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Hidden in plain sight: the UK’s extraterritorial management of immigration

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Migration Studies
University of Sussex
February 2020
Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature: __________________________

Date: _______________
Hidden in plain sight: the UK’s extraterritorial management of immigration

Summary

The UK, like most countries in the Global North, seeks to regulate immigration and travel in advance of its physical border by projecting their interventions outward and cooperating with sending and transit states. These extraterritorial practices vary widely in their application across different countries, national populations and individual profiles. The UK, for example, requires restrictive visitor and transit visas for nationals from Jamaica, India and Turkey while waiving them for people from Botswana, Malaysia and Mexico. The UK’s extraterritorial interventions in countries like Ghana and Egypt also differ greatly. How do we explain these variations? What are the conditions influencing the UK’s choices, and who are the actors involved in the process? Which countries and groups of people are targeted for greater exclusion and control?

The thesis sets out to answer these questions by examining the UK’s visa system and liaison network in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. By comparing the UK’s actions across such diverse contexts, this study provides an in-depth analysis of the conditions shaping the Home Office’s choices. The goal is to shed light on the way extraterritorialisation manifests in practice and the reasons it takes the shape that it does. Or, to put it another way, the study aims to better understand how, where and why the UK intervenes from abroad. Drawing on original evidence from interviews with Home Office officials, freedom of information requests and documentary research, this thesis demonstrates how the Home Office balances the government’s interests in encouraging and excluding particular flows by making judgements about levels of so-called “immigration risk.” Equally important, it shows the UK’s international relationships and the behaviour of foreign state actors too are necessary for explaining the state’s actions. In doing so, the study reveals more complexity to extraterritorialisation than is often depicted in the literature.
Acknowledgements

As a US citizen who moves and travels frequently, I am acutely aware the privileged access I have to most foreign countries based on the arbitrary location of my birth. While living, working and studying in Guatemala, India, Thailand and Uganda, I was continually faced with the uncomfortable truth that many of my closest friends did not have the same ability to move, even when they had far more legitimate reasons for doing so. This unfair reality is where my thesis originated. It is in the stories of the difficulties these friends encountered when attempting to cross international borders. These stories include dangerous journeys to seek asylum in another country, as well as the tedious bureaucratic hurdles associated to applying for visas and the all too common disappointment of having your application rejected. This thesis is also grounded in their resilience and activism, which inspired me to investigate and question the systems states use to structure international mobility.

In addition to these friends, there are many other people I owe a deep gratitude to for their support during and prior to my doctoral research. First, I am indebted to my interviewees, who were all very gracious in the time and knowledge they shared with me. I would also like to thank Rotary District 6220 for the 2015-16 Global Grant Scholarship, which provided financial support during my first year of study. I owe a special thanks to District 6220 Scholarship Chair, John Townsend, for his assistance and support during the application process and beyond.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Five Country Conference</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department of the Ghanaian Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Ghana Immigration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIBI</td>
<td>Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACOB</td>
<td>Narcotics Control Board in Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS II</td>
<td>Second Generation Schengen Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction – extraterritorial immigration management

1.1 Setting the scene

Today most rich destination states seek to regulate immigration and travel in advance of their physical borders by projecting their interventions outward and cooperating with sending and transit states. This extraterritorial approach has been a defining feature of the developed world’s immigration management since the mid-1980s (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018). Through the use of visas and fines on shipping companies during the early 20th century, governments have long sought to influence international flows from abroad (Zolberg 1997). Over the last three decades, however, these practices have substantially grown and diversified (Zaiotti 2016). They now incorporate techniques like posting immigration officials in foreign jurisdictions, maritime interceptions, offshore detention centres, data sharing arrangements with other countries and agreements with sending and transit states to curb migration flows. In a political environment where immigration and asylum are highly contentious issues, governments in liberal democracies use these measures to exclude the types of mobility they conceptualise as unwanted while also appearing to abide by their liberal principles and international human rights obligations (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2014; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010).

The extraterritorialisation of immigration management refers to a set of policies and practices designed to regulate the movement of people while they are still outside the territory of their intended destination state (FitzGerald 2019, 6). It is a form of immigration control, including decision-making and enforcement, that occurs prior to a given state or region (Ryan 2010, 3). The manipulation of territory is important as such divisions often map onto legal jurisdictions (FitzGerald 2019). Accordingly, by controlling immigration and travel from abroad governments are better able to influence who has access to their territories and the accompany human and civil rights that are contingent on a foreigner’s presence at, or within, their borders. It helps governments in wealthy liberal democracies avoid providing asylum protections and due process safeguards for large portions of the global population (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010). As Aristide Zolberg observed in 1997, this process has become so normalised “that we tend to underestimate its radically innovative character and its fundamental importance in regulating world-wide movement” (1997, 308). Admission decisions and the policing of irregular immigration are no longer occurring primarily at, or within states’ physical boundaries, but happening in extensive and routine ways outside of their sovereign territories.

States’ extraterritorial practices have significant implications for people’s opportunities to move. They shape individuals’ access to international protection, labour markets, education systems, trade and travel. More importantly, they have serious humanitarian consequences for asylum seekers and other unauthorised migrants who have no alternative pathways. This includes a rise in deaths at sea (Williams and Mountz 2016), increasingly dangerous land journeys (Andersson 2016; Hayden 2019) and reduced access to asylum procedures in wealthy countries in the Global
North (Andrijasevic 2010; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013). Given these consequences, it is important to understand how, where and why rich destination states intervene from abroad. Which groups of people are targeted for more and less exclusion? How are these choices made and justified? Who are the actors shaping a country’s overseas actions?

This study investigates these questions by examining two key extraterritorial mechanisms used by the UK: the visa system and overseas liaison network. The UK is a major destination state for immigration and travel and is often in the vanguard of countries exporting their management outward. Both the visa system and liaison network are fundamental features of the country’s extraterritorial approach. The visa system allows the government to decide who does, and does not, have authorisation to transit through, visit or reside in the UK prior to an individual’s departure. It enables them to implement a range of qualification procedures for entry from abroad. The liaison network supports and helps enforce the visa system by posting immigration officials to foreign jurisdictions. It serves as the state’s “overseas arm” for immigration enforcement (Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). The goal is to pre-empt the movement of the immigrants and travellers who the government defines as unwanted, and thus unauthorised, well in advance of the state’s physical border (ibid.).

From the UK's perspective, both mechanisms are “a main delivery agent for offshore migration control” (FCO 2008, 107) and “provide essential and invaluable support” (Interview T, 2017). They also impact a large number of people. As Steffen Mau et al. (2012) note, visas are one of the most pervasive and effective means for controlling international mobility. In the UK, nationals from three-quarters of the world’s countries require visitor visas to enter the state, including some of the most populated countries like China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. The liaison network also effects a large number of people. It operates in nearly all regions of the world. In 2015, the UK had liaison officers in 36 countries throughout the Americas, Europe, the Middle-East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia (Ostrand FOI 40413). Additionally, despite the regular use of liaison networks by most countries in the North, there has been no systematic examination of what they do in practice and why. They are a significant yet understudied area of extraterritorial control.

This study focuses, in particular, on the UK’s visa system and liaison network in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. These countries are from five different regions and consist of rich states in the North as well as less wealthy states in the South. Through an analysis of the UK’s extraterritorial interventions across such diverse locations, I endeavour to provide a detailed understanding of the state’s overseas actions. The study also fills a gap in comparative research on the topic. Few studies consider how a destination state’s extraterritorial management manifests in different countries, and, to my knowledge, no research has compared interventions occurring in both the North and South. Comparisons are an important tool of analysis because they allow us to identify and interpret patterns of similarities and differences. This improves our ability to understand why the visa system and liaison network vary across locations like Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. It also helps us see who the UK Home Office most often cooperates with and why this is the case. Importantly, a comparison of the Home Office’s actions in five countries also permits examination of conditions that are difficult to assess using large “n” comparative studies. This enables analysis of the role played by officials
from the UK and other countries, as well as the UK’s political and historical ties – dimensions largely missing in explanations of countries’ extraterritorial regimes.

Following the rise in destination states’ overseas interventions, research on the topic has grown over the last two decades (e.g. Boswell 2003; Casas, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2011; Gibney 2005; Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010; Zaiotti 2016; Zolberg 2003). The vast majority of studies concentrate on restrictive policies and practices. This includes research on Australia, the US and Europe’s efforts to prevent immigration flows by intercepting boats at sea, using offshore detention centres and imposing fines on airlines for transporting unauthorised migrants (Fleay and Hoffman 2014; Frenzen 2010; Gibney 2005; Heijer 2016; Legomsky 2006; Pascale 2010). Studies have also demonstrated the way wealthy countries (and the EU) fund, train and equip sending and transit states to carry out migration control on their behalf (e.g. Andrijasevic 2010; Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016; Taylor 2010). Often, extraterritorialisation is conceptualised in the literature as an approach used to stem immigration, especially by asylum seekers and other unwanted travellers (Mau et al. 2012, 89; Spijkerboer 2018). This gives the impression that governments’ extraterritorial strategies are primarily about exclusion. This, however, is only part the story. As a 2007 UK report makes clear, “upstream,” or overseas, “activity can also help facilitate the legitimate movement of goods and people” (Cabinet Office 2007, 56). The goal of extraterritorial management then is not to increase immigration and border controls overall, but to create a highly selective system of exclusion prior to the physical border.

As Aristide Zolberg famously explained in 1989, the “coexistence” of restrictive and liberal immigration policies suggests they are interrelated, so that if we wish to understand the overall role of industrial capitalist countries in the determination of international migrations, it is necessary to account for the wall they have erected as well as for the small doors they have provided in it (Zolberg 1989, 408). This too is true for countries’ overseas actions. Most studies focusing on restrictive practices, however, miss the way they are part of a strategy of selection (see e.g. Gibney 2005; Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016; Nicholson 2011). That is, extraterritorial interventions are not only designed to prevent the types of movements governments conceptualise as unwanted, but to also create easy access channels for those they view as wanted. The Home Office, for instance, uses visa waivers, special visa services and expediated entry programmes to encourage some immigration and travel to the UK. This dimension is important because it counters common depictions of extraterritorialisation as a method used predominantly to stem migration flows. Through this study, I aim to generate a more accurate understanding of extraterritorialisation by evaluating the “walls” and “small doors” in the UK’s overseas management. This helps us see facilitative logics shaping the Home Office’s choices. It also exposes the types of countries, national populations and individual profiles targeted by the Home Office for varying levels of control. In doing so, the study highlights the way extraterritorialisation reproduces and increases global inequalities in people’s opportunities to move.

Yet, a state’s extraterritorial interventions also transpire in an international environment and cannot be divorced from their international relationships and the actions of foreign state actors.
These two factors are often neglected by studies evaluating the topic (see e.g. Flynn 2014; Frellick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016; Geiger 2016; Gibney 2005; Nessel 2009; Weber 2006). Christina Boswell (2003), for example, focuses on the political and institutional conditions within the European Union (EU) and individual member states to explain why certain extraterritorial approaches emerged in the European context. In another example, James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen argue that wealthy governments in the North co-opt less wealthy countries “to effect migration control on behalf of the developed world” (2014, 9). These accounts portray rich destination states as the dominant actors shaping their extraterritorial interventions, with sending and transit states acting as secondary context. This, I argue, produces an oversimplified picture of what occurs abroad and why. It minimises the agency of foreign state actors and the way historical and political context influences governments’ choices.

This study, in contrast, addresses these two aspects directly. It evaluates if and how the UK’s relationships with Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France shape the Home Office’s actions. It also analyses the way officials from these countries inform where and what the UK does. This exposes the multiple actors and considerations involved in a country’s extraterritorial regime. Here the study shows the UK’s overseas interventions are not just a reflection of the government’s immigration goals. Rather, the context and actions of other states also influence the Home Office’s choices. This demonstrates that a country’s extraterritorial management is more complicated than conventional narratives in the literature indicate. Destination state governments do not simply “shift” their control objectives and practices outward and pressure sending and transit states “to become proxies to carry out their agendas” (Zaiotti 2016, 10).

1.2 Purpose of the research

Like other rich states in the North, the UK’s extraterritorial management varies widely across different countries, national populations and individual profiles. The Home Office, for instance, requires visitor and transit visas for nationals from countries like Egypt, India, Turkey and Vietnam but not Botswana, Malaysia or Mexico. Similarly, only some nationals have access to facilitative services, such as the Registered Traveller programme and Super Priority visa scheme. The liaison network likewise varies across countries and populations. In Ghana, liaison officers prioritise capacity building initiatives, while in Egypt they concentrate on stemming unauthorised migration by plane. How do we explain these variations? What are the conditions influencing the Home Office’s choices? Who are the actors involved in the process? What accounts for seeming inconsistencies in the UK’s extraterritorial interventions, like the decision to post liaison personnel to the US when the state is considered low “risk” for unwanted immigration? The purpose of the study is to answer these questions by examining how the Home Office organises the visa system and liaison network in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The ambition is to shed light on the way extraterritorialisation manifests in practice and the reasons it takes the shape that it does. Or, to put it another way, the study aims to better understand how, where and why the UK builds “walls” and opens “small doors” abroad.
While the UK government frequently promotes their use of extraterritorial controls, little information is provided on what the Home Office actually does and how they reach their decisions. This process is, to a large extent, hidden in plain sight. For example, a 2014 report explains that the UK’s overseas liaison network is responsible for identifying threats to the UK border, preventing inadequately documented passengers from reaching UK shores, providing risk assessment to the Home Office visa issuing regime and supporting criminal investigations against individuals and organisations which cause harm to the UK (Vine 2014, 30).

Yet, what precisely does this entail? How do liaison officers identify and interpret so-called “threats to the UK border?” What are the activities liaison officers carry out in different countries, who do they work with and why do they vary?

The UK rarely discloses this type of information (see e.g. Cabinet Office 2007; Home Office 2007; Ostrand FOI 42049; Ostrand FOI 45995; Ostrand FOI 46078). The Home Office has even refused to identify the number of liaison personnel working in each country (Ostrand FOI 40413). Instead, they largely provide generalised statements, such as the Home Office is “working with international partners to tackle visa document fraud” and “helping transit countries to develop the capability to intercept illegal migrants en route to the UK” (Home Office and FCO 2010, 6). These statements, however, do not reveal much about what the UK’s extraterritorial management looks like in practice and why this is the case. Through a systematic examination of the UK’s visa system and liaison network, this study provides important insight into this process. It helps uncover many of the details that are concealed by the UK’s generalised descriptions.

The analysis focuses on four areas: the Home Office and its officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk” related to unwanted and unauthorised mobility; their assessments of the economic benefits associated to international movement; the UK’s political and historical ties with other countries; and the actions of foreign state actors related to the UK’s overseas interventions. Perceptions of “risk” and economic goals are used to explore how the Home Office interprets and balances the government’s objectives related to encouraging and excluding certain types of immigrants and travellers. Political ties and foreign state actors, on the other hand, are utilised to investigate the way other countries influence the Home Office’s actions. The study is based on data from interviews with Home Office officials; freedom of information requests (FOIs); primary and secondary legislation; explanatory memorandums; impact assessments; Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) reports; and government reports, policy papers, speeches and press releases. The multiple data sources enabled the collection of in-depth information on the UK’s extraterritorial interventions and the justifications used to explain them. They also provided insight into the institutional context in the Home Office, which informs the department’s choices and actions.

One of the main arguments of the thesis is a state’s dual interests in allowing and excluding particular types of flows matter, and recognising this is essential for understanding the country’s overseas management. This explains the highly targeted and differentiated approach used by the UK. It also helps us make sense of who is subjected to more pre-entry controls and why this is the case. The study additionally aims to illustrate how the UK government’s goals are
understood and put into practice by the Home Office and its officials. This shows government ministers are not the only important actors determining the state’s extraterritorial regime. I find Home Office officials interpret and make judgements about levels of “immigration risk,” which then informs where and what the UK does from abroad. Notably, by using claims of “risk” and “statistical and intelligence-based evidence” to justify their actions, the Home Office is able to frame their decisions in ostensibly neutral and apolitical terms. This helps the UK government and the Home Office legitimise policies and practices that deliberately target specific types of immigrants and travels for exclusion, namely asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy and racialised people from countries in the South. It gives them a veneer of objectivity.

I further argue that the UK’s international relationships and the behaviour of foreign state actors too are necessary for understanding the country’s extraterritorial regime. They set boundaries for possible UK actions. In other words, the state’s overseas interventions are shaped by the interests and motivation of foreign governments and their authorities to cooperate with the Home Office – conditions that are generally influenced by the UK’s political and historical ties. The study also goes beyond other research on extraterritorialisation by analysing the role played by the Home Office and the foreign immigration and law enforcement officials responsible for carrying out the UK’s overseas interventions. Much of the literature on the topic examines formal policies, government statements and bi- and multilateral agreements (see e.g. Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; FitzGerald and Ruhrmann 2016; Legomsky 2006; Rodier 2006; Wolff 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016; Zaiotti 2016b; Zolberg 2003). Consequently, they miss the way officials working on the ground influence a country’s extraterritorial management. Yet, as Antje Ellermann demonstrates in her analysis of deportation policy in Europe, studying the formal policy level and inter-state agreements tells us little about what actually occurs (2008). Instead, we must also consider if and how these policies are put into practice. In doing so, my study shows mid- and low-level interior bureaucrats from the UK and other states influence where and what the country does from abroad.

Last, but not least, the study aims to draw attention to the types of immigrants and travellers who are subjected to different levels of pre-entry restrictions and controls. That is, who are the people that benefit from more privileged access to the UK, and who faces greater restrictions and exclusion? Juxtaposing facilitative and restrictive measures improves our ability to investigate this. It helps us see the justifications used by the government and Home Office to rationalise their targeted and differentiated approach. It also exposes the way the UK’s visa system and liaison network reinforce global inequalities by creating highly unequal opportunities to move for people based on their nationality and wealth. As we will see, the UK’s interventions are largely designed to encourage movement by relatively affluent individuals, especially those from rich countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific. At the same time, they are often used to restrict movement by less wealthy people from relatively poorer countries in Africa and South Asia. More significantly, the UK’s extraterritorial practices are designed to exclude people who the Home Office views as more likely to seek asylum in the UK. This differentiated structure of exclusion contributes to what Mau et al. (2015) call a “global mobility divide,” where nationals from the North generally have far greater mobility rights than those from the South.
1.3 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 situates the study and research questions within the literature on extraterritorialisation. The first section outlines conventional understandings of states’ overseas management. Here we see much of the literature concentrates on the techniques used to restrict and exclude unwanted flows. In doing so, it undervalues the way extraterritorial interventions also open small entry channels for select groups of people. The second section turns to common explanations for why states project their immigration management outward. Extraterritorialisation is generally interpreted in the literature as an approach used by governments to overcome constraints on their exclusionary power and to better restrict the types of immigrants who they define as undesirable and unauthorised. The focus on restrictive rationales, however, tends to overlook other important conditions explaining the reasons states organise their extraterritorial management in particular ways. This includes governments’ economic interests in allowing international tourism, trade, business and some labour. The chapter next highlights gaps in the research on the role played by foreign countries and mid- and “street-level” (Lipsky 1980) immigration and law enforcement officials in shaping a destination state’s interventions. Largely, the literature depicts destination state governments as the dominant actors defining their extraterritorial management. This generates an oversimplified understanding of how, where and why a destination state projects its immigration and border management outwards.

Chapter 3 describes the research approach, design and methods of the study. Here I explain my rationale for using a comparative case study approach and why I concentrate on Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. I also discuss the reasons I focus on four areas of analysis: perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic goals, historical and political ties and foreign state actors. The case studies of Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France were selected because of their variations in objective characteristics, such as geographic location, economic wealth and levels of immigration, tourism and trade to the UK. I additionally chose them because of their variations in subjective traits, including the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk” for each country, the UK’s relationship with the other countries and the foreign authorities’ willingness to work with the UK. The second half of the chapter outlines the data collection process. The three methods used were document analysis, semi-structured interviews and freedom of information (FOI) requests. This section also discusses challenges I encountered during the data collection process and how I addressed them. The primary difficulties were a lack of documentary material on the liaison network and the Home Office’s reluctance to disclose information on their extraterritorial interventions. The multiple data sources and interviews with Home Office officials helped reduce these challenges.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the UK’s visa system. It explores how and why the Home Office organises this mechanism across different types of national populations and individual profiles, focusing especially on those from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The visa system is a legal-administrative mechanism that structures access to the UK by defining who can (and cannot) enter the country, and under what conditions. The analysis covers several important features of the UK’s visa system: immigration, visitor and transit visas; risk profiles; visa exemptions; the Registered Traveller programme; special visa services; and data sharing.
arrangements with other states. These features provide a holistic depiction of the way the Home Office uses legal-administrative practices to shape mobility in advance of the UK’s physical borders. This contributes to research on visas, which tends to analyse immigration and visitor visas only.

Specifically, chapter 4 demonstrates how the Home Office attempts to organise the visa system to enable the kinds of movement the government views as likely to contribute to the economy while restricting it for others who do not fit that image, especially asylum seekers. The Home Office does this by weighing their assessments of the economic benefits associated to international movement against their interpretations of “immigration risk.” This helps us make sense of the higher levels of visa restrictions and lower access to facilitative services for people from the South compared to the North. The chapter also illustrates how the UK’s political and historical relationships and foreign state actors influence the visa system. Foreign state actors help shape the methods used by the Home Office and inform who the department prioritises for increased control by deciding to share (or not) data, resources and ideas with the Home Office. We also see that the UK’s legacies of cooperation and current relationships with other states condition who the Home Office more often works with on visa-related practices.

Chapter 5 focuses on the UK’s liaison network. The liaison network is an enforcement and intelligence mechanism that is made up of immigration officials working in foreign jurisdictions. It is designed to put into practice the UK’s visa rules and procedures by preventing the movement of people without authorisation from reaching the UK’s shores. To date, very few studies have analysed liaison networks. More importantly, no research has attempted to explain how and why these networks vary across different types of countries. By comparing the UK’s liaison operations in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, chapter 5 addresses this deficit. It shows that although the goal of the liaison network is to stem unauthorised immigration, it too is shaped by the government’s interest in enabling certain kinds of immigration and travel. In other words, the Home Office’s strategy of targeting their resources and interventions on the areas and types of people they perceive as “higher risk” is intended to prevent the kinds of movement the government defines as unwanted while allowing easy access for those they view as wanted. Here we see the Home Office creates small doors in the UK’s extraterritorial controls through an absence of scrutiny and control.

Chapter 5 also reveals that the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “risk” alone are inadequate to explain the network’s actions. It illustrates how the activities carried out by liaison officers are dependent on the boundaries established by the local government and officials. These boundaries are often informed by the country’s historical legacies and relationships with the UK. This shows the Home Office’s liaison network is not simply about “shifting” or “exporting” their immigration objectives and practices to foreign states. Rather, the motivation of foreign authorities and their opinions regarding the types of support they want are equally important for explaining where and what the liaison network does abroad.

Chapter 6 examines in more detail the power of foreign governments and their immigration and law enforcement agencies on the UK’s extraterritorial management. This is especially important given the growth in cooperative practices and the lack of research on how foreign governments...
and their officials influence a destination state's policies and practices. The purpose of the chapter is to further demonstrate the complexity involved in extraterritorialisation, particularly when foreign countries are involved. It highlights the autonomy and decision-making power of mid-level officials from the Home Office, as well as the immigration and law enforcement authorities of other countries. It also questions the implicit assumption that destination states are able to successfully project their immigration management abroad. The chapter does this by drawing attention to several difficulties the Home Office encounters when delegating immigration enforcement responsibilities to foreign state actors. They include non-compliance by immigration and law enforcement officials, the lack of institutional capacity to carry out the Home Office’s requests and differing laws and views on migration-related offences.

Chapter 7 concludes the study by discussing the key findings. Here I underscore the important role played by officials from both the UK and other countries. This shows the interpretive agency of mid- and street-level officials inform how and where the UK erects barriers and opens small doors abroad. The chapter also emphasises the unequal impact the UK’s visa system and liaison network have on prospective immigrants and travellers based on their nationality and wealth. Both mechanisms are designed to favour movement by affluent individuals, particularly those from the North, and to restrict access to individuals with less wealth, especially those from the South. The visa system and liaison network are also used to prevent immigration and travel by nationals from countries experiencing political instability and armed conflict. This illustrates the highly selective nature of the UK’s extraterritorial regime. It demonstrates how the Home Office uses overseas interventions to exclude immigration and travel by large portions of the global population while simultaneously allowing small entry channels for certain types of people.

Chapter 7 then goes on to critique the Home Office’s application of “immigration risk.” It exposes how the department’s undefined use of “risk” and “statistical and intelligence-based evidence” help legitimise higher levels of control on potential asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy and racialised groups of people from the South. This gives their policy choices an appearance of objectivity, and obscures how the UK deliberately seeks to exclude particular types of people. We will also see that the Home Office’s assessments of “risk” are shaped by institutional prejudices and the government’s normative views about who is and is not wanted. Finally, the chapter critically reflects on the way the Home Office’s secrecy around “risk” and their extraterritorial activities serve to further conceal how and why the department makes the decisions that they do. This is concerning given the significant implications these practices have on people’s opportunities to move. It also makes it much more difficult for the public and immigration advocates to identify what the Home Office is doing and to hold the department accountable for their actions.
Chapter 2
The extraterritorialisation of immigration systems

2.1 Introduction

Extraterritorial management is a significant and growing part of many countries’ immigration and border regimes. While not a new phenomenon, the way governments attempt to regulate international mobility in advance of their territories has developed over time. This includes traditional forms of “remote controls” (Zolberg 2003), like visas and fines on transportation companies, as well as newer forms that increasingly involve foreign states (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018). For example, rich countries in the North are placing immigration liaison officers in foreign jurisdictions and developing the capacity of sending and transit states to curb migration flows. Extraterritorial interventions vary considerably in their application across different countries, national populations and individual profiles. The UK government, for instance, imposes high levels of visa controls on individuals from India, Jamaica and South Africa while requiring few restrictions for people from Costa Rica, Malaysia and Namibia. The UK’s capacity building programmes and other actions occurring in countries like Ghana, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also differ in the forms they take.

How do we explain these variations and the specific shape of a state’s extraterritorial regime? Who are the actors involved in the process, and what influences their choices? This study investigates these questions by examining the UK’s visa system and liaison network. It compares in particular the manifestation of these two mechanisms across Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. This allows for a systematic analysis of how and why the UK’s overseas actions transpire under diverse circumstances. The goal is to better understand the reasons these practices take the shape they do and why they vary across certain types of countries, national populations and individual profiles.

The purpose of this chapter is to situate the study within the literature on extraterritorialisation. The first section discusses typical interpretations of states’ extraterritorial practices. It illustrates the way research on the topic largely concentrates on measures designed to restrict immigration flows and tighten borders. This gives the impression that extraterritorialisation is predominately about exclusion, and underemphasises the way overseas practices are also used to make immigration and travel increasingly easy for particular types of people. Examining both restrictive and facilitative measures, on the other hand, draws attention to the highly selective and differentiated structure of states’ extraterritorial regimes. This provides a more accurate understanding of how countries intervene from abroad. It also helps us identify the kinds of immigrants and travellers who benefit from greater access to the UK and those who do not. The next section covers common explanations for why governments attempt to regulate immigration and travel in advance of their physical borders. They are a perceived ineffectiveness of traditional controls, a rise in unwanted flows and a strategy to overcome judicial limitations on states’ exclusionary power. I find that by concentrating on restrictive rationales, these accounts tend to miss other motivations explaining states extraterritorial actions. They often
overlook, for example, the way governments’ economic interests in encouraging international tourism, trade and some labour also inform their choices.

The subsequent section describes several studies that take into consideration governments’ dual interests in openness and closure. They demonstrate how extraterritorial practices are used to filter out the immigrants and travellers who governments consider as unwanted, while enabling easy access for those they see as wanted. Here I discuss how my research contributes to these studies. The following section turns to the role played by foreign states. Much of the literature on extraterritorialisation undervalues, or omits altogether, the way other countries influence the design of a destination state’s overseas management. This study, in comparison, pays special attention to the way foreign countries shape the UK’s choices. In doing so, it counters conventional narratives where destination state governments are the dominant actors defining their extraterritorial management. The last section explains why it is also important to consider the role played by mid- and “street-level” immigration and law enforcement officials in shaping a country’s overseas practices. By evaluating this dimension, this study further adds to our understanding of how and why states attempt to manage mobility from abroad.

2.2. What is extraterritorial immigration management?

Research on extraterritorialisation has grown substantially over the last two decades (e.g. Boswell 2003; Gibney 2005; Lavenex 2006; Nessel 2009; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor 2012; Menjivar 2014; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010; Zaiotti 2016). Largely, this political phenomenon is conceptualised as an approach used by states to restrict immigration, especially asylum seekers and those defined by destination countries as unauthorised (ibid.). Liette Gilbert, for example, characterises extraterritorialisation as a range of policies and practices that “expand the policing of borders and various control mechanisms” beyond a given territory (Gilbert 2016, 207-208). Bernard Ryan describes it as “immigration control action – both decision-making and enforcement – prior to an individual’s arrival” (Ryan 2010, 3). Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel and Jenifer Podkul, in another example, define it as extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims (2016, 193 emphasis added).

Predominantly, extraterritorial policies and practices are interpreted in the literature as additional layers of restriction on mobility (Mau et al. 2012, 89). Or, as Tilman Rodenhäuser put it, they are extra “brick[s] in the wall designed to halt migration flows” (Rodenhäuser 2014, 224). These examples highlight the way extraterritorial measures are generally regarded as instruments for exclusion and increased control.

In one of the early and most influential works on the topic, Aristide Zolberg (1997, 308) used the notion of “remote control” to describe the way states are projecting their controls overseas to regulate the entry of would-be immigrants before their arrival. The classic example is the US’s implementation of pre-embarkation entry permits, a process that was institutionalised in the 1920s. According to Zolberg, the 1924 Rogers Act professionalised the US consular service and
charged it, among other things, with attributing immigration visas. Once this bureaucracy was in place the US government could implement a range of qualification procedures for entry from abroad (Zolberg 1997, 309). It allowed them to enforce restrictionist legislation passed in the US throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. This included the 1917 law requiring immigrants to take a literacy test and the 1924 Immigration Act banning immigration from Asia (1997, 307). This pre-entry system fundamentally altered the US’s immigration practices. Through its establishment, the US government was able to regulate admissions to the state at the point of departure rather than physical ports of entry, a radical shift from their earlier practices (Zolberg 1997, 308).

Other conventional forms of extraterritorial control include visitor visas, maritime interceptions, offshore detention and carrier sanctions. The imposition of carrier sanctions – which are fines levied by states on airline, train and shipping companies for transporting unauthorised migrants – effectively transfers immigration checks to carriers before passengers’ arrival (Gibney 2005, 7). They help countries enforce restrictive visa requirements by preventing individuals without authorisation from reaching their territories where they could request asylum (Rodenhäuser 2014). Maritime interceptions and offshore detention are similarly used to obstruct and deter unwanted flows. Australia and the US have regularly applied these methods to limit access to asylum and other judicial protections for people intercepted outside their territorial waters (Frenzen 2010; Kneebone 2010; Legomsky 2006; Ostrand 2014). European countries too have utilised maritime patrols, although with less success due to legal obligations from the European Convention on Human Rights (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017).

Since the 1990s, destination states’ overseas interventions have increasingly involved countries in regions of transit and sending (Betts 2011; Boswell 2003; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018). In Europe, there has been a steady rise in migration control arrangements with states in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2009; EPRS 2018). Australia has similarly intensified their collaboration with countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Nauru and Papua New Guinea (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018). These cooperative interventions include posting immigration officials to foreign jurisdictions, data-sharing arrangements and joint patrols and enforcement. They also involve indirect measures, such as funding, training and equipping foreign immigration and law enforcement agencies to conduct migration controls on the behalf of a destination state or region (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018, 365-366). The US, for example, provided over 2.5 billion to Mexico to help curtail unwanted flows toward its territory (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016, 201). The logic of such cooperation, according to Christina Boswell, is “to engage sending and transit countries in strengthening border controls,” to extend “police and control methods to an enlarged area” (Boswell 2003, 623).

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1 Pre-entry permits also helped the US enforce the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibiting future immigration of Chinese labour; the 1882 Immigration Act, which authorised the exclusion of “idiots, lunatics, convicts and persons likely to become a public charge” from entering the US; and the 1924 Immigration Act. The 1924 Act, in addition to banning immigration from Asia, created an annual quota system designed to restore the ethnic profile in the US to the one that prevailed before the 1890s. This measure greatly favoured immigration from Western European countries.
The common, defining feature of extraterritorialisation is a relocation of immigration and border controls outside the physical boundaries of a destination state or region. There are, however, different interpretations of the policies and practices that comprise it. One of the major differences relates to the temporal dimension. That is to say, at what point in a migrant’s journey the intervention occurs. Mathew Gibney, James Hathaway, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Bernard Ryan all interpret extraterritorialisation as policies and practices designed to prevent asylum seekers and other unwanted migrants before they reach a given country or region (Gibney 2005; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Hathaway 1992; Ryan 2010). It consists of “non-arrival” or “non-entrée” measures (ibid.). Other people, such as Sarah Wolff (2016), see extraterritorial management as also comprising practices that remove unauthorised migrants after they reach a destination state or region (see also FitzGerald and Ruhrmann 2016; Zaiotti 2016). Essentially, they see the phenomenon as including deportation policies and readmission agreements with other countries, in addition to traditional forms of remote control (ibid.). This research adopts the pre-entry interpretation, and focuses exclusively on interventions occurring prior to the UK’s physical border.

A notable absence in much of the literature on extraterritorial management is consideration for the way these measures are also used to create easier entry channels for some types of immigrants and travels. Or, to put it in the words of Zolberg, most studies concentrate on the “walls” countries erect without looking at the “small doors” provided in them (Zolberg 1989). The small doors include visa waivers, facilitative services and an absence of scrutiny and enforcement. These doors are important because they emphasise the highly selective and differentiated structure of a country’s extraterritorial regime. This helps expose differences in the types of immigrants and travellers who have greater access to move, and those who do not. In other words, a country’s extraterritorial practices operate as filters designed to exclude the immigrants and travellers who governments define as unwanted, while allowing others to pass with ease (Mau et al. 2012, 89). Yet, as Thomas Spijkerboer (2018) notes, the focus in the literature on preventing entry and tightening borders overlooks the way restrictive measures are only one part of a larger system – a system that is created to enable increasingly easy movement for select flows of people. Extraterritorial management then is not just about additional restrictions and control, but about improved selectivity prior to the physical border. By examining restrictive and facilitative measures, this study expands conventional interpretations of states’ overseas actions. It provides a more accurate reflection of how and why states intervene from abroad.

2.3 Explaining extraterritorialisation: a focus on exclusion and overcoming constraints

How then do we explain governments’ decisions to extend their immigration and border practices outward? What accounts for the particular shape of a country’s extraterritorial regime, and why does it vary across specific places and populations? Given the concentration of the literature outlined above, it is hardly surprising that most explanations emphasise restrictive rationales. Common explanations for states’ extraterritorial actions are a perceived ineffectiveness of national or regional controls; increases in unsolicited flows, especially asylum
seekers; and limitations on liberal democracies’ abilities to restrict immigration due to legal, constitutional and international norms. These justifications, of course, are not mutually exclusive and often occur concurrently. In what follows, this section outlines several examples demonstrating these explanatory themes. It then goes on to discuss why restrictive narratives alone are insufficient to account for the reasons a country projects their practices outward in particular ways.

In an influential 2000 article, Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav analysed the immigration control policies of liberal European democracies during the 1980s and 90s. They identified a threefold “shift [in] the level policy is elaborated and implemented ... upward to intergovernmental fora, downward to elected local authorities, and outward to private actors” (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 164). Guiraudon and Lahav explained the shift as a strategy by restrictionist governments to circumvent judicial constraints on their ability to exclude and expel foreign nationals. The constraints were based on liberal democratic principles and human rights instruments. They argued that European governments sought to mitigate these limits by delegating more immigration control responsibilities to actors outside the central state apparatus (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). The governments used this approach because they believed it improved their ability to implement restrictive policy goals. For example, by cooperating with airline carriers and neighbouring countries to prevent unwanted immigrants before their arrival, they could stem immigrants’ access to judicial protections which would guard against their summary deportation. In other words, European governments used international fora and external practices “to regain some of the control that they have lost over migration flows because of national jurisprudence” (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 164).

In a second paper, Guiraudon uses the concept of “venue-shopping” to account for the rise in European cooperation on migration in the 1980s and 1990s (Guiraudon 2000). She argues that law and order officials looked for international venues more amenable to their control objectives than domestic ones. This explains the growth in European transnational working groups during the period. These working group allowed interior ministries to avoid scrutiny by national courts, other ministries and migration-aid groups (ibid.). In a similar vein, Sandra Lavenex argues that Europe’s “shift towards extraterritorial control” is a strategy by interior ministries to sidestep EU limitations on their ability to restrict immigration (2006). Again, the limits primarily come from liberal democratic norms and legal rights established for specific groups of migrants, such as family members and asylum seekers (Lavenex 2006). Lavenex argued that European governments pursued cooperation with non-EU countries to “escape from internal blockades” in implementing their control-dominated policy goals (Lavenex 2006, 330).

Christina Boswell (2003) also found limitations on immigration control account for European states’ increased cooperation within the EU and with non-EU member states during the 1980s and 90s. From the 1980s onwards, immigration was a highly politicised issue in most Western European countries. Many political parties during this period ran on platforms of restricting flows. The promises they made, however, were difficult to fulfil due to legal barriers. Specifically, Boswell explained that

[...]liberal democratic states found themselves constrained by a range of domestic constitutional and international legal norms. Constitutions and the courts were
curtailing attempts to restrict family reunion, limit access to welfare benefits, expel long-term residents or restrict asylum systems (Boswell 2003, 621). Boswell linked the restrictionist policy goals in the 1980s and 90s to an increase in immigrant and refugee flows during the period, as well as growing anti-immigrant public opinions. The two conditions led to a perception that traditional immigration controls were insufficient and new strategies were needed: “the perceived need for such external approaches was above all a consequence of the inadequacy of domestic border controls in managing migration” (Boswell 2003, 621). According to Boswell, interior ministries and police officials believed extraterritorial practices improved their ability to curtail immigration. Once again, we see extraterritorialisation is interpreted as a strategy to evade limits on governments’ capacity to carry out their restrictive goals.

In a more recent analysis, James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (2014) explain rich destinations states’ overseas management as a means to circumvent international refugee law commitments that impinge on their ability to exclude and expel asylum seekers (see also Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017). These pre-entry controls allow countries in the North to symbolically support international norms while avoiding substantive obligations stemming from them. The symbolic support is important, according to Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, because it gives rich countries in the North legitimacy to insist that less wealthy states continue to uphold their refugee law obligations. The goal is to ensure countries in the South shoulder the largest burden when it comes to refugees. Or, in the words of Nikolas Tan and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,

[i]t allows wealthy states to have their cake and eat it too: maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while at the same time largely being spared the associated burdens (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017, 31).

