Bu, Qingxiu (2021) The viability of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) in the UK: the impact on global anti-bribery compliance. European Business Organization Law Review, 22. pp. 173-201. ISSN 1566-7529

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Abstract

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) provide an alternative enforcement tool to tackle economic crime. Prosecutors tailor punishment and remediation measures more accurately to satisfy the principles of prosecution. The companies in question can avoid criminal charges, provided that they comply with agreed terms and conditions. The use of DPAs is conducive to relieving collateral consequences, while being able to deter, punish and reshape corporate behaviour. In principle, enforcement authorities can maximise the leverage with criminal liability over companies to cultivate a robust corporate culture against bribery. It is argued that an effective global anti-bribery regime rests with not only transnational cooperation, but also adequate governance and rigorous compliance. With the DPAs having increased in prominence as a mainstay of the US enforcement regime, it remains to be seen whether the potent tool will be viable and further reshape the future enforcement landscape of the anti-bribery regime in the UK and even on a global basis.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of Law, Politics and Sociology > Law
Depositing User:	Qingxiu Bu
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2020 09:23
Last Modified:	18 Mar 2021 13:30
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/89439

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