“Prevent duty”: empirical reflections on the challenges of addressing far-right extremism within secondary schools and colleges in the UK

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“Prevent duty”: empirical reflections on the challenges of addressing far-right extremism within secondary schools and colleges in the UK

Abstract

Forming part of its wider counter-terrorism apparatus, the United Kingdom’s “Prevent duty” imposes a legal requirement on various sectors to show “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. Since its introduction in 2015, the duty has been subject to increasing empirical research, with a particular focus upon the education sector. There has been, however, a distinct lack of scholarly works that specifically explore the issue of far-right extremism within this context, reflected in the often-reluctant policy development in this area. This article directly addresses this gap in research by drawing upon the qualitative experiences of 39 respondents with responsibility for the implementation of the duty within various schools and colleges across Sussex. Thus, through an empirical exploration of the challenges and complexities attached to its enactment, this article is one of the first to offer insights into educators’ negotiations of the duty in relation to far-right extremism. Within the data, three themes were particularly dominant: the normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right narratives; the associated challenges with the implementation of Prevent duty on the ground within classrooms; and considerations around the effective enactment of the duty. The findings demonstrate that addressing far-right extremism within schools and colleges is predictably problematic and closely reflects developments in wider society. It is also argued here that although addressing far-right extremism needs urgent attention, there should be a concerted effort to avoid the same oversights experienced with previous attempts at Prevent-related counter-terrorism.

Introduction

One of the more recent developments in the UK’s counter-terrorism apparatus has been the implementation of “Prevent duty” which imposes a legal requirement on various sectors – including secondary and further education – to show “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2019). Mandated by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (Parliament, UK 2015), the duty has extended rather than replaced the UK’s Prevent Strategy (known informally as “Prevent”) (HM Government 2018). Prevent has, however, been subject to intense and sustained criticism across its various embodiments. Although its first incarnation was considered to be somewhat ground-breaking as an approach to preventing violent extremism (Lakhani 2012), it faced widespread condemnation due to funding decisions, a conflation with wider community cohesion initiatives, and accusations of covertly acting as a vehicle to gather intelligence and spy on Muslim communities (Lakhani 2012; Kundnani 2009). In 2011, the coalition government attempted to resolve some of these concerns in an updated version of the strategy (HM Government 2011), though it contained its own particular problems. The most pertinent related to whom the strategy considered to be an extremist and its definition of the term “extremist” more generally (Lakhani 2014). This is an issue that appears to have transcended boundaries into the implementation of Prevent duty (O’Donnell 2016). Here, there is particular concern that counter-terrorism efforts have been disproportionately focussed upon “Islamic extremism” (Allen, Isakjee, and Ögtem-Young 2019).

This failure to sufficiently address other threats is especially prominent considering the sustained and more visible risk from far-right violent extremism globally (Bjørgo and Ravndal 2019). Within the UK, this can be demonstrated through various publicly accessible data. For example, when looking at arrest figures, there have been gradual increases for persons in custody for terrorism-associated
offences relating to “far-right ideologies”: an increase of 5% between 2018 (13%) and 2019 (18%) (Home Office 2019, 2020). This is further accentuated within Prevent referral and Channel figures (HM Government 2015). In the most recent (at the time of writing) Home Office statistical factsheet released in December 2019 (Home Office 2019a), “Of the 561 individuals who were adopted to a local Channel panel in 2018/19, 210 (37%) were refered for concerns related to Islamist extremism and 254 (45%) were referred for concerns related to right-wing extremism”. Although there are complexities to this that will be discussed later, importantly, for the first time, far-right extremist referrals have overtaken “Islamist extremism” in terms of adopted cases. When focussing upon data from educational institutions this concern remains, whereby between April 2018 to March 2019 “Of the 1,389 referrals for concerns related to right-wing radicalisation, the Education sector made the highest number of referrals (530; 38%) . . . ” (Home Office 2019b, 12).

Of late, however, there have been indications that the UK government at least appears to be moving towards treating the threat from far-right extremism with the seriousness it requires. For one, there was a marked departure with the security services taking on increased responsibility for far-right extremism (Dearden 2019), and the inclusion of far-right terrorism within the UK’s terror threat level (BBC 2019). The Challenging Hateful Extremism Report, by the Commission for Countering Extremism (2019), further placed far-right extremism at the centre of concerns. Here, alongside anxieties around the mainstreaming of far-right narratives and ideologies, it found that far-right extremism was the largest concern for practitioner respondents (68%), closely followed by Islamist extremism (64%) (Ibid: 19). However, there is suggestion here that whilst this threat is increasingly visible in the form of (as mentioned) increased arrests (Allen, Isakjee, and Ögtem-Young 2019, 4), a rise in referrals to Channel (ibid: 3; Allen 2019), and the proscription of organisations such as National Action (Macklin 2018, 2019; Allen, Isakjee, and Ögtem-Young 2019), there remain “concerns as to whether existing counter-terrorism policies and measures – to date having almost solely been applied in response to Islamist extremism – remain fit for purpose” (Allen, Isakjee, and Ögtem-Young 2019: 1), particularly in addressing and dealing with far-right extremism.

In addition – and although concerns around an increasing threat from far-right extremism and government efforts to counter it have been more evident within public discourse (Quinn, Grierson, and Gayle 2019; Commission for Countering Extremism 2019; Hope Not Hate 2020) – there has been little, if any, scholarship which has explored these issues in relation to the implementation of the Prevent duty. Instead, much of the literature has focussed upon the potential impact felt by Muslim communities due to the disproportionality in previous iterations of Prevent. To this extent, a significant amount of research, both pre- and post-duty, has centred around the lived experiences and potential implications upon Muslim students (see, for example, Kyriacou et al. 2017; Sjøen and Jore 2019). Whilst this literature has provided important lessons for minimising these problematic outcomes, it can be argued that academic work has generally failed to engage sufficiently with far-right extremism. The presence of narratives and ideas associated with these organisations within educational spaces – particularly, secondary and further education – have thus been largely ignored, as has an exploration of the ways in which they are countered by educators in light of their responsibilities to the duty. Research which provides an empirical grounding of this claim is of paramount importance.