In particular, Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen interpret the shift toward greater cooperation with sending and transit states as a response to successful legal challenges on traditional extraterritorial methods, such as carrier sanctions and maritime interceptions. They view such cooperative practices as a tactic to better “insulate wealthier countries from liability by engaging in the sovereignty of another” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014, 9).

Other research on extraterritorialisation similarly interprets states’ overseas interventions as a means to avoid procedural and substantive laws (both international and national), and to address perceived security concerns and anti-immigrant views (see e.g. Frenzen 2010; Gibney 2005; Heijer 2010; Mitsilegas 2010; Pascale 2010; Zaiotti 2016). Still others more broadly claim it is a reaction to increased flows of unwanted immigrants and the inability of traditional controls to prevent them. According to Mathew Gibney, rising numbers of asylum seekers in the 1980s and widespread public concern over unauthorised immigration led to the development of new extraterritorial measures (Gibney 2005). Annick Pijnenburg, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Conny Rijken likewise argue that the “so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015–2016 triggered a raft of ad hoc [and extraterritorial] measures” (2018, 366). The new measures primarily involved sending and transit states and were “aimed at addressing the higher numbers of arrivals, and, crucially, stopping the flows” (ibid.). Alexander Betts (2011), in comparison, claims wealthy destination countries’ recognition that they are unable to achieve their immigration control goals in isolation has led to more bi- and multilateral cooperation. Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel and
Jenifer Podkul similarly link extraterritorial interventions to “the ineffectiveness (and politicization) of national or regional migration policies” (2016, 192-193).

The common narrative across all these accounts is that governments’ desire to improve their ability to stem and preclude unwanted immigrants, especially asylum seekers, has led to new efforts to regulate flows in advance of their territories. They interpret extraterritorialisation as a tool for greater restriction and exclusion. Or, as Frelick et al put it, extraterritorial management is “a strategy of migration containment and control” (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016, 193). The concentration on restrictive rationales, however, minimises the way other conditions also influence a country’s choices, such as economic motivations and foreign states’ interests. Studies likewise tend to neglect the way a country’s overseas interventions are used to open small doors for select flows by using visa waivers and programmes designed to make entry into a country easier. To better understand how, where and why rich destination states intervene from abroad, it is thus necessary to extend our analysis beyond restrictive rationales alone. For instance, as most studies ignore the small doors in states extraterritorial barriers, they also miss the way a government’s interests in enabling international trade, tourism, business and some labour for economic reasons informs their choices.

Equally important, analyses focusing exclusively on governments’ restrictive goals are inadequate for explaining variations in a state’s extraterritorial practices across different countries, national populations and individual profiles. Examining facilitative rationales helps address this. It allows us to better understand when and why a government uses visa waivers, offers special visa services and dedicates less attention and enforcement to specific countries and populations. It also exposes the way preventing some flows prior to the border is part of a strategy to reduce congestion at ports of entry, and thereby smooth access for the types of people governments define as “legitimate” and wanted. This highlights the differentiated structure of a country’s extraterritorial regime and improves our ability to comprehend why it takes the shape it does. In other words, examining the UK government’s dual interests in encouraging and excluding different types of flows helps us make sense of the Home Office’s decisions to target particular countries and populations for differing levels of control.

2.4 Filtering flows before the border

A 2013 study by Dennis Broeders and James Hampshire provides useful insight into why European governments have digitised their borders, which they regarded as a digital-era expansion of remote controls (Broeders and Hampshire 2013). With the use of passenger data, digital technologies help governments identify and categorise would-be immigrants and travellers before they arrive at their territorial borders. The goal is to improve the country’s ability to pre-emptively manage mobility. According to Broeders and Hampshire, the use of digital border technologies is part of European governments’ strategies to overcome “facilitation-control dilemmas” present in most rich destination states (Broeders and Hampshire 2013, 1203). That is, European governments were drawn to the method because they believe it would ease entry for the types of mobility they view as wanted while simultaneously tightening controls on those they conceptualise as unwanted. This interpretation fits within the larger body
of literature on immigration policies, which recognises that most governments in the North are interested in encouraging select groups of people who they perceive as contributing to the economy (Geddes 2008; Hampshire 2009; Hollifield 2004; Boswell 2007). This largely consist of wealthy tourists, businesspeople, traders and some workers (ibid.).

In essence, Broeders and Hampshire’s study shows European governments’ interests in openness and closure help explain their use of digital border technologies. It adds to the literature on extraterritorialisation which tends to undervalue governments’ facilitative objectives. Due to the high volumes of cross border movement in the 21st century, border technologies are considered especially useful by governments for their ability to sort large amounts of data and create increasingly fine-grained categories of people (Broeders and Hampshire 2013). The sorting and categorising of people subsequently enables immigration and border agencies to dedicate their attention on a few so-called “high-risk” passengers while streamlining entry for others. Governments believe this allows them to more effectively carry out immigration controls without hindering the movement of wanted immigrants and travellers. This helps us understand the highly differentiated structure of a country’s extraterritorial strategy.

Broeders and Hampshire’s paper, however, does not specify the types of people and national populations who are subjected to varying levels of control. Who has greater access to international mobility and why? How do immigration and border agencies make these decisions, and what informs their choices? What role, if any, do foreign state actors contribute to the process? Furthermore, do governments’ interests in encouraging select flows for economic reasons help explain other types of extraterritorial practices, such as the posting of liaison officers abroad and cooperative-interventions involving sending and transit states? Here my study contributes to Broeders and Hampshire’s analysis by considering these additional dimensions.

Bigo and Guild’s examination of Schengen visa policies also helps us make sense of the way certain extraterritorial practices serve as pre-arrival filters (2005). They illustrate how individuals are categorised and subjected to differing levels of control prior to their arrival based on their nationality and “risk profiles” – which are documents used by immigration officers to help them predict people’s potential behaviour. In particular, Bigo and Guild show EU visa policies and procedures make international travel to (and within) the Schengen area very easy for nationals from states “with an especially privileged relationship with the Union” (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).2 Nationals from other “favoured countries” (e.g. the US, Canada, Australia, Israel) also have relatively easy access (2005, 236). Bigo and Guild juxtapose this privileged position against the cumbersome procedures for nationals from countries that always require pre-arrival visas for entry into the Schengen area. They also demonstrate the way additional levels of scrutiny are applied to some individuals if they are perceived as “suspicious” by EU officers during the visa application process (Bigo and Guild 2005).

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2 The UK is not part of the EU’s visa system but is part of the EU’s free movement regime for citizens from EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (as of 2018).
Bigo and Guild’s study is useful because it highlights inconsistencies in people’s opportunities to move based on a country’s (or the EU’s) extraterritorial visa policies and practices. Still, their analysis focuses predominately on the exclusionary process. They discuss why certain countries are put on the Schengen visa list, but dedicate little attention to the reverse question. According to Bigo and Guild, the EU imposes restrictive visa policies on countries based on their construction of “suspicion.” The so-called “suspicious” countries largely correspond to states that either have low GDPs or are experiencing conflict where their people may have reasons to seek protection elsewhere. Although we can conclude that nationals from countries with higher GDPs generally face fewer barriers when travelling to the Schengen area, Bigo and Guild do not explicitly discuss the motivations for more liberal visa policies.

Several other studies on visas address this question by analysing the reasons states waive visitor visas (e.g. Brabandt and Mau 2013; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006; Torpey 2000). They conclude that economic objectives are one important factor shaping governments’ decisions to forgo this pre-entry requirement (ibid.). Eric Neumayer, for example, found a country’s level of international trade and tourism corresponds to more liberal visa policies (2006). He argued that governments offer visa free travel for economic purposes. Countries that rely on trade and tourism, for instance, often seek to encourage the movement of people and goods by providing easier access to their territories (Neumayer 2006, 76). This economic rationale also helps us understand why nationals from wealthy countries often have fewer visa restrictions when travelling abroad (Brabandt and Mau 2013; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). Still, despite several studies on visas and digital border technologies, consideration of the way governments’ interests in enabling and excluding particular flows inform their choices is seldom analysed in the literature on extraterritorial management. This is especially true for research on destination countries’ overseas interventions involving sending and transit states.

One exception is a 2012 study by Steffen Mau, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube and Christof Roos. The study examines how liberal democratic states have attempted to regulate the cross border-movement of people overtime, particularly under conditions of globalisation. They find liberal states have responded to increasing flows of people by rearranging their borders to make them more selective. This allows them to follow their self-defined liberal principles and benefit from global economic activity, yet also maintain control over their territories. The result is a system where small groups of people have greater mobility rights, primarily those from the North, while the vast majority of the global population face considerable barriers to move (Mau et al. 2012, 3).

Although Mau et al.’s study does not focus exclusively on extraterritorial practices, it does cover several important measures: visa polices, carrier sanctions, liaison officers, data sharing arrangements and maritime interceptions. What makes the study rare in the context of literature on extraterritorialisation is the explicit emphasis on the way these “relocated measures” are designed to address objectives related to openness and closure (Mau et al. 2012, 89). That is, they are used by states to improve their ability to filter between those they perceive as wanted and unwanted, excluding the later. Mau et al. argue that by targeting specific groups of people for extra restrictions and scrutiny prior to the border, extraterritorial controls enable
relatively easy travel for small flows of wanted immigrants and travellers. This helps alleviate liberal states’ dilemmas related to globalisation and the accompanying increase in the movement of people internationally. It generates mobility and immobility at the same time (Mau et al. 2012).

What Mau et al.’s study misses is an analysis of how and why relocated measures vary under specific conditions. Why, for example, do liaison officers carry out different types of extraterritorial activities in states like Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France? What explains the varying levels of cooperation and data sharing between a destination state and another country? How do political relationships and the agency of foreign state actors shape a destination country’s extraterritorial regime? What accounts for seeming inconsistencies in extraterritorial controls, like an absence of interventions in major sending and transit states? Finally, what role do mid-level immigration and law enforcement officials play in this process? This study advances knowledge by examining these questions. Through a comparative analysis of the UK’s visa system and liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, the study provides insight into how and why the Home Office arranges these two mechanisms under specific circumstances. This exposes nuances and complexities in a state’s extraterritorial management that are often absent in studies on the topic.

2.5 The power of foreign states

Aside from the limited attention on the reasons overseas interventions differ across particular countries and populations, a common omission in the literature on extraterritorialisation is consideration of the way foreign countries and international relationships influence a destination state’s policies and practices. This is especially conspicuous given the increasing and widespread use of interventions involving sending and transit states. As the above studies indicate, extraterritorialisation is typically interpreted as a strategy by government authorities to find new venues that allow them to better achieve their goals and circumvent constraints on their exclusionary power. This narrative omits the way other states and their political and historical relationships also inform the design and implementation of a country’s overseas management. In other words, explanations focusing on a destination state or region’s immigration objectives alone neglect the role of foreign state actors.

Boswell’s 2003 study, for example, concentrates on the political and institutional conditions in the EU and individual member states to explain why certain extraterritorial approaches emerged in the European context. It analyses three determinants: “the potential of such approaches to meet migration policy goals; the institutional context of decision-making; and domestic political and electoral pressures” (Boswell 2003, 620). The last two factors, according to Boswell, help explain the EU’s inclination toward more punitive extraterritorial practices. Boswell’s analysis does not consider how non-EU countries influence the EU’s choices. Instead, it regards these countries as secondary context, as actors “encouraged … to apply EU standards of migration management” (Boswell 2003, 624). This gives the impression that extraterritorial management is driven predominantly by the destination state or region. It portrays sending and transit states as passive actors in Europe’s migration project.
Other research on extraterritorialisation reinforces this interpretation, describing it as a “shifting,” “offshoring” or “outsourcing” of migration control to other countries and actors (e.g. Casas, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2011; Geiger 2016, 261; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lavenex 2006; Menjívar 2014; Ryan 2010). Intentionally or not, these accounts create a narrative where governments from rich countries in the North are the powerful actors imposing their will on others. Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, for instance, describe sending and transit states as actors “conscripted” by rich countries in Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific “to effect migration control on behalf of the developed world” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014, 9). Cecilia Menjívar similarly characterises “outsourcing” as “a series of extraterritorial activities in sending and in transit countries at the request of the (more powerful) receiving states” (2014, 357, emphasis added). In another example, Ruben Zaiotti describes externalisation as a process that often involves destination states pressuring governments in foreign countries “to become proxies to carry out their [migration control] agendas” (Zaiotti 2016, 10). These studies portray destination countries and regions as the dominant force in the design and implementation of their extraterritorial management. They are the policy-makers while sending and transit states are passive policy-takers. This, I argue, produces an overgeneralised narrative. It omits the historical and political context informing governments’ choices and minimises the agency of sending and transit states.

While several studies do consider the agency of sending and transit states, they seldom analyse how these countries influence a destination state’s choices. Instead, they focus on the impact a destination state or region has on another country’s policies and practices (e.g. Flynn 2014; Geddes and Taylor 2015; Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor 2012; Dominguez and Iniguez Ramos 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016). For example, Amy Nethery, Brynna Rafferty-Brown and Savitri Taylor trace the changes in Indonesia’s immigration enforcement stemming from Australia’s diplomatic pressure and financial contributions during the 1990s and 2000s. They find that Indonesia adopted a more punitive approach toward asylum seekers to maintain their good relationship with Australia, and to benefit from the incentives offered by the country. This resulted in a rise in Australia-funded immigration detention centres throughout Indonesia and fewer protections for asylum seekers.

Roberto Dominguez and Martin Iniguez Ramos likewise examine the effect of US policies on the design and implementation of immigration and border management in Mexico (2016). According to their study, Mexico substantially increased their interior enforcement due to US aid and pressure. They additionally argue that Mexico’s interests in stemming transit migration through their territory played a role in their compliance with the US’s interests (ibid.). In another example, Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer evaluate the modes through which the EU’s migration policies are exported to other countries. Drawing on the policy transfer literature, they identify two broad categories of policy transfer. The first category is “adaption through emulation,” where a country voluntarily follows the EU. The second is “adaption through conditionality,” where the transfer occurs at the insistence of the EU. Michael Flynn also uses the policy transfer framework to explain the spread of Western-inspired immigration detention (Flynn 2014, 190). Flynn argues that through a combination of voluntary and pressured or
coerced adaption, destination countries in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific have exported immigration detention practices to a large number of countries in their peripheries.

These studies demonstrate the way destination states and regions influence others by using a combination of persuasion techniques, including diplomatic pressure and financial incentives. They also show sending and transit states interests shape their level of adaption. They do not, however, consider the reverse question. That is, how do the sending and transit countries influence the destination state’s policies and practices? Antje Ellermann’s 2008 study on the implementation of deportation policies in Europe offers useful insight into this question. By analysing the impact of other countries on Europe’s ability to deport migrants, Ellermann exposes how the willingness, or unwillingness, of foreign authorities to cooperate sets boundaries for what European states are able to do. In particular, she finds “the refusal of many foreign governments to cooperate in the control efforts of advanced democracies” help explain policy failures in the area of migration control (Ellermann 2008, 169). This underscores the importance of foreign state actors on destination countries’ actions.

Lyubov Zhyznomirska (2016) reaches a similar conclusion. Zhyznomirska examines the responses of Russia and Ukraine to the EU’s pressure to control unregulated migration through their territories (Zhyznomirska 2016). She observes that while the EU is a facilitator of norms outside its territory, “the decision to pursue – or not – certain policy directions is made and justified by the government of a given country” (Zhyznomirska 2016, 134). This subsequently impacts the EU’s ability to control migration from abroad. In other words, the EU is not an “all-powerful” actor imposing its will on others. Still, the emphasis of Zhyznomirska’s analysis is on the EU’s influence on Russia and Ukraine instead of the impact the two countries have on the EU’s choices.

Sarah Wolff’s 2016 study also considers the way sending and transit state governments inform the EU’s extraterritorial management (2016). Like Ellermann, Wolff focuses on EU readmissions agreements, which are bilateral arrangements to return unauthorised immigrants to another country. She finds that domestic and regional political dynamics in Turkey and Morocco informed their motivation to agree to the readmission agreements. Specifically, the reluctance by Moroccan and Turkish authorities to re-admit migrants traveling from and through their territories obstructed the EU’s efforts and forced them to modify their readmission agreements. In Morocco, for example, the EU had to open visa facilitation discussions and provide financial aid and technical assistance on legal migration to reach an agreement. This further shows sending and transit countries “are not passive actors when confronted with the externalization of border controls and are able to influence to some extent the EU” (Wolff 2016, 89).

The studies by Ellermann (2008), Zhyznomirska (2016) and Wolff (2016) demonstrate how the motivation and interests of foreign countries have bearing on the actions of destination states and regions (see also Kimball 2007 and Paoletti 2011). Here we see analyses that focus on the interests of a destination state or region alone are insufficient for understanding their overseas actions. This study builds on, and contributes to, Ellermann, Zhyznomirska and Wolff’s studies. It evaluates if and how the behaviour of authorities from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France help account for variations in the UK’s visa system and liaison network. It also goes a step
further by analysing how the UK’s political and historical relationships relate to the Home Office’s choices and to the willingness of other countries to cooperate. By examining these conditions in relation to the UK’s visa system and liaison network, this study adds insight into the role of foreign countries on two understudied areas. Few studies evaluate the role foreign state actors have on another country’s visa system, and, to my knowledge, no research has examined this in the context of liaison networks.

More importantly, this study goes beyond other research by analysing the way foreign countries influence a destination state’s interventions through the exchange of ideas, resources and information. As we will see, foreign authorities are more than ancillary actors deciding to participate, or not, in the UK’s overseas management. Rather, they also shape the UK’s policies and practices by providing the Home Office with new ideas and information on their extraterritorial management. This advances knowledge by revealing more ways foreign state actors contribute to, and inform, another country’s decisions than is covered in the literature on the topic (e.g. Ellermann 2008; Kimball 2007; Paoletti 2011; Wolff 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016). It also helps us see the way low level officials influence extraterritorialisation.

2.6 What role for mid- and “street-level” immigration and law enforcement officials?

As Ellermann demonstrated in her 2008 study, analysing bilateral agreements and the formal policy level tells us little about what actually occurs aboard. She found that Europe’s cooperation with countries in the South is often problematic even after official agreements are signed (ibid.). Daniel Wunderlich agrees, arguing that EU migration agreements with non-member states face challenging implementation environments for the EU’s policies (Wunderlich 2013). To better understand how, where and why a country’s extraterritorial interventions manifest, it is thus necessary to also consider what happens in practice. Much of the literature on extraterritorialisation, however, focuses exclusively on the formal policy level, political discourse and bi- and multilateral agreements (see e.g. Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; FitzGerald and Ruhrmann 2016; Legomsky 2006; Rodier 2006; Wolff 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016; Zaiotti 2016; Zolberg 2003). These studies accordingly miss the way extraterritorial polices are put into practice. In doing so, they ignore how the immigration and law enforcement agencies and bureaucrats responsible for carrying out a state’s overseas interventions also matter.

This study helps fill the gap by analysing how the Home Office and its officials interpret and apply the UK government’s stated immigration goals. It also evaluates the way foreign immigration and law enforcement officials contribute to the design of the UK’s overseas management. Here the study makes a significant contribution to the literature by showing immigration and law enforcement officials from the UK and other countries significantly influence the UK’s extraterritorial actions. They help inform how, where and why the UK builds walls and opens small doors from abroad. This shows government ministers and senior officials are not the only important actors determining a country’s overseas regime, which is often implied by studies focusing on the formal policy level. Instead we see messier bottom-up processes have consequential bearing on states’ extraterritorial regimes.
Michael Lipsky’s seminal work on “street-level bureaucracies” highlights the critical role lower level public officials have in society: “the actions of most public service workers actually constitute the services ‘delivered’ by government” (1980, 3). A key conclusion from Lipsky’s analysis is that “street level bureaucrats” – officials who interact directly with the public and put government rules, regulations and programmes into practice – are not merely policy implementers but policymakers. This is due to the relatively high degrees of discretion and autonomy such individuals have in relation to the organisational authority (ibid.). The actions of these officials, when taken together, form state policy. Or, as Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Oliver de Sardan put it,

[p]olicy is not what is written in policy papers and organizational regulations but what street-level bureaucrats do: they, and not the administrators and politicians, make the everyday decisions about what really constitutes policy in the field (Bierschenk and de Sardan 2014, 36).

Several ethnographic studies on immigration controls likewise show that evaluating the actions of lower level officials is necessary for a more complete explanation of states’ behaviour (Gill 2016; Infantino 2019; Mountz 2010). Alison Mountz, for example, argues that written border control policies “tell only partial stories – idealized versions of what might be or what should happen” (2010, 35, italics in original). These idealised scenarios rarely reflect what immigration officials encounter in their daily work, leaving them to create “policy on the fly” to address the local context and situations they confront (ibid.). Similarly, in studying the implementation of Schengen visas, Frederica Infantino demonstrates that as “policy-making at the level of policy design is far from authoritative … much policy-making is left in the remit of implementers” (Infantino 2019, 6-7, italics in original). In other words, top-down analyses provide, at best, partial explanations. This is especially the case for extraterritorial policies operating in foreign countries as there is generally limited direction and influence from the destination state government (or EU), in addition to a wide range of actors and interests involved (Collyer 2016).

Ellerman, for instance, illustrates how “street- and mid-level interior bureaucrats” from Germany pursue informal strategies with foreign officers to encourage cooperation, thus illustrating how lower level officials impact Germany’s deportation regime (Ellermann 2008, 180). In particular, she finds interior officials are able to circumvent conflicting national interests on readmission agreements by working with “like-minded foreign law-and-order bureaucracies” (ibid.). She also finds that even when successful negations occur, non-compliant behaviour by foreign authorities often obstruct the implementation of bilateral agreements. To address these recurrent policy failures, German immigration officers developed “strategic relationships” with key interior officers from the other country to elicit their aid (Ellermann 2008, 182). According to Ellermann, this informal strategy, which by-passes “the conventional diplomatic route,” allows immigration officers to “effectively eliminate[] a level of decision-making marked by incongruent policy preferences” (Ellermann 2008, 181). It avoids the politics and public scrutiny associated to discussions at the diplomatic level.

Ellermann’s study is important because it shows incentives and diplomatic pressure are not always sufficient to motivate foreign governments and authorities to cooperate with rich destination states and regions. More notably, she finds that establishing personal contacts and
relationships among interior officials can mitigate non-compliant behaviour by sending and transit states. This demonstrates one of the ways lower level officials contribute to a destination state’s deportation regime. How else do these officials matter; do they inform the UK’s extraterritorial interventions? What role, if any, do Home Office officials and their foreign counterparts play in the design and implementation of the UK’s overseas management? Do relationships and trust between interior authorities matter in the context of the UK’s visa system and liaison network? How, if at all, does the UK’s historical and political ties with other counties relate to the Home Office’s ability to develop “strategic relationships” with foreign state actors? Here this study adds a further dimension to our understanding of a country’s overseas practices.

2.7 Conclusion

Despite the considerable body of literature on extraterritorialisation, few studies consider how and why a state’s overseas practices manifest across different types of countries and populations. This study, in contrast, address this point directly. By comparing the UK’s visa system and liaison network in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, it provides important insight into the conditions shaping the UK’s extraterritorial regime. This helps us understand the reasons a country’s interventions take the shape they do, and why they vary across specific countries, national populations and individual profiles.

As we will see, the UK’s extraterritorial management is more than a reflection of the government’s restrictive immigration goals. Rather, it too is designed to address their economic interests by easing movement for relatively wealthy tourists, traders, businesspeople and some labourers. More notably, UK government ministers and senior officials are not the only important actors determining how, where and why the country intervenes from abroad. Instead, the study shows that the Home Office and its officers significantly contribute to this process. They interpret and put into practise the UK government’s goals, influencing the shape of the state’s overseas actions. The study additionally reveals how foreign authorities play a critical role in the design of the UK’s extraterritorial management. Much of what the UK is able to do abroad depends on the willingness of foreign governments and officials to work with the Home Office. These actors likewise inform the UK’s actions by sharing ideas, resources and information, which subsequently impacts the Home Office’s decisions.

In the next chapter, I describe the research approach, design and methods before moving on to analyse the UK’s visa system and liaison network. The chapter unpacks the reasons I selected the cases of Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. It also explains why the analysis focus on perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic goals, political and historical ties and the behaviour of foreign state actors. The chapter then shifts to the data collection process. The three methods used were document analysis, semi-structured interviews and freedom of information (FOI) requests. Finally, the chapter concludes by describing challenges I encountered during the data collection process, focusing especially on the Home Office’s secrecy regarding their extraterritorial practices.
Chapter 3
Uncovering the UK’s extraterritorial practices: approach, design and methods

3.1 Introduction

The objective of this study is to investigate how and why the Home Office organises the visa system and liaison network under specific sets of circumstances. The goal is to gain insight into the conditions shaping the UK’s extraterritorial efforts. What informs the Home Office’s decisions and who are the actors involved in the process? How do we explain the variations in the UK’s visa system and liaison network across different types of countries, national populations and individual profiles? This chapter sets out the approach, design and methods of the research. It explains the rationale for choosing a comparative case study that analyses the UK’s extraterritorial interventions in relation to five countries: Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. It also details how the research was conducted and why the analysis focuses on four areas: perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic goals, political and historical ties and the behaviour of foreign state actors.

This chapter begins by discussing the design and benefits of using a comparative approach across five countries. Such an approach allows for the evaluation of the way specific conditions relate to the UK’s extraterritorial management. It also permits examination of features that are difficult to assess using large “n” comparative studies, such as officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk.” The chapter then describes why I focus the analysis on the four areas listed above. It outlines the reasons these four conditions matter, what their basis is in the literature and how they are operationalised to investigate the UK’s visa system and liaison network. The next section turns to the case selection of Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The five states were chosen because of their variations in concrete characteristics like geographic location, economic wealth and levels of immigration, tourism and trade to the UK. I also selected them because of their differences in subjective features, including the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk” for each country, the UK’s political relationships with them and the foreign authorities’ willingness to cooperate with the Home Office. The section outlines the way these traits transpire across the five states, demonstrating their variations and the reasons they make useful cases.

The second half of this chapter concentrates on the data collection process. The three methods used were document analysis, semi-structured interviews and freedom of information (FOI) requests. These techniques made it possible to gather in-depth information on how, where and why the Home Office arranges their overseas interventions. Here the chapter describes the way the data was gathered and the benefits of using the specific methods. The section also highlights challenges I encountered during the process and how I addressed them. The combination of the three methods helped overcome two key problems I experienced during my research: gaps in data from a single technique and a reluctance by the Home Office to disclose information relating to their overseas actions. Together they provided the means to gather a substantial body of material to analyse and interpret why the UK’s visa system and liaison network take the
shape that they do. This chapter concludes by reflecting on the Home Office’s secrecy and how the research design and methods allowed me to mitigate this.

3.2 Research design

I applied a comparative approach to investigate the UK’s extraterritorial management. Comparisons are an important tool of analysis for examining the way certain conditions connect to certain outcomes (Ragin 1994). They enlarge our understanding of phenomenon by bringing into focus similarities and differences across cases (Alba and Foner 2015, 14). This makes more visible aspects of a state’s extraterritorial management that might otherwise be overlooked, such as discrepancies in restrictiveness across countries and groups of people from the Global North and South. A systematic comparison of the UK’s visa system and liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France enables us to scrutinise patterns of similarities and differences and interpret why these two mechanisms vary under specific contexts. This provides insight into the conditions informing the Home Office’s choices and the reasons their extraterritorial interventions take the shape that they do.

In particular, this study investigates how and why the UK’s visa system and liaison network manifest in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France by concentrating on four sets of factors: the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk” regarding unwanted and unauthorised immigration; their assessments of the economic gains associated to international movement; the UK’s political and historical ties with the other states; and the actions of foreign authorities related to the UK’s overseas interventions. A comparative design makes possible evaluation of how these conditions connect to outcomes. Do they help account for the UK’s visa system and liaison network in relation to the five cases? Do they explain the reasons the Home Office organises these two systems in particular ways? In addition to the comparative analysis, the research provides an evaluation of both mechanisms overall. This includes a global level analysis of the UK’s visa requirements across all national populations, as well as an assessment of the countries where the liaison network operates. The purpose is to situate the case studies within the larger context of the UK’s visa system and liaison network and allow us to draw general conclusions about the Home Office’s actions.

Comparative studies evaluating a state’s overseas interventions across different types of countries are rare in research on extraterritorialisation. This is especially true for countries as diverse as Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The comparative analysis is thus an important contribution of the study. By examining the way four sets of factors relate to the UK’s interventions in five countries, we are able to gain a detailed understanding of the UK’s overseas management. Focusing on a small number of cases also allows for the evaluation of characteristics that are unfeasible to assess using larger “n” scale studies. For example, global level comparisons of a state’s visa regime are unable to address the role of foreign state actors or the importance of Home Office officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk.” Instead, they focus on quantifiable trends, like variations in visa restrictiveness and countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (see e.g. Brabandt and Mau 2013; Neumayer 2006). A small comparative design, in contrast, permits consideration of subjective conditions. It also allows
for the analysis of explanations provided by Home Office officials and government documents. It enables greater interpretative depth.

3.3 Explanatory factors

As stated above, the study concentrates on four areas to investigate and explain the UK’s extraterritorial interventions. The first factor, perceptions of “immigration risk,” deals with the Home Office and its officials’ assumptions regarding the potential for the types of immigrants the government defines as unauthorised to travel from or through another country. The second factor, economic goals, refers to the government and the Home Office’s understanding of the economic benefits associated to immigration and travel. This factor additionally takes into account the economic connections the UK has with the other countries in terms of trade, tourism and immigration. The third factor, political and historical ties, addresses the UK’s current and historical relationships. This includes their participation in intergovernmental (and supranational) organisations like the EU, the Five Country Conference (FCC) and the Commonwealth. It also involves the UK’s historical cooperation with other states in areas like security, defence and development. The last factor, foreign state actors’ behaviour, covers the autonomous actions of foreign governments and authorities related to the UK’s overseas management. This section discusses the reasons I focused on each area and how they are applied in the study.

3.3.1 Perceptions of “immigration risks”

Governments in rich democracies in the North are undeniably interested in excluding certain types of immigrants and travellers from their territories. As chapter 2 shows, wealthy states regularly project their immigration and border management outward to improve their ability to restrict and exclude unwanted flows, especially asylum seekers. Yet, how do we understand the particular shape of these extraterritorial interventions and their variations across different countries and populations? Studies on visa regimes offer several important insights into this. They demonstrate a connection between visa restrictiveness and a government’s assumptions about the kinds of movement coming from the state (e.g. Brabandt and Mau 2013; Neumayer 2006). Steffen Mau et al. (2015), for example, found nationals from countries that are considered major sources of refugees or other unauthorised flows generally have much stricter visitor visa requirements (Mau et al. 2015, 1197). Alison Siskin (2004) similarly showed the US implemented visitor visas for all nationals from states where more than two percent of the immigrants and travellers attempting to enter the US violated the country’s immigration rules or procedures. Gina Clayton (2010) and Christian Joppke (1999) also found the UK’s application of visitor visas during the 1990s and 2000s were linked to the government’s concerns over asylum seekers (Clayton 2010, 402; Joppke 1999, 130).

Given these findings, it makes sense to expect the Home Office and its officials’ assumptions about the kinds of immigrants and travellers coming from and through another country will inform how they organise the UK’s extraterritorial interventions. As we saw in the previous chapter, bureaucrats the bureaucracies are important policymakers with considerable discretion and autonomy (Infantino 2019; Mountz 2010). Their assumptions should thus help us
understand which countries and populations the UK targets for more pre-entry controls. In other words, I anticipate the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk” will be a major factor conditioning their choices related to the visa system and liaison network. Does the Home Office direct more pre-entry restrictions and scrutiny at the national populations and individual profiles they perceive as “higher risk?” Do they prioritise more resources and interventions for the countries and routes they see as having greater potential for unwanted and unauthorised movement? Do we also see the Home Office target facilitative services and a liberalisation of controls on the people and countries they perceive as “lower risk?” The study investigates these questions by evaluating the explanations given by Home Office officials and documents regarding the department’s decisions on the visa system and liaison network. It also compares Home Office officials’ claims about the levels of “immigration risk” associated to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France and the extraterritorial interventions occurring in each country.

I focus exclusively on the Home Office as it is the ministerial department responsible for the UK’s visa regime and liaison network. While the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) “promotes the United Kingdom’s interests overseas” (FCO 2019), and provides some support for the Home Office on immigration-related areas, it is not directly involved in the design or implementation of either mechanism. Accordingly, the Home Office and its immigration officials’ understanding of the UK’s goals and their subsequent decisions related to the visa system and liaison network are of principle concern. As Frederica Infantino explains, the power of agencies whose officials deliver government policies and services, such as the Home Office, “lies precisely in their capacity of interpreting, and defining while interpreting, the objective of their action and, in turn, the objectives of policies” (Infantino 2019, 10).

The Home Office does not publicly disclose how they define and assess levels of so-called “immigration risk.” For example, most documents describing “immigration risk” use undefined terms like “immigration abuse,” “immigration threats” and “criminality” to justify their claims (see e.g. Bolt 2016; Home Office 2007b, 9; Vine 2014, 21). The Home Office also refuses to release information on the criteria and methods they use to evaluate this (see e.g. Home Office 2015d, 15; Ostrand FOI 46078). Consequently, the study largely relies on Home Office officials’ assertions about levels of “immigration risk,” as well as claims made in documents and statements. Nevertheless, by drawing on interviews and several reports, it is possible to identify a few measurable conditions related to the department’s understandings of “risk.” The study compares these measurable conditions across the UK’s extraterritorial interventions in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The analysis of the visa system takes into account the visa refusal rate and number of asylum applications made by the national population. The analysis of the liaison network, on the other hand, evaluates the presence of large international airports and UK visa centres, two characteristics Home Office officials consistently identified as factors contributing to their assessments of “risk” (e.g. Interview F; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017).

Government administrations and agencies frequently promote the idea that risk assessments and data-driven processes generate objective policies and practices that are devoid of human prejudices, like instances of discrimination on the basis of race, nationality and religion (Ajana
Research on risk assessments and risk profiles, however, indicate that this is not the case (see e.g. Ajana 2015; Amoore 2006; Bigo and Guild 2005). Rather, government agencies construct categories and criteria based on problematic assumptions and “risk” proxies – such as nationality, personal wealth, travel history and other biographical data – to make predictions about people's possible future behaviour (ibid.). This raises important questions about how the Home Office and its officials interpret and put into practice notions of “immigration risk.” Who are the groups of people and countries characterised as having higher levels of “risk,” and how are these distinctions made and justified? What are the institutional assumptions and prejudices shaping these choices? Do claims of “immigration risk” and “statistical and evidence-based data” help the Home Office and UK government legitimise policies and practices that, in effect, reinforce global inequalities by excluding asylum seekers and less wealthy and often racialised people from the South? This study also investigates these questions, problematising the Home Office's understanding and use of “immigration risk.”

### 3.3.2 Economic interests

In addition to preventing unrestricted and unwanted flows, most governments in wealthy democracies in the North are interested in opening their territories to specific types of immigrants and travellers for economic reasons (Geddes 2008; Hampshire 2009; Hollifield 2004; Menz 2008; Boswell 2007). They believe that to compete in a global market economy they must attract certain types of mobility, such as highly skilled workers, tourists, businesspeople and traders (ibid.). According to James Hollifield (2004), liberal democratic states face a “liberal paradox” where economic forces push them toward more open immigration policies while perceived security concerns and political forces push them toward more closure. These states, he argues, attempt to manage immigration in ways that balance between these competing goals. Over the last two decades the UK government, at least at a rhetorical level, follows this model (e.g. Green 2012; Home Office and FCO 2010; Menz 2008, 153; NAO 2004). They have promoted the movement of certain kinds of immigrants and travellers who they see as supporting their economic agenda. This has generally included wealthier individuals travelling for tourism, business, trade, study and some labour, which they argue “will boost the UK economy” (FCO 2008, 51; Byrne 2007; Home Office 1998, 23; Home Office 2007; Home Office and FCO 2010, 20). Or, as the 2014 Home Secretary Theresa May put it: “Britain is open for business. We welcome legitimate students, tourists, business travellers and people who want to come to this country to contribute” (May 2014).

Yet, does the UK government's stated economic interests in enabling some immigration and travel translate into their extraterritorial management? Does it influence how, where and why the Home Office organises the visa system and liaison network? While there is a considerable amount of research on economic rationales within the larger field of immigration policy (e.g. Hollifield 2004; Menz 2008; Boswell 2007), this is seldom the case for studies focusing on extraterritorial management (see chapter 2). My study, in contrast, considers this point directly. It evaluates whether the UK government’s economic goals shape the Home Office’s choices, and whether it helps explain variations in the UK’s interventions across different countries, national populations and individual profiles. The study assesses this by examining the Home Office's explanations for their decisions. Do Home Office documents and officials use economic
rationales to justify their choices? For example, do they justify the removal of visas on the grounds that it will encourage more tourism and trade?

In addition to evaluating the Home Office’s explanations, the study compares the UK’s visa system and liaison network to several measurable characteristics, including the relevant sending country’s economic wealth and levels of trade, immigration and tourism to the UK. I evaluate these characteristics to help assess whether the UK government’s stated goals of promoting immigration and travel for economic reasons connect to the UK’s visa system and liaison network in practice. In other words, if the Home Office organises their extraterritorial interventions to reflect the government’s economic objectives this should not only be reflected in the department’s explanations of their choices, but also in general trends. We should see, for example, that the UK’s overseas measures favour immigration and travel by people from countries with higher GDPs per capita and which are important sources of tourism, trade and immigration for the UK.

A relationship between a destination state’s relative openness and a sending state’s economic characteristics is supported by previous research on visitor visas. Several studies show nationals from less wealthy countries travelling toward a high income one face stricter visitor visa requirements compared to those travelling from one high income country to another (see e.g. Bigo and Guild 2005; Brabandt and Mau 2013; Mau 2010; Mau et al. 2012; Mau et al. 2015, 1197; Neumayer 2006). Eric Neumayer also found a positive relationship between levels of international trade and tourism and more liberal visa policies (2006). He argued that governments offer visa free travel for economic purposes, and countries that rely on trade and tourism seek to promote the movement of people and goods by providing easier access to their territories (Neumayer 2006, 76). Steffen Mau et al. (2012) additionally found that among the countries whose nationals require visitor visas to enter the US, GDP per capita had a strong connection to visa refusal rates. In other words, “the richer the country of a passport holder, the more likely it is that a person is granted a visa” (Mau et al. 2012, 72-73). Drawing on these studies and the UK government’s rhetoric, I expect the Home Office to arrange extraterritorial interventions to enable, or at least not impede, the kinds of human flows the government views as contributing to the economy, namely wealthy tourist, businesspeople, traders and some skilled labours. This should especially be the case for individuals from wealthier countries and countries which are major sources of trade and tourism for the UK.

