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Paper 2

Muslim Youth as Global Citizens

Barbara Crossouard and Máiréad Dunne

Abstract

Dominant understandings of global or cosmopolitanism citizenship align it with the ‘modern’ and the ‘secular’, in ways that construct religious belongings as irrational, or indeed ‘pre-modern’. Assumptions of superiority embedded in claims to cosmopolitanism are all the more powerful for being constructed as a ‘universal’, in ways that erase and occlude the local social relations and particularities of the spaces and positions from which these very claims emanate. Resisting such understandings, this paper engages with research into Muslim youth identities with respect to nation, religion and gender in four nation-states of the Global South. It explores how Muslim youth’s strong affective commitments to the religious community of the ‘global Ummah’ can be understood as a distinctive form of global, cosmopolitan citizenship, in ways that are similar to, but also sharply differentiated from modern (secular) understandings of cosmopolitanism. We suggest that appeals to any ‘universal’ cosmopolitan project can work to silence local social relations (such as ethnic, gender, religious or class differentiations), and how all claims to cosmopolitanism are intrinsically sutured to youth’s struggles for positioning within their nation. We stress therefore the importance of attending to local social dynamics throughout our analysis of youth identity constructions and their constitutive others, and take this up throughout the following papers of this special edition.

Key words Muslim identities; youth identities; cosmopolitanism; global citizen; postcoloniality

Word count: 7756

Introduction

This paper draws on case study research into Muslim youth identities in Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan and Senegal, as described in the opening article of this special edition. It explores how Muslim youth identifications with their nation and religion could be considered as enacting a form of global or cosmopolitan citizenship. We begin with a critique of the concepts of citizenship and global citizenship, highlighting the Eurocentric nature of both, and the tensions which this poses in contexts of postcoloniality. We also highlight the importance of ‘global citizenship’ in contemporary
international policy agendas, again critiquing its distinctively modern and Eurocentric framing. We then turn to our research into Muslim youth identities, to illustrate how youth’s religious affiliations could be considered as a form of ‘Muslim cosmopolitanism’, whose religious character contrasts with the secular cosmopolitan imaginary of the West. We show how these affiliations involved differentiation against constitutive others, both internal and external to the nation, that intersected the global and the local. In the concluding section, we critique the uncritical transfer of international education policy (Crossley, 2019), particularly with respect to global citizenship, highlighting its misrecognition of the significance of religion for (Muslim) youth identities.

Postcoloniality and the (global) citizen

The citizen

The concept of citizenship is recognised as originating in Greek states, although the term began to take its present form in Western societies from the 18th century onwards. Known as the Age of Reason, this was a period of considerable change, which included the transition from agrarian to capitalist societies, increasing secularisation, urbanisation and industrialisation. It also saw the emergence of constitutional democracy as a mode of governance that ensured both the freedoms of the individual citizen and the orderly functioning of society in ways that facilitated the development of commerce (Bhambra, 2007; Dean, 2007). These sweeping social changes continued throughout Europe in the 19th century, a period when the ‘nation’ was increasingly naturalised as the ‘imagined community’ through which states governed their populations (Anderson, 2006). In its contemporary guise, the citizen continues to be framed by a modern imaginary, as an autonomous individual who enjoys formal rights and obligations within their nation-state and beyond, a construction which is now thoroughly normalised and formally secured by an international legal system and a vast web of multilateral agencies.

What is missing from this admittedly highly summarised account of citizenship as it emerged in Western societies is the colonial and imperial underbelly upon which the rights and freedoms of the modern man of reason was forged. At its widest, citizenship can be understood to imply participation within a community. However, all ‘communities’ depend upon their ‘constitutive others’ - in other words, those who are excluded from it. In its inception in Greek times, the constitutive others of citizenship were children, women and slaves. In its modern form, citizenship was similarly beset with exclusions. For the purposes of this text, one critical exclusion revolved around the question of what contexts fell within the ‘civilised world’ and who counted as part of its ‘humanity’, as defined through Western norms. Dean (2007) points to the increasing formalisation
of the status of the individual within the territorial boundaries of Western Europe, but highlights how the norms of European civil society were not assumed applicable in the rest of the world. The supposed superiority of modern Western society was claimed instead as a justification for its ‘civilising mission’ and the colonisation of Africa and Asia. This was to see the appropriation of great tracts of land and the dehumanisation, displacement and indeed massacre of many peoples (Dean, 2007).