Drawing upon empirical data collected as part of a funded research project undertaken by the lead author, this article addresses these pertinent issues in relation to far-right extremism within schools and colleges across the county of Sussex, thereby contributing to this highly under-researched area of study. When analysing the data, three particular contemporary concerns (or themes) were especially prominent: the normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right narratives; the associated challenges with the implementation of Prevent duty on the ground within classrooms; and subsequent and wider considerations around the effective enactment of the duty. Prior to discussing
these themes, an investigation of contemporary concerns will first be explored through relevant scholarly works. This discussion provides an important foundation for the empirical sections by engaging with the definitional complexities of key terms used within this study (such as “far-right extremism”). It also explores the increasing mainstreaming and normalisation of associated narratives, and a broader investigation of concerns with the duty, predominantly within educational settings. This is followed by details of the methodological approach taken by the study. A short empirical prologue then follows which outlines respondents’ perceptions of far-right extremism, importantly further setting the scene for the empirical discussions to follow. The three empirical themes are then explored in detail, followed by a discussion.

An investigation of contemporary concerns

With the contemplation of the key themes, concepts, and findings running throughout this article, it is both important and useful to at least begin to explore and consider approaches that attempt to define what the far- or extreme-right is. In this regard, Carter (2018, 157) suggests that “despite the frequent warnings that we lack an unequivocal definition of this concept, there is actually a high degree of consensus amongst the definitions put forward by different scholars”. However, as she also notes, whilst “most concur that the concept of right-wing extremism/radicalism primarily describes an ideology . . . there is wide recognition that defining the right is, in itself, a very difficult task” (ibid: 160–161). Carter, therefore, “canvasses the recent academic literature to explore how the concept has been described and defined” and, using Mudde’s (1995) influential study, proposes key features which emerge. The work determines that across the selected “15 sets of scholars . . . deemed to be authoritulative and influential” (Carter 2018, 161), there were only slight shifts which had emerged in the years prior to their own work. In this regard, Mudde’s (1995) study found five key characteristics: “nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state” (Carter 2018, 161), with Carter (2018, 174) similarly proposing that “authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and an exclusionary and/or a holistic kind of nationalism are defining properties of right-wing extremism/radicalism”. Importantly, Carter also notes that “[b]y contrast, xenophobia, racism, and populism are accompanying characteristics of the concept”, as opposed to central ones (ibid).

Further, the generalised use of the term “far-right” to describe and discuss a range of individuals, groups, ideologies and narratives should also be mentioned. In this regard, as argued by Lee (2019, 18), the term “far-right” is used as a container term for a diverse set of views ranging from revolutionary neo-Nazism to radical right-wing populism that seeks to work (mostly) within established democratic systems. These views are all characterised by hostility to perceived alien groups within societies, although the level and form of this hostility varies widely. Far-right ideologies are seldom advocated directly but are more usually embedded in narratives.

However, whilst the importance of differentiating between extreme right-wing organisations like National Action, street protest movements like the English Defence League and far-right political parties like UKIP is recognised, this article also appreciates the value of considering the label of “far-right,” as an umbrella term. This, in-line with other scholarship in the field (ibid), enables acknowledgement and engagement with both the fluidity of these organisations and their ideologies, and the difficulties faced by academics and practitioners alike in distinguishing between the multi-faceted forms in which they manifest (Mudde 2019).

Although Mudde (1995), Carter (2018) and Lee (2019) provide useful foundations for consideration, there needs to be further engagement with the concepts of “far-right extremism” and “far-right terrorism” more specifically; a contemplation of importance considering the context of this article.
This is particularly relevant when considering that the “far-right as a whole is amorphous. Its messiness is inherent . . .” (Lee 2019, 2). Further, as appropriately argued by Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019, 2), relevant terms in this area such as “far-right”, “radical right”, “extreme-right”, and concepts like extreme-right violence/terrorism (and their variations) are often used interchangeably, though they “should be used in ways that are more precise to avoid ambiguity about which phenomenon we discuss or measure”. Thus, should there be a distinction between those who are prepared to use violence or more likely to use violence? If so, how should they be represented?

In order to provide a more nuanced approach, Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019, 3–5) outline three “far-right ‘families’” consisting of cultural nationalists (e.g. “radical-right populist parties and movements against immigration and Islam”), ethnic nationalists (e.g. “exemplified by the Identitarian movement in Europe”), and racial nationalists (e.g. “based on ideas of racial purity and embrace totalitarian principles”), with the second, and (increasingly) latter, categories being more likely to engage in violence and/or terrorism. However, there is, as expected, complexity within this model where the authors outline how groups and individuals do not always fit cleanly into one of these categories, and that there is sometimes collaboration across them. In fact, the three categories span across both far-right “radical” and “extremist” considerations.

It is, therefore, useful to make clarification here between “radical” and “extremist” “where radical movements work for change within the framework of democracy whereas extremists reject democracy and are willing to use violence or other non-conventional means to achieve their goals” (Bjørgo and Ravndal 2019, 2). However, it needs to be considered that attitudes towards democracy can differ across groups and ideologies and thus should be treated with caution (Lee 2019). These considerations are, of course, relevant within the context of this article in terms of using the term “far-right extremism”, where further distinctions can be made for terms such as “far-right violent extremism” (and of course between “violence” and “terrorism” within this context (Bjørgo and Ravndal 2019)), rather than wider etymological considerations of the term “extremist” (see, for example, Pisoiu, 2012). As a part of this, it is important to make a further definitional distinction here; this being, the value of considering the concept of “terrorism” more analytically (Richards, 2019). The use of additional terms interchangeably adds further complication, such as “hate crime”. Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019, 6) argue that this term is particularly problematic as it “include[s] incidents that qualify as extreme-right violence or terrorism but also includes acts that are non-violent . . . [and] the categories of people protected by hate crime legislation vary considerably between different countries and legislations”. As a result, “statistics on frequency levels and trends of (extreme-right) violence, terrorism, and hate crimes” are “often misleading” (ibid).

