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The Economic Realization of Civic Friendship
Theoretical Underpinning and Grass-roots Praxis

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PhD in Philosophy

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I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for the Award of any other degree.

Signature:
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Summary

As a solution to the extended poverty and economic insecurity in contemporary societies, care theorists have suggested the alignment of the market economy with the ethic of care. Although they have developed an insightful critique of the neoliberal capitalist order, they have been reluctant to propose a radical re-organization of the economy that would subordinate the economy to the goal of human life’s maintaining and flourishing. Aristotelian “civic friendship”, I hold, could lead to an economy that serves life precisely because it activates citizenship expressed in citizens’ mutual goodwill and reciprocal contribution to one another’s well-being that presupposes political equality and the closing of economic inequalities. Marx’s “social production” constitutes a modern reconstruction of civic friendship which places the Aristotelian ideal in the economy rendering thus the latter a field for enacting politics. Civic friendship, I argue, implies a primordial meaning of the good life derived from its inscription in the political community. This primordial good life could be actualized through virtuous shared praxis which in the economy concerns the production and distribution of social wealth, as well as the caring services. Apart from its implicit content, I further argue, civic friendship embodies an instinctual need for being in common which, in essence, underpins it and which could thrive within a non-productivist economic context. Degrowth movement supporting an economy of a lower ecological footprint delineates such an economic setting. Supplemented by the political positivity of Neurath’s associational socialism, degrowth movement, I propose, could result in a kind of degrowth socialist economic order in which the productive and distributive procedure, as well as direct caring labour, would be organized and performed by citizens-workers in a decentralized, democratic mode, and on the basis of a primordial conception of human well-being. Thus, the economy would realize civic friendship and confirm the political community.
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**CONCLUSION**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
INTRODUCTION

Contemporary capitalist societies are marked by huge economic inequalities; large segments of the population cannot live a decent life nor can they even meet their basic biological needs. This humanitarian crisis has been made worse by the ecological crisis, which threatens the planet. This dire situation is due to the fact that the economy, as Polanyi (2002) has maintained, has become an autonomous sphere, separate from the political sphere. The aim of the economy is to satisfy individual preferences (O’Neill, 1998) rather than human needs. Preference satisfaction points to separate individuals with divergent wants. Human needs on the other hand imply an imaginary primordial human community; people have similar needs dictated by their human nature. That human community, the needs imply, finds its concrete form in the political community. Therefore, the economy speaking of preference satisfaction strips individuals of their political identity and of their community. The pursuing of individual economic goals calls for free economic action of individuals who view themselves as independent and self-sufficient, and related to others instrumentally. The others are not persons with equivalent human needs but market contractors who pursue their own purposes, which might clash with one another. Not feeling interdependent on the basis of their common human needs, on their common vulnerability, and not feeling that they need the others, they cannot feel the others as other selves, namely they cannot perceive their ontological community with them. Hence, citizens exercise their economic freedom without caring about its impact on others’ freedom and well-being; they prioritize the fulfillment of their wishes over respecting and promoting the meeting of others’ needs instead of keeping a balance between these two pursuits. The institutions and legal rules of the state, of course, are supposed to harmonize citizens’ claims thus achieving a structural peaceful co-existence of citizens but this co-existence fails to be a true community of political agents.

Extended poverty caused by devotion to the hunting of individual material interest, and by the indifference towards others’ needs and well-being, has been described as a lack of care by care ethicists such as Tronto (2013) and Engster (2007) who suggest as a solution, inserting caring ethos and practice in the public realm and more specifically in the economy. However, I argue that, the proposals of care theorists for a caring state and market do not call for and, what is more, cannot bring about a substantial change of
economic structures which would render the economy an institution attentive and responsive to citizens’ needs, and would enable citizens to care for one another by acting economically. *Therefore, care idiom cannot on its own provide a firm grounding for an alternative economy that would serve human life.* The Aristotelian concept of civic friendship could underpin such an economy by determining its main features; the primordial conception of the good life that civic friendship implies could lead to a repoliticizing of the economy, and thus to its restoring as an activity oriented to fulfill human needs. An economy permeated by civic friendship cannot but be a post-capitalist economy of a low ecological footprint which allows and also motivates citizens to establish a harmonious relationship with one another and with nature.

Civic friendship bears the awareness and valuing of citizens’ interdependence, and it points to a true community of political subjects, which can be created by citizens themselves through reciprocal economic-political action that can ensure their political and economic equality as well as everyone’s well-being. Although civic friendship has not been modeled by Aristotle on the economy since the economy, in antiquity, was not separate from politics, it could be applied to the economy if the latter is viewed not only in its superficial form, namely, the market but also in its primary form, that is, production. If productive labour is rehabilitated as an economic action, which aims to meet human needs, and it is organized and performed in a civic-political manner it would become a token of civic friendship; it would confirm the civic tie between citizens and it would revive political community. *This rehabilitation of labour, I hold, presupposes a rupture with the productivist logic and the growthism that are immanent in the neoliberal capitalist economy.*

In the present thesis I have illuminated the concept of Aristotelian civic friendship and I have endeavoured to reconstruct it and to apply it to the economic sphere thus portraying an economic setting which could substitute for neoliberalism. The ecological degradation caused by economic growth (Kallis, 2011; Foster, 2011) has shown the limits of growth and of self-interested economic behavior. The energy intensive and pollutant economy cannot but be replaced by a different economy of a lower metabolism. However, the deceleration of economic rates will not necessarily make citizens less indifferent to one another or eliminate economic inequalities. Also, degrowth shift might be undertaken by authoritarian economic and political elites which might be extremely uncaring towards people by imposing non-equitable economic
reduction thus intensifying the current economic hardship. Consequently, what we should strive for is achieving the coupling of degrowth with civic friendship under a democratic post-capitalist economic order. Degrowth movement features as a hopeful grass-roots economic movement which, I maintain, should acquire a clear socialist orientation in order to accomplish the transition to a society of “ecological sustainability and substantive equality” (Foster, 2015, p.8), a society imbued with civic friendship.

The thesis has been divided into six chapters, organized into three units. The first chapter examines caring as a value and practice, and as a political idiom related to suggestions for a caring economy. Care theorists, such as Held (2007) and Tronto (2013), have developed an insightful critique of the neoliberal capitalist order understanding the lack of care in a world of mutually disinterested individuals. Feminist economists have also criticized the science of economics since it ignores normative queries and reduces economic agency to ‘rational’ choices for profit maximization thus providing an epistemological basis for a non-caring economy. Chapter one finishes with the positive evaluation of the political notion of ‘care’ and of care ethicists’ work on identifying and elucidating the care deficit of modern societies but it also stresses the unilateral character of caring which does not indicate a communication on an equal basis between citizens and thus impedes a radical re-organizing of the economy.

Chapter two addresses civic friendship as a two-way relation between political subjects. In particular, it exposes Aristotle’s concept of friendship, its components and its kinds, as well as its interlacing with happiness (*eudaimonia*). Aristotle conceptualizes friendship as a mutual and mutually recognized goodwill and practice of beneficence. Civic friendship, as the political instantiation of friendship, situated in the political universe of the city-state, is closely examined and it is illuminated at its kernel, that is, the feature of reciprocity which presupposes equality. Citizens should be equal politically and not extremely unequal economically in order to be able to reciprocate each other’s well-wishing and beneficence.

In addition, the second chapter addresses Sibyl Schwarzenbach’s (2009) reconstruction of the Aristotelian civic friendship on the basis of caring, of “ethical-political reproduction” which continues and expands care theorists’ attempt to introduce feminine values in the political and economic domain. The chapter closing the first unit
results in the position that civic friendship is more effective political tool than civic care for building an economy which serves human flourishing.

In the second unit, I deal with the modern conceptions of civic friendship which in a way correspond to two versions of the Aristotelian civic friendship as a sharing of the political authority and as market exchange. So chapter three is about Marx’s “social production” (1978), which is interpreted as his account of civic friendship that does not consist in the reciprocation of political authority but of production of material goods pointing thus not to a political equality but to an economic one. Labour, as a non-alienated “species activity”, underlies ‘human production’ as an expression of human community.

In chapter four, I address the potential moral dimension of the market. In particular, I present Adam Smith’s (1976a) account of civic friendship as an outcome of the market’s “invisible hand”. Moreover, I provide Hegel’s (2001) account of civic friendship as the mutual conditioning of the “principle of particularity” and the “principle of universality” in the “system of needs” as well as Honneths’ (2014) reading of Hegel’s position concerning the market, as an institution that could incarnate “social freedom” or, as I interpret it, civic friendship. The inference that ensues from scrutinizing these modern embodiments of civic friendship is that Marx’s ‘social – human’ production denotes a conscious concern for others’ welfare that brings it closer to the meaning of the Aristotelian civic friendship compared to the other modern economic readings of civic friendship. Moreover, Marx’s thought demonstrates that the economy can be a realm where civic friendship is realized and it contributes significantly to the envisioning of a ‘human economy’.

In the third unit, I propose an alternative arranging of the economy that realizes civic friendship. Specifically, in chapter five, I reconstruct civic friendship and I endeavour to furnish it with certain economic content by referring to market socialism as an inefficient economic framework of civic friendship and by exposing, in contrast, Neurath’s (1973a) associational socialist model as an insightful socialist suggestion for realizing civic friendship in the economic field. I also analyze solidarity economy movement as a contemporary economic venture which actualizes civic friendship in the margins of the capitalist economy and which will possibly remain there as a tolerable
deviation from the capitalist rule unless it formulates explicit political objectives and radicalizes its critique on the productivist market economy.

In the final chapter, chapter six, I am deepening on the meaning of civic friendship, foregrounding its instinctual root, and I show, by invoking Marcuse’s (1966) work, that the capitalist economy has severed, in a way, the instinctual need that upholds civic friendship. Degrowth movement (Latouche, 2009; Kallis, 2015) by proposing the downscaling of economic production along with the equitable distribution of material resources, and the valuing of relational goods, creates an environment where, I argue, civic friendship, as an instinctual need and as a virtue, could thrive since people being re-aligned with their real needs would be able to affirm the primordial conception of human well-being that civic friendship implies by acting economically. Being supplemented by Neurath’s decentralized associational socialist model, degrowth project could lead to a post-capitalist economic order that enacts civic friendship and thus serves life.
I

The Eclectic Affinity and the Divergence of Civic Care and Civic Friendship
Chapter 1

On Caring

The notion of care has been deemed by many feminist thinkers as the characteristic feature of women’s morality and activity. Women’s caring labour in the household consists in meeting the needs of others and thus it signifies a concern, an active interest for the others’ well-being. This moral attitude and action of care, for feminists, has been underestimated precisely because it is connected to women and to the private sphere, the sphere where nature and irrationality still prevail. Care is not usually considered to be an appropriate organizing principle for the public domain because the latter does not resemble a family but is based on a contract between self-sufficient and rational individuals who pursue their own goals. The common life of these independent adults is arranged through legal rules and abstract moral principles. However, feminist thinkers believe that this image of public life is illusory since people are not independent and self-sufficient but vulnerable and interdependent. People have needs and need one another in order to fulfill them. They need the care of others in order to feel independent and to pursue their life-goals. Care is thus not inappropriate for the public realm but on the contrary is indispensable to it.