3.3.3 Political and historical ties
As extraterritorialisation by definition operates in an international context, it is also necessary to consider how foreign countries and officials inform this process. One way the study investigates this is by analysing the relationships between the UK’s political and historical ties with other states and their extraterritorial management. Do these connections condition the Home Office’s actions, and if so how? In particular, this study compares the UK’s political and historical relationships with Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France to the level and types of extraterritorial initiatives involving each state. It also evaluates the justifications given by Home Office officials explaining why the department works with some countries on their overseas management and not others. Do Home Office officials justify their frequency of cooperation with another country on the UK’s political relationship with the government and authorities
from that country? Do the UK’s colonial ties relate to the countries the Home Office operates in? Is there a relationship between the UK’s historical legacies of sharing intelligence and cooperating on issues like security, defence and development and the countries who the Home Office most often collaborates with on their extraterritorial management today? Does the Home Office consider the political consequences to their international relationships when designing immigration policies and practices? How, if at all, does the UK’s participation in intergovernmental (and supranational) organisations like the EU and FCC inform the Home Office’s actions?

During the post war period, the UK’s immigration policy was closely tied to its colonial history and the politics of the British Empire (Hansen 2000). In 1948 the UK created a definition of citizenship that not only included the population of Britain, but also the populations of its colonies and all Commonwealth countries (i.e. its former colonies and dominions) (Hansen 2000). This granted all British subjects the right to enter, live, and work in Britain. The UK progressively curtailed these rights throughout the 1960s and 70s for Commonwealth nationals, including the imposition of pre-entry visas for Commonwealth applicants wishing to settle in the UK (Clayton 2010, 399). It wasn’t until the 1981 British Nationality Act, however, that the UK created a separate citizenship for British nationals. According to Randall Hansen (2000), the UK’s uniquely liberal policy towards Commonwealth populations prior to the early 1960s was shaped by their reluctance to alienate members from “Old Commonwealth” countries, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, by applying entry restrictions. It was informed by their political interests and international relationships.

Even after the 1981 British Nationality Act, it took four more years before the UK imposed visitor visas on the first Commonwealth country, Sri Lanka (Joppke 1999, 130). The following year, the Home Office further applied visitor visas on nationals from India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana and Bangladesh (ibid.). According to parliamentary debates, there was contestation regarding the Home Office’s decisions, with several parliamentarians arguing that the new visa requirements would negatively impact the UK’s already poor relationships with many of its Commonwealth countries in the South.3 Since the mid-1980s, the UK has continued to adopted a restrictionist approach towards immigration and travel from its former colonies by increasingly requiring visitor and transit visas for nationals from Commonwealth states.

By examining the connection between the UK’s historical and political ties and their extraterritorial management today, the study endeavours to gain insight into the way international relationships continue to shape the Home Office’s choices. This allows us to analyse if and how these relationships have bearing on their overseas actions. It also enables exploration of the influence of intergovernmental/supranational institutions like the EU and FCC. Do these institutions structure the Home Office’s choices related to the visa system and liaison network by providing more opportunities for collaboration and by generating new ideas and practices? I expect this to be the case. I also anticipate a relationship between the UK’s political and historical ties and the countries the Home Office most often cooperates with. That is, the

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closer the UK’s connections to countries like Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, the more often the Home Office will work with them on their extraterritorial interventions. I additionally expect a similar relationship with the UK’s historical legacies of cooperation in areas of security, defence, politics and development.

3.3.4 Foreign state actors’ behaviour

The second way the study investigates the role other states have on the UK’s extraterritorial management is by analysing the way foreign state actors’ behaviour conditions the Home Office’s actions. As the previous chapter discussed, studies by Antje Ellermann (2008), Sarah Wolff (2016) and Lyubov Zhyznomirska (2016) show foreign governments’ motivation to cooperate with a destination state matter. It informs what the destination state is able to do abroad. This study builds on, and adds to, these analyses by examining how foreign governments and their immigration and law enforcement agencies influence the Home Office’s visa system and liaison network. Drawing on examples from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France the study considers whether foreign authorities’ ideas and willingness to collaborate impacts the Home Office’s extraterritorial actions. Do differences in the motivation of state actors from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France help explain discrepancies in the level and types of extraterritorial activities the Home Office conducts in each country? How do foreign state actors influence the types of training and resources the Home Office provides, and do they seek out the Home Office to request specific kinds of support? What role does the sharing of ideas, data and resources with the Home Office have on the UK’s extraterritorial actions?

This research assesses these questions by comparing the motivation and actions of authorities from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France to the UK’s extraterritorial interventions in each country. The study primarily draws on information from Home Office officials who worked with relevant foreign state actors on the UK’s overseas operations. Many of the interviewees were directly involved in deciding what the liaison network did in different countries. This put them in an especially good position to comment on the way foreign state actors’ behaviour informed the Home Office’s actions. It also allowed them to comment on the relative significance these actors have on the Home Office’s choices. Following Nick Gill and Anthony Good (2019, 18-19) I use the concept of “actors” to emphasise the diversity of people involved and their relative agency in the process. Foreign state actors not only include the foreign government (and its senior officials), but also the local immigration and law enforcement agencies (and their officers). By analysing the role of foreign immigration and law enforcement bureaucrats, in addition to policy elites and politicians, this study highlights a level of actors and interests that are rarely considered in research on extraterritorialisation.

Building on insights from Ellermann (2008), Wolff (2016) and Zhyznomirska’s (2016) research, I expect the motivation and interests of foreign governments and their immigration and law enforcement authorities to have a significant impact on the Home Office’s extraterritorial interventions. This should influence where the Home Office works abroad and who they cooperate with. In other words, the wide array of foreign state actors and their varying goals are likely to shape the design and implementation of the UK’s extraterritorial management. I also go beyond Ellermann, Wolff and Zhyznomirska’s studies by considering the way the exchange of ideas, information and resources condition the UK’s extraterritorial actions. Such exchanges,
when they occur, should inform how the Home Office perceives and responds to immigration and mobility.

3.4 Case selection: why Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France?

Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France were largely selected because of their variations in characteristics I thought might be related to the organisation of the UK’s extraterritorial management. This involves quantifiable traits like geographic location; economic wealth; participation in intergovernmental organisations; and levels of trade, tourism and immigration to the UK. Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, for example, span four continents and diverge greatly in their GDP per capita and levels of trade with the UK. There are also substantial differences in the volume of immigration and travel to the UK by nationals from each state, as illustrated by table 1. The table shows that that over 4.7 million Americans entered the UK in 2015 compared to only 50,000 Ghanaians, 77,000 Egyptians and 117,000 Thais (table 1). The number of French people entering the UK is excluded from table 1 as the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) does not collect admissions data on French (or other EEA) nationals (as of 2018).

In addition to these quantifiable conditions, I selected the five cases because of their variations in subjective characteristics related to the behaviour of state officials. This includes the Home Office and its officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk” for each state, as well as the foreign authorities’ motivation to work with the UK on migration management. Home Office officials, for instance, said there are much higher levels of “immigration risk” for Ghanaians compared to Americans. They also claimed Egyptian authorities are less willing to cooperate with the Home Office compared to authorities from Ghana and Thailand. Finally, my institutional and personal connections helped inform the case selection. I spent two and a half years working and studying migration at Mahidol University in Thailand. I also worked as a consultant at the Centre for Migration Studies in New York City for six months. In both places I developed personnel connections with researchers focusing on immigration policy in the US and Thailand. The Sussex Centre for Migration Research also has partnerships with the University of Ghana and Mahidol University.

In table 2, I summarise key variations across Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France that are connected to each of the four factors described above: perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic interests, political and historical ties and foreign authorities’ behaviour. For the first condition, I list the relative level of perceived “risk” by Home Office officials regarding the potential for unwanted and unauthorised immigrants coming from and through each state. Under economic interests, I provide the GDP per capita for each country as well as their import and export levels and levels of tourism to the UK. As we saw in the previous section, GDP per capita is often linked to the degree of visa restrictiveness for a country’s national population, and I expect this trend to also occur for other extraterritorial interventions. UK ministers and reports also consistently claim international trade, tourism and business are good for the country’s economy (see e.g. Harper 2013; Home Office and FCO 2010, 20; May 2014; Prime Minister’s Office 2014). I thus selected these traits to help capture the likely perceived economic
benefits for the UK associated to immigration and travel from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France.

Table 2 also outlines the UK’s historical and political ties with the five case studies. This includes their participation in the Commonwealth, EU and FCC; their status as a former colony; and their historical legacies of cooperation related to security, defence and politics. In the last column, I describe the relative willingness of foreign authorities from each country to cooperate with the UK on migration, according to Home Office officials who had experience working with the authorities. The variations related to the four factors are important because they allow us to better evaluate how they connect to the Home Office’s extraterritorial management. It improves our ability to interpret whether perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic interests, political relationships and foreign state actors’ behaviour help explain the Home Office’s choices and the shape of the visa system and liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. In what follows, I describe the five case countries in more detail, highlighting important characteristics which informed my selection.

Table 1. No. of individuals admitted to the UK in 2015 by purpose and nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of nationality</th>
<th>Short-term visits (tourism &amp; business)</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>All admissions**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>77,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>74,200</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>5,340</td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>2,720,000</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>197,000</td>
<td>4,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>Free movement</td>
<td>Free movement</td>
<td>Free movement</td>
<td>Free movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office immigration admission statistics, year ending December 2018 (ONS 2019b).

* The numbers of French nationals are excluded from this table because the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) does not provide admissions statistics for French, or other European Economic Area, nationals who have free movement rights to enter and reside in the UK (as of 2018).

** The ‘all admissions’ category is larger than the sum of the short-term visit, work and study categories because it also includes individuals returning after a temporary absence abroad, individuals in transit, and those granted permission based on a family connection.
Table 2. Characteristics associated to explanatory factors for Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case country</th>
<th>Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk”</th>
<th>Traits related to UK economic interests</th>
<th>Historical and political links</th>
<th>Foreign authorities’ behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Relatively high</td>
<td>1,500 (Low (not top 50 import or export))</td>
<td>Former colony and Commonwealth member</td>
<td>Relatively high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Relatively high</td>
<td>3,500 (Fairly low (40th largest export))</td>
<td>Former colony but not Commonwealth member</td>
<td>Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Moderately low</td>
<td>6,000 (Moderate (34th in export 26th in import))</td>
<td>No colonial ties</td>
<td>Moderately low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>57,600 (High (largest export 3rd largest import))</td>
<td>NATO, G7 and EU member; long history of cooperation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>36,900 (High (3rd largest export 5th largest import))</td>
<td>NATO, G7 and EU member; long history of cooperation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UK International Passenger Survey statistics on inbound tourism markets for Britain (IPS 2015); UK Office for National Statistics data on trade in goods for the UK (ONS 2016); World Bank GDP per capita (US$), year ending December 2016 (World Bank 2017).

Ghana is a lower middle income developing state in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2017). It had a GDP per capita of $1,500 in 2016 – nearly 27 times lower than the UK’s GDP per capita that year, which was $40,400 (ibid.). Ghana is the smallest source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK compared to the other cases. It was not ranked in the UK’s top fifty import or export markets in 2015 (ONS 2016). It was also not part of the UK’s fifty largest tourism markets from at least 2011 to 2014 (IPS 2015). Additionally, as table 1 shows, Ghana had the smallest number of people entering the UK for short-term visits (i.e. tourism and business), study and work in 2015. Given these characteristics, it is likely that the Home Office views Ghana as a comparatively small source for the kinds of wanted immigration and travel that the UK government perceives as contributing to the economy. Home Office officials described Ghana as a country with relatively high levels of “immigration risk” for the kinds of movement the government classifies as unwanted and unauthorised (Interview D 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview M 2016). Essentially, Home Office officials assume less wealthy Ghanaians might try to enter and stay in the UK without authorisation and/or request asylum. Home Office officials also described Ghana as a relatively “higher risk” transit country (ibid.). This means they believe there is potential for unauthorised migrants from other countries to attempt to reach the UK by travelling through Ghana, either by land or air.
Ghana is unique among the cases for its Commonwealth link. As a former British colony and current Commonwealth member, Ghana has closer historical and political ties to the UK than Egypt, which is a former colony but not a Commonwealth member, and Thailand, which was never a colony. Or, as one official put it, the UK has more connections and influence in Ghana compared to the other two states (Interview U 2017). According to Home Office officials, the relatively good relationship between British and Ghanaian authorities stems in part from the UK’s postcolonial history of providing support to Ghana in areas like development aid, trade and security (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview U 2017). This helps us understand why Ghanaian authorities are much more willing to work with the Home Office on migration compared to Egyptian and Thai authorities (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017; Interview U 2017). For example, Home Office officials said Ghanaian authorities cooperate on migration control, in part, because they do not want to tarnish the country’s good relations with the UK, which could impact the amount development aid, trade and technical training they receive (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2016).

Egypt is a lower middle income developing state and former British colony. It is located in North Africa and had a GDP per capita of $3,500 in 2016, about 11 times lower than the UK’s (World Bank 2017). Egypt is a slightly larger source of trade, tourism and immigration for the UK compared to Ghana. It was the UK’s fortieth largest export market in 2015 (ONS 2016), and more Egyptians travelled to the UK for tourism, business, work and study in 2015 (table 1). Nevertheless, measured against the other cases it is a relatively small source for these wanted types of flows. According to Home Office officials, Egypt is a relatively “higher risk” country for unauthorised immigration travelling from and through its territory, although slightly less than Ghana (Interview D 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview M 2016). Overall, the Home Office views Egypt as having more potential for unwanted immigration compared to Thailand, the US and France, but less than Ghana.

Notably, the Home Office’s assessment of so-called “immigration risk” for Egypt increased during the 2010s due to the popular uprising that overthrew the long-time president in 2011, as well as the rise in asylum seekers transiting through North Africa between 2014 to 2016 (Home Office 2011; Interview P 2017). The shift in the Home Office’s interpretation of “immigration risk” provides a good opportunity to evaluate how this change impacted the UK’s extraterritorial management. Egypt is also an important case because its officials are by far the least willing to cooperate with the Home Office on migration and border control, according to Home Office officials (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017). This sets the country apart from Ghana, despite several similarities between the two states, such as their former colonial status, perceptions of “risk” and economic potential for the UK. In particular, this case improves our ability to determine how foreign authorities’ motivation influences the UK’s extraterritorial interventions.

Thailand is an upper middle income developing state in Southeast Asia (World Bank 2017). Its GDP per capita of $6,000 in 2016 was around 7 times lower than the UK’s. Out of the three developing states of Ghana, Egypt and Thailand, it has the most economic potential for the UK in terms of immigration and travel. Thailand was the UK’s twenty-sixth largest import market and thirty-fourth largest export market in 2015 (ONS 2016). Between 2011 and 2014, it was among the UK’s fifty largest tourism markets, ranking in the low forties (IPS 2015). We also see
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more Thai nationals entered the UK in 2015 to work, study and visit for tourism and business compared to Ghanaians and Egyptians (table 1). Still, measured against the US and France, Thailand’s levels of tourism, trade and immigration to the UK is relatively small. Based on Home Office officials, Thailand is a country with lower levels of “immigration risk” than Ghana and Egypt, but higher levels than the US and France (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016; Interview U 2017). These officials said Thais rarely attempt to enter the UK without authorisation but believed there is some potential for unwanted and unauthorised movement due to the country’s relatively low economic wealth compared to the UK. They also believed the large international airport in Bangkok is a potential route for unauthorised immigration to the UK (ibid.).

In general Thai authorities are less willing to cooperate with the Home Office on migration and border control compared to those from Ghana, the US and France, according to Home Office officials (Interview A 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017; Interview U 2017). They are, however, more inclined to work with the UK than Egyptian authorities (ibid.). Overall, Thailand typically holds an intermediary position related to the four factors. It is neither the highest or lowest in terms of perceived “immigration risk,” economic potential or motivation by its state officials. This makes Thailand a useful case as it helps reveal subtler ways these conditions shape the Home Office’s extraterritorial interventions. Furthermore, there are no previous studies that have evaluated the UK’s overseas management in relation to Thailand.

In contrast to Ghana, Egypt and Thailand, the US is a very significant source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK. This rich, high income country had a GDP per capita of $57,600 in 2016, about 17,000 more than the UK’s GDP per capita that same year (World Bank 2017). In 2014, the US was the UK’s third largest tourism market in volume of travellers and largest in money spent (IPS 2015). In fact, American travellers spent nearly £1.5 billion more in 2014 than the UK’s second most profitable tourism market that year, Germany (VisitBritain 2015). As table 1 illustrates, many more Americans entered the UK for work and study in 2015 compared to Ghana, Egypt and Thailand. The US is likewise a key trading partner for the UK. It was the UK’s largest export market and third largest import market in 2015 (ONS 2016). In other words, the US is one of the UK’s top sources for the kinds of immigrants and travellers the UK government views as economically beneficial. Home Office officials also described the US as having very low “risk” for unwanted and unauthorised movement coming from and through its territory (Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T 2017).

The US has much closer political and historical relationships with the UK compared to Ghana, Egypt and Thailand. It has a long history of sharing intelligence and working together on areas related to security, defence, foreign policy, law enforcement, politics and so on (Interview E 2016; US Department of State 2018). Both the US and UK are members of intergovernmental organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the G74 and the Five Country Conference (FCC). The UK and US’s involvement in the FCC is especially important. The FCC it is a multilateral forum designed specifically to address common migration and border issues between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and US (Homeland Security 2009). It

4 The G7 is a group of seven rich states – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and US – who have an annual meeting to develop consensus on global issues like economic growth, crisis management, global security, energy and terrorism (Laub and McBride 2015).
provides opportunities for these countries to “share ideas, practices and resources;” “reaffirm relationships;” and develop joint initiatives related to migration and border management (Interview A 2016; Interview E 2016). Home Office officials also said US authorities are quite willing to cooperate with the Home Office on migration (Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017). Overall, they had much higher levels of motivation than authorities from Ghana, Egypt and Thailand (ibid.).

Similar to the US, France is a high income state and a major source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK. It had a GDP per capita of $36,900 in 2016, slightly less than the UK’s at $40,400 (World Bank 2017). In 2014, France was the UK’s largest tourism market in volume of people and third largest in money spent (IPS 2015). It was also the UK’s third largest export market and fifth largest import market in 2015 (ONS 2016). France is an import case as it is the only one that neighbours the UK and connects the country to continental Europe by land, via the Channel Tunnel. France is thus a key transit state for immigrants and travellers going to the UK. France is also a unique case because its nationals have free movement rights for the UK, at least until the UK leaves the EU. This means French nationals have the ability to enter and reside in the UK subject only to a passport or identity card check. The UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) does not collect information on the number of free movement nationals admitted to the UK by nationality and purpose. Consequently, there is no data that allows us compare to the numbers of French who entered the UK for work or study in 2015 to the other cases (table 1). Based on the ONS’s annual population survey, French nationals represented the eighth largest group of foreign nationals residing in the UK in 2014, higher than all the other states (ONS 2015, table 2.3). This suggests there is a relatively high number of workers and students.

According to Home Office officials, France is a country with very low potential for the kinds of immigrants the UK government characterises as unwanted (Interview M 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T 2017). Furthermore, as French nationals have very few limits on their ability to enter and stay in the UK, it is nearly impossible for them to be considered unauthorised (as of 2018). As of 2018, they have the right to reside in the UK as long as they remain a “qualified person,” which means they are a jobseeker, worker, self-employed person, self-sufficient person or student. Home Office officials, however, described France as a problematic state for unwanted transit migration to the UK. They believed non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals attempting to enter the UK without permission often try to do so from France (ibid.). French authorities, like those from the US, are generally willing to cooperate with the Home Office on migration and border management, according to Home Office officials (Interview E 2016; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). France also has a very close political and historical relationship with the UK. The two countries have a long history of working together on security and defence, and they are members of the same intergovernmental (and supranational) organisations, including NATO, the G7 and the EU. The UK and France’s

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5 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
6 US nationals were the tenth largest group; Ghanaians were the 35th; Thais were the 44th and Egyptians were not in the top 60 most common nationalities residing in the UK in 2014 (ONS 2015, table 2.3).
7 See Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016. All EEA nationals have the right to stay in the UK as long as they remain a “qualified person” as defined by the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
membership in the EU is especially significant. This connection is unparalleled by the other cases and has had major implications for the UK’s ability to regulate immigration and travel by EEA nationals (HM Government 2014; Gower 2015, 11).  

As we can see, there are substantial variations across the five cases selected for the study. This allows for meaningful comparisons of the way these conditions relate to the Home Office’s choices. It helps us see if and how they inform the visa system and liaison network, and whether they help explain variations in the UK’s policies across the cases. In other words, the design and selection of cases provide a useful foundation to investigate the reasons the Home Office’s arranges these two mechanisms in specific ways. This chapter now turns to the discussion of methods and the challenges I encountered during the data collection process.

3.5 Data collection methods

This study is based largely on qualitative research where the cases are located within a comparative framework. As the goal of the study is to understand how, where and why the Home Office organises the UK’s overseas interventions, qualitative research is an appropriate way to gather data that can be subjected to interpretation and analysis for this purpose. It has the ability to produce in-depth information on how and why processes and events transpire (Vromen 2010). The specific methods used were document analysis, semi-structured interviews and freedom of information (FOI) requests. Utilising multiple data sources increases the reliability of research through triangulation (Porta and Keating 2008) and enables us to obtain a deeper understanding of the topic (Paoletti 2011, 8). Importantly, the methods of document analysis, interviews and FOI requests mitigated two key challenges I encountered during the data collection process: gaps in information and the Home Office’s secrecy concerning their overseas activities. The combination of the three methods and the case study research design made it possible to construct a detailed picture of the UK’s visa system and liaison network and gain insight into the reasons they take the shape that they do.

3.5.1 Document analysis

I began the data collection process by compiling and analysing relevant documents. The documents analysed consisted primarily of reports by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) and the National Audit Office; transcripts from parliamentary debates (Hansards); primary and secondary legislation on the UK’s immigration rules, regulations and orders; explanatory memorandums on legislation; impact assessments evaluating the likely cost, benefits and impacts of legislation; official reports, policy papers, official reports, policy papers,

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8 The UK (prior to leaving) has a special position in the EU regarding border controls and immigration and asylum policy. It is not part of the Schengen acquis and maintains internal EU border controls (Protocol no. 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union). The UK government can, however, “request to take part in some or all of the provisions of [the Schengen] acquis” (ibid., article 4). The UK is also not bound by Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union but can opt into provisions on a case-by-case basis (Protocol no. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice). This means the UK has the ability to selectively participate in some of the EU’s immigration and asylum policies, providing the members of the Council of the EU unanimously agree (ibid.).
speeches and press releases; and joint press statements and agreements between the UK government and the governments of France, Thailand and the US (see list of documentary materials). These documents are a key source of data for the study. The goal of examining them was to assemble as detailed a picture as possible of the UK’s extraterritorial actions and the Home Office’s justifications for them. They were also used to contextualise and crosscheck information obtained by interviews and FOI requests.

The documents analysed for the study were selected based on their content. I conducted a thorough online search for official material that discussed the UK’s visa operations and liaison network, in addition to the UK’s extraterritorial approach in general. Over 150 documents were gathered and examined for the purpose of the research (see list of documentary materials). From this body of material, I prioritised the documents and legislation that discussed at least one of the case countries and/or described the Home Office’s rationale for their overseas interventions. Each document was scrutinised for themes addressing how the Home Office (and UK government) justified their extraterritorial management. I also searched them for specific statements explaining the UK’s visa policy and the liaison network. I additionally examined the documents for specific examples of extraterritorial interventions occurring in each of the five cases.

I used a variety of documentary sources in order to gather specific types of information. I examined government strategy papers and speeches by prime ministers, home secretaries and immigration ministers to identify the UK’s key objectives and approaches to immigration and border management. The main strategy papers used in the study included *Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain: Five Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration* (Home Office 2005); *Security in a Global Hub: Establishing the UK’s New Border Arrangement* (Cabinet Office 2007); *Securing the UK Border: Our Vision and Strategy for the Future* (Home Office 2007); *Managing Global Migration: A Strategy to Build Stronger International Alliances to Manage Migration* (Home Office and FCO 2007) and *International Solutions: Managing the Movement of People and Goods* (Home Office and FCO 2010). These documents set out how the government and Home Office intend to pursue their immigration objectives, and, more importantly, how an overseas approach contributes to this. The 2005 strategy paper *Controlling Our Border*, for instance, claims that immigration controls before to the UK’s physical territory provide a more efficient and effective means for enabling so-called “legitimate” immigrants and travellers while preventing those who are not (Home Office 2005).

In addition to strategy papers and speeches, I used secondary legislation, especially immigration orders – documents created by the Home Office which make alterations to the law – to identify specific changes to the UK’s immigration rules and regulations. For example, I drew on the Immigration (Transit Visa) Orders to ascertain which nationals require transit visas and to track the growth of transit requirements from the mid-1990s onward (see list of documentary materials). Many of these immigration orders are also published with an explanatory memorandum which explains what the change is and why it was made. These memorandums provided useful insight into the rationales used by the Home Office to justify transit visa obligations. In a few cases, the Home Office also produced impact assessments when they were contemplating alterations to the UK’s immigration policy and procedures. These assessments
described why the Home Office was proposing the change, the main options they were considering and an estimation of the impact of each option. Impact assessments (when available) provided an especially detailed description of the reasons behind the Home Office’s choices.

Press releases are another example of documentary material I relied on for the study. They outlined new extraterritorial initiatives implemented by the Home Office and their justifications. This source was particularly useful for identifying overseas actions that do not require an immigration order or official statement before parliament. This includes activities carried out by the liaison network and new and expanded visa services designed to encourage tourism, trade and investment in the UK (Home Office 2014; Home Office 2016; Prime Minister’s Office 2014). For example, a 2005 press release publicised a significant increase in the UK’s liaison network, which grew from 25 locations to 42 (Home Office 2005b). The decision, according to the press release, was intended to improve the UK’s ability to prevent the embarkation of unauthorised travellers. Press releases and speeches by government ministers were particularly useful for identifying and explaining overseas interventions during the 2010s as the UK produced far fewer immigration strategy papers throughout that period.

In addition to the official documents listed above, I utilised eight job vacancies advertised by the UK government for immigration liaison personnel in Abu Dhabi, Bangkok, Berlin, Bogota, Colombo and New Delhi (see list of documentary materials). The job vacancies were found through an online search and were posted between 2016 and 2017. They provided an up-to-date description of the purpose of the liaison network and identified the kinds of activities and responsibilities liaison personnel are expected to perform. This source helped offset the difficulties I encountered in finding official material on the topic. They supplemented ICIBI, UK government and Home Office reports discussing the liaison network, filling in some of their gaps. They also provided useful background information prior to my interviews. Finally, I drew on material from the VFS Global and TLScontact website pages – two private companies the Home Office contracts to collect visa applications and biometric information for individuals applying for UK visas from abroad. The website pages contained important information on the visa services available in each of the case countries, data that is not listed on the UK government’s website. Drawing on the variety of documentary material described above allowed me to piece together pertinent information on where, how and why the UK organises the visa system and liaison network.

Conducting a comprehensive document analysis at the start of the data collection process was an informed decision. Examining over 150 documents improved my ability to obtain richer and more relevant data from interviews and FOI requests. For example, it enabled me to identifying deficits in publicly available material and helped me formulate knowledgeable questions and requests. My understanding of the documentary material also allowed me to compensate for disparities in the material between the visa system and liaison network. I found a dearth of data on what the liaison network does in practice, how it varies in different locations and who liaison personnel actually work with abroad. On the other hand, there was a relatively large body of documentary material on the UK’s visa system, its variations across different countries and the Home Office’s justifications for their decisions. As a result, I decided to conducted more
interviews focusing on the liaison network. The knowledge I obtained through a detailed document analysis also allowed me to concentrate my interviews on the reasons specific interventions and practices are used, rather than the structure and function of the two systems.

3.5.2 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are the second primary data source for the study. The main purpose for using this method was to gain insight into why the Home Office organises their overseas activities in particular ways and how foreign state actors contribute to the process. I also used them to uncover missing information from the documentary material, particularly on the activities carried out by the liaison network. I chose a semi-structured interview method to allow for flexibility. This gave interviewees the opportunity to comment on the issues they thought were most important and enabled probing when significant and unexpected topics arose. The semi-structured interview method is an important technique that has the ability to provide indispensable information not accessible in documents (Tansey 2007). This includes material on the inner workings of the Home Office, such as the reasons certain decisions are made as well as officials’ thoughts and subjective experiences related to policy choices and practices. The interviews conducted for the research uncovered data on how the Home Office determines what extraterritorial interventions to use and why officials think specific choices are made. They also provided information on officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk” and the role of foreign state actors. This included material on the degree of cooperation Home Office personnel have with different foreign authorities, their relationships with the authorities and insights on the cooperation process. The interviews are an especially important source for the study as the kinds of data I obtained from them are not observable in official documents.

The study is based on 18 semi-structured interviews with current and former Home Office officials between July 2016 and October 2017 (see list of interviews). The interviewees were mid-level government officials with the exception of two senior-level officials (director and assistant director). All interviewees had direct involvement either managing or implementing parts of the UK’s overseas immigration and border operations. This included personal experience working abroad and/or collaborating directly with foreign authorities, particularly those from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The interviewees position within the Home Office, their insider knowledge of the UK’s extraterritorial management and their insight into foreign state actors’ behaviour make them experts and important sources of data. The selection of interviewees was based on their familiarity with the UK’s overseas operations, especially the liaison network, and by referral. This sampling method is well-suited for the study as it relies on a particular group of actors with a specific knowledge set who are not visible or easily accessible to the public (Tansey 2007).

Identifying appropriate interviewees was one of the main challenges during the interview process as mid-level government officials in the Home Office are not listed in public records. Consequently, I depended largely on UK embassies, Home Office sections within the state’s immigration and border agencies and previous interviewees to provide contact information. Gaining access to relevant Home Office sections, as well as the individuals they identified, was a major challenge. I found the Home Office sections dealing with immigration and border management to be very secretive and reluctant to provide information or referrals. This was
especially the case for the central Home Office offices located in the UK. Many of the UK officials I emailed were also unwilling to provide information or referrals. Overall about half of the offices and officials I contacted refused my requests. Out of the forty people and offices I emailed, thirteen did not respond and five replied but declined the request for an interview. Two Home Office officials initially agreed to an interview but stopped responding to emails when I tried to establish a specific date and time. Two other officials refused to be interviewed but agreed to forward my questions to the central Border Force and Immigration Enforcement sections responsible for the UK’s overseas operations: Border Force International and Immigration Enforcement International (IEI), formerly the Risk and Liaison Overseas Network (RALON). Neither Home Office section responded.

Most of the interviewees were recruited by reaching out to British embassies, high commissions and consulates, and by recommendation from earlier interviews. I emailed seven British diplomatic missions in addition to six British ambassadors and heads of missions requesting to be put in touch with UK immigration and border officials who had experience working abroad, or who had insight into the UK’s cooperation with foreign governments on migration. I also contacted six Home Office sections asking for interviews, including the Carriers Liaison Section, Clandestine Entrant Civil Penalty Team and UK Visa and Immigration Section. I found the embassies, high commissions and consulates to be much more responsive to my requests than the Home Office offices. Thus, while the UK’s foreign missions are not part of the Home Office, they were crucial to the research as they provided many of the initial referrals that allowed me to gain access to officials within the Home Office who had experience working abroad.

In addition to interviewing Home Office officials, I attempted to obtain interviews with officials from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. I contacted the Ghanaian, Egyptian, Thai, US and French embassies in London in addition to the Ghana Immigration Service, Thai Immigration Bureau and Thai departments of Consular Affairs, European Affairs (Western European Division) and UK Affairs. I also tried to find contact information for both the US and French immigration and border sections responsible for their international operations. All the embassies and government sections I contacted either declined to provide information or did not respond. As a result, the study relies on Home Office officials’ description of foreign authorities’ motivation to cooperate and their actions related to the UK’s overseas initiatives. This however was not an issue as most interviewees (13) had significant experience working directly and regularly with relevant foreign authorities and were thus able to provide sufficient insight into their dealings with them. This included Home Office officials’ assessments of foreign authorities’ willingness to cooperate with them. In fact, the Home Office officials’ role working with foreign state actors to design and implement the UK’s overseas interventions put them in an especially good place to remark on if and how they influenced the Home Office’s decisions.

An extensive online search provided the email addresses for the British embassies, high commissions and consulates; several British ambassadors and heads of missions; the Carriers Liaison Section and Clandestine Entrant Civil Penalty Team; the foreign embassies in London; the Ghana Immigration Service; as well as the Thai Immigration Bureau and the Thai departments of Consular Affairs, European Affairs (Western European Division), UK Affairs. The majority of personal email addresses were acquired by contacting these offices and from other
interviewees. Additionally, one University of Sussex colleague arranged an interview with a former senior Home Office official. I also relied on my connections working as a consultant at a migration think-tank in New York, the Centre for Migration Studies, in 2014 to access US immigration and border officials. These contacts however did not know of any officials with insight on the US’s cooperation with the UK on migration. Finally, I utilised personal contacts at the University of Sussex and Mahidol University in Thailand to obtain email addresses for a former Thai ambassador, a senior Thai immigration officer and a former Ghanaian immigration officer. None of the officials replied to my emails. According to my contacts in Thailand, the Thai government and its immigration officers are notoriously hard to gain access to. I suspect the immigration authorities from the other cases are similarly secretive and reluctant to talk as immigration policy and their cooperation with foreign states are politicised and contentious topics.

3.5.3 Freedom of information requests
Freedom of information (FOI) requests are the final source of data for the study. I used this method to help mitigate the challenges I encountered in accessing information via the other two data collection methods. Under the UK’s Freedom of Information Act 2000, individuals (regardless of nationality and location) have a general right to access recorded information held by public authorities. I utilised this technique to verify and gather new information, supplementing my document analysis and interviews. The primary purpose for making FOI requests was to ascertain (or confirm) specific facts, such as the location of the UK’s liaison operations, the number of liaison personnel working abroad and the number of joint visa application centres the UK has. FOI requests are a good method for discovering these kinds of details which are often absent from official documents. Equally important, they are useful for obtaining on-the-record responses from UK agencies as the agencies are required by law to reply to requests. They must also justify their decision for withholding information, which is another source of data.

The study draws on original FOI requests made to the Home Office between July 2016 and October 2017 using the free, volunteer-run website Whatdotheyknow.com. The purpose of the website is to increase transparency by making it as easy as possible for individuals to request and obtain information from public-sector bodies in the UK. The website also publishes and achieves all requests and responses, creating a large repository of information. I made a total of 16 FOI requests for the purpose of the study (see list of freedom of information requests). In addition to this, I submitted four requests for an internal review. These requests asked the Home Office to re-evaluate their decision and disclose additional information. I also made one complaint to the Information Commissioner’s Office when the Home Office was not providing a response to my request (ibid). The Home Office fully supplied the information requested in six instances, provided some information in five and refused to disclose any information in three. In another case, the Home Office did not collect the relevant information and in one case they failed to reply at all (as of June 2018). Out of the four internal reviews requested, one resulted in the Home Office disclosing extra information. The Home Office’s justifications for withholding

parts of or all of the information also provided useful data. In addition to the original FOIs, the study relied on five requests made by other people which were published on the Whatdotheyknow.com website (see list of freedom of information requests).

3.5.6 Challenges to data collection: the Home Office’s secrecy and gaps in public documents

The combination of data collection methods provided a substantial basis of material to investigate how and why the Home Office organises the UK’s visa system and liaison network. The three methods were also critical for dealing with gaps in data and the Home Office’s secrecy regarding their overseas activities. In this section, I discuss in detail some of the difficulties I encountered in gathering relevant information for my research. This is important because it illustrates limitations to the data and how I addressed them. It also highlights the importance of the comparative case study design used for the study.

The two main challenges, aside from accessing interviewees, were deficits in documentary material and the Home Office’s reluctance to disclose certain information through FOI requests. This was especially problematic for the UK’s overseas liaison network. For example, most public documents on the liaison network cover the objectives of the network as a whole and omit details on individual liaison operations (see e.g. Bolt 2016; Home Office and FCO 2010, 16; Toms and Thorpe 2012, 26). The Home Office also refused to provide basic information about the network’s operations, such as the number of liaison personnel working in each location and the states where they operate police referral programmes (Ostrand FOI 40413; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 40413; Ostrand FOI 45995; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 45995). They justified their refusal by arguing the information is “operationally sensitive” and could “prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the operation of immigration controls” (ibid.). The Home Office also refused to release information on the criteria they use to determine the states “whose nationals are more likely to present risk to the UK’s immigration control,” as well as the specific states they define as higher “risk” (Ostrand FOI 46078). They claimed that “giving specific insight into visa/border policy and operations” creates “significant risk that disclosure would enable individual immigration offenders to identify and target potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities in immigration controls” (ibid.).

In addition to refusing to disclose certain data, the Home Office’s response to FOI requests was often delayed, and, in some cases, they did not hold the necessary records (see e.g. Ostrand FOI 42684; Ostranad FOI 43399). In one example, I submitted a FOI request on the network’s capacity building in Thailand and did not receive an answer for nearly 10 months when they should have responded within 20 working days (Ostrand FOI 42825). Only after repeatedly following up on the FOI, requesting an internal review and submitting a complaint to the Information Commissioner’s Office did I receive a partial answer. According to their response the Home Office did not hold “centrally recorded records” on the trainings conducted by individual liaison operations prior to 2014. They also did not have records on what, if any, equipment or funds were given to Thailand for the purpose of strengthening their immigration and border management. This suggests poor record keeping and oversight by the central Home Office on the activities conducted by individual liaison operations abroad.
The Home Office’s delayed replies to FOI requests and refusal to release certain data indicate a reluctance by the department to share information on their overseas operations. A clear example of this was the Home Office’s unwillingness to release historical data on the number of liaison personnel working at each liaison operation in 2010 – nearly eight years before I requested the information (Ostrand Internal Review FOI 45995). The department’s secrecy was also evident in the difficulty I had in gaining access to the Home Office sections responsible for their overseas work, as well as Home Office officials in general. Several interviewees said many of their colleagues were unwilling to be interviewed because of their concern about negative publicity and criticism of the Home Office, especially by the media and human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Interview A 2016, Interview D 2016; Interview E 2016). This concern was likely exacerbated by the high level of public attention and scrutiny placed on the department relating to the June 2016 UK referendum decision to leave the EU, as well as the rise in unauthorised immigrants and asylum seekers entering Europe during the mid-2010s (ibid.).

The primary excuse used by the Home Office for withholding information was that releasing it could obstruct their immigration controls. In every case where the Home Office refused to disclose information for a FOI request, they argued that it would “prejudice” the “operation of immigration control” and/or “law enforcement.” This was even the case for my request of historical data on liaison personnel working abroad in 2010. When I challenged this particular decision with an internal review, the Home Office upheld its position. They argued that releasing the historical data “could enable potential offenders to circumvent [immigration] systems and procedures ... by building a picture with the information available and making assumptions on potential strengths or weaknesses at certain international posts” (Ostrand Internal Review FOI 45995, emphasis added). They further explained that this information could be used by “potential offenders” to “target locations where they believe they are more likely to evade detection” (ibid.). The Home Office called this a “mosaic” argument where they claimed the “disclosure of the information in question could be combined with other information to form a ‘mosaic’ of the process that the information relates to” (ibid.). Given that the information I sought was eight years old, I found the arguments against its release to be weak and excessively cautious. The Home Office’s refusal to disclose the data based on the view that it “could” be used to create “assumptions” about their current immigration controls illustrates how reluctant the department is to provide information concerning their overseas operations.