Further complication is added, and the contemplations thus far become particularly critical, when considering mounting anxieties around how far-right ideas, narratives, and ideologies are becoming increasingly normalised and mainstreamed within society and, as a result, seep into the discourses engaged with, or visible to, students and their teachers. Recent literature has demonstrated the capacity for ideologies associated with far-right organisations to become emboldened through both media and political discourse, and subsequently find their way into public rhetoric (Mondon and Winter 2020). The media perpetuation of these ideologies has been found to be significant in not only driving support for such discourses (Murphy and Devine 2018) but for providing plat- forms, particularly through online sources (Winter 2019), for them to be hyper-visible. Some have noted how they have acted as gateways for further engagement, whether actively through “larger networks and subcultures” (Mondon and Winter 2020, 148) or passively through problematic algorithms of suggested content to follow on sites like YouTube (Lewis 2018; Lee 2019). As argued by Allen (2019), the visibility of their activities and ideologies across these platforms have been utilised by far-right extremists as a means to capitalise on the more modern mainstream interpretation of
nationalism, particularly in the recruitment of young people in the hope of improving “their overall aesthetic appeal” (Lee 2019: 9; Macklin 2018). Abbas and Awan (2015, 22) suggest that as a result, “[i]t appears far-right extremist groups have been able to gain momentum and support relatively quickly”.

However, the effect of this increased mainstreaming and normalisation is absent from the Prevent duty literature, particularly how it transpires “on the ground” within classrooms across the country. This is particularly relevant when considering how these developments could further influence some of the existing criticisms that have been raised more generally towards the duty. These include concerns around asking teachers to spot signs of radicalisation, particularly when radicalisation itself is ill-defined within policy and academia (Moffat and Gerard 2019; O’Donnell 2016). This can have implications for referrals due to increasingly blurred lines, perceived or otherwise, between racially motivated hate, hate crimes and xenophobia, amongst others, and concerns related to Prevent (an issue discussed more widely in terms of terrorism statistics (Bjørgo and Ravndal 2019)).

This becomes particularly apparent when considering Prevent data. Although the aforementioned Prevent statistics appropriately outline an increased awareness and growth of the threat, a large percentage of all referrals (rather than just far-right extremism related), around 77%, “were deemed not suitable for Channel consideration and exited the process prior to a Channel panel discussion” (Home Office 2019b, 6). Further, of those “referrals deemed suitable through preliminary assessment to be discussed at a Channel panel . . . [58%] did not go on to be adopted as a Channel case” (ibid: 7). As Lakhani (2020, 2) argues in his empirical research on the duty in educational settings, although there are wider considerations here, “it can be hypothesised that a potentially sizeable number of the ‘no further action’ and ‘deemed not suitable for Channel’ categories could relate to erroneous . . . referrals, at least in the context of Prevent duty”. Thus, the higher levels of referrals could be due to an increasing awareness and growth of the threat itself, and the attrition rates due to erroneous referrals linked to practitioner confusion around what is considered to be an issue of far-right extremism and one that relates to racially motivated hate, or similar, alone. Therefore, as Lakhani (2020) asserts, this becomes just as much about reducing erroneous referrals as it is about identifying and supporting individuals considered to be “at risk”.

There are also broader implications that need to be considered in relation to wider anxieties held with the duty. Within the context of this study, this could relate to better determining: the relationship between extremism and terrorism, including the wider question of where the balance lies between education, freedom and security (Miah 2017; Dudenhofer 2018; Ramsay 2017); the epistemological shifts in pre-criminal counter-terrorism space (Heath-Kelly 2017); the tensions that exist between fostering debate, safe spaces and referrals (Elwick and Jerome 2019); and the issue of losing trust between students and teachers when a referral is made (Moffat and Gerard 2019). The implementation of the duty has also raised wider questions around whether or not educators should be expected to undertake these roles, where commentators have warned against both the potential securitisation of education and burdening teachers with the responsibility of “policing” their students (O’Donnell 2016). This could lead, according to Lundie (2019, 322), to the “blurring notions of due process and culpability which have typically bounded police work”. There are, then, anxieties around the duty developing a “counter-productive” nature (Durodie 2016; Davies 2016), and fear of educators being drawn into a “villain-victim” imagery of their students (Sieckelink, Kaulingfreks, and De Winter 2015), resulting in the “alienation, disaffection and disengagement” of pupils more generally, with wider concerns over academic freedom (Taylor and Soni 2017).

Saying that, recent research has found that despite these fears, professional opposition to the duty has been limited with some evidence of positive acceptance (Busher et al. 2017; Bryan 2017; Busher and Jerome 2020; James 2020a). Further, some of the wider concerns initially raised, including the
duty creating a “chilling effect” upon free speech and thought (Rights Watch UK 2016), appear to have not entirely manifested (Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim 2019; James 2020a). Much of this is due to placing the duty within existing safeguarding structures (Busher et al. 2017; Busher, Choudhury, and Thomas 2019; McGlynn and McDaid 2019; Bryan 2017; Higton et al. 2018; Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim 2019; Sjøen and Jore 2019), and due to the duty being flexible enough for teachers to enact agency (Lakhani 2020; James 2020b; Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim 2019; Elwick and Jerome 2019). In this regard, within Lakhani’s (2020) aforementioned research it was demonstrated that the enactment of social capital through informal relationships was critical to providing support to teachers, Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSLs) and institutions more widely, whilst for others the level and perceived quality of training and resource were central to ideas of confidence (Moffat and Gerard, 2019; Elwick and Jerome 2019). However, although these scholarly works begin to delineate the different roles, responsibilities and resources which hold importance with the effective enactment of the duty, the literature would benefit from a particular focus upon how they play out in relation to far-right extremism. This article begins to address these gaps in the research.

Methodology

This article is based upon empirical data collected between September 2018 and June 2019 for a British Academy and Leverhulme Trust funded project undertaken by the lead author. As part of the original methodology, it was intended that a total of 30 qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews would be completed across three pre-determined sites within the county of Sussex (located in the South East of England in the UK). Of these 30 interviews, 24 were planned with various DSLs, Deputy Designated Safeguarding Leads (DDSLs), and teachers working in secondary schools or colleges. The remaining six interviews were to be conducted with local-level Prevent leads. However, the data collection faced a critical issue owing to the response rate from the (randomly) pre-selected schools and colleges being extremely low. It can be hypothesised that this was due to a number of reasons, including institutions being too busy and heavily under-resourced; being “over-researched”, i.e. participating in much research of late whereby they have research fatigue; and due to a cautiousness with engaging in research that is highly controversial and sensitive in nature. A new methodology was therefore developed comprised of a “bottom-up” approach based upon the principles of “snowballing” (see Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam 2003). The lead author sent emails to colleagues and disseminated requests on social media to friends living in and around Sussex to be put in touch with teachers at any secondary school or college across the entire county, rather than just the originally planned three pre-determined areas. As a result, a number of potential respondents were identified and contacted, and additional ones were snow-balled through these individuals.

