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Abstract

This article explores the origins and consequences of India’s regional parties and subnationalism, focusing and expanding on the key arguments made by Prerna Singh and Adam Ziegfeld in their books. According to Singh, when political leaders promote an inclusive form of subnationalism, it creates a feeling of cohesive solidarity across the region, which helps to achieve superior social welfare outcomes in the Indian states. Ziegfeld provides an elite-centered explanation for the emergence and success of India’s regional parties, and considers Indian politics to be dominated by clientelistic relationships between parties and voters, which leads to delivery of particularistic rather than public goods. The article also discusses two key themes emerging from the books relating to the importance of subnational versus national identity, and the significance of interests versus ideas in shaping Indian politics and public policy. Finally, it identifies future areas for research on regional parties and subnationalism in India.

Key words: Clientelism, coalitions, India, regional parties, subnationalism, welfare
Introduction

India provides a particularly fertile setting for scholars of comparative politics due to inter-state variations in respect of history, culture as well as social and economic outcomes. A growing body of research in this field has focused on India’s regional parties, which have grown in importance especially since the late 1980s, and remain an indispensable part of the Indian party system and politics. While the Congress, which led India’s struggle against the British colonial rule, was the country’s principal national party in the first two decades following independence in 1947, its dominance declined in the late 1960s, in part due to the formation and growing influence of regional parties across many Indian states. Regional parties continued to grow in importance in the 1970s and 1980s in many states, and also became pivotal constituents of coalition governments at the centre since the late 1980s. Many regional parties in India have been led by charismatic leaders who have often espoused a subnationalist agenda to appeal to mobilize electoral support.

Research on regional parties in India has mainly focused on their origins, ideology, leadership, reasons for success, and their socio-economic consequences. Most of these studies have focused on a specific region or party, although one has also seen a growing interest in comparative studies encompassing a number of states and parties. Scholars have attributed rise of regional parties in India to a variety of factors including politicization of social cleavages, decline of Congress’ dominance, political and fiscal decentralization, and the ambition of regional leaders. The rise of regional parties in the 1990s contributed significantly to fragmentation of the Indian party system. Early accounts of the rise of regional parties saw them as a positive influence
since it was evident that socially underprivileged groups were the most active participants in elections that brought success to many of these parties.\textsuperscript{1} It was also suggested and hoped that the interests of the such groups would be better represented by these parties. More recent scholarship has however, painted a mixed picture since the social transformation promised by the regional parties has not fully materialized.\textsuperscript{2} However, there are some studies\textsuperscript{3} that contest a sweeping negative portrayal of the effect of the fragmentation of the party system and coalition governments on Indian polity and democracy.

My endeavor in this article is to review and explore the origins and consequences of India’s regional parties and sub-nationalism, focusing and expanding on the key arguments put forward by Adam Ziegfeld\textsuperscript{4} and Prerna Singh\textsuperscript{5}. While Ziegfeld’s primary aim is to explain the origin and success of regional parties, Singh explores the effect of a cohesive subnational identity on the variation in social outcomes across Indian states. Although the two books paint a somewhat contrasting picture of the role and consequences of regional parties in India, their works can also be considered complementary, and represent an important contribution to the scholarship on regional parties and subnationalism in India.

The article begins with a critical analysis of the main arguments and findings of the two authors. It is followed by a discussion on key overlapping themes presented by them, including situating these within the broader literature on subnationalism and party politics in India. Finally, the article presents conclusions and identifies areas for future research.
Role of sub nationalism in achieving superior social outcomes (Singh, 2015)

Singh examines why Indian states with identical democratic institutions are characterized by different levels of social development. Previous explanations about diverse social outcomes across similarly situated regions or states have included differences in economic approaches to deliver public goods, effect of community based institutional arrangements and role of citizen participation and monitoring. Drèze and Sen⁶ argue that in India, local democracy is also essential in the context of the need for effective and equitable management of local public services.

The research design followed by Singh is a mixed method approach consisting of qualitative and quantitative analysis. She undertakes paired case studies of four Indian states – Kerala and Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (UP), with Bihar included as a supplementary case study to explore the reasons for differences in education and health outcomes across these states. She also carries out a quantitative analysis to validate her findings across 15 major Indian states. Singh develops a measure of subnationalism based on: (i) existence of popular mobilization for creation of a state, (ii) absence of a separatist movement, and (iii) presence of a sub nationalist party.⁷

Key arguments and findings

Singh highlights that since India’s independence, Kerala and Tamil Nadu have achieved better social development outcomes as reflected in higher literacy and lower infant mortality rates in comparison to Rajasthan and UP. She argues that this is
despite no clear differences in initial conditions faced by these states in respect of economic development, ethnic diversity and legacy effects of colonial rule. Singh defines subnationalism as “the identification with, or aspiration for, a self-governing homeland located within the boundaries of a sovereign country”, and shows that this helped Kerala and Tamil Nadu to achieve higher level of social outcomes.

Subnationalism, shared solidarity and welfare

According to Singh, political units responsible for social policy that have a shared solidarity that emerges from a collective identification are more likely to institute a progressive social policy and have higher welfare outcomes. On the other hand, political units that are characterized by a relatively fragmented subnational identity deliver worse welfare outcomes. Her argument is that an attachment to a subnational identity encourages a perception of shared interests and a sense of mutual obligations amongst citizens, which means that they are more likely to support social welfare measures for the collective benefit of the subnational community. She claims that her thesis is a departure from the dominant view that higher social diversity leads to worse outcomes in respect of provision of public goods.

In respect of the causal mechanisms, Singh argues that subnationalism is an outcome of deliberate choices made by challenger elites, and is likely to emerge when they “perceive the espousal of subnational symbols such as a common history, memories, myths, culture and language to be the most advantageous strategy in their quest to wrest political power from the dominant elites.”
She shows that in Kerala and Tamil Nadu challenger elites mobilized against dominance of the upper castes, and demanded greater access to political power, thus facilitating the growth of subnationalism. This politically expedient strategy of challenger elites in Kerala and Tamil Nadu to construct Malayali and Dravidian subnational identities respectively helped in overcoming narrower identities, and frame social welfare issues on a more inclusive and geographical basis.\textsuperscript{13}

In Kerala, Malayali subnationalism was constructed by the challenger Nair, Syrian Christian, and Izhava elites to contest the domination of the non-Malayali, particularly Tamil Brahmin elites.\textsuperscript{14} The inclusive nature of subnationalism prompted the governments to increase state funding on social welfare, and generated effective monitoring of welfare outcomes by the community. This combination of top-down state activism and bottom-up popular participation was also facilitated by a closed party system in Kerala, dominated by the United Democratic Front and the Left Democratic Front.\textsuperscript{15}

Tamil subnationalism was also promoted by the non-Brahmin elites to challenge the small Brahmin elite.\textsuperscript{16} Non-Brahmin leaders succeeded in promoting a cohesive subnational Tamil identity in the 1950s and 1960s through turning a “socially fragmented society” into a “politically integrated region”.\textsuperscript{17} Like Kerala, Tamil Nadu also benefited from a closed party system dominated by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), which helped in ensuring a focus on social welfare. While DMK had initially held
secessionist views, it gradually moved towards mainstream Indian politics, while retaining its focus on an egalitarian Tamil society and subnationalism.

