways to encourage more applicants from some of our more diverse communities.

Secondly, it is important that we develop the independent scrutiny of our processes, policies and working practices. It is not only important that these independent advisory groups are in place, but also that they are made up of the right people. This means they need to be both representative and have the voice of lived experience, which includes ex-offenders. Progress in this area is being made, but it is slow. Those of us in leadership roles across the agencies need to work a harder at this challenge. I think that the Black Lives Matter protests are both a challenge and an opportunity for us as a catalyst to do something different to make sure we are representative of our local communities and provide a fair and equitable service to all.
Introduction
The experience of anti-corruption interventions the world over is that an incorrect diagnosis leads to an inadequate response. Prisons, in the UK and elsewhere, are ideal environments for corruption to thrive. Yet there is little available research or literature on the nature, extent and prevalence of corruption in prisons. Where there have been studies, references to corruption have usually been a minor part of works whose primary focus is elsewhere. On the specific subject of corruption, the focus has generally not been on corrupt staff, although a classic corruption analysis would show them as high risk. Other corruption risks also exist in the prisons environment, such as within procurement, and it is possible that these risks have been compounded by performance management KPIs and aspects of privatisation.

In the UK, the Government and relevant authorities appear until very recently to have neglected the level and seriousness of the risk. The situation is likely to be improving, but significant corruption risks still exist within the UK prisons system. Despite the paucity of data and information, there are identifiable research needs and a requirement for a research community to be pro-actively developed around this issue. Having reviewed the available literature and data, this paper concludes with nine proposed research areas and six policy recommendations to ameliorate the corruption that exists today within the UK prisons system.

The extent to which the UK prison system suffers from corruption has been a subject of debate, and not consensus, both inside and outside the prison system. The leaked findings of a 2006 Metropolitan police report on prison staff corruption, claiming that there were at least 1,000 corrupt prison staff working within the prison estate, received a divided reaction from officials. Although the debate has continued, there has been very little analytical deliberation, such that policy makers have not much better access to evidence today than they had in 2006.

A conventional approach to analysing corruption in any sector would be to ask some basic questions:
- What form or forms does the corruption take?
- What is the scale and prevalence of the problem?
- What is the harm and who are the victims?
- What measures have been taken to prevent or detect the corruption?
- How successful have those measures been?

It is not possible to provide answers to any of these fundamental questions in relation to prisons within the UK. Although it is not uncommon for there to be an absence of data when analysing corruption, it is unusual not to be able to answer any of these questions in a high-risk sector.

In the absence of data or evidence about corruption itself, a common approach is to look at corruption risk. This would address the question ‘how likely is it that corruption will be occurring?’

A typology of how corruption occurs in a given sector or setting can typically be constructed from known cases, and the risks can be analysed both individually and in aggregate, with mitigation, prevention, detection and enforcement strategies designed to reduce the risks to acceptable levels. But as with corruption analysis, there is also a paucity of information with regard to corruption risk analysis in relation to prisons.

This does not mean that it is not possible to research corruption in prisons. There is scope for qualitative and quantitative data collection; for example, by way of surveys or one-on-one interviews with key actors in

1. This paper is based on the Masters dissertation submitted in 2019 by Jack Silverman as part of the Masters in Corruption & Governance at the University of Sussex.
2. Produced by the Metropolitan Police and Prison Service’s anti-corruption unit.
4. Although many reports in this study refer to England & Wales, the same lack of information applies to the other parts of the UK. There is no obvious reason why the analysis and conclusions should not relate to Scotland, although Northern Ireland may be an exception due to the particular circumstances and historical background of the province.
establishments. These data may elicit knowledge based on perceptions or experience and although corruption is an activity, often a crime, that takes place out of the public eye, and it is in the interests of all parties involved to keep it secret, such obstacles to research have been overcome in other areas. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the subject matter of corruption in prisons to arise as part of research exercises not directly on this topic.  

This situation is not unique to the UK. The literature regarding corruption in prisons is extremely sparse, and has focussed primarily on the US and Australia, as well as some extreme examples such as Abu Ghraib.

This is all the more striking because at face value, it might be expected that prisons are not only at risk of corruption, but in a particularly high-risk category. They are institutions whose population contains a significant number of people convicted of criminal offenses, often with internal and external links to organised crime. They are closed worlds with little continuous external scrutiny. The staff are often poorly-paid, whereas some of those imprisoned have considerable assets. The exercise of power is a daily reality, and therefore the abuse of power is a daily possibility. The internal sub-rosa economy has a demand for supply from the external economy, but a very small number of potential supply points. It is hard to envisage that there could be more fertile conditions for corruption to thrive, and indeed in both factual and fictional accounts of life in prison, corruption is accepted as a daily reality.

It is a plausible hypothesis that one of the principle reasons for the lack of research in this area is the lack of sympathy for the victims. Those who research corruption in healthcare, or education, or the police, can demonstrate the wider harm that is done and the damage and injustice for the victims among general populations or vulnerable groups. In the case of prisons, there is no generally accepted narrative about the external damage that is done by corruption that takes place within the prison system. The closest in the UK context is perhaps the national Anti-Corruption Strategy, which states:  

‘Corruption has the potential to weaken critical state functions like our border controls and prison system — allowing criminality and corrupt insiders to operate unfettered, and to undermine our attempts to reform individuals. Corruption in prisons allows criminality to proliferate (including serious organised crime) and thereby not only undermines safety and security in prisons but also our efforts to reform prisons and rehabilitate offenders.’

Within prisons, as in any community, there are of course both victims and perpetrators of corruption: in this case among the 80,422 prisoners in the UK prison estate, plus around 36,000 staff. In circumstances where the family members of prisoners may also be implicated in corruption, they too can be considered as potential victims — not least as involvement in corrupt act may be a means of protecting their imprisoned friend or family member — although they are more usually viewed as perpetrators. Little has been heard of the voices of victims of corruption within prisons, and there is a little indication that even if the voices were heard telling a message of serious harm done by corruption to the prison population, there would be much response.

Sources of information

There are four broad types of source material for analysing corruption in prisons:

5. For example, during the third author’s ethnographic research on family contact in prisons and a recent project on communication practices in the prison environment.
10. A fuller literature review on Corruption and UK Prisons is available in the CSC working paper Corruption in UK Prisons (2020) https://www.sussex.ac.uk/research/centres/centre-for-study-of-corruption/research
i. Studies of corruption, governance and integrity, which might be extrapolated to prisons; these would include both general studies, and studies of sectors that might be considered to be analogous; examples are the work on institutional integrity by Paul Heywood, or articles on corruption in the police.

ii. Studies and reports of other aspects of prisons, in which corruption is a minor or incidental part, even if its importance is acknowledged; examples would be the Blakey report, Jamie Bennett’s book *The Working Lives of Prison Managers*, the Ministry of Justice report of 2016 into *Prison Safety and Reform*, and the Policy Exchange ‘Coming Clean’ report of 2010.

iii. Technical guidance notes and plans on corruption in relation to prisons issued by relevant authorities; examples are the HMPPS Framework of 2019, the NOMS Instructions of 2016 and the UK’s Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-22.

iv. Studies or reports specifically of corruption in prisons. In this last category, there is a notable absence of not only academic literature, but any literature at all, and in particular in relation to UK prisons.

The only report that definitively covers UK prisons in a corruption context is a section of the Transparency International report titled ‘Corruption in the UK: Assessment of Key Sectors’. However, this report is now 9 years old, and therefore does not reflect recent changes.


The article by Katie Fish, with contributions from Phil Wheatley and Mark Pyman, on the *Curbing Corruption* website gives a good overview of research to date, collated by experts in the field of corruption. It draws on a key text by the Australian researchers Goldsmith, Halsey and Groves, whose 2016 volume *Tackling Correctional Corruption: An Integrity Promoting Approach*, introduces an approach called ‘correctional integrity’. The work attempts to fill many of the gaps highlighted in this paper, for example in establishing a language and typology for corruption in prisons. Although the principle focus is Australia, the work also encompasses the US and the UK.

The same authors have put together an extremely helpful ‘Literature Review: Correctional Corruption — Final Report Prepared for Queensland Corrective Services’ published in 2018. This is the fullest available bibliography of corruption in prisons.

Regarding the UK specifically, apart from the 2011 Transparency International report, the only available

---


corruption in prisons. 

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), which has within its remit both the secretariat to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the lead on organised crime, has published practical guidance on how to address corruption in prisons. Drafted by John Podm ore and published in 2017, it is the most comprehensive practical guidance available.

Although it is common for the papers above to bemoan how little research there is on corruption in prisons, it is encouraging that the situation has been improving. A picture of corruption in prisons is gradually taking shape. It is not a big community of researchers, but one that exists. There is a great deal of first-hand experience, particularly from former prison governors. However, the considerable corruption expertise that lies with both academics and practitioners in other sectors and fields has not to date been brought to bear on prisons.

**Official definitions of corruption in the UK prison system**

Building a sensible response to corruption in any sector requires an understanding of what is meant by corruption. This is typically achieved through a generic definition, supported by some sort of typology, illustrated with examples or case studies. There is as yet no global consensus on what this looks like for prisons.

Most usefully, in the absence of an established typology, is the categorisation of five ‘harmful practices’ in correctional settings from Goldsmith _et al._

- Inappropriate relationships
- Trafficking of contraband
- Assaults, use of force and control
- Misuses of prisoner information
- Procurement.

Efforts have also been made by the relevant authorities in the UK to establish a working definition. The current definition of corruption in HMPPS’s 2019 ‘Counter Corruption and Reporting Wrongdoing Framework’ is ‘a person in a position of authority or trust who abuses their position for benefit or gain for themselves or another person.’

This builds on the 2016 guidance note for ‘staff in prisons and headquarters’:

‘Corruption occurs when a person in a position of authority or trust abuses their position for their or another person’s benefit or gain. In NOMS, this would include the misuse of their role in order to plan or commit a criminal act, or a deliberate failure to act to prevent criminal behaviour’. This includes *actual or attempted conveying of restricted items into prisons, aiding escape, unauthorised disclosure of information, accepting or seeking bribes, inappropriate relationships, blackmail, taking or seeking money or other favours for commercial purposes, for moving or reclassifying prisoners, or theft of prisoner’s money or property.*

Almost identical is the NOMS Instruction of 2016 for the Probation Service — the variances are italicised in each version — which states:

‘Corruption occurs when a person in a position of authority or trust abuses their position for their or another person’s benefit or gain.’


27. Italics highlights by the authors, not in original
another person’s benefit or gain. In NOMS, this would include the misuse of their role in order to plan or commit a criminal act, or a deliberate failure to act to prevent criminal behaviour. Examples of corruption include (but are not limited to) unauthorised or improper drafting and amending of all reports, records and licence conditions, unauthorised disclosure of information, accepting or seeking bribes, inappropriate relationships, blackmail, taking or seeking money or other favours for any reason, or theft of money or property. These disparities in the two NOMS instructions can be seen as an attempt to tailor the definition to different audiences. However, the result is two definitions that are each complex, do not precisely match, and may therefore muddy an already complicated subject. The potential for confusion at this level — two slightly varying definitions within the same organisation — would usually be avoided in anti-corruption approaches, and in some organisations might be indicative of a turf war. Notwithstanding the variances, the two NOMS definitions and the HMPPS definition are broadly in line with standard definitions, including that of Transparency International cited in the UK’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy: ‘There is no universally accepted definition of corruption, but it is generally understood to involve the abuse of office and position to benefit a third party (an individual, business or other organisation), in return for payment or other reward. These features are captured in Transparency International’s definition: ‘the misuse of entrusted power for personal gain.’

The HMPPS Framework of 2019 goes on to elaborate on its definition by stating that, ‘abusing their position’ may include acting in a way that constitutes a breach in their official duties. This importantly clarifies that turning a blind eye to corruption issues still constitutes a corruption offence. The ‘benefit or gain’ section of the definition relates to sexual, financial, emotional or other personal gains that can occur within the prison environment.

This HMPPS definition further notes that staff may be encouraged to act in a corrupt manner based on causes they consider noble — in other words, corruption by prison staff would not necessarily need to be for personal gain. These noble causes refer to officers breaking the rules and committing acts of corruption for reasons that they perceive to be ‘right’. This has been a long-standing theme of literature in relation to police corruption. Whatever the motivation, acts of corruption remain illegal and damaging. The NOMS Instruction of 2016 is clear on this: ‘Corruption, as defined in this Instruction, will not be tolerated no matter what the form or the motivation.’

