Booth2020_Article_TheType-BMoralErrorTheory.pdf (939.32 kB)
The type-B moral error theory
Version 2 2023-06-07, 08:51
Version 1 2023-06-07, 07:27
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-07, 08:51 authored by Anthony BoothAnthony BoothI introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts (both of which she deems morally irrelevant), but denies that there are categorical all things considered oughts on pain of requiring ‘queer’ facts to obtain. I detail the most central motivation of this version of the theory against its more traditional rival, according to which there are no irreducible normative properties at all. The motivation is that it, unlike its rival, can successfully be defended against the notorious charge of self-defeat.
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ErkenntnisISSN
0165-0106Publisher
Springer VerlagExternal DOI
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0Page range
0-0Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
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- Yes
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2020-07-08First Open Access (FOA) Date
2020-08-19First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2020-07-08Usage metrics
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