*UP, Rajasthan and Bihar*

Singh uses weak subnationalism argument in UP, and its late emergence in Rajasthan and Bihar to explain the relatively poor social outcomes in these states. She argues that unlike Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the states of UP, Rajasthan and Bihar witnessed a bounded subnationalism restricted by social divisions of caste, religion and language. Political elites in UP were deeply divided along religious and caste lines, which prevented them from constructing an inclusive form of subnationalism. Singh notes that since UP was considered as the “heartland” of India, popular mobilization in the state followed a nationally oriented trajectory, resulting in a weak form of subnationalism and a low priority given to the overall social welfare of the state.\(^1\) These impediments to achieve a strong subnational identity were exacerbated by a linguistic divide between the Hindi-speaking Hindus and Urdu-speaking Muslims. As Drèze and Gazdar point out that an important factor for slow social progress in UP “is the failure of civil society to challenge oppressive patterns of caste, class and gender relations…And the highly divided nature of the rural society in UP has seriously constrained the scope for collaborative public action at the village level”.\(^1\) They also note that “the jajmani system of patronage and dependence was a system of factional alignment par excellence, and factions remained the basis for political mobilization even after the mobilization of zamindari and the disappearance of jajmani”.\(^2\)
In Rajasthan, challenger elites constructed subnationalism many decades later than in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and hence the state registered better social outcomes than in UP but worse than in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. \(^{21}\) Singh stresses that since the 1980s, BJP’s efforts in promoting subnational Rajasthani identity helped in achieving social welfare progress in the state especially in education. Like in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, a closed party competition between the BJP and Congress ensured the government’s continued commitments to social welfare in Rajasthan. Although Bihar had a restrictive form of subnationalism until the early 2000s due to deep caste divisions, it experienced a significant improvement in social welfare outcomes thereafter, which Singh attributes mainly to Chief Minister Nitish Kumar’s attempts to construct a Bihari identity. \(^{22}\)

**Regression analysis**

Singh’s time-series and cross-sectional analysis\(^{23}\) across fifteen major Indian states from 1966–2006 reveals that subnationalism has a positive and statistically significant on social development outcomes and expenditures. Singh finds that even after controlling for all or some combinations of other explanatory factors such as economic growth, ideological basis of the ruling parties, nature of the colonial system, political competition and ethnic diversity, subnationalism remains a statistically significant variable to explain unequal welfare and social development across the Indian states.

**Discussion**
Singh’s contention that a strong subnational identity facilitates social development is novel and innovative, and deserves attention both from scholars and policy makers. Her work is concerned with political economy as well as the impact of subnational identity on social outcomes. Overall, she makes a substantial contribution to the existing literature in this field, and provides several promising avenues for further research in this area. However, there are also some aspects of her methodology and arguments that need further reflection in light of the complexities inherent in a comparative study of Indian states, and the wider ambit of the subject matter covered in the book. These are discussed below.

**Methodology**

For her case studies, Singh selects two states\(^2\) above and two below the regression lines showing association between per capita income and (i) levels of literacy, and (ii) infant mortality in the Indian states. While there could be practical limitations on the number of case studies, it would have been useful to also select few states on the basis of their strength of subnationalism, so that differences in their social outcomes could be studied. Since subnationalism is the key independent variable of interest, this arguably would have been a useful basis for selecting states suitable for case studies. This issue is illustrated by Deshpande et al\(^2\) who find that states with higher levels of subnationalism on Singh’s index such as Punjab, Haryana, or Gujarat have not fared strongly in implementing social protection schemes. Therefore, future research should consider researching additional states, for example West Bengal, which ostensibly has common language and culture and Maharashtra, which has a history of an exclusive form of subnationalism based on nativism. North Eastern states could also be
interesting case studies for future research to study how their unique tribal identities influence social outcomes.

Although Singh’s quantitative research design controls for the effect of other potential explanatory factors on social outcomes, it implies that subnationalism is only one of the many explanatory variables to achieve higher social welfare. To this extent, the effect of subnationalism is likely to be confounded by many other intervening and contextual factors.

Legacy factors

Singh’s findings for Kerala, her paradigm case, are broadly consistent with those of many scholars who contend that postcolonial policies have played an important role in achieving higher social outcomes in the state. Rathore and Das also find that mass literacy in Kerala is explained by reforms-driven state activism.

However, many scholars also stress the contribution of legacy factors in explaining Kerala’s superior social outcomes. These include the effects of decentralized planning through panchayati raj institutions, missionary activity and policy pursued by the princely states of Travancore and Cochin that later were merged (in addition to Malabar province that was directly administered by the British) to form the state of Kerala. An example of this was a Royal Rescript issued by the queen of Travancore, which stated that “the state should defray the whole cost of education of its people.” Mathew notes that opposition to caste inequalities in Kerala historically favored mass education, which pushed the government towards a broader provisioning of
public goods. This legacy factor, in turn equipped citizens with the capabilities to monitor governments to pursue such welfare policies. Further, literature suggests that left-wing governments tend to spend and tax more than their right-wing counterparts either due to ideology or to maximize electoral gains. Given that Kerala’s politics has been dominated by left-wing parties, it would have been useful to assess the impact of this factor in more detail through a comparison with another state dominated by left-wing parties for example, West Bengal. Overall, as Rathore and Das (2019:208) argue, achievements of Kerala are explained by an amalgam of cultural factors specific to the state, historical educational policy pursued in its central-southern parts, and the social reforms movements that have roots in the pre-independence era.

In a recent study, Deshpande et al. carry out two paired comparisons between Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra and West Bengal, and find that differences in social policy outcomes between these states are better explained by policy legacies, nature of social coalitions underpinning party competition and the role of political leaders in strengthening state capacity to achieve program goals. Thus, overall, legacy factors also play a key part.