Care, either as a character quality, as a virtue and psychological stance or as a tangible deed, delineates a movement of an I towards a You, an openness to another subjectivity that in a sense is another instantiation of the I. Care signifies a “between” that completes the I and confirms You. Care theorists have developed persuasive arguments for the centrality of care in the definition of morality doubting the gendered character of the dominant conception of morality and they have insightfully argued for the importance of caring social and political structures and institutions, using care as a political idiom. Also, they have stressed the role of the economy in a caring polity but the majority of them have not expounded on the structuring of a caring economic order. Feminist economists have revealed the gendered and ideological character of the science of economics which props up the prevalent conception and exercise of economic activity, supporting in parallel a different economy and economics, closer to caring purposes. The first section of the present chapter illuminates the moral concept of care and its political ramifications. The second section refers to the critique of care ethicists on the
economic order and to their suggestions for the aligning of the economy with care as a moral and political principle, and it shows that although these suggestions point towards the right direction, they are anchored in the logic of the social policy and of welfare state. The third section presents the significant contribution of feminist economic scientists on disclosing the epistemological and ideological basis of the market economy. Feminist economics determines a different object of economic scientific research and theory adding the dimension of providing for human needs in the conceptualization of the economy. However, again it does not seem that caring aims could be effectively promoted since objections to the market economy are not decisive. The unilateral character of care does not allow for a radical critique and transformation of the economy that would put it in the service of human life.

1.1 Conceptualizations of Care Ethics

Carol Gilligan, a psychologist, established care theory when in her work *In a Different Voice* she analyzed the different moral voice of women to that of men, which she captured in the concept of ‘care’. Gilligan conducted a series of interviews examining the development of the moral thinking of women and men, and she noted that the women’s morality centres upon the injunction not to hurt others and upon responsibility and care. Women see themselves enmeshed in a web of relations and feel responsible for the others and for the sustaining of relationships. “The awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for response” (Gilligan, 1982, p.30) Care is expressed through the fulfillment of moral responsibility (Gilligan, 1982, p.73). So, for Gilligan, women’s ethic is an ethic of care, a relational ethic that rests upon the recognition that self and the other are interdependent (Gilligan, 1982, p.74). On the other hand, men feel separated from the world, prioritize their autonomy and interpret morality in terms of abstract principles, of justice and of rights (Gilligan, 1982, p.27).

Gilligan believes that these two ethics are complementary because the ethic of care through the ethic of justice can overcome its latent self-sacrificial element and become more self-inclusive by the realization of the significance of the logic of equality and rights, and the ethic of justice through the ethic of care can appreciate the importance of
the contextuality of judgment and become more sensitive to the differences between people. For Gilligan, a fully developed, mature morality consists of a synthesis of both moralities and points to a mature moral agent who understands “that self and other are interdependent and that life however valuable in itself, can only be sustained by care in relationships” (Gilligan, 1982, p.127).

Gilligan’s work on the different moral perspective of women influenced many feminist thinkers who elaborated on the ethics of care, viewing it as an alternative, promising moral theory. Nell Noddings in her book *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* dealt with care as the foundation of morality but conceptualized care ethics as a private ethic, an ethic that thrives in intimate relationships. Noddings deems that caring is what provides people with their individuality (Noddings, 2013, p.60). People become real subjects, acquire their identity through relatedness. Caring, for Noddings, presupposes a state of “feeling with”, of receptivity, of “engrossment” (Noddings, 2013, p.30). By these terms she describes the attitude of the one-caring towards the cared-for. The person who provides care “does not put herself in the other’s shoes by analyzing his reality as objective data and then asking “How should I feel in such a situation?” but she “receives” the other into herself and she sees and feels with the other. She becomes a “duality” (Noddings, 2013, p.30). Also, in caring there is a motivational shift: the motive energy of the one-caring flows towards the cared for and it is subjected to her service (Noddings, 2013, p.33). However, caring involves not only the engrossment and the motivational displacement of the one-caring but also the recognition of caring and the spontaneous response of the cared-for (Noddings, 2013, p.78). This is a kind of reciprocity in caring which resembles more a sort of assurance that caring was accomplished, and was fruitful, and not an assumption of the role of the care-giver by the care-receiver. Consequently, caring, to Noddings, is a relationship that contains the one-caring and the cared-for who are reciprocally dependent (Noddings, 2013, p.58).

According to Noddings, people have a natural caring sentiment, an innate impulse to act on behalf of the other which alters into an ethical sentiment through “an evaluation of the caring relation as good, as better than, superior to other forms of relatedness” (Noddings, 2013, p.83). We care for the others because we are naturally inclined to do

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1 Levinas (1985) also views subjectivity as emanating from a kind of responsibility for the others, from “being for the others”.
so and because we decide consciously to remain related. So, “an ethic of caring has its source in natural human caring, and it seeks the maintenance and enhancement of that caring” (Noddings, 2013, p.99). The self who wants to care for the other is an ideal self who has been created by the remembrance and positive evaluation of being cared-for, and of caring. That self has been completed in the other and feel fulfilled in the caring relation. This kind of relatedness releases a great deal of joy which enhances the “ethical ideal” and our commitment to it (Noddings, 2013, p.132). Consequently, we caring does not emanate from an obligation meant as a harsh injunction or from formal principles, but from a “rational” joy and fulfillment that the caring relation itself generates.

In contrast to Noddings, who views caring inscribed within close relations, Virginia Held suggests that care as a value and a practice can be used as an organizing principle of the public realm, as a political ideal. In *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global* she gives her account of care ethics and compares it with the dominant moral theories that reflect the logic of the political and economic structures of the contemporary liberal societies. In particular, she clarifies that the ethics of care focuses on attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we are responsible, and she values emotion and contextual reasoning (Held, 2007, pp.10-13). According to the ethics of care, people are relational and interdependent morally and epistemologically rather than self-sufficient, independent individuals, as the dominant moral paradigm insists (Held, 2007, p.13). Held notes:

> Every person starts out as a child dependent on those providing us care, and we remain interdependent with others in thoroughly fundamental ways throughout our lives. That we can think and act as if we were independent depends on a network of social relations making it possible for us to do so. And our relations are part of what constitute our identity (Held, 2007, pp.13-14).

Thus, in the ethics of care, values such as trust, mutual concern, solidarity, empathetic responsiveness and sensitivity are highlighted, and the cultivation of human caring relations is prioritized (Held, 2007, p.16).

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2 Noddings in her later writings (2015) acknowledges that large organizations such as social services, nations and schools can care about (show concern) but they cannot care-for, since that kind of caring, prescribed by care ethics requires a person-to person relationship. Organizations thus can create and support the conditions in order for caring-for, on-site caring, to take place. For Noddings, if they could care-for, that might mean the corruption of the concept of care.
Held regards care as the most basic value, as basic as the value of life (Held, 2007, p.134) and as the presupposition for rights and justice, since it points to a social connectedness and mutual consideration that constitute the necessary condition for the respect of rights and the application of justice principles (Held, 2007, p.137). Thus, she states:

I will argue that empirically before there can be respect for rights there must be a sense of social connectedness with those others whose rights are recognized. I will argue that a relation of social connection, or a caring relation, is normatively prior and has priority over an acknowledgement of rights. We ought to respect the human rights of all persons everywhere, but first of all we ought to develop in everyone the capacity for and the practice of caring about all others as human beings like ourselves (Held, 2007, p.125).

The par excellence caring relationship, for Held, is the one between the mothering person and the child. That type of relationship, she asserts, could replace the prevalent view of society in contractual terms of the economic man who enters into contractual relations which enable him to pursue his interest competing with the other self-interested actors in an eternal race for power. Society could change its goals and could prioritize the bringing up and flourishing of children, the meeting of the needs of everyone, the achieving of peace and the protection of the environment over the longing for domination (Held, 2007, p.19).

Although Held stresses the importance of the mother-child relationship for society’s radical change and improvement, she clarifies that she does not take it as paradigmatic for all the others since she believes that each context calls for a different approach (Held, 1995, p.195). That position derives from her suggestion for an integration of care and justice, since “an adequate, comprehensive moral theory will have to include the insights of both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice” (Held, 2007, p. 16), and for the prioritization of each over the other in different realms. So:

in the realm of law, for instance, justice and the assurance of rights should have priority, although the humane considerations of care should not be absent. In the realm of the family and among friends, priority should be given to expansive care, though the basic requirements of justice surely should also be met (Held, 2007, p.17).

While Held argues for an integration of care and justice moral perspectives and for a situated decision about each one’s priority, she certainly envisions a feminist society where caring relations would limit political conflict and legal coercion (Held, 2007, p.137). Such relations thus would limit the need for applying justice principles. Her
future feminist society is not a pure contractual society because for her that kind of society is always in danger of collapsing. Social cohesion, to Held, is achieved through the forging of social ties, through relations of concern, caring, empathy and trust, and not merely through contracts (Held, 1995, p.204). Held claims that social relations should be enriched with the concern and caring that marks family relations (Held, 1995, p.202). She admits that citizens cannot care for one another at the same level, as family members do but she seems to hold that the adoption of that caring ethos on the part of citizens is feasible.

We see that Held questions the contractual modeling of society, she opposes caring in the pursuit of self-interest, and she describes the priorities of a future feminist society, but her suggestions for an alternative society resemble mere wishes since they are not accompanied by a suggestion for the development of a concrete alternative structuring of political and social institutions. What is more, her vague view about the different moral approaches in the various domains of life seems just a depiction of what is already the case: indeed in family and friendly relations people privilege caring, while in the realm of law, politics and economics, concepts like rights, interests and contracts dominate. She does assert that in the latter sphere human relations should approach caring relations but this does not sound helpful; on the contrary in some cases it might be puzzling or contradictory because for instance people cannot function on the basis of narrow self-interest and on the basis of caring for others simultaneously since personal interest might not be aligned with the meeting of the others’ needs but instead might clash with it. One might assume that Held would answer this dilemma regarding the primacy of interests, either of self or others, by pointing to their mingling, because “persons in caring relations are acting for self-and- other together” since the “wellbeing of caring relation involves the cooperative well-being of those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itself” (Held, 2007, p.13). However, that harmony of interests seems plausible in her future society but not in the present society where individual interests compete. Another possible answer would be that public institutions should permit that mingling of interests by privileging caring aims instead of encouraging people to advance their interests at the expense of others or instead of just preventing them from infringing upon others’ rights, but again, as noted, Held does not seem to have particular proposals about this institutional shift.
In the same vein as Held, Joan Tronto states that care “is not only a moral concept, but a valuable political concept as well” (Tronto, 1993, p.21). Care applies not only to our relations with our friends and relatives but also to our relations with the distant others and with nature. Caring, according to her and Fisher’s definition, is a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web (Tronto, 1993, p.103).