The two NOMS Instructions of 2016 both contain the same annex with twenty-two examples of what constitutes corruption. By the HMPPS Framework of 2019, this had been reduced to ten. Taken together, these three documents tell an interesting story. There is a genuine attempt to fill the gaps in defining corruption, describing the risks and creating an adequate management system. Clear progress is made between 2016 and 2019.

However, the documents are complex and look as though they would be hard to use in practice. They give the impression that they have been generated by an institution that is used to procedural thoroughness, extensive cross-referencing, and thinking hard about how to reduce the possibility of things going wrong by putting in place extensive systems and detailed instructions. Perhaps most notably, the documents incorporate several ingredients from good practice approaches to anti-corruption compliance in other sectors, but ultimately read as though they are quite divorced from those settings.

What is also very unclear is whether they are built on a base of evidence about the types, scale and...
prevalence of corruption in prisons. If the evidence does exist somewhere within the prison service, it has certainly never been published.

**Staff corruption as a contraband trafficking route**

Most of the rare independent research into prison corruption assumes that staff corruption in relation to contraband is an important part of the picture. By contrast, analyses of contraband trafficking have tended not to highlight corrupt prison staff or ascribe them a primary role as a trafficking route. This is distinctly counter-intuitive from the perspective of anti-corruption theory as the classic conditions for staff corruption exist: low-paid, de-motivated and poorly-valued public officials (prison officers and civilian staff) who are in a position of considerable discretion (their daily interactions with prisoners) that enables them to offer an advantage (access to drugs). To compound this, in recent years the privatisation of areas of the prisons system (and diminishing pay scales and pension provision) may have led to an environment in which institutional culture and loyalty to the public service ethos might not be expected.

Given what is known from around the world about the corruption risks for public officials, particularly in relation to organised crime, the default assumption might reasonably be that bribery or coercion occurs relatively frequently within prisons. While it is possible that corruption is being deliberately ignored, it is equally possible that researchers and practitioners who are not experts in corruption are paying less attention to a risk to which a corruption researcher would be more immediately drawn.

**Contraband routes**

There is surprisingly little data, or academic literature, on the most widely used routes that either organised crime gangs or individual offenders use to bring in drugs and mobile phones into UK prisons. From the academic literature which is available, the following routes are often highlighted:

- visits from domestic visitors (for example family members) and official visitors (such as legal professionals)
- the exploitation of the prison postal system
- drugs being passed over prison walls, specifically in reference to the use of drones
- new and returning inmates bringing drugs into prisons
- corrupt staff members working within an institution smuggling in contraband.

**Evidence base for prison staff corruption**

The Home Office’s 2005 report, ‘Tackling Prison Drug Markets’ is the only quantitative study to have analysed the different trafficking routes for drugs. The researchers used interviews with 158 ex-prisoners, current prisoners and staff. One interview question asked the interviewees to outline the main smuggling routes that drugs take to get into the prison system. The results of this question are summarised in figure 1.

![Figure 1: Formatted interview results for the question on the most prevalent drug smuggling routes in the Home Office's 2005 study on 'Tackling Prison Drug Markets.'](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237776662_Tackling_Prisons_Drug_Markets_An_Exploratory_Qualitative_Study)

33. Ibid
37. Ibid, Table 2 p. vii
It is notable that 48 per cent of all respondents interviewed named prison staff as the most prevalent route for smuggling drugs, indicating the high likelihood of staff corruption. It is additionally noteworthy that a greater proportion of prison staff (54 per cent) identified their colleagues as the route for the entry of drugs into prisons than prisoners/ex-prisoners who were interviewed (46 per cent). It is not clear what proportion of the sample were serving prisoners, as opposed to those who had been released or what impact this may have had on the data collection process. Moreover, the results relating to other routes might also involve prison staff corruption. All the other routes could be facilitated by prison staff’s active involvement, or indeed passive — turning a blind eye — involvement. However, relying on a one-off study of a difficult population from 2005, which itself may be challenged due to the small sample size, illustrates how little quantitative research is available in this area.

Importantly, despite almost half of all interview respondents notifying staff corruption as a key route of drug supply, the study had no active recommendations on staff corruption and how to counteract this threat.

**An independent perspective**

The potential for prison staff corruption as a route for trafficking drugs was reinforced by the Policy Exchange’s 2010 report on combating drug misuse in prison entitled ‘Coming Clean: combating drug misuse in prisons.’ The report suggests there is an estimated £100 million prison drugs trade annually, and there are on average around seven corrupt prison officials working at every prison — implying that each corrupt member of prison staff is responsible for around £100,000 of the drug markets occurring in UK prisons.

The researchers sent a survey to prisoners questioning what they believed was the main route of drug smuggling. Despite not being one of the options that respondents were asked to score, the results showed that 23 per cent of prisoners questioned claimed that prison officers or civilian staff were the main route for illegal substances to enter prison. The fact that inmates hand-wrote out this answer suggests that had the Policy Exchange included this as an option within the survey they were conducting, then a far greater percentage of respondents may have also given the answer of prison staff.

**The Blakey report**

The government’s primary focus on family visits being the key route of the influx of drugs and contraband, while neglecting the role of corrupt prison staff, is to some extent reflected in David Blakey QC’s government-commissioned 2008 report ‘Disrupting the supply of illicit drugs into prisons.’ This report identifies five routes to trafficking, and places considerable emphasis on the family and friends route. However, he also notes: ‘No one I have spoken to in the course of this Review doubts that staff corruption is a live issue for the Service or that it constitutes a way of getting drugs into prisons. I was particularly impressed by the frank and realistic manner in which Governors spoke to me about this matter. There is a proper debate about the actual level of corruption but I did not encounter the ‘head in the sand’ response that might have been the case in many organisations both now and in the past.’

**The Pentonville scandal 2006**

In 2006, there was a large and costly corruption probe into several prison officers who had allegedly...
trafficked weapons and drugs into HMP Pentonville. Some of these officers had also been accused of having inappropriate relationships with prisoners.\textsuperscript{46}

The governor of the prison, Gary Deighton, chose a group of trusted prison officers to investigate these allegations in what became known as ‘Operation Extract.’ As a result of this investigation, Deighton fired 17 prison officers and suspended 14 other staff members for alleged corruption charges and deemed that there needed to be greater investigation into their potentially corrupt actions. Four senior security officials from four different London prisons were brought in to lead an independent investigation into the suspended prison staff.

The investigation ultimately failed due to mis-handling of confidentiality by one of the investigators. After the investigators speedily concluded their investigation and suggested that 12 of the then 13 suspended officers should be charged with corruption, Deighton — who was put in charge of the disciplinary hearings of the suspended officers — decided to remove 9 of them from their posts and charge the remaining 3 officers.

Out of 31 suspected officers, 28 were therefore fired or removed from their posts and the remaining three were found guilty of corruption charges but later cleared and re-instated. The investigation was deemed a significant failure, as several million pounds had been spent on the investigation and no corruption charges were proven.\textsuperscript{47}

The Pentonville scandal demonstrated the institutional difficulties for the prison service in being able to investigate corruption allegations successfully. All the independent investigators were simultaneously trying to run busy London prisons and a significant corruption investigation. A government internal review of the process concluded the timescale for the investigating officers to compile and write their reports was ‘extremely tight.’ This resulted in the investigators missing their reporting deadline, and not being able to compile enough detailed evidence, with the government’s internal review stating that the intelligence gathered by the investigators had, ‘not met the required burden of proof…if the investigations had been carried out more thoroughly and in greater detail it may have been possible to offset any gaps in the analysis of intelligence.’\textsuperscript{48}

The prison governor, Gary Deighton, was heavily criticised in the internal review on a number of grounds.\textsuperscript{49} The case shows the potential for mishandling by an individual prisoner governor attempting to deal with corruption allegations, and highlights the advantages of having investigations staffed by independent anti-corruption and counter-fraud professionals.

\textbf{Slow progress}

The 2005 Home Office Report, 2006 Pentonville Scandal and 2008 Blakey Report, would seem to have provided the government with evidence both that staff corruption was a problem, and that this needed to be dealt with in a systematic, independent and coordinated way. More than a decade on, this remains the case. The sparse literature on corruption in prisons highlights this risk; the scarcely fuller literature on contraband trafficking tends to highlight areas other than corruption; and there is no sense that corruption amongst prison staff, and in particular systemic or extensive corruption, is an area of focus for the government or prison authorities. While the Pentonville scandal helped make the case for the government to create an independent anti-corruption unit, to succeed, it would need to be a unit that was adequately resourced and had sufficient institutional support.

\textbf{Corruption Prevention Unit(s)}

Although nearly half of all respondents of the Home Office’s 2005 report had named prison staff

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
corruption as a route of drug smuggling, it was not until 2008 that the government created the Corruption Prevention Unit, a body which looked to work alongside the police to identify corrupt prison staff. By contrast, the anti-corruption unit of the Metropolitan Police dates from the early 1990s.

In 2008, Blakey had identified a 5-step approach to tackling staff corruption that was already in operation: “These steps are:

- Identify the extent of the threat
- Improve intelligence
- Implement common standards
- Establish a culture where corruption is not tolerated
- Work closely with other agencies, especially the police.”

He reported that this 5-Step process was being taken forward by the Professional Standards Unit, soon to become the Corruption Prevention Unit. However, two years later, Transparency International was reporting that: ‘In January 2011 after an internal review, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) announced that the Corruption Prevention Unit (CPU) would be subsumed under another branch of the security directorate, and that the post of Head of CPU would be abolished. This left no one with a senior operational background in what was already a very small unit, consisting of a junior prison manager, a seconded police officer and a handful of administrative staff. The CPU’s budget had been significantly reduced since its inception some three years earlier.”

The original budget for the CPU was £700,000, and it consisted of ten staff members. By 2010, the organisation’s employee numbers were halved alongside its budget, meaning that only five full-time staff were looking into staff corruption problems in UK prisons on a meagre budget of £350,000.

What Blakey had identified as a reasonable approach (a CPU underpinned by a 5-step plan) was therefore subject to budget cuts, downgrade in status and institutional change. These were evidently not the conditions for the counter-corruption actions to thrive: there is no publicly-available information on whether the 5-Step approach was evaluated, or how successful it was considered.

Indeed, between the Transparency International report of 2011 and 2017, the formal mechanisms for dealing with corruption in prisons seems to have gone into enforced hibernation due to lack of resources. The national Anti-Corruption Plan of 2014 contained nine paragraphs on corruption in prisons, indicating that the CPU continued to exist, although its only listed task was to manage a network of Regional Corruption Prevention Managers. The Plan’s action for prisons was ‘NOMS to consider the extension of its corruption prevention programme to cover the increasing number of non-directly employed staff delivering custodial services’.

Progress against the Plan was reported formally in May 2016, when not only was this action logged as completed, but in addition NOMS was reported as having issued the 2016 Instruction, and extending its anti-corruption approach to the probation service and non-directly employed (NDE) staff. The inescapable impression is of a small number of dedicated staff battling against the odds with little senior institutional support.

The Plan’s action for prisons was ‘NOMS to consider the extension of its corruption prevention programme to cover the increasing number of non-directly employed staff delivering custodial services’.

---

52. Ibid
54. Ibid, p.32
56. Ibid, Action 13
support; but also of the importance of national-level Plans and Strategies in helping to stimulate and reinforce activity.

Interviewed in 2016, former governor John Podmore said ‘the anti-corruption methods for prisons are incredibly under-resourced’ and ‘the whole thing is a complete dog’s breakfast.’ He told Buzzfeed News that while a governor he ‘didn’t have the resources to investigate corruption so we used to have to find other reasons to sack people’; ‘It isn’t something the prison system is wanting to tackle or recognise.’

By 2017, the government had produced a national Anti-Corruption Strategy, and somewhat out of the blue, prisons appeared as one of four priority areas.

This was followed in 2019 by the creation of a new Counter Corruption Unit, possibly reflecting the Ministry of Justice’s concern about the alarming rise in prosecutions and disciplinary actions made against prison staff since 2014, with over 2,666 prison staff having faced disciplinary action over the last five years. This disciplinary action included a number of criminal prosecutions, with 960 of these cases being related to a breach of security which can include bringing mobile phones and drugs into the prison environment.

Announcing the creation of the unit, Justice Secretary David Gauke said that it was in reaction to, ‘recent criminal prosecutions’ whereby ‘a small minority continue to engage in corrupt behaviour in our prisons damaging both the integrity of the system and their profession.’ This suggests a reactive approach to a problem that could no longer be swept under the carpet.