Structural elements

Understanding structural elements is also essential to appreciate the unique position of some Indian states to provide public goods. Chandra et al point out that the roots of some states’ backwardness lie in their socio-economic and political organization. For example, in Bihar and parts of UP, agrarian structure is still regressive, and land
reforms have been inadequately implemented. The nature of caste system across Indian states can also help explain the variations in level of social development.

Jaffrelot\(^{37}\) differentiates between the ‘ethnicizing’ character of caste movements in the south and their ‘sanskritizing’ northern counterparts who sought to emulate upper caste practices for advancement. Thus, the ethnicization process in Tamil Nadu supported the development of an egalitarian and alternative subnational identity, while in Kerala there was a particularly strong overlap between class and caste, leading to popularity of cultural demands of caste organizations.\(^{38}\) In northern parts of India, for example UP and Bihar, mobilization of lower castes was limited by the heterogeneous nature of caste divisions. Further, upper castes in north India were far more numerous (for example, >20% in UP compared to <2% in Kerala) and less privileged than in the south, making them more difficult targets of subaltern grievances.\(^{39}\) In contrast, Muslims comprised 13% of United Provinces’ (later renamed UP) population but dominated the social, political, and economic life of the province.\(^{40}\) Thus, the relative size of the population that the challenger elite was mobilizing against was another (structural) factor that influenced the varying success in forging of a subnational identity.

It is also true that given the size of Hindi speaking population in India, political elites in Hindi speaking states have had better opportunities to succeed at the national level, which encouraged them to seek power at the national rather than just the state level. On the other hand, political elites in non-Hindi speaking states had to limit their ambition to a regional level, facilitating an environment conducive to forging a subnational identity, for example in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
According to Brancati\textsuperscript{41}, the key to explain the varying effects of decentralization of power to states in India, rests in the shape of India's party system. As Zoya Hasan also notes, “India's diversity yields a variety of social differences, and these differences can form the basis of very different kinds of parties and distinct party systems at the national and state levels depending upon the patterns of political mobilization and organization”.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, the type of party system may have more powerful impact on decentralization and social welfare outcomes than is implied by Singh.

\textit{Administrative efficiency and policy inheritance}

Singh also gives limited consideration to the importance of administrative efficiency. While a conducive political and social environment in Tamil Nadu and Kerala may have empowered the civil service, administrative efficiency can have more direct effect on delivering superior social outcomes. As Chandra et al. note,\textsuperscript{43}

Bihar and U.P. are classic cases of states bedeviled by high levels of corruption, sheer bad administration, and deteriorating law and order…The role of greater administrative efficiency is also proved by the better rates of economic growth in the relatively better administered states of south and western India as compared to Bihar and Uttar Pradesh”. Success of Kerala has also been explained by the relative efficiency of provisioning of public goods, including the most effectively run public distribution system in the country.\textsuperscript{44}
Further, as Rose\textsuperscript{45} points out policy makers are heirs before they are choosers. He stresses the importance of inheritance in understanding the long-term trajectory of public policy. Thus, in addition to the current choices faced by policy makers, we also need to pay attention to activities that continue by routine and may account for a substantial proportion of public expenditure. In a study comparing social outcomes in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, Deshpande et al\textsuperscript{46} find that both these states “have transformed health service delivery along the way through a process of layering which involves not abandoning old practices and structures but building new practices and structures on top of the old”. Thus, administrative set up can have exogenous effects of the quality and level of social welfare through institutionalization of processes and routines causing both positive and negative outcomes.

\textit{Policy prescriptions}

Singh’s policy prescription that “jurisdiction over social policy should be vested with the political-administrative unit with which citizens most strongly identify”\textsuperscript{47} is non-controversial but simplistic. Keefer and Khemani\textsuperscript{48} suggest that decentralization is likely to have a positive impact on social services only in certain specific circumstances. Specifically, this is likely if (i) decentralization enables voters to become better informed about political responsibilities for local public good provision; (ii) local public good provision is more salient in local elections than in central government elections, and (iii) promises by political competitors are more credible in local elections than in central government elections.
Although Singh recognizes that subnationalism has the potential to be a destabilizing force, she argues that it has actually helped in implementing progressive social policies in the Indian states. Singh’s analysis implies that a culture, which is unique to a state, is an important determinant of achieving a cohesive subnational identity. In this context, her second recommendation that “initiation of policies to encourage popular solidarity with the unit of policy” may be difficult to achieve in states that have high levels of intra-state diversity.

Singh’s findings imply that a reasonable level of cultural homogeneity may be necessary to forge a subnational identity. However, it is unclear if Singh would favor creation of smaller, more culturally homogenous states, for example Gorkhaland and Bodoland, which may also fuel secessionist tendencies. As Varshney cautions, Indian states where identities are cumulative rather than crosscutting thereby promoting a homogenous culture, have witnessed most serious centre-state clashes, including secessionist movements. Alternatively, forging a subnational identity in a diverse nation such as India that also preserves the unity of the nation could also be achieved on civic (common interests and duty towards community) rather than cultural lines. This facet is explored later in the article as part of discussion of key themes emerging from the works of Singh and Ziegfeld.

**India’s regional parties, clientelism and the role of elites (Ziegfeld, 2016)**

Ziegfeld’s book represents an important contribution to the literature on emergence and evolution of regional parties and more broadly, the nature of party system and politics in India. Congress’ dominance in the 1950s and 1960s inhibited the
emergence and growth of rival national parties, and also limited the role of regional parties at the national level. This political situation changed with the decline of the Congress that began in the late 1960s, and continued in the 1980s and 1990s. This contributed towards the increasing prominence of regional parties, and advent of an era of coalition governments at the centre. While India’s regional parties won between 20 and 30 percent of the national vote during the 1950s and 1960s, their vote share increased to 45 percent in the 1990s. Even after emergence of the BJP as a national party in the 1990s, regional parties continued to have substantial presence in many states, and also became crucial in the formation of coalition governments at the centre. According to Jaffrelot and Verniers (2011), regional parties’ vote share has remained stable since 1998, and there are no signs that it is likely to decline to the pre-1990 levels. Similarly, Ziegfeld notes that regional parties won more than 40% of the national vote despite BJP’s substantial victory in 2014 general election.

Ziegfeld defines regional parties as those “whose electoral support is geographically concentrated in a small part of a country”. Regional parties tend to “defend the interests of an ethnically or geographically defined region or have ties to a regionally concentrated ethnic group”. Defined in this way, Indian regional parties are a heterogenous group, and include regionalist parties, which are characterized by their “regional message” and not “regional geography”.