As an ongoing process, care involves four phases: “caring-about” in which we notice a need, “taking care of” in which we assume a responsibility for the identified need, “care-giving” in which we meet the need and “care-receiving” in which we see the response to the care by the receiver of care (Tronto, 1993, pp.105-107). To Tronto, care is, in essence, a practice characterized by the ethical qualities of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness (Tronto, 1993, p.127). In addition, the performing of this action requires that we are disposed to understand the needs of others as they phrase them, not to put ourselves into their position assuming that the others are like us (Tronto, 1993, p.136).

The qualities of attentiveness, of responsibility, of competence and of responsiveness, Tronto notes, can inform our practices as citizens. Caring can render us not only more moral people but better citizens in a democracy (Tronto, 1993, p.168). Tronto believes that caring can function as a political ideal but only within a liberal pluralistic, democratic framework (Tronto, 1993, p.158). Caring can thrive within democracy, and democracy can be deepened through the inclusion of the political idiom of care.

In Caring Democracy, Tronto elaborates on the public-democratic aspect of caring, adding a fifth phase to the process of caring, namely, the “caring with” which is accompanied by the elements of plurality, communication, trust, respect and solidarity (Tronto, 2013, p.5). This fifth phase “requires that caring needs and the ways in which they are met need to be consistent with democratic commitments to justice, equality, and freedom for all” (Tronto, 2013, p.23).

A democratic type of politics should revolve around assigning responsibilities for care, and for ensuring that citizens are capable of participating in this assignment of responsibilities (Tronto, 2013, p.30). The values of freedom, justice and equality that penetrate democracy acquire a new meaning under the lens of caring. Freedom is
defined as the “capacity to engage in deep and superficial relationships of care” (Tronto, 2013, p.62). Justice refers to a just distribution of the burdens and joys of caring and to ensuring that everyone will be adequately cared for (Tronto, 2013, p.62). Equality points to equal chances for people to be care-givers and care-receivers, and on the other hand, it entails that all people have an equal voice in the procedures of discussing and assigning caring responsibilities (Tronto, 2013, pp.169-170).

Tronto claims that care is devalued because it is connected with privacy, with emotion, and with the needy, and these are considered to be the very opposites of public accomplishment, rationality and autonomy, which our society praises as worthy (Tronto, 1993, p.117). Caring activities are also, devalued, underpaid and performed mainly by women and people of colour (Tronto, 1993, p.113). However, Tronto asserts, all human beings have needs, all are vulnerable and fragile and all need the care of others (Tronto, 2013, p.31). This reality should be thematized in the public sphere and influence the way people conceive politics, structure institutions and policies, and organize the economy. Care thinking discloses the existent inequalities of power and poses the goal of equality of resources that will guarantee the right and responsibility of all citizens to be care-givers and care-receivers. A care relationship starts off from an inequality of power and aims at overcoming this imbalance, at the empowerment of the needy person. In the public realm this overcoming of dependence can be achieved only in the context of democracy (Tronto, 1993, p.163). Equality is a desideratum for democracy, so a public caring can be accomplished only within democracy without being degenerated into a paternalistic relationship, one of never-ending dependence.

Moreover, democracy can ensure an inclusive collective deliberation for the fair distribution of caring responsibilities and for sensitivity and attentiveness towards people’s needs, since dialogue and open participation are constituents or objectives of democratic polity. The caring policies of a government or caring initiatives of an institution presuppose discerning needs, interpreting and negotiating those needs, and assigning caring tasks so that all citizens can live as well as possible, since:

the key to living well, for all people, is to live a care-filled life, a life in which one is well cared for by others when one needs it, cares well for oneself, and has room to provide for the caring-for other people, animals, institutions, and ideals - that gives one’s life its particular meaning (Tronto, 2013, p.170).

Sevenhuijsen (1998; 2003), another care ethicist, has also argued for a deliberative caring citizenship, and for government and politics to be attentive and responsive towards people’s needs.
Although, for Tronto, adequate care entails answers about “employment policies, non-discrimination, equalizing expenditures for schools, providing adequate access to health care, and so forth” (Tronto, 1996, p. 145), she does not intend to propose a corpus of institutional changes in order for these general caring aims to be accomplished, since that would contradict her view about the importance of common deliberation, which constitutes the quintessence of democracy. This refusal also resonates with the “expressive-collaborative” morality and politics that the ethics of care as an alternative moral epistemology emphasizes. By providing “the moral space” for the interpretation of needs and the allocation of caring responsibilities, a caring democracy, allows citizens as moral thinkers to arrive at moral decisions - political proposals for institutionalizing democratic caring. According to Walker, the work of feminist ethicists delineates an alternative moral epistemology that departs from the endeavour of dominant tradition of moral philosophy for identifying “a fairly compact system of very general but directly action-guiding principles or procedures” (Walker, 1989, p. 19), and it points to “shared processes of discovery, expression, interpretation, and adjustment between persons” (Walker, 1989, p.16). Human beings involve themselves in “a search for shareable interpretations of their responsibilities, and/or bearable resolutions to their moral binds” (Walker 1989, p.20). Communication, contextuality and narrative are basic elements of the expressive-collaborative morality which denotes an interpersonal moral view which in turn leads to situated moral judgments and solutions. By appealing to this expressive-collaborative model of ethical reasoning, Tronto seems to call for an active citizenship. Citizens who are constantly engaged in dialogical procedures concerning their responsibilities and who do not simply follow pre-established rules revitalize democracy. One could object, however, that the contextuality of dialogues and the refusal of universal moral formulae might question and finally compromise fundamental principles and inalienable rights that people arrived at through painful experience. However, it does not appear that Tronto or even Walker affirm relativism and parochialism, since on the one hand Tronto strongly supports the democratic ideals of freedom, equality and justice, and she clarifies that the recognition of value of care “does not require that we abandon previous moral commitments, for example, to universality, or to a moral point of view that rejects special pleading to serve one’s interests” (Tronto, 1993, p.151), and on the other hand, Walker determines the presupposition of the expressive-collaborative procedure, that is, the protection of goods that people share and the preservation of human connections (Walker, 1989, p.20).
A more systematic account of an ethics of care comes from Daniel Engster who gives a more precise definition of caring compared to that of Tronto and Fisher, and develops an obligation theory for caring. Thus, according to Engster:

>caring may be defined as everything we do directly to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop and function in society (Engster, 2007, pp.28-29).

These purposes of caring are best served if caring rests on the virtues of attentiveness, responsiveness and respect (Engster, 2007, p.30).

Engster does not underestimate the role of emotions as incentives for caring but on the other hand, he contends that the reasoning through a theory of obligation can contribute to the development and strengthening of them. Thus, he claims that we ought to care for the others because:

>we have all made claims upon other human beings for care, and in the process, implicitly committed ourselves to the general moral principle that capable human beings ought to care for other human beings in need when they are able to do so (Engster, 2007, p.123).

So our duty to care for the others is based on our common human dependency, on the very fact of human vulnerability.

Engster places caring responsibilities in an order starting from our responsibility to ourselves, then to our close relatives, friends, compatriots and finally to people in other countries. He justifies this arrangement of caring duties by invoking the correlation between distance and effectiveness of caring. Specifically, he claims that we can care better for people close to us, since we are aware of their needs or can understand these better (Engster, 2007, pp.55-58). Noddings has done something similar, namely, she has prioritized caring obligations on the basis of the dynamic potential for growth in relation and of the capacity of the cared-for to respond. As she contends, “if the possibility of relation is dynamic - if the relation may clearly grow with respect to reciprocity - then the possibility and degree of my obligation also grows. If response is imminent so also is my obligation” (Noddings, 2013, p.87). However, Noddings would not recognize a caring obligation towards distant others, since for her concrete caring actions can take place on a face-to-face interaction. She does not believe that we can do any more than just feel a concern for distant others, caring about them rather than for them.
Engster admits that there are caring responsibilities for people out of the circle of our acquaintances and thus agrees with Held and Tronto that care can be provided through governmental policies, social and economic structures and institutions. At first he asserts that a caring relationship is not necessarily dyadic, a relation between two persons, but can involve groups of people. Care-givers can systematize and improve their caring activities through collective caring schemes and further they can institutionalize these collective caring efforts. A government constitutes an institutionalized collective caring entity that according to Engster’s account of care theory “exists primarily to support and accommodate personal caring activities” (Engster, 2007, p.115).

Although Engster emphasizes the importance of caring and though he asserts that caring is “prior to and necessary for any conception of the good life, and as such, serves as a sort of integral check on all conceptions of morality and the good life” (Engster, 2007, p.61), he does not consider it to be the highest vision of the good. In particular, he does not believe that we should provide care to all individuals before ensuring the availability of resources to enhance the higher capabilities of our loved ones or pursuing our conception of the good life (Engster, 2007, p.61). If we put the caring of others above all other goods, then care theory would become an all-encompassing conception of the good life (Engster, 2007, p.61) and that would not represent his conceptualization of care theory. However, the duty to care for others is considered to be a basic moral duty that everyone should balance against their other ends and values (Engster, 2007, p.62).

While Engster situates caring at the heart of justice and morality, he does not prioritize it over other ends and values. He asserts that care theory does not ask individuals to provide care to people who cannot meet their vital biological needs before ensuring any resources on enhancing the higher capabilities of their dependents or pursuing a conception of the good life. Whether we will provide complete care to our children or basic care to distant others is a matter of our moral judgment and our conception of the good. What Engster seems to say is that the duty of caring for others cannot be an abstract, formal principle; in other words, that we should not apply it to real, concrete moral situations on the terms of an abstract principle but that instead we should think contextually and decide whether we should apply it and when we should do so. It seems that he implicitly appeals to the virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) as the means for helping himself to choose between caring for survival and caring for flourishing, caring
for intimate others or ourselves and caring for distant others. But if we follow his ranking of caring responsibilities we will always result in the same decision: namely, that we should fully care firstly for our dependents and for ourselves and then to devote any remaining resources to others who might be in dire need.

Since caring is regarded as effective when caring practices are implemented in an attentive, responsive, and respectful manner, a caring government’s policies should be informed by these virtues. Engster suggests two ways in order these virtues to be realized:

First, a caring government should attempt whenever possible to involve the potential recipients of care in the process of formulating and implementing the policies designed to serve them (Engster, 2007, p.77).