In the construction of this civilising mission, the superiority of the man of reason of Western civilisation was assumed. In contrast, the colonised were constructed as sub-human, lacking in rationality, and without rights. Mbembe (2017, p. 11) in particular points to how the Western world considered itself as ‘the center of humanity, the earth and the birthplace of reason, universal life and the truth of humanity’. From such a position, modern nations constituted a system of ‘universal’ rights they felt relevant for themselves, but not for the peoples of their colonies. They were the constitutive other of this Western ideal - what Mbembe describes as its ‘Remainder - the ultimate sign of the dissimilar, of difference’. As indicated above, this marking of colonised peoples as sub-human in turn allowed the colonial enterprise to be understood as a moral duty that was “civilising’ and humanitarian’ (p. 12). Although supposedly founded on this moral high-ground, the wealth and supremacy of colonial powers depended upon the brutal exploitation of the colonised, an express denial of their humanity, with their commodified bodies instead providing what Mbembe (2017) describes as the ‘ore’ from which Western wealth and superiority was forged. As Mignolo also puts it, ‘modernity and coloniality were two sides of the same coin’ (2003, p. 452).

We discuss the particularities of the emergence of our case study countries as independent nation-states in the two papers which follow. Here our more general interest is in the complexities of defining one’s identity as a postcolonial nation, when the defining ‘prototype’ of the modern nation already seems to have been delineated by those against whom one seeks distinction (Chatterjee, 1993). He suggests this constitutive difficulty produced an emulation on the one hand of modern science, technology and techniques of government, but an intensified search for differentiation in cultural and spiritual domains. These were looked to as the distinctive ‘hallmarks’ of the postcolonial nation’s identity, and indeed became a ‘defining feature’ of postcolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa.

The constitution of the postcolonial nation was also thoroughly marked firstly by the ‘metricisms’ of the sciences through which colonial power sought to know the peoples they had colonised
(Mbembe, 2017; Said, 1994) and secondly by the divisive nature of the systems of indirect rule through which they were governed. The first involved taxonomic categorisation of peoples along racial and ethnic lines. These processes did not ‘represent’ differences in colonised communities - they constituted them. Indirect rule in turn instrumentalised and deepened these differences, taking up these categorisations to install particular ethnic groups as representatives of colonial power (Mamdani, 1996). These processes were to lead to the formation of internal ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ classes (Fanon, 1967), in ways that sedimented difference and resentment for generations ahead, and ensured that the constitution of many postcolonial ‘nation-states’ was inherently fractured (Kabeer, 2002).

The injustices of colonial domination are evident in all the writers cited above. However it is Fanon (1986) in particular who illuminates how its violences marked the constitution of the colonised (black) subject. Born in Martinique and with a French education, Fanon’s position as a psychiatrist working for the French in Algeria ensured he lived out these violences. He vividly discusses his realisation of being constructed as ‘other’ through the racialized gaze of the coloniser. He describes how this gaze was filled with ‘treacherous stereotypes’, symbolic totems such as ‘tom toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects’ - inscriptions beyond his control, which marked him out as different within the coloniser’s world, and reduced him to an object in its world of objects. With graphic symbolism, he describes how these inscriptions produced a dislocation that ‘spatters my whole body with black blood’ (Fanon, 1986, p. 112). This conveys a deep sense of alienation and internal fracture, at the same as it produced a (cosmopolitan) desire to be recognised as part of humanity, as ‘a man, nothing but a man’ (1986, p. 113). We will see below how memories of the colonial past continue to haunt the identity constructions of our participants, and take up implications for cosmopolitanism in the concluding discussion.

The great majority of colonised countries were to gain their independence as nation-states in the period following World War II. Repugnance against its atrocities added to the imperatives that propelled the subsequent development of international human rights legislation and the birth of multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. However, this has not put an end to the economic exploitation of the Global South and its peoples - quite the contrary, it has accelerated within the economic liberalisation that is now a constitutive part of our contemporary globalised (cosmopolitan) world. In addition to intensifying social stratification across all states, economic liberalisation has also complicated the issue of national self-definition, given that the autonomy of the nation-state is now radically conditioned by the global economy. Its strictures have also
disproportionately impacted on postcolonial nations, given the ways that free market principles have been imposed on ‘developing’ nations through multilateral bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Policies (Jomo and Fine, 2006).

**The cosmopolitan citizen**

This contemporary geopolitical landscape leads us directly to the complexities of global, cosmopolitan citizenship, which has been much valorised in recent international policy agendas, with the justification that we now live in a globalised, interdependent and interconnected world (UNESCO, 2015; 2016). In vernacular terms, being ‘cosmopolitan’ implies urbanity, someone who is well-travelled and at ease within different cultures. What this common-sense, everyday usage typically misrecognises however is the social and material privileges which sustain such claims, and how they rely on forms of class consciousness which assume a certain superiority in relation to the local or the ‘provincial’ (Appiah, 2006; Calhoun, 2008). The declaration of one’s openness to the cultures of the ‘other’ might seem benign, but when analysed more closely, this ‘openness’ is offered from a position assumes the superiority and ‘universality’ of its particularities, at the same time that these are ‘emptied out’ by an appeal to an apparent cosmopolitan universalism. This does the work in other words of evacuating the position from which such claims are made, while simultaneously subsuming difference (Skeggs, 2004).