Like its predecessor, the 2019 Counter Corruption Unit has a relatively small number of staff. This new Unit began operational tasks in 2019 and consists of 29 specialist staff members, divided into 5 national and regional sub-units. It has four key aims, familiar from the Home Office and National Crime Agency 4Ps approach: protect the prison service against corruption by building an open and resilient organisation; prevent staff from engaging in corruption by attempting to strengthen professional integrity; pursue and punish those involved with corruption; and, prepare prisons to lower the impact of corruption where it does occur.

This specialist team will also aim to work with other agencies such as the police and the National Crime Agency to hinder organised crime groups that act in a nefarious manner with corrupt staff.

The recent 2019 Prison Drug Strategy, created by HMPPS, pins the success of the Unit to achieving the aim of reducing the proportion of random mandatory drug tests that are found positive by March 2020. This highlights the intertwined nature of HMPPS’s adherence to the use of key performance indicators (that can be potentially be manipulated), the drug strategy, and approach to tackling corruption. A positive development is the focus on ‘staff who use their position for illicit gain’, and explicit — if somewhat hidden — acknowledgement that staff corruption might have a significant role to play.

An internal HMPPS presentation from September 2019 develops some of these points. There is a clear focus on staff corruption as a key area. Corruption is seen as part of a ‘wider security picture’, and there is a strong emphasis on the importance of culture, training and staff support, based on ‘academic literature and international evidence.’


61. Ibid


63. Ibid, p.12

64. Counter Corruption Unit case for investment (2019), HMPPS powerpoint, September 10 2019
such documents have demonstrated and a plan for a more comprehensive approach, while still based on the 4Ps.

However, the same challenges and questions inevitably face the new Counter Corruption Unit as had faced the CPU. There is a danger the metrics for success will neither incentivise the unit correctly, nor give real insight into the nature of the problem and how it is being tackled; a concern that whatever actions are taken are built primarily on experiential learning by those who are personally involved, rather than a firm evidence base; a risk that the introverted nature of the prison system will neglect the lessons and expertise that can be incorporated from other sectors and institutions; and above all, the risk that the resourcing and senior, institutional support for tackling corruption will be insufficient in the face of competing priorities and institutional pressures. In the absence of transparency about what is going on and how effective it has been, external observers are required to guess.

Further research areas

It is clear that corruption in the UK prison system is under-researched. There is no comprehensive academic literature on either corruption risks or the actual corruption that occur within UK prisons.

Seven proposed areas to prioritise for future research are:

1. **Typology and harm.** For analysis and management purposes, it would be useful to have both the academic and practitioner communities in the UK coalesce around a typology of prison corruption; similarly, research and narratives which establish the victims and the harm would help underpin policy approaches. An interested party — a research or practitioner institution — could convene a workshop of key players to start building a consensus.

2. **Scale and prevalence.** Basic quantitative information, supplemented by qualitative data collection, would enable a better picture to be built, along with a basis for prioritising anti-corruption resource allocation.

3. **Motivations and incentives.** This would examine the landscape from junior staff to Governors, encompassing public and private sectors, establishing the motivations and incentives for different actors (including domestic and official visitors) to become involved with corruption, including the extent to which KPIs may be a contributor to corrupt behaviours and whether privatisation has made a difference.

4. **Staff corruption as a route that contraband takes into the prison system.** A proposed methodology is a nationwide survey with a large sample group on the prevalence of different trafficking routes. Within the formulation of such a survey, there should be specific investigatory emphasis on staff involvement in contraband trafficking. The results could then inform qualitative research in establishments (including attempts to engage with ex-staff members who have been found guilty of what would be considered corrupt practices).

5. **The extent of corruption in relation to procurement.** Although not covered in this paper, the same rationale applies as to other research areas: it is a key corruption risk that is under-researched.

6. **Confidential reporting (whistleblowing).** In other fields, information on corruption is often gathered through confidential reporting mechanisms. Within prisons, this might be considered to have dangers over and above the norm. Research would help show how effective the current channels are and whether enhancements would make them a more useful tool. A specialist agency such as Protect could be commissioned to do this.

7. **Gender and corruption.** This research would analyse whether the types or prevalence of corruption have a relationship with gender. For example, are there different types of corruption at play within male and female prisons?

8. **Additional (demographic) factors.** For example, is the prevalence or form of corruption different in the adult estate compared to the Young People's estate? What variance is there across the estate: is there less in the High Security Estate compared to local or open establishments? Eliciting a more nuanced understanding will aid in resource allocation and prioritising.

9. **Organised crime.** The existing prisons literature suggests that organised crime plays...
a role both in corrupting, and in benefitting from corruption. This reflects the learnings from other areas such as border security and policing. Prisons-specific research should examine the intersections/collusion between members of organised crime in prisons and corrupt prison staff/social and official visitors.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This paper aims both to assess the state of research into corruption in UK prisons and offer a commentary on what is known about the state of corruption in UK prisons. In the near absence of research, neither the corruption nor the corruption risks can be accurately assessed. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that the subject has been neglected, and that for a long period the relevant authorities have been in denial. However, there are signs of improvement, most notably the inclusion of prisons as one of the priorities of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2017, and the creation of the Counter Corruption Unit in 2019.

Overall, both the research outputs, policy making and operational actions regarding corruption within UK prisons need a considerable addition of impetus, with the latter made more likely by the advent of the Counter Corruption Unit.

Six policy recommendations to improve the situation are:

1. Gain consensus on the typology, harm and narrative, enabling a common language and framework for policy and operational work (including training)
2. Pro-actively build a research community, including academics and those within civil society who specialise either on corruption or on prisons
3. Identify key research gaps and questions, building on the proposal in section 6 above
4. Bring in external expertise to the insular world of prisons so that practitioners in the prisons field can draw on the extensive anti-corruption expertise from other sectors
5. Ensure the anti-corruption approach has adequate resourcing and institutional support, a key lesson from the past both in UK prisons, but also across the world in anti-corruption agencies
6. Increase transparency over the sector’s activities, facilitating researchers and enabling appropriate levels of external accountability
Speaking truth to power: a review of the field of Intelligence Analysis

Professor Julian Richards is Director, Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at University of Buckingham

Introduction
As a formal academic subject, Intelligence Studies has been something of a creature of the post-Cold War world, when previously heavily secret issues could start to be discussed more freely, and subsequent inquiries and investigations began to release ever more sensitive data into the public domain. It did not really gain significant traction as a formal subject other than in the historical studies realm, however, until the beginning of the twenty-first century and the 9/11 attacks that punctuated the change in the security landscape. Since then, it has become the subject of a small number of dedicated research centres — mostly, it has to be said, in the Anglo-Saxon world — and has increasingly featured as modules on Politics and Security Studies programmes across a wide range of universities. On publishing, a good handful of peer-reviewed English-language academic journals are now dedicated to the study of intelligence, and all enjoy a very healthy number of submissions from diverse international contributors at the time of writing.

Within the subject, the study of intelligence analysis as an activity is one of several strands. It is also worth noting that the subject has tended to coalesce around two separate communities of interest and sets of considerations. On the one hand is the traditional, state-centric discussion of intelligence as a core element of machinery and policy in the national security state. This community fits comfortably with the traditional and established subjects of Politics and International Relations. In another part of the forest sits a much more practical and professional-focused community, in which recent and current intelligence practitioners feature significantly.

In this paper, I review the state of the nation of Intelligence Studies in terms of its shape and development, and the position occupied within it by considerations of intelligence analysis as a tradecraft. The general message is that this area of the subject remains vibrant and active, and is developing in interesting ways with the advent of massively expanding data and open-source intelligence opportunities. At the same time, there are different strands to the relevant scholarly and practitioner communities and these are not always as integrated as they could be. It is also the case that the practical application of intelligence analysis tradecraft tools and techniques has not always been evaluated as to its effectiveness, and could usefully be subjected to further research.

Learning from mistakes and failures — the traditional way

It is generally the case that the traditional academic approach to intelligence studies and to the question of intelligence analysis has been strongly grounded in the wider context of International Relations. Considerations of strategic foreign policy at times of state-centred military threat have often been the starting point for discussion. The Cold War itself was, of course, the archetypal state-centred military and diplomatic confrontation in modern history, and it is no surprise that the whole modern intelligence architecture in many parts of the globe was developed and shaped around its considerations. It is also the case that the lure of Cold War spy stories were a powerful draw for those generally interested in the secret world. Academically, many, such as Marrin have conceptualised intelligence studies as ‘an academic complement to the practice of national security’; and have long called for it to be taken seriously as a properly recognised academic discipline to rival established pursuits such as International Relations.

Intelligence Studies as an organised subject of academic discussion probably dates back to the 1980s, when a dedicated panel section was established at the large and prestigious International Studies Association (ISA) annual symposium. At around the same time the two hitherto pre-eminent peer-reviewed English

1. In the UK, for example, significant centres in which Intelligence Studies can be studied in part or as a whole subject include Buckingham, Brunel, Aberystwyth, Leicester, Kings College London and Salford universities. Similar centres and courses are available in the US, Canada and Australia, but are few and far between beyond those countries.

language academic journals in the field, *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* were launched. The impetus for their parallel development on either side of the Atlantic was purportedly increased awareness of the activities of the intelligence services following the Pike and Church inquiries in the 1970s in the US. This reflects the initial concentration both on what can be learnt from major strategic intelligence failures, and on the development of a critical view of the intelligence services in terms of being a sometimes problematic organ of state.

Writing at a similar time, Richard Betts noted that case studies of intelligence failures were very numerous in the academic literature. As Wesley Wark subsequently noted in his analysis of the study of espionage in the early 1990s, the study of intelligence failures and strategic shocks provided an intellectual link between the traditional discipline of International Relations, and the emerging field of Intelligence Studies. This, in turn, allowed largely Realist theorists such as Wohlstetter, Handel, Jervis, and the aforementioned Betts to loom large in discussion, taking twentieth century case studies of strategic shock and surprise such as Pearl Harbor and the Yom Kippur War to frame thinking about how and why analysis goes wrong at the strategic level.

As Gill and Phythian noted, the post-Cold War era saw much academic interest in inquiries into intelligence failures affecting the major episodes of conflict in the new era, such as the case for going into war in Iraq in 2003, and issues pertaining to terrorist attacks in Western cities including those of 11 September, 2001. The establishment of the Intelligence and Security Committee of parliament in the UK in 1993, and its subsequent detailed post-mortem examinations of major strategic intelligence failures (not to mention those of parallel government inquiries across the Anglo-Saxon world in particular) have provided rich new fodder for scholars and researchers of national security and the role that intelligence analysis plays within it.

In the UK, the Butler Inquiry into intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction was comprehensive and detailed in its discussion of analytical factors that were causing problems in the post-Cold War era of new security threats and challenges. The report was influential in the sense that it led to the establishment of the new post of Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) within the Cabinet Office, with the aim of working across the disparate elements of the intelligence community and looking for opportunities to ‘professionalise’ intelligence practice. How successful it has been in so doing in subsequent years is difficult to assess from the outside. In the US, the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) at the same time had a similar remit to work across the broad and complex US intelligence community and to think about the analytical professionalisation of those who worked within it (among its general coordination and strategic assessment objectives). In Australia, the Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee (FICC) that flowed from the post-Iraq Flood inquiry report of 2004 reflected similar thinking and objectives.

In some ways these developments were as much about the ‘governance/policy’ project, as Gill and Phythian described as they were about the business of analysis. The shock of Iraq for the Western intelligence coalition was as much about a suspected politicisation of the system, as it was about the capabilities of the analysts working within it. One can have the best analysts in the world, but if the machinery of processing intelligence judgements from analyst to policy-maker is flawed, then all can be for nought. The subsequent reorganisations were also partly about a

---

9. See n.4
12. See n.10, p.10
recognition that the intelligence community itself can be a very political entity in terms of rivalries and equities between members. Shifting the leadership of the community in the US from the DCI to the supposedly more independent DNI, for example, inevitably contained as much politics as practicality in its thinking. These are the many reasons why a critical study of intelligence machinery remains a critical component of Intelligence Studies, and why it arguably has to be considered as hand-in-glove with questions of analytical capability.