Interviews with Home Office officials were a critical tool for addressing deficits in documentary material and overcoming the central Home Office’s hesitancy to provide information. They provided vital data on individual liaison operations that was not in any documents, like the number of people working at several of the UK’s liaison operations. Once I obtained access to an interviewee, they were generally quite willing to disclose information. Still, several gaps remain, such as the number of officials working at each of the UK’s liaison operations and the criteria and methods the Home Office uses for making risk assessment. These limits in data made it difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture of the UK’s liaison network and its variations around the world. It also prevented me from gaining access to information on all the states the Home Office considers higher and lower “risk.” Given these conditions, the comparative case study design was especially important as I was able to gather enough detailed information from
interviews and documents on a select number of locations. This allowed me to analyse the UK’s visa system and liaison network despite gaps in data on the two systems. Here we see the research design and methods are well-suited to purpose of the study: to understand how, where and why the Home Office arranges extraterritorial interventions under specific circumstances.
Chapter 4
The visa system: regulating flows with legal-administrative measures

4.1 Introduction

Visa regimes are one of the primary extraterritorial mechanisms used by states to structure international movement globally (Mau et al. 2012, 5; Mau et al. 2015). By requiring, or waiving, visas and offering special programmes to ease entry prior to the border, governments endeavour to influence who has access to their territory from abroad. In the view of the UK government, pre-entry visas are “a main delivery agent for offshore migration control” (FCO 2008, 107) and essential to their efforts to regulate immigration and travel (see e.g. Cabinet Office 2007, 57; Brokenshire 2016; Toms and Thorpe 2012). Accordingly, the Home Office requires a large majority of the world population to apply for visas before travelling to the UK. Yet, the UK government also believes visas suppress the kinds of international flows they perceive as wanted and beneficial to the state’s economy, such as for tourism, business, trade and some labour (Interview A 2016; UKBA 2009; Home Office 2011). In this environment the Home Office opens small doors for some people by waiving visa obligations and providing facilitative services. The result is a collection of visa policies and practices that vary widely across national populations and individual profiles. How exactly does the Home Office organise this legal-administrative mechanism? What shapes their choices and how are they justified? In what ways do foreign states contribute to the process, and who are the people subjected to more and less control?

This chapter explores these questions by examining several key features of the UK’s visa system: immigration, visitor and transit visas; visa waivers; risk profiles; the Registered Traveller programme; special visa services; and data sharing arrangements with foreign states. This provides a holistic depiction of the state’s visa regime – one that extends beyond the presence or absence of visas alone. In doing so, the study contributes to the literature on visas which largely focuses on immigrant and visitor requirements and misses important initiatives like transit obligations, facilitative programmes and data sharing (see e.g. Bigo and Guild 2005; Hobolth 2012; Brabandt and Mau 2013; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). Analysing these additional features reveals more nuance in how states use legal-administrative measures to influence immigration and travel from abroad. This exposes greater levels of variation in pre-entry restrictions across national populations and individual profiles, highlighting discrepancies in peoples’ opportunities to move. It also enables a deeper understanding of why the Home Office makes the choices that they do.

Variations in immigrant, visitor and transit visas illustrate the way the Home Office applies differing levels of pre-entry requirements on a national level. The use of risk profiles to identify visa applicants for more or less scrutiny demonstrates this too occurs on an individual level. The UK’s special visa services and the Registered Traveller programme, on the other hand, show the Home Office creates extraterritorial programmes to target and promote some immigration and travel. This is significant as it expands the dominant depiction of extraterritorialisation as a method primarily used to restrict flows. The collection and interpretation of information is also
important, and shapes how the Home Office organises visas and facilitative programmes. By sharing ideas, databases and information, other countries contribute to this process. This shows the Home Office does not develop and implement the UK’s visa system in isolation. How then do we explain the system and its variations across national populations and individual profiles?

Previous research on visitor visas has illustrated a “global mobility divide” (Mau et al. 2015), where a small group of nationals from rich countries in Europe, the Americas and the Asia Pacific enjoy relatively easy access to move while a larger group of people face greater levels of restrictions and control (Brabandt and Mau 2013; Hobolth 2012; Mau et al. 2012; Neumayer 2006). Or, as Eric Neumayer put it, there is considerable “inequality in access to foreign spaces” (Neumayer 2006, 81). The richer a country is, the more likely its nationals are to be granted entry into another state (Mau et al. 2012, 72-73; Neumayer 2006). Typically, visa policies are regarded in the literature as a trade-off between states interests in preventing unwanted immigration and their desire to compete in a global market economy by allowing international trade, tourism and business (Vezzoli and Flahaux 2016; Neumayer 2006). They are designed to be selective, to differentiate and sort between the kinds of immigrants and travellers governments conceptualise as wanted, primarily for economic reasons, and those they define as unwanted (Mau et al. 2012). This chapter supports and builds on these findings. First, it shows the Home Office not only uses immigrant and visitor visas to achieve these goals, but also uses transit visas, risk profiles, facilitative services and data sharing. The purpose of these additional initiatives is to improve the Home Office’s ability to regulate immigration and travel from abroad. Second, the chapter analyses how the Home Office actually reaches their decisions. This illustrates the way the department and its officials’ interpretative agency matters. I find the Home Office interprets and implements the government’s goals by making judgements about levels of “immigration risk” and balancing this against their understanding of the potential for economic gains.

Still, objectives related to facilitation and restriction are not the whole story. International relationships and foreign state actors too are important. While several studies recognise the way political ties influence a country’s visa regime (e.g. Mau et al. 2012; Neumayer 2006), they rarely consider how the agency of foreign state actors do. Here the chapter further advances knowledge by broadening our understanding of the drivers shaping a country’s visa policies and practices. It shows foreign officials influence the Home Office’s choices by pressuring the UK and by sharing ideas, migration-related information and resources. We see the Home Office not only considers the political consequences of their visa policies on the UK’s relationships, but also learns and benefits from working with other state actors. The level of willingness by foreign officials to cooperate with the UK thus has bearing on the country’s actions. It shapes how the Home Office organises and implements the visa system.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a global level analysis of the UK’s visa system. By examining visa requirements, risk profiles and facilitative programmes, it demonstrates how the Home Office organises the system to be highly selective. The Home Office uses these initiatives to encourage the kinds of immigration and travel the government views as likely to contribute to the economy while restricting it for all others who do not fit that image. The result is a visa system that predominantly benefits wealthier individuals, especially those
from the North, and restricts the movement of potential asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy individuals from the South. It shows much of the variation in the UK’s visa system is based on the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk” and economic potential. The section also describes how the visa system is connected to the UK’s political relationships and foreign state actors by analysing data and resource sharing arrangements.

The following section examines the UK’s visa system in relation to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The countries all vary in the level of visa controls required by the UK for their national populations, ranging from highly restrictive to very liberal. Nationals from the five countries also have differing degrees of access to the UK’s facilitative programmes. The variations enable a detailed examination of the reasons the Home Office organises the visa system in specific ways across different types of countries. It further illustrates how the Home Office balances perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic objectives and political relationships when designing visa policy.

The subsequent section focuses on the agency of foreign state actors. It evaluates the way these actors inform the Home Office’s choices by lobbying for policies that align with their national interests and by sharing ideas, information and resources with the Home Office. In this section we see foreign authorities influence the Home Office’s actions by agreeing, or not, to exchange knowledge and data with the UK. This illustrates how the motivation of foreign state actors shape the methods used by the Home Office and informs who the department targets for more control. The section also shows the UK’s legacies of cooperation and political relationships condition who the Home Office more often works with on visa-related practices.

4.2 A global level analysis of the UK’s visa system

4.2.1 Visas: discrepancies in control across nationality
At the national level the Home Office applies differing levels of pre-entry visa controls. Some nationals never need visas to enter or stay in the UK while others must always have them, even to transit through airports. The UK has four general categories of visa controls. The first and most liberal category is made up of nationals from the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland (as of 2018). This group, known as “free movement nationals,” have the right to enter and reside in the UK without prior authorisation, at least until the UK leaves the EU. The second category of people, called “non-visa nationals,” also have relatively privileged access to the country. Nationals from this group do not require visas to visit the UK, but must have one for immigration purposes (e.g. work or study), or if they plan to stay for longer than six months (Bolt 2015b). The “visa nationals” category, in contrast, must always have prior authorisation.

11 The EEA consists of EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Although Switzerland is not an EEA member, it is part of the single market and Swiss nationals enjoy the same free movement rights as EEA nationals (Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016).
12 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
13 “Non-visa nationals” are the nationals or citizens of all non-EEA states and territories which are not listed in appendix 2 to appendix V of the Immigration Rules.
to enter the UK regardless of their reason for entry.\textsuperscript{14} That is, the Home Office requires people from this group to apply for visitor visas in addition to immigration ones. The last and most restrictive category is the “transit visa nationals” group (Carriers Liaison Section 2015). Members of this group must also apply for visas to transit through UK airports, even when they do not plan to leave the airport or pass through border controls (ibid.).\textsuperscript{15}

Table 3 lists the states and territories whose nationals make up each category and the types of visas required. It highlights the varying degrees of visa controls across national populations, ranging from full liberalisation to highly restrictive requirements for transit nationals. Most of the countries and territories (86%) in the free movement and non-visa categories are high income states (62%) or upper middle income developing states (24%), according to the World Bank (2017). There are no low income developing countries in either group. In contrast, a majority of the 112 countries and territories (63%) in the most restrictive visitor and transit visa categories are lower middle income (35%) or low income (28%) developing states. No high income countries are in the transit group, and only six (6%) are in the visitor visa group: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Furthermore, as figure 1 illustrates, most countries in Africa and Asia are part of the two most restrictive categories. A majority of the countries in Europe and the Americas, on the other hand, are in the more liberal free movement and non-visa groupings.

There is also a connection between visa restrictiveness and levels of tourism and trade to the UK. Over three-fourths (78%) of the 50 countries with the largest tourism flows to the UK in 2014 are part of the free movement (52%) and non-visa (26%) categories (see appendix). Similarly, two-thirds of the UK’s 50 largest import countries in 2015 are in the two groups (ibid.). These trends reveal a visa system that largely favours movement by nationals from wealthy countries in the North, as well as countries that are notable sources of tourism and trade for the UK. Nationals from less wealthy states in the South, in comparison, generally face much higher levels of pre-entry visa restrictions and exclusion. This aligns with previous research showing people traveling from one rich state to another often have more open visa policies compared to those travelling from less wealthy countries (see e.g. Brabant and Mau 2013; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). Eric Neumayer, for instance, demonstrates a positive relationship between a country’s income per capita, bilateral trade and level of tourism and its probability of being included in a visa waiver scheme (2006). What these trends do not tell us is how a country reaches and justifies their decisions. Here the chapter goes beyond research on general trends in visas by investigating the process. This is important as visas significantly shape peoples’ opportunities to move, including their access to asylum, immigration, trade and tourism.

\textsuperscript{14} See appendix 2 to appendix V of the Immigration Rules.
\textsuperscript{15} Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) Order 2014 (as amended).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category (no. of states &amp; territories)</th>
<th>Visa requirement by type</th>
<th>States and territories whose nationals make up each category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free movement nationals (31)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-visa nationals (55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenade, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Kiribati, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor visa nationals (57)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain*, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait*, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, North Korea, Oman*, Peru, Philippines, Qatar*, Russia, Sao Tome e Principe, Saudi Arabia, Suriname, Taiwan*, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates*, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit visa nationals (55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon, China, Congo, Congo Dem. Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa*, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey*, Uganda, Vietnam*, Yemen, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The following people do not need a visa before they travel to the UK as a visitor: a) nationals or citizens of the People’s Republic of China who hold a passport issued by Taiwan that includes the number of the identification card; b) people who hold a service, temporary service or diplomatic passport issued by the Holy See; or c) nationals or citizens who hold a diplomatic or special passport issued by Bahrain, Indonesia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, South Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirates or Vietnam.
Figure 1. UK visa requirements by country (as of 2018)
According to Home Office officials, the department’s evaluation of “immigration risk” is a primary factor shaping the country’s visa system and accounts for much of the variation in visa restrictions across national populations (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017). “Immigration risk” essentially relates to the Home Office’s assumptions about the potential immigrants and travellers might attempt to enter and stay in the UK in breach of the state’s rules and procedures. Home Office officials claimed the department imposes more visa controls on the national populations they view as “higher risk” and vice versa (ibid.). This view is reflected in UK reports and statements. Numerous documents explain the Home Office’s decisions to introduce visitor and transit visas on evidence of, or concern about, a rise in the types of movement the government defines as unwanted, including asylum seekers (see e.g. Bourn 1995; Home Office 2002, 30; Home Office 2005, 27; NAO 2004; Home Office 2011). In 2002 and 2003, for example, the Home Office introduced visitor visas for Jamaicans and Zimbabweans to stem the number of asylum applications made in the UK (Home Office 2005, 25; NAO 2004). In another example, the 2011 Home Secretary Theresa May described transit visas as “a direct response to emerging security and immigration threats to the UK” (May 2011). More specifically, the Home Office justified the imposition of transit visas for Syrians in 2012 on an increase, and projected increase, in asylum claims and other so-called “immigration abuses” (Home Office 2011).

These examples illustrate how the Home Office applies more extraterritorial barriers based on their view of the potential that immigrants and travellers defined by the government as unwanted might try to enter and stay in the UK without authorisation. Or, as one Home Office report put it, “[p]eople from countries where we have concerns about possible immigration abuse need visas to enter the UK” (Home Office 2005, 25). Perceptions of “immigration risk,” however, are not all that matters. The Home Office also weighs their assessments of “risk” against other considerations, including economic ones. Several Home Office officials described a tension in visa policy stemming from the government’s dual interests in encouraging tourism, trade, study and some labour and restricting access by others who do not fit their image of desirable (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017). In the words of one official: “more liberalised visa policies are good for economic reasons but come at a higher risk of abuse” (Interview A 2016). To address this dilemma the Home Office balances their perceptions of “risk” against their views of the economic gains connected to international mobility (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017).

The Home Office’s 2007 to 2009 review of the visitor visa system provides an especially good illustration of this. It exposes the interplay between the government’s facilitation and control objectives, as well as the way foreign states inform this process. Under the review, the Home Office evaluated all non-EEA countries for the “overall level of harm” their nationals pose to the UK in terms of unauthorised immigration and “crime and security concerns” (Home Office 2009; Home Office and FCO 2010, 14). The department assessed specific criteria, including the security of the countries’ passport issuing processes; the level of perceived “risk” from the countries’

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16 Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 No. 771.
17 Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 No. 771.
nationals; and the frequency of so-called “immigration abuse,” which refers to people identified by the Home Office as breaking an immigration rule or procedure (Home Office 2007b, 9; Home Office and FCO 2010, 14; UKBA 2009). Notably, the Home Office also evaluated “the likely economic, cultural and political consequences” of introducing or waiving visitor visas (ibid.). This shows the Home Office considered economic and political conditions in addition to what they conceptualise as “risks.”

The Home Office initially decided 11 states which were previously exempt from visitor visas did not fulfil the criteria necessary to avoid this restriction: Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.\(^\text{18}\) Prior to making any changes the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) consulted the authorities from each state, and, in many cases, worked with them to improve their passport and border control systems (UKBA 2009; Home Office and FCO 2010, 14).\(^\text{19}\) Ultimately, the Home Office decided to impose visitor (and transit) visas on nationals from five of the countries: Bolivia, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland, as well as people from Venezuela who do not have a biometric passport (ibid.). This shows the UK’s engagement with other countries shaped their choices. The Home Office also decided to waive visitor visas for Taiwanese, as long as they have a passport with the identification number on it (ibid.). The Home Office justified their decision by claiming the waiver would encourage “legitimate travel” from Taiwan, which they said would benefit the economy by increasing airfare revenue and spending in the UK (ibid.). Here we see the government’s economic goals informed the Home Office’s decision to liberalise visa restrictions.

4.2.2 Risk profiles: individualised variations in pre-entry inspection

On an individualised level, the Home Office also applies various levels of visa controls. This is evident in the use of “risk profiles” during the visa decision-making process. According to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI), a risk profile is a document that identifies “the relative potential harm to the UK of a visa applicant/travelling passenger” (Vine 2014). These profiles are used by visa officers to identify and target so-called “higher risk” applications for more scrutiny (Bolt 2017, 6; Home Office 2007b, 8; Home Office 2015d, 15; UKvisas 2007, 15; Toms and Thorpe 2012, 26). The goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making process by allowing visa officers to quickly process “straightforward applications” while dedicating more time and energy on those they identify as “higher risk cases” (Home Office and FCO 2010, 4; UKvisas 2007, 15).

UK visa officers, for example, responded to an increase in unwanted asylum claims from the Middle East in 2013 and 14 by using risk profiles to prioritise certain types of visa applications for “more extensive verification checks” (Bolt 2015, 28-29). This primarily involved greater examination of visitor visa requests from Iraqis, Palestinians and Syrians (ibid.). The additional checks included an inspection of family members’ immigration histories, interviews with the applicant and extra scrutiny on their supporting documents, such as financial statements and

\(^{18}\) Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 4) Order 2009 No. 1233.

\(^{19}\) Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 4) Order 2009 No. 1233.
employment history (ibid.). These are relatively intrusive procedures and create additional obstacles for individuals to travel to the UK. This is particularly true when juxtaposed against people from the US and France. Nationals from these counties do not need to disclose such personal information, or even request permission in advance of their journey. The extra layer of pre-entry scrutiny further exposes the inequalities in people’s opportunities to move.

Once again, we see the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk” shape their decisions on the national populations and individual profiles they target for greater restrictions and exclusion. The varying levels of visa requirements and scrutiny generates small doors with easier access for some people while erecting considerable barriers for most of the global population. Nationals from rich countries in Europe, North America and the Asia Pacifica largely benefit from this arrangement while people from countries in Africa and Asia are often subjected to much greater degrees of pre-entry controls (see figure 1). This occurs at both a national and individual level. The Home Office even hopes advances in risk profiles, biometric information and international data exchange will allow them to “move away from using crude indicators of risk such as nationality” and focus more on individualised criteria (Home Office 2007b, 9; UKvisas 2007, 32). The department believes such individualised criteria will enhance visa decisions and security (ibid.).

The Home Office does not disclose how they define or assess levels of so-called “immigration risk.” Most documents describing “risk” use ambiguous terms like “immigration abuse,” “immigration threats” and “criminality” without specifying their meaning (see e.g. Bolt 2016; Home Office 2007b, 9; Vine 2014, 21). The Home Office has also refused to release information on how they determine the countries “whose nationals are most likely to present risk to the UK’s immigration control” (Ostrand FOI 46078). They even declined to identify the specific counties they define as “high risk” (ibid.). Instead, we are told the Home Office uses “data” and “statistical and intelligence-based evidence” to make their decisions (Brokenshire 2015; Ostrand FOI 46078). This, however, reveals nothing about the types of data used, where it comes from or the institutional assumptions involved in the process. Essentially, we are asked to accept their interpretations on faith. The Home Office does not even clearly identify what the “risk[s] to immigration controls” are (ibid.). The department justifies their secrecy by arguing that disclosure “would substantially prejudice the operation of [their] immigration controls and [their] ability to prevent and detect crime” (ibid.). A 2015 report similarly claims a “[d]etailed discussion on risk profiling is restricted for security reasons” (Home Office 2015d, 15). This secrecy is concerning as claims of “immigration risk” are so often used to rationalise increased visa restrictions and controls. The concluding chapter discusses and critiques the Home Office’s construction of “risk” and secrecy.

For now, we can infer some criteria Home Office officials likely consider when determining levels of “immigration risk” by drawing on interviews, a visa impact assessment and several ICIBI reports. The number of asylum applications made by a national population appear to be a key factor associated to officials’ assessments of “risk” (see e.g. Bolt 2015, 28; Home Office 2011; Home Office 2011b). This is reinforced by a trend in transit visas and asylum numbers. Nearly all 31 countries whose nationals submitted more than 100 asylum applications to the UK in 2015 require transit visas, with the sole exception being Ukraine. Other criteria include the number
of people identified (or presumed to be) using inaccurate documentation during the visa process (Vine 2011b, 25; Vine 2013, 11; Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016); the political, social and economic stability of the state (Bolt 2015, 5; Home Office 2011; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017); and the capacity of a state to regulate migration (ibid.). Still, this information provides an incomplete picture and does not clarify how Home Office officials evaluate criteria and draw conclusions. It is also important to remember that interpretations of “risk” are shaped by the UK’s immigration rules and procedures themselves. Assessments about the perceived potential certain types of people might violate the country’s visa requirements are, after all, informed by variations in the UK’s rules across national populations. Americans, for example, are much less likely to be viewed as presenting “risk” for breaking the UK’s pre-entry rules compared to Ghanaians and Egyptians as they are subject to far fewer restrictions.

4.2.3 Facilitative programmes: opening more small doors

In addition to opening small doors for some immigrants and travellers by liberalising visa controls, the Home Office offers several facilitative programmes. Two important programmes are the UK’s special visa services and the Registered Traveller scheme. The objective of both initiatives is to encourage particular kinds of travellers by making entry into the UK easier. Neither programme is applicable for EEA nationals who already have comparatively easy access to the country.

The Registered Traveller programme is a membership scheme that enables faster and more convenient passage through passport controls for certain non-EEA nationals. Eligible individuals must apply for membership in advance of their travel. If they are accepted, they gain access to e-passport gates and the EEA/UK queue (Home Office 2016d). As of January 2017, the service was available for people from 25 countries (see figure 2). A majority of the countries where the Registered Traveller programme is offered are relatively wealthy. Nearly all 25 countries (84%) are high income (52%) or upper middle income (32%), with the exception of four: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (World Bank 2017). Half of the countries are also among the UK’s top 50 import markets, and 11 are in the top 50 tourism markets (IPS 2015; ONS 2016). As illustrated in figure 2, most countries whose nationals are eligible for the programme are located in the Americas and Asia-Pacific. No nationals from Africa, the Middle East or South Asia have access, with the exception of Israel (figure 2).

The UK’s special visa services are another optional initiative intended to encourage some movement by reducing the burden of the visa application process for a fee. This includes accelerating the visa processing time and offering more convenient appointments. The study focuses on two services: the Super Priority and Priority services. The Super Priority service provides a decision on visa applications within 24 hours, while the Priority service offers a decision within one to two weeks. They are outlined in more detail in table 4. The Priority scheme is available in over 100 countries and costs an additional £100 to £450 (Home Office

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20 Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, United States and Uruguay. See Gov.uk website. “Registered Traveller.” Available at: https://www.faster-uk-entry.service.gov.uk/about#about. (Accessed 25 January 2017).
The Super Priority service is more exclusive in its availability. It costs £750 and is only offered in 12 countries (as of 2018): China, Colombia, India, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE and the US (Prime Minister’s Office 2014). The Super Priority service is, in effect, limited to affluent individuals and businesses from the 12 countries who have the extra resources to pay such a high fee, in addition to the standard visa costs. All but three of the states where the Super Priority service is available are part of the UK’s top 50 import markets and tourism markets (IPS 2015; ONS 2016). The exceptions are Columbia, Kazakhstan and the Philippines (ibid.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost £</th>
<th>Description of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Super Priority</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>This service enables individuals to receive a decision on their visa application within a 24-hour period after providing biometric information at the visa processing centre. It is available for all types of visitor visas as well as some work visa categories. It is not available for student or settlement visas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Between 150 - 450 depending on application type</td>
<td>This service allows an individual to have their visa application processed faster than the standard time. It moves the application to the front of the queue. The length of time varies across visa application centres and type of visa application. For Priority visitor, student and work visa applications, the Home Office strives to process the application within 3 to 7 working days rather than the approximately 15 working days it usually takes. This service is available for most types of visitor, immigrant and settlement visas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: VFS.Global websites for UK visa services in Ghana, Thailand and the US (last accessed 1 February 2017); Home Office Immigration and Nationality Charges 2016 (Home Office 2016c).

According to the Home Office, both the Registered Traveller programme and special visa services are designed to support the government’s economic agenda (Home Office 2015, 22; Home Office 2016b). The 2013 Immigration Minister, for example, said the Registered Traveller scheme “will be beneficial to high-value, regular travellers to the UK and have a positive impact on economic growth” (Harper 2013). In 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron similarly claimed the Super Priority visa service will persuade more business travellers, investors and tourists to visit Britain, to trade with Britain and to expand in Britain. This is good news for British business and tourism, helping us to build a more resilient economy and secure a brighter future for Britain (Prime Minister’s Office 2014).

Importantly, these initiatives target the types of movement the government considers desirable and likely to contribute financially to the state. This includes so-called “high-value travellers” like businesspeople, investors and wealthy tourists, as well as people from key tourism and trade markets for the UK (Home Office 2013; Home Office 2013b; Home Office 2015a, 22; Home Office 2016; Home Office 2016b). As with the UK’s visa requirements, the programmes largely benefit wealthier individuals from relatively affluent countries. No nationals from low income

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developing states have access to either programme, and few from lower middle income states do.

These programmes further illustrate how the Home Office uses extraterritorial initiatives to encourage select flows. Their purpose is to facilitate specific types of immigrants and travellers who the government sees as economically useful while also maintaining relatively high levels of control. The programmes, for instance, are less liberal than waiving pre-entry visa restrictions. Individuals using the special visa services must still apply for immigrant and visitor visas and members of the Registered Traveller programme are screened by the Home Office prior to their acceptance. In other words, they represent a compromise between liberalisation and control. The Home Office uses these programmes to crack open small doors without creating unrestricted access through an absence of pre-entry regulations. This shows the Home Office attempting to balance the government’s economic goals with their concerns over unwanted immigration by easing the entry process for small groups of relatively wealthy individuals.
Figure 2. UK visa requirements and availability of facilitative services by country (as of 2018)
4.2.4 Data and resource sharing: cooperating with foreign states
But what role do other states play in the UK’s visa system? How do foreign authorities shape the Home Office’s visa-related actions? Since at least the 1990s, the Home Office has cooperated with some countries to augment their resources and improve their ability to regulate immigration and travel prior to the state’s physical border (Home Office 1998, 15; Home Office and FCO 2007, 9; Home Office 2007b, 14; Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016). One example is the UK’s joint visa application centres. The Home Office has 80 joint centres where they share buildings and resources with Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland (as of January 2017) (Ostrand FOI 42565). The purpose of the shared centres is to allow the Home Office to dedicate fewer resources on collecting visa applications and biometric information, and thus spend more time identifying and preventing so-called “immigration abuses” (Tai FOI 40510; VFS.Global 2013).

Another important example is the exchange of migration-related information. EU and FCC officials regularly provide data and intelligence to Home Office officials on migration trends, forgeries and information on individuals and groups suspected of being involved in unauthorised migration (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). UK liaison officers, for instance, work closely with officials from the visa centres of other EU countries to verify information on visa decisions and refusals (Interview C 2016). This is then used to inform UK visa officers’ decisions on applications. Home Office officials similarly receive regular information from their FCC colleagues. This includes data on trends in “immigration abuses” and risk profiling (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). It also involves authorities from FCC countries sharing information on visa decisions and verifying the travel documents of their nationals (ibid.). The information shared by other countries contributes to the Home Office’s visa policies and practices (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). It also informs visa officers’ decisions on individual applications (ibid.).

UK visa officers also have access to several international databases when processing applications. All UK visa applications are checked against the EU Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) – a European-wide IT system for sharing law enforcement information. The travel documents of all applicants are likewise checked against INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database (Ostrand FOI 47192). Visa staff can also obtain criminal records from other EU member states when they believe it is appropriate for a specific application (ibid.). Furthermore, the fingerprints of visa applicants from the US and Jamaica are automatically checked against the US Department of Homeland Security’s biometric database (ibid.). The Home Office also has bilateral memorandums of understanding with the immigration and border agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US to obtain information on a case-by-case basis (Ostrand FOI 47192; Blacque FOI 42284). Additionally, visa officers may request to have travel documents verified by the issuing state authority (Ostrand FOI 47192). These verification checks are difficult to obtain from countries outside of the EU and FCC (Home Office 2015d, 15; Ostrand FOI 47192). This shows how the willingness of foreign authorities to exchange data with the Home Office shapes the information available to the department.

According to the Home Office and its officials, cooperation with other states is very important to the UK’s visa operations (Home Office 1998; Home Office 2007b; Home Office and FCO 2010;
Interview A 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). It supplements the Home Office’s resources and helps informs who they target for more restrictions and exclusion prior to the physical border (ibid.). Notably, there is considerable variation in who the department works with on visas. As the above examples demonstrate, this most often involves EU and FCC countries. The high frequency of cooperation among EU and FCC authorities indicates political relationships matter; they condition who the Home Office cooperates with. This interpretation is supported by Home Office officials who claimed the UK’s relationships with, and trust in, the authorities from EU and FCC countries influence the departments decisions (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). They also said institutional mechanisms and regular meetings associated to the EU and FCC foster higher levels of cooperation (ibid.). The FCC, for example, has a working group on data sharing which “meet[s] regularly to take forward work on progressing existing co-operation, and to identify areas in which co-operation on immigration exchanges could be enhanced or initiated.”

4.3 Comparing Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France

So far, the chapter has illustrated how the Home Office organises visa policies and practices to address the government’s dual interests in allowing and restricting certain types of flows. They do this by developing a targeted and differentiated visa system that varies widely across national populations and individual profiles. We have also seen the way some countries contribute to the process by sharing information and resources with the Home Office. This section turns to a comparison of the visa system across to Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. It analyses how and why the UK’s visa policies and facilitative programmes vary for the nationals from each state. The comparison allows for further exploration of the conditions shaping the Home Office’s choices. The section finds perceptions of “immigration risk,” economic potential and political relationships help explain many of the variations in the UK’s visa regime across the five states. It shows how these conditions interact, and how this shapes the Home Office’s choices.

Table 5 summarises the variations in the UK’s visa policies and facilitative programmes for the five countries. This illustrates the degree of restrictiveness for nationals from each country, with the French having the most liberal access and Ghanaians and Egyptians having the most restricted. The variations are discussed and analysed in the following sub-sections. Table 6 illustrates the total number of people applying for UK visas from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand and the US in 2010 and 2015. It also provides information on the number of visas granted and the refusal rates for each of the four countries. France is excluded from the table as its nationals require no visas to enter or stay in the UK (as of 2018). The information in the table gives us an indication of number of people requesting permission to enter the UK from the four countries. It also provides insight into the number of people the Home Office is granting permission to. The numbers for Ghana, Egypt and Thailand include both visitor and immigrant visa applications. The US numbers only include immigrant visas as Americans do not require visitor ones.

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Table 5. Visa-related measures for nationals from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand the US and France (as of 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Visa requirement by type</th>
<th>Expedited entry</th>
<th>Special visa services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>Visitor</td>
<td>Transit (airside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (1986)</td>
<td>Yes (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (since at least 1972)</td>
<td>Yes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (since at least 1972)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Number of visa applications, visas granted and refusal rates for nationals from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand and the US in 2010 and 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total applications 2010</th>
<th>Total applications 2015</th>
<th>Total visas granted 2010</th>
<th>Total visas granted 2015</th>
<th>Refusal rate 2010</th>
<th>Refusal rate 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>30,290</td>
<td>32,326</td>
<td>21,080</td>
<td>18,876</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41,171</td>
<td>47,123</td>
<td>36,184</td>
<td>38,225</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>56,883</td>
<td>71,368</td>
<td>52,164</td>
<td>68,837</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US**</td>
<td>41,442</td>
<td>38,308</td>
<td>38,495</td>
<td>36,622</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* France is excluded because the country’s nationals do not require any visas to enter or stay in the UK.

** The number of US visas does not reflect the total number of US nationals travelling to the UK. As US nationals do not need visitor visas to enter the UK, the numbers only reflect the number of people applying for immigration visas (e.g. work and study). The numbers for Ghana, Egypt and Thailand include both immigration and visitor visa applications.

4.3.1 Ghana

Nationals from Ghana are members of the UK’s most restrictive transit visa category. They must always request authorisation from the Home Office to transit through, visit or stay in the country prior to their journey. Ghanaians have required visitor visas to travel to the UK since 1986 and transit visas since October 1995. They are not eligible for the Registered Traveller programme (as of 2018). Additionally, nationals from Ghana only have access to one of the two special visas services covered by the study: the Priority visa service. In other words, the Home Office imposes high levels of visa restrictions on Ghanaians and provides little opportunity for access to optional facilitative programmes.

Ghana was among the earliest Commonwealth states to need visitor visas for its national population. The Home Office justified their decision in part by claiming that it would help reduce the growing congestion and delays at UK ports of entry for so-called “bona fide”

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25 Sri Lanka was the first Commonwealth state to require visitor visas for its nationals in 1985, followed by India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, and Bangladesh in 1986 (Joppke 1999, 130).
travellers. That is, the Home Office argued that increasing pre-entry controls on some people would allow for easier entry for the immigrants and travellers the government views as wanted, and thus “legitimate.” Here we see the Home Office using goals related to selective facilitation to rationalise their visa policy. Ghana’s Commonwealth membership helps explain the Home Office’s decision to wait until the mid-1980s before imposing visitor visas on the country. This period is much later than Thailand, which is not a former colony, and Egypt, which is but did not to join the Commonwealth. Since at least the 1970s, a large portion of the world population has required visitor visas to travel to the UK, especially people from African and Asian countries. All Commonwealth countries, however, were exempt from this restriction until 1985 (Joppke 1999, 130). This shows the UK’s political and historical relationships shaped their visa policy at the time. Debates in parliament also support this. Several parliamentarians argued against the new visas by saying they would negatively impact the UK’s already poor relationships with many Commonwealth countries in the South.

Today, Home Office officials justify restrictive visa requirements for Ghanaians on their assessments of “immigration risk” (Interview D 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview M 2017). They believe Ghana has a moderate to higher potential for unwanted and unauthorised immigration to the UK, and thus require more pre-entry scrutiny (Interview D 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). According to one official,

[t]he actual number to the UK for illegal entry by Ghanaians are pretty low. But that doesn’t mean people are not there irregularly, either by using deceit or fraud in the visa application process or overstaying a visa etc. (Interview I 2017).

This quote indicates suspicion within the Home Office regarding the intentions of Ghanaians applying for visas. This is further illustrated by the relatively high visa refusal rate for Ghanaians, which was nearly 42 percent in 2015 (see table 6). A high refusal rate means visa officers suspect a significant number of applicants might try to violate the UK’s immigration rules if they are allowed to travel to the UK (NAO 2004b). This could include requesting asylum, overstaying a visa or working without authorisation. Between at least 2010 and 2015, nationals from Ghana also submitted around 100 to 200 asylum applications annually to the UK (ONS 2019). As previously mentioned, a rate of asylum applications over 100 per year is almost always correlated to highly restrictive visa requirements.

Ghana’s low GDP and its comparatively small role as a source of trade, tourism and high-skilled labour for the UK also helps explain the Home Office’s visa policy toward the country. Ghana is

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27 Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry 1972, appendix: foreign countries whose nationals need visas for the United Kingdom. The 1972 list was the earliest record I could obtain on visitor visas. All non-Commonwealth nationals from Africa and Asia needed visitor visas except those from Algeria, Bahrain, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kuwait, the Maldives, Morocco, South Korea, South Africa (which left the Commonwealth between 1961 and 1994), Tunisia, Turkey and Qatar.
29 See also Impact Assessment HO0029 which claims “[v]isa refusals could be seen as beneficial to the UK as they prevent the high-risk type of people from travelling to the UK, and hence generate benefits from reducing illegal activity in the UK” (Home Office 2011b). This indicates visa refusals are based on Home Office officials’ assessments of an applicant’s “immigration risk.”
a lower middle income developing state with a GDP per capita of $1,500 in 2016 (World Bank 2017). The UK, in contrast, had a GDP per capita of $40,400 (ibid). The large discrepancy in wealth between the two countries contributes to Home Office officials’ perceptions of “risk” (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016). Essentially, they assume people from countries with relatively less wealth might try to stay in the UK if they are given the opportunity to enter, which the UK government does not want. Additionally, as Ghana is not a large source of tourism or trade for the UK there is little economic cost for requiring high levels of visa restrictions. Although Ghana is a relatively notable trading partner for the UK compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is the smallest out of all the case studies, and was not in the UK’s top fifty import or export markets in 2015 (ONS 2016). It was also not among the UK’s top fifty tourism markets between 2011 and 2014 (IPS 2015). These conditions help us make sense of the reasons the Home Office offers few facilitative programmes for Ghanaians. The Registered Traveller programme and Super Priority service are designed to target so-called “high net-worth individuals and businesses in key growth markets” (Home Office 2015, 22). It is unlikely that Ghana fits the Home Office’s image of this profile.

4.3.2 Egypt

Egyptians, like Ghanaians, face very high levels of pre-entry visa controls and have access to few facilitative services. They are also members of the UK’s transit visa category. As such, they must always request permission to enter and transit through the UK in advance of their departure. The Home Office has required Egyptians to have visitor visas since at least 1972, and transit visas since April 2012. Egyptians are not allowed to participate in the Registered Traveller programme, and only have access to one of the two visas services: the Priority service.

Home Office officials described Egypt as having a medium to higher level of “risk” for unauthorised immigration during the 2010s (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017). Between 2011 and 2015, Egyptians were also among the top 30 nationalities to submit asylum applications to the UK. Nationals from Egypt requested higher rates of asylum compared to Ghana, especially from 2012 onward (ONS 2019). In 2015, for example, Egyptians made 321 asylum applications compared to 172 by Ghanaians (ONS 2019). Still, the visa refusal rate for Egypt is lower than Ghana. In 2010 and 2015 it was at 12 and 19 percent respectively, while the refusal rate for Ghana was 30 and 42 percent (table 6). This indicates visa officers generally view applicants from Egypt as having lower potential for breaking the UK’s immigration rules and procedures compared to those from Ghana. This helps explain differences in the timing of transit visa requirements for each country. While Ghanaians have needed transit visas since 1995, Egyptians have only required them since 2012.

Egypt is a lower middle income developing state with a GDP per capita of $3,500 in 2016 (World Bank 2017). It is also a larger source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK compared to

30 For visitor visas see Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry 1972, appendix: foreign countries whose nationals need visas for the United Kingdom. For airside transit visas see Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 2) 2012.
Ghana (table 6; ONS 2016). This further explains the Home Office’s delayed imposition of transit visas for Egyptians, which occurred 17 years after Ghanaians. Compared to Thailand, the US and France, however, Egypt is a relatively small source of tourism and trade for the UK. Egypt was the UK’s fortieth largest export market in 2015; it was not in the top fifty import markets during that year (ONS 2016). Egypt was not part of the UK’s top fifty markets for tourism between 2011 and 2014 (IPS 2015). Overall, Egypt is viewed by Home Office officials as having some “risks” for unwanted immigration, particularly related to seeking asylum since the mid-2010s (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017). Officials also described the country as a relatively smaller source for wanted follows, such as wealthy tourists, traders and businesspeople, compared to richer countries in Europe and North America (ibid.).