In total, 39 in-depth qualitative interviews were completed, surpassing the original target. Of these, 29 were undertaken in schools and colleges, 11 with teachers, and 18 with DSLs and DDSLs (16 male and 13 female interviewees). In terms of their geographical breakdown, 14 were conducted in West Sussex, 10 in Brighton (East Sussex), four in other parts of East Sussex, and one interviewee who preferred to keep their local area completely anonymous. Four of these interviews were in schools only (i.e. with no sixth-form or college attached), five in colleges, and 20 in schools which either had an attached sixth-form or college. Finally, the remaining 10 interviews were completed with Prevent officers in Sussex Police, and local and county officials working on the Prevent agenda. A constructivist grounded theory approach was adopted in order to avoid overlooking (and to further explore) under-researched topics (Charmaz 2012).

Perceptions of far-right extremism: an empirical prologue
Prior to discussing the three prominent empirical themes to emerge from the data, it is important to set the scene, so to speak, by outlining respondents’ perceptions of the risk emanating from far-right extremism. As expected, the data indicated that these perceptions were often varied and conflicting in nature, though the majority of respondents at least appeared to understand and appreciate the potential severity of the threat. Saying that, however, there were still a (albeit very minor) number of participants who suggested that they would be “more panicked” if extremist views “came from an ethnic student” (R22 Interview, Teacher). Similarly, others spoke of how their institutions or local areas were “not very ethnically diverse” (R31 Interview, DSL/DDSL). When pushed, it became clear that the duty was not considered to be a pressing issue due to the continuing association between Prevent and “Islamic extremism”, as told by one respondent:

... perhaps when living and working in a town like [town name deleted] it’s difficult to regard Prevent as being a really high priority for this local area because of the demographics of the area, so it’s really a duty which we fulfil ... There are many other issues that we would regard as being more important ... we’re not particularly thrilled about having to kind of squeeze it into our curriculum or lever it into our college timetable. (R36 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

These types of sentiments were recognised as potentially problematic by various respondents. For example, one explained how these potential misperceptions of the threat were something their institution was actively working to counter:

... in the college we have training schemes that happen in inset days around about twice a year at the moment ... because there does tend to be a tendency to think it’s a predominantly kind of White area, and therefore radicalisation is not really an issue but we certainly do have cases here ... (R10 Interview, Teacher)

Some interviewees felt that the media had much influence within this situation, believing that they had failed to fully delineate the parameters and risks associated with far-right extremism as a more visible and increasing threat. These respondents suggested there had been “a biased media presentation” in that “the media doesn’t reflect far-right extremism or far right-terrorism in that same way” (R1 Interview, DSL/DDSL). For them, the media framed terrorism as “Islamic fundamentalism rather than any other fundamentalism” (R3 Interview, Teacher). Terrorism, some participants argued, had long been presented as “just a Muslim thing” (R1 Interview, DSL/DDSL). On the other hand, others were far more positive about media reporting and asserted that recent increased (perceived or otherwise) coverage of far-right extremism within the media was important with influencing their colleagues’ awareness of this issue.

Overall, as mentioned, the vast majority of respondents understood that Prevent should consider all forms of extremism. In fact, on many occasions, in relation to the duty, it was felt that far-right extremism was the most pressing threat within their own local situations. There was an appreciation that far-right extremism is a serious issue, one that is becoming increasingly prominent. Even those institutions that did not have many referrals, and in some cases none, generally agreed that there should not be any complacency of the threat becoming more visible:

Respondent: “… there haven’t been any cases of far-right extremism either …”

Interview: “So, has your training specifically focused on what is generally referred to as Islamic extremism?”
Respondent: “We focused on extremism as a whole . . . To overcome that danger of being complacent and saying, ‘this is a lovely middle-class college and therefore we don’t have extremism here’”. (R10 Interview, Teacher)

Normalisation and mainstreaming of the far-right

For many respondents within the study, the increasing normalisation and mainstreaming of narratives, ideas, rhetoric, and ideologies associated with the far-right (NMFR) often formed the foundation of discussions in relation to their Prevent duty. This set the basis for numerous contemplations on far-right extremism or what was perceived to be far-right extremism. Within the data, a number of respondents spoke of how – albeit an extremely small minority of – students displayed “extremist views in terms of nationalism, white-nationalism” (R10 Interview, Teacher), and problematic conceptions around immigrants (R22 Interview, Teacher). As a result, “tensions” (R6 Interview, County Council) between White and the perceived immigrant of often non-White communities were “quite entrenched” (R31 Interview, DSL/DDSL). Further, some respondents argued that strains within “coastal, under-achieving, high-level deprivation areas” have been a key tenet of the mainstreaming of far-right discourse (R5 Interview, County Council), with wider literature outlining how such organisations have long utilised tensions within and between communities to further their narratives (see Burdsey 2011; Polakow-Suransky 2017). Thus, as one respondent working at the local level argued: “[T]hose attitudes are probably more readily expressed [in those areas] and people are more used to hearing them so they don’t necessarily get reported in” (R5 Interview, County Council).

For some respondents, key events like Brexit had both enabled and emboldened such narratives (Mudde 2019; Hope Not Hate 2020). Although, as mentioned above, community tensions are not new facets of exploitation for far-right organisations (Jackson and Feldman 2011), where the demand and supply of support for the far-right can be high-lighted and synergised (Cifuentes, Whittaker, and Lake 2013), Brexit was seen by participants to promote the acceptability of these narratives of the Other. This positioned immigrants as harmful to national identity and socio-economic security (Schwartz et al. 2019):

I do think that there are racist assumptions in the wider community that have to be challenged. And you see things coming in – you come out and you talk to people about Brexit and things like that, because I think that’s opened up – the whole Leave campaign was built around immigration and it’s made it okay to say things that are not okay. (R31 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