At the same time, there were valid observations in all of these inquiries, and other contemporaneous reports such as the 9/11 Commission Report in the US, about the adjusted considerations that twenty-first century intelligence analysts needed to have when considering the new threat landscape. The reports also provided a language for analysts to speak about the challenges and the potential solutions. Concepts such as institutional mindsets (or ‘groupthink’), mirror-imaging, and a ‘lack of imagination’ when confronted with new threat actors such as international terrorists all came more extensively into the parlance of analysts and scholars alike. They also helped to establish frameworks and structures for a myriad of analytical training programmes, whether aimed at newly installed intelligence agency staff, or at students and scholars involved with the subject as an academic pursuit.

It could also be said to be the case that the renewed emphasis on the skills development of analysts was following the path set by early pioneers such as Sherman Kent on the foundation of the CIA after the Second World War. A historian by training, Kent, whose name was posthumously applied to the CIA’s central intelligence school, was a strong advocate of a scientific method for conducting intelligence analysis. This included such notions as structured and forensic post-mortem analyses of intelligence failures to establish where the points of analytical failure had been. One of Kent’s key disciples in the CIA during the Cold War was Richards J Heuer Jr, who worked for a period under James Angleton in the agency’s counterintelligence section during the ‘wilderness of mirrors’ period of paranoia about Soviet deception and counter-espionage in the early Cold War. Heuer was himself a former academic of distinction in the area of philosophy, and became increasingly interested in psychology and its impact on the business of intelligence. I will return to Heuer’s work below, but in the early period, one of his lasting legacies was a notion developed during the infamous Yuri Nosenko affair in the early 1960s, with which he was closely involved, that deception analysis had to be subjected to a structured, scientific approach, lest it fall prey to unstructured biases and prejudices. This led to the development of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) technique, the authorship of which is claimed by Heuer in his 1999 book, the Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. ACH synthesises the experience of early Cold War deception analysis and applies a basic Popperian scientific approach, to create the single best-known and probably most widely-used structured analytical technique of the modern era.

It is the case, therefore, that one strand of discussion about intelligence analysis within academic Intelligence Studies is heavily dominated by a state-centred, foreign policy and national security approach to the challenges. In this way, the traditional approach enjoys heavy and detailed overlaps with mainstream International Relations as a subject, and with related disciplines such as Foreign Policy Analysis and Security Studies. The focus here is as much on institutions as it is on individual analysts, in the sense of how intelligence organisations and agencies manage the business of intelligence gathering and interpretation, and how governmental machineries best deliver national security assessments.

There is nothing wrong with this approach per se, but it does carry some limitations. The main problem is that the field of view is somewhat limited to state intelligence agencies and their agendas. This means that wider members of the intelligence community, such as law enforcement and commercial intelligence...

...intelligence analysis within academic Intelligence Studies is heavily dominated by a state-centred, foreign policy and national security approach to the challenges.

16. See n.14
organisations, receive lower billing in the thinking than the Western, Cold War behemoths of state intelligence. It also means that the focus can tend to be rather limited to the Anglo-Saxon worldview, and particularly to that of dominant actors such as the CIA and its veterans. Again, the suggestion is not that there is anything necessarily wrong with this per se or that there is not a great deal that can be learnt from these approaches: Kent, Heuer and the numerous other analysts who worked with and for them were undoubtedly highly significant thought-leaders in the whole domain of how to do intelligence analysis more effectively. However, as Lord Butler and others have told us, limited worldviews and institutional mindsets can sometimes lead to cognitive traps in our analysis. If we always look at a problem from one starting point, there could be analytical risks.

The wider Intelligence Community

For the reasons identified above, it is worth considering developments in the debate about intelligence analysis in the wider community beyond the traditional, state-centred intelligence agencies. Many of the debates and discussions in this wider community are led by a notable involvement of current and recent intelligence practitioners, and particularly (though not exclusively) in the law enforcement and military domains. Significant knowledge communities include the International Association for Intelligence Educators (IAFIE), which was established in 2004 following a colloquium at Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania. The emphasis of this group is much more about the professionalisation of intelligence practitioners through the sharing of best practice and networking amongst those in and around the business, than necessarily about academic reflections on the politics and governance of intelligence within states. With the exception of pandemic-hit 2020, the group has successfully held vibrant and well-attended annual conferences in the US, Canada, Australia and in Europe.

Other major communities of note include the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), which, like IAFIE, is primarily a knowledge hub and networking organisation, but aimed at those working in commercial, rather than national security roles. The objectives of SCIP claim to be to ‘increase members’ impact through advancing ethical best practices, offering training and education in areas critical to professional effectiveness, curating innovative ideas, and cultivating a powerful peer community’. Again, the strong practical focus of the group is very evident. Academic reflections on the nature of competitive intelligence occasionally appear, such as discussions about the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act in the US, but are relatively few and far between. Given the rising significance politically of economic and industrial espionage, there may be opportunities for greater cross-pollination of these communities and debates.

Particularly in action-oriented domains such as the military, much of the thinking in recent times has been to connect the challenge of intelligence analysis with wider considerations of understanding and responding to increasingly complex, dynamic and asymmetric threats. In this way, not only are accurate intelligence assessments crucial, but so are the speed and efficiency with which these can be promulgated to those taking kinetic action on the ground: essentially the ‘decision cycle’ process. Thus, concepts such as the OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) designed by the US Air Force Colonel John Boyd, have been developed and elaborated in increasingly complex ways, such as in Svendsen’s recent paradigm of ‘intelligence engineering’. Within these models, intelligence (sometimes rendered as ‘information’ or even ‘knowledge’) is a critical component, but it is important to note that the models are as much about business processes as about the art of intelligence analysis itself. This is an issue, and, indeed, a problem to a certain extent in other realms such as law enforcement.

---

17. https://www.iafie.org/page/About_Us
18. https://www.scip.org/page/About-Us
Indeed, policing is a key area in which significant developments of both a practical and academic nature have unfolded in the area of intelligence analysis in recent years. A significant driver was the rise of personal and social media data within the context of Information and Computing Technology (ICT), which offered opportunities both for better intelligence on targets, and for more efficient and ‘intelligent’ targeting of scarce resources in an age of public sector stringency. As early as the 1970s, there was recognition that new sources of ‘information’ would become critical to the business of law enforcement, as reflected in a statement by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice and Goals in the US in 1973, calling on every law enforcement agency to ‘immediately establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information and to disseminate intelligence in a manner that protects every individual’s right to privacy while it curtails organized crime and public disorder’23. Interestingly, there was recognition here of potential public anxiety over the extent of data surveillance; a point to which I will return.

By the 1990s, the New York Police Department was developing a new ‘goal-oriented, strategic management process that uses information technology, operational strategy, and managerial accountability to guide police operations’: a model which became known as Compstat24. Compstat was essentially a ‘problem-oriented’ mode of policing, in which analysis of data and ‘science’ were applied both to understanding the picture of crime in a particular area. This was driven by a similar recognition that ‘community policing’ was not necessarily very effective in penetrating serious criminal or terrorist groups; a fact starkly demonstrated by the failure to anticipate the 1985 bombing of an Air India plane departing Vancouver by Sikh extremists25. Here again was a process of attempting to learn from intelligence failures, but in the law enforcement rather than state security realm.

In the UK, ‘intelligence-led policing’ (ILP) emerged at a similar time, initially driven by Kent constabulary, and later replicated in a number of other areas26. Initially called the Kent Policing Model, ILP was similar to Compstat in reflecting a strategic need to drive down crime statistics at a time when budgets were being squeezed. The model in Kent involved a combination of analysing statistics to develop a better geospatial view of where the key crimes were occurring, and prioritising incoming calls for service to more efficiently target the priority areas where the best dividends would be scored in reducing crime statistics27.

Intellectually, the objectives of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) and ILP would appear to be the same in the sense that they involve a conceptual refocusing of the analysis of security threat away from traditional and established processes, and towards a more holistic and dynamic view of the situation, using sophisticated data analysis as the fuel for the machine. Such thinking was reflected in Robert Clark’s influential ‘target-centric analysis’ paradigm28, in which a call is made to see each challenge from the problem outwards, rather than from the traditional top-down approach of tackling issues in accordance with bureaucratic process norms and stove-piped organisations. Particular reference is made to the traditional ‘Intelligence Cycle’ process model, believed to be originally established in the 1970s29, which, claimed Clark, had inappropriately taken on ‘almost theological’ significance among its users whereby ‘no-one questions its validity’30. Instead, he argued, in a

Compstat was essentially a ‘problem-oriented’ mode of policing, in which analysis of data and ‘science’ were applied both to understanding the picture of crime in a particular area.

24. Ibid p.57
30. Clark (2007) see n.28. P.11
post-Cold War world of greater dynamism, unpredictability and the knowledge economy, it seemed to make sense to see each problem as unique and potentially different from those encountered before. The formulaic and production-line epistemology of the Intelligence Cycle was described by Hulnick\textsuperscript{31} as ‘not a very good description of the ways in which the intelligence process works’.

So far, so good in terms of fitting with the injunctions of inquiries in which a lacking imagination and institutional mindsets were seen as problems that had bedevilled intelligence analysts. However, experience has shown in the UK and almost certainly in other jurisdictions that the management benefits of ILP in terms of reducing costs, targeting dwindling resources and generating beneficial metrics, have been prioritised higher than the analytical uplift implied by a shift to ILP. In a sense, the ‘intelligence’ part of Intelligence-Led Policing may have been neglected. In his extensive analysis of ILP, typified in the UK by the initially much-heralded National Intelligence Model (NIM), James suggests that attempts to ‘shift the policing paradigm, usually have fallen far short’\textsuperscript{32}. Again, organisational and governance problems are seen to have a big effect on the ability to improve analytical capability, in the shape of a ‘resistance to change’ amongst the established detectives who are fearful that data analysis is not proper policing\textsuperscript{33}; and further problems in the lacking profile of intelligence work within the police hierarchy and woefully poor database and computing capabilities at the local level\textsuperscript{34}. The NIM has proved itself to be more of a management model, than one focused on upskilling analysts (in some ways, a corollary to the OODA Loop in military thinking). On the training front, an empirical survey of policing intelligence practitioners in the UK found that a significant proportion found their intelligence training to be lacking or too ‘rudimentary’, perhaps reflecting the ‘low status’ accorded to intelligence work within the organisation\textsuperscript{35}.

...policing intelligence practitioners in the UK found that a significant proportion found their intelligence training to be lacking or too ‘rudimentary’, perhaps reflecting the ‘low status.

There is also perhaps further evidence here that the PHIA model has not yet had much discernible impact on the law enforcement parts of the intelligence community in promulgating best practice, if that were its intention.

**Intelligence analysis tradecraft**

All of these institutional and organisational issues aside, the discussion of intelligence analysis tradecraft has been a healthy area of debate and publication in recent years. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that a small industry has grown up around teaching and training analytical techniques and approaches. Much of this has been driven by current or recent practitioners of intelligence, who have been able to bring their experience to bear on what does and does not work well in solving today’s security challenges.

At this stage, it is worth returning to the personality of Richards J Heuer Jr, and to recognise his highly significant presence within the practice of developing intelligence analysis approaches. The aforementioned ACH technique, claimed Heuer, ‘helps an analyst overcome, or at least minimize, some of the cognitive limitations that make prescient intelligence analysis so difficult to achieve’\textsuperscript{36}. Here we see recognition of the pivotal role that mainstream psychology has played within debates about intelligence analysis, and particularly that promulgated by Daniel Kahneman and his close friend and colleague, Amos Tversky\textsuperscript{37}. Central to the discussion are notions of ‘cognitive biases’ in judgement and decision-making. These are assumed to occur in all cultures and walks of life, but have a particularly important impact for those making significant assessments based on sometimes problematic information: a good description of the role of the intelligence analyst. Heuer himself acknowledges that his work on cognitive biases was very significantly informed by the work of Kahneman and Tversky, and particularly their paper, ‘Judgement under Uncertainty:

33. Ibid p.194
34. Ibid p.194-7
Heuristics and Biases’, published in the journal Science in 197438.

As discussed above, Heuer’s lynch-pin ACH model uses classical Western scientific theory as enunciated by Karl Popper39. This takes as its basis that perhaps the most pervasive and damaging of all cognitive biases, the ‘confirmation bias’, is best mitigated by a process of scientific discovery and evaluation that attempts to disprove hypotheses based on available evidence, rather than to seek to prove and favour a naturally favoured hypothesis. This allows the analyst to overcome confirmation bias (that is, a strong tendency to show that the analyst is right about their instinctive judgement of a situation), and to ensure that ‘evidence’ is properly and objectively assessed in forming a judgement. This approach forms the basis of testing new drugs and vaccines to destruction before they can be released to the public, for example. In the world of intelligence, where information and data may be selective, missing, faulty, and — on occasion — deliberately deceptive, this would seem to be a very valid prescription.