The department’s decision to implement transit visas for Egyptians in 2012 provides an especially good view of the Home Office’s decision-making process. The policy change reflected a shift in the Home Office’s perception of “risk.” This subsequently altered how they sought to balance the government’s interests in allowing movement for economic reasons while excluding other unwanted flows. In 2011, a popular uprising in Egypt removed the long-time president, Hosni Mubarak, from power. From the perspective of the Home Office, “[t]he political and civil unrest” in Egypt stemming from the Arab Spring and change in power “led to increasing immigration and security risks to UK border security.”32 As such, the department decided to require transit visas to help the Home Office identify and reduce what they saw as “the volume of high-risk individuals” traveling to the UK (Home Office 2011).

In essence, the Home Office believed more Egyptians might try to stay in the UK by requesting asylum or overstaying a visa due to the instability in their country. A 2011 Home Office impact assessment largely justified the decision on the rise in asylum applications: “[s]tatistics for Egypt show that nearly double the figure for asylum claims in 2010 have been made to date in 2011” (Home Office 2011, 4). Despite the above statement, the actual increase was relatively small, only rising by 64 applications (ONS 2019).33 The impact assessment also said the liaison network reported that some Egyptians were being denied boarding by airlines because they were perceived as likely to “abuse” their transit by requesting asylum in the UK (Home Office 2011, 4). The Home Office additionally argued that the “economy and internal stability” in Egypt means “there is a high risk of further increases to [transit] abuse and the number of asylum applications from visa holders” (Home Office 2011, 4). Here we see the Home Office increased the level of pre-entry controls for Egyptians based on their assessment of a rise, and projected rise, in unwanted immigration, especially asylum seekers.

It is noteworthy that before the Home Office implemented the transit visa requirement, they weighed what they considered the benefits of increased controls against the potential negative economic costs. In particular, the Home Office conducted a “full economic assessment” of the consequences for requiring transit visas for Egyptians (Home Office 2011). The assessment predicted that the new requirement might cause some reduction in airfare revenue and the money spent by Egyptians in the UK. It concluded, however, that the negative economic impact

32 Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 No. 771.
33 The number of asylum applications made by Egypt nationals was 94 in 2010 and 154 in 2011 (ONS 2019).
would be relatively small and was outweighed by the advantages of increased control (ibid.). The Home Office followed the advice of the assessment and implemented the transit requirement. Still, the fact that the department spent time and resources to evaluate the economic consequences of a new visa restriction illustrates the importance they place on the issue when designing policy. 34 Once again, we see the Home Office weighing their interpretations of “risk” against their view of the economic benefits associated to fewer controls.

4.3.3 Thailand
Thai nationals are part of the UK’s visitor visa category. They must always apply for a visa to enter the country, but do not need one to transit through UK airports, as long as they do not pass through border controls (e.g. if they must leave the airport to change planes). The Home Office has required visitor visas for Thais since at least 1972. 35 Like Ghana and Egypt, nationals from Thailand are not eligible for the Registered Traveller programme. They do, however, have access to both the Super Priority and Priority visa services. 36 Overall, Thais have fewer visa requirements and more access to facilitative services than Ghanaians and Egyptians, but more controls and less access than US and French nationals.

According to Home Office officials, Thais pose relatively low potential for unauthorised immigration to the UK (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016; Interview U 2017). As one official put it, “Thais are not a big issue” and rarely try to enter and stay in the UK without permission (Interview A 2016). Still, Home Office officials expressed some concern related to specific types of unwanted movement. This included what they labelled the “human trafficking” of Thai females into the sex industry as well as people who might try to gain access to long-term stay in the UK by overstaying a visa or using inaccurate information during the application process (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). These officials nevertheless claimed the level of “immigration risk” for Thais is small (ibid). This view is reflected in the very low visa refusal rates for Thailand. In 2015, only six percent of Thai visa applications were refused (table 6). Thai nationals have also submitted a very small number of asylum applications to the UK in the last decade (ONS 2019). The number of applications made in 2014, for example, was 11 (ibid.).

Home Office officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk” for Thailand compared to Ghana and Egypt help us understand why the department requires fewer visa controls for Thais. At the same time, there is still a large economic gap between Thailand and the UK. Thailand had a GDP per capita of $6,000 in 2016 compared to the UK’s GDP per capita of $40,400 (World Bank 2017). According to Home Office officials, waiving visitor visas would allow too many people from Thailand to travel to the UK and stay without authorisation (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016). In other words, the Home Office imposes visitor visas on Thailand as a precautionary measure to pre-empt unwanted immigration by less wealthy individuals from the country. Here we see

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34 For another example see the impact assessment on introducing transit visas for Yemeni nationals (Home Office 2011b).
35 Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry 1972, appendix: foreign countries whose nationals need visas for the United Kingdom.
36 VFS.Global website “User pay services in Thailand.” Available at: https://www.vfsglobal.co.uk/Thailand/user_pay_services.html. (Accessed 1 December 2016).
visitor visas are not intended to reduce flows overall, but to help the department identify and exclude the type of people they conceptualise as “higher risk.” This is supported by Home Office officials who described the visa system in Thailand as a “trade-off” between the department’s interests in encouraging travel by Thais for economic reasons and preventing so-called “immigration abuses” (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016). They explained that the Home Office attempts to balance these goals by offering facilitative services while also requiring visitor and immigration visas (ibid.).

Thailand is an upper middle income developing country and a larger source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK than Ghana and Egypt (table 6). Between 2011 and 2014, Thailand was in the UK’s top 50 tourism markets, ranking in the lower 40s (IPS 2015). In 2014 Thais visitors spent over £100 million in the UK (British Embassy Bangkok 2015b). Thailand was also the UK’s twenty-sixth largest import market and thirty-fourth largest export market in 2015 (ONS 2016). These characteristics help explain the reasons the Home Office offers the Super Priority programme in Thailand when it is not available in Ghana or Egypt. One Home Office official even claimed the Super Priority service is offered in Thailand to promote travel by affluent Thais, especially for business, trade and tourism (Interview A 2016). The official further explained that this was part of their strategy to boost the UK’s economy (ibid.). Press releases describing the Super Priority and Priority visa services in Thailand similarly portray the two initiatives as supporting the government’s economic agenda (British Embassy Bangkok 2015; Home Office 2014). This illustrates how the UK uses facilitative services to encourage movement by some wealthy Thais while simultaneously excluding access for other individuals from the country who are relatively less wealthy.

4.3.4 The US
US nationals are part of the UK’s non-visa category, and only require visas for immigration purposes (e.g. work or study). They do not need any pre-entry authorisation to visit the UK, unless they plan to stay for longer than six months (Bolt 2015b). As with Thailand, both the Super Priority and Priority visa services are available in the US. Americans are also eligible for the Registered Traveller programme (Harper 2013). With the exception of France, nationals from the US have the fewest visa restrictions and greatest access to facilitative services out of the case studies.

According to Home Office officials, Americans have very low levels of “immigration risk” for unwanted and unauthorised movement to the UK (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T 2017). Americans are also a very important source of revenue for the UK’s economy. The US is a rich country with a GDP per capita of $57,600, which is higher than the UK’s (World Bank 2017). More importantly, the country is a major source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK. In 2014 it was the UK’s third largest tourism market in volume of travellers and largest in money spent (IPS 2015). American travellers spent £3 billion in the UK in 2014 alone, nearly £1.5 billion more than the UK’s second most profitable tourism market, Germany (VisitBritain 2015). The US is also a major source of trade for the UK. It was

37 VFS.Global website “User pay services in United States of America.” Available at: https://www.vfsglobal.co.uk/usa/user_pay_services.html. (Accessed 1 February 2017).
the country’s largest export market and third largest import market in 2015 (ONS 2016). Given these characteristics and Home Office officials’ assessment of Americans as “low risk,” it is hardly surprising that the Home Office requires few visa obligations and offers access to all facilitative services.

The Home Office justifies both the Registered Traveller and Super Priority programmes in the US as measures to attract more business and tourism from the country. A press release for the Super Priority visa service in New York said the Home Office picked this location “due to high demand from businesses and high value travellers” (Prime Minister’s Office 2014). As of January 2017, the Super Priority service was available in seven US cities: Boston, Chicago, Houston, Miami, New York, San Francisco and Washington, DC (BAL 2018). This is a higher number of cities than any other country. It further demonstrates the Home Office’s interest in easing travel for wealthy individuals and businesses from the US. The Home Office similarly justified the Registered Traveller programme as a means to “attract business to Britain,” an important goal of the government’s economic agenda (Harper 2013; Home Office 2014b). The US was one of the first countries to have access to the Registered Traveller service, together with Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. Notably, these countries all have very close political ties with the UK. They are either members the FCC and/or the G7, and regularly cooperate with the UK. The political ties help us understand why the five countries were selected. This is especially the case for Japan and New Zealand, which were picked over other counties with larger trade and tourism markets for the UK, such as India, Russia, Turkey and the UAE (IPS 2015; ONS 2016). This shows economic considerations alone are insufficient to account for the Home Office’s Registered Traveller programme. Rather, political relationships and interpretations of “risk” also matter.

4.3.5 France

French nationals are members of the UK’s free movement category. They are not subject to any visas, at least until the UK leaves the EU. In other words, the French have the right be admitted to the UK, subject only to a valid passport or identity card check (as of 2018).38 They are also entitled to remain in the UK as long as they are a “qualified person” – meaning they are a jobseeker, worker, self-employed person, self-sufficient person or student (ibid.). French nationals have had privileged rights related to their entry and stay since the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, the precursor to the EU.39 Initially these rights applied to entry, residence and employment for the purpose of economic activity only (Geddes 2008, 47). The rights were gradually expanded to include job seekers, students and the self-sufficient persons (HM Government 2014). As French nationals (and other EEA and Swiss nationals) already have liberal access to the UK, the country’s facilitative services are not applicable (as of 2018).

38 The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.
39 Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry 1972. Laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Office on 23 October 1972 under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, part V, paragraph 52. The EEC member states in 1973 were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.
France is an important case as it is the only one where the UK’s authority, prior to leaving the EU, is limited by EU law. The UK government and Home Office do not have the power to impose any pre-entry visa requirements on French nationals, as of 2018. They are also restricted in their ability to regulate their stay until after the UK departs the EU (HM Government 2014; Gower 2015, 11). Here we see UK’s decision to participate in a political and economic coalition with other European countries has substantially shaped the country’s visa policy and authority related to EEA nationals. It illustrates the most significant example where the UK’s visa system is influenced by the country’s political ties and the actions of foreign states. This is especially notable given the high volume of immigrants and travellers from the EEA. In 2016, for example, 87 percent of the people crossing into the UK were either British or other EEA nationals (ONS 2019b).

Despite the UK’s limited power to regulate immigration and travel by French nationals, their liberal access generally aligns with the government’s economic interests. France is a high income country with a GDP per capita of $36,900 in 2016 (World Bank 2017). It is also a very significant source of trade, immigration and tourism for the UK. In 2014 France was the UK’s largest visitor market in volume of people and third largest in money spent, with French travellers spending £1.4 billion in the UK (IPS 2015). France was also the UK’s third largest export market and fifth largest import market in 2015 (ONS 2016). Furthermore, French nationals make up a significant portion of the UK’s international students and work force (UKCISA 2016, table 8 and 9). As such, it is unlikely that the UK government and Home Office will decide to impose highly restrictive visa controls regulating their ability to visit, work and study in the UK after leaving the EU. It is, however, quite likely that the French, and other EEA nationals, will be subjected to more restrictive requirements than they are under the current system.

4.4 Foreign state actors: ideas, data and resources

The five cases illustrate the way the Home Office balances facilitative and restrictive objectives in addition to the UK’s political relationships. This section concentrates specifically on the agency of foreign state actors. It reveals how the behaviour of authorities from other countries also contribute to the UK’s visa regime. As we will see, foreign state actors’ interests and ideas condition the Home Office’s visa policies and practices. The section also demonstrates how some aspects of the UK’s visa system are developed with, and depend on, foreign state actors. This includes the Home Office’s access to international databases and information, as well as knowledge on new methods for sorting prospective immigrants and travellers from abroad. Foreign authorities’ motivation (or lack of) to collaborate with the Home Office thus shapes the department’s actions. They help account for the reasons the Home Office organises and implements the UK’s visa operations in particular ways.

Foreign authorities in some cases lobby the UK government to advance their interests related to the UK’s visa regime (Interview F 2016). These discussions largely happen behind closed doors, making it difficult to identify such instances (ibid.). Nevertheless, two joint press releases

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40 Between 2011 and 2014, France was consistently in the UK’s top three visitor markets for volume of travelers and money spent (IPS 2015).
by the UK and Thailand reveal negotiations between the two governments on visa policies. The negotiations focused on easing the application process for UK and Thai nationals. Both governments justified their collaboration on their shared interests in increasing bilateral trade, tourism and immigration between the countries (British Embassy Bangkok 2013; Kent 2013). The press releases illustrate how the UK and Thai governments attempted to achieve these goals by refining the visa process to better enable what they labelled “genuine” immigration and travel (British Embassy Bangkok 2013; Royal Thai Embassy London 2016). This shows Thai authorities conferred with the UK government to improve access to the country for their nationals.

For example, during a 2013 “strategic dialogue,” the UK and Thai foreign ministers agreed “to work together to look at enhancing the visa services between our two countries,” with the aim of encouraging “genuine tourists, business visitors, students and residents” (British Embassy Bangkok 2013). In this context, it is notable that the Home Office launched the Super Priority service in Thailand in 2015. As the service is only available in a few select countries, it is likely the UK’s agreement with Thailand to “enhanc[e] visa services” to encourage tourism and business contributed to the Home Office’s decision to select Thailand for the programme. During a second dialogue in 2016, the Thai and UK delegations further reviewed “UK visa procedures with a view to facilitating mobility and travel for tourists, students, skilled labour and residents” (Royal Thai Embassy London 2016). These examples demonstrate how discussions between the two counties informed the Home Office’s choices related to visa procedures for Thai nationals. It shows foreign state actors are not always passive recipients to the UK’s visa policies and practices. I did not find any instances where Ghanaian or Egyptian officials lobbied the UK government on visas. This of course does not preclude that possibility. The highly restrictive visa process for Ghanaians and Egyptians, however, suggests that their efforts (if any) did not have a significant impact on the Home Office’s behaviour.

Another example where foreign state actors’ persuasion helped shape the UK’s visa system is the transit visa exemption scheme. This scheme, first launched in 2003, allows some individuals who require a visa to transit through the UK to forgo the process if they meet several criteria (Carriers Liaison Section 2007).41 The most important criterion is the person must have a valid visa or permanent resident card from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US, Switzerland or an EEA country (Carriers Liaison Section 2015). Essentially, the Home Office agreed to waive the transit visa fee and application process for people who have permission to enter another EEA or FCC state. This means the individual has already been evaluated and approved by one of the other countries’ immigration authorities. According to a Home Office official, the department implemented the scheme due to pressure from the airline industry and foreign governments whose nationals were subjected to the transit requirement (Interview F 2016). Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s the governments and UK airlines lobbied the Home Office to create an exemption which would reduce the negative impact of transit visas on their populations and on airlines’ profits (Interview F 2016; Home Affairs Committee 2001c, appendix 12). They argued that transit passengers are unlikely to be a “risk” if they have a valid visa or residence card from

41 Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2003, article 2(4)).
another “highly developed” country in Europe, North America or the Asia Pacific (ibid.). The Home Office eventually conceded and implemented the scheme.

The transit exemption scheme is also important because it illustrates the way the UK’s trust in other countries conditions their actions. The Home Office’s confidence in the evaluation process of EU and FCC states contributed to their willingness to implement the programme (Interview F 2016). In the words of one Home Office official:

we have confidence in these countries’ vetting process, especially FCC states, and it would be unlikely for them to grant a visa to an individual who is an immigration or security risk ... if they grant them visas than the individual should be fine to transit the UK (ibid.).

Here we see the Home Office’s trust allowed them to delegate migration control responsibilities to other state actors, such as the vetting process for UK transit passengers. According to Home Office officials, the department’s confidence in EU and FCC countries stems from the UK’s close political ties and long history of cooperating with authorities from the countries on a range of areas, including security, defence, intelligence sharing, law enforcement and so on (Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016). This reveals the way relationships and legacies of collaboration matter.

Home Office officials likewise said their trust and shared policy goals explain the Home Office’s frequent cooperation with EU and FCC authorities on other visa-related areas (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview T 2017). A senior Home Office official justified the UK’s regular collaboration with FCC officials by saying “[t]he UK knew it had these other four countries to rely on for advice and support...this was a very important” (Interview E 2016). Other Home Office officials claimed their cooperation with EU and FCC authorities was mutually beneficial (Interview C 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2017). Documents describing bilateral arrangements between the UK and the US and France reinforce this interpretation (see e.g. Cazeneuve and May 2015; Cameron and Hollande 2016; UK and US Governments 2014). In one example, the explanatory memorandum for a 2013 UK-US agreement on sharing visa and immigration information said:

[e]ffective co-operation between organisations is essential to tackling abuse of our respective [immigration and visa] systems, and there are many benefits that can be realised by immigration organisations exchanging information on individuals with whom they both come in contact.42

This aligns with Randall Hansen’s argument that international cooperation only occurs when there are mutual gains to the parties involved (Hansen 2011). This helps us understand why foreign authorities from the US and France are motivated to cooperate with the UK.

Officials from the US and France regularly work with the Home Office on visas by sharing ideas, information and resources (Interview A 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2017). This rarely happens with state actors from Ghana, Egypt and Thailand (ibid.). The cooperation includes working together on visa-related areas like “new analytic approaches to

sifting out the threat;” “facilitating legitimate travel;” passenger profiling; using biometric information; and joint visa application centres (Home Office and FCO 2007, 8; Interview E 2016; Interview R 2017; Tai FOI 40510). It also involves the exchange of migration information and databases. In the view of Home Office officials, authorities from the US and France are “key partners” and their collaboration is “a very useful thing” (Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). It supports the Home Office’s visa operations and conditions their policy choices and practices.

For example, the transfer of ideas informs the methods used by the Home Office to regulate immigration and travel from abroad. The UK’s Registered Traveller programme demonstrates this. Based on the agendas of annual FCC plenaries between 2009 and 2015, immigration authorities from the five countries regularly discussed strategies for creating “trusted traveller” programmes – the generic name for the UK’s Registered Traveller scheme (Tai FOI 40510). A 2013 Home Office press release similarly said the UK and US have had “close cooperation” on their trusted traveller initiatives, which helps them address their “mutual interest[s]” in easing entry for so-called “low risk travellers” (Home Office 2015b). A senior Home Office official also said working with the US is particularly beneficial because of their advanced technology and methods for identifying and “sifting out the threat” (Interview E 2016). US authorities’ willingness to share these practices, according to the official, have aided the Home Office’s development of new techniques for processing visas and assessing “immigration risks” (ibid.).

Here we see the techniques used by the Home Office to manage immigration and travel from abroad are not developed by the department in isolation. They too are shaped by the practices and ideas of other state actors.

From the perspective of the Home Office, sharing information and databases with foreign authorities is especially important (Home Office 1998; Home Office 2007b; Interview A 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017; Home Office and FCO 2010). They believe it enhances the visa system by increasing their “knowledge of the threat,” which improves their capacity to respond (ibid.). In the words of one report:

sharing more immigration data ... internationally with overseas law enforcement and security ... greatly enhances our ability to deny entry to foreign criminals, immigration offenders and others who might cause harm to the UK. It will also streamline clearance for legitimate passengers coming for work, study or pleasure (Home Office and FCO 2007, 9).

A 2010 UK and US data sharing agreement illustrates one example where another state’s data shapes the Home Office’s behaviour. Following the 2010 agreement, Home Office officials are able to submit enquiries on biometric information to the US Department of Homeland Security. This has resulted in Home Office officials identifying visa applications with unfamiliar travel documents and “biographic discrepancies” (e.g. changes in name, nationality and date of birth) that they would not have known about otherwise (ibid.). The information subsequently informs Home Office officers’ visa decisions. Between June 2010 and 2012, for instance, Home Office

officials cancelled at least 110 visas due to the information they received from the US (ibid.). This demonstrates the way shared data can inform Home Office officials’ actions.

Foreign authorities’ motivation to cooperate with the UK is important. It defines whose databases and what information the Home Office has access to. According to a 2015 Home Office report, most countries outside the EU and FCC “would refuse direct access to their data” (Home Office 2015d, 16). EU and FCC authorities, in contrast, are generally more willing to share data with the Home Office because they see it as mutually beneficial to their shared policy goals (Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; UK and US Governments 2014; UK and French Governments 2018). This helps us understand why the Home Office has greater access to information and databases from the US and France compared to Ghana, Egypt and Thailand. More importantly, it shows foreign state actors’ willingness (or lack) influences the information available to the Home Office, which then shapes their policy choices and practices. Once again, we see authorities from other countries are not passive actors in relation to the UK’s visa system. Their agency matters and sets boundaries for possible UK action.

4.5 Conclusion

By examining the walls and small doors in the UK’s visa system, the chapter exposes the types of national populations and individual profiles the Home Office targets for more and less control. Equally important, it helps us see how the Home Office reaches and justifies their decisions. We have seen that the Home Office largely imposes more pre-entry visa restrictions and examinations on individuals from less wealthy countries in the South, especially those from Africa and Asia. They likewise target countries which they view as potential sources for asylum seekers. On the other hand, the Home Office creates relatively liberal access channels for some people by waiving visas and offering facilitative programmes. These small doors are more accessible for wealthier individuals, particularly those from rich countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific. This highly targeted and differentiated system is informed by the government’s dual interests in openness and closure. That is, the Home Office organises the visa system to enable easy movement for the kinds of immigrants and travellers who the government views as contributing to economy while stemming it for others who do not fit that image.

This supports previous research which shows governments use visa requirements and waivers to manage their often-conflicting objectives of encouraging wanted flows – i.e. tourism, trade and some labour – and restricting unwanted ones (e.g. Brabandt and Mau 2013; Mau et al. 2012; Neumayer 2006). Yet, the chapter also goes further by demonstrating the way the Home Office and its officials interpret and implement the UK government’s goals. They do this by making judgements about levels of “immigration risk” and economic benefits associated to fewer restrictions. This informs their choices on the national populations and individual profiles they subject to different levels of pre-entry controls. As the example of Egypt showed, these assessments change overtime and the Home Office’s visa restrictions are altered to reflect this. This is also evident in the continual updating of risk profiles by Home Office officials, which shape the types of visa applicants prioritised for extra scrutiny. Here we see the Home Office and its officials’ interpretative agency matters.
This however is not all that matters. The chapter has also demonstrated that the UK’s visa system is not developed and implemented in a vacuum. Instead, the UK’s international relationships and foreign state actors too inform how the Home Office organises visa-related interventions from abroad. The UK’s participation in the EU, for example, has constricted the state’s visa policies towards EEA nationals. We also saw foreign authorities lobby the UK government for more favourable procedures. Additionally, we saw foreign state actors, especially those from the EU and FCC, contribute to the UK’s visa system by sharing ideas, resources and data. This influences the Home Office’s actions. It shapes the methods they use to regulate immigration and travel and the types of people they target for extra scrutiny and control. The motivation of foreign state actors to collaborate with the Home Office is therefore important. It sets boundaries on whose data, resources and ideas the Home Office has access to. This shows foreign authorities are more than passive actors in the UK’s visa regime. By analysing the way these actors shape the UK’s visa system, the chapter advances research on visas which often neglects this dimension.

Overall, the findings of the chapter reveal the complexity and subjectivity involved in the UK’s visa policies and practices. The Home Office’s decisions are not simply a cost-benefit analysis using measurable conditions like GDP per capita, trade, tourism and asylum flows. Instead officials’ interpretations of “risk,” the UK’s international relationships and foreign state actors contribute to the process. The next chapter moves on to the UK’s liaison network. The network is an enforcement and intelligence mechanism designed to put into practice the UK’s visa policies and procedures. It does this by attempting to stem the movement of immigrants and travellers who do not have the necessary pre-entry authorisation prior to the UK’s physical border.
Chapter 5
The liaison network: extraterritorial enforcement and intelligence

5.1 Introduction

The liaison network is a key component of the Home Office’s extraterritorial management. It serves as the “overseas arm” for Immigration Enforcement – the Home Office agency responsible for identifying and removing people who have broken the state’s immigration rules and procedures (HM Government 2016; Interview A 2016; Interview O 2017). The purpose of the liaison network is to pre-empt the movement of unwanted immigrants and travellers who the government defines as unauthorised before they reach the UK’s physical border (Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). Or, as a job description put it, the purpose is “to identify, disrupt and prevent abuse of UK immigration controls” (HM Government 2016). Liaison officers attempt to do this by helping UK visa staff identify inaccurate information during the visa application process and by working with airlines and foreign authorities to interdict and prevent unwanted movement from abroad. The network also provides an important intelligence function. Liaison personnel collect, analyse and distribute information on migration trends to relevant Home Office agencies, including Immigration Enforcement, UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI), Border Force and the National Crime Agency (Bolt 2016b, 9; Toms and Thorpe 2012, 26; Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). The information is then used by the Home Office and its officials to prioritise the state’s immigration and border management (ibid.).

Similar to the visa system, the liaison network varies considerably across countries, national populations and individual profiles. For example, the liaison operation in France concentrates on stemming unwanted immigrants transiting through the country. The operation in Ghana, on the other hand, focuses on supporting UK visa officers, as well as building the capacity of Ghanaian agencies. Liaison personnel also have diverse relationships with foreign authorities, working closely with some state actors and not others. This raises questions about what happens in practice, how the network varies across particular countries and why this is the case. To date, no research has analysed a state’s overseas liaison network in a systematic and comparative way, especially related to these questions. This chapter addresses this deficit. It finds the organisation of, and variations in, the UK’s network is shaped by the government’s dual interests in facilitation and exclusion, as well as Home Office officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk,” the state’s political and historical ties and the behaviour of foreign state actors.

As previously discussed, much of the literature on extraterritorialisation centres on restrictive objectives and practices (see chapter 2). According to Liette Gilbert “[t]he underlying goal of externalization has been to expand the policing of borders and various control mechanisms whether they be deterrence, interception, detention, or removal into new buffer zones” (Gilbert 2016, 207-208). These studies portray states’ extraterritorial management as a method designed primarily to restrict and exclude unwanted flows. This is especially true for research on interventions operating in foreign countries. James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen, for example, describe such measures as “cooperative deterrence,” where wealthy countries enlist sending and transit states to conduct immigration control on their behalf (2014, 9). The concentration on restrictive rationales minimises the way extraterritorialisation is designed to be selective. It overlooks how these “relocated controls” are often aimed at filtering out the kinds of immigrants and travellers who governments conceptualise as unwanted while enabling increasingly easy access for those they consider wanted (Mau et al. 2012, 89). Or, in the words of Aristide Zolberg, they provide “small doors that allow for specific flows” (Zolberg 1989, 406).

By illustrating the way the UK’s liaison network is designed to open small access channels for some groups of people, this chapter shows this mechanism is not solely based on exclusionary goals. Rather, it too is informed by the government’s interests in encouraging entry for certain types of immigrants and travellers who they view as benefiting the economy. The Home Office attempts to balance these goals and their limited resources by focusing their attention on the countries, routes and individual profiles they perceive as having greater “immigration risk,” and thus “need” for intervention. The result is a liaison network that operates in a highly targeted and differentiated way around the world. Importantly, many of the decisions regarding the network are made by the liaison officers working abroad. Here we see the interpretive agency of UK immigration bureaucrats influence the state’s extraterritorial management – a dimension largely missing in the literature.

This, however, is not enough. Much of what the liaison network does abroad relies to some degree on foreign state actors. Their contribution is thus essential for understanding how, where and why the Home Office arranges this mechanism. Yet, many studies on extraterritorialisation overlook the way sending and transit states contribute to the design and implementation of a destination state’s overseas regime (see e.g. Boswell 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lavenex 2006; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Geiger 2016, 261). They tend to depict other counties and their officials as secondary actors. This chapter counters this representation by demonstrating how foreign state actors and the UK’s historical and political relationships significantly influence the liaison network. This shows extraterritorialisation is not simply a relocation of immigration and border controls to sending and transit countries as conventional narratives suggest (ibid.). Instead we see foreign state actors’ ideas, interests and levels of motivation to work with a destination state have consequential impact on what that country is able to accomplish abroad.

This highlights the power of foreign states, and supports analyses by Antje Ellermann (2008), Sarah Wolff (2016) and Lyubov Zhyznomirska (2016). As Zhyznomirska explains

> although the EU acts as the facilitator and promoter of norms ... the decision to pursue – or not – certain [immigration] policy directions is made and justified by the government of a given country (Zhyznomirska 2016, 134).

These decisions subsequently influenced the EU’s extraterritorial management (ibid.). I similarly found the activities of the liaison network in a given country are shaped by the local government and their immigration and law enforcement authorities’ level of willingness to work with the UK. This sets the boundaries for where the Home Office is able to operate and what it can do. I additionally show the level of motivation of foreign state actors is connected to the UK’s political
and historical ties. Equally important, this chapter demonstrates how foreign officials influence the liaison network by sharing their ideas, preferences and practices. It conditions the types of interventions the Home Office selects, providing them with new ideas and insight into what other countries want. This shows foreign state actors are more than passive recipients deciding to participate, or not, in the UK’s overseas management. In doing so, the study goes beyond Ellermann (2008), Wolff (2016) and Zhyznomirska’s (2016) research, adding needed analysis to the way foreign officials contribute to extraterritorialisation.

In the next section, this chapter provides an overview of the liaison network and its variations globally. It then evaluates why the network takes the shape that it does. I find the Home Office often focuses their extraterritorial interventions on specific countries and routes based on their interpretations “risk.” This approach is intended to address the government’s interests in restricting and allowing certain types of flows. The section also reveals how the liaison officers working abroad contribute to the decision-making process. It then moves on to consider the way foreign state actors influence the Home Office’s choices. Here we see a “risk-based” narrative alone neglects important conditions shaping the liaison network, such as the agency of foreign governments and their immigration and law enforcement authorities.

The second half of the chapter focuses on Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. The comparison is especially important because of the Home Office’s secrecy and lack of publicly available material related to the liaison network (see chapter 2). For example, the Home Office refuses to disclose where they have police referral programmes, how many liaison officers work in each country and what individual liaison operations do (Ostrand FOI 40413; Internal Review FOI 40413; Ostrand FOI 42049). By drawing on interviews with Home Office officials, the five cases enable a detailed analysis of the network and its variations across specific countries. It allows us to uncover how Home Office officials explain and justify the actions of the liaison network. Here we see liaison officials’ goals and understandings of “risk” are mediated by the motivation of foreign state actors. The section also shows foreign authorities’ motivation to work with the Home Office is conditioned by the UK’s political and historical ties. It then illustrates the way foreign officials further shape the activities performed by liaison personnel by sharing ideas, preferences and practices.

5.2 The UK’s liaison network

At the end of December 2015, the Home Office had 188 liaison officers working in 45 cities located in 36 foreign countries (figure 3). As figure 3 illustrates, 17 of the countries were in Asia, 11 in Europe, five in Africa and three in the Americas. They include rich states in the North, such as Denmark, France, Germany and the US, as well as wealthy Gulf states like Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. They also comprise relatively poorer counties in Sub-Sharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia, including Bangladesh, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria and Vietnam. Out of

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44 I count Hong Kong separately from China because this is how the Home Office lists it (see e.g. Montgomery 2013). In addition to the 188 overseas liaison officers, the Home Office had 13 officers working in the UK who coordinate and manage the network’s overseas operations (Interview F 2016; Ostrand FOI 40413).
the 36 countries with liaison operations in 2015, 15 were classified by the World Bank as high income (see appendix). The remaining 21 countries consisted of ten upper middle income, ten lower middle income and one low income (ibid.). These observations underscore the breadth of the UK’s liaison network and the range of places where liaison personnel work abroad. More important, however, are the variations in what individual liaison operations do. Home Office officials repeatedly emphasised this point. One official explained “no two countries are quite the same” (Interview T 2017), while another said “the harsh reality is, every country is different... [each liaison operation] has to be country specific” (Interview U 2017). Other officials similarly claimed the UK’s liaison network is “tailored” to the particular country and region (e.g. Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017).

In other words, instead of having a liaison network that functions uniformly around the world, the Home Office runs a group of highly individualised operations. Variations include the number of personnel, the priorities of each location, the activities conducted and the level of cooperation with foreign state actors. In some places, liaison personnel focus on what they call the “air agenda,” which refers to their efforts to prevent unauthorised immigrants from reaching the UK by plane (Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview Q 2017). This is a common priority among the locations in Europe (ibid.). It involves working at airports and cooperating with airlines to identify and interdict individuals who do not have the necessary documentation to transit through or enter the UK. Yet, even within Europe the activities of liaison personnel differ, according to officials (Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview Q 2017). Outside of Europe, liaison operations exhibit even more variations. Some operations, such as the one in Thailand, prioritise the prevention of what the Home Office labels “visa abuse” – namely the use of inaccurate documentation, the omission of information, visa overstaying and/or using visas to request asylum. Still, in other countries, liaison personnel focus more on capacity building, facilitating the return of unauthorised migrants or collecting intelligence on migration trends (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017).

There are also variations in the level and types of cooperation liaison personnel have with foreign state actors. In countries like Ghana and the UAE, UK officials regularly provide training and support to local immigration and law enforcement agencies. Liaison officers in Europe and North America, in contrast, generally cooperate with local authorities by sharing information and conducting joint investigations and enforcement operations. In Egypt, on the other hand, liaison personnel rarely interact with local officials at all (Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). One consistency across the liaison network is that UK officers almost always work with their EU and FCC counterparts located in the same country. For instance, UK liaison officers in Thailand collaborate daily with personnel from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway and the US (Interview C 2016). This includes sharing information on individuals, groups, trends and forgeries (ibid.). It also involves working together to provide training and support to local authorities and airlines (ibid.). Or, as one liaison officer put it: “we work very closely with European partners and FCC partners. Outside of Europe it is very rare that you see us do something just on our own” (Interview T 2017).

45 Inadequate documentation includes an expired passport or travel document; no visa or an expired visa (when required); a fraudulently obtained or mutilated travel document; a document that does not match the individual’s identity; and no documentation (Toms and Thorpe 2012, 25).
Another important feature of the liaison network is the presence (or absence) of police referral programmes. Police referral programmes are agreements between the Home Office and a foreign government which allow UK personnel to share intelligence with local law enforcement agencies on individuals suspected of participating in, or facilitating, unauthorised migration (Vine 2010). The local authorities are then expected to use the information to investigate, arrest and prosecute implicated individuals. From the Home Office’s perspective, these programmes are useful because they allow liaison officers to generate punitive action outside their jurisdiction against people who they suspect of trying to circumvent the UK’s immigration rules. One Home Office official highlighted this point:

[w]hat you have to understand is that if you found criminality, you want to bring it to the local authority [otherwise] nothing happens, there are no consequences and nothing to deter them from trying again (Interview O 2017).

While the government and the Home Office claim police referral programmes are important (e.g. Cabinet Office 2007, 53; UKBA 2010b; Home Office and FCO 2010, 18), they do not exist in every country (Ostrand FOI 42049). As of December 2015, the UK had police referral programmes in 15 non-EU states (ibid.). The Home Office has refused to identify which countries (Ostrand FOI 42049; Internal Review FOI 40413).46 Within the EU, the Home Office does not need police referral programmes as there is a mechanism that serves an equivalent purpose (Interview M 2017). This means there are 24 countries where the Home Office has a police referral agreement or equivalent and 12 that do not.

The variations in the liaison network pose questions about why the Home Office arranges this mechanism in the way they do, and what conditions their choices. That is, how do we understand the differences and inconsistencies in the network across countries? Why, for example, does the Home Office have liaison officers in the US and Denmark when they are not commonly thought of as sending or transit states? What explains the absence of police referral programmes in some countries? Why does the network vary across similarly situated states like Ghana and Egypt, which are both lower middle income, located in Africa, former British colonies and viewed as potential sources for unwanted immigrants? I found the government’s interests in allowing and excluding specific types of flows combined with a limited amount of resources help explain the network’s specific manifestation. These considerations are then interpreted and put into practice by Home Office officials in cooperation with foreign state actors.

46 Although the Home Office refused to disclose the places with police referral programmes, interviews and several reports identify a few locations: Abu Dhabi, UAE (Vine 2010, 22); Accra, Ghana (Home Office and FCO 2010, 16; Interview I 2017); Bangkok, Thailand (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017); Dhaka, Bangladesh (Vine 2013, 39); Islamabad, Pakistan (Vine 2010, 22); and New York, US (Vine 2011, 39). There is no police referral programme in Egypt as of 2017 (Interview L 2017).
Figure 3. UK liaison operations, December 2015
5.2.1 Prioritising “immigration risk”

The liaison network is an enforcement and intelligence mechanism aimed at pre-emptively stemming the types of immigrants and travellers who the government defines as unauthorised from reaching the UK. Its purpose is to help the Home Office implement immigration control prior to the physical border (Interview T 2017). Yet, the network is also shaped by the government’s interests in enabling relatively easy access for small flows of wanted movement, which they characterise as “legitimate.” A 2010 report illustrates this point:

[O]ur presence overseas is vital to ensure that we are in the right places, at the right time, to facilitate those who wish legitimately to travel or trade with the UK, and to intercept those who pose a threat to our national interests and security at the earliest point (Home Office and FCO 2010, 13).

Here we see the liaison network is about selective exclusion. It is designed to operate as a “semi-permeable filter” that allows for both openness and closure (Mau et al. 2012, 194). Or, as a 2002 report put it, the network helps “protect [the UK’s] borders and speed up procedures for genuine passengers” (Home Office 2002, 18). As we saw in chapter 4, the government is primarily interested in allowing access to a relatively small number of immigrants and travellers who they consider likely to contribute to the economy. At the same time, they aim to prohibit a much larger portion of the global population, especially those they perceive as more likely to seek asylum or who have relatively limited financial means.

To address the government’s restrictive and facilitative objectives while using limited resources, the Home Office organises the liaison network to operate in a highly targeted and differentiated way. They dedicate their resources, interventions and scrutiny on the countries, routes and types of people they interpret as having more potential for unwanted immigration. Likewise, they prioritise little or no attention on the areas and people they see as having low potential. From the government and Home Office’s perspective this targeted and “risk-based approach” (Cabinet Office 2007, 56) is a more efficient and effective means of immigration control “as resource is applied where most needed” (e.g. Cabinet Office 2007; UKBA 2009; Home Office and FCO 2010). Importantly, they also believe this approach lessens the “contact and burdens on the legitimate traveller or trader” and reduces congestion at ports of entry (Cabinet Office 2007, 28 and 56). The goal is to enable easy access for wanted flows (ibid.). This shows the Home Office arranges the liaison network to allow small entry channels for some types of immigrants and travellers through an absence of, or reduction in, pre-entry scrutiny and enforcement.

According to Home Office officials, the location and activities of the liaison network are largely informed by their assessments of where there is greater “immigration risk,” and thus “need” for intervention (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview L 2017; Interview Q 2017). For instance, one liaison manager said:

[w]e have to look at our work and footprints and where we need to be. Where do we need [visa] decision making posts abroad, where is the air risk, etc.? (Interview O 2017).