The primary aim of Ziegfeld’s book is to investigate “why regional parties are more electorally successful in some places and at some times”. More generally, he researches “the formation of party systems in places where policy and ideology take a backseat in electoral politics”. Although he also explores cross-national variation in
regional party support, the main focus of his book is on the formation and electoral success of regional parties in India. The book’s main arguments are premised on the claim that factors influencing the composition of party systems are strikingly different in clientelistic compared to programmatic democracies. Accordingly, he rejects the social cleavages approach to explain the support base of regional parties in India, and instead presents an elite-based analysis of the growth and trajectory of these parties.

Ziegfeld pursues these research questions through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches including fieldwork, interviews with politicians, comparative analysis using aggregate economic data, public opinion data from National Election Study (NES) and election results. He also presents case studies of four small regional parties to provide evidence for the role of elites in shaping the composition of the Indian party system.60

**Key arguments and findings**

Ziegfeld rejects the proposition that regional parties succeed because of their regional appeals, programs or policy solutions. Instead, he argues that in patronage democracies, voters’ support is largely influenced by clientelistic appeals made by parties and candidates. Thus, his argument is grounded in rational-choice theory, focuses on the political elites’ incentives, and implies a relatively passive role of voters in determining the composition of the party system.

*Clientelistic versus programmatic democracy*
Drawing on the concept of patronage democracy, Ziegfeld emphasizes the importance of clientelism in shaping party politics in India. He draws on extensive academic literature to argue that patronage is widespread in Indian politics, and therefore, elites’ preferences, strategies and choices are crucial to understanding the party competition and voter behavior in India. Specifically, he argues that in a clientelistic democracy, voters prefer the party that provides them the most clientelistic benefits, and it does not matter to them whether the party is regional or national. Thus, if the voters believe that a certain party can provide them clientelistic benefits such as jobs, they devote little attention to other factors including their social identity. This implies that elites in a clientelistic democracy do not need to formulate or defend detailed policy propositions or party programs to win voters’ support.

Although Ziegfeld acknowledges that the supply of programmatic initiatives has increased in some parts of India, this does not suggest that “programmatic politics has eclipsed clientelism.” Echoing this view, Manor states that “post-clientelistic initiatives are almost always pursued not instead of clientelism but in addition to it, since it is politically risky to try to abandon clientelism.” Ziegfeld stresses that even if voters are in favor of universalistic social policies, they might still vote on the basis of expected clientelistic benefits in order to gain from both social policy and targeted distribution.

Role of elites versus voters in shaping party systems

One of Ziegfeld’s important conclusions is that Indian voters with a strong sense of regional identity do not necessarily prefer to vote for a regional party. Based on a
quantitative analysis of survey data, he concludes that voters “may well have strong preferences over which specific party they vote for. But, having preference for a specific party is different from having a preference for a certain type of party [national versus regional]”.\textsuperscript{68} Instead, Ziegfeld shows that elites’ choices drive regional parties’ success. He also provides evidence from case studies of four small regional parties to illustrate that “voters are frequently willing to shift from regional to national parties (and back again) as they follow politicians capable of offering clientelistic benefits…” and “the decisions about whether to establish regional parties were, in most cases, a function of elites’ career ambition”.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, Ziegfeld’s findings imply that the emergence and success of regional parties in India is not the result of voters’ preferences on ethnic or policy grounds but rather a consequence of elites’ strategies and decisions.

While examining role of elites in an era of coalition politics, Ziegfeld discusses the trade-offs involved in joining or establishing different party types. He argues that as self-interested utility maximizing actors, elites’ decisions involve weighing up costs and benefits of establishing a party and access to political power. Specifically, Ziegfeld identifies three factors contributing to the elites’ preference for regional parties versus national parties: (i) costs of building national parties; (ii) likelihood of access to national-level power and size of the regional party; and (iii) uniqueness of a regional elite’s ideological commitments.\textsuperscript{70} Further, he proposes geographical compactness and distribution of elites’ programmatic preferences as two distinctive features of regional parties. He argues that depending on these factors, elites should have greater or lesser interest in joining or forming regional parties, thereby accounting for variation over space and time in the electoral success of these parties.
Ziegfeld shows that most Indian parties are poorly organized and evince little interest in making costly investments in party organization to build durable national followings. As a result, regional parties have been highly successful. He argues that shifts between SPM (single-party majority) and coalition governments at the centre matter for the prospects of regional parties. This is because regional parties are invariably small in the context of national politics, and therefore, incapable of forming SPM governments on their own. Consequently, when SPM government is the norm regional parties are excluded from national-level power, whereas when coalition governments are frequent regional parties can aspire to gain access to national-level power.\(^7\)

In providing an elite-focused explanation about the success or failure of a regional party, Ziegfeld also refers to the process of elite sorting and regional political configuration.\(^7\) He argues that the nature of ideological divisions within regions and complexities of party competition shape the formation and performance of regional parties. Specifically, regions dominated by opportunistic political factions or where factions are durable are more likely to witness cross-regional alliances that facilitate elites joining national parties. On the other hand, ideological factions which face greater obstacles in building cross-regional alliances or factions that are unsustainable in the longer-term, are more likely to become regional parties.\(^7\) This reasoning is used to explain, and empirically examine the success or failure of regional parties before advent of coalition politics in India. According to Ziegfeld, this explanation is consistent with his elite-centred approach to understand party systems under clientelism, since “voters are, in effect, nowhere to be seen”.\(^7\)
Although Ziegfeld’s explanations about the success of regional parties are premised on the political elites’ incentives and decisions, he also points out the importance of certain structural and institutional features of India’s political system that have facilitated the emergence of regional parties. These include political, fiscal and horizontal decentralization, parliamentarianism, no minimum electoral threshold, single-member districts, and no cross-regional contestation laws.75

Coalitions and the rise of regional parties

Ziegfeld argues that the advent of coalition governments in the late 1980s contributed to political elites’ decision to form or join regional parties since they hoped to share power at the national level. He rejects the opposite causality which has dominated the scholarly view that the rise of regional political parties facilitated the likelihood of coalition governments.76 According to Ziegfeld, a noticeable decline in Congress’ support and pre-election coordination between the BJP and JD [Janata Dal] rather than regional parties ensured that 1989 election did not produce a SPM. 77 He also notes that in India, where clientelism imposes substantial costs on politicians seeking to build national parties, coalition governments tend to favor regional parties over national parties. Therefore, a shift from SPM to coalition governments should prompt the rise of regional parties.