A second important strategy is encompassed by the principle of subsidiarity:

Governments should shift the delivery of care as much as possible to the personal and local level, facilitating the care of individuals primarily by providing support for parents, families, caregivers, and local organizations who can care for individuals in context-specific and particular ways (Engster, 2007, p.78).

Engster outlines two basic tasks of a caring government. Firstly, it should provide individuals with public goods that they cannot easily obtain on their own and the basic rights necessary to safeguard their integrity, security and ability to care for themselves and others (Engster, 2007, p.81). Similarly, a caring government “will guarantee individuals’ rights against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin in matters directly affecting their ability to give or receive care” (Engster, 2007, p.80).The second task of a caring government is providing support to “the inevitable dependencies of human life”, that is, “infancy and childhood, sickness and injury, and frail old age and disability” “and the derivative dependencies that arise from caring for inevitably dependent individuals” (Engster, 2007, p.81).

Engster claims that caring policies should not necessarily be embedded in a liberal democracy. Although he recognizes some plausibility in Tronto’s position that care theory is most compatible with liberal democratic institutions because these promote listening and, responding, and allow citizens to express and discuss their needs this is not absolutely true, since “liberal democratic governments generally attend and respond to majority demands and interest group pressures, but are not always sensitive to the
basic needs of all citizens, especially the poor and disenfranchised” (Engster, 2007, p.92). A different political regime which could insulate government from the various political pressures would guarantee the fair distribution of care to the citizens even to those less well-off who cannot influence political decisions for the satisfaction of their needs. So, an aristocracy, a theocracy or a merit-based bureaucracy can be acceptable and legitimate if it is effective at helping people to meet their needs. “The general form of government”, Engster maintains, “is less important for care theory than the mode of the government’s administration” (Engster, 2007, p.93). While care theory does not presuppose democracy at the macrolevel, it requires some measure of democracy at local levels since the provision of care is implemented in an attentive, responsive and respectful way. However, it is difficult for me to imagine a non-democratic regime that applies democratic principles in its administration. A non-democratic regime is not necessarily caring and impartial. Quite the contrary: governments that have not been elected by the people represent not all the citizens but a certain group or class of people who wish first of all to promote their own interests and not to listen to and meet society’s needs. What Engster seems to have in mind is a sort of government constituted by wise and just people that will protect the essence of democracy that, contemporary democracies have lost. But although it is true that contemporary democracies are not fully fledged democracies, that does not entail that we ought to abolish democracy and allow the establishment of non-democratic governments which though non-democratic will probably enact democracy at the microlevel so as to rescue the essence of democracy.

Engster asserts that care theory is not egalitarian and does not require the political and social equality of individuals (Engster, 2007, p.100). The meeting of people’s needs does not presuppose their equal status. However, it is reasonable for someone to wonder whether the needs of a socially and politically inferior person can be equally satisfied as the needs of a superior one, since the distribution of resources and opportunities for need satisfaction is tied with people’s social, political and economic status. If their needs are not adequately and equally met within the framework of liberal democracies where people are considered to be socially and politically equal, how that can happen in conditions of recognized and legitimate inequality? Would the voices of unequal individuals count the same in the designing and implementation of caring policies? Engster argues that a caring government would guarantee the adequate care of all the
citizens regardless of their social and political position, and that would lift the oppressions that inhibit caring. That kind of government, however, sounds like a paternalistic one or something like God’s divine providence which protects all the creatures on the earth. It seems that although Engster states that caring should be provided in a respectful manner: namely, a manner indicative of the ontological worth of the recipient of care, this worth is not translated into political or secular terms.

I think what Engster implies is that the political and social equality that democracy connotes is an empty rhetorical scheme and maybe the realization of democracy come from an administration that cares for people regardless of their social and economic position. Engster equates politics and administration in order to re-animate democracy. However, he cannot avoid seeing the administration under the lens of broad politics, since he appeals to democratic procedures when he speaks of the distribution of care at the microlevel. So, the form of a government is not just an empty shell, as he seems to believe. It has content, and that content consists of values and ideals that are incarnated through policies, institutions and administration. The administration is always the mirror of the broad political form or culture, and not its substitute.

Moreover, there are inequalities and oppressions that, contrary to what Engster claims, do impede the provision of care. Women who live under authoritarian regimes which do not acknowledge their equal social and political status, even though these regimes care for the meeting of their needs and the development of their capabilities, and do not treat them violently, are not adequately cared for, since they cannot exert their skills and their capabilities, and they suffer because of the deprivation of their social and political agency. So, Engster’s care within such a framework can be regarded as deficient. People are not only biological-bodily beings but social and political beings as well. Social and political equality is a kind of recognition of their ontological and moral substance. This recognition is a crucial component of caring that Engster does not address because he wants to give a minimal definition of care. However, by doing that he gives a simplistic depiction of a human being’s needs and human’s essence.
1.2 Care Ethics and the Economy

Held, as we saw, sketches a feminist – near or distant – caring future society which privileges the flourishing of children and of human relations, inscribed in the present institutional framework of a contemporary liberal democratic society. In her view, the state, the law and the market will continue to be guided by their own principles but they will also embrace caring considerations. Each sphere of life should work according to its inherent values and objectives and not aspire to extend its influence over the others. Hence, the imperialism of the market should be curbed and areas such as health-care, childcare, education, the informing of citizens, and the production of culture could all be thought of as domains in which values other than economic gain should be accorded priority (Held, 2002, p.29).

The market is a domain where self-interest and maximization of profit prevail and so its norms cannot organize domains in which caring concerns constitute their core. The development of independent thought and the cultivation of social responsibility, for example, are basic educational objectives that commercialized educational institutions leave aside for the sake of market goals such as the optimization of productivity and profit. The promotion of consumption through advertising within schools and universities, and the decreasing of salaries along with the increasing of workloads, that entail more competitive and marketable educational products (Held, 2002, pp.27-28) surely do not edify free people and sensitive citizens, and do not satisfy the needs of all involved in the educational process.

Education, healthcare and childcare are not goods to be sold in the market, to be distributed by the market mechanism, since they are not commodities. Held invokes Anderson’s definition of economic goods according to which “economic goods are goods that are properly valued as commodities and properly produced and exchanged in accordance with market norms” (Anderson, 1993, p.143). Anderson, like Held, positions education out of the reach of the market norms (Anderson, 1993, p.163) and moreover she gives illustrations of commodities, namely, “conveniences, luxuries, delights, gadgets, and services found in most stores” (Anderson, 1993, p.167). She does not seek the elimination of the market institution but regards it as a certain sphere of life where people value certain goods in a certain way. Human life and activity are deployed in various social spheres which precisely embody the different modes of valuation of
different goods (Anderson, 1993, p.141). This “multiple sphere differentiation” serves the ideals of freedom, autonomy, and welfare that liberal pluralistic society promises (Anderson, 1993, p.141). One can understand that Held and Anderson, in fact, are influenced by Walzer’s view that “liberalism is a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty” (Walzer, 1984, p.315). For Walzer, “institutions are responsive to their own internal logic” and the art of their separation is “a morally and politically necessary adaptation to the complexities of modern life” (Walzer, 1984, p.319). While liberalism has been seen as a political ideal aimed at the limitation of political power of the state in order to protect the autonomy of other institutions and citizens’ autonomy, now it looks as if the market needs to be limited in order for the integrity of other institutions - and by extension, people’s autonomy and equality, - to be enshrined. Walzer does not think that the market should be abolished but that it should be confined to its proper space by a socialized government (Walzer, 1984, pp.322, 323).

According to Held, liberal individualism cannot impose limits on the market because the protection of rights that liberal individualism of a Kantian sort supports, and the maximization of preference satisfaction that liberal individualism of a utilitarian form prioritizes, do not question whether institutions assigned with the task of providing food, medical care or education should run within the province of the market or not. In addition, as long as we respect the rights of persons, we could theoretically treat them as a means, apart from as an end, and thus we could buy their services. And as long as we can obtain a benefit and satisfy our preferences from the services sold in the market, we could consider them to be a commodity (Held, 2002, pp.28-30).

The ethic of care, on the other hand, could provide us with a criterion so as to identify the areas of human life that should not be commercialized. That criterion is the existence of practices relying on values, such as a mutually caring concern, that are incompatible with market logic (Held, 2002, pp.30-32). The market does not foster caring and social bonds but rather it undermines them, since it relies on the pursuit of individual gain at the expense of other people’s interests and needs. Consequently, social goods that embody social values and guard social cohesion should not be engulfed and converted into commodities by the market. Held, although she does not

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4 Michael Sandel (2013; 2012) has also argued against the reaching of market reasoning into non-economic spheres of life. According to him, the commodification of certain goods and social practices brings about their degradation and corruption.
preclude the possibility that the market could be informed by the values of caring (Held, 2002, p.32), does not believe that in its present form it can distribute care.

Tronto underscores the significance of the participation of all citizens in the public deliberative procedures for the allocation of the joys and burdens of care and she also understands that in order for such dialogues to be meaningful and fruitful, every citizen’s voice should count equally. So power differentials should be reduced (Tronto, 2013, p.33). However, she does not seem to identify the structural causes of economic inequalities. This may be due to her decision to rule out production from caring activities. She distinguishes production from care because production “repairs, maintains and preserves daily life at one remove, rather than in the direct and intimate ways usually associated with care” (Tronto, 2013, p.70). What she nonetheless suggests for ensuring resources for adequate caring is “the raising of the minimum wage and improving access to such benefits as sick days and personal days”. She also proposes the equation of school day and work day that would enable parents to spend more time with their children, and would allow children more time to learn and play in school (Tronto, 2013, p.175). In addition, she argues for higher salaries for necessary care workers (Tronto, 2013, p.179) and for a redistribution of money (Tronto, 2013, p.179).

While Tronto does not address productive procedure, she develops a critique of neoliberalism and of the work ethic. She defines neoliberalism as:

> the economic system in which government expenditures are limited, the market is viewed as the preferred method of allocating all social resources, the protection of private property is taken to be the first principle of government, and social programs are limited to being a ‘safety net’. This economic system is supported by a political form of limited liberal democracy and an ideology of limited government involvement (Tronto, 2013, p.37).

The market in neoliberalism - apart from constituting a method for distributing resources - is considered to be the means for resolving disputes and for permitting individuals’ “choice” which, it is deemed, constitutes the meaning of freedom. So, according to that logic, the market achieves human freedom and any interference with such choice harms people’s freedom and society in general (Tronto, 2013, p.37).