The manager further explained that his liaison officers are in the places where there are higher levels of “risk:” “[s]o, my guys will cover three or four countries, and they will be in the one that is more risk averse, and most important” (Interview O 2017). A second liaison official reinforced this interpretation:
[a]ll the key exit points toward the UK, we have got offices there. We operate where there is a need to operate ... We don’t operate in countries where we have no migration threat and there is no visa operation (Interview T 2017).

Another official similarly said the liaison network “is always dependent on what the threat is to the UK,” we do not “waste money” and “time” on the places with low potential for unauthorized immigration to the UK (Interview U 2017). These statements illustrate the way the Home Office attempts to apply their limited resources in an effective way by targeting particular countries and routes.

The organisation of the liaison network regularly alters to reflect the Home Office and its officials’ assessments (Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). As one official put it, “we move offices when we see the threat change” (Interview T 2017). In the two years between December 2015 and 2017, for example, the Home Office closed seven liaison operations – those in Amsterdam, Bahrain, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Moscow, Mumbai and New York (Ostrand FOI 46475). It also opened three new locations during the period: in Addis Ababa, Brussels and the Hague (ibid.). Importantly, many of the decisions on the liaison network are decided by mid-level managers and their officers working abroad. This shows the interpretive agency of the UK’s immigration officials matter. In other words, the network is not defined by a top-down process informed by government ministers and senior Home Office staff. Rather, as one officer explained, the activities carried out by a liaison operation are “pretty much decided by the [liaison manager] in the country because you know what your current threats are, what is the continuous problem you keep seeing” (Interview U 2017). The official further said “everything is evidence based; it is not just based on ‘oh let’s do this training today’” (ibid.). Another officer similarly claimed:

there are a lot of analyses done [by liaison personnel] on a fairly regular basis on the kind of, looking at the problems facing irregular migration flows from that country to the UK (Interview T 2017).

These analyses are then used to inform the network’s strategies in different countries and regions (Interview A 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017).

Here we see the Home Office and its officials’ assessments of “immigration risk” are critical for understanding where the liaison network is located and what it does in each location. So-called “immigration risk” is not a neutral category derived from objective evidence. It is defined and constructed by the state and its officials – a process informed by the “knowledge production” and data used by the Home Office (Broeders 2007). This is discussed in more detail in the conclusion chapter. For now, the key point is that liaison officers contribute significantly to the process. They use their position overseas and their collaboration with foreign state actors to gather information that is not accessible to Home Office personnel located in the UK. This includes information on the capabilities of foreign countries as well as data on trends and groups related to unwanted migration (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016). Not only does the data collected and analysed by liaison personnel condition the network, but it also informs the UK’s visa system, border controls and immigration enforcement within the country (Bolt 2016; Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2017). Liaison personnel, for example, create the risk profiles used by visa officers to help them decide which applications to subject to more extensive verification checks and scrutiny (Vine 2010; Vine 2014). They also provide general
assessments about regions, countries and trends, which are used by the Home Office when prioritising their immigration and border enforcement activities (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2017).

As previously discussed, the Home Office does not disclose how they define or evaluate “immigration risk.” Nevertheless, interviews and several documents offer insight into some of the conditions the Home Office and its officials consider when assessing levels of “risk” for the liaison network. This includes the number of individuals arriving from a specific country without the documentation necessary to transit, enter or stay in the UK (Home Affairs Committee 2006; UKBA 2010c; Interview U 2017); the frequency of fraudulent documents identified during the visa application process and/or travel to the UK (Vine 2011b, 25; Vine 2013, 11; Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016); the political and civil stability of the state (Home Office 2011; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017); and the perceived capacity of another state to effectively regulate migration through its territory (ibid.). Home Office officials also said large UK visa decision-making centres and international airports inform their assessments of “risk” as they create potential avenues for unwanted movement (Interview F; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017).

I found a relationship between the liaison network and the presence of major airports and UK visa centres. As of December 2015, the liaison network was located in 15 of the 25 cities with the largest international airports by volume of passengers (ACI 2016). The Home Office also had liaison operations in nearly all 20 locations where the UK had a major visa decision-making centres in 2015 (Clark FOI 39383; Ostrand FOI 40413). The sole exception was Havana, Cuba (ibid.). These trends support Home Office officials’ claims that airports and visa centres factor into the department’s decisions on where the network operates abroad. The Home Office does not disclose statistics on the number of individuals arriving without adequate documentation by nationality or departure point, nor do they provide statistics on trends related to fraudulent documents or other so-called “immigration abuses.” The case studies discussed in the second half of this chapter help address the gaps in statistics and information on the network. They allow for a more detailed examination of the way officials’ interpretations inform the network’s actions.

5.2.2 The role of foreign state actors

Despite the importance of the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “risk,” this alone is insufficient to explain the network and its variations across countries. Rather, the motivation of foreign state actors too is essential. It informs where the network is located and what it does in specific places. As one liaison official explained, “[y]ea, we have no legal powers overseas. So, you do what you do in that location as the guest of whoever is the leadership of that country” (Interview T 2017). For example, the Home Office does not have the authority to operate in another country’s jurisdiction without the permission of that government (Interview F 2016; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 40413). Foreign governments also have the power to refuse

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48 See also section 4.2 of the 2002 International Airport Transportation Association code of conduct for liaison officers (IATA/CAWG 2002), which the UK government abides by (Madder FOI 28330).
liaison officers’ access to international airports within their territories (Interview T 2017). In other words, the existence of the liaison network largely depends on the consent of others.

According to Home Office officials, foreign authorities’ willingness to cooperate with the UK on migration control is also a “critical” and “necessary” condition influencing the network (Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017). It sets boundaries for the types of activities liaison personnel are able to carry out abroad, and impacts liaison officers’ ability to stem unauthorised immigration in advance of the UK’s territorial border (ibid.). Foreign state actors’ level of motivation to work with the Home Office also informs the network’s strategy in a given country. Or, as one official explained: “[o]ur strategy varies depending on the country and the relationship in that country” (Interview T 2017). Another official similarly claimed the network’s approach is shaped by “what kind of relationship [local officials] give us back” (Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). For instance, are foreign authorities willing to participate in a police referral programme with the Home Office? And, if so, are the local officials motivated to act on the information provided by liaison officers by arresting and prosecuting those suspected of being involved in unauthorised migration? Are foreign state actors interested in participating in capacity training, joint operations and data sharing arrangements with the Home Office? These examples reveal how the behaviour of foreign officials condition the liaison network’s actions in different countries.

Significantly, foreign authorities are more than passive actors deciding to participate or not in the UK’s extraterritorial management. Instead we see their preferences and ideas influence the Home Office’s choices. One liaison official clearly illustrated this point:

[w]e work and build relationships in a country, but they also work with us ... In fact, I think it is a two-way street. You wouldn’t normally tell someone they are inefficient in certain ways when you are coming through and you are developing projects with the local law enforcement partners ... So, you know, you might get a shopping list of equipment and we say ‘actually we are not in position to fund that. But what we can do is provide the following which will give you the capability to do that without the equipment’ (Interview T 2017).

This quote highlights the way liaison officers’ decisions on the training and support they offer involves discussions and negotiations with local authorities. They do not simply tell other countries what to do. Rather, in countries where liaison officers have good relationships with local officials, they meet regularly to discuss what these officials want to improve their migration control and law enforcement (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017). This subsequently influences the Home Office’s choices on the extraterritorial initiatives they implement.

In some cases, local authorities seek out liaison officers to request specific types of training, resources and/or other capacity building (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017). This is common in Ghana and the UAE, and helps us understand the support provided by the liaison network. According to Home Office officials, the network is generally receptive of the requests and interests of foreign authorities (ibid.). In discussing requests made by local officials, one liaison officer said “[w]e are open to that” (Interview T 2017), while another said “[w]e will train anyone who needs it, to be honest” (Interview O 2017). This demonstrates
the agency of foreign state actors and the influence they have on the Home Office’s decisions. It shows the UK’s extraterritorial management is more complicated than simply shifting their immigration control objectives onto others.

5.3 The liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France

So far, we have seen perceptions of “immigration risk” and foreign state actors have bearing on the UK’s extraterritorial actions. Yet, how precisely do they matter? How do these conditions interact and translate into the particular shape the liaison network takes in different countries? The absence of publicly available information on individual liaison operations makes it difficult to evaluate this. The Home Office does not identify the number of liaison officers in each location, who liaison officers cooperate with or what activities they preform (Ostrand FOI 40413; Internal Review FOI 40413). They also do not disclose information about their assessments of “risk” (Ostrand FOI 46078). The examination of the liaison network across five countries allows us to circumvent the Home Office’s secrecy and gaps in data. By relying primarily on interviews with Home Office officials who have knowledge about the liaison network, we are able to gain insight into how and why the Home Office makes the choices they do. The selected cases of Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France vary in relation to the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk,” the UK’s political and historical ties and the motivation of foreign state actors. This permits analysis of the way these conditions relate to the liaison network.

Equally important, the comparison helps us to make sense of seeming inconsistencies in the liaison network. This includes, for example, the reasons the Home Office focuses extraterritorial attention on countries that are not typically considered major sending or transit states, such as Thailand and the US. They reveal how the Home Office reaches and rationalises their actions. In other words, the five-case comparison offers important insight on the department and its officials’ understandings of what generates “immigration risk” for the UK. It also illustrates the way foreign state actors and the UK’s political and historical ties influence the Home Office’s choices. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that the UK’s extraterritorial interventions are far more complex than conventional narratives suggest. The Home Office does not simply select countries with the highest volumes of unwanted immigrants travelling from or through their territory, nor do they merely export their immigration control objectives onto other countries. Instead, we see more nuance and subjectivity in liaison officials’ interpretations of “risk” and the role foreign state actors’ interests and behaviour have on the Home Office’s decisions.

Finally, few studies have compared a state’s extraterritorial interventions occurring in different countries, particularly ones as diverse as Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France. In fact, no studies to my knowledge have considered how and why liaison networks vary. Here the chapter advances knowledge by helping fill the gap in comparative analyses on states’ extraterritorial control. Table 7 summaries the UK’s liaison network in each of the five cases. The cases are then discussed and analysed in the following sub-sections. Table 7 lists the year each liaison operation was first opened, the number of officials posted to them and the types of activities conducted in each location. It shows that France has the largest operation, followed by Thailand and Ghana. Egypt and the US have the smallest operations, with the US closing in 2017. The table also shows
liaison officers in France place a high priority on supporting airlines while officials in Ghana and the US do not. We additionally see Egypt and Thailand have the lowest levels of cooperation with the UK. The cooperation in Ghana, Egypt and Thailand is largely confined to capacity training, receiving equipment and participating in police referral programmes. This contrasts the UK’s cooperation with the US and France, which also includes joint operations and the mutual exchange of data and advice.

Table 7. Characteristics of the liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, as of 2016 and 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location of liaison operation</td>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>New York City (closed in 2017)</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for UK visa operations</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
<td>Occasionally (low priority)</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
<td>Occasionally (low priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for airlines and airports</td>
<td>Occasionally (low priority)</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
<td>Rarely (very low priority)</td>
<td>Frequently (high priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity training for local officials</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of equipment or other resources</td>
<td>Yes (e.g. forgery &amp; IT equipment)</td>
<td>None known of</td>
<td>None known of</td>
<td>None known of</td>
<td>Yes (largely for juxtaposed border controls)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police referral programme</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EU equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal sharing of data, resources &amp; advice</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training, investigations and enforcement</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
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5.3.1 Ghana
The Home Office initially posted a liaison officer to Accra, Ghana between 1997 and 1998 (Home Affairs Committee 2001, annex 23). It was among the first countries to have a one. The Home Office’s decision was based on a 1995 Home Office and FCO review which advised the department to expand their pilot programme, then operating in New Delhi, India, to four additional locations: Accra, Ghana; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Dhaka, Bangladesh; and Nairobi, Kenya (ibid.). The countries were largely selected because they were considered problematic locations for unwanted immigration to the UK (ibid.). All five counties are also Commonwealth members with long historical and political ties to the UK. This suggests a link between the UK’s relationships and the Home Office’s initial selection of locations for the liaison network. As of 2016/17, the UK had four liaison personnel in Accra (Interview I 2017), although the number fluctuates regularly (Ostrand FOI 40413; Interview U 2017). From the perspective of Home Office officials, Ghana has a moderate to higher level of “immigration risk” for the UK (Interview D 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview M 2016). They described it as both a potential source and transit location for unauthorised immigration (ibid.). This perception and the large UK visa centre
in Accra are the primary reasons Home Office officials gave for the continued presence of liaison personnel in the country (ibid.).

The top priority in Ghana in 2016/17 was to stem so-called “visa abuse” – i.e. the use of fraudulent documents or other inaccurate information during the visa process (Interview I 2017; Interview M 2017). As one official explained, “[a] big, big chunk of our work here deals with corruption or miss-documentation or submission of forged documents” with visa applications (Interview I 2017). Liaison officers attempt to curtail these “abuses” by creating risk profiles, collecting and sharing information, providing advice on individual visa applications and training visa officers in detecting inaccurate documentation and other types of breaches to the UK’s rules and procedures (such as lying or omitting information) (Interview I 2017; Vine 2012, 18). Home Office officials explained the liaison network’s focus by claiming that the use of inaccurate information during the visa process is a major area of concern for Ghana and the region (Interview I 2017; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). The large visa-decision making centre in Accra contributes to this (ibid.). The centre not only processes visa applications from Ghana but also evaluates applications from Cameroon, Gambia, Senegal and Sierra Leone (Kingham FOI 32905; Ostrand FOI 44306; Vine 2012, 8). According to a Home Office official, these countries all have relatively high rates of “abuse” and thus warrant extra resources and attention (Interview I 2017).

The second priority for the liaison network in Ghana is to improve local authorities’ capabilities related to migration, law enforcement and border control (Interview I 2017). The Ghana operation is unique for being the only case where “developing local capacity” is a primary objective of the network. It is thus unsurprising that liaison personnel in Ghana also have relatively high levels of cooperation with local authorities compared to the other developing countries of Egypt and Thailand. For example, liaison personnel regularly work with members of the Ghanaian Immigration Service (GIS) and the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ghanaian Police Service (CID) – something that does not happen in Egypt or Thailand (Interview I 2017; Cabinet Office 2007, 54; FCO 2010; Home Office and FCO 2010; Vine 2012). Ghana also has a particularly active and successful police referral programme, according to Home Office officials and documents (e.g. Cabinet Office 2007: 40; Home Affairs Committee 2006, 51; Home Office and FCO 2010; UKvisas 2007; Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). In the view of one official, the referral programme “is effective in combating corruption, reducing fraud, improving the capacity and capability of local law enforcement authorities” (Interview L 2017).

The types of support provided by the liaison network in Ghana consist of training local officials, providing equipment and aiding in institutional development (Interview I 2017). Training is by far the most common, according to officials (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017; Interview S 2017). As one Home Office official put it, “there are plenty of examples of training being provided” (Interview S 2017). This includes instructing Ghanaian officers in interviewing skills, profiling techniques, intelligence use, investigative skills, Information Technology (IT) and identifying inaccurate documentation (GhanaWeb 2009; Interview I 2017; UKBA 2010, 20). The Home Office has also donated some small equipment, such as “forgery equipment to Ghana CID, like magnifiers, UV lights, etc.” (Interview S 2017). Occasionally, the UK donates larger items, including IT equipment “worth over £10,000” to Ghana’s immigration agency (BHC Accra 2013).
The Home Office has additionally offered resources “such as vehicles or other equipment to organisations like NACOB [Ghana’s narcotics agency], promises of interviewing equipment to GIS, and possibly vehicles to Ghana CID” (Interview S 2017). Finally, liaison officers helped Ghana’s police and immigration agencies set up specialised units in human trafficking and immigration crime (Interview I 2017; Home Office and FCO 2010).

The high level of capacity building in Ghana is partially explained by the Home Office’s strategy of targeting countries they perceive as having more “risk” and “need.” For example, a 2010 press release justified the UK’s support of Ghana’s “fight against illegal migration” by saying it is “a phenomenon which has a direct impact on the UK” (FCO 2010). The Home Office’s assessment of “immigration risk,” however, does not fully explain the network’s actions. It does not account for the reasons there is greater support for Ghana compared to other countries which Home Office officials described as having similar or higher levels of “risk,” such as Egypt and Libya (Interview P 2017). Instead, Home Office officials explained the relatively high levels of cooperation and support on their good relationship with Ghanaian authorities (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview U 2017). This generates more opportunities to develop capacity building initiatives and other collaborative interventions designed to restrict unwanted flows (ibid.). Home Office officials also believed the UK’s political and historical legacies in Ghana contributed to liaison officers’ ability to form good working relationships with local immigration and law enforcement agencies (ibid.). In particular, they said the UK’s involvement in Ghana in the form of development aid, trade and security over the last several decades helped create the conditions necessary to develop such ties. In other words, the UK’s historical and political relationships help explain the high levels of cooperation occurring in the country.

According to Home Office officials, local Ghanaian authorities are quite interested in receiving support from the liaison network and regularly seek out their aid (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). This has resulted in liaison officers providing “tailor-made trainings” in areas like human-trafficking, document authenticity and investigative skills at the request of Ghanaian officials (Interview I 2017). This exposes the way Ghanaian state actors influence the network’s actions. Home Office officials also maintained that the police are cooperative and generally follow through on the information they receive from liaison officers via the police referral programme (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). That is, Ghanaian police usually pursue investigations and arrests of people suspected by liaison officers of being involved in, or facilitating, unauthorised migration toward Europe (see also Home Office and FCO 2010, 16). This illustrates the way Ghanaian officials’ behaviour creates space for the network to do more in the country. Or, in the words of one official: “it provides considerable scope to develop prevention and capacity building in Ghana” (Interview I 2017).

From the perspective of Home Office officials, the high level of motivation to cooperate is informed by Ghanaian authorities’ interests in gaining benefits from the UK (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). This includes new skills, equipment, development aid and better trade relations with the UK (ibid.). As one officer explained, if they cooperate then they are likely to get more assistance from us on building their capability, and aid and assistance on other fronts. Also, it improves the business
environment, improves the credibility ... and probably development aid and trade (Interview L 2017).

Another official similarly said many of the less wealthy countries in the South work with the UK because they are “interested in access to the British trade market and in learning from the UK’s expertise in immigration and border security” (Interview E 2016). This helps us understand why authorities from Ghana are often willing to cooperate with the liaison network in support of the UK’s immigration goals.

5.3.2 Egypt
The first liaison officer was posted to Cairo, Egypt in 2000 (Home Affairs Committee 2001, annex 23). The Home Office’s decision was informed by a 1998 review which advocated for the expansion of the liaison network to 20 new locations, including Cairo (ibid.). The locations, according to the Home Affairs Committee, “were selected primarily on the basis of the number of inadequately documented passengers arriving in the UK” (ibid.). In other words, the Home Office sought to pre-empt the arrival of unwanted immigrants by targeting the countries they viewed as key departure points. In 2012, the number of liaison personnel in Cairo rose to five (Interview P 2017). The increase is unsurprising as it happened directly after the 2011 popular uprising and the Home Office’s subsequent assessment that the “political and civil unrest” in the country created “increasing immigration and security risks to UK border” (Home Office 2011). This illustrates how the number of personnel fluctuate to reflect the department’s perceptions of “risk.”

Over the next several years, the Home Office reduced the number of liaison officers in Cairo. They lowered it to one to two people between 2013 and 2015 before increasing it to three at the end of 2016 (Interview P 2017). A Home Office official justified the decrease by saying “Egypt itself was sort of medium risk [during that period],” and it wasn’t until 2015 when unauthorised migration from the region was an issue for Europe, “mainly in Libya but [liaison personnel] could not go there so we had to work from Egypt” (Interview P 2017). This further demonstrates how the size of the liaison network varies based on the Home Office’s interpretations of “risk” and “need.” Equally important, it shows the UK does not have the power to operate wherever it wants. The Home Office viewed Libya as the larger threat, but officials could not go there so they worked from Egypt. Home Office officials also said the absence of a visa decision-making centre in Egypt from 2014 onward meant there was less need for a large number of liaison officers in the country (Interview P 2017). This helps us understand the reduction in personnel in Egypt during the middle of the decade and the reasons Egypt has fewer staff compared to Ghana and Thailand, two locations with large visa decision-making centres.

The top priority for the liaison network in Egypt in 2016/17 was preventing individuals without the necessary documentation from travelling to the UK by plane (Interview L 2017; Interview P 2017). Or, as one official put it: “the air agenda in Egypt is strong” (Interview I 2017). Compared to Ghana, liaison personnel in Egypt spend much more time at the airport where they check

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49 Explanatory memorandum to the Immigration (Passenger Transit Visa) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 No. 771.
50 The Home Office relocated the visa decision-making centre in Cairo to Abu Dhabi in 2014 (Kingham FOI 32905; Interview P 2017; Ostrand FOI 44306).
passengers’ documents, provide advice to airlines, train airline staff in identifying fraudulent documents and distribute information to airport personnel, such as data on common types of counterfeit documents (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). The international airport in Cairo was not among the 30 busiest airports for international travel in 2015 (ACI 2016). However, according to an official, it has “more flights” and “more threat” than the airport in Ghana (Interview L). This explains the why the “air agenda” is a larger priority for liaison officers in Egypt. The second priority of this liaison operation is gathering and analysing information on migration from the region (Interview L 2017; Interview P 2017). The information is then shared with other Home Office sections, as well as foreign officials from EU and FCC states (ibid.). UK liaison officers in Egypt, for example, are part of an “anti-fraud group” consisting of immigration officers from Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the US (Interview S 2017). This group consistently exchanges data and has monthly “anti-fraud briefings” on migration trends, in addition to other information they view as relevant to stemming unwanted flows (ibid.).

Liaison personnel in Cairo are also supposed to engage with, and provide support for, Egyptian authorities (Interview M 2017; Interview P). Yet, this almost never happens (ibid.). According to Home Office officials, there is no police referral programme and no training on migration control or enforcement (as of Feb. 2017) (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017; Interview P 2017). I also did not find any instances where the Home Office provided material resources or other support. Overall, there is “much less” cooperation and capacity development in Egypt compared to Ghana (Interview L 2017). In fact, I found liaison personnel in Cairo had by far the lowest levels of cooperation with local authorities out of all the cases. This is largely explained by Egyptian authorities’ unwillingness to work with liaison officers despite their efforts to do so (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017). According to one official, “[i]t was difficult to do that with Egyptians; they did not want to engage” (Interview P 2017). Another similarly said “[g]etting the political buy in was absolutely crucial and [in Egypt] that buy in was not there” (Interview I 2017). This stymied what liaison officers were able to do in the country.

The absence of a police referral programme is another example where foreign state actors’ lack of motivation shapes the network. A Home Office official explained the absence of this programme in Egypt by saying the “law enforcement authorities are not very cooperative” and largely “unwilling” to work with the UK on any enforcement-related issue (Interview L 2017). Other officials reinforced this interpretation. They described how some police agencies have “fantastic relationships” with the liaison network while others “are just not interested” (Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). According to the officials, poor working relationships with local police negatively impact liaison officers’ ability to prevent unauthorised immigration and hold those involved accountable (ibid.). One official explained that the uncooperative relations means fraudulent documents are not confiscated, no one investigates the incidents and individuals and groups are not held accountable (Interview O 2017). These conditions make it much easier for individuals to attempt unauthorised migration again as there

51 There is a limited amount of cooperation between the UK and Egypt on “programmes being developed to work with migrants, charities and livelihood programmes but at a very slow pace,” according to an interviewee (Interview L 2017). The UK also provides support to several Egyptian government committees who were drafting the anti-smuggling legislation (ibid.).
is no deterrence, according to the official (ibid.). Here we see the behaviour of foreign police influence the network’s ability to implement their immigration enforcement goals prior to the border.

As a result of Egyptians’ unwillingness to cooperate, liaison officers “had to get creative and look for other ways of working with various people, like having a better relationship with the airlines” (Interview I 2017). This illustrates how the relative motivation of Egyptian authorities informs the liaison network’s strategy in the country. It restricts their ability to develop capacity building and preventative initiatives. The network thus focuses more energy on working with airlines and collecting and exchanging information with other EU and FCC officials. This shows the Home Office’s perceptions of “immigration risk” alone are insufficient to explain the shape of the network in Egypt. While the Home Office views Egypt as having similar levels of “risk” compared to Ghana, there are essentially no collaborative actions with local state actors to restrict unwanted migration out of the country (Interview P 2017).

The lack of motivation by Egyptian authorities to work with the UK is likely conditioned by the more distant relationship between the UK and Egypt compared to Ghana. Following independence, Egypt did not join the Commonwealth and has received much less development aid and support from the UK. The UK has also had more confrontational relations with Egypt. This has included the UK’s military re-occupation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the UK government’s recent ban on flights to the major Egyptian holiday resort city, Sharm el-Sheikh, in 2015 (BBC 2019). This context helps us understand why Egyptian authorities are less willing to cooperate with the UK on migration compared to Ghana.

5.3.3 Thailand
The Home Office has had a liaison officer in Bangkok, Thailand since 1999 (Home Affairs Committee 2001, appendix B). Like Cairo, it was recommended by the 1998 Home Office review, which based its decision on the number of people arriving at the UK’s ports of entry without adequate documentation (Home Affairs Committee 2001, Annex 23). In 2016/17 the Home Office had five liaison officials located in the country, a typical number over the last several years (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). I found the larger number of personnel in Thailand compared to Ghana and Egypt surprising as Home Office officials depicted the state as having lower levels of “risk” (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016; Interview F 2016). Home Office officials explained the discrepancy on the major international airport and UK visa centre in Bangkok (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview U 2017). They believed both conditions created potential avenues for unauthorised immigration to the UK, especially by people transiting through the state (ibid.).

Similar to Ghana, the top priority for the liaison network in Thailand in 2016/17 was to prevent the use of fraudulent documents and other inaccurate information during the visa application process (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). According to one official, “[t]he majority of the work we do here is actually fraud-based against the visa system” (Interview U 2017). This priority is closely followed by the “air agenda” (Interview U 2017; table 7). These priorities make sense given the large airport and visa centre in the country. The international airport in Bangkok was the ninth busiest in terms of international passenger traffic in 2015 (ACI 2016). The focus on the
“air agenda” in Thailand corresponds to Home Office officials’ claims that liaison personnel generally spend more time working with airlines when the airport has high volumes of flights and international passenger flows (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview L 2017; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017). They said more travellers usually mean more potential for unauthorised movement (ibid.). Two officials additionally said the airport in Bangkok has “risk” because of the volume of inbound flights from so-called “problematic” countries in Africa and Asia and outbound flights to Europe (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016). The UK also has a large visa centre in Bangkok which processes applications from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam (Interview U 2017; Kingham FOI 32905; Ostrand FOI 44306). Home Office officials claimed the potential use of fraudulent documents during the visa process and air travel to the UK pose enough “risks” in Thailand to warrant extra attention (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview U 2017).

The liaison network in Thailand provides some capacity training and support for local authorities. This however occurs on an ad hoc and relatively infrequent basis (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). Between 2014 and 2016, liaison personnel only offered two trainings (Ostrand FOI 42825). In one instance, they instructed Thai immigration officials in identifying people using documents that do not match their identity (Interview A 2016; Ostrand FOI 42825). In the second instance, they trained law enforcement officials to recognise common forgeries in UK passports (Interview U 2017; Ostrand FOI 42825). The Home Office also has a police referral programme in Thailand. However, Home Office officials said the programme is not very successful and liaison personnel rarely share intelligence with Thai police (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). Overall, the liaison personnel in Thailand have much less engagement with local officials compared to Ghana, but more than Egypt.

One Home Office official explained the relatively low level of cooperation in Thailand on the limited “threat” and “need” relative to the UK:

So the difficulty we have here is everybody is providing it … everyone is throwing money at the Thais. So, it is really not worth the UK reinventing the wheel. To give them something that they are already getting is a waste of our time and money. And the other thing is, everything is always dependent on what the threat is to the UK. So, I am not going to spend time in Thailand talking about human trafficking from Burma to Thailand because there is no threat to the UK from that trafficking. We have no evidence of it coming directly from Thailand. Does that make sense? So [the network] is not going to waste money on what it perceives as not a UK priority (Interview U 2017).

The official further said that prioritising their energy on international air travel and “visa abuses” is a better use of their resources (ibid.). This illustrates the way the Home Office assess levels of “risk” and “need,” and priorities their resources accordingly. Equally important, the assessments are determined primarily by the liaison manager and the other liaison officers working in Thailand (Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017; Interview U 2017). These officials are given autonomy because they “know what the threats” and “problems” are in the given country (ibid.). This exposes the importance of mid- and street-level immigration officials.
Still, officers’ understandings of “risk” are not the whole story. The Home Office official also said the UK’s smaller level of influence in Thailand is a contributing factor to the lower level of cooperation in the country compared to Ghana:

> [t]he other thing in Thailand is we are not such a big player. We do not have so much influence in Thailand as we would in other countries [like] Ghana which is obviously a former Commonwealth country (Interview U 2017).

This shows the UK’s historical and political connections help account for the Home Office’s actions. It informs who liaison personnel most often work with and why.

According to Home Office officials, Thai authorities are less interested in cooperating with the liaison network compared to Ghanaians, but more so than Egyptians. Their relative level of motivation compared to the other cases further explains discrepancies in support and training occurring between the three countries. Thai authorities’ limited interest in working with the UK restricts the network’s choices. For example, as the Thai immigration agency “doesn’t really care who is leaving their country” the only type of training the network is able to provide is “on who is entering the country on UK documents” (Interview U 2017). Home Office officials also said “[liaison officers] never get fully fledged cooperation” from the immigration and law enforcement in Thailand (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016; Interview U 2017). This subsequently impacts their interventions (ibid.). One official explained the situation by saying it is very difficult to get anything done here in Thailand ... if we come across forgeries in the visa process, if we refer that information to the Thai police, um well nothing ever happens (Interview U 2017).

The liaison officer further described how the Thai police’s behaviour limits their ability to implement extraterritorial controls. While liaison officers can identify and “disrupt” unwanted movement they “cannot get anything solved in you know following the trail back to the crime groups involved” (ibid.). As such, the officer said there was little deterrence or accountability that would discourage future attempts (ibid.).

The relatively low level of motivation by Thai immigration and law enforcement agencies to pursue the UK’s immigration objectives conditions liaison officers’ actions in the country. Instead of working closely with local officials they spend more time providing visa support and cooperating with airlines. We also see Thai authorities’ interests shape the small amounts of training and support the Home Office is able to provide. This shows the Home Office is not the sole arbiter of what the network does abroad. It demonstrates that the UK’s extraterritorial management is more complicated than enlisting other countries’ cooperation in their immigration control.

5.3.4 The US

In the US, the Home Office first posted a liaison officer to the country in 2008 (Ostrand FOI 41828). As of 2011, there were around five officials in New York City (Vine 2011a). The number significantly decreased to between one and two people in the mid-2010s before closing in early 2017 (Interview F 2016; Interview R 2017; Interviews T 2017; Ostrand FOI 46475). While Home Office officials described the US as having very low potential for unwanted and unauthorised immigration to the UK, they said there are some “risks” associated to the visa decision-making centre in New York City (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T
This was due to the large volume of applications evaluated in New York and the inclusion of applications from countries throughout the Americas (ibid.). In 2011, for example, UK visa officers in New York evaluated applicants from 35 countries across the Caribbean and Central and South America, as well as the US (Vine 2011, 9 and 11). It is thus unsurprising that the top priority for the liaison network in the US was aiding UK visa officers in preventing “visa abuse” (Interview O 2017; Interview T 2017; Vine 2011). In fact, this appears to be one of the main reasons why the network was located in the country at all.

According to officials, the Home Office decided to close the US liaison operation because of changes to the visa centre (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T 2017). In 2016, the Home Office relocate where the “higher risk” visa applications from the Americas are evaluated from New York City to the UK (ibid.). Officials said the Home Office made this choice because they believed it would be a more efficient and effective use of their resources (ibid.). As one official explained,

[s]o the high risk [visa] groups being dealt with in the Americas are pretty much back in the UK. So, the decision was made that we can kind of manage more cost effectively by supporting the US operation from the UK (Interview T 2017).

As a result of this change, Home Office officials said there is no longer much need for liaison personnel to work in the US (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview R 2017; Interview T 2017). Instead, they claimed it is more cost effective to concentrate on the “higher risk” areas in the Caribbean and South America (ibid.). For example, one official said: “[t]here is no risk there [in the US]. The risk is in the Caribbean. We will run our liaison network from the Caribbean” (Interview O 2017). Another explained that the US operation is unnecessary because “[w]e have a team in Jamaica and we have got a team in Bogota dealing with the kind of more high-risk parts in that part of the world” (Interview T 2017). These statements demonstrate how the Home Office altered the network to reflect what they saw as a better use of their resources.

The Home Office’s “risk-based” approach is also exhibited in the limited amount of energy liaison personnel dedicated to the “air agenda” (Interview F 2016; Interview R 2017). While there is a high volume of air travel between the US and UK (IPS 2015; ACI 2016), Home Office officials are confident in the US’s border control and airport security (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017). In the words of one official: “there is no need to secure the border from the States” (Interview O 2017). This explains why the US operation spent the least amount of time working with airlines out of all the cases. In addition to preventing “visa abuse,” liaison officers in the US primarily worked with local authorities to “disrupt immigration crime” (Interview F 2016; Interview I 2017). This included joint investigations on individuals and groups involved in unauthorised migration (ibid.). It also involved the frequent exchange of information and intelligence with local police and immigration authorities (Interview F 2016; Interview I 2016; Vine 2011).

Overall, liaison personnel have very high levels of cooperation with US authorities (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview O 2017; Vine 2011). It is much higher than any collaboration occurring in Ghana, Egypt and Thailand. One official even claimed liaison officers’ cooperation

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52 From 2012 to at least 2014, UK visa staff in New York evaluated applications from Bermuda, Canada and all US states (Kingham FOI 32905).
with local US authorities is the most extensive out of all non-EU countries (Interview F 2016). In contrast to the capacity building and one-way transfer of knowledge occurring in countries like Ghana and Thailand, liaison officers’ cooperation with US authorities is largely reciprocal in nature. It involves the regular, two-way sharing of data and intelligence, mutual exchanges of expertise and the operation of joint investigations (Bolt 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview O 2017; Interview R 2017). According to one official, UK and US officers work together daily, “sharing information on passenger profiling; targeting and selection; verifying each other’s nationals’ documents, etc.” (Interview R 2017). Another Home Office official said the UK has an especially close relationship with the US on data sharing and learning new approaches for “sifting out the threat” (Interview E 2016).

Home Office officials explained the exceptionally high levels of cooperation with US officers on the two countries’ long history of working together and their belief that it is a mutually beneficial way to address “common threats to [their] shared democracies” (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016). For example, one official justified liaison officers’ regular collaboration with their FCC counterparts by saying

we are all accustomed to working with each other in all other formats: political, military, counter terrorism, law enforcement, not just immigration. Historic ties and longstanding MoUs are also a decisive factor (Interview C 2016).

A second Home Office official made a similar assessment. He said the UK and US’s “strong relationship” on immigration and border control stems from their trust in US authorities, which is based on their historical cooperation in areas related to security, defence and intelligence sharing (Interview E 2016). The official further believed that the collective action is beneficial for both countries (ibid.). This corroborates Randall Hansen’s claim that mutual gains are necessary for countries to work together on migration (2011). Yet, we also see, there is more to UK and US officials’ frequent cooperation related to the liaison network. It too is shaped by trust and historical legacies.

Notably, a Home Office official said one of the reasons the liaison network was in the US was because it facilitated more collaboration with US and Canadian immigration officials:

[i]n some ways, the reason for us to be there meant that we [UK officials] had good interaction with other colleagues [from the US and Canada] doing similar high-level work (Interview O 2017).

This allowed liaison officers to learn new techniques and gather more information on migration trends, according to the official (ibid.). Another official supported this, claiming that there is a “high level of learning” between UK and US immigration authorities (Interview E 2016). This learning conditions the Home Office’s actions. It informs how they attempt to manage immigration and travel from abroad. Here we see the UK’s liaison network is not just based on the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk.”

5.3.5 France

The Home Office initially posted liaison personnel to Paris, France in 2003 (Ostrand FOI 41828). By the beginning of 2017 there were seven liaison officers working in the country, a typical number over the last several years (Interview M 2017). The liaison operation in Paris is one of the UK’s largest globally (ibid.). In addition to the liaison network, the Home Office has border
officers working at juxtaposed controls in Calais, Coquelles, Dunkirk, Lille and Paris. There is also a Joint Operational Command Centre in Calais where UK and French border officials share information on the movement of goods and people between the two countries (Toms and Thorpe 2012, 48; Vine 2013a, 48). The large liaison operation and other extraterritorial programmes in France are primarily explained by the government and Home Office’s opinion that it is a key transit country for unauthorised immigration to the UK (Cabinet Office 2007, 40; Interview F 2016; Interview H 2017; Interview L 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview T 2017).

Out of all the cases, Home Office officials said France has the most “risk” related to unwanted transit migration by non-EEA nationals (Interview F 2016; Interview H 2017; Interview L 2017; Interview Q 2017; Interview T 2017). This consists of individuals arriving at the UK’s ports of entry without adequate documentation as well as people attempting to cross into the UK without detection (Vine 2013a). Between financial years 2011/12 to 2015/16 there was also a substantial rise in the number of unauthorised attempts identified by the Home Office of people trying to enter the UK through France (Ostrand FOI 43682). The number increased from around 5,000 to 20,000 during the period (ibid.).* This has further added to officials concerns. According to Home Office officials, the main “risks” associated to France stem from the country’s physical proximity and shared border, which connects the UK to continental Europe. Officials also said the absence of internal border controls for people travelling within the Schengen area and the large number of French airports with regular and cheap flights to the UK are significant contributing factors (Interview D 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview H 2017; Interview O 2017).

The top priority for the liaison network in France in 2016/17 was the “air agenda” (Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). France has around 30 airports with regular flights to the UK, including Charles de Gaulle – the fourth busiest international airport in 2015 (ACI 2016). In addition to the larger airports, the country has many small provincial ones. Home Office officials said the smaller airports also present “risks” for the UK (Interview D 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview Q 2017). They claimed French officials working at these airports often lack resources, skills or an interest in carrying out detailed document checks (ibid.). Because of the large number of airports with regular flights to the UK, liaison officers carry out risk assessments to determine which locations to focus on (Interview M 2017; Interview Q 2017). As on liaison official explained, “we regularly have to assess the risk; we analyse the risk and threat level and determine how we prioritise training the [airline] agents” (Interview M 2017). Once again, we see the Home Office’s strategy of targeting their resources and interventions based on their interpretations of where there is greater “risk” and “need.” We also see the liaison officers working in the country make these decisions.

According to Home Office officials, there is a tension between the department’s interests in comprehensive pre-departure scrutiny and the government and airlines’ interests in convenient travel for those they define as “legitimate” passengers (Interview D 2016; Interview Q 2017).

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53 Juxtaposed controls refer to reciprocal arrangements between the UK, France and Belgium which allow UK Border Force officers to conduct immigration checks on specific cross-Channel routes in Belgium and France before passengers board the train or ferry to travel to the UK (Home Affairs Committee 2016, 7).