ACH is one of many structured techniques that purportedly help analysts to overcome innate cognitive biases and to ensure a more scientific approach to their analysis. It also allows for uncertainty to be properly assessed in making judgements, and to make sure that the policy and decision-makers know exactly what the analysts are, or are not telling them. In 2010, Heuer and Randolph Pherson collaborated in the publication of ‘Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysts’40. This book, in its third edition at the time of writing, represents a compendium of analysis techniques, some of which Pherson — another veteran of the US intelligence community — had previously published as a ‘Handbook of Analytical Techniques’. As well as ACH, these include variations on established techniques such as mind-mapping, brainstorming and red teaming; and new techniques such as ‘quadrant crunching’ and ‘what if?’ analysis. The techniques have been supplemented with compendia in which the techniques are applied to case studies of recent intelligence challenge, showing how they could be implemented in practice41. Refreshingly, these do not include the rather time-worn cases of major strategic surprise such as Pearl Harbor or the Cuban Missile Crisis; but more recent and specific cases of crime, espionage, and cyber activity.

The language of SATs (Structured Analytic Techniques), as they have become known in the intelligence community, has been developed and adapted by others. The Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), for example, has developed the notion of ‘SMATs’, or Structured Analytical Models, Approaches and Techniques, to provide the framework for analytical training courses42. These include not only the practice of SATs, but also techniques for presentation and communication of the results of the analysis, such as graphical intelligence summaries (‘Grinstein sums’) and the ‘bottom line up front’ (BLUF) technique. Indeed, training and exercising of techniques using simulations of real-world scenarios, which can be used in professional or academic environments alike, have been the subject of a number of recent publications and courses, such as two recent volumes by Lahneman and Arcos43.

In the world of intelligence, where information and data may be selective, missing, faulty, and — on occasion — deliberately deceptive, this would seem to be a very valid prescription.

There is, therefore, a considerable amount of discussion, writing and training being undertaken in various parts of the world on how to improve the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, using a framework of cognitive considerations. Much of this is driven by an essentially ‘CIA school’ of thinking. A question that could be asked is: how effective is this training in improving analytical performance? As a recent study by Whitesmith44 highlighted, there has been very little

---

42. https://casisvancouver.ca/smatcourse/
evaluation of whether and how techniques such as ACH actually work in generating better analytical outcomes. In her empirical study of a group of UK-based intelligence analysts, the worrying conclusion was that ‘ACH had no impact on belief acquisition and no reducing effect on the occurrence of confirmation bias’\(^{45}\). Similarly, a study in the US found that, while use of SATs such as ACH by the intelligence community had increased, especially following the Iraq inquiries of the early 2000s, there appeared to be very little evidence of mechanisms for measuring whether they were effective in delivering improved analytical outcomes\(^{46}\).

What this may mean is that an ideology of industrialised training of new and existing analysts using the established understanding of cognitive challenges, and a set of formatted structured techniques, is now being undertaken by bureaucracies — especially in the Western world — without too much evaluation as to the effectiveness of the approach. This statement may appear a little uncharitable in that there is clearly a great deal of well-designed and rigorous training and discussion going on with practitioners, much of it commendably using relevant and useful examples of current security threats. It is also the case that such techniques never promised to ‘fix’ the problems, but merely to raise the awareness and mental agility of analysts.

But, from a philosophical point of view, the whole epistemology of the approach is based on a standard, orthodox Western scientific model, and an unquestioning use of that approach may itself be mitigating against challenge and alternative hypotheses, to some degree. In some ways, structure could be said to be a strange bedfellow for creative analysis in uncertain environments. The answer is probably that continual evaluation and challenge needs to be undertaken, especially by current practitioners who are best placed to see how well or otherwise the techniques translate across from the training room to the workplace.

Similarly, a study in the US found that, while use of SATs such as ACH by the intelligence community had increased, especially following the Iraq inquiries of the early 2000s

**The internet age**

The final piece of the jigsaw is that presaged by the US National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice and Goals in the early 1970s about the importance of data analysis to the business of intelligence. The authors of that report could barely have anticipated the spectacular and exponential rate at which data availability would grow subsequently, and the opportunities it would offer to intelligence analysis.

There are several dimensions to these developments which are driving and shaping the debate on intelligence analysis. The first is a growing recognition that social media exploitation can and should be a new and important part of intelligence tradecraft. Indeed, Omand, Bartlett and Miller\(^{47}\) and Dover\(^{48}\) have contributed usefully to thinking of a whole new strand of tradecraft under the rubric of SOCMINT. It is clear that Big Data exploitation, whether it be of social media or a host of other sources of data, offers tremendous new opportunities for analysing complex networks and possibly even working more proactively in an anticipatory sense to predict threats. At the same time, there are contrary risks in the new landscape. Some of these are to do with adversaries using social media themselves to undermine democratic societies (a notion of the ‘weaponization’ of social media\(^{49}\); while other concerns relate to the ethical questions of privacy protection in what many critics might characterise as a creeping ‘surveillance state’\(^{50}\).

There seems no doubt that modern intelligence analysis increasingly has to take account of disinformation in all its guises. This is not the first time in history, of course, that propaganda, deception and ‘psychological operations’ have been used in intelligence environments: such phenomena have a long history dating back to the beginnings of mass communication. But the sheer scale of contemporary information environments and the speed and ease with

---

45. Ibid p.213
49. Ibid p.216
which messages can be spread and consumed, all mean that the modern intelligence analyst needs to have extremely heightened awareness and capability in how to spot and mitigate disinformation and the effect of such phenomena as ‘hybrid warfare’.

Particularly since 2013, when Edward Snowden’s revelations broke about the scale of data surveillance on both sides of the Atlantic, the concerns of civil libertarians in democratic states have increasingly focused on data surveillance techniques and the ‘proportionality’ of them (to use the parlance of the European Convention on Human Rights). This has led, in turn, to legislative developments, such as the passing of the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) in the UK in 2016, which attempts to more clearly delineate the roles and remits of intelligence services in this field, and indeed of key stakeholders with whom they work, notably the large communications and internet service provider companies (CSPs and ISPs). The new regulations have not necessarily satisfied the critics: the IPA is commonly known in some quarters as the ‘Snooper’s Charter’[^52]. But at least, perhaps, there is some degree of public debate about what a democratic state should rightly do in the era of Big Data exploitation for national security purposes.

These concerns, of course, are not necessarily immediate issues for intelligence analysts undertaking their mandated duties, since appropriate checks and balances should be in place to ensure properly authorised investigations are taking place. But again, there is a strong argument to say that the contemporary intelligence analyst needs to be fully cognisant of ethical risks and threats in the exploitation of Big Data in pursuit of security outcomes, and these need to shape the thinking, approaches and assessments. It is also the case that the study of ethics rightly remains an important element of academic Intelligence Studies.

In the meantime, the explosion of data in the contemporary era means that Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is developing an increasingly influential role in the business of intelligence analysis, and challenging the notion that intelligence should be a fundamentally secret affair[^66]. Increasingly, organisations outside of the intelligence services themselves are proving themselves to be thought-leaders and pioneers of analytical tradecraft in the complex and challenging world of online information exploitation. Organisations such as Bellingcat, who claimed to have independently exposed the Russian GRU agents at the centre of the 2018 Sergei Skripal poisoning using OSINT techniques[^54], are likely to become significant actors in the development of analytical tradecraft and best-practice. All elements of the intelligence community will probably do well to partner with such actors in effective ways, or at least to capitalise on their approach.

**Conclusions**

This review of the evolution of debate and discussion of intelligence analysis has highlighted two distinct communities of interest around the subject. The first community preceded the second in its evolution and has been characterised by a set of discussions and debates driven very much by state-centred concerns arising from the Cold War era. This area of the debate has a close relationship with the traditional academic disciplines of International Relations and Politics, to which it sees Intelligence Studies as an important adjunct, if not an emerging academic discipline in its own right. An analysis of major strategic intelligence failures in areas of foreign policy and military confrontation have driven the thinking about analytical tradecraft and its weaknesses, and the application of traditional academic theories has been a much-used conceptual framework. Intellectually, scholars with a varying degree of relationship with the major Anglo-Saxon intelligence agencies forged in the Second World War and Cold War, headed to a significant degree by the CIA, have tended to set the academic agenda and claimed it to be the rightful shape and form of traditional Intelligence Studies. In the post-Cold War era, this agenda has

established a language and framework for thinking about strategic intelligence analysis tradecraft and approaches, with the various governmental inquiries into the 2003 Iraq War debacle proving themselves to be highly influential in framing the contemporary debate.

The second key community is a much more practical and practitioner-focused group, which focuses more on practical applications of intelligence analysis techniques and principles to current security challenges. Military and law enforcement are particularly strong in this community, and, to a lesser extent, other practitioners such as those engaged in business or 'competitive' intelligence.

It is not the case that these communities are entirely distinct and never intersect. There are many colloquia and conferences where elements of both happily come together and discuss the issues, such as the major ISA annual conference. At the same time, there are separate gatherings and sometimes separate discussions that characterise the two groups. In a sense, Intelligence Studies is a classic interdisciplinary concern with multiple connections, sometimes spinning off into International Relations, and sometimes into other disciplines such as Criminology and Psychology.

Despite their differences, there are three factors that intersect across both communities and unite them in certain ways. One is the inescapable link between organisational and governance issues, and the business of analysis. As the Iraq War showed, the first can be as pivotal as the second in causing a major intelligence failure in the system. In policing, models such as the NIM aimed at structuring the new era of advanced data analysis have ended up being more about management of organisations and processes than about honing and improving the analytical function. Considerable problems in integrating high-value intelligence analysis into policing organisations and fully delivering on the erstwhile promises of intelligence-led policing still need to be addressed. At the same time, seeing the analytical function in complete isolation from organisational factors will continue to be a poor prescription for the wider intelligence community.

The second key factor is the way in which social media data and open-source intelligence can and should be integrated into the intelligence function, across the board from tactical to strategic intelligence. In some ways, private analysts outside of the official intelligence community are lighting the way here as well as government analysts themselves, and it is probably the case that this needs to be recognised and acted upon, perhaps in a spirit of more dynamic partnering across and outside of government.

The final key factor is the big pitfall in all domains of settling into a standardised and bureaucratised way of thinking about intelligence analysis and structuring training approaches and techniques in accordance with unquestioned principles of Western scientific method, without necessarily thinking enough about the evaluation and development of those methods to deliver solid and demonstrable security dividends. Further research on how well or otherwise the structured analytic techniques actually work in the contemporary intelligence workplace will continue to be essential in moving towards the objective of developing excellent analysts able to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Introduction

Prisons are intense places to live and work, with many residents living with poor mental health, learning disabilities, and addictions. The nature of prison life appears to generate and sustain high levels of violence resulting in prison staff being called upon to maintain safety and security; no easy task in a prison community of almost 80,000 people. The fine balance of managing safety, security and rehabilitative support depends on officers maintaining control and trust, and their ability to promote boundaries to ensure the peaceful co-existence of people with very complex lives and needs. Knowing how to balance the responsibilities of maintaining control and promoting rehabilitation has previously been referred to as a ‘prison officer’s dilemma’. 1

Difficulties that prisoners may have with relationships, debt or responsibilities, which might be manageable in the community, multiply in intensity and impact for incarcerated people. We know that efforts to convey drugs and contraband into and around prisons generate competition and that this is frequently controlled through violence and other forms of coercive control. Add to this that many prisoners may have suffered various personal traumas, and it is clear why frustrations can run high. 2 This can result in problems being acted, rather than talked, out. The prison officer must frequently switch hats between mentor, carer and disciplinarian; a varied and demanding professional practice. A good prison officer understands the complex relationship between security and rehabilitation, exhibits consideration and understands the difficulties, frustrations and disappointments that imprisonment can bring. 3

This largely descriptive article focuses on the considerations and judgements that officers have to make when exercising their authority to use force. We start by introducing the evidence base, current operational guidance, and our vision for a new national framework, and go on to discuss the challenges officers face when making decisions about the need to use force. In the article we put forward how we believe Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) can ensure all decisions and actions relating to force are carried out to the highest professional standard. We hope to demonstrate balance in our understanding of the challenges and threats associated with the role officers perform, with acknowledgment of the importance of relational approaches to conflict resolution and rehabilitative practice in creating safe and secure environments. For clarity, in this article ‘we’ refers to the opinions of the authors, and does not necessarily represent the current position of HMPPS.