Although the far-right landscape is far more complicated (Lee 2019), participants within the data even suggested that a student’s demographics and family background could perceivably have some influence on their rhetoric. This is a consideration that they felt made challenging far-right discourse and ideologies more difficult. Thus, numerous respondents often felt that these views were a repetition of discourses around them, rather than beliefs students had internalised.3 Therefore, there was sometimes a shifting of responsibility for the promotion of, or engagement with, far-right narratives from students onto those within their wider circles, predominantly their parents. The ideas then became something which required challenging, rather than referring, since they belonged to the wider discourse:

What seems to be almost quite clear, they are just repeating what they hear their parents say or what they hear on televisions. And when we challenge them on those notions, so for example if they say, “Oh immigrants are coming into this country and the issues for
In addition, the data indicated that the role and effect of publicly accessible platforms were also considered to be noteworthy. The capacity of media outlets to influence public discourse has been explored across multiple academic disciplines, with scholars such as Ansari and Hafez (2012) demonstrating the debate’s applicability to far-right influence and NMFR within the UK. Further, some respondents feared that the proliferation and widespread use of social media and other online spaces would foster an “echo chamber of the same views just permeating” (R17 Interview, Assistant Head). However, though the challenging of these views was felt to be becoming “more common” (R32 Interview, DSL/DDSL), it was the mainstreaming of these discourses which led some of the respondents to conclude that such ideas would not be seen as the basis for referral. Moreover, for some participants, the repetition of rhetoric by students from people like Tommy Robinson, though problematic, was not equated to support for far-right extremist organisations: What can you do with someone who is just viewing Tommy Robinson videos and repeating what is said there at school? It is hard. And I think that is when you get into all that attitudinal stuff and having to have conversations with parents and the parents may be supporting those views. And we have certainly had that. Really challenging isn’t it for teachers to have to deal with all that? (R6 Interview, County Council)

For many, this was an extremely challenging and confusing area of engagement. The complexity here stems from a deeper understanding (or lack) of what is considered to be far-right extremism as opposed to other racially motivated hate or hateful rhetoric. For many respondents, the NMFR was thought to impact people’s perceived “threshold” of what warranted a far-right extremist referral. Thus, “trigger points” to indicate a referral over a far-right extremism related concern could, as a result, potentially be “a lot higher” than for Islamic extremism, as one participant concluded (R20 Interview, DSL/DDSL). At the same time, however, there were also very real concerns that teachers could refer due to a lack of understanding, and as a result some students could be referred to Prevent erroneously. There is, then, a potential difficulty here with maintaining balance. Much of this has impact and effect on how Prevent is implemented “on the ground”.

Prevent duty OTG

When considering the enactment of Prevent duty on the ground, this increased NMFR contributes to wider issues felt within schools and colleges. In this regard, as mentioned earlier, one prominent concern to emerge from the data analysis was a blurring of lines between what could be considered as a far-right extremist issue and one that is of a racist or hateful nature alone. It is important to mention here that although there is by no means any disparity or casualisation towards racism or hate crime, at the same time there needs to be an avoidance of Channel referrals made for issues that do not correspond to the Prevent agenda. There are of course strong and distinct overlaps between them (Bjørgo and Ravnadl 2019; Carter 2018). However, at the same time, there should not be conflation between them, particularly when considering wider works which consider racism to be part of “accompanying characteristics”, rather than a defining property (Carter 2018).

The conflation of incidents of racism, hate, bullying, and other behavioural issues with far-right extremism was a general theme visible in the data. One teacher demonstrated this very issue, who, when asked “do you have concerns with the rise of far-right extremism within your school”, replied, “a good example would be the racial incidents, the incidents of racial abuse ...” (R30 Interview,
DSL/DDSL). DSLs within the study appeared to be particularly aware of this concern adding to their (already burgeoning (Lakhani 2020)) responsibilities by having to decipher between actual and erroneous Prevent referrals: “So, I get a lot of referrals about, for example, racist incidents . . . usually it’s got nothing to do with Prevent . . . I’d say to be honest I think it’s a little bit ill informed” (R34 Interview, DSL/DDSL). This was supported by a respondent working at the local level with responsibility for the delivery of Prevent:

. . . it also is about not getting too muddled with hate crime and the crossover into that arena, and I think sometimes that gets forgotten about with Prevent, and some of it is just quite clearly defined hate crime, although low-level but that’s the beginnings of it, but it’s not really Prevent. But people just put all these things into the box don’t they, whether or not its racism or ideology . . . (R39 Interview, County Council)

At the same time, however, another local authority representative was concerned that separating hate crime and far-right extremism can also be detrimental, arguing, “but there are a lot of elements that come out in schools very early on around hate crime and bullying that are recorded as incidents. They’re often the initial seeds of somebody’s understanding, their beliefs, their views of another group of people” (R19 Interview, County Council). This, then, not only highlights the complexity of the issue as demonstrated in wider literature (Carter 2018; Bjørgo and Ravndal 2019) but also puts teachers in a difficult position to be able to find some middle ground. Deciphering between these positions is influenced by the NMFR, but also goes beyond this to reflect the increasing interconnectivity between different established and emerging ideological positions. As the same respondent continued, “You can’t is isolate what an extremist is, to a racist, to somebody who hates women. There’s something that’s misconnecting with quite a lot of these young adults in one way or another. It’s very difficult to put everything into a box” (R39 Interview, County Council).

Although numerous institutions were clear that they “trust the staff . . . to be able to distinguish between somebody who was interested in basically exploring ideas and critically evaluating ideas, and somebody who had an extremist agenda” (R36 Interview, DSL/DDSL), the details of how this is accomplished were often vague. This is by no means to disparage the dedicated work undertaken by the vast majority of teachers within schools, something that was abundantly clear in the passion displayed by the respondents within the study, but more so to highlight the general lack of understanding within this area (an issue shared by other sectors alike (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019)):

I think people find it almost harder to deal with because I suppose it is not as widely explained I don’t think . . . racism or sexism, those sorts of things are very clear to people, people know more about them and understand them more. Whereas I think the far-right part, I myself and other teachers have definitely found that harder because it is not something they know a lot about. (R28 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