54 These numbers represent attempts and do not reflect the number of individuals as a single person can make multiple attempts.
The rise in cheap flights across Europe has exacerbated this problem (ibid.). The airlines operating these flights usually have small budgets, few staff, minimal contact with passengers and want speedy boarding and quick turnaround times (ibid.). Consequently, they tend to be resistant to carrying out extensive document checks on passenger prior to their boarding (ibid.). One official explained the situation by saying “[s]peed is a big thing for airlines. They don’t want passengers delayed; flights delayed because that means money” (Interview Q 2017). The UK government also has an interest in convenient and cheap air travel as they believe it encourages more tourism, business travel and trade, which they see as supporting their economic agenda (ibid.). From the Home Office’s perspective, however, such travel makes it easier for people to reach the UK without the necessary documentation (Interview D 2016; Interview Q 2017; Interview U 2016). As one official explained, “you can imagine that you know for twenty quid on a cheap ticket on a European flight from Spain or France, that is where you are going to have problems” (Interview Q 2017).

One of the main strategies the liaison network uses to address this dilemma is to train and encourage airlines to use profiling techniques, a practice liaison personnel use as well (Interview Q 2017; Interview U 2017). One Home Office official justified their reasoning:

so, what we say to the airline rather than check everybody, if you can’t check everybody, then pick up the high-profile cases and concentrate on those three passengers. They might be alright but if you don’t, it is better to just concentrate on those three then perhaps do everybody in a superficial way. So, that does work well. And we’ll help them with that. We will give them the profiles to look for, and we do some of this ourselves (Interview Q 2017).

This example illustrates how the liaison network uses risk profiling to balance objectives related to facilitation, control and efficiency. In the view of the Home Office, more extensive examinations on a few passengers who they see as “higher risk” allows relatively easy travel without forgoing their ability to identify and exclude unwanted movement (Interview Q 2017; Interview U 2017). In other words, risk profiling at airports is a strategy used by the Home Office to balance the government’s economic interests in convenient travel and their desire to preemptively exclude people the they define as unwanted and unauthorised.

Similar to the US, liaison personnel in France have very high levels of cooperation with French authorities (Interview M 2017). This includes sharing information and resources as well as joint investigations and enforcement (Brokenshire 2015; Interview M 2017; Toms and Thorpe 2012, 27; Vine 2014, 21). Exchanging information with local immigration and law enforcement agencies is particularly common (Interview M 2017; other cites). In the words of one official, predominantly, where you have day to day sort of stuff, you are dealing with passing information and intelligence and communications [to French agencies], saying we identified this false document being used trying to travel to the UK, etc. (Interview M 2017).

Joint investigation and enforcement operations occur less frequently, but are not uncommon (Brokenshire 2015; Interview M 2017). As with the US, Home Office officials explained their frequent cooperation with France on their shared goals, trust and good relationships with local immigration and law enforcement agencies (Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). The Home Office’s relationships with, and trust in, French authorities is conditioned by
the close political ties between the countries and their legacies of cooperation in areas like security, defence and intelligence sharing (ibid.).

The UK and France’s participation in the EU is particularly important. According to Home Office officials, the regular meetings and institutional mechanisms associated to the EU facilitate higher levels of collaboration on migration (Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). The EU, for example, has an arrangement allowing liaison officers to exchange information with police from any EU country (Interview M 2017). There is also a regulation on cooperation between liaison officers from EU countries. The regulation encourages the frequent exchange of information and expertise, as well as participation in regular meetings and joint training courses. One Home Office official explained the discrepancy in UK liaison officials’ cooperation with French and Thai authorities on their confidence in European officials and the institutional arrangements associated to the EU:

obviously in Europe there is generally more cooperation because you don’t have the same risk sharing information with the EU [and] we have those legal obligations and agreements going (Interview U 2017).

This shows political relationships and trust matter. They condition who liaison officers more often collaborate with abroad. This subsequently shapes the Home Office’s extraterritorial actions.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how the Home Office organises the liaison network to address the government’s dual interests in allowing easy entry for small flows of people – primarily for economic reasons – while excluding large portions of the global population who they define as unwanted, including asylum seekers. The Home Office does this by focusing their resources and activities on the countries and routes they perceive as having higher levels of “immigration risk.” They believe this strategy offers an efficient and effective way of stemming unwanted immigration while using limited resources. Equally important, I found the absence of scrutiny and enforcement on certain locations and types of people is designed to reduce the “contact and burdens on the legitimate traveller and trader,” facilitating their movement (Cabinet Office 2007, 28 and 56). It opens small doors in the UK’s extraterritorial controls. The result of this targeted and “risk-based” approach is a liaison network that varies widely across different types of countries and populations.

These findings support Mau et al.’s analysis where “relocated controls” serve as “semi-permeable filters” that permit both openness and closure (Mau et al. 2012, 194). Yet, we have also seen that the government’s interests in openness and closure are only part of the story. Home Office officials’ interpretative agency, foreign state actors’ behaviour and the UK’s political and historical ties too are important. These conditions expose the complexity involved in the UK’s overseas management. They contrast conventional narratives where governments from rich countries in the North are portrayed as simply exporting their immigration control

outward and eliciting the aid of sending and transit states. Rather, the chapter illustrates the
day foreign state actors influence the Home Office’s decisions by sharing ideas, preferences and
practices with liaison officers. They are more than passive recipients in the UK’s extraterritorial
regime. Their level of motivation to cooperate is also important and often tied to the UK’s
historical and political relationships.

The chapter additionally reveals the important role played by the liaison officers working
abroad. They make many of the decisions on the priorities and activities carried out by individual
liaison operations. These decisions are informed by their interpretations of where there is
greater “risk” and “need,” as well as the behaviour of foreign officials. This exposes the way
lower level officials from the UK and other countries influence the design and implementation
of the UK’s liaison network. This adds an important contribution to the literature which largely
analyses formal policies and bi- and multilateral agreements made by government ministers and
senior officials. It helps us better understand how and why rich destination states regulate
immigration and travel in advance of their borders. This significant and often neglected
dimension is further examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
Negotiations, interior bureaucrats and extraterritorialisation

6.1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, destination states and regions have increasingly incorporated countries of sending and transit into their extraterritorial management (Betts 2011; Boswell 2003; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018). These cooperative practices include posting immigration officials to foreign jurisdictions, data-sharing arrangements with other countries and joint enforcement operations. They also consist of indirect methods where wealthier states in the North fund, train and equip immigration and law enforcement agencies in sending and transit states to carry out migration control on their behalf (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014). Many of the newer forms of extraterritorialisation rely on these delegated practices (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018, 365-366). The EU, for example, committed € 300 million to strengthen border controls in countries outside of Europe in response to a rise in irregular migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2015 (European Commission 2016). The US government has similarly provided funding, training and equipment to Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico to prevent migration flows from Latin America from reaching their southern boarder (Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018).

Given the growing prominence of cooperative practices, foreign governments and their officials are playing increasingly important roles in the immigration management of destination states and regions. Few studies, however, dedicate sufficient attention to the way these actors influence a destination state’s policies and practices. Research has also tended to overlook the way the immigration and law enforcement officers responsible for carrying out these interventions shape the process. This chapter addresses these gaps. It focuses on the power foreign governments and their local authorities have on the UK’s overseas actions. It also highlights the way mid-level Home Office officials significantly contribute to the design of the country’s extraterritorial regime. The purpose of the chapter is to further illustrate the complexity involved in extraterritorialisation, particularly when foreign countries are involved. It shows foreign states and mid- and street-level bureaucrats are more than ancillary actors carrying out the UK government’s dictates. Rather, they too help define how, where and why the state intervenes from abroad.

As chapter 2 illustrated, much of the research on extraterritorialisation describes the way destination states and regions are exporting their immigration management outward and enlisting the aid of sending and transit states (see e.g. Boswell 2003; FitzGerald and Ruhrmann 2016; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017; Legomsky 2006; Rodier 2006; Wolff 2016; Zhyznomirsk 2016; Zaiotti 2016). Largely these studies examine the formal policy level, political discourse and the bi- and multilateral agreements without evaluating what happens in practice (ibid.). In doing so, they overemphasise the importance of government ministers and senior officials, especially from wealthy countries in the North. This minimises agency of sending and transit state governments, as well as their immigrant and law enforcement agencies. It also
obscures the autonomy of lower level Home Office officials in determining the UK’s overseas practices.

Alexander Betts (2011), for example, depicts governments from rich states in the North as the dominant actors who are “are striving to find ways to exert direct and indirect extra-territorial control over migration from and among ‘sending’ states in the developing world” (Betts 2011, 29). Bill Frelick et al. similarly explain extraterritorialisation involving sending and transit states as the “systematic enlistment” of other countries in preventing migrants from reaching a destination state or region (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016, 192-193). In another example, Christina Boswell describes how European governments have sought to “engage sending and transit states in strengthening border controls” (Boswell 2003, 619). These narratives portray destination state governments as the policy-makers, with the governments and officials from sending and transit states as policy-takers. This chapter counters this representation by highlighting the negotiations and compromises that are often involved in extraterritorialisation. Building on the previous two chapters, it further exposes the importance of Home Office officials and the foreign governments and authorities they engage with.

In the following section, I discuss the reasons the Home Office cooperates with varying types of countries when it comes to the visa system and liaison network. This section shows how differences in the UK’s dependency on other countries helps explain why the Home Office is more selective in who they work with when it comes to the visa system. This primarily consists of EU and FCC authorities, contrasting the liaison network which also includes authorities from the South. Yet, as is often the case, the section also shows that we cannot understand the Home Office’s actions without analysing the behaviour of the foreign governments and immigration and law enforcement agencies involved. The subsequent section concentrates on the role of mid- and street-level immigration officials. It highlights the autonomy and decision-making power of the Home Office personnel working abroad, particularly the liaison managers who oversee each liaison operation. These Home Office officials, however, must also navigate their limited power abroad by forming relationships and negotiating with the government and local authorities in the given country. The next section concentrates on the reasons officials from different countries cooperate. It shows that although a sense of mutual gains from the collaboration is necessary, it is not all that matters. Rather, trust and familiarity also inform the degree of cooperation.

The chapter then discusses some of the difficulties the Home Office encounters when delegating immigration enforcement responsibilities to foreign state actors. As David Wunderlich (2013) notes, much of the literature on extraterritorialisation implicitly assumes powerful destination states in the North are able to successfully project their immigration objectives and practices outward. Yet, is this always the case? This section problematises this assumption. It shows non-cooperation by foreign governments and their officials often impede the Home Office’s ability to achieve their migration control objectives, even when agreements for cooperation are reached. This support’s Antje Ellermann’s analysis on deportation policies in Europe, which argues that a central reason for policy failure is “the refusal of many foreign governments to cooperate in the control efforts of advanced democracies” (2008, 169). This chapter, however, goes a step further by also illustrating other conditions that impact the UK’s goals. They include
a lack of institutional capacity to carry out the Home Office’s requests and differing laws and views on migration-related offences.

6.2 Dependency and motivation: explaining differences in cooperation between the visa system and liaison network

By its very nature, immigration control has to function in an international context. We subscribe to various sets of international rules which govern our actions and also benefit from international co-operation – in sharing intelligence, in mounting joint operations and in developing joint policies – which is essential if we are to tackle trafficking (Home Office 1998, 16)

As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, foreign states are an important yet underrated factor explaining a destination state’s overseas management. We have seen that the behaviour of sending and transit states significantly influence the UK’s extraterritorial policies and practices. It informs who the Home Office works with and what types of activities the department is able to perform. This is especially true for the liaison network as the mechanism is highly dependent on the cooperation of other countries. The Home Office, for example, relies on the consent of foreign governments to gain access to their territories and to international airports outside the UK. The immigration and law enforcement authorities in foreign countries likewise play a major role what the liaison network is able to do abroad. The cooperation of foreign governments and officials, on the other hand, is not a necessary condition for the visa system. The Home Office nevertheless views such collaboration as beneficial to their capacity and effectiveness. This section highlights discrepancies in the Home Office’s cooperation across the visa system and liaison network. It explains how differences in dependency and motivation help us make sense of who the Home Office works with in relation to each mechanism.

In chapter 4 we saw the Home Office’s ability to receive and share data with international partners is an important part of the UK’s visa system (Home Office 1998 Home Office 2007b; Interview A 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017; Home Office and FCO 2010). It supplements the department’s resources and helps inform the state’s visa policies and practices (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). It likewise influences visa officers’ decisions on individual applications (ibid.). The Home Office also learns new strategies for identifying and sorting through prospective immigrants and travellers by working with other countries. This has included “new analytic approaches to sifting out the threat,” strategies for using biometric information on visa applications and new techniques for facilitating wanted flows, such as the Registered Traveller scheme (see chapter 4). In other words, international cooperation contributes to how the Home Office operates their pre-entry visa regime and who they target for more restrictions and exclusion prior to the physical border (ibid.).

In particular, Home Office officials and documents emphasise the advantages of gaining access to information and databases from other countries (Interview A 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). In the words of a 2007 report:
[c]hecking the given identities of people seeking to come to the UK before they travel with data from international partners greatly enhances our ability to deny entry to foreign criminals, immigration offenders and others who might cause harm to the UK (Home Office and FCO 2007, 9).

Or, as a 2013 explanatory memorandum on UK-US cooperation put it, “[e]ffective co-operation between immigration organisations is essential to tackling abuse of our respective systems ... There are significant benefits derived from information exchange.” Despite these claimed benefits, the Home Office largely confines their cooperation on visa-related areas to wealthy democratic countries in the North, especially those in the EU and FCC. This contrasts the liaison network where the Home Office works with a much wider range of states. Not only do they cooperate with EU and FCC states, but they also work with countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Many of the non-EU and non-FCC countries liaison officers engage with are relatively less wealth and have more distant political relationships with the UK. They also include non-democratic governments, such as those in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Home Office’s level of dependency on other countries related to each mechanism helps account for these discrepancies. Yet, as we will see, the behaviour of foreign authorities too is necessary for explaining who the Home Office works with. While the Home Office considers collaboration with foreign countries to be beneficial to their visa operations, it is not an essential condition. This allows the Home Office to be more selective in who they chose to work with. This is especially the case with regards to sensitive areas, such as sharing databases and intelligence. According to Home Office officials, the department is often reluctant to provide this type of information to countries in the South (Interview L 2017; Interview U 2017). They do, however, solicit visa-related data from these countries. Here the level of willingness by foreign state actors to provide information to the Home Office has bearing on the UK’s visa system. For example, UK visa officers have the ability to request the issuing state authority to verify travel documents if they consider a visa application to be “high risk” (Ostrand FOI 47192). They are also encouraged to ask relevant law enforcement authorities for data on the criminal histories for visa applicants when UK visa officers think it is appropriate (Home Office 2015d, 15). This information is difficult to obtain from countries outside the EU and FCC, according to the Home Office (Home Office 2015d, 15-16; Ostrand FOI 47192). While some foreign authorities from the South may provide information on an ad hoc basis, most would refuse direct access to their data (Home Office 2015d, 16).

Authorities from EU and FCC countries, in contrast, tend to be much more willing to exchange information and databases as they generally see it as mutually beneficial to their shared policy goals (Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; UK and US Governments 2014; UK and French

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57 This includes Albania, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, UAE and Vietnam.
Governments 2018). The Home Office thus has much greater access to information from these states when evaluating visa applications and making decisions on visa policies. This includes information on migration trends, common forgeries, criminal records and other immigration and law enforcement data (Home Office 2015d, 15-16; Interview M 2017; Ostrand FOI 47192). One notable exception is the UK’s exclusion from the EU Visa Information System (VIS) – a database that contains information on individuals applying for visas to the Schengen area (European Scrutiny Committee 2017). As the UK decided to opt out of the Schengen free movement area, the EU has restricted their ability to participate in several Schengen-based mechanisms, including VIS. The above examples underscore how foreign authorities influence the Home Office’s visa operations. They condition the information and international databases the Home Office has at their disposal, which subsequently shapes the UK’s visa policies and practices.

Still, the liaison network is much more reliant on foreign states compared to the visa system. As a result, the Home Office must work with a wider range of countries. This also means foreign governments and their officials have greater power over the UK’s liaison network. In the words of a 2010 ICIBI report: “as [the liaison network] has no formal overseas jurisdiction, host governments are key partners” (Vine 2010). Or, as a Home Office official explained, “you do what you do in that location as the guest of whoever is the leadership of that country” (Interview T 2017). The power of other countries is most evident in the need for foreign governments to authorise liaison officers’ access to their territories and international airports. This is a necessary condition for the liaison network to function (Interview F 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). It also helps explain why the network is often located in countries with relatively good political relationships with the UK. For instance, 20 of the 36 countries with a liaison operation in 2015 were either part of the EU (9), FCC (1) or Commonwealth (10) (see appendix). Many of the other locations also have decent relations with the UK, including Bahrain, Hong Kong, Jordan, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The reliance on foreign governments to permit access to their territories likewise helps us make sense of the reason the Home Office does not have liaison officers in several countries which they identify as “higher risk,” such as Eritrea, Iran and Libya.

Beyond the initial consent necessary to operate in another jurisdiction, the inclination of foreign governments and senior officials to cooperate with the Home Office on migration significantly impacts the liaison network. It shapes the scope of what liaison officers are able do in the given country. As one official explained,

> getting the political buy in is absolutely crucial … If the political will is there at least you can make some inroads, maybe not as deep as you would like but you can make a start (Interview I 2017).

Another Home Office official reiterated this point: “absolutely, if the political will is there then the authorities are more willing and interested” (Interview L 2017). Here we see the behaviour

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of government ministers is an important first step. This helps explain discrepancies in the liaison network’s level of cooperation and capacity building across different countries. In Egypt, for example, “there is no a political buy in from the senior officials which reflects down to the authorities,” according to a Home Office official (Interview L 2017). The official further believed that “due to lack of political will the authorities just did not cooperate. Also [the government] uses all levers to pursue their own agenda” (ibid.).

This contrasts the situation in Ghana where there is more interest by government ministers and senior officials to work with the UK (Interview I 2017). According to Home Office officials, the “political will” by the Ghanaian government creates more opportunities for liaison officers to work with the immigration and police departments (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). Home Office officials also explained the relative indifference by Thai police to investigate cases involving unauthorised migration out of the country by saying, “it is just not high on the Thai government’s priority list” (Interviews A 2016; Interview B 2016). These examples illustrate how the interests and behaviour of government ministers and senior officials’ matter. Of course, the interests of foreign governments are not fixed and often alter with changes in power (Interview A 2016; Interview I 2017). This creates additional challenges to the liaison network’s overseas work (ibid.). It also emphasis the precarity of the network, which can shift with changes in leadership.

In addition to foreign ministers and senior officials, the interests of the local immigration and police authorities are also necessary for explaining the UK’s extraterritorial interventions. They shape the types of activities carried out by liaison officers and influence the effectiveness of the network. As liaison officers have no legal authority overseas, they rely on foreign officials to perform enforcement actions, such as physically obstructing an individual’s movement and penalising them for breaking the UK’s visa rules. For example, if a liaison officer identifies an individual attempting to travel to the UK with an inaccurate travel document, they have no power to apprehend them or charge them with an offense. They do not even have the authority to prevent the individual from boarding a plane. Instead they depend on airlines to obstruct the individuals travel and for the local police and prosecutors to arrest and charge them. In other words, the Home Office alone has limited power to stem unwanted immigration from abroad. The UK’s ability to develop the migration and law enforcement capacity in sending and transit states also depends on the motivation of the local police and immigration agencies.

The Home Office’s dependency and the power of foreign officials is particularly well illustrated by a Home Office official’s comments on the use of forged travel documents in Thailand. The official described how liaison officers aid airlines in identify fake documents and advise them to refer any instances to Thai immigration. Once this happens, it is up to the local authorities to decide how to respond: “[Thai immigration] take it from there. It is their country, they do their stuff, it is their laws” (Interview U 2017, emphasis added). Here we clearly see the Home Office’s reliance on the actions of others. The example also illustrates how the response of foreign officials will vary depending on the laws and the institutional and cultural perceptions of immigration offences and forged documents in the given country (Interview O 2017; Interview U 2016). This further demonstrates how the UK’s extraterritorial efforts are shaped by the context and officials in another country. Liaison officers’ ability to develop good relationships
with foreign authorities also impacts their ability to achieve the Home Office’s goals. As one official explained,

some countries have a fantastic relationship with [liaison officers] because the law enforcement does absolutely everything for them, and they want that kind of close engagement. Other countries like Thailand, um they don’t want that (Interview U 2017). Once again, we see foreign state actors are more than secondary participants in the UK’s exterritorial management. They have autonomy and agency, which conditions the Home Office actions.

6.3 Mid- and street-level bureaucrats

The immigration and law enforcement officials involved in carrying out the UK’s overseas interventions are particularly important actors who are often disregarded in research on extraterritorialisation. This section focuses on these officials, lessening the deficit. As we saw in chapter 5, the immigration liaison manager and their officers working in a given country make judgments about where there is greater “immigration risk” and “need” for action. The liaison manager then uses this information to develop strategies to address perceived areas of “risk.” Liaison personnel, however, must also operate within the specific context in that country. This context includes, in particular, the level of willingness by the foreign government and local authorities to cooperate. In other words, senior Home Office officials and government ministers do not simply decide what the liaison network does in another country. Instead, mid- and street-level Home Office officials, in collaboration with foreign state actors, have considerable autonomy in determining where and what the UK does from abroad. This highlights the subjectivity and complexity involved in the UK’s extraterritorialisation. The Home Office’s decisions are not based on objective assessments of “risks,” but are interpreted and negotiated by the actors working on the ground.

According to a Home Office official, a significant part of the liaison network’s role in Ghana “is to see how we can make improvements to their systems” (Interview I 2017). This shows the Home Office does not have an established set of extraterritorial interventions which they intend to implement in Ghana. Rather, the UK’s actions are flexible and depend on liaison officials’ ability to form relationships with the local authorities and to develop initiatives that reflect the needs and circumstances in Ghana (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). Here we see the liaison officers in Ghana have a relatively high degree of autonomy. They make decisions about how to carry out the UK’s extraterritorial actions, a process that is informed by the interests and motivation of Ghanaian officials. This is similarly the case in other locations. As a Home Office official explained, one of the primary roles of liaison officers is to “liaise” with foreign officials, to create opportunities to work with the local immigration and law enforcement agencies on migration control (Interview A 2016). This is a two-way process, involving negotiations and compromises between the liaison officers working abroad and the relevant foreign state actors.

For example, when liaison officers in Thailand identified a rise in counterfeit UK passports being used at the airport in Bangkok, they attempted to develop a strategy to help address this issue. In particular, they sought to
increase the awareness of the documents being used, and effectively make them targeted so the people who want to use them, do not use them anymore because they know that every time they use [forged] UK documents they are going to get jumped (Interview U 2017).

The liaison officers, however, were not successful in gaining the aid of Thai police in arresting individuals attempting to use these documents to travel out of Thailand (ibid.). They consequently had to look for other avenues, such as training Thai immigration on identifying people entering the country with the counterfeit passports. A Home Office official explained this decision by saying, “that is all we can do … [Thai officials] only care about who is coming in” (Interview U 2017). However, when the Thai police encountered a factory making counterfeit passports, they decided they wanted more information on these types of documents, which liaison officers provided (Interview A 2016). This illustrates the way the actions of the liaison network are shaped by the officials working abroad, as well as the goals of the local immigration and law enforcement authorities.

Some foreign officials also seek out the liaison network to request specific types of training or support. This occurs regularly in Ghana and has led to liaison personnel providing customised trainings in “human-trafficking,” profiling techniques, investigative skills and document authenticity for the police and immigration agencies at the request of Ghanaian officials (Interview I 2017; Interview T 2017). This counters conventional narratives where destination states simply pressure other countries to carry out their immigration agendas (see e.g. Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Zaiotti 2016, 10). Instead, we see Ghanaians play an active role in the UK’s extraterritorial interventions and use the Home Office to advance their own objectives. This is less common in Thailand, according to a Home Office official:

[Thai authorities] never really come to you directly. So, if you want something, it is down to us [liaison officials] to … engage with them, and we ask them ‘what would they want from us?’ (Interview U 2017).

Still, the quote demonstrates that Thai authorities inform the actions of Home Office by defining what they want, even if they do not seek out the support. These examples show foreign officials are neither secondary context nor passive recipients in a destination state’s overseas management. Extraterritorialisation is more complicated than governments from rich countries in the North exporting their immigration control objectives and practices onto others. Foreign officials also matter and transform what the destination state does.

Notably, I found many of the UK’s extraterritorial arrangements occurring in foreign jurisdictions are not based on bi- or multilateral agreements negotiated by government ministers and senior officials. The absence of these formal agreements gives the Home Office and its officials greater autonomy to decide how to achieve the UK government’s immigration goals. Most studies miss this dimension by exclusively evaluating the formal policy level and bi- and multilateral agreements (e.g. Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2009; Legomsky 2006; Wolff 2016; Zhyznomirska 2016). There is, however, more to a country’s extraterritorial management than is visible in official policies, statements and agreements. By investigating the actions of the liaison network in countries like Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, this study shows government ministers and senior officials are not the only important actors. This exposes the power of mid- and street-level interior bureaucrats – both from the destination state and the
sending and transit states. This power is also evident in Home Office officials’ regular collaboration with their EU and FCC counterparts. In Dubai, for example, the liaison officers from EU and FCC countries have an informal arrangement to always have two people working together at the airport to help each other cover the whole area (Interview F 2016). UK liaison officials also agreed to work with the other EU and FCC liaison officers in Dubai to provide training for the local immigration and security agencies in the city (Interview O 2016). The officials divided up the people who needed training and shared the responsibility among themselves (ibid).

Home Office officials emphasised the importance of this type of cooperation. They believed that coordinating and sharing of tasks among EU and FCC personnel prevents repetition in the training and provision of equipment to local authorities and airlines (Interview O 2017; Interview T 2016). They also said it improves the effective capacity of the Home Office by generating more training and support than they could offer alone (ibid.). One official highlighted this point:

it is very rare that you see us do something just on our own ... More often than not we are working with the Australians, the Canadians, the Germans, the French, the Americans. It is very much making sure that we are delivering as a whole to build up the capability of [local authorities and airlines] (Interview T 2017).

While it is expected that EU and FCC liaison officers will work together, how this transpires is shaped by the ideas of the individual officials working abroad, as well as their motivation to cooperate (Interview F 2016). Yet again, we see various immigration bureaucrats have bearing on the UK’s overseas actions.

6.4 Why officials cooperate: good relationships, perceived benefits and trust

Home Office officials frequently claimed that developing good relationships with other governments and authorities is essential for beneficial collaboration to occur (Interview A 2016, Interview E 2016, Interview F 2016; Interview L 2017; Interview M 2017, Interview O 2017, Interview T 2017). If there is a good relationship, “than one thing leads to another;” there is more compliance by local police and immigration agencies, and more opportunities to share ideas and develop capacity building initiatives (Interview M 2017). How are these relationships fostered? While I found that there needs to be a sense of mutual gains for cooperative relationships to occur, I also found this is not always sufficient. In the words of one official, “good relationships require trust, a willingness to share and mutual benefits” (Interview E 2016). They are about “compromises and sharing,” “give and take” and meeting your partner “halfway” (Interview D 2016; Interview E 2017). In other words, cooperation is more complicated than the presence of benefits and incentives alone.

6.4.1 Perceived benefits and incentives

That cooperative relationships need to have perceived advantages for the actors involved is not all together surprising, and aligns with previous research on international cooperation (Hansen 2011). As we saw in the previous two chapters, this helps explain variations in the willingness of authorities from Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France to work with the UK on migration. In Ghana, for example, Home Office officials said the Ghanaian police and immigration
authorities are generally willing to cooperate with the UK because they know it will result in more assistance in the form of training and equipment (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). They also said the Ghanaian government and lower level officials are aware that having a good relationship with the UK on migration control will likely lead to benefits in other areas, such as development aid, trade, security and technical training (ibid.). This contrasts Egypt where the government does not see cooperation with the UK as very beneficial. For instance, the Egyptian government responded to the Home Office’s efforts to develop a police referral programme by saying “we don’t want to cooperate. There is nothing in it for us” (Interview I 2017).

The Thai government and local authorities also do not appear to view cooperation with the Home Office on migration as especially beneficial. This is likely due, in part, to the high level of support provided by Australia and the US, as well as international organisations like the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Interview U 2017). As one official put it, “everyone is throwing money at the Thais” (ibid.). In particular, the US and Australia dedicate a lot of time and resources on immigration and law enforcement in the country, including a “huge” international law enforcement academy run by the Americans (Interview U 2017) and a substantial amount of funding and assistance by Australia related to migration (Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor 2012). Given this, the Thai government and local authorities are less likely to rely on the UK for aid and support. In other words, notions of benefits are often connected to the historical and current influence the UK has in the country. The UK, for example, is a more dominant actor in Ghana compared to Thailand (Interview U 2016), and provides greater levels of aid and support. In 2010, the UK provided £107,858 in overseas development aid in Ghana compared to only £4,617 in Thailand (DFID 2016, table C.2). It is thus unsurprising that Ghanaians appear to have more interest in maintaining good relations with the UK than Thais. Ghana’s regular receipt of aid and support from the UK likely shapes the government and the immigration and law enforcement authorities’ perceptions regarding the benefits associated to cooperation on migration.

In the US and France, the Home Office’s “strong relationship” and high level of cooperation with officials from these countries is connected to the view that collective action is mutually beneficial to their shared policy goals (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016). They believe it helps them address “common threats” to their respective immigration systems (ibid.). Yet, I also found that perceptions of benefits do not fully explain the strong working relationships the Home Office has with US and French officials. They are also linked to trust and legacies of cooperation on a range of areas, including security, defence, intelligence sharing, law enforcement and so on (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016; Interview T 2016). Officials additionally said frequent meetings and institutional mechanisms associated to the EU and FCC facilitate greater levels of collaboration on migration (Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). For instance, there is an FCC working group on data sharing that meets regularly “to identify areas in which co-operation on immigration exchanges could be enhanced or initiated.” While a sense of benefits is necessary, there are also other conditions that contribute to good working relationships.

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6.4.2 Trust and familiarity
In the view of one Home Office official, the primary challenge in cooperating with other countries is reaching a level of familiarity where officials from both countries “are comfortable enough to get to the real issues, without worrying about offending and tarnishing the relationship” (Interview E 2016). The Home Office official said that level of familiarity was there with countries like the US and France, but not Libya and Egypt (ibid.). In other words, “good [working] relationships” require a “high degree of trust” and comfort (ibid.). Other Home Office officials supported this opinion, explaining the department’s frequent collaboration with EU and FCC officers on their trust and familiarity. For example, they said: “we are all accustomed to working with each other” (Interview C 2016), “we have confidence in these countries” (Interview M 2016) and “we knew we could rely on them for support” (Interview F 2016). Another official similarly justified the Home Office’s cooperation with US and French immigration and law enforcement authorities by saying there is a “deep sense of respect” for the other countries’ officials (Interview D 2016). Here we see confidence and familiarity facilitate greater collaboration. This helps us understand why the Home Office works so frequently with French and American officials compared to Ghanaian, Egyptian and Thai ones. This is especially the case for sensitive areas, such as sharing intelligence and databases.

For example, one Home Office official said liaison officers’ limited confidence in Thai authorities helped explain the lower levels of cooperation in the country, as well as the types of cooperation they participate in:

the second thing in Thailand is about trust. It is a continuous change of commanders ...
and the other thing is sometimes we will have information we give to them and we ask them that the information is not for disclosure to the public or during an investigation and they still tell people. So that is why we are wary of what kind of cooperation we give (Interview U 2017).

Consequently, the liaison network largely shares “knowledge of skills and methods” to Thai officials rather than information “of an investigative nature related to immigration [enforcement] purposes” (ibid.). That is, the liaison officers are more willing to provide training in Thailand because it does not involve the exchange of sensitive information, such as personal data on individuals (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). It requires less trust. In contrast, the Home Office is much more willing to share sensitive information and intelligence with authorities who they trust: “obviously in Europe there is generally more cooperation because you don’t have the same risk sharing information with the EU” (Interview U 2017).

Trust and comfort go both ways, and it is likely authorities from countries like Egypt and Thailand do not have high levels of confidence in the Home Office. This will accordingly influence their motivation to work with the UK, especially if they do not perceive the cooperation to be in their interests. Of course, notions of trust and familiarity are developed overtime and are often connected to the countries’ relationships and legacies of cooperation (Interview A 2016; Interview C; Interview E 2016; Interview F 2016). For instance, the Home Office’s confidence in their US and French counterparts stems from the countries’ close political ties and long history of cooperating together in other areas, according to officials (ibid.). This shows that who the
Home Office cooperates with and why cannot be reduced to the presence of shared interests and perceived benefits alone.

6.5 The UK’s extraterritorial management: implementation gaps

Yet, are the governments and immigration agencies in the North able to successfully project their power overseas and achieve their goals? While there is little doubt that some extraterritorial measures are very effective – such as visas, carrier sanctions and shared databases – there are reasons to question the efficacy of certain delegated forms. As Antje Ellermann (2008) and Daniel Wunderlich (2013) show, governments from rich states in the North often face challenging implementation environments in sending and transit states in the South, even after bi- and multilateral agreements are signed (Ellermann 2008; Wunderlich 2013). Many studies on extraterritorialisation overlook this fact. By concentrating on official statements, policies and bi- and multilateral agreements, they describe the intentions of governments without evaluating what happens on the ground (see e.g. FitzGerald and Ruhrmann 2016; Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017). In doing so, they implicitly assume powerful destination states are able to successfully carry out their immigration objectives in another country (Wunderlich 2013). This section problematises this assumption by highlighting several problems the Home Office encounters when working abroad.

As we have seen so far, the willingness of foreign governments and local authorities to cooperate is not a given and impacts the Home Office’s ability to delegate migration control responsibilities to others. In Egypt, for example, the Home Office has little effective capacity to enforce and penalise so-called “immigration abuses” due to the lack of interest by the Egyptian government and law enforcement. Yet, even when foreign governments and local authorities are officially committed to cooperating, I found that there are other conditions that impinge on the Home Office’s ability to achieve their immigration control objectives. They include non-compliance by lower level officials, the institutional capacity of foreign agencies, the laws and perceptions of migration-related offences and low-level corruption.

The Home Office’s police referral programme provides a good illustration of many of the challenges the department faces when carrying out immigration enforcement overseas. The programme allows Home Office officials working in foreign jurisdictions to share intelligence with local law enforcement agencies. The local authorities are then expected to use the information to investigate individuals suspected of participating in, or facilitating, unauthorised migration, and to arrest, prosecute and sentence them (if appropriate). The goal of the programme is “to reduce visa abuse and immigration offences” by holding individuals accountable, disrupting “organised immigration crime” and decreasing the number of inaccurate documents used during the visa application process (Cabinet Office 2007; Toms and Thorpe 2012; UKBA 2010; Vine 2010, 22). These objectives are contingent on the Home Office being able to elicit the participation of foreign governments and police agencies. They also depend on officials within the criminal justice system following through with investigations, arrests and prosecutions (Interview A 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview U 2017).
While the Home Office regularly promotes the usefulness of police referral programmes, we saw in chapter 5 that they do not have one in every country where there is a liaison operation (Ostrand FOI 42049). This is likely due to the Home Office’s inability to gain the necessary consent from some foreign governments. Egypt is a prime example. Despite the Home Office’s efforts, the department has been unable to get the Egyptian government to agree (as of 2017) (Interview I 2017). Still, even when the government and law enforcement authorities are willing to officially participate in a police referral programme, the Home Office’s desired outcomes are far from assured. In Thailand, for example, Home Office officials said the programme is not very useful (Interview A 2017; Interview B 2017). They claimed that the Thai police are receptive to receiving intelligence from the Home Office but almost never follow through on investigations and arrests (ibid.). As there are costs for police and prosecution services in terms of time and personnel committed to investigating immigration offences, an area that is not generally a priority for many countries in the South, local criminal justice officials may choose to turn a blind eye to such cases (Interview A 2016; Interview O 2017).

The following account from a Home Office official in Thailand illustrates this point:

[s]o, if we come across forgeries in the visa process, if we refer that information to the Thai police, um well nothing ever happens with them. So, you are passing information in good faith ... the law enforcement is duty bound to investigate the offense. But it never seems to go anywhere (Interview U 2017).

According to the official, this is especially a problem when the suspected individual is a Thai national:

the difficulty we have in Thailand ... is it is very difficult to get Thais to act on Thais. They will quite happily go and arrest any foreigner. But it is very difficult to get them to investigate Thais (Interview U 2017).

The Home Office official further claimed that the Thai police’s unwillingness to pursue immigration cases limits the liaison network’s ability to “get anything solved” because there is no deterrent effect, and no accountability for people using inaccurate documentation (Interview U 2017). While the Thai government and law enforcement have agreed to participate in a police referral programme, the Home Office’s ability to achieve their goals are impeded by the local officials responsible for carrying out the enforcement actions.

In the view of Home Office officials, non-compliance by foreign immigration and law enforcement officers is a significant condition limiting their ability to deter and penalise the types of immigrants and travellers the UK government defines as unwanted and unauthorised (Interview A 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview O 2017; Interview U 2017). One official even implied that officers in France sometimes turn a blind eye to migrants leaving their country (Interview M 2017). In particular, they believed that some French security officers at smaller regional airports are letting individuals with inadequate travel documents pass through security because they prefer the migrants to be in the UK (ibid.). In other words, diverging national and local interests can lead foreign governments and officials to choose not to follow the UK’s

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61 As of 2015, the Home Office had a police referral programme (or equivalent) in 24 of the 36 countries a liaison operation (see chapter 5). The Home Office has refused to identify which countries they have police referral programmes in (Ostrand FOI 42049; Internal Review FOI 40413).
objectives. Or, as a Home Office official put it, “the difficulty we have is that Thai immigration really doesn’t, like most immigration in other countries, doesn’t really care who is leaving their country” (Interview U 2017).

Ghana, on the other hand, is often presented by the Home Office as a success story in terms of their collaboration on migration control. Home Office officials and documents regularly describe their relationship with Ghanaian authorities as very good, especially with the Ghana Immigration Service and Criminal Investigation Department (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017; Cabinet Office 2007, 54; FCO 2010; UKHO and FCO 2010; Vine 2012). Still, this so-called success story may not be as effective as portrayed. For instance, while Home Office officials said the police referral programme is “working very well” and “the [Ghanaian] police are regularly involved,” they also acknowledged that “the end result might not always be what we would desire” (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). In particular, they said the number of arrests in Ghana are lower than the Home Office wants, and few arrests result in prosecutions (ibid.). One official blamed this on the long delays in courts and the regular dismissal of cases, which he attributed to the detention facilities and court system being overextended (Interview I 2017). He also claimed minor corruption in the lower levels of the government, police and courts impeded successful outcomes (ibid.). This example illustrates how another country’s criminal justice system and low-level corruption can limit the Home Office’s migration enforcement objectives.