Discussion
Ziegfeld provides a focused survey of India’s regional parties, which illustrates that these parties vary in respect of features such as origins, geographical presence and size. His categorization of these parties into seven major types (regionalist, remnants of the Janata Dal, splinters from Congress, left parties, independents, other major regional parties and micro parties) enables a clearer understanding of party politics in India. His overarching conclusion is that regional parties “have succeeded because they represent excellent options for India’s office-seeking politicians”, which paints a rather unflattering picture about India’s democracy. This implies that elections in India do not provide any real choice to the voters, and “are unlikely to convey important information about voters’ attitudes on social policy, foreign relations, redistribution, national identity, or any of the other big-ticket policy issues”.

Although many previous studies have characterized India as a patronage or clientelistic democracy, Ziegfeld provides detailed theoretical reasoning as well as comprehensive empirical analysis to support this claim. Some subsequent studies have also reinforced the primacy of elites in shaping politics in India. For example, Vaishnav notes that “most political parties in India are elite-driven outfits, with ultimate power residing within the hands of a select few. By and large, this is by design; party elites are intrinsically more interested in accumulating and protecting their own political power rather than building well-institutionalized organizations”.

While Ziegfeld’s contribution to the literature on regional parties is substantial and insightful, there are certain areas where his arguments are debatable, and need further consideration.
Although Ziegfeld characterizes Indian democracy as clientelistic, the evidence presented by him suggests a mixed picture. The 2009 NES data\textsuperscript{83} used by Ziegfeld shows that although voters vote for a party or candidate in expectation of discretionary benefits i.e. “Politically-motivated pork”, a majority of respondents (excluding “the don’t know category”) deny approaching a politician for a service or gift, and did not believe that the parties are able to track how people vote in a locality, which is a key requirement for a clientelistic exchange.\textsuperscript{84} Further, while a theoretical distinction between clientelistic and programmatic democracies is useful, in practice, this difference may not be so stark. For example, in India, which according to Ziegfeld is a clientelistic democracy, return of the Congress-led UPA in 2009 general election was also attributed to various programmatic social welfare schemes it implemented.\textsuperscript{85} Similarly, Elliott shows “how an incumbent [Congress] government [in Andhra Pradesh] overcame the problem of electoral volatility by using enhanced government revenue to move from clientelist politics toward a welfare regime”.\textsuperscript{86}

A recent study by Chhibber and Verma\textsuperscript{87} provides a sharp rebuttal to the claim that Indian politics is dominated by patronage or clientelistic exchanges between parties and voters. Instead, they point out the primacy of ideology in explaining the decision of voters to support a specific party. They find little evidence of quid pro quo, which is the central element of the clientelism thesis. Further, although they find that ruling parties in India often try to build support for themselves by distributing gifts and benefits to voters, “ideology has a greater influence than receipt of freebies or
government benefits on whether and how a citizen votes, and on whether a voter will identify with and prefer a particular party on a range of issues”.

*Politicization of identity*

Ziegfeld disregards the politicization of caste as a factor contributing to the rise of regional parties. He argues that this proposition cannot explain why this should lead to a rise in regional party support, rather than support for an OBC [Other backward classes]-dominated national party. However, this defense is not particularly convincing given that OBC include a number of heterogenous castes, which vary from state to state, and hence there are significant obstacles in the path of forging a unified OBC-dominated national party. It is not surprising therefore that many parties representing the OBC have limited their political ambitions to specific states for example Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar and Samajwadi Party in UP.

Ziegfeld’s key conclusion that voters with strong regional identity do not necessarily vote for regional parties is based on a regression analysis using 2004 NES data. However, regression results also reveal that members of native language groups are more likely to vote for a regional party, which is reflected in the positive and statistical coefficient for the variable *Native*. Ziegfeld explains that *Native* is a less direct measure of regional identity, and “one possibility is that linguistic identity could correlate with other forms of ethnic identity that may influence expectations of ethnic patronage but have nothing to do with regional identity and attitudes towards regionalist parties”. This is not an entirely satisfactory interpretation since in India, language is a key part of regional culture, and the reorganization of Indian states in
the 1950s was also done on linguistic basis. Ziegfeld also breaks down the results by state and reports that these “vary considerably by state”\(^9\). Although informative, disaggregating the results implies that it is difficult to generalize about the effect of regional identity on voting, and one also needs to consider state-specific factors while studying regional parties, a theme stressed by Singh.

The NES survey data (1996-2009) presented in Table 7.2\(^\text{93}\) does not provide an unequivocal evidence to support limited valence of regional identity in explaining the rise of regional parties. The responses relating to regional/national identity are only presented from 1996, and therefore one cannot ascertain the changes in regional identification of the respondents from 1989 (the advent of coalition era). Ziegfeld uses World Values Survey data to argue that regional identification remained relatively stable in the 1990s. However, national and regional identities run parallel and not necessarily counter to each other\(^\text{94}\) and this complexity may not be captured in surveys that are based on a specific categorization of identity.

Although scholarly opinion is divided about the consequences of Indian regional parties, there is a wide agreement that these largely represent the underlying ethnolinguistic and religious differences in India.\(^\text{95}\) Overall, it is difficult to fully explain the advent of coalition era without considering reorganization of Indian states along linguistic basis, which facilitated the emergence of regional parties beginning in the in the 1970s. As Ruparelia\(^\text{96}\) argues,

> The demise of SPM governments at the Centre since 1989 owes much to the complex interaction effects of plurality-rule elections in a progressively regionalized federal parliamentary democracy…Its roots lie in the 1950s and
1960s, when New Delhi acceded to growing popular demands to reorganize the federal system into distinct linguistic-cultural zones... The vernacularization of federalism in India gradually encouraged the emergence, under FPTP [First-past-the-post electoral system], of distinct political systems in the states in which two parties or blocs competed for power in the 1960s and 1970s.

Coalition governments and the rise of regional parties

The book claims that the advent of national coalition governments in 1989 explains why vote share of regional parties increased significantly subsequently. This claim is not an unreasonable one considering the opportunities for regional parties to share national power brought about by coalition governments. However, to say that “regional parties played no part” in ending single-party governments is an exaggeration since regional parties’ national vote share and influence saw a steady increase since the late 1970s. In a previous paper, Ziegfeld acknowledges that the relationship between the formation and continuation of coalitions and the rise of regional parties is a feedback loop.

His explanation for the continued importance of regional parties despite BJP winning majority in 2014 election is that since this was an unexpected election result, it did not impact the vote share of regional parties. However, regional parties continue to flourish in many Indian states despite BJP’s consecutive (majority) victory in 2019 national election, and this anomaly can be a subject of future research in light of Ziegfeld’s propositions. Further, his argument that coalition governments facilitated
the growth of regional parties since the 1990s assumes that regional parties are mainly concerned with access to national power. However, historically, regional parties have had a much stronger presence in the state assemblies rather than in national parliament, and therefore regional political elites are more likely to take political decisions on the basis of implications for state rather than national elections. Consequently, regional parties’ national vote share may not reflect regional leaders’ expectation of coalition government at the centre, but a conscious strategy focused on state assembly elections.