The pressing question then is how do teachers make that distinction? As mentioned earlier in reference to Lakhani’s (2020) research, it is emphasised here that this is just as much about reducing erroneous referrals as it is about identifying and supporting individuals considered to be “at risk”. There will, of course, be some cases where individuals are forthcoming about particular extremist ideologies that they are either exploring or have internalised. However, many others will not be so vocal, where the subtleties in determining this position can often be missed. As has been demonstrated in wider research (Busher et al. 2017; Busher, Choudhury, and Thomas 2019), several respondents elucidated how one mode of identifying students “at risk” was based upon “instinct” or picking up on something “not being quite right”. This was considered to be part of their “professional judgement and their professional curiosity”, as one interviewee explained, “that feeling when something is not quite right” (RS Interview, County Council).
As another DSL pointed out, however, although there is a general lack of understanding in this area, there is still room for overconfidence and complacency with this approach:

... and through overconfidence in our ability, I think we can miss things . . . [teachers] assume that they would know. “If I saw it, I would know immediately!” Rather than asking themselves questions about whether things that they’re seeing are necessarily relevant, but I think that’s the same for everyone really. (R20 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

There could be, of course, some merit in this approach, as teachers often spend numerous hours with these students and might be able to determine any “changes in behaviour” through “having really good relationships [with them]” (R25 Interview, Teacher). However, a number of associated challenges were highlighted within the data. First, there needs to be some appreciation that teachers will have emotional attachments to their students which could lead them to question their actions. For example, one teacher within the sample spoke of a student they had referred – one they had spent much time tutoring on a one-to-one basis – and reflected on whether it was “just a knee jerk reaction in me just hoping that it wasn’t something worse than that” (R22 Interview, Teacher). Here, teachers’ wellbeing must not be neglected either, as the same respondent explained, “it did upset me for a couple of days to think was he really of this type of ilk and did he really believe in this stuff? Like that really upset me”.

Second, in schools and colleges with larger student numbers, implementing the “something is not quite right” approach is often more problematic:

And sometimes maybe the tell-tale signs might not be the best ways to help identify it especially when it is in a heavy timetable of older students and when I am dealing with various other sorts of things on a day-to-day basis . . . it did make me think how many students are withdrawn and how many might go under the radar. (R22 Interview, Teacher)

Third, and potentially most critically within the context of this article, is that a change in behaviour by no means reflects a relationship with extremism. An aspect that is often overlooked is the consideration that these students (who potentially might be “at risk”) are adolescents, with similar tendencies, wants, needs, and desires to others in their age bracket. As demonstrated in wider studies (see Lakhani 2020, for example), young people often make what respondents described as “stupid comments” (R19 Interview, County Council; R23 Interview, Sussex Police), or explore radical ideas, attention seek, or consistently change their behaviour as they move between adolescence and adulthood. These incidents may occur – in different forms that could (albeit spuriously) be linked to issues around Prevent – on relatively regular occurrences. Here, teachers have the often-challenging task to be able to distinguish between “stupid comments” and those that indicate that a student is “at risk”:

... it was actually me who referred the student, the student had daubed swastikas and what you would probably associate with White power slogans across their exam paper in an exam because they got bored basically. And so, he had a really challenging conversation with a member of the police force who said he had satisfied himself that he understood this wasn’t the right thing to do . . . I think basically that is the way we approach it in school and it is kind of to think really carefully about it. Because young people do stupid things all the time . . . (R32 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

This is especially important when proportionality is considered. By this it is intended, as mentioned at numerous points in this article, that this is not merely about spotting, referring, and/or supporting
those considered to be “at risk”, but just as importantly also about ensuring that erroneous referrals are reduced (Lakhani 2020). Maintaining this balance is often complicated and challenging: “So I think it is not that there are young people who could be going down all sorts of extreme routes and you need to be spotting it . . . But I guess that counters with the idea that are you then going to unleash a whole nightmare stuff on a young person based on one relatively innocuous comment?” (R21 Interview, Teacher).

There are, however, wider points of contemplation here beyond the fear of missing opportunities to support a student considered to be “at risk” or making erroneous referrals. As reflected in broader literature (Lakhani 2020), an issue that adds complexity to this situation is that Prevent might not be the most pressing safeguarding concern within educational institutions, and due to limited resources is often pushed further down the agenda – a sentiment also demonstrated within the data here. Thus, an important consideration then is how does this – and wider deliberations within this article thus far – impact and have implications for the effective enactment of the duty? This is the focus of the next and final empirical section.

Effective enactment of the duty: roles, responsibilities and resources

The concerns and complexities raised within the last section lead to wider considerations of how they can begin to be addressed. Here, there is particular attention towards institution and individual roles, responsibilities and resources. An aspect of this relates to whether teachers choose to address issues that arise within the classroom itself, decide to refer, or a combination of both. Within the data, the response to this was varied and often paralleled wider findings which assert that confidence in one’s knowledge and ability are significant factors to consider (Revell and Bryan 2018). The particular subject that individual educators taught was also important in terms of perceived capacity to be able to deal with these types of issues and whether or not a referral was justified. Teachers engaged in specific subjects, commonly sociology (or humanities based), politics, and history, often felt like their classrooms were spaces where ideas and concepts could and should (within reason) be discussed and challenged, if needed (see also Moffat and Gerard, 2020; Higton et al. 2018). Saying that, the intensity and fast-moving pace of the curriculum often restricted the depth of these conversations. Within this, there is some ambiguity about what can be considered as acceptable discussion where, as outlined within the first empirical section above, boundaries can often be blurred. Context also plays an important role as, for example, a student raising potentially contentious points about Adolf Hitler in a history or politics lesson could be dealt with in a different way, as compared to if the incident occurred within a science-based class, i.e. with little or no relevance to the topic being discussed:

So, we don’t say or do anything to get angry with them because obviously they are still developing so we try and give them that safe space to kind of like challenge but invite them to discuss what they have said. But do it in a place where we are controlling the conversation to a certain extent of making sure it doesn’t get out of hand . . . (R22 Interview, Teacher)

. . . I think you are in the best position as a teacher to unpick that a little bit. Rather than a kid being called into an office and being told, “Right Chris apparently you have said some of the things in Mein Kampf sound sensible?” And the kid is going to shut down whereas you are in a position to delve a little deeper in that and say, “Why are you saying that?” (R21 Interview, Teacher)
The data did suggest, however, that there are some limitations to this confidence. There was general—although not entirely unanimous—agreement from respondents that they would be more confident in dealing with issues around far-right extremism within the classroom, particularly where, as mentioned above, the discussion is relevant to the context of the lesson. Further, as expected, familiarity (perceived or otherwise) was also linked to confidence. The data indicated that there was markedly less confidence in dealing with issues around Islamic extremism more generally. Much of this was due to a number of reasons, which included the vast majority of respondents not being Muslim, having a lack of knowledge on Muslims and Islam, and also fear of being perceived as racist or potentially isolating Muslim students. In terms of far-right extremism, as many connected it with racism or hate crime and, as mentioned previously, often conflated these concepts, numerous respondents felt they had far more familiarity with this issue from their own experience at school or dealing with family members, for instance, who expressed these types of views:

I suppose I would feel more comfortable about challenging far-right White extremism because I think I would feel more like knowledgeable . . . then I think if it was like another type of extremism that I just didn’t know about as well I maybe would not feel as comfortable . . . I think I would worry about maybe being seen as like racist or xenophobic or something like that if I challenged something and felt like I had done it in the wrong way.