Even in situations where the authorities and officials are sufficiently motivated to pursue the UK’s interests, there may be legal and operational limits to their capacity to do so. Do other countries have laws to prosecute individuals involved in migration-related offenses (e.g. possession of, or intent to sell, fraudulent documents; smuggling and trafficking in persons; etc.)? Do local law enforcement agencies have the necessary skills, resources and equipment to investigate and arrest suspects? These conditions are likely to influence the Home Office’s effective capacity to work with other countries to restrict the movement of immigrants and travellers the UK government characterises as unwanted and unauthorised.

According to a Home Office official, the success of police referral programmes, and whether it makes sense to have a programme at all, depends on how the foreign authorities perceive and deal with immigration offenses (Interview O 2017). In some countries, the possession or selling of counterfeit documents is not viewed as a serious offence (ibid.). In other countries, their approach might be too punitive, and sharing information with local officials could violate the UK’s data protection legislation or human rights obligations (Interview A 2016). A 2006 statement by the head of the UK’s visa directorate highlights this point:

> [w]e have to look very carefully at the likely response of the [] authorities and make sure that the penalties are of an equal level to those in the UK and proportionate to the offence that had occurred (Home Affairs Committee 2006, 51).

Another official similarly said the local officials’ reaction to migration-related offenses is an issue the Home Office has to consider when working in another country: “how do the locals manage that particular problem ... how effective are they at taking action?” (Interview T 2017).
Institutional capacity and infrastructure are also important. In Thailand, the IT system made it difficult for the liaison network to work with Thai authorities on identifying inaccurate documents and sharing that information across relevant agencies, according to Home Office officials (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). As one official put it, Thailand’s “IT systems don’t tie up” and this is one of the problems “that [the liaison network] cannot overcome” (Interview U 2017). A Home Office report also identified this issue. It claimed that the department’s ability to access records from foreign countries outside Europe is often limited due to the lack of infrastructure, which creates restrictions on the use of the data and the reliability of the information obtained (Home Office 2015d, 15). In some cases, the Home Office works with countries to develop their infrastructure and capacity, with the goal of improving their ability to collaborate with foreign authorities on migration control (Interview T 2017). This however can be costly and time consuming, and does not guarantee desired outcomes.

6.6 Conclusion

As we have seen throughout the chapter, foreign governments and their immigration and law enforcement agencies have important power in relation to the UK’s overseas actions. They help inform which international databases and information the Home Office has access to, which countries the liaison network operates in and what types of interventions liaison officers are able to perform. Equally important, the chapter further reveals the significant role lower level Home Office officials have on the UK’s extraterritorial management, especially liaison managers. These officials make judgements about where there is greater need for intervention and develop strategies based on the context in the given country and the willingness of the local authorities to cooperate. In other words, mid- and street-level Home Office officials do not simply execute the decisions of government ministers and senior officials. Rather, they help define how, where and why the UK intervenes from abroad. This highlights the complexity and subjectivity involved the state’s extraterritorial management. The Home Office’s actions are not derived from objective and clearly defined assessments of “risk,” but are interpreted and negotiated by the actors working on the ground – both from the UK and the given sending and/or transit state. By going beyond the formal policy level, this chapter helps us better understand how the UK’s extraterritorialisation is in put into practice.
Chapter 7
Conclusion – reflections on the UK’s extraterritorial management and the problems of “risk” and secrecy

As Aristide Zolberg demonstrated three decades ago, to understand a state’s immigration regime “it is necessary to account for the walls they have erected as well as for the small doors they have provided in it” (Zolberg 1989, 408). This is important because it exposes the selectivity in the system by juxtaposing the kinds of immigrants and travellers who are, and are not, viewed by the government as wanted. It also improves our understanding of how these choices are made and justified. Most research on extraterritorialisation, however, concentrates on restrictive policies and practices (see e.g. Gibney 2005; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017; Nessel 2009; Weber 2006). This gives the impression that governments’ strategies are predominantly concerned with exclusion and control. Yet, this is only part of the story. By examining how, where and why the Home Office builds “walls” and opens “small doors” abroad, this study offers a more nuanced understanding of the UK’s overseas management. I found the country’s extraterritorial interventions are far more complex than “shifting” control practices and objectives outward and co-opting the aid of sending and transit states. Rather, the UK’s interventions are also influenced by the government’s economic interests in enabling trade, tourism, business and some labour, as well as their interactions with foreign states. This helps us make sense of the higher levels of pre-border controls for individuals from the South. It also sheds light on the reasons the Home Office conducts more interventions in places like Ghana and France compared to Egypt.

Through a systematic comparison of the UK’s visa system and liaison network in Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France, this study provides an original and in-depth analysis of the conditions shaping the Home Office’s choices. Not only do we see the government’s dual interests in enabling and excluding particular types of flows matter, but we also see these goals are mediated by the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk,” the UK’s political and historical ties and the behaviour of foreign state actors. This study also advances knowledge by showing mid- and street-level bureaucrats significantly influence the country’s extraterritorial regime, a dimension largely overlooked in the literature. In this chapter, I highlight key findings from the study and draw attention to the disproportionate impact the UK’s extraterritorial practices have on prospective immigrants and travellers based on their nationality and wealth. I then critique the Home Office’s ambiguous use of “immigration risk,” which allows the department to rationalise their actions without actually explaining them. Finally, I reflect on the way the UK’s extraterritorial interventions and undefined application of “risk” shield the state’s decisions from public scrutiny by obscuring what they do abroad and why.
7.1 Extraterritorial controls and small doors

The Home Office creates extraterritorial barriers with the visa system and liaison network by imposing pre-entry visa requirements and working abroad with airlines and foreign state actors. This involves activities like sharing information with other countries, running joint enforcement operations and training airline staff and foreign officials. The Home Office also provides relatively easy access channels through an absence of, or reduction in, extraterritorial restrictions and controls. This includes waiving immigration, visitor and transit visas and using risk assessments to identify individuals for lower levels of scrutiny prior to their arrival. The Home Office further opens small doors for some people by offering facilitative programmes like the UK’s special visa services and Registered Traveller scheme. These initiatives are important as they show the UK’s overseas interventions are used to both restrict and encourage mobility. This adds to the large body of research focusing on extraterritorial controls without considering the small doors provided in them (see e.g. Casas, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2011; Clayton 2010; Geiger 2016; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor 2012).

Examining the facilitative and restrictive aspects of the UK’s visa system and liaison network reveals the highly selective nature of the state’s extraterritorial regime. The Home Office organises both mechanisms to identify and exclude the kinds of immigrants and travellers the government defines as unwanted and unauthorised while encouraging others who they deem desirable and “legitimate.” The result is a visa system and liaison network that operate in a targeted and differentiated way across countries, national populations and individual profiles. From the UK government’s perspective, such an approach improves their ability to capitalise on what they perceive as the economic gains associated to international trade, tourism, investment, study and some labour while restricting movement for others who do not fit that image (Cabinet Office 2007). In other words, the UK’s extraterritorial approach is shaped by the government’s normative views about the types of immigrants and travellers who contribute to the economy, and are thus considered desirable, and those who do not.

The targeted and differentiated structure of the visa system and liaison network create highly unequal opportunities to move for individuals based on their nationality and wealth. In chapter 4 we saw the Home Office imposes more visa controls and scrutiny on individuals from relatively poorer countries, particularly those in Africa and Asia. They also target countries experiencing political instability and armed conflict, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Individuals from these types of countries likewise have little or no access to facilitative programmes, including the UK’s special visa services and Registered Traveller programme. This contrasts the full visa liberalisation for EEA nationals who have free movement rights (as of 2018), and the comparatively few visa obligations and greater access to facilitative services for individuals from affluent countries, such as Australia, Argentina, Canada, Israel, Japan and the US. An individual’s wealth also matters. A necessary prerequisite for all visas is an applicant’s ability to demonstrate sufficient funds to support themselves during their period of stay. Facilitative programmes, like the Super Priority service, are also expensive (i.e. £750 per application), effectively limiting their availability to wealthy people and businesses. In essence, the Home Office organises the visa system to erect walls for asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy people, largely from the South, while enabling much easier access for affluent
individuals, especially those from the North and from countries that are important sources of tourism and trade for the UK.

The liaison network reproduces this selectivity by aiding and enforcing the visa system. It provides information and support to visa officers and cooperates with airlines and foreign authorities to prevent the movement of individuals without pre-entry authorisation from reaching the UK – either due to their exclusion during the visa process or their circumvention of the process (when required). That is, the liaison network helps put into practice the UK’s visa rules and procedures which define who can, and cannot, enter and stay in the country. As of December 2015, the network consisted of 188 liaison personnel located in 36 foreign countries: 17 in Asia, 11 in Europe, 5 in Africa and 3 in the Americas. Many of these countries are identified by the Home Office as key transit and/or sending states. This includes places like Bangladesh, Ghana, Jamaica and Sri Lanka, which the Home Office views as sources for unwanted immigration, as well as transit locations like France, Italy and the UAE.

The above picture of the visa system and liaison network reflect what we would expect from reading the literature. Trends in the UK’s visa system align with previous research on visitor visas, showing a positive relationship between higher levels of economic wealth, trade and tourism and more liberal visa policies (e.g. Mau et al. 2012; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). Studies have also shown that countries which are sources of asylum seekers and other unwanted travellers are subject to more visa restrictions and controls (Clayton 2010, 402; Joppke 1999, 130; Mau et al. 2015, 1197; Neumayer 2006). Likewise, studies on extraterritorial interventions occurring in foreign states tend to concentrate on major sending and transit locations. This includes, for example, research on Spain, Italy and the EU’s outsourcing of controls to countries in the Mediterranean, especially Libya, Morocco and Turkey (e.g. Bialasiewicz 2012; Casas, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2011; Wolff 2016). Such studies give the impression that destination states and regions intervene primarily in major sending and transit states.

I found, however, that there is more going on than is visible in these trends. Why for instance does the UK have liaison personnel in Thailand and the US – two countries that are not commonly thought of as sending or transit locations? A closer look at the UK’s visa system and liaison network reveals far more complexity and subjectivity to the state’s overseas actions than is often recognised in the literature. That is, the UK’s extraterritorial controls are not solely based on concrete and measurable conditions, like GDP per capita, trade, tourism or asylum numbers. They are also not as simple as enlisting other states’ aid in implementing their immigration controls. Instead we have seen that the Home Office and its officials’ interpretations of “immigration risk,” the UK’s political and historical ties and foreign state actors’ behaviour too are significant factors shaping the country’s practices. This contributes to understandings of extraterritorialisation by going beyond conventional narratives where destination state governments (or EU) are the primary actors defining what happens abroad (e.g. Boswell 2003; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Taylor 2010; Weber 2006). It also shows larger generalisations and trends in the literature overlook important explanatory conditions, such as the way mid- and street- level bureaucrats help design and implement states’ overseas interventions.
7.2 Interpreting “risk” and “need”

As I have demonstrated throughout the study, the Home Office and its officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk” play a central role in where the department erects walls and opens small doors from abroad. It informs their choices on the countries, national populations and individual profiles they prioritise for more restrictions and control. For example, I found the different levels of visa requirements and facilitative programmes available for Ghana, Egypt, Thailand, the US and France are shaped by the Home Office’s views about the potential nationals from these countries might try to enter and stay in the UK without authorisation. This interpretation is then weighed against their assessments of the economic benefits associated to fewer controls (see chapter 4). Thai nationals, for instance, have fewer visa restrictions and more access to facilitative services than nationals from Ghana and Egypt. Home Office officials justified this by claiming Thais have lower levels of “risk” and more prospect for wanted types of mobility, like tourism, trade and study by relatively affluent individuals (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017). Still, Thais are seen by officials as having more potential for unwanted movement compared to nationals from the US and France, and are thus subject to higher levels of pre-entry controls.

The location and activities of the liaison network are also informed by the department and its officials’ views of where there is greater “immigration risk” and “need” (see chapter 5). Or, as one official put it: “everything the [network does] is always dependent on what the threat is to the UK ... we focus on the areas where there is more risk and need” (Interview U 2017, emphasis added). In France, Home Office officials claimed the large number of airports with regular and cheap flights to the UK present considerable potential for unauthorised immigration (Interview D 2016; Interview O 2017). As a result, liaison personnel in the country dedicate substantial resources to working at airports and training airline staff in identify passengers with inadequate documentation. This contrasts the liaison operation in the US, which, before it closed in 2017, rarely spent time at airports or with airlines. Home Office officials explained this by saying there was little “risk” associated to air travel from the US (Interview O 2017; Interview Q 2017). We also saw that the Home Office closed the US operation in 2017 because they wanted to dedicate more resources to Jamaica, a location that officials claimed had more potential for unwanted and unauthorised immigration (ibid.). The objective of this targeted, “risk-based” approach is to create an effective system of immigration control which simultaneously allows easy access for the types of immigrants and travellers the government views as good for the economy by reducing their pre-arrival burdens and control (Cabinet Office 2007, 28 and 56).

The Home Office’s interpretation of “immigration risk” is not a neutral framework based on objective conditions. It is constructed, understood and assessed by the department and its officials – a process shaped by the data and “knowledge production” of the institution (Broeders 2007). Liaison personnel play a key role in this process, illustrating one important way lower level officials influence the Home Office’s actions. As liaison officers work overseas and with foreign state actors, they have access to information that is not available to Home Office personnel in the UK. Accordingly, a major responsibility of the network is to gather, analyse and distribute information to relevant Home Office actors on the migration context in other countries. This includes information on local authorities’ capacities, trends in so-called “visa abuses” (e.g. using lost, stolen or fake documents), and data on individuals and groups involved...
in unauthorised migration. The information is then used to inform the department’s understanding of where there is more “risk,” and thus “need” for increased restrictions, scrutiny and enforcement.

For example, the Home Office relied on analyses from liaison officers to inform their decisions on whether to require transit visas for Egyptians, Syrians and Libyans in 2011 (Home Office 2011). Liaison personnel also generate the “risk profiles” visa officers use to identify and categorise visa applications into higher and lower “risk” groups. The “higher risk” applications are then subjected to more extensive checks by visa officials while “lower risk” applications are streamlined for faster processing. More significantly, liaison personnel play a key role in determining what the liaison network does abroad. They have interpretive agency which influences the UK’s interventions in foreign countries. As one official explained, the activities performed by each liaison operation are “pretty much decided by the [liaison manager] in the country because you know what your current threats are, what is the continuous problem you keep seeing” (Interview U 2017). These examples show the UK’s extraterritorial management is not simply a product of the central government and Home Office ministers’ dictates. Rather, mid- and street-level officials interpret and make judgements about levels of “risk,” influencing how, where and why the UK intervenes from abroad.

The Home Office’s ability to access information and databases from foreign states also informs this process. EU and FCC authorities, such as those from the US and France, regularly share information with the Home Office. This includes data on individuals, migration trends, forgeries and passenger profiling. The Home Office also has access to several large databases like the EU Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the US Department of Homeland Security’s biometric archive. According to the Home Office and its officials, this information enhances their “knowledge of the threat” and improves their ability to respond (Home Office and FCO 2007, 9). Officials from Ghana, Egypt and Thailand, in contrast, almost never provide this type of information to the UK. This shows foreign state actors’ willingness to share data with the Home Office impacts the information and databases available. This in turn shapes the department’s assessments of “risk.” It further exposes the complexity involved in the Home Office’s choices regarding the countries and individuals they prioritise for differing levels of control.

7.3 Deconstructing “risk”

But what exactly are the “immigration risks” the Home Office is concerned with and how does the department and its officials assess levels of so-called “risk”? As I have previously explained, the Home Office does not provide a clear or transparent picture of this. This is concerning as the department so frequently uses claims of “risk” and “evidence” to justify differential treatment. In particular, I found the lack of clarity from the Home Office on these terms conceals the reasons they target certain individuals, national populations and countries for more restrictions and enforcement. For instance, the Home Office defended its authority “to give greater scrutiny or priority to” individuals from 31 countries (as of Nov 2017) on the argument that these “nationalities pose the greatest risk to immigration controls” (Brokenshire 2015; Ostrand FOI
46078). Yet, the Home Office has refused to identify the nationalities this is permissible for. They also refused to explain the methodology and types of criteria they use to make such decisions (ibid.). Instead we are told the Home Office uses “data” and “statistical and intelligence-based evidence” to determine which nationalities immigration and border officials can priorities for greater enforcement and control (Brokenshire 2015; Ostrand FOI 46078). This, however, tells us very little. It provides no indication as to types of data or institutional assumptions used to draw conclusions, or even what the “risk[s] to immigration controls” are.

The absence of basic information makes it difficult to evaluate the Home Office’s behaviour. Which nationalities, for example, are being targeted for greater scrutiny and control? Is the Home Office using prejudiced assumptions based on race, religion and wealth? Are they selecting specific nationalities to prevent asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy and racialised groups of people from reaching the UK? Or, are they using other rationales? While we can speculate on these questions, the Home Office’s secrecy prevents us from being able to conclusively answer them. It limits academics and immigration advocates’ ability to scrutinise the department’s choices and hold the Home Office accountable. In other words, the Home Office’s undefined use of “risk” and “evidence” to justify their decisions actually shield how and why they make them. Equally important, these terms mask the kinds of people and countries the UK prioritises for increased levels of control. It is, after all, more palatable to say the Home Office targets “higher risk” countries, populations and individuals for more restrictions and scrutiny than it is to say that they target individuals from African, Asian and Muslim-majority countries, especially those who are comparatively poor and/or fleeing violence and persecution. Yet, this is precisely what the UK’s visa system and liaison network do in practice.

For example, all but two of the 54 countries in Africa (i.e. Namibia and Botswana) are part of the UK’s most restrictive visitor visa and transit visa groups. Similarly, nearly all 47 countries identified by Pew as having Muslim-majority populations are included in these two groups, with three exceptions: Brunei, Malaysia and the Maldives (Desilver and Masci 2017). The Home Office has also placed every country and territory classified by the World Bank as low income into these restrictive categories, with a majority (61%) in the most restrictive transit visa group. In contrast, the majority of countries in Europe and the Americas are part of the UK’s free movement or non-visa groups. As such, nationals from these countries have much greater access to the UK. Ninety percent of the high income countries and territories classified by the World Bank are also in these two categories. The six exceptions are the rich Muslim-majority countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The liaison network likewise targets less wealthy and racialised groups of people from the South for increased control through profiling at airports, supporting the visa system and training law enforcement officials in sending and transit states.

By claiming the UK’s extraterritorial approach is based on “risk assessments” and “statistical and intelligence-based evidence,” the Home Office gives the impression that their decisions are apolitical and objective. This, however, is not the case. As data scientists Cynthia Dwork and Deirdre Mulligan have explained, the classifications necessary for statistical analyses and data-driven assessments are “neither neutral nor objective, but biased toward their purposes. They
reflect the explicit and implicit values of their designers” (2013; see also Amoore 2006; Lyon 2010). This too is true for the Home Office’s evidence-based assessments of “immigration risk.”

What we know from several UK documents and Home Office officials is the number of asylum seekers, and the Home Office’s predictions of a rise in asylum seekers, is associated to the department’s assessment of “risk.” Targeting asylum seekers for increased restrictions and control is certainly a political choice, and one that is easily informed by statistics and evidence. A 2011 impact assessment, for instance, justified imposing transit visas on Egyptians based on statistics showing an increase in asylum applications and the liaison network’s prediction that individuals from Egypt will continue to break the UK’s rules by using transit flights to request asylum (Home Office 2011). Similarly, a 2015 ICIBI report identified the “main risk of abuse” by individuals from the Middle East as the use of visas to request asylum in the UK (Bolt 2015, 28). This assessment was based on data collected by the Home Office that showed a rise in the number of asylum applications by certain types of visa recipients from the region (ibid.). The Home Office’s response to this evidence was to have visa officers conduct “more extensive verification checks” on the so-called “high-risk applications,” namely visitor visas applicants from Iraq, Syria and Palestine who are viewed by the Home Office as more likely to seek international protection (ibid, 28-29). This illustrates the link between interpretations of “risk,” asylum and increased control.

More broadly, Home Office officials described the department’s assessments of “immigration risk” as being based on evidence (and assumptions) about the prospect individuals coming from or through a country may breach, or “abuse,” the UK’s immigration rules and procedures (Interview A 2016; Interview D 2016; Interview T 2017). These “abuses” include inter alia using false or inaccurate documentation, misrepresenting information on a visa application, working without authorisation and/or overstaying a visa. This ostensibly neutral justification, however, obscures the way the UK’s rules, procedures and opportunities are fundamentally unequal for different types of immigrants and travellers. As I have shown throughout the study, the Home Office deliberately uses pre-entry regulations and initiatives to facilitate certain kinds of mobility – largely by affluent individuals from the North – while excluding others, especially potential asylum seekers and relatively less wealthy individuals from the South. Syrians fleeing violence, for example, are classified by the Home Office as having a “high risk” for breaking the UK’s visa rules. Yet, the Home Office provides essentially no legal pathways for such Syrians to reach the UK, leaving them with few alternatives. Likewise, Home Office officials claim US nationals have “lower risk” of “abusing” the UK’s rules compared to Ghanaians without mentioning that Americans have far fewer pre-entry requirements. Here we see understandings of “risk” are based on the government’s normative views about the kinds of immigrants and travellers who are, and are not, considered wanted.

I also found institutional logics and assumptions influence officials’ assessments. One Home Office official explained the higher level of “immigration risk” for Ghanaians on their perceptions about the population rather than any evidence:

[It]he actual number to the UK for illegal entry by Ghanaians are pretty low. But that doesn’t mean people are not there irregularly, either by using deceit or fraud in the visa application process or overstaying a visa etc. (Interview I 2017).
In another example, I found liaison officers teach airline staff to examine flight manifests to identify “higher risk” passengers for extra scrutiny by looking at the names, routes and nationalities of the people flying. In describing how this works, a Home Office official explained that on a flight from France to the UK they would instruct airline workers to pick out names that don’t “sound” European or American and to look at passengers’ routes and ask “why is that person going here and there and there? That is suspicious” (Interview U 2017). It is easy to see how individual and institutional prejudices will influence the types of people targeted for extra examination at airports. Individuals from Africa and the Middle East, for instance, will almost certainly be viewed as more “suspicious” than someone from the US or Canada, especially if they are travelling from a country experiencing violent conflict, economic hardship and/or political instability.

Finally, the institutional context under which immigration data is collected by the Home Office has the ability reinforce prejudices within the department. For example, as Home Office officials believe Ghanaians have higher levels of “immigration risk” than Americans, they will target Ghanaians for extra scrutiny while paying little attention to Americans. This will undoubtedly result in more individuals from the targeted group being identified for (or assumed likely to engage in) immigration offenses, leading to confirmation biases and data supporting this assumption. Additionally, as Ghanaians have more pre-entry rules and procedures they must follow, it is likely they will also have higher rates of so-called “abuse” compared to Americans. This data is then used as evidence to further justify the Home Office’s decisions to prioritise Ghanaians for extra control while subjecting Americans to less. These examples illustrate how assessments of “risk” and “evidence” can be used to rationalise policy decisions. Once again, we see the subjectivity in the UK’s extraterritorial controls. Not only are the Home Office’s actions shaped by the categories created and given significance by the UK government, but they are also informed by officials’ interpretations of data and by institutional assumptions and prejudices. While “risk” and “evidence” give a veneer of objectivity, they are easily used to legitimise state behaviour.

7.4 The power of foreign state actors and international relationships

Another important finding that comes out of my research is the significant influence political relationships and foreign state actors have on the UK’s actions – conditions that are overlooked in much of the literature on extraterritorialisation (e.g. Boswell 2003; Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Rijken 2018; Flynn 2014). Often, governments in rich states in the North are portrayed as the dominant actors defining what occurs abroad, with sending and transit states operating as secondary context, as “policy-takers” (ibid). Descriptions of extraterritorialisation as a “shifting,” “offshoring” and “outsourcing” of immigration controls to other countries reinforce this narrative (Boswell 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lavenex 2006; Geiger 2016, 261). This generates an oversimplified explanation of what happens abroad and why by neglecting the historical and political context informing governments’ choices and by minimises the agency of foreign state actors.
Here this study further contributes to the literature by demonstrating the indispensable role these two conditions have on the UK’s extraterritorial controls. A clear example of this is evident in the UK’s liaison operations in Ghana and Egypt. Both locations are lower middle income countries in Africa, former colonies of the UK and viewed by Home Office officials as having relatively higher levels of “immigration risk.” Yet, as we saw in chapters 5 and 6, the actions of the liaison network differ considerably in each country. In Ghana, two key objectives of the network are building the capacity of the Ghanaian immigration and law enforcement agencies and providing information to the police to facilitate the arrest of individuals suspected of unauthorised migration. Neither activity occurs in Egypt. Instead, the network focuses on working with airlines to prevent unwanted travel by plane. Liaison personnel in Ghana have relatively good relationships with the government and local officials, and Ghanaians are generally motivated to work with the UK on migration control (Interview I 2017; Interview L 2017). This is not the case in Egypt. In fact, the Egyptian authorities refused to engage with liaison officers on any migration control and enforcement-related activities despite liaison officers’ efforts (Interview I 2017; Interview P 2017). The lack of motivation by Egyptian authorities stymied the UK’s ability to train officials, provide equipment and work with local police to arrest and prosecute individuals.

I also found the motivation of Ghanaian and Egyptian officials are shaped by the UK’s postcolonial involvement in each country. According to Home Office officials, the relatively high level of cooperation by Ghanaians on migration control is influenced by the UK’s current and historical engagement, including the provision of development aid, trade relations and security training (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2017; Interview U 2017). These preestablished ties helped liaison officers build relationships with the local immigration and law enforcement, which then allowed them to develop more capacity building initiatives and to better elicit their aid in migration control (ibid.). Home Office officials additionally said Ghanaian authorities are aware of the benefits of having good relations with the UK – e.g. more development aid, trade and technical training – and do not want to tarnish this by failing to cooperate on migration (Interview E 2016; Interview I 2016).

Egyptian authorities on the other hand do not appear to care much about jeopardising their relations with UK officials. According to one Home Office official:

[the Egyptian government] uses all levers to pursue their own agenda, such as a resumption to flights to Sharm el Sheikh, their pursuit of Muslim Brotherhood … They use all levers all the time such as delaying visas for [UK] embassy officials etc. (Interview L 2017).

Unlike Ghana, Egypt did not join the Commonwealth, has received much less development aid from the UK and has had more confrontational relations. This includes the UK’s military re-occupation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the UK government’s 2015 ban on flights to the major Egyptian holiday resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh. It is thus unsurprising to see less willingness by Egyptian authorities to cooperate with the UK on migration control compared to Ghana.

The UK’s political and historical connections and local authorities’ motivation similarly shape the liaison network’s actions in Thailand. The smaller amount of training in Thailand compared to
Ghana, for instance, stems from the UK’s influence in the country, which is conditioned by their historical ties:

> [t]he other thing in Thailand is we are not such a big player. We do not have so much influence in Thailand as we would in other countries [like] Ghana which is obviously a former Commonwealth country (Interview U 2017).

Thai authorities’ lack of interest in preventing and prosecuting unauthorized migrants leaving the country also limits what the UK is able to do. The only training the liaison network was able to provide in Thailand, for example, was in identifying common forgeries in UK passports. As one Home Office official explained, “that is all we can do … they only care about who is coming in” (Interview U 2017). Other officials similarly said “it is difficult to get anything done” and “[liaison personnel] never get fully fledged cooperation,” especially by Thai police on arresting individuals involved in unauthorized migration out of the country (Interview A 2016; Interview B 2016).

These examples demonstrate the power foreign state actors have on the UK’s extraterritorial actions. They show the Home Office does not simply export their immigration objectives outward, but operates within the boundaries set by local governments and officials – boundaries that are often shaped by historical legacies and political ties. Here we see rich countries do not just tell poorer countries what to do. Motivation and historical and political ties also help explain the Home Office’s exceptionally high levels of cooperation with US and French authorities. As we saw in chapters 4, 5 and 6, US and French officials are often quite interested in cooperating with the UK on migration. Home Office officials explained this on their long history of working together in other areas, such as political, counter terrorism and law enforcement (Interview A 2016; Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017). They also said the high level of collaboration is due to the UK’s trust in these states and the belief that it is a mutually beneficial way for the UK, the US and France to address their shared policy goals (ibid.).

Notably, I found foreign authorities do not merely decide to participate (or not) in the UK’s extraterritorial interventions. Rather, they too shape what the Home Office decides to do by sharing ideas, preferences and practices. For example, the exchange of ideas and practices among EU and FCC authorities helped the Home Office develop new extraterritorial techniques for “facilitating legitimate travel,” using biometric information and applying “analytic approaches to sifting out the threat” (Interview E 2016; Interview R 2017; Tai FOI 40510). Foreign state actors in countries like Ghana and Thailand likewise inform the Home Office’s actions by influencing the kinds of training and support the Home Office provides. As one official explained, “it is a two-way street. You wouldn’t normally tell someone they are inefficient in certain ways when you are coming through and you are developing projects” (Interview T 2017). Instead, liaison personnel meet with local authorities to determine what the UK can do to improve their migration and border enforcement capacities (see chapters 5 and 6).

Here we see the UK’s extraterritorial interventions are not developed by the Home Office in isolation but are influenced by foreign officials’ ideas and preferences. This advances knowledge by revealing more ways foreign state actors contribute to, and inform, another state’s extraterritorial management than is visible in formal policies. This includes the day to day exchange of ideas, resources, information and databases, as well as the negotiation process between the Home Office officials posted abroad and the local immigration and law
enforcement authorities’ they work with. In looking beyond the formal policy level, this study highlights the consequential role mid- and street-level bureaucrats have in shaping extraterritorialisation. We see much of the policy-making “is left in the remit of implementers” (Infantino 2019, 7), it is interpreted and negotiated by the actors working on the ground. Once again, this shows the UK’s walls and small doors are far more complex than conventional narratives suggest. Governments do not just export their immigration control objectives outward and enlist the aid of other states.

7.5 Going beyond “risk,” economics, political ties and foreign state actors

At the outset of this thesis, I identified four themes which I focused my analysis on: the Home Office and its officials’ perceptions of “immigration risk,” their assessments of the economic benefits associated to international mobility, the UK’s historical and political ties with other countries and the behaviour of foreign state actors. As we have seen throughout this thesis, my empirical evidence shows these conditions help explain the country’s extraterritorial interventions. Collectively, they provide insight into the reasons the Home Office organises the visa system and liaison network in specific ways, and why they vary so greatly across different countries, national populations and individual profiles.

In addition to these four factors, I found several other conditions help account for the country’s extraterritorial interventions. One important condition is the personal relationships between officials, especially their levels of trust and familiarity. Or, as one Home Office official put it, “good [working] relationships” are necessary for beneficial collaboration to occur and require a “high degree of trust” and enough comfort “to get to the real issues without worrying about offending and tarnishing the relationship” (Interview E 2016). The liaison personnel in Thailand, for example, do not have much confidence in the Thai police, and are thus “wary of what kind of cooperation [they] give” (Interview U 2017). Home Office officials’ relationships with their US and French counterparts, in contrast, are largely characterised by high levels of trust and familiarity (Interview C 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview U 2017). This facilitates greater levels of cooperation, which subsequently influences what the UK is able to achieve abroad. It provides more opportunities for joint investigations and enforcement and for sharing resources, intelligence, migration-related data and new techniques for migration control. According to Home Office officials, trust and familiarity develop overtime and are tied to legacies of cooperation and the political relationships between states (Interview A 2016; Interview E 2016; Interview M 2017; Interview T 2017).

The system characteristics of a given sending or transit state are also important. That is, the laws and the institutional and administrative capacity of the other state have substantial bearing on the UK actions. Does the other county, for example, have rules that can be used to prosecute individuals involved in unauthorised migration toward the UK, such as the possession of, or intent to sell, fraudulent documents; smuggling and trafficking in persons; etc.? Likewise, do the local immigration and law enforcement agencies have the skills, resources and equipment to carry out the UK’s interests? Here we see that even if foreign governments and officials are motivated to work with the UK, a lack of capacity and/or laws can impede the Home Office’s
actions. In Ghana, for instance, the country’s overextended detention facilities and court system limited the Home Office’s ability to get individuals prosecuted for using inaccurate documentation for migration purposes (Interview I 2017). In Thailand, the outdated IT system made it difficult for liaison personnel to work with Thai authorities on identifying inaccurate documents and sharing that information across relevant agencies (Interview A 2016; Interview U 2017).

The system characteristics of sending and transit states and the personal relationships between officials further illustrate the complexity involved in designing and implementing extraterritorialisation. They show the goals and interests of destination state governments alone are not enough to understand how, where and why states intervene from abroad. In other words, focusing on policy documents and political elites miss the wide range of actors and considerations that influence a country’s overseas interventions. Or, as Alison Mountz put it, they “tell only partial stories – idealized versions of what might be or what should happen” (2010, 35, italics in original).

7.6 Hidden in plain sight: secrecy and extraterritorialisation

While the Home Office regularly publicises their reliance on extraterritorial controls to regulate immigration and travel, we have also seen that they offer few details on what they actually do and how they reach their decisions. This is especially the case for interventions occurring in foreign jurisdictions, such as those carried out by the liaison network. As chapter 3 shows, the Home Office rarely discloses specific information on the activities conducted by liaison officers. Instead, we are offered generalised statements about the network as a whole. A 2015 ICIBI report provides an emblematic example of this. According to the report, the network has responsibility for identifying threats to the UK border, preventing inadequately documented passengers from reaching UK shores, providing risk assessment to the Home Office visa issuing regime and supporting criminal investigations against individuals and organisations which cause harm to the UK (Bolt 2015, 39).

Yet, this statement does not reveal much about what actually happens in practice. How do liaison officers determine so-called “threats to the UK?” Who do they work with, and how do they attempt to prevent unwanted immigration? Similar to the way the Home Office’s ambiguous use of “immigration risk” obscures who they target for more control, the UK’s generalised descriptions conceal their actions occurring in foreign jurisdictions. They are, in a sense, hidden in plain sight.

The secrecy surrounding the UK’s overseas management is concerning as it makes it difficult for the public and immigration advocates to identify what the Home Office is doing. More importantly, it inhibits their ability hold the department accountable. This problem is further exacerbated when foreign state actors take on substantial migration control responsibilities. As we saw in chapters 5 and 6, Ghanaian police regularly carry out arrests of individuals who UK liaison officers suspect of participating in unauthorised migration. The liaison network also provides enforcement-related equipment and training to Ghanaian authorities. This type of information is seldom made public. The Home Office almost never releases data on who they
train or what resources they provide. They have even refused to identify the countries where the department has police referral agreements that allow Home Office officials to share intelligence with foreign law enforcement agencies (Ostrand FOI 45995; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 45995). The lack of transparency raises critical questions about accountability. Without such basic information, how can we ensure the resources and actions of the Home Office do not contribute to human rights violations? How can we be confident in the foreign authorities the Home Office works with when we do not even know who they are?

The Home Office rationalises their decisions to withhold information by arguing that it is “operationally sensitive” (Ostrand FOI 45995; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 45995). They also claim that disclosure could “prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the operation of immigration controls” (ibid.). Given the Home Office’s secrecy around “immigration risk,” it is hardly surprising that this extends to their activities occurring in foreign jurisdictions. What is notable, however, is that the Home Office has used their relationships with other countries to further justify the suppression of information. For example, they argued that identifying the national populations Home Office officials can target for extra control would “prejudice [their] international relations” by eroding “trust and confidences” with their international partners (Ostrand FOI 46078). This trust, according to the Home Office, “allows for a free and frank exchange of information and advice” (ibid.). The Home Office further claimed that if the UK “does not respect such confidences, its ability to protect and promote UK interests, in this case on migration, will be hampered” (ibid.).

Here we see the Home Office using their international relationships to help validate their secrecy. It is not even clear why disclosing information on the nationalities the Home Office prioritises for extra scrutiny would impact the “free and frank exchange of information and advice” with foreign partners. Instead, this argument indicates that the Home Office is excessively cautious and guarded about the release of information on their extraterritorial controls (see also chapter 3). This creates an institutional buffer that shrouds the Home Office’s decisions and activities. Transparency and accountability are important given the impact these policies and practices have on people’s opportunities to move. Extraterritorial interventions shape individuals’ ability to unit with family, access international protection and participate in international labour markets, education systems and trade. More crucially, they have grave humanitarian consequences for asylum seekers and other unauthorised migrants who are unable to obtain permission to move. This includes an increase in deaths at sea (Williams and Mountz 2016), limited access to asylum (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013) and ever more dangerous land journeys for people who have no alternative pathways (Andersson 2016; Hayden 2019). We have also seen that extraterritorial controls have highly unequal impacts on people across nationality and wealth.

By providing generalised statements about the UK’s extraterritorial management and claiming their actions are based on “evidence” and “risk assessments,” the Home Office gives the appearance of transparency and objectivity. My research has demonstrated that this is far from the truth. By exposing the subjectivity and complexity involved in the Home Office’s choices, the study shows the UK’s overseas management is neither neutral nor transparent. Rather, the Home Office’s choices are informed by constructed – and often unclear – understandings of
“immigration risk.” These understandings are shaped by institutional assumptions and prejudices regarding who is and is not “legitimate” and likely to contribute to the economy. The study has additionally illustrated that the autonomy and interpretive agency of lower level bureaucrats, including Home Office officials and the foreign immigration and law enforcement personnel they work with. These actors make consequential decisions about the UK’s overseas actions, and help us understand the messy, contingent and often opportunistic process involved in designing and implementing extraterritorial controls. In exposing these dimensions, this study offers important insights into how, where and why destination states intervene from abroad. It exposes details about a process that is frequently hidden in plain sight.


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2. Interview B, 2016: Home Office official with experience working abroad
3. Interview C, 2016: Home Office official with experience working abroad
4. Interview D, 2016: Home Office official with over 20 years of experience, including as an airline liaison officer
5. Interview E, 2016: former Home Office senior official with over 10 years of experience in the immigration and border directorates and who had regular engagement with US and French officials
6. Interview F, 2016: Home Office official with experience working in the Middle East and South Asia
8. Interview I, 2017: Home Office official with experience working in more than 5 foreign states
10. Interview L, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad, including countries in Africa
11. Interview M, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad, including countries in Europe
12. Interview O, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad, including the Middle East
15. Interview R, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad
16. Interview S, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad
17. Interview T, 2017: senior Home Office official with experience working with foreign officials and with Home Office officials posted overseas
18. Interview U, 2017: Home Office official with experience working abroad
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Office.


Appendix

Top 50 import countries and territories for the UK by visa category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transit (26%)</th>
<th>Visitor (14%)</th>
<th>Non-visa (26%)</th>
<th>Free movement (40%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Belgium &amp; Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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</table>

Top 50 countries for tourism to the UK by visa category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transit (12%)</th>
<th>Visitor (10%)</th>
<th>Non-visa (26%)</th>
<th>Free-movement (52%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Korea (South)</td>
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### Countries with UK liaison operations (as of 2015) by intergovernmental organisation

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<th>Commonwealth (10)</th>
<th>EU (9)</th>
<th>FCC (1)</th>
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### Countries with UK liaison operations (as of 2015) by World Bank income classification

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Low income (2%)</th>
<th>Lower middle income (28%)</th>
<th>Upper middle income (28%)</th>
<th>High income (42%)</th>
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