Alongside vernacular usage, cosmopolitan citizenship has deep roots in Western philosophical thought. Cheay (2006) describes Emmanuel Kant as the ‘inaugurator’ of cosmopolitan thinking, as a project that imagined a ‘world of perpetual peace’ based in a (supposedly universal) sense of man’s common humanity. However, as discussed above, this ‘common’ humanity was based in Western norms that constructed its own civilisation as the pinnacle of rationality, in a world that awaited its ‘legitimate’ exploitation.

Contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism are diverse, but two strands seem particularly important. Firstly there is the strand drawing on Habermasian ideas which aspires to the development of a system of global governance (Held, 1995), and secondly, Appiah’s (2006) ‘situated cosmopolitanism’. The first takes up the partial ‘unbundling’ of the nation-state as a consequence variously of the power of multilateral organisations which transcend state jurisdictions, the emergence of ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2006), and a global public forum involving international non-governmental organisations, made possible by online media. However, yet again the appeal to ‘universal humanity’ would appear to be thoroughly modern and Eurocentric, particularly for its continued privileging of its rationality as the foundation of democracy. Furthermore, by assuming
globalisation to be benign, it misrecognises the extent that global capital flows depend on economic
inequalities, notably between the Global North and South. The extent that a global public forum can
be a force for democratisation is also highly suspect, as revealed by the use of social media to
influence recent political debates in the US and UK, and indeed how ‘networks of protest’ are being
captured as further opportunities for profit-making (Skeggs and Yuill, 2016). Moreover, even if the
development of the international regime of human rights and supra-national institutions has
provoked some ‘unbundling’ of the relationship of citizenship and the nation-state, the nation-state
is still arguably a critical site for the enforcement of those rights (Cheay, 2006; Sassen, 2006). Indeed
for Nash (2009), the ‘cosmopolitanization’ of international law is adding to inequalities between
citizens, with ‘super-citizens’ enjoying full citizenship rights, secure employment and international
mobility, in stark contrast to the liminality of ‘non-citizens’ - undocumented migrants, refugees, and
those detained outside national and international jurisdictions, such as Guantanamo Bay. Instead of
a new era of supposedly universal ‘cosmopolitan’ rights, the interstices between international and
national legal systems may rather be ‘concretizing’ new forms of inequality.

Turning to the concept of situated cosmopolitanism (Appiah, 2006), this too is an openly normative
project. It understands local values and practices as being integral to cosmopolitanism, along with
the values of tolerance, pluralism and fallibilism (awareness that our knowledge is always imperfect
about the implicit superiority embedded in cosmopolitan claims to universality, Calhoun (2006)
questions the misrecognition of the relative positioning of those who can extend their ‘tolerance’ to
the ‘other’, and how this openness simultaneously constructs an evaluative distancing of those who
are ‘othered’.

Alongside these hierarchies, it is also what the modern framing of cosmopolitanism implies for
religious faith which is of particular interest. The qualitative changes in society that accompanied the
emergence of modern constitutional democracy were noted earlier to have involved increased
‘secularisation’. The privileging of science and reason that was embedded in the progressive ethos of
Enlightenment times implied a distrust of religious beliefs and a rejection of the authority of the
church. The Enlightenment’s ‘stripping away of myth, magic and the sacred’ was constitutive of what
Asad (2003, p. 13) describes as the ‘secular space’ of modernity, as well as the ‘myth’ that secularism
was intrinsic to liberal democracies. This myth completely misrecognises the deep interpenetration
of religion and the state in the American, English and French democracies as they emerged in the
18th and 19th Centuries. Instead, it can be argued that particular religions are already ‘inside’ the
public sphere. This allows them to be affirmed as ‘the secular’, in ways that consolidate their hegemony and simultaneously exclude other faiths (Butler et al., 2011). In contemporary Western society, particularly after 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ that followed, the religious ‘other’ is overwhelmingly Islam. Indeed, Islam and Islamic societies have been characterized as ‘pre-modern’, or even ‘anti-modern’, despite evidence of the ways Islamic leaders have been implicated in democratic ‘modernising’ movements in contexts of coloniality or postcoloniality (Mamdani, 2004).