Neoliberalism intensifies the work ethic\(^5\), which is gendered since it honours production, which is connected with men, and underestimates caring which is

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\(^5\) Care ethicists adopt Weber’s (1992) view on work ethic as one of the pillars of capitalism.
synonymous with feminine, and it is highly individualistic (Tronto, 2013, pp.83, 84). People must work hard in order to meet their needs and government should safeguard order so as to enable industrious citizens to enjoy the fruits of their labour (Tronto, 2013, p.83). Those who lack the means for their subsistence are responsible for their poverty since they consciously abstain from work (Tronto, 2013, p.83). Neoliberalism emphasizes the responsibility of people for their economic status and presents poor people as a drag for their fellow citizens. The caring, thus, for those less well-off is a burden and not a fulfilling and valuable activity that creates ties among people. And indeed, it looks as if it is a drudgery if it is a kind of charity for alleviating extreme poverty on the part of a state committed to ensuring the unbridled function of a market that promises fair distribution of wealth and reward of “moral”-industrious subjects, and on the part of citizens who are required to support their fellow-citizens by giving them a share of their well-deserved income. This image of neoliberalism is evidently the opposite of a caring democratic society as Tronto has described it. The market has replaced democratic dialogue as a means for settling public issues, and freedom is not a caring commitment which fills life with meaning and contributes to social cohesion but instead has been reduced to an individual choice for selfish preference satisfaction. Further, equality is not a justifiable objective and justice is distributed through the market on the basis of the criteria of an effective economic agency. Therefore, it looks as if neoliberalism is perverting the kernel of democracy and transforming citizens into mere economic agents detached from one other and devoted to their own economic life-projects. Thus, inserting care as a moral value and practice into the public sphere seems to be not just an attempt to invigorate democracy but an attempt to protect it.

The markets, Tronto states, do not begin from equality (Tronto, 2013, p.177) and they perpetuate and intensify economic discrepancies that do not correspond to different levels of industry. Therefore, the non-interference with them is not a respect for human freedom but rather a fostering of economic injustice that is interpreted as a serious care deficit in society. Tronto does not, however, condemn capitalism or the market per se, as she says (Tronto, 2013, p.177), and she believes that the market can distribute various types of care such as health care, provision for the elderly, or child care (Tronto, 2013, p.177), thereby permitting choice concerning the preferable form of care which, however, should not entail superior or inferior levels of care (Tronto, 2013, p.177). She holds that the market can adopt other values in parallel with the maximization of profit.
Capital, she notes, can be caring if people begin to demand it (Tronto, 2013, p.178), but while care can be distributed through the market mechanism, it should not be seen exclusively in market terms because that would distort its meaning (Tronto, 2013, p.129). The market for her is:

> an institution that can further a variety of ends. If however, the market’s ends are taken to be only those that fit with the neoliberal preferences for entrepreneurship, accumulation of wealth, driving prices for all goods as low as possible, then such a market will interfere with rather than support, making just arrangements for care (Tronto, 2013, p.130).

It seems that what Tronto asks the market to do is to function as a welfare state, to adopt other laws and purposes from its intrinsic ones and thereby to oppose itself and its maintenance. The elimination of costs and the maximization of profits are the foundation of the market and the way that capital is produced. I find it extremely difficult for the market to follow genuine caring standards and I do not think that capital can start being caring and conforming to citizens’ demands, precisely because its nature is aggressive; its creation and augmentation presuppose an aggressive economic mode of behavior (Cohen, 2009). What Tronto wishes to convey is that the market can be - though it is not - a neutral mechanism if it is subsumed within the state and citizens’ dictates for the prioritization of caring values and democratic values over market thinking. She holds that if democratic institutions and the democratic citizens appreciate the value of care and dethrone market thinking as the only possible model for reasoning, then the market could be controlled in the interests of society. However, the omnipotence of market thinking reflects the omnipotence of the market and of capital, of a certain mechanism for the reproduction of the material basis of society. Consequently, citizens, I think, should not simply demand the adoption of caring aims by the market but should rather question its fundamental nature and re-establish, or re-invent it so as to serve caring-social goals.

For Engster, capitalism, in its most extreme form of neoliberalism has perverted the nature of the economy by privileging the maximization of profit. Moreover, it has disseminated an individualistic and selfish mindset that undermines caring attitudes and actions among citizens (Engster, 2007, pp.134-136). Care theory opposes that degeneration of the role of the economy and seeks to realign it with its implicit normative purpose of supporting human survival, development, and basic social functioning (Engster, 2007, p.126). The central objective of a caring economic order is
to ensure that everyone has access to the necessary economic resources to care for themselves, their dependents and human beings in general (Engster, 2007, p.118). The establishment of such an order, which would favour a more equitable distribution of wealth, he states, would encourage the development of caring dispositions among people, which in turn would confirm caring institutions (Engster, 2007, pp.118-119).

Engster distinguishes caring from productive work by pointing out their different immediate purposes: caring practices aim directly at meeting people’s biological and developmental needs, whereas productive labour aim at different ends, such as growing, harvesting, extracting or manufacturing (Engster, 2007, p.121). Although the ultimate goal of labour is the support of caring activities, it does not count as a caring practice for Engster. Caring and commodity production, he asserts, constitute two independent and interdependent material bases of human life but caring has some moral priority over commodity production because it does not have other goals apart from providing care. This is in contrast to commodity production, where as well as working to meet their needs, people work to serve other aims such as “earning money, becoming powerful or asserting their identity” (Engster, 2007, p.123). The higher moral status of caring over commodity production, dictates, for Engster, the subordination of the latter, at least in part, to the moral aims of caring (Engster, 2007, p.123).

Care theory does not seek to entirely subsume labour within the purposes of caring (Engster, 2007, p.126). People can pursue a variety of ends through their economic activity but first they should fulfill the end of caring, which is the necessary presupposition for the functioning of the economy and the maintenance of society. Just as Engster’s theory remains open toward various forms of governments, it likewise remains open toward different macroeconomic systems, since “more important from the perspective of care theory than the form of the economy are regulatory principles that guarantee the productive economy will support caring practices no matter what macroeconomic structure a society may adopt” (Engster, 2007, p.140). However, because care theory wants to re-embed the economy within society it is opposed to an unregulated free-market system which undermines direct care services and deprives many people of the resources necessary to care for themselves and others (Engster, 2007, p.139).
Engster sketches a caring economic order\textsuperscript{6} by referring to six economic policy principles. The first principle dictates that all individuals should have the opportunity to work and to receive a wage that enables them to care adequately for themselves and for their dependents. That means that government should create jobs and should warrant a decent minimum income for employees. He suggests a series of ways for the accomplishment of these objectives, such as tax incentives that will lead to investments, cheaper credit, training programmes, and support for the sector of care work. With regard to a decent income for workers, he proposes the raising of the minimum wage and the supplementing of low incomes through measures such as the earned income tax credit (Engster, 2007, pp.141-142).

The second principle is related to the time that people need in order to meet their caring duties towards themselves and their dependents. Thus, a government in a caring economic order should determine a maximum working day and working week, and should also establish publicly funded leaves. Further, flexible workplace scheduling could also facilitate caring (Engster, 2007, p.143-144).

The third principle is to ensure that economic activity will not cause harm to employees or the environment. So, government should enact laws for the workplace and environmental protection so as to protect individuals’ capability for providing care (Engster, 2007, pp.144-145).

According to the fourth principle, government should support direct care services and personal caring activities. Hence, care sectors such as childcare, disability care, and education should be publicly subsidized and regulated in order for all citizens to have

\textsuperscript{6} Eisler (2007) argues for a caring economic setting similar to that of Engster – though she does not provide a normative grounding of a care theory - which comprises caring “economic inventions” like child-care allowances, paid parental leaves, reduced transportation costs, local currencies, better training and payment for childcare, nursing, elder care, and flexible work options. Eisler has underlined the role of caring work and a caring ethos in the development and sustaining of a healthy and productive economy. For her, an economy that fulfills people’s survival needs and their need for dignity and meaning, nurtures their capacities and conserves natural habitat, is a successful and efficient one because it ensures the thriving of its core components: namely, human capital and natural resources. The caring economic order that Eisler envisions is characterized by the element of partnership: household, community economy, market and government economy as basic sectors of the economy should apply a model of partnership which is a model of democratic and egalitarian relationships of mutual benefit, responsibility and accountability. Government policies and businesses’ policies, to Eisler, should become caring through “hierarchies of actualization”. Although she critiques the market economy, she claims that the market is a key factor of a healthy economy and that its malfunction is due to the transgression of its rules such as competition.
access to quality care. Engster does not preclude the provision of care through the market mechanism but he contends that government should establish certain standards and terms that will safeguard the quality of care, such as adequate training and fair remuneration of care workers (Engster, 2007, pp.145-146).

The fifth principle calls for temporary economic assistance for those capable individuals who are unemployed and for those incapable of working (Engster, 2007, p.146).

Finally, the sixth principle which Engster calls the “just entitlement principle” states that individuals are entitled to keep that portion of their resources that will allow them to care adequately for themselves and for their dependents. Moreover, they are entitled to retain some resources that will enable them to pursue a conception of the good life. And they “might also be allowed to retain additional resources insofar as it serves as an incentive to generate more social resources for individuals in need” (Engster, 2007, pp.147-148). Consequently, taxation should not be high for people on a low income and not imposed at all if it would deprive them of the means for subsistence and for a decent life interpreted as the leading of a life according to a certain conception of the good. Also, the most well off should be exempted from taxation as long as they employ their high income to promote productivity and economic efficiency that will avail those less well-off by rendering them capable of caring for themselves and their loved ones (Engster, 2007, pp.148-149). Engster here follows Rawls’ “difference principle” which allows income differentials insofar as the latter redound to the interest of the least advantaged, showing thus once again that his account of care theory is not egalitarian since it does not call for economic equality but simply justifies the limiting of economic inequalities through the imposition of taxation on high incomes for the sake of caring.

This caring economic order that Engster describes, presupposes a powerful state which decisively regulates the market economy and renders capitalism a caring economic system. That idyllic picture, however, does not resonate with the nature of capitalism which demands the state’s non-interference in the market. Neoliberalism, which he rejects, is nothing but the natural evolution of capitalism, which although it increases economic efficiency and resources and opportunities for caring for some people, is simultaneously un-caring and even cruel for many others. Engster is inventive about the ways in which a caring government could partially subject the economy to its caring aims and it is true that capitalism has co-existed with more or less developed forms of a
welfare state, which would mean that the instituting of a broad well-ordered caring economic structure could be feasible within capitalism. However, historical experience has shown that capitalism rests on economic inequalities; it entails an economic disequilibrium which is difficult to turn into its opposite since it has been generated to exist as such.