Use of Force

Prison officer training is heavily focused on development of skills that are known to be effective in supporting rehabilitative journeys, but significant time is spent in initial training developing practical skills and explaining sources of authority that underpin the professional Use of Force (UoF). HMPPS have developed specific techniques approved for use in adult prisons (Control and Restraint) and in children’s custodial environments (Minimising and Managing Physical Restraint). Both are subject to oversight, review, continuous development and evaluation. Prisoners have a right to expect that officers are both competent and confident to use the techniques professionally, and within the boundaries of their authority. The organisation expects that officers will interrupt efforts by prisoners to pursue criminality, and intervene to stop prisoner on prisoner violence. Further, officers are

---

frequently called upon to defend themselves or colleagues against violence. To put this into context, there were 267 recorded prisoner-on-prisoner assault incidents per 1000 prisoners in the 12 months to March 2020, up from around 150 per 1000 in 2015. In the same 12 months, the rate of assaults on staff was 118 per 1,000 prisoners. Despite some progress in the last year, and a welcome reduction in violence during the COVID lockdown period, the cycle of violence in prisons has become endemic to prison environments, with actions and reactions fuelling the problems. It is an imperative that staff have the skills and confidence to apply effective techniques to protect themselves and others should they need to.

However, the increase in violence in prisons in recent years does not alter when force is justified, nor the safeguards that must apply. We acknowledge that the use of force against prisoners will sometimes be necessary, but that it represents an extreme manifestation of the authority vested in prison officers. Even where justified, using physical force causes harm to some degree, and represents a failure to resolve or prevent conflict in the first place. For this reason, it is right that all use of force is subject to scrutiny and that professional practice is underpinned by an effective process for complaint and investigation where appropriate. We believe that professional standards as they apply to the use of force and its governance are objective rather than subjective, and that clear articulation of that standard will drive better practice and safer prison environments. Whether in the context of daily leadership or a disciplinary hearing, there must be a clear standard of professional conduct for staff to work to, and by which Governors can decide whether the use of force was professional as well as legal, however necessary and reasonable the officer believed their actions to be.

The professional UoF demands this level of attention because of the impact it can have on officers and those in their care. Not much research has been done in prison settings examining the outcomes associated with use of force, but research considering interpersonal violence in other settings, suggests that exposure to violence is related to a range of negative effects on mental health, psychological well-being and behaviour.

We understand that UoF impacts individuals, but it also sets the tone for relationships at a prison level, and we believe this is an important variable in determining the ‘culture’ of a prison. We can’t list all the factors and variables that contribute to individual prison cultures, but it is understood that architectural design and physical state are important, along with regime stability and the intensity of focus on surveillance and control.

In addition to logistical and physical differences, personal and social factors including the balance between training and governance, and the experience of officers, undoubtedly shape prison cultures.

In a previous edition of this journal Ruth Mann and colleagues argued persuasively the view that everyone plays a role and has the potential to support or undermine rehabilitative outcomes, and in doing so determine the culture of a prison. It is clear that security practice can be designed so that it connects or conflicts with rehabilitative efforts, and we suggest that use of force is an area of critical importance, where getting it right matters more so than in any other professional judgement. We also know that in prisons when the boundaries of authority are overstepped, particularly when prisoners perceive use of force lacks legitimacy or justification, it makes rehabilitative outcomes less likely. From a prisoner’s perspective, the legitimate use of authority helps prison environments to feels safe and regulated, in turn enabling steps towards rehabilitation.

5. Speeches from the former Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, David Gauke, on ‘Beyond prison, redefining punishment’, 18 February 2019 and ‘From sentencing to incentives – how prisons can better protect the public from the effects of crime’, 10 July 2018.
Need for a Renewed Focus

We understand that increased oversight may cause anxiety and could be perceived as a lack of trust in an officer’s judgement and conduct. We don’t seek to present a view of UoF through a singularly negative lens. On the contrary, we are confident that under the right circumstances, using force can save lives and limit harm; and we have seen this first-hand, through experience and in footage of professionally applied practice. Therefore, while lower annual UoF figures would no doubt be welcomed by all, this paper’s aim is not to advocate a strategy that simply demands a continuous push for fewer and fewer UoF incidents. Instead, we want to advocate for an approach that ensures that every UoF incident is held to the highest standards so that the public, prisoners and their families can have the greatest confidence that every decision and action has been executed with professionalism and competence. Our vision is a UoF culture in HMPPS characterised by the highest professional standards and rigorous scrutiny that balances the responsibilities to safeguard prisoners and protect staff. We propose the LACES framework as a way forward to achieve this.

LACES: Lawful, Accountable, Considered, Equal, and Setting the Standard.

Lawful.

From a legal perspective, each use of force can only be justified, and therefore considered lawful, if it is necessary, reasonable in the circumstances, proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances, and the individual(s) uses no more force than is necessary. In every instance where force is applied, the circumstances are unique so must be judged on their own merits. This individual approach to scrutiny is imperative if we are serious about establishing a character to our Public Service that is built on the legitimate use of authority by a professional body of prison staff. It is the foundation upon which we will build a consistent and universal approach that we can have confidence will be upheld by every officer, in every prison, and which is internalised into our culture. We believe that it is this impression that we should aspire to be recognised by, and which the scrutiny bodies that oversee us will describe us in future.

Use of force that falls short of the law, or which does not act as an exemplar for professional standards, can cause severe harm and erode legitimacy. Inappropriate or excessive use of force undermines public trust and confidence in HMPPS, and damages the relationships between prisoners and staff. It perpetuates inequality and disproportionality in experience and outcome. It is squarely at odds with our organisational purpose and values. This pushes us to better lead, train and support prison staff to make decisions about when and how to use force, and to practice with legitimacy and to a standard that goes above and beyond the expectations of law, and reflects their professionalism. Acting in compliance with law is our bottom line, with no excuses for staff failing to meet this standard. The conditions of UoF being lawful are set out and taught in initial and annual refresher training. We must be confident that prison staff know and understand the lawful basis for their practice. Any use of force must pass the test of being necessary and reasonable, and decision making about use of force must stem from the honestly held belief that one’s self, or another person is at imminent risk should you fail to intervene, having considered and discounted other options. Such harm could include risk to life, or the imminence of another serious impact. We also have protection in law to use force to prevent crime, but not to use this as a means of upholding prison rules. This is a commonly misunderstood point, with widespread belief that it is lawful to use force to gain compliance with a reasonable instruction in the interests of good order or discipline.

Where these minimum standards are not met prison officers can face disciplinary investigation, and potentially criminal enquiry. The Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) also provide independent

11. See Prison Service Order 1600
12. Values of preventing victims by changing lives and doing this with humanity, openness, and togetherness. See the HMPPS strategy:
Quality scrutiny and assurance processes should ensure that officers are accountable for their actions. This is important for those occasions when complaints are made, and also for allowing senior management teams to recognise good practice. An important part of this process is the statement the officer makes following a UoF incident, and the medical report that accompanies this. HMPPS have introduced measures to ensure professional standards are elevated further. For example, every prison must form committees to monitor UoF at their establishment, and for national-level specialist teams (e.g. the National Tactical Response Group [NTRG]) and a senior committee meet to ensure accountability at all levels. HMPPS have also ensured they are responsive and flexible to changes in operational demands; for example, during the COVID-19 response additional scrutiny committees were assembled to examine exceptional PAVA use. This was a form of agile response management that ensured that any local-level issues could be escalated to a national cross-profession panel when required.

A key part of accountability is being able to reflect on the scrutiny process and learn from our actions to better ourselves in the future. One way of doing this is through reviewing Body Worn Video Camera footage. This aids the officer when reflecting on their actions, and also helps committees gather better insight into incidents they are reviewing, and where necessary help the PPO to more quickly resolve complaints. BWVC use may also help as some research has found that officers wearing cameras use force less than those who do not wear them, and that there can be sustained effects on lowering UoF over time. Although research into the use of BWVC has revealed that the degree of discretion that is used in whether and cameras were turned on impacted their effectiveness.

Another facet of accountability is that of the officer to both the prisoners and their colleagues. We feel it is worthwhile for an officer to have a meaningful conversation with the individual who has had forced used upon them when it is safe and appropriate to do so. Following procedural justice principles we are keen to ensure an explanation is provided and that prisoners have an opportunity to have a voice as part of a debrief. Another way we feel providing prisoners with a voice may be possible is to have a representative from the prisoners sitting on the UoF committees (for at least some of the meeting). This would go some way in ensuring prisoners can see that reviews and decisions are transparent and fair. This is important as we know that research shows when prisoners are treated in a way they feel is fair, and consistent with the rules in place, they are less likely to engage in acts of indiscipline.

One technique that may help aid de-escalation is for officers to ensure they offer calm, rational replies when faced with emotive situations. A key part of accountability is being able to reflect on the scrutiny process and learn from our actions to better ourselves in the future. One way of doing this is through reviewing Body Worn Video Camera footage. This aids the officer when reflecting on their actions, and also helps committees gather better insight into incidents they are reviewing, and where necessary help the PPO to more quickly resolve complaints. BWVC use may also help as some research has found that officers wearing cameras use force less than those who do not wear them, and that there can be sustained effects on lowering UoF over time. Although research into the use of BWVC has revealed that the degree of discretion that is used in whether and cameras were turned on impacted their effectiveness.

Another facet of accountability is that of the officer to both the prisoners and their colleagues. We feel it is worthwhile for an officer to have a meaningful conversation with the individual who has had forced used upon them when it is safe and appropriate to do so. Following procedural justice principles we are keen to ensure an explanation is provided and that prisoners have an opportunity to have a voice as part of a debrief. Another way we feel providing prisoners with a voice may be possible is to have a representative from the prisoners sitting on the UoF committees (for at least some of the meeting). This would go some way in ensuring prisoners can see that reviews and decisions are transparent and fair. This is important as we know that research shows when prisoners are treated in a way they feel is fair, and consistent with the rules in place, they are less likely to engage in acts of indiscipline.

Considered

While some UoF may be viewed as truly instantaneous because of a spontaneous event, many occasions present opportunities for de-escalation...
before UoF is required. One technique that may help aid de-escalation is for officers to ensure they offer calm, rational replies when faced with emotive situations. We know minimising emotionally driven responses in such moments can help our decision-making ability. The evidence tells us that generally people can make less biased decisions (e.g. impulsive decisions influenced by emotion) when they engage in ‘system two’ rather than ‘system one’ thinking. The difference between the two ‘systems’ is that system one is fast and reflexive (i.e. the system we operate in most of the time which enables effortless, automatic decision-making) whereas system two is slower, conscious and more deliberate. Therefore, to make an informed and well-thought-out decision officers should consider how, in the build up to an incident, they can move from quick, emotional responses to slower, more deliberate reasoning.

Research suggests a number of ways that decision-makers can do this including generating alternatives to their original thinking and by considering why their initial judgement might be mistaken. These techniques may be particularly useful when trying to anticipate if an incident has the potential to escalate. For example, while an intuitive reaction to witnessing a prisoner with contraband may be to immediately approach the individual and attempt to retrieve the item, a more considered approach may be for the officer to consider the support available to them at the time (e.g. are colleagues around them?), and the control the officer is likely to have if the situation escalates (e.g. what is the environment like, are many other prisoners present?). This more deliberate decision making process may ultimately minimise any force required (should the situation escalate) and even if force is used, minimise the length of time and severity of force needed (e.g. if no other prisoners around and if colleagues are in support, compared to if having to deal with the situation alone in a crowded environment).

It is through this more measured decision-making that officers may be able to reassure themselves and their seniors that all potential steps to minimise the chance of the situation escalating had been taken. This does not mean that officers should avoid challenging or avoid difficult conversations and let prisoners ‘get away’ with inappropriate behaviour, but instead it provides officers an opportunity to consider whether the situation needs an immediate action or whether it may be safer and more appropriate to deal with the incident in a different environment, at a different time, or with more support available.

Equal

Social inequalities are intensified in prison environments; we know that experiences in the criminal justice system from the point of arrest to the point of exit are impacted on by social factors such as wealth, ethnicity, employment status, experience of care, and education achievement level. Custodial environments and prison hierarchies are impacted by the same complexities, with over representation of marginalised groups of individuals, in particular those from black ad minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. People from BAME communities represent 14 per cent of the population of England and Wales, but 25 per cent of adult prisoners and 41 per cent of children in custody.