However alternative understandings of cosmopolitanism to this modern secular framing are more accommodating of religious beliefs. Social theorists have identified how ‘cosmopolitan’ from a normative perspective involves a project of global integration based in some sense of common humanity (Calhoun 2008). The desire to build a global community of Muslims (ummah) can therefore be considered as a form of cosmopolitanism. However this sits at odds with the assumptions of secularity and its appeal to rationality described above as being intrinsic to modernity, and to its visions of cosmopolitanism. These tensions are suggested in the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of minority Islamic communities in Europe, which Edmunds (2013) suggests amounts to a ‘failure’ of cosmopolitanism. She sees this arising from fundamental differences between ‘European’ and ‘Muslim’ cosmopolitanisms, where the first assumes ‘cool’ affective attachments and loyalties, which resonate with republican ideals, based in secular reason, while the second is based in ‘thick’ religious attachments, which have a fundamentally affective rather than ‘rational’ basis.

Beck and Levy (2013) also discuss ‘global Islam’ through the lens of cosmopolitanism. Their discussion focuses on the new imaginaries produced through the intersections of the national and the global which are made possible through the ubiquitous use of information technologies and new media. The discourses they highlight as being in global circulation include the international regime of human rights; the imperatives of world market, migration and global generational civil society movements, and ‘local interpenetration of world religions’. They propose a non-normative understanding of cosmopolitanism that is concerned with analysis of global flows, rather than holding out for any utopian ‘world without borders’. Their ‘impure’ understanding of cosmopolitanism is concerned with the interpenetration of the global, the national and the local in contemporary contexts where the ‘Global other is in our midst’ (p. 9). This refutes a dichotomy between nationalism and cosmopolitanism and highlights instead how ‘cosmopolitan orientations can complement the national’ (p. 5). Their analysis foregrounds conflict and tension. Like Marsden (2008) below, they seek to analyse cosmopolitanism as a product of intersecting discourses, both historical and contemporary.
Other writers offer alternative imaginaries of cosmopolitanism from a Muslim perspective. Marsden’s (2008) ethnographic research into Muslim peoples in Northern Pakistan explores the intersections of religious, ethnic, cultural discourses both historical and contemporary, in the production of what it means to be Muslim and takes up the (pre-modern) Muslim cosmopolitanism of scholars who aspired to a world that shared Islamic ideals. However, rather than positing any universal cosmopolitan ‘norms’, his analysis privileges a ‘resolute localism’ where ‘cosmopolitanism’ is understood as a discursive device through which ‘a specific and exclusive local identity [is] objectified and valorised’ (Osella and Osella, 2007 in Marsden, 2008, p. 215). This chimes well with our analysis, and our concerns with fusions of the global with the local, and in particular the identity work that is done in the local in any invocation of the global.

The cosmopolitan citizen as a development goal

Before turning to our research data, we note increasing international policy interest in global citizenship education, particularly within UNESCO’s Sustainable Development Goals, where Goal 4 (Quality Education) has specifically coupled sustainable development to global citizenship (UNESCO, 2015b). The indicators for this require global citizenship education and education for sustainable development to be ‘mainstreamed’ across national education policies, curricula, teacher education and student assessment (UNESCO, 2016). Given the penetration of such policies into education systems around the world (Crossley, 2019), and the conceptual difficulties with the concept we have identified above, it is worth exploring how UNESCO seems to understand the term.

Global citizenship is a key concept within the ‘new humanism’ promoted by a previous UNESCO Director General, Irene Bokova. In response to the challenges of a globalised world, Bokova (2010) finds the need for a ‘community of humanity that binds every individual to all others’, and calls for commitment to building this ‘ideal community’ in the interests of ‘lasting peace and global prosperity.’ However, in addition to resonating with the ethos of modernity, by emphasising man’s agency in (re-)shaping the world, the illustrations used are strikingly Eurocentric. For example, the depiction of this ‘new humanism’ takes up the 15th Century Italian philosopher Mirandola as follows:

God the Father, [..] set [man] in the middle of the world and thus spoke to him: ‘we have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer’. (Bokova, 2010)

Global citizenship is also taken up in UNESCO working papers by Haddad (2013) and Tawil (2013). Tawil (2013) in particular is critical of ‘postnational’ forms of citizenship, arguing for the continuing relevance of the nation-state. He looks instead to cosmopolitan citizenship, framed through Appiah’s
situated cosmopolitanism, where the ‘global’ is not incompatible with the local. Haddad (2013) on the other hand openly endorses a progressive, modern standpoint, framing his article with reference to the grand narratives of modernity:

The notion of development, associated with that of progress, is naturally seen as the central theme of the epic of modern humanity. (Haddad, 2013, p.1)

Apart from Bokova’s (2010) somewhat infelicitous invocation of religion, what is striking in these texts is their silence about world religions, and how they might contribute, or be excluded from notions of global or cosmopolitan citizenship. In UNESCO (2015a), which elaborates specific global citizenship education topics and learning objectives, religion does sometimes appear, including for example as an element that requires an ‘understanding of difference and diversity’ (along with culture, language, gender and sexuality). However, it is striking that in the suggested list of key words to frame teaching of global citizenship, religion appears only once, and in the binary frame of ‘religious v. secular’, in a section on the relationships between global and local issues (p. 43). More recently, UNESCO (2018, p. 193) again positions religion in a negative way, constructing education for global citizenship as a counter to violent extremism that it defines as being driven by ‘ideological, religious or political goals’. Overall, UNESCO’s investment in global citizenship is clear, but at the same time seems to be tied to a modern ‘secular’ framing of the concept.