The form of the economy, like the form of the government, is not of less importance compared to the particular regulatory economic principles since the latter derive from the former. Engster in a way acknowledges this truth when he clarifies that a non-regulated market economy undercuts caring. He describes a more just capitalist economy, an economy that cares for people. He outlines the economic policy of a caring government within a capitalist economic framework which tries to balance care and the thriving of capital. Again, he believes that caring does not presuppose economic equality as it does not presuppose social and political equality, and so he does not address the economic structures that engender unequal incomes and unequal care. Engster’s economic policy is an endeavour to improve the welfare state in the direction of structural economic equality without the intention of reaching this structural economic equality. However, structural inequality entails caring inequality or else ‘more adequate’ care for some people and ‘less adequate’ care for other people but this does not seem to concern Engster, in so far as the common denominator in both cases is adequate care. However, as he points out, adequate care is determined by the government, given the condition of the economy, of the existing resources (Engster, 2007, p.88). So, in the case of economic scarcity, adequate care cannot be the same as in times of prosperity. And although the inequality of adequate care among people in prosperity does not count as a lack of care for those less well-off, it does so under scarcity. While Engster argues for a fairer and caring economic order, he does not question the terms of existence, the foundations of the current economic order. His economic policy is a kind of economic administration. But the improvement in the level of administration is feasible to the extent that the broad economic condition allows it. Consequently, what we need is to look again at the fundamental principles and the structures of the economic sphere in relation to a more inclusive, a broader concept of care.

As can be deduced from the discussion above, it cannot be said that public life is informed by caring either as a valuable cultural norm or as a caring activity, and
economic life more specifically is not under “the dominance of the spirit that says Thou” (Buber, 2004, p. 43). Instead of being engrossed in their fellow humans, individuals “harden into the world of it” (Buber, 2004, p. 46) and sink into unreality (Buber, 2004, p.53). As a solution to this situation, care ethicists suggest economic policies and institutions for meeting human needs; in other words, policies and institutions that accommodate caring practices, pointing thus to an enrichment of the welfare state. Social policy and the welfare state aim at giving people opportunities for caring for themselves and their loved-ones. Educational programmes for unemployed citizens, income subsidies for low wage earners, subsidies for poor families, and a just form of taxation are only some illustrations of the social policy of a caring authority which aims to compensate for the economic inequalities that obtain in market economies. Capitalism creates inequalities that the market perpetuates and intensifies while presenting itself as the guarantor of equal chances and the fair arbiter of the different interests and needs. To this reality the state responds with a series of corrective initiatives that seek to redress the balance between the unbridled pursuit of profit and the needs of the many. To some extent the state succeeds to its attempt to care for people whom the market deprives of the means to satisfy their needs. However, this type of caring does not always achieve the empowerment of care-receivers and the overcoming of power differentials, of the inequality that dwells in the caring relation. Yet even if a particular person recovers and is capable of providing for herself, there will be another person who will lack adequate resources to survive and develop. If we see both the state and society as collective entities we understand that the care-giver and the care-receiver are condemned to a permanent relation of dependence. Hence, the caring circle does not close with the empowerment of the cared-for; the caring is incomplete or unsuccessful. Therefore, the state will remain an unending giver of unfruitful help if we insist on ignoring and not thematizing the economic structures that cause economic inequalities.

1.3 Feminist Economics and Care

Feminist thinkers have criticized the dominant neoclassical model of economics and have suggested a different way of conceptualizing economics that will allow for a new conception and organization of the economy which will be beneficial not only for
women’s economic and social status but also for society overall. This new understanding of economics and economy is oriented to moral values and caring goals that the positivist paradigm of economics has ostracized as non-scientific, thereby draining economic thought of its normative content.

Nelson claims that contemporary economics has been built upon the Newtonian idea of a clockwork world (Nelson, 2004, p.384). The economy, according to this conception, works like a machine and should be studied in terms of observability, predictability and control (Nelson, 2004, p.394). Economic agents, for the neoclassical economic model, are autonomous, rational and self-interested, and strive to maximize utility and profits (Nelson, 2004, p.385). Self-interest is regarded as the fundamental motive of economic agency and the fuel of the productive machine. This positivist model of economics, to Nelson, has been anchored in a broad conception of the self, the world, knowledge and science since the time of the Enlightenment, and marked by hierarchical dualisms not empty of gender connotations. Thus,

> reason, detachment, independence, certainty, clarity, eternals, and order, for example, are culturally associated with masculinity as well as with traditional science, while emotion, connection, interdependence, fallibility, vagueness, changeableness, and chaos have been pushed away as the feminine-associated ‘other’ (Nelson, 2003, p.110).

Economists attempting to render economics a ‘hard’ science followed the paradigm of natural sciences, excluding normative questions from their research as not scientific since these cannot yield measurable elements. The notion of value is defined only in material terms or in terms of preference satisfaction that is drained of any ethical concerns. Goods that are sold and bought in the market have a certain use, a certain utility, and respond to mere wants and preferences of mutually disinterested individuals. Economists are not interested in the moral quality of consumers’ desires and they do not study the way these wants have been formed (Nelson 2004, p.385). Also, they do not deem interpersonal utility\(^7\) comparisons scientifically justifiable, since desires are subjective:

> Neoclassical theory tells us that we cannot know which of two persons gained more from a given exchange because the relevant “currency” in which gain or advantage is measured is utility, and utility is conceived as being radically subjective (England, 2002, p. 157).

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\(^7\) Utility for economics is the satisfaction of an individual’s subjective desires.
But, England argues, if we cannot compare the well-being of persons or groups because that well-being is entirely subjective⁸ then we cannot speak of advantaged and disadvantaged people or about unjust economic inequalities, and we are not scientifically entitled to refer to distributional issues (England, 2002, p.158).

Contemporary economics focuses on preference satisfaction and on choice. Economic agents pursuing their self-interest are required to make a series of rational choices, that is, choices that yield economic gain and fulfill their selfish wants. The centre of economics is an economic ego separated from fellow-humans and from the world in general. Nelson aptly says that this separation underscores the Cartesian dichotomy of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* (Nelson, 1993, p.32) in which economics is entrapped and she asks for an overcoming of that separation: “What is needed instead is a definition of economics that considers humans in relation to the world” (Nelson, 1993, p.32). This kind of definition would occur if economics focused on the provisioning of human life, namely, on the commodities and processes necessary to human survival⁹ (Nelson, 1993, p.32). Issues such as the adequate provisioning of food and shelter, child care, healthcare and education should become the centre of economic inquiry (Nelson, 1993, p.32).

Folbre also argues for a new caring paradigm that should replace the conservative neoclassical economic model. She stresses the importance of caring which she defines as “concern for others” (Folbre, 2003, p.214) and of caring labour which for her is broad and includes activities such as meeting the needs of children, the elderly, the sick, and other dependents, but which is not confined to these activities; caring labour rather includes what people perform out of a caring motive, namely, out of affection or out of a sense of responsibility for others with no expectation of immediate pecuniary reward (Folbre, 2003, p.214).

Folbre finds institutionalist economics a more appealing and reasonable economic model since it does not ignore norms and values or examine them along with preferences. In addition, it surveys collective action in the economic terrain posing

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⁸ Neoclassical economics defines well-being in terms of preference satisfaction. However, the conception of well-being within the neoclassical tradition has not always had a subjective meaning, since it was defined in hedonistic or objectivist terms by the founders of that economic tradition. (O’Neill, 1998, pp. 56-60).

⁹ Donath’s “other economy”, as the object of feminist economic discipline, is “the direct production and maintenance of human beings” (Donath, 2000, pp. 116,122).
questions such as “how people may come to identify with, and pursue common interests within social groups” (Folbre, 2003, p.220).

England maintains that neoclassical economic theory contains androcentric biases since it is characterized by three basic assumptions that form a “separative” model of human nature which points to a male agent impervious to social influences (England, 2002, p.154). These assumptions are: interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, tastes are exogenous to economic models and unchanging, and actors are selfish (have independent utilities) in markets (England, 2002, p.154). England asserts that interpersonal utility comparisons are regarded as impossible because they presuppose a self without emotional connections that would facilitate empathy (England, 2002, p.158). People, however, are capable of placing themselves in the others’ position and can imagine how others feel in a given situation; so they can make interpersonal utility comparisons (England, 2002, p.158). It could be said, nonetheless, that appealing to sympathy, to emotions, which England invokes, would not be scientific for neoclassical economics because it is not compatible with a strict objectivity which dictates a distance between the scientist and the object of research, and working with quantitative elements.

Regarding tastes, England asserts that these are not fixed but changeable and influenced by people’s surroundings; our relations with our friends, co-workers and neighbours, our jobs, our social roles, and our gender certainly have an impact on the formation of our tastes (England, 2002, p.159). This social origin of preferences, it could be noted, extending England’s thought, might raise queries about the worth of those tastes and about their contribution to human well-being. Also, it could be questioned whether they express rational attitudes and spring from real needs or whether they are spurious and alien to them. The questioning of the nature of desires that are fulfilled in the market, in effect, questions the tenet that the market guarantees autonomy, consumer sovereignty, and by extension it doubts the justifiability and legitimacy of the doctrine of the free, entirely unregulated market that neoliberalism advocates and the neoclassical economic paradigm bolsters scientifically.

Selfishness in the market could mean altruism, England contends, since some people may feel good by helping others, through economic activity, to improve the well-being of those others. Utility can come from altruistic economic action (England, 2002, p.160). This is a positive sort of altruism that could thrive in the market. However, there
is also a negative one, namely, the pro-male altruistic discrimination; sometimes “employers are willing to pay male workers more than the contribution of the marginal worker to revenue product” (England, 2002, p.161). The market thus harbours discrimination even though neoclassical economics excludes that possibility (England, 2002, p.161). This intentional decrease of profit, it might be added, equates to irrational behaviour which is also ruled out by the neoclassical model as alien to the conceptualization of the economy as a well-tempered apparatus, animated by rational, calculative agency.

Nelson contends that we could alter the way in which we conceive economics if we shift our attention to a different ontology, to a different view about the nature of the world. Whitehead, she maintains, has developed an ontology which is “process-oriented, energetic, and interconnected” (Nelson, 2003, p.113). For Whitehead, reality is “a process” and a deeply interconnected whole. Each unit of reality “upholds value intensity for itself, and this involves sharing value intensity with the universe” (Whitehead, 1968, 1938, p.111, cited in Nelson, 2003). This notion of value, which illuminates the role of “feeling”, introduces the notion of “purpose” as an analytical category concerning how the world works. Matter for him is not “a passive substance proceeding either deterministically or randomly without purpose” (Nelson, 2003, p.115). These ontological elements of process, of openness, of purpose, of feeling and value could help us to discern and draw to the forefront features of the economy, sorts of economic behaviour that neoclassical economics neglects since they do not fit into its well-formed mechanical ideal type. Experimental economists, she notes, have found that subjects in various economic simulations very often tend to cooperate. Moreover, researchers on organizational behaviour and business ethics have observed that a persons’ conduct is characterized by dimensions of “loyalty”, by “a search for meaning and purpose”, by “identification with work and with community” (Nelson, 2004, p.391). Shedding light on these behaviours, one could start thinking of economy as a creative process or as an organism, as a field of human activity that is “sustained, continually created, and potentially transformed by beliefs, norms, relationships, aspirations, concerns, satisfactions, and ethical reflections” (Nelson, 2004, p.393). Consequently, what Nelson means to say is that the way we see the world affects the way we form the world. Viewing economy not as a machine with fixed laws but as an open process we could form it in accordance with moral aims and values and we could act in its territory
as morally responsible and socially interconnected persons. The self-fulfilled prophesy can thereby function not only for bad but for good too.