In light of this we need be mindful of the impact of our collective ‘face of force’. In using this phrase, we mean the impression that is given to and held by those experiencing force, about our wider culture and our system of control. Outside of big cites, our staffing group as a whole remains predominantly white, with fewer women than men at all grades. Indeed, Crawley and Crawley (2008) note that ‘prison officers work in an occupation that has been thought to require the traditional male qualities of dominance,

The evidence tells us that generally people can make less biased decisions (e.g. impulsive decisions influenced by emotion) when they engage in ‘system two’ rather than ‘system one’ thinking.


72 Prison Service Journal Issue 252
authoritativeness and aggressiveness’ (p.141). While this is simply not the case, it remains that the face of force in HMPPS is still overwhelmingly white and male, and given that we know BAME prisoners experience more use of force than white prisoners we see this as particularly problematic.

Evidence demonstrates the extent of this disproportionate youth estate in particular. A reasonably recent survey of 600 boys found just over half of the BAME respondents (53 per cent) reported experiences of physical restraint (compared to only 36 per cent of white respondents), and also found that Muslim boys were more likely to be physically restrained compared to non-Muslim boys (56 per cent v 41 per cent).²⁴

David Lammy highlighted the need to address the issue of disproportionality in 2017, suggesting that we improve governance to focus attention on the problematic levels of use of force being practiced against BAME prisoners. Since then HMPPS has strengthened governance, scrutiny and safeguarding processes in response to his recommendations, but we need to work with staff on their individual decision-making, and help them to engage in conversations about factors that impact on that, including internal and systemic bias. These are not easy conversations to have, but there is no palatable explanation for the findings of several external scrutiny bodies that BAME prisoners in many UK prisons experience excessive use of force, or that governance arrangements are lacking and fall short of protecting Human Rights.²⁵ We must look hard, honestly and reflectively at our organisational policies, our leadership messages and the behaviours and tolerances that have become embedded in our culture if we are to rise above this challenge.

We must look hard, honestly and reflectively at our organisational policies, our leadership messages and the behaviours and tolerances that have become embedded in our culture if we are to rise above this challenge.

but we must seek to explain how any inequality becomes established and tolerated.

There is a need for a global focus on the disproportionate use of force against BAME people by police in communities and custody. We recognise and validate these charges as equally relevant to the prison environment. Practice which is known to impact in discriminatory ways must be talked about, challenged and repaired. We know that unconscious biases affect us all, and this includes in our professional decision-making, which can lead to discrimination even when we have good intentions not to think or behave in a biased manner.²⁶ Research has shown that good intentions are simply not enough to remove biases. For example, in other settings research has shown us that including a statement reminding people of their duty not to discriminate on the basis of age makes no difference to actual levels of discrimination when examining hiring decisions.²⁷ Perhaps more surprisingly, research has also found that both unconscious and conscious racial bias can increase when people are presented with a message that emphasises their legal obligation to comply with anti-prejudice policies.²⁸ It may be that people react negatively when they believe their decisions or choices are being censored, and so how we approach bias in UoF decisions needs careful consideration. As UK police forces have recognised, change may require further investment in dedicated training regarding unconscious bias and how to reduce the influence of negative stereotypes.²⁹

Setting the Standard

The final part of the LACES acronym outlines our vision that we must be setting the standard at all levels in the organisation. This means individuals ensuring

²⁵ The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), 13 – 23 May 2019
they are up-to-date with training and aware of guidance, supervisors ensuring their staff feel supported, and leaders modelling the behaviours we strive for. We know that managerial controls, training and quality supervision are all ways that have been reported to help prevent unreasonable UoF. The study cited shows that everyone can make a difference as it demonstrated that trained supervisors significantly moderated their officers’ use of weapons-based UoF (in a police setting). In other words, investing in quality training and education for staff can help control UoF. We know from research that training and education should focus on promoting a professional outlook which means officers should be open and non-defensive, make exceptions when warranted, prefer to gain cooperation through communication, and use force as a last resort. We know that leadership can go a long way in setting the standard and ensuring officers strive for these qualities by considering some of the following suggestions from the literature:

- Targeting officers with a pattern of poor UoF behaviour, for remedial attention and training — rather than blame.
- Reinforcing training on-the-job (plus refresher training) with close supervision, including being held to account for decisions.
- Explicit policies of what is required in different situations, which are written down, regularly reviewed and updated where appropriate.
- Accountability frameworks with written reports that include compulsory justification for UoF, supervisor sign off and discussions between officers and supervisors.
- In-depth analysis of UoF reports, with essential public reporting on an annual basis.
- Effective lines of communication so difficulties can be discussed and addressed as they arise.
- Commitment in leadership to improve UoF practice.

Moving Forward

As we have outlined, the primary aim of this paper is not to issue a rallying call for reducing UoF (although we welcome all reductions in violence in prisons), but it is to share a message of appreciation for the difficult work our staff do, recognise that the decisions they have to make are incredibly complex, celebrate that a lot of the time we make the right decisions and save lives and limit harm through using force, and acknowledge there are times when additional steps could have been taken to minimise or eliminate the need for force.

Providing we are satisfied of the legality of the force, when mistakes happen we should move away from blame, and try to understand how improvements can be made: do we need more accountability — should we be encouraging more use of BWVC? Were all actions considered — was an opportunity for de-escalation missed? Is our UoF practice equal — are we reviewing incidents for disproportionality? Are we setting the standard — are supervisors providing feedback and identifying training needs? Each prison may find their focus needs to be on different parts of the LACES framework, but we encourage all prison teams to reflect where they are at now and where they want to get to next in their UoF practice.

Centrally, there are efforts to apply an evidence-based approach to policy and practice development, and a commitment to support local leadership teams to develop stronger leadership messaging and extend and promote good UoF practice. Work is ongoing to improve the quality of recording and reporting through greater use of technology. A digital UoF reporting tool is currently being piloted in two establishments with promising results; when widely implemented this will give greater oversight and enable HMPPS to publish national statistics for UoF as part of our commitment to transparency and improvement.

An ambitious programme of evaluation of UoF is currently underway. For the first time HMPPS are systematically reviewing UoF committees across the estate to understand what works and to provide best practice guidance for our establishments. We are undertaking primary research including interviews with staff and prisoners to fill evidence gaps around the impact of using force in prisons and to become world leaders in this field. Overall this is an exciting time to be involved with security in our prisons, there are a raft of changes happening regarding UoF practices, training and policy, and world-leading research plans afoot.

Dr Alison Wakefield is Professor of Criminology and Security Studies at the University of West London. She is also Chair of the Security Institute, the UK’s largest professional membership body for security professionals, with over 3,600 members. The Institute promotes the highest standards of integrity and professional competence in the business of security.

Dr Wakefield’s publications are the books Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space, The Sage Dictionary of Policing, and Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention, and her next book Security and Crime: Converged Perspectives on a Complex World is due out in next year. She serves on the editorial boards of Security Journal, the Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice and the Internet Journal of Restorative Justice, as well as the international advisory board of the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology.

Dr Wakefield is a regular author and public speaker on security topics, and recent themes have included the security implications of fake news, security for the fourth industrial revolution and UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit.

This interview was conducted in September 2020.

JB: Could you tell me about your professional background and experience?

AW: My background is primarily in academia, much of that in security education which followed from my research interests, although I also worked in the private sector for a short while. I’ve specialised in teaching mature learners who are usually full-time security practitioners.

Early on, I was based at the University of Leicester and because that was one of the few institutions to engage with security, and I was invited to get involved with the professional community, representing the educational side. So, I’ve been working closely with the practitioner community since the end of 2004, supporting the professional development of the security sector.

JB: What drew you to the security as a field?

AW: I had an interest in policing, which was how I had envisaged my career developing. I was a police cadet before going to university and worked as a special constable. I’d always planned to go into the police after graduation. I then decided to change direction. As I continued to study, I noticed that private security was a hidden area in terms of research. That then became the focus of my PhD research. Following that I found myself in an ideal position to teach on educational courses, with a niche that was broader than policing and with much scope for development. That has enabled me to be in a position to respond to the evolving educational needs of the security profession.

JB: How would you define security? What are the critical elements? Why are security professionals important?

AW: In simple terms it is about the protection of assets: people, property or information. That encompasses a whole range of different roles including people working internationally, nationally or locally; in the public, private or non-governmental sector; they could be in management, front-line, consultancy, investigative or analytical roles; they may be in specialist, generalist roles or ancillary ones such as mine as an educator, trainers, recruiters or media. There are a whole range of people playing a role in the resilience of governments, commercial organisations, non-governmental organisations, and the community.

1. For more information see https://security-institute.org/
People working in prisons will recognise this as their role is amongst the most challenging. But there is also a wider body of knowledge in which to ground that experience.

What would you say is the value of the development you are describing?

AW: In any organisation, if everyone comes with the same experience then you don’t get much change, improvement or innovation. There is a wealth of research on the prison setting, for example: — there are different approaches to prison practice all around the world. Education gives you access to new ideas that can be introduced into different contexts. Any setting needs a good evidence base underpinning how things are done and a good diversity of staff who can bring different perspectives. We know that prison work is extremely challenging, perhaps now more than ever, where managers are dealing with tight budgets and all kinds of barriers. Sometimes what you can control are small innovations that might not cost much money. Education is a route to a wider range of answers and perspectives in any line of work.

JB: Organisations are measured in many ways including research, targets, audits, inspection. How do organisations know if security practice is effective?

AW: you need to be gathering data at every stage. You need data in order to make comparisons. The risk management cycle starts with understanding the context, knowing the organisation you are dealing with, the culture, the aspirations and needs of the organisation. Then you come to the risk identification stage, which is the most crucial as if you miss a key risk you create a cycle that is flawed from the outset. You need to find ways of analysing the landscape, including research, targets, audits, inspection. How do organisations know if security practice is effective?

JB: When I think about security practice in prisons, it can be quite traditional, more of a craft based profession where people don’t necessarily undertake formal training but learn on the job. The training that they do undertake will be technical or about current practices rather than taking a broader perspective, theoretical perspective that you are describing. I can imagine some people asking why they would want to know about theory or learn about private security firms, when that is not the setting they work in?

AW: you need to be gathering data at every stage. You need data in order to make comparisons. The risk management cycle starts with understanding the context, knowing the organisation you are dealing with, the culture, the aspirations and needs of the organisation. Then you come to the risk identification stage, which is the most crucial as if you miss a key risk you create a cycle that is flawed from the outset. You need to find ways of analysing the landscape, including issues internal to the organisation and in the external environment. What are the vulnerabilities within as well as the threats on the horizon? You need good qualitative and quantitative data-gathering techniques to find out this information. That goes through an analytical process, which will inform the approaches that will be taken to mitigate the risks or adverse incidents. There have to be robust ways of measuring those incidents so you can evidence whether there is improvement. Then there is a review process, which feeds back into the top of the cycle. There is data gathering and analysis all the way through. That should produce the evidence that practitioners need to communicate to others in order to have their decisions supported.
JB: Your roles involve promoting security management and leadership. What are the key elements of security management and leadership? Are they different in the security context than in other settings?

AW: Starting with management, we all do this to ensure that day-to-day activities are happening. In security, the risk management cycle is at the heart of professional practice. Some people may mainly be involved in particular stages of the cycle. For example, analysts mostly focus on assessing the risks on the horizon, or business continuity experts are concerned with preparedness for emergencies. It is all about risk management. Leadership is about the strategic vision and objectives, and getting others to engage with them and work with you to realise those goals. You will be setting your objectives and values, such as excellence, growth, professionalism, ethics, integrity or inclusion, that you see as necessary for organisational success. That is more about inspiring people and bringing them with you.

JB: What is the role of the Security Institute and how do you see this developing?

AW: We are a UK-based professional association for security practitioners with over 3600 members. We run learning events, masterclasses and educational courses, and have links with universities. We also have knowledge-sharing and thought leadership functions, delivered through a growing number of special interest groups. These groups represent a wide range of disciplines, including cyber security, counter terrorism, the built environment, insider risks and many others. There are increasing numbers of people within the sector who want that kind of association to give professional recognition and support their development.

We are still a small organisation in terms of our employees; we only have nine employees, but we are growing. We have a volunteer Board of 15, and innumerable volunteers running committees and special interest groups and getting involved in a whole range of activities. We always say we are run by members for members. The Institute is now gathering a lot of momentum and new members. We are widening our reach and capacity to engage with government and industry at a senior level. Any revenue is ploughed back into the organisation as we are a not-for-profit. The more we grow in numbers and income, the further and faster we can go along that journey.