To conclude this section, we stress again the need to interrogate what work appeals to cosmopolitan values might do in their particular context, and to question the work of international education policy transfer (Crossley, 2019). As Butler (1992, p. 7) puts it ‘[w]ithin the political context of contemporary postcoloniality more generally, it is perhaps especially urgent to underscore the very category of the ‘universal’ as a site of insistent contest and resignification.’

**Research Methodology and Methods**

The research drew on an interpretative research paradigm that seeks to understand situated meaning-making from the perspectives of local actors. A case study approach was felt to be appropriate for developing a holistic understanding of a particular issue (Stake, 2005), the focus in this instance being on Muslim youth identity constructions with respect to nation, religion and gender. Case studies were conducted in four distinctive contexts of postcoloniality, these being Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan and Senegal. Identity as a concept was understood through postcolonial and poststructural theories (e.g. Hall, 2000; Butler, 1990) which see identity - or identities - as being fluid and multiple, an ongoing discursive production involving differentiation against constitutive
Youth’s identity constructions were explored through focus group discussions (FGDs) which gave space for youth’s identity work. These were conducted separately with male and female youth, and with Muslim and Christian youth. Observation notes and reflective field diaries were also kept. A total of 276 youth were involved across the four cases (138 male and 138 female), the majority of whom were Muslim (n=204). The participants were identified mainly through educational institutions and local contacts in the different country contexts. A shared interview guide focusing on nation, religion and gender was used for each case study. In most contexts, interviews were conducted with the support of local researchers, some of whom were youth themselves. With the consent of the participants, the focus group discussions were recorded, translated and transcribed. The analysis was conducted thematically, focusing on the key concepts of interest in the research, with particular attention being paid to the constitutive ‘other’ throughout youth’s discourses. Excerpts from the interviews are used to illustrate the analysis below, attributed country and by gender. Unless otherwise indicated, the quotes are from FGDs with Muslim youth.

**Muslim Youth as Global Citizens**

**National belongings**

We highlighted above the challenges that globalisation has posed for the sovereignty of nation-states. We start our analysis by signalling the significance of the nation for the majority of our youth participants. Despite the questions raised above, these youth identified strongly the concept of the nation. It was clearly meaningful and important to them, and something that they took up with great pride in the focus groups, even if this was also tempered by concerns about issues such as corruption and poor governance. The quotes below show the ways youth in Nigeria and in Lebanon felt respected and admired by other nations:

> In other countries in Africa they look up to Nigeria for a lot of things. That’s why they seem to call us the giant of Africa so when I say I am a Nigerian, it carries a lot of weight. (Male Nigeria)

> All the world love Lebanese and they imitate them. (Male Lebanon)

The symbol of the ‘lion’ was also taken up in Senegal, as a marker of their national distinction. Ways of depicting national affiliations were often rich in imagery and inscribed with affective language, as in example of the Senegalese youth below who speaks of her ‘love’ for the nation, as well her commitment to ‘fight’ for its future:
I feel very proud to be a Senegalese. It creates in me a feeling of love for this country [...] it’s our homeland. Everything we have, we have it here, so we fight to help the country to move forward. (Female Senegal)

Across the FGDs, there were youth who expressed their sense of national belonging as something that was totally natural - the nation as an imagined community was an entirely real fabrication for them:

We get such patriotic feelings naturally. We live here, get our education here and are born and bred here. (Female Pakistan)

Overall, although globalisation may have created a more interdependent and interconnected world, these youth nevertheless declared a strong sense of national belonging.

We take up the gender symbolism of youth’s national belongings in more detail in the final paper of this special edition, and the differentiation of the nation against ‘constitutive others’, both external and internal, in the two papers which follow. At this point, we turn to the expressions of cosmopolitanism within youth’s narratives.