Nelson acknowledges that non self-interested incentives are weak in economic transactions but for her the position that the economy runs on greed is something like a universal law we should not accept. Stereotypes, she seems to say, naturalize and ossify reality, presenting the observance of usual conducts as knowledge and as a natural law. In contrast, an unbiased scientific attitude towards the world that it allows for fallibility and unpredictability could make people more active and could assist them to take seriously and deploy their moral potential as a creative power, as a power that can shape the world. This, she seems to say, is not clear to “systemic critique” and “separate spheres” scholars who in developing their critique against the market that inherently damages human dignity, in fact adopt the assumption of neoclassical economics and see the economy as a closed system (Nelson, 2004, pp.387-389). Nelson does not exclude studies of choice, of exchange, of provision of conveniences or luxuries from economics, neither does she reject an organized, impersonal market as one locus of economic activity, but she strongly argues for its removal from the core of economics (Nelson, 1993, p.33). Households, governments and informal organizations also belong to the territory of the economy and they should be objects of economic survey. Economics should search to see whether the economy contributes to the provisioning of human life and to its flourishing and that of all creation (Nelson, 2004, p.393). In other words, economics should be about how we live in our oikos, in our “house”, the earth (Nelson, 1993, p.33).

Nelson is right that, in the economic terrain, caring, cooperation and loyalty can be encountered, but as she states, this does not happen very often. It is also true that our actions conform to our cognitive schemes, making possible the self-fulfilling prophesy. However, the overshadowing of the dominant features of a phenomenon does not eliminate them, and the underscoring of marginal features does not change the overall character of that phenomenon which is determined by its stronger ones. Nelson seems to support a non-essentialist critique of the economy explaining in parallel her disagreement with the essentialist critique of the market economy. As a post-modern thinker, she does not hold that the market has an essence, a cohesive, unchanging substance. This anti-essentialist thesis backed by a process-oriented and purpose-oriented ontology, she believes, makes possible not just a change in the way in which
we define economics but also a radical change in how we organize the economy. However, by identifying the core properties of the market economy we do not overlook that it has deviations from its main character; we simply map a phenomenon and we try to comprehend it. Hence, the essentialist critique on the market does not impede a radical change of the economy but rather facilitates it, because it is easier to change a reality we completely understand than a reality whose identity we hesitate to determine.

Moreover, a process-oriented ontology that recognizes purposive economic action and allows room for value, feeling and ties between economic agents, does not necessarily point to ethically right action. Of course it implies free and not pre-ordained action but it does not ensure its moral quality. Human agency need not necessarily resort to the world of natural sciences for guidance. People are able to use their reasoning and they can establish moral rules so as to guide their actions. In addition, they can reflect on their actions and revise them. By exchanging reasons and arguments, Nussbaum argues, people infer that some things are good and others bad, some arguments persuasive and others not, and then they can act according to their evaluative judgments, unencumbered by transcendental or “scientific” certainties\(^\text{10}\) (Nussbaum, 1992, pp.212-213). The fixed form of the economy will not change if we decide to see it as a living organism in which moral economic agency springs from some of its pores. This is because by overestimating the power that the exogenous to the market moral behaviour has to limit the inherent rules of its function, we will possibly weaken our perceptivity and unconsciously accept the ostensibly multifarious ethical reality of the market economy.

Strober asserts that economic theory hinges on notions like ‘scarcity’, ‘selfishness’ and ‘competition’, and relegates their opposites, namely, ‘abundance’, ‘altruism’ and ‘cooperation’ to a place out of economic analysis (Strober, 1994, p.145). The concentration on these notions rules out any thought of redistribution of power and of economic well-being, and hinders the improvement in women’s economic situation (Strober, 1994, p.145). The tenet that material resources are scarce does not permit the realization that many economic problems are due to the maldistribution of economic resources and not to their scarcity. In the USA for example, Strober states, there is sufficient food for everyone, but there is a significant section of the population, mostly women and children that experiences malnutrition and hunger (Strober, 1994, p.146).

\(^\text{10}\) Nussbaum here actually refers to the paradigm of scientific realism, which has collapsed.
addition, scarcity is partly artificial because it depicts the expectations and desires which are cultivated by the suppliers of commodities through advertising. The assumption of economics that individuals’ tastes are independent from those of others hides this induced scarcity (Strober, 1994, p.146). Selfishness and competition are not necessarily the only motives that can work in the economy because they are not dominant human psychological inclinations. People are pleased not only, as economists contend, when they enjoy more goods by using additional income but also when that additional income is used for improving the well-being of others (Strober, 1994, p.146). However, the doctrine of the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons does not allow for identifying and thematizing altruism and caring.

Feminist economists cast light on the gendered premises of economics and on its false objectivity which sustain an economic reality with stable principles that look like eternal laws deriving from human nature. They claim that the objectivity of the neoclassical economic theory which prevails in economics and the concomitant economic reality it explains and underpins are socially constructed and so it is possible to change. The economy is an area of human activity that accommodates self-interest and altruism, competition and cooperation, market and household, profit-organizations and government. It is not only about the market and profit maximization but also and principally about the provisioning of life. Consequently, economics should study matters about caring and about the quality of life along with matters about the markets, efficiency and productivity. Economics should reconcile itself with morality and insert normative queries to its purview. This would encourage moral behaviour in economic sphere and would contribute to an alternative structuring of the economy in the interests of the least well off members of society, including women. This venture of ‘secularizing’ economic discipline constitutes an emancipatory human endeavour which, however, operates in the ethics field of economics and has not yet evolved to become a “usable alternative model of economic decision making” (Blank, 1993, p.143). This, I think, is partly due to feminist economists’ anti-essentialist view that it does not assist them to escape vagueness nor suggest precise and well-justified institutional changes.
Conclusion

Care ethicists and feminist economists have examined the model of *homo economicus*, that self-interested, independent, rational subject, highlighting its a-social or anti-social dimension. Care ethicists have pointed out that this image of the economic man has in effect influenced liberal moral theory, since the moral reasoner of liberalism is a detached, self-sufficient person who arranges his relations with the others by using abstract principles. His relations with his fellow-citizens are inscribed in a kind of social contract that ensures the free action of citizens, permitting them to pursue their life-plans by guaranteeing principles of justice and a branch of rights. As economic actors now, citizens pursue their self-interest being “constrained only by a minimal formal common good, namely, a working legal apparatus that enforces contracts and protects individuals from undue interference by others” (Baier, 1994, p. 24). The common denominator of the moral reasoner, the liberal citizen and the economic agent is a masculine, rational, detached figure that resembles the archetype of the scientist of the realist scientific paradigm who adheres to the cult of a chimeric objectivity and separates himself from the object of his study.

That separation of the individual from the world that occurs in the spheres of moral theory, politics, science, economy and economic theory is a masculine characteristic and it leads to a self-interested attitude that tends to become anti-social. Exhaustive competition and greed in the market signify this indifference and animosity towards others, towards society. While feminist scholars speak of a modelling of society and the economy in accordance with the image of economic man, they do not deem that the selfish and detached stance pertains substantially to man, that a man’s essence is of a certain kind, but that it is socially constructed and linked to the economic, social, scientific and political changes of the last centuries. Women were intact from these developments since they remained in the household, in a realm where spontaneous human sociality could be expressed, or better, was indispensable, because it was connected with their caring labour, and so maintained their “feminine” attributes. These feminine properties, however, for modern men, echoed the disavowed, crude, a-rational and amoral nature they meant to control through science and through economic production, and from whose fetters they wanted to be released by using their reasoning and by neglecting their emotions and inclinations in order to become moral persons. Hence, they undervalued feminine morality as synonymous with irrationality and
dependence and they likewise disdained non-productive caring labour. This contempt, however, for women and nature has led to the separation of individuals from the world and from others, and has culminated in a threat for human existence, since unregulated economic activity has caused extreme poverty and irrevocable harm to the planet.

It might be an unfair exaggeration to say that liberal theorists privilege a moral agent uninterested in the others, since they mean to uphold the ideals of equality and justice, and bolster human rights by building reasonable arguments. Liberal principles crystallize human knowledge acquired through painful historic experience. Also, the cultivation of reason and the abandonment of blind hatred and fundamentalism, has led to liberal democracy which at least warrants a peaceful co-existence of people. What is more, liberal principles have rendered women’s rights legitimate. Feminist ethicists, starting from Gilligan, have in fact acknowledged the value of liberal thought and have asserted that liberal principles, expressed schematically in the ethic of justice, and the ethic of care are complementary. What they have tried to say is that if we reduce our moral conduct to just respecting the others’ rights we could easily slip into an indifference towards them and then in a violation of those rights seeking to ensure the best possible economic benefit for ourselves in the market race. Therefore, liberal principles are not enough; they need to be supported by a positive concern and a practical doing for the sake of others, by revitalizing an active sociality, by undertaking responsibility for the others’ well-being. By this care ethicists mean to re-activate citizenship and to reinforce the citizen against the selfish economic actor, against ‘homo economicus’. They aim at furnishing freedom and equality with a new meaning deriving from the value of care, reminding people of their interdependence, of their common quality of vulnerability, and of their obligation for caring and right to be cared for.

Care-receiving and care-giving become the two constitutive elements of a conception of the good life but this conception of the good is not considered to be a ‘comprehensive doctrine’, since care ethicists place care within a liberal pluralist democracy that accommodates various conceptions of the good. However, this plurality of the conceptions of the good life might imply the existence of conceptions of the good which are completely the opposite to caring. Consequently, caring cannot remain a mere ideal but should be backed by concrete policies and social and economic structures. Engster has proposed, in contrast to feminist care ethicists, a precise institutionalization of care, but even if his suggestions are in the right direction and even if they do not just outline
another welfare state - as he states that they include proactive policies which can reduce the need for traditional forms of welfare and they involve care recipients in the design and implementation of caring projects (Engster, 2007, pp.94-95) - they correspond to a minimal conception of caring that in turn reflects a schematic conception of human needs. The other care ethicists have described an alternative polity with different priorities but they have not made clear how economic activity should be organized in order to aid and not undermine the desirable political alterations. They have strongly argued for a caring market economy oriented to the meeting of people’s needs, and for well-paid caring services, but their suggestion for a pluralist economy, populated simultaneously by self-interested individuals and profit maximizing firms, and by caring and cooperative action, points to a movement back and forth which in effect is a vacillation that entails inertia. It is important, however, that they have clarified that the market as it is now cannot distribute care and hence that domains like healthcare and education should remain out of the reach of the market. But what about the productive domain? They have evaded dealing with the material production and its organization since they have classified it as non-caring labour. However, direct caring labour is conditioned by the material production. Also, the way we work, the way we spend most of our time, has an impact on our attitude towards work, on the meaning we ascribe to work, and our psychological stance towards the world. Feminists have fathomed that caring labour has formed women’s morality, so in my view they should consider the role productive labour could play in instilling caring principles in citizens. They should examine how productive labour can become caring affirming.