*Other factors*

Brancati notes that the extent to which federal decentralization has promoted regional parties, in particular, depends on a number of institutional factors such as the size of India's regions, the number of regional legislatures and the method used to fill India's upper house. Another institutional change that deepened the regionalization of party system was the delinking of state assembly and national elections in 1971. Finally, while Ziegfeld’s book is robust in respect of data and analysis, its mainly quantitative comparative research design does not fully capture the historical perspective on the emergence and growth of specific regional parties.

*Policy implications*

Ziegfeld does not offer specific solutions to mitigate the ill effects of the clientelistic model of politics in India beyond a sombre observation that “if the choice facing most large, diverse post-colonial countries is between a clientelistic democracy and an autocracy, then India’s longstanding experiment with democracy is certainly worth
In this context, Keefer and Khemani\(^{101}\) identify three political market imperfections that are important for understanding government incentives to serve the poor: (i) lack of information among voters about the performance of politicians; (ii) social fragmentation among voters manifested as identity-based voting; and (iii) lack of credibility of political promises to citizens. Accordingly, they argue that efforts to improve the quality of public services may fall far short unless efforts are expanded to address these imperfections.

**Key themes**

Literature has noted both positive and detrimental aspects of regional parties in democracies across the world. These parties highlight and represent local issues that get ignored by national parties,\(^{102}\) restrain national governments from interfering in regional politics,\(^{103}\) and help increase political participation.\(^{104}\) However, these parties can also incite conflicts,\(^{105}\) negatively impact spending on national programs,\(^{106}\) destabilize national government and divide people,\(^{107}\) and undermine the relationship between federal government and the states.\(^{108}\)

Ziegfeld and Singh add substantially to our understanding of the causes and consequences of regional parties and subnationalism especially in the Indian context. According to Singh, when political leaders and parties promote an inclusive form of subnationalism, it creates a feeling of cohesive solidarity across the region, which helps to achieve superior social welfare outcomes in the Indian states. In contrast, Ziegfeld considers Indian electoral politics to be dominated by clientelistic relationships between parties and voters, which leads to delivery of particularistic
rather than public goods, and can produce negative outcomes such as suboptimal allocation of resources and corruption.

Both authors broadly agree about the importance of elites’ incentives and decisions in influencing the nature and trajectory of party politics and subnationalism in India, and their work can be situated within the wider literature on Indian society, politics and political economy. Below, I discuss two key themes emerging from the scholarship highlighted in their books: (i) importance of national versus subnational identity in building cohesive communities, which is mainly highlighted in Singh’s work; and (ii) significance of interests versus ideas in shaping public discourse and politics, which has more relevance to Ziegfeld’s arguments.

**Importance of national versus subnational identity**

Demand for recognition of one’s identity has been a key recurring theme in world politics. Khilnani\(^{109}\) notes that a state’s duty is not merely to protect the physical and material security of its members but also their identities. However, he argues that “all too often this has involved a tortuous simplification of internal cultural diversities into a uniform political identity”\(^{110}\). According to him, the view that Indian nationalism had to unite and subordinate regional identities is a misreading of the relationship between nation and region in India, and argues instead that “a sense of region and nation emerged together through parallel self-definitions”\(^{111}\).

Given the presence of multiple ethnolinguistic, religious and caste divisions, the relative stability and unity of India as a nation is extraordinary. Differences along
these dimensions are also crosscutting, meaning that people who belong to the same
ethnolinguistic group in India often belong to a different religious group. At
independence, the Indian nation sought to shape its identity to fit the existing
characteristics of the society, incorporating the country’s diverse population and
regions. In the 1950s, subnationalism was considered as a potential threat to unity
of the Indian nation. Nehru’s preference was also for India’s states to continue as
multi-lingual units that were established during the British colonial rule. Although
he finally accepted demands to recognize regional cultural groups by creating
linguistic states in the 1950s, he “saw these states as a step towards rendering the
practices of democratic government more comprehensible, rather than as a challenge
to or dilution of Indianness”. Thus, India adopted a multi-layered Indian identity,
which also resonated with Gandhi’s view that “as the basis of my pride as an Indian, I
must have pride in myself as a Gujarati…”.

However, Fukuyama cautions that “desire for equal recognition can easily degenerate
into a demand for recognition of the group’s superiority”. In the Indian context,
Khilnani argues that developments of the 1990s (when Indian party system
fragmented) as an emergent cultural pattern marked a rupture with the idea of a
layered Indian political identity, where each cultural fragment was resentful of the
other, unwilling or unable to learn to speak the other’s language. Therefore,
contrary to Singh’s findings, identity, and especially subnational identity, may not
always act as a positive force especially when society comprises groups who are
likely to regard themselves as engaged in a zero-sum competition for resources.
According to Singh, subnational symbols can allow challenger political elite to come together as “sons of the soil”, rightfully entitled to hold positions of power in a state, in opposition to the outsiders with no legitimate claim to power. However, this can easily degenerate into a negative right-wing populism based on nativism as has been the case in some Indian states, for example Maharashtra. This issue is also illustrated by Brancati who finds that regional parties in India have promoted ethnic conflict and secessionism by passing legislation threatening other regions as well as regional minorities in the country.

While making a case for an inclusive and cohesive form of subnationalism, Singh argues that a subnational identity is most likely to be maintained where it is institutionalized for example in a single language policy state-sponsored subnational festivals and art forms, as well as the establishment of arts, literary and cultural academies. Fukuyama acknowledges that nationalism “necessitates a uniform national language, and a state-sponsored educational system to promote national culture”. However, in the Indian context, this can also lead to a more exclusive form of subnationalism if a state has multiple linguistic and cultural minorities, a situation that prevails in many Indian states. Although both Tamil and Malayali subnationalisms as outlined by Singh were multireligious and multiethnic, they were still rooted in common language and culture. And, replicating this model in Indian states with multiple languages and cultures may not be feasible.

One should also note that unilingual states were not feasible in India when the states’ boundaries were drawn at the time of independence, and later reorganized in the 1950s. Chandra et al illustrate the problem of the status of minor languages in the
Indian states, and point out that “nearly 18 per cent of India’s population do not speak the official language of the states where they live as their mother tongue”.124 Although, Indian constitution provides for safeguards to address the possibility of unfair treatment to linguistic minorities, these have not always been adequately enforced. Fukuyama125 argues that the remedy is not to abandon the idea of identity but to define larger and more integrative national societies that take account of the de facto diversity in societies. Therefore, shared interests or a feeling of community rather than a common cultural identity may arguably be a more appropriate option to pursue.