**Cosmopolitanism in a modern guise**

Our earlier discussion of cosmopolitanism pointed to a vernacular use of the term involving a claim to urbanity, being well-travelled and open to different (other) cultures. There were a small number of instances where our participants’ comments about their national characteristics reflected something of this kind of cosmopolitanism. This first example is a Lebanese male, describing the cosmopolitan characteristics of the Lebanese:

...our openness, acceptance of new things and modern life. We travel. We learn everything quickly. We are educated and love science more than other Arabs. All Lebanese are smart. We speak more than one language [Arabic, English and French]. We are like Italians. They are stylish and dress to impress, like us. (Male Lebanon)

It seems significant that these claims are related to acceptance of ‘new things’, and an openness to science - these are archetypally modern ideals. The word ‘modern’ is specifically invoked, although of course may reflect a vernacular understanding of the term. Another participant in Senegal specifically invoked the notion of the ‘citizen of the world’ in response to a question posed in the FGDs about what nationalities they would not want to have, this being a question that aimed to
explore the ‘constitutive others’ of participants’ national identifications. Although he had earlier expressed pride in being Senegalese (alongside being African), his response resisted the question:

it’s not a question of nationality, for me it’s a question of education, because it doesn’t matter what country it is, there are virtuous people, it doesn’t matter what country you are from, if some do evil, others do good things, it’s about being a citizen of the world. It doesn’t matter the colour, the nationality, the sex. (Male Senegal)

In considering this invocation of a cosmopolitan ideal, it is important to take cognisance of the social status of this participant, as being amongst the oldest, most educated and most elite of those interviewed. The work of this claim to be a world citizen also serves to flatten gender, race, national and gender differences - in contrast to the narratives of the great majority of the Senegalese participants. This is not to say that they did not espouse ‘cosmopolitan’ values - however the axis of identification with cosmopolitan values for the majority of participants was through their religious identities as Muslims, as we now explore.

**Muslim cosmopolitans**

When asked about their religious identities, our Muslim participants were effusive about what Islam meant to them. They often showed their awareness of the contemporary demonization of Islam and of Muslims in Western society, and strongly resisted the association of Islam with war. Instead, the portrayed Islam as a religion of peace and love, that embraced all humanity, in ways that resonated with strongly with cosmopolitan ideals. The first quote below takes up both how participants portrayed their religious belongings, in ways that show the significance to them of the world community of the *ummah*, at the same time as resisting the association of Islam with violence and terror:

*Being a Muslim means harmony, peace in the world. Because the main message of Muslim religion is solidarity, sharing, peace; the entire inhabitants of Earth are our brothers, are our sisters. Currently it’s not very easy to identify ourselves as a Muslim, to talk about the Muslim religion, because we are the victims of some ideologies, of certain influences, of a lot of disastrous things that happen now in the world. But anyway, Islam is peace, love, sharing.*

(Female Senegal)

The concern of Muslims for all of humanity were echoed across the case studies, as in these examples:
Religion can shape morality, can shape anything, you’ve done away with these gender, ethnicity, nationality, and what have you, because we’ve learnt from religion that we belong to the same earth. (Male Nigeria)

The Islamic requirement is not just to take care of the needs of other Muslims but all human beings. (Male Pakistan)

A striking aspect of youth’s religious belongings was the affective language within which they were often expressed. As shown above, concepts such as peace, love, caring and happiness were often invoked when describing what it meant to be a Muslim. Although one Lebanese participant described her religion as the ‘most logical’, religion was much more often couched in terms of faith and belief, as a predominantly affective issue:

Being Muslim, it’s in the heart first, it’s internal. (Female Senegal)

A question about how one would be different if one could choose to be a Christian sometimes provoked responses about this being impossible to imagine. As Butler et al. (2011) suggest, religion was an embodied structure of feeling which was deeply incorporated in one’s being. It was beyond the field of individual agency, and resisted as something that was a question of personal choice:

you know that [being Muslim] is not up to the person to choose by yourself. This is done for you by God. Now we came to life and found our parents be Muslims. And this is how we’ve been brought up until we grow up. So this is what we can know, being a Muslim is what we know. We can only be Muslim. (Male Senegal)

Nevertheless, even if these affective dimensions challenge modern associations of cosmopolitanism with secular rationality, participants also associated the ideals of their religion with democratic ideals. For example, alongside the significance of the global ummah, Islam’s values were also conjoined with democratic ideals by this Senegalese participant, in ways that would seem to contradict secular, republican understandings of democracy:

[Being Muslim] is about humanity, really universal values, democracy. Because Islam is an open, tolerant religion, which inculcates values such as sharing, like respect, like democracy. (Male Senegal)

Across the different contexts of our case studies, youth’s affiliations to their nation and their religions were often sutured together in powerful ways. In some instances, this suturing of national and religious identity was left open in terms of which religion was implicated, at other points very firmly tied to a particular religion:
To me I am proud to be Nigerian, because Nigerians are very religious people. In terms of their faith, either as Muslims or Christians, they are very religious. (Male Nigeria)

For the typical Senegalese, there’s the aspect of religion which is important. Because the population is religious in its overwhelming majority; no matter which religion it is. (Male Christian Senegal)