(R26 Interview, Teacher)

Saying that, teachers perceiving themselves to be more comfortable with dealing with far-right extremism-related matters should not be conflated with them having the necessary training or experience to effectively engage with this issue. Further, being more knowledgeable about far-right extremism, as compared to other forms of extremism, should also not be conflated with being well-enough informed. There are, though, wider mechanisms available to teachers which help to mitigate some of these concerns. As Prevent is part of existing safeguarding duties (Department for Education 2019)—a decision that is generally favoured by schools and colleges (Busher et al. 2017; Busher, Choudhury, and Thomas 2019)—teachers often have access to support structures within their own institution, normally facilitated by DSLs/DDSLs. As Lakhani’s (2020) research demonstrated, DSLs/DDSLs play a pivotal role in reducing anxiety, stress, and increasing confidence in teachers with regards to their Prevent duty. These safeguarding leads have the ability to look over a range of information in relation to their students, rather than acting upon one incident which may not provide enough context regarding whether or not a student needs to be referred through Channel (ibid):

As the DSL I see everything . . . if there is then a pattern, in the same way as I would look at patterns in safeguarding generally . . . I would do the same with something like a racist comment . . . we would have to build the evidence in the same way as we would do with any safeguarding referral that I would need to put forward . . . if there was a comment that there needs action [to be] taken, for example, at a student support level with the head of school, a conversation would be had with the student. If the conversation has been had and the child doesn’t take it very seriously or we feel that the child needs a greater level of intervention, at that stage we would then refer to a Police Liaison Officer. Again, we’re lucky to have someone who comes in and works well with our students on antisocial behaviour [and] a number of different things. (R37 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

Alongside outlining the fundamental role played by DSLs/DDSLs within the context of Prevent duty, the above respondent also demonstrated the vital support provided by wider services, including the police and local authorities/county councils. The value of social capital is imperative within these situations with informal relationships playing key roles (Lakhani 2020). The informal (and formal) relationships that exist between schools, colleges and other local-level public sector authorities
appear to be important for all parties involved and vital for the delivery of the duty. This was demonstrated across numerous examples within the data, sometimes in response to gaining a deeper understanding of the growing threat of far-right extremism, or being able to better determine between issues of racism alone, for example, and those relating to Prevent. For instance, one DSL spoke of bringing in police officers for training:

I have asked for face-to-face training as well with our local Prevent Police Officer . . . Because I feel that it's always necessary to do refresher training around training anyway, but particularly around far-right extremism. I think there is a need for it to be flagged really. I think the more it’s flagged the more likely staff are going to be more comfortable about raising it if there is an issue within the classroom. And they will have a better understanding of how to get into a conversation or relate to that conversation, to support the student within the classroom. (R37 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

Alongside the participation and consultation of the police – and other local-level actors involved in the delivery of Prevent and other services – the respondents also spoke of the involvement of parents:

There have been occasions where, I’ve had a boy there, I’ve been made aware of his social media account, he’s been making really nasty right-wing violence in terms of, the pages he has up there, so . . . First of all, [I went] to his father, talk to his father and show him the evidence and his father was horrified, and he went on with that. We look on balance, whether this was something that we also should refer to Prevent. (R8 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

However, some respondents demonstrated concern towards how the situation becomes more complicated if they suspect the student’s parents subscribe to similar viewpoints and/or ideologies. This is particularly relevant to the conversation in the previous empirical section in relation to the NMFR, and in turn applicable to the subsequent empirical section which outlined the complexity of deciphering between far-right extremism and those issues related to racially motivated hate or hateful rhetoric. There was some anxiety that when discussing incidents with parents, they “could say anything. [They] could tell us what she wants us to hear” (R28 Interview, DSL/DDSL). This was expanded upon by another respondent:

And I think that issues around radicalisation . . . are much more difficult because a lot of those views are quite entrenched. So like EDL, White extreme racist views we have to, we tackle with our students. And it’s things that I think that they get from the home. And so, we have to work with parents and social services. And it’s not necessarily things that meet a threshold for a Channel referral, but it’s around casual racism and lack of exposure to diversity particularly in these areas, that means that it’s something that we have to always tackle whenever we come across it. (R31 Interview, DSL/DDSL)

Although there will, of course, be some truth in the above-mentioned concerns regarding the involvement of parents in racist and hate-related narratives, and/or some with issues related to far-right extremism, there needs to be some caution. There is the risk here of alienating individuals, families, and communities due to the problematisation of beliefs that fall within the range of contemporary political discourses. As suggested by one respondent, a safeguarding approach that facilitates decision-making that is grounded in relationships and local knowledge should not be undermined by an approach which relies upon more unsubstantiated assessments of threat:

If that child is not safe then we have to do something. Is that child likely to endanger anybody else? Then we have to do something. So, it’s within those parameters rather than a
kind of quasi-political agenda of identifying particular groups. I think the White working class are as scapegoated as the Muslim community . . . it’s not helpful if it becomes associated with either Islamic fundamentalism or far-right White working class. If it gets inscribed with religion, ethnicity and class ... So, when people say “it’s all about Muslim Fundamentalism and extremism”, that was problematic. When they started saying it was all about White working class that was problematic, as well as dangerous for me. (R17 Interview, Assistant Head)

Discussion

This article has empirically explored the considerations, complexities and challenges associated with the implementation of the Prevent duty with specific reference to far-right extremism within schools and colleges across the county of Sussex. In order to address this highly under-researched area of academic study, the research drew upon the qualitative experiences of 39 respondents, including DSLs, DDSLs, teachers, police officers and those working in local and county councils with a responsibility for Prevent. As expected, an overarching theme present throughout the article was that addressing far-right extremism as part of one’s Prevent duty (and more generally) is an extremely difficult and complex area to engage in. What appeared to underpin these considerations were anxieties around the increasing normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right narratives, ideas, rhetoric, and ideologies (NMFR) across societies globally.