In addition to serving the purpose of human recognition, national identity can also be important for the quality of government. Like Singh, Fukuyama126 points out the importance of solidarity within the community, and that effective delivery of public services depends on state officials placing public interest above their own interests. However, a comparative study127 finds that low party system nationalization is a barrier to improvement in public outcomes, and that a substantial presence of regional parties hinders states’ convergence towards international health standards. Thus, effect of subnationalism on social outcomes may not be uniform and is likely to depend on various contextual factors, in addition to incentives of political elites. For example, Chhibber and Nooruddin128 and Saez and Sinha129 argue that nature of party competition has significant effect on the delivery of public goods in the Indian states.

Ziegfeld does not associate the strength of subnational identity with the rise of regional parties and paints a negative picture about party politics in India, which has roots in a clientelistic exchange between elites and voters. It has been suggested that
while many regional parties in India were formed to represent the interests of socially disadvantaged groups, these have often become a tool for gaining power for opportunistic political elites,\textsuperscript{130} echoing Ziegfeld’s arguments. As Khilnani notes, “India’s regional politicians have essentially parochial views, and they are devoted to cultivating their own vernacular gardens”.\textsuperscript{131}

Overall, one cannot dispute that patriotism to a state and its language, and having pride in one’s region can be a positive influence on the society. However, in a country such as India, regional identities can also be exploited by power-seeking political elites to win power (a theme implied in Ziegfeld’s work) to the detriment of feeling of solidarity amongst a region’s population. Many scholars argue that decentralization, a policy prescription advocated by Singh can reinforce regional identities leading to demands for more autonomy, and ultimately full independence.\textsuperscript{132} Similarly, initiatives to develop one’s state and implement progressive social policies cannot be branded as a threat to national unity, but “if the interests of one region or state are asserted against the country as a whole or against another region or state in a hostile manner and a conflict is promoted on the basis of such alleged interests it can be dubbed as [a negative manifestation of] regionalism”.\textsuperscript{133}

Although linguistic states have allowed cultural autonomy and, in most part, have strengthened Indian unity, concerns remain about the potential negative effects of identity politics. In respect of social welfare outcomes, while role of having a cohesive subnational identity cannot be trivialized, but equal, if not more, focus has to be on enhancing administrative capacity, and stressing common interests, with an
overarching aspiration of bringing all Indian states to a certain level of economic and human development.

**Significance of interests versus ideas**

The works of Singh and Ziegfeld also highlight tension between interests and ideas in shaping public policy and politics. The rational choice approach, which stresses the role of interests, assumes that individuals want to maximize their material well-being, and that politics is an extension of this rational behavior. However, this model cannot explain many aspects of human behavior and in particular, does not acknowledge the role of ideas in shaping party politics and policy outcomes, including provision of public goods.

Singh’s analysis shows that subnationalism is a deliberate process, led by elites, popular movements and organizations, and helps in delivering better social outcomes. Subsequently, these social outcomes are also facilitated and sustained by a bottom-up monitoring of delivery of public goods by citizens. Singh claims that elites, “far from being driven only or even primarily by considerations of re-election, are motivated by altruism, commitment to a cause and a desire to do good”.134 The reasons for such altruistic behavior include “the power of irrational, often dominating motives such as empathy, sympathy, commitment to a principle, ideology, fairness and justice”.135 Acting in this way, elites are motivated by a feeling of social solidarity. Singh also relies on the so-called ideational turn in public policy and political science, according to which, ideas constitute an important and even the primary source of political behavior. This formulation is also consistent with the
concept of substantive rationality set out by Weber, which refers to “goal-oriented rational action within the context of ultimate ends or values”, which in the context of Singh’s work would be to promote social welfare, broadly defined.\(^{136}\)

In contrast, Ziegfeld’s main arguments are premised on the assertion that India is a patronage or clientelist democracy where the role of ideas, ideology, policies and programs are less relevant. In this situation, composition of the party system is primarily driven by the rational decisions made by the elites rather than the choice of the voters. Keefer and Khemani point out that in a clientelistic political environment, promises of buildings and government jobs become the currency of political competition at the expense of universal access to high-quality education and health care.\(^{137}\) Scholars have provided two explanations grounded in rational choice theory about why citizens respond to clientelist appeals. First, citizens are risk averse who prefer instant clientelistic benefit over uncertain and future benefits that programmatic policies may offer.\(^{138}\) Second, given diminishing marginal utility, poor value a material inducement highly than the rich.\(^{139}\)

In a comprehensive study on role of crime in Indian politics, Vaishnav\(^{140}\) finds that political elites often make appeals on ethnic lines, taking advantage of deep, pre-existing social networks, organizations, and focal points that allow them to effectively communicate with voters. Vaishnav goes on to argue that the proclivity towards mobilizing based on ethnic identity is greatly enhanced when parties are pragmatic, rather than ideological, in a programmatic sense, echoing Ziegfeld’s propositions. However, the presence of ideological factions within regional parties in Ziegfeld’s argument about elite sorting recognizes the importance of ideology in elites’
decisions. Singh also places elites at the centre of initial development of a subnational identity, but refers to an altruistic element in decisions made by the leaders that are dictated by forging of a subnational identity.

Chhibber and Verma provide a contrasting view of Indian party politics to that of Ziegfeld, and argue that Indian party politics involves genuine contests of ideas, policies and visions. They identify two alternative ideological dimensions—‘Politics of Statism’ and “Politics of Recognition” that have shaped party politics in India. While Statism is defined as the extent to which the state should dominate society, regulate social norms, and redistribute property, Recognition refers to whether and how the state should accommodate the needs of various marginalized groups and protect minority rights from assertive majoritarian tendencies. They argue that these themes have constituted ideological space of party politics in India, and imply that ideology rather than office-seeking incentives of politicians plays a primary role in shaping party politics in India.

However, if parties in India routinely shift their ideological positions to win elections, it is difficult to argue that politics is mainly ideology driven. A recurring feature of the contemporary party politics in India is that social cleavages have become ideologies in their own right, and one does see electoral competition on these grounds. Overall, there seems to be minimal ideological constraints for the Indian parties, and they remain flexible to accommodate candidates based on their winnability.