There are only two states in the world formed on the basis of ideology, Israel and Pakistan. So Pakistan means pak (pure), a land where pure people live. (Male Pakistan)

It is perhaps to be expected that in the Muslim majority contexts of Pakistan and Senegal, youth’s national affiliations were in most cases strongly bound up with their identifications with Islam. Examples could be found in every case study however, whatever their different constitutional arrangements, which challenged the separation of nation and religion, and suggested how different formations of the secular could incorporate religion. In very many instances, participants identified religious leaders as their national heroes, as in this example from Senegal:

I am really proud to be born in the same country as Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, El Hadji Malick [Muslim religious leaders]. Great men who are in Senegal, who have done something for Senegal. Even now, we follow in their steps. (Male Senegal)

In this context, religious leaders’ commitment to cosmopolitan values of peace and non-violence were integral to the significance of Muslim leaders at a national level:

...this [commitment to peace] is what makes the strength of Senegal, because since our independence we have never had a coup d’état. Because religious groups have an influence on the political sphere, on the social sphere. Today, for example before taking certain political decisions, the politicians resort to these religious men. They will certainly tell them ‘no, don’t do this, do that’. If society wanted to organize a peaceful demonstration today, if the religious men speak, maybe it will have an influence on that. So that’s why everybody takes them as models. (Male Senegal)

In this instance the participant points to contemporary religious leaders, but in many cases those identified were historical figures, who had been important in the formation of the nation. We drew attention earlier to the ways identities are constructed in relation to their ‘constitutive others’. We now turn to a critical dimension of the fusion of religion and nation in youth’s narratives of identity in these contexts of postcoloniality and how these involved the articulation of these identities (religious and national) against the colonial other. The struggle for independence against the rule of
the colonial power clearly continued to reverberate through youth’s discourses, particularly in Pakistan, Nigeria and Senegal. The first example from Pakistan is in response to a question asking youth to identify their national heroes, where Muslim groups who had resisted British colonial rule were identified:

*I am proud of our ancestors who fought against the British colonisation and oppression, be they leaders of the Muslim League or the Khudai Khidmatgar - their resistance and struggle got us our independence and sovereignty.* (Male Pakistan)

These groups were seen as foundational to the nation, and its emergence as an independent state from colonial rule. Responses to the same question in Senegal saw the founder of the Mouride brotherhood, Serigne Touba, frequently identified, for similar reasons. The participant below demonstrates an awareness that the ‘national’ hero he has identified is a religious figure, but justifies this for his resistance against the imposition of ‘Western’ forms of modernity:

*...Serigne Touba, the great marabout of Touba, was a defender of the rights of the Senegalese people. He was a religious guide, but he also defended the Senegalese people culturally speaking. Because he didn’t want Senegalese people to get confused with the modernity European people tended to instil in us.* (Male Senegal)

Importantly, the intersection of nation and religion in this imaginary did not sit in tension with ‘secularity’. Another participant from this context pointed to the role of Muslim leaders in the struggle for Senegalese independence, and specifically identified the role of Muslim leaders in allowing Senegal to emerge as an independent ‘secular’ nation:

*And if we take up the Muslim religious side, there are many people who fought so that Senegal can today be a secular country.* (Male Senegal)

The constitutive other from the colonial past could be identified in national terms, but also be constructed more generally against ‘the West’, or in racial terms against ‘white people’. In other more contemporary instances, the ‘constitutive other’ was neo-colonial rather than colonial, as in the example below from Lebanon:

*We defend our rights and the rights of the oppressed. In spite of all the wars in Lebanon, we are still standing. […] In spite of all the international pressure on Shi’a from some countries (America) and organisations such as Da’ash (so-called Islamic State), we are still stronger than them.* (Male Lebanon)
In these different contexts of postcoloniality, past histories of colonial domination as well as instances of contemporary neo-colonial pressures reverberated through youth’s discourses of identity. In closing this analysis, we consider the implications of these agonistic relations with the colonial or neo-colonial other for the reception of gender equality legislation. We will see in Paper 7 of this issue the ways that nation, religion and ethnic identifications were consistently and pervasively inflected by gender, often in ways that left women constructed in subordinated positions. This was recognised as being challenged by gender equality legislation by different participants, and while some spoke positively about this, for others it was not compatible with their religious beliefs:

*I cannot allow my wife to go out in public without a reasonable excuse that is allowed by my religion. [...] I cannot allow her to work in a public institution. My religion denies me that. So I cannot expose her to such a level. The law is saying that women should go out and participate in politics, this is against my religion. (Male Nigeria)*

Indeed political leaders attempts to introduce gender equality legislation could all too readily be constructed as an alien imposition, that was not in harmony with local culture, as in this first example from Senegal, where gender equality or parity legislation is constructed it as an imposition from ‘white people’:

*Wade [previous president] wanted to push forward the issue of [gender] parity, as he had seen white people do. Really, above all, as a Muslim one should base everything one does on one’s faith, and there is very specific place for women in religion, that is to say, the family home. (Male Senegal)*

Cosmopolitan ideals espoused but in the particularities of the local articulations of participants’ identities, particular tensions were evident in relation to gender. We see here a conflict between a modern, juridical discourse based in liberal understandings of gender in binary terms, taken up as part of a nation-state’s entanglement with international legal systems and conventions, and structures of subjectification with more local, but still complex roots. Rather than locating gender hierarchies in ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ cultures, we should take account of Oyewumi’s (2005, p. 488) analysis of the introduction to Yoruba culture of the category of ‘woman’, which she describes as ‘foundational’ in Western understandings of gender. In addition to the introduction of Western gender norms, we should also take account of the ways that indirect rule instituted more masculine and more hierarchical power structures, flatting the more plural indigenous power structures that preceded colonisation, which had drawn on age groups, clans, women’s groups, chiefs and religious groups (Kabeer, 2002). Out of all these, only chiefs were ‘sanctified’ as having authority within
indirect rule. This was constructed as singular and authoritative, in ways that were despotic rather than consensual. In other words, we should resist any assumption of the superiority of Western juridical discourses, just as we remain critical of women’s subordination in the contexts of our research.

Conclusion

Overall, the analysis in this paper demonstrates the continued relevance of the nation to our Muslim youth participants - this was meaningful to them and provoked expressions of pride, as well as concern. The complexities of the gender symbolism embedded in these discourses are addressed in the concluding paper of this edition. While some youth appealed to cosmopolitan values when articulating their national identities, it was much more frequent for these to be associated with youth’s religious identities, even if for many youth religious and national identifications were entwined. These articulations resonated with affective affiliations. As Butler et al. (2011) argue, religion is lived as an embodied structure of feeling, in ways that are not available to ‘rational’ intervention and reconstruction. These identity formations pose a particular challenge to understandings of cosmopolitanism based in the secular reason of Western modernity, within which religion has been constructed as ‘pre-modern’, and Islam in particular as even ‘anti-modern’. As was argued earlier, the very claim to universality of such ‘cosmopolitan’ positions readily misrecognises the value system in which they are based and looks to the other to assimilate to this.

This article instead takes up our interest in the ‘constitutive others’ of Muslim youth’s identity formations, and in particular, the articulation of their national and their religious identities against the colonial or neo-colonial other. We refute calls for a global ‘cosmopolitan’ sociology that transcends the category of the nation-state and point to the importance of attending to ways the histories of postcolonial nation-state formations reverberate still within youth discourses. These histories are lived in the present, as an ‘embodied citationality’ (Skeggs, 2004), whose agonisms are readily revivified, especially when national or religious belongings come under pressure. More widely, the call for a postnational sociology also misrecognises the interdependencies between the development of modern capitalist societies and their historical exploitation of their colonies, as well as the continuing structural inequalities between the Global North and South (Bhambra, 2014; Go, 2013). So while we agree with Beck (2002) and Beck and Levy (2013) on the significance of the circulation of global discourses and how these become infused with the local, the significance of historical traces within these are also important and should not be glossed over in any appeals to cosmopolitanism. In this respect Marsden’s (2008) invocation of a ‘radical localism’ is highly apposite to our analysis, and is taken up throughout the later papers.
With respect to international policy interest in global citizenship education (UNESCO, 2015; 2016; 2018), our analysis hints at the potential difficulties this may face. UNESCO’s understandings of the global citizen appears to be framed by a modern, secular conceptualisation, which seems unlikely to accommodate affiliations based in religious faiths in an easy way. The response of postcolonial nation-states to the SDG priorities may also be contended. In particular, the ways that national legislation on gender equality could be constructed as an imposition from the West raises the prospect that ‘global citizenship’ itself will be constructed as normatively Eurocentric, in ways that fail to take account of the ways postcolonial nations may seek differentiation through their distinctive local cultures and histories. Mbembe’s (2017, p. 158) questioning of any ‘abstract’ understanding of universal community seems highly apposite here, alongside his call for the rehabilitation of singularity and difference that involves a re-thinking of the ‘universal’ as ‘precisely the site of a multiplicity of singularities’.

Overall, this paper has focused on the significance within youth discourses of the ‘cosmopolitan’ values which informed their religious affiliations. It has been concerned at the same time to open up this ‘universal’ and explore instead the situated particularities of such constructions, and how these are pervasively constructed against a ‘constitutive other’. We take up these themes again, exploring them in more detail, throughout the papers which follow.

References