It is very exciting that we have so many people across the sector coming together to develop our capacities and services. A lot of the most engaged members are involved in volunteering and they get a lot out of it as it can open up new opportunities as you can show what you can do and work alongside other people. It is a wonderful way of trying out new areas and opening up new opportunities.

JB: The Security Institute nurtures the idea of a cross-sector security profession. What is the value of sharing experience and expertise between such apparently different fields as retail security, prison management, and private policing?

AW: In the past they were very separate areas. The more that we come together around common methodologies, which are simply being applied in different ways and in different settings, then the more there is a knowledge exchange and opportunities for people to move around the sector. All of those areas are becoming more professionalised and there are common standards emerging. There is greater diversity of thought when people come together with different experiences and ways of doing things.

You might not think that someone working in a prison in a security role has much to do with an IT security professional, but they are still working within that security risk management cycle. A lot of IT security is not rocket science, it is based on the same principles. So we are seeing a distinct profession coming together, with a distinct identity and way of doing things.

A lot of IT security is not rocket science, it is based on the same principles. So we are seeing a distinct profession coming together, with a distinct identity and way of doing things.
JB: How do you see technology reshaping security and the nature of both threats and countermeasures in the future?

AW: It is becoming something that everyone has to acknowledge is part of their remit. The world is so technologically dependent that the distinction between the digital and physical world is getting more blurred. We all need to improve our game in terms of understanding technology and its implications. We are working in an environment of increasing complexity. When you are working in a complex context, you face what are sometimes referred to as ‘cascading threats’ when one things happens and there is a cascade of unexpected outcomes that generate something completely different. It's like the butterfly effect. To manage in an increasingly complex world, people need to adapt their working styles to a more network- and partnership-based approach, and be more adaptable and agile. The prison system is an example of managing complexity at every level, but more and more dimensions of today’s world are characterised by complexity and that is a bit daunting for everyone.

JB: You’ve mentioned the risk management cycle a number of times, how can organisations and professionals best identify emerging security threats?

AW: You can use very simple established frameworks. For example, the SWOT analysis is based around strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Strengths and weaknesses are within the organisation — what does it do well and where are its vulnerabilities lie? The opportunities and threats are external to the organisation — what is on the horizon? Horizon-scanning is a growing area of analysis, drawing on intelligence. If you are established in the profession it might not be possible to retrain in analytical skills, but you might think about employing a young graduate who has analytical skills to fulfil that function. Building a more analytical approach will build resilience, and getting talented young people into the sector will improve diversity and encourage innovation.

Another example is PESTEL analysis. The letters refer to political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal issues on the horizon. It is a useful checklist about what the challenges might be.

For example, with political risks, if you want to go into business in another country, what are the particular bureaucratic obstacles and societal challenges that you need to be aware of before you decide whether what you want to do is viable?

JB: Part of the role of security professionals is to respond to risks and emergency situations. For example, the coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the challenges of preparing and responding to global threats. What do you see as the role of security professionals in contingency planning and management? What are the best practices in this field?

AW: What it has highlighted is the tendency of many organisations and governments to ignore issues until something happens. The government was well aware of the threat from pandemics on the horizon. It has been on the National Risk Register in a prominent position. But actually getting organisations to invest sufficiently in the planning is the challenge. You have a lot of business continuity and crisis management professionals or corporate security managers fulfilling those roles.

Planning is key, drawing upon established methodologies to put together business continuity plans. It is similar to the risk management cycle in terms of understanding what is on the horizon, outlining the potential impact of those risks that might derail the business and stop it functioning. Practitioners always recommend regular testing and exercising. This is often what falls by the wayside. You can have an excellent plan, but if you haven’t tested it, when the event happens you may struggle to get people to do what they are supposed to because they haven’t had a chance to test the issues out and operate under pressure. Testing is essential. Many consultants will offer to come in and run these for organisations but they can also run them themselves. Then there is the crisis management response when something does happen. Just like any other aspect of security, this relies on a lot of knowledge sharing and collaboration. It is an area that practitioners with frontline experience are often very good at, as they are good at harnessing networks and working under pressure.

JB: The security profession is often presented as being male dominated both numerically and in
its culture? Has this been your experience? Does the security profession need to change?

 AW: The historic issue is due to the security function not having initially been placed very high in the organisational hierarchy. That is changing. The closer it gets to the Board of an organisation, the more strategic, professional, and better resourced it becomes. Then it attracts a broader range of people with a range of qualifications. In the earlier stages, it was lower down the organisational hierarchy, budgets were small. This is still a concern as frontline security workers are not always well-rewarded and there can be a high turnover. When a sector isn’t well—resourced, it is not good at investing in staff development and will find shortcuts. Historically, the sector has relied upon retired police and military people to fulfil those roles. It is not that long ago that people in those sectors would do thirty year careers and then come out after that, while still relatively young. A lot would go into security, but not necessarily demand high salaries because they had a pension. As the sector has gained more credibility, it is gradually changing and becoming more diverse with people coming in earlier in their careers and often through educational routes. Also, the scope of security has expanded with the cyber dimension as well as the physical, and other areas such as business continuity, investigative functions, counter fraud, and health and safety. The more functions, the more diverse the people taking up those roles. Having said that, there is still a large market for physical security, which does still attract more men.

 The Security Institute has just launched an Inclusive Security Special Interest Group whose premise is that an inclusive profession is more healthy and innovative, as well as more welcoming. As well as being the right thing to do from an equal opportunities perspective, it makes good business sense to attract a broader range of candidates and remove barriers to the best people coming into the sector. As well as being the right thing to do from an equal opportunities perspective, it makes good business sense to attract a broader range of candidates and remove barriers to the best people coming into the sector.

 AW: The police aren’t doing very well in adhering to Robert Peel’s founding principle when establishing the Metropolitan Service in 1829: ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’. At that time he was trying to deal with public resistance to the establishment of the police and emphasised that the police would be drawn from the community it served. Today it clearly isn’t always drawn from the community it serves. Going back over 20 years to the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, there have been long-standing calls for the police to recruit from a more diverse body of people. They haven’t been successful in doing that. That has got to be one of the first measures in order to build trust with those communities. That equally applies to security, particularly frontline security. It needs to cater to the needs of those being protected. Private security is more diverse than policing, but the diversity is not consistent through the hierarchy.

 Everybody needs to play their part in understanding the barriers that other people face. Many of these are to do with poverty as well as ethnicity. Education is always key. It is important to teach frontline practitioners to think about and engage with the wider issues and context in which they are operating. We can all educate ourselves better about issues of equality and diversity. When it is better understood, it is possible to identify the right actions required and embed a more positive culture from top to bottom. Ultimately organisations will


be more successful as they will be richer and more dynamic for the talent and expertise that different types of people bring.

**JB: What are your plans for the future?**

**AW:** I’m relatively new in my job at the University of West London. I will carry on identifying new areas for research and teaching as my work takes me in different directions. When my Security Institute term of office comes to an end I will want to do some more voluntary work. I have undertaken voluntary roles since the age of 16 and I have many passions such as improving routes for young people into security and supporting diversity and inclusion.

I have just completed a book that I will be promoting next year, which is intended to convey to any practitioner, no matter where they sit in the grander puzzle, that we are all part of a common framework. It looks at security from the international level downwards. It has a chapter on regional security, taking a developing world perspective. There are chapters on national security; local security, primarily around policing; security from an individual perspective. It also covers the cyber, corporate and maritime spheres. It looks at threats ranging from transnational organised crime to street crime, knife crime, corporate crime and pandemics, and the common challenges being faced now and anticipated in the future. The idea is that it draws together a range of ideas to present a bigger picture of security that anyone will be able to relate to and apply to their own work. It will show how security has become a major organising feature of society.

---

Reviews

Competing for control: Gangs and the social order of prisons
By: David Pyrooz and Scott Decker
Publisher: Cambridge University Press 2019
Price: £26.99 (Paperback)
Pen Picture: Dr Jamie Bennett is a Deputy Director in HM Prison and Probation Service.

Gangs have become one of the enduring fears of contemporary life. As I write this review, the headlines for the day included fears about rising violent crime and the undermining of public policy:

‘Profoundly worrying’: Knife-wielding gang members now ‘aiming to kill rather than frighten’
Covid loans ‘exploited by crime gangs’

There is deep concern about the impact of gangs in exploiting vulnerable people through drug distribution networks known as ‘county lines’, while a cross government strategy has been developed to promote early intervention and protect those vulnerable to gang involvement.

Inside and outside of prisons in the UK, therefore, gangs are particular concern for the public, media, politicians and practitioners. It is in this light that David Pyrooz and Scott Decker’s extensive research on prison gangs in Texas, provides a particularly important exemplar for integrating research, policy and practice.

This book reports the findings from The LoneStar Project, Pyrooz and Decker’s five year long gang research project in Texas. This was partly funded by the National Institute for Justice, an agency of the agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Texas is the largest state prison system in the US, with a population of nearly 160,000 inmates, twice the size of the England and Wales prison population. The general population of Texas, at 29 million, is about half that of England and Wales. Texas has, in the past experienced high levels of gang violence in prisons, although in recent years this has reduced. There are over 11,000 confirmed gang members in Texan prisons, from 67 different groups. The research involved interviews with over 800 prisoners (368 gang members and 434 non gang members), as well as analysis of inmate records, statewide law enforcement records. The study examined a number of questions, including: how and why do inmates organise themselves into social groups like gangs; how do these groups govern themselves and maintain external relations inside and outside of prison; who gets involved in these groups and how do they join and leave them, and; what are the consequences of group involvement for misconduct and victimisation in prison. There was a particular focus on transitional points, such as entering and leaving prison as well as joining and leaving the gangs.

One of the most obvious questions is defining what a gang is. There have been various definitions proposed, which often a group of people who see themselves (and are seen by others) as a noticeable group, and engage in a range of criminal activity and violence. In this study, Pyrooz and Decker focussed on self-identification, in others words they asked people to identify themselves whether or not they were gang members. They found that there was significant overlap between those that self-identified as gang members and those that officials classified as gang members. This finding suggested that, in contrast to some work on street gangs, that gang membership is not a stigmatising label, the classification is legitimate and has validity in Texan prisons.

References
The research findings are presented in significant detail, with carefully analysed data. This reveals some new insights into the workings of prison gangs in Texas. This includes that the identity of ‘gang’ or ‘non gang’ member was not fixed, but could change on entry into prison, on leaving the prison, or at other points. Contrary to popular belief, gang members were not members for life, but could opt out and leave. Those that did could be anxious about potential repercussions, but in reality there was rarely any violent retribution for leaving gangs. Those that did disengage usually did so not for positive reasons such as family, employment or education, but more often because they became disillusioned with gang life. They often sought a sense of belonging in alternative communities, including faith.

The findings also explored the impact of gangs on prison life. Inmate behaviour and misconduct was shaped by gang membership. Those that were members of gangs were more likely to both be the perpetrators and victims of violence. Most of the violence was between gangs and the others forms of misconduct were generally to do with drug dealing and other contraband. While there have been many different explanations offered for prison violence and misconduct, Pyrooz and Decker argue rather than looking to individual explanations (focussing of factors such as psychology and socio-economic background) or ecology (the prison culture and environment) that:

‘Prison gang membership is a leading explanation for misconduct and victimisation, and ignoring this fact misrepresents our understanding of their occurrence in prison’ (p.180)

In relation to the social world of prisons, the authors describe that prison gangs are important in the production of social order, they do not hold primacy. The gang culture and hierarchy plays a significant role in governing the lives of members, but is less influential for non-gang members and these groups ‘operate in different social worlds’ (p.152).

This study has significant implications for practice. In Texas, it can certainly be used to inform management strategies to promote safety, as well as design and target interventions at critical points. For the UK, this really points to the need for similar large scale research on prison gangs in order to inform a more effective strategy. There are also other groups that could usefully be the subject of similar attention, including peer groups (where the association is not necessarily linked to offending or only lower level non-violent offending) and organised criminal networks (involved in persistent criminality which is causing significant harm to the community). Pyrooz and Decker are to be applauded for producing such an extensive and illuminating study of prison gangs, which really cuts through many assumptions and offers a grounded, empirical analysis. This has the potential to shape policy and practice in Texan prisons. It is also offers a blueprint for the exploration of gangs and criminal networks in UK prisons as well as being a wider model for integrating research, policy and practice.