In practice, both ideas and incentives drive human behavior. As Fukuyama argues that causality moves in both directions. While material conditions do shape people’s
receptivity to certain ideas, ideas also have their own inner logic, and without the
cognitive framing they provide, people will interpret their material conditions
differently. Institutions also matter. Tillin and Heath study the effect of political
leadership and institutions in providing public services in Madhya Pradesh and the
newly carved out state of Chhattisgarh. They find that “it is not a shift in voter
responsiveness to clientelism that has pushed one state in a more programmatic
direction in some areas of government activity, but rather a strategic decision by the
political leadership in Chhattisgarh to make the public delivery of welfare programs
work more successfully.” They conclude that in institutional contexts where basic
services are better provided, minor inducements are less likely to be successful at
buying votes.

Concluding remarks

The works of Singh and Ziegfeld reinforce that we need to understand both elites’
incentives as well as the effect of ideas in order to comprehend party politics and
public policy in India. Singh goes beyond the strictly defined rational actor model and
argues that elites prioritize social welfare due to the motivational consequences of
subnational solidarity. Ziegfeld’s arguments on the other hand, are based on rational,
utility maximizing political elites, who are primarily motivated by material gains such
as political power, wealth and access to resources. Their work also provides a useful
reminder about the importance of institutions in strengthening quality of democracy
and achieving better social outcomes, especially in a diverse and complex polity.
Ziegfeld stresses the importance of context i.e. whether a country’s political environment is programmatic or clientelistic, in shaping the decisions of elites and the composition of the party system. The fact is that political elites, even in programmatic democracies can put their own interests above public interest but this problem becomes more acute in democracies with relatively weak institutional checks and balances. Therefore, in India, where disadvantaged sections of voters are already politically active and well mobilized, the challenge is to strengthen political accountability to provide public goods and reduce incentives to pursue clientelistic exchanges.

Turning to the vexed issue of identity highlighted in Singh’s book, one has to recognize that the system of modern nation states and indeed of states within a nation is based on citizens co-existing under the jurisdiction of a geographically bound national or state government. This is intended to allow individuals belonging to diverse social groups and with different political affiliations to live and interact as members of a community. Therefore, while promoting subnational identity is important, one has to be aware of the tension between promoting civic values and cultural identity as the basis to promote cohesion and achieve better social outcomes. In particular, the negative effects of identity politics can be especially deleterious when minority groups lack political power as is the case in many Indian states.

Responses to the problems of clientelism and a narrowly defined identity should be based on creating social spheres where groups can relate to shared interests and concerns, and strengthening India’s institutions, checks and balances, rule of law, free speech and minority rights. However, these ends are not achievable without a
responsive population, and therefore, a long-term education plan to educate citizens about their civic rights and duties can go a long way in making political leaders more accountable. Reforms other than decentralization to local governments and communities such as independent validation of the quality of public goods and the performance of local politicians, and clearly communicating these to citizens can also help better coordination within a community.¹⁴⁹

Singh and Ziegfeld have to be applauded for their excellent and well-researched books. In many ways, their arguments are bold and innovative, and based on a well-defined research design and detailed empirical analysis. One may not agree fully with their diagnosis, and some aspects of their methodology, but this has to be seen in the context of the difficulties in undertaking comparative research in a country with deep historical, social, cultural and economic diversity. Future research in this field could include extension of their work in respect of time period as well as states/parties not covered in their analysis. There is also a need to understand how clientelism and subnationalism can affect the rise of populist forces in the Indian context and with what effect. The effect of a BJP-dominated party system on the prospects of regional parties is another ripe area for future research. Ultimately, we need to incorporate incentives of elites and voters, role of ideas including identity, as well as the institutional context to make sense of the party politics, subnationalism and delivery of public goods in India. It is towards such a unified approach to study India’s regional parties that future researchers should focus their efforts on.

3 See Sanjay Ruparelia, Divided We Govern (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).
7 Singh, How Solidarity Works, 201-02.
8 Ibid., 27.
9 Ibid., 5.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 36.
12 Ibid., 30.
13 Ibid., 110-11.
14 Ibid., 77-87.
15 Ibid., 145-47.
16 Ibid., 118-29.
17 Ibid., 122.
18 Ibid., 149.
20 Ibid., 98.
21 Ibid., 182.
22 Ibid., 187-92.
23 Ibid., 217-32.
28 Drèze and Sen, “Democratic Practice”.
34 Rathore and Das “Explaining the Superior Education Outcomes of Kerala”, 208.
35 Deshpande et al., “States as Laboratories”.
38 Thachil, Elite Parties, Poor Voters, 192.
39 Ibid., 199.
40 Singh, How Solidarity Works, 87.
43 Chandra et al, India Since Independence, 158.
44 Thachil, Elite Parties, Poor Voters, 194.
46 Deshpande et al., “States as Laboratories”, 98.
55 Ibid., 2.
56 Ibid., 5.
57 Ibid., 9.
58 Ibid., 7.
59 Ibid., 3.
60 Ibid., 100-11.
68 Ibid., 100.
69 Ibid., 111.
70 Ibid., 73.
71 Ibid., 171.
72 Ibid., 75.
73 Ibid., 206.
74 Ibid., 207.
75 Ibid., 151-55.
76 Ibid., 177-81.
77 Ibid., 179.
78 Ibid., 37-49.
79 Ibid., 245.
80 Ibid., 254.
84 Keefer and Khemani, “Democracy, Public Expenditures”
Ibid.

Ziegfeld, Why Regional Parties, 201.

Ibid., 93.

Ibid.

Ibid., 94.

Ibid., 196.

Varshney “Indian Federation”


Ruparelia, Divided We Govern, 27.


Brancati, Peace by Design.

Ziegfeld, Why Regional Parties, 255.


Brancati, Peace by Design


Ibid.

Ibid., 153.

Brancati, Peace by Design, 124.


Khilnani, The Idea of India, 175-76.

Chandra et al, India after Independence, 151.

Fukuyama, Identity, 22.


Fukuyama, Identity, 130.

Singh, How Solidarity Works, 30.

Brancati, Peace by Design.

Singh, How Solidarity Works, 30.

Fukuyama, Identity, 62-63.

Chandra et al, India Since Independence, 132.

Fukuyama, Identity, 123.

Ibid., 129.


Diwakar, Party System in India, 153-155.
133 Chandra et al, India After Independence, xxx.
134 Singh, How Solidarity Works, 258.
135 Ibid., 259.
136 Ibid., 260.
141 Ziegfeld, Why Regional Parties, 75.
142 Chhibber and Verma, Ideology and Identity.
143 Ibid., 2.
145 Fukuyama, Identity, 36.
147 Ibid., 99.
148 Ibid., 107.