The data demonstrated that this NMFR had the strong potential to affect teachers’ actions on the ground, particularly around misperceptions between incidents considered to be racist and xenophobic alone, and those associated with far-right extremism. One example mentioned by teachers within the data concerned how they address contentious figures, such as Tommy Robinson,4 and groups like the English Defence League (EDL). Although the popularity and visibility of these individuals and groups will fluctuate, they highlight the wider difficulties facing educators. With both Robinson and the EDL, although they have been involved in violence (Pearson 2019), have propagated hateful narratives and as a result have been banned from most of the large social media platforms (see, for example, Rawlinson 2018; Hern 2019), neither are “proscribed” by the British government (at the time of writing). This becomes particularly challenging when considering potential infiltration, collaboration and overlaps between different types of groups across the three far-right “families” outlined by Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019). Teacher within the study were uncertain about how to deal with those students who engage with and share rhetoric, propaganda and ideologies associated with these types of individuals and groups.

Another aspect of this could be due to, as Lowe (2017, 918) contends, current definitions of “extremism” not providing “sufficient legal certainty” (see also Abbas and Awan 2015). Within the study, dangers of its absence were demonstrated, where it became an extremely challenging task for teachers to determine the point at which views were not merely a repetition of wider influences but an endorsement of far-right extremist ideologies. Thus, due to the NMFR, there are questions over whether those who are tasked with the implementation of Prevent duty are able to recognise the point at which these mainstream discourses become potentially dangerous in the form of right-wing extremism and/or terrorism. In this regard, teachers found it difficult to make a distinction between what could be considered as racism alone or indications that would place the student “at risk” in relation to Prevent. However, as strongly emphasised throughout the article, although there are very distinct and obvious overlaps between racially motivated hate (including what has been described as “new racism” (Carter 2018)), hate crimes and xenophobia, and far-right extremism, there needs to be an avoidance of conflation between them as this has the potential to be counter-productive. There should not be the assumption that if someone partakes in acts of racism, they are
on a “conveyor belt” towards engaging in far-right (violent) extremism, thereby having parallels with the early debates on radicalisation in terms of non-violent and violent extremism (Lakhani 2014; Kundnani 2015).

This becomes particularly complicated when it is considered that numerous teachers within the study believed that rather than internalising ideologies, some students were merely replicating views found within their wider environments, reflecting the findings of a broader body of literature that has discussed parental (Duriez and Soenens 2009; Sinclair, Dunn, and Lowery 2005) and peer (Nesdale et al. 2005) influence upon young people. Within the data, some respondents linked far-right extremism to class and other socio-economic considerations. Although class is becoming increasingly blurred and undefined (Weeden and Grusky 2005), the far-right extremist landscape is far more complicated beyond these claims (Lee 2017); it is by no means reserved for White working-class families or communities. As with the “conveyor belt” argument, there needs to be a conscious effort to avoid making the same mistakes witnessed with Prevent more widely, particularly around the securitisation and stigmatisation of certain people and positioning them as “suspect”, as has been experienced by Muslim (Lakhani 2012; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009), and for that matter Irish (Hillyard 1993), communities.

Taking a broader look at the tenor of this article, there is added complexity when considering that the Prevent duty may well not be considered as a priority area within these institutions due to the visibility and immediateness of other safeguarding issues (Lakhani 2020). As Ball, Maguire, and Braun (2012) found, educators are balancing over 170 different policies at any one time. Although preventing violent extremism is widely considered as an important issue, it would be counter-productive for it to eclipse other safeguarding concerns, taking focus away from them when they may be more pronounced, particularly during times of austerity where resources are already stretched. At the same time, educators’ role in supporting students “at risk” of extremism should not be overlooked (Pels and de Ruyter 2012). As Grubben (2006, 60) argues, teachers and educational institutions are “an important partner” in pro-actively challenging far-right narratives which impact broader societal relations.

Further, as reiterated throughout this article, this is not simply about enabling teachers to better identify students “at risk” in order to provide them with support. This is also about teachers being better informed about the situation, which could hypothetically also contribute to a reduction of erroneous referrals (Lakhani 2020). There needs to be an attempt to maintain balance across all of these considerations, though this will naturally be a difficult task to undertake, one that will differ from institution to institution. One promising avenue to (at least begin to) address these issues is through the encouragement of stronger relationships at the local level, and thus the enactment of social capital, where, as found in this research (and reported more widely, see Lakhani (2020)), knowledge, experience and advice can be drawn upon in informal settings when required.

Finally, it needs to be emphasised here that there was a distinct commonality in the research regarding how seriously the vast majority of respondents took their professional duty of care towards students and to protecting them from all safeguarding concerns. The implementation of the Prevent duty is an extremely difficult and complex task. Further, far-right extremism is a serious and growing threat in the UK (and more widely), one that needs a joint effort to begin to address it through co-production between numerous actors at the local and central level, supported by academia. However, as mentioned, at the same time there needs to be a concerted avoidance of making the same oversights as witnessed with previous attempts at preventing violent extremism. In order to move forward effectively, a co-ordinated well thought through and evidenced strategy which is specifically tailored (though draws from existing knowledge and experience) to deal with
the threat from far-right extremism needs to be developed and implemented, rather than an over-
reaction in the future.

Notes

1. Channel, usually co-ordinated at the local level, “is a programme which focuses on providing
support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into
terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by: (a)
identifying individuals at risk; (b) assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and (c) developing the
most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.” (HM Government 2015, 5).
2. This issue is, however, gaining some momentum across the European Union (see Krasenberg,
Lenos, and Sterkenburg 2019, for example).
3. For a discussion on “internalisation”, see Kelman (1958).
4. Tommy Robinson is the pseudonym for Stephen Christopher Yaxley-Lennon. He is one of the
EDL’s founders.

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