In addition to all the above, however, in order for a polity to become a caring one, caring concerns should be mutual among citizens; in other words citizens should reciprocally care for one another and contribute to the satisfaction of one another’s needs. Care does not necessarily imply reciprocity, but it does indicate responsibility and deeds on the part of a care-giver for a care-receiver. Of course care ethicists have pointed out that everyone’s life is nested in caring relationships implying thus the rotation of the roles of care-giver and care-receiver, but I think we should insist upon the significance of reciprocating care because otherwise caring will stand for charity and will entail relations of constant dependence. Citizens should be able to reciprocate caring, namely, they should be endowed with a caring ethos and possess the resources for mutually performing caring acts. The right of being a care-giver does not entail that
the care-receiver is able to reciprocate that care. They might do so in the long run or might not, either because they will remain dependent on us or because they will not wish to benefit us. This is not to say that we should not care for people if we are not sure that they will reciprocate caring, or that caring for our dependents is sheer charity on our part, but that we should base our relations with our fellow citizens on reciprocity because otherwise caring citizenship will be reduced to mere help for the needy who will possibly stay needy, and it will not lead to a real caring economy. It is true that someone could say that a care-receiver can reciprocate the received good with a good of a different kind and thus a poor man could reciprocate by being a law-abiding citizen, thereby meeting his benefactor’s need for safety. However, this second type of caring is not actually a positive contribution to a benefactor’s well-being but rather a passive non-interference with their well-being. So, caring should be seen as inextricably linked to reciprocity and equality, the equality of means for mutual caring. These values of reciprocity and equality, I hold, are included in friendship which will be addressed in the following chapter.
Chapter 2

Civic Friendship

As noted in chapter 1, although care indicates a movement towards the other person, an intention to offer help and support, it sketches an one-way movement between an active benefactor and a passive beneficiary. This kind of connectedness implies a sort of immaturity or inferiority on the part of the care-receiver and surely cannot constitute the basis of the complex social and economic web of the public sphere. What is more, it cannot inspire a radical transformation of the economy. In contrast, the notion of friendship signifies a two-way relationship. It involves the sense of reciprocity, of communication and implies care-giving. A friendship is a relationship between two parties who contribute equally or almost equally to this relationship by supporting one another. This idea of mutual help and support between mature agents applied to the public domain entails the forging of social bonds and leads to social cohesion. Citizens adopting a friendly attitude and organizing their agency on the basis of this friendly ethos can enter into equal caring relations that can function precisely because they possess this reciprocal character which points towards the sharing of the benefits and burdens of caring. Social subjects entering into the network of public relations can more easily be attentive and responsive to others’ needs knowing that these others are equally sensitive to their needs. The element of reciprocity which constitutes the heart of civic friendship can provide the grounds for an alternative conception and structuring of the economy, for an economy in the service of human life.

The conception of social actors as friends can be traced back to Aristotle’s notion of political or civic friendship between the members of the political community. Aristotle referred to civic friendship as a variety of the general phenomenon of friendship on which he elaborates mainly and explicitly in his Nicomachean Ethics and in his Eudemian Ethics. However, he approaches friendship also in his Politics and in his Rhetoric. In this chapter, I shall examine closely the Aristotelian concept of friendship, its basic components and its main kinds. Also, friendship’s correlation with happiness (eudaimonia) will be illuminated, and then there will be an analysis of civic friendship as the actualization of friendship in the political community, in the polis. The feature of reciprocity, which characterizes friendship, will be examined in its relation to civic
friendship and it will be argued that it constitutes the core of civic friendship since it requires the equality of citizens. A reconstruction of the Aristotelian civic friendship by Sibyl Schwarzenbach is also discussed in the present chapter since it updates the ancient concept of civic friendship. Schwarzenbach bases her account of civic friendship on the Aristotelian archetype and gives it a feminine dimension since the beneficence of friends is interpreted in terms of caring, of “ethical reproduction”.

2.1 Aristotle’s Concept of Friendship

Aristotle conceives friendship (philia) as a relationship in which both parties wish each other well for one another’s sake and are inclined to confer benefit on one another, and also are aware of these features of their relation:

We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return. Those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends (Rhet. 2.4.1380b36 - 1381a2).

This conceptualization of friendship occurs not only in the Rhetoric but also in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle stresses the mutuality of goodwill, namely, of wishing good to a friend for that friend’s sake, the mutuality of the affection between friends, and finally the mutuality of the recognition of that reciprocal goodwill and affection (NE 8.2). Aristotle clarifies that mere goodwill is not identical with friendship since it can be felt towards people whom we might not know and without their knowing it (NE 9.5 1166b30-32). Goodwill is regarded as friendship on the condition that we know well the person whom we wish well, we feel an intense friendly feeling for him, we share activities with him, thus spending time together, and we perform a deed for his sake (NE 9.5). Consequently, we infer that people are friends in so far as they wish one another good for one another’s sake, they are mutually disposed to bring about that good and undertake a deed in order to benefit the other, they feel affection for one another and are aware of that reciprocal active goodwill and of that mutual affection. We see that Aristotelian friendship is characterized by mutuality; the two parties provide their share to the relation and recognize each other’s contribution. Moreover, it is informed by respect for the friend’s individuality. Specifically, the concern for the other is accompanied by respect for his individuality since the goodwill and the well-
doing by the loving person are determined as such by the loved person’s needs and wants. The loving person seems to be open to the other’s subjectivity; it attends to his needs and acts accordingly in order to provide for the meeting of those needs. As in the case of caring, it can be observed that Aristotle conceives friendship as a sensitive hearing of the other subjectivity, a positive disposition toward it, and as an active expression of the concern for it. The object of friendship is a being with a separate good and is not a possession or extension of the self. Friends, for Aristotle are separate and independent, and see one another as “distinct centers of choice and action” (Nussbaum, 1986, p.355).

Aristotle maintains that there are three kinds of friendship, since there are three things because of which people feel affection and wish well to one another. Thus people become friends because of utility (διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον), of pleasure (διὰ τὸ ηδύ), and of virtue (διὰ ἀρετήν) (NE 8.3.1156a6-10). However, in utility and pleasure friendships both parties like each other and wish well to each other not for themselves but because of a good and a pleasure they gain from each other (NE 8.2.1156a10-19). Goodwill and affection exist as long as the others are sources of utility and pleasure; when they cease to function as such, friendly ties are dissolved (NE 8.2.1156a19-20). Therefore, utility and pleasure friendships are incidental and unstable.

In contrast, the friendship based on virtue is considered to be perfect, since its parties are good people and alike in virtue; they wish well alike to each other for that other’s sake, because they recognize and approve each other’s goodness, and because they are good in themselves (NE 8.3.1156b8-10). Their goodwill derives from their virtue and is oriented towards the other on account of that other’s virtue. And because virtue is something that endures, virtue friendship is stable (NE 8.8.1159b4-5). Virtuous people “being steadfast in themselves hold fast to each other” (NE 8.8.1159b4-5).

Aristotle does regard utility and pleasure friendships as friendships but he gives them a lower value, stating that they are friendships through their resemblance to virtue friendship (NE 8.4.1157b36-39). Utility and pleasure friends wish well to each other, as noted, so long as the other provides them with something useful or pleasant. Their goodwill is of a derivative kind since they do not wish well to the other for his sake absolutely but in so far as the latter’s good can furnish them a benefit. In addition, utility and pleasure friendships resemble virtue friendship, since virtuous people too are useful
and pleasant to each other (NE 8.31156b13-14). However, in the case of virtue friendship, that usefulness and pleasure are not incidental as in the other two sorts of friendship but substantial because they spring from the substantial goodness of the friend’s character. A virtuous friend:

is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like (NE 8.3.1156b14-17).

In virtue friendship, people bear goodwill to one another not in order to receive an incidental gain but because they endorse one another’s good character, one another’s virtue. They are good without qualification and want to be friends with people who are equally good without qualification. So, virtue friendship is the par excellence friendship, since as Cooper aptly argues:

although there is unself-interested well-wishing in all three types of friendship it is both broader and deeper in a character friendship than in the other two. For it is only in this case that the conception of the other person under which one is his friend and wishes him well for his own sake is a conception that corresponds to what he himself essentially is (Cooper, 1980, p.315).

In other words, the quality of friendship and the quality of goodwill is determined by the friends’ quality; a virtuous person’s goodwill is unqualified and completely for the other’s sake but a bad person or less good person’s goodwill is limited and dependent on the incidental goods derived from the other. Utility and pleasure friendships are incomplete instantiations of the archetype of virtue friendship and they approach the latter to the extent that the utility or pleasure motives achieve the engendering of an unqualified goodwill and affection.

Virtue friendship is infrequent since virtuous people are rare (NE 8.3.1156b25-26). Also, virtuous people do not have many friends because as liking is an intense friendly feeling it cannot be felt but towards one person (NE 8.6.1158a12-13). Moreover, virtue friendship requires time and familiarity since people need to know each other well in order to realize they are alike in virtue and to feel goodwill, as well as to act in the interest of one another. This familiarity and knowledge are achieved through living together and this latter can only be the case with few people. In contrast, Aristotle claims, utility and pleasure friendships can involve more people, for “these services take little time” (NE 8.6.1158a16-17).
While parties in virtue friendship are of a good character, in the other two sorts of friendship, friends are either bad men or of different character qualities (NE 8.4.1157a16-18). And while among virtuous friends there is trust and the feeling that they will not be deceived, in the friendship of bad men there is nothing to prevent suspicion and insecurity (NE 8.4.1157a20-25). It is seen that the awareness of a friend’s good character is what renders him worthy of affection and trust, and what makes friendship a secure environment for both friends.

Finally, utility friends do not live much alongside each other because each other’s presence is not necessarily pleasant, and pleasure friends, though they enjoy their living together, change their friends easily because their tastes alter quickly (NE 8.3.1156a27-1156b5), whereas virtuous friends delight constantly in living together since they enjoy the same things (NE 8.5.1157b724). They have chosen one another to be friends because of their character, and by extension, because of their criterion about things. Their mutual liking derives from their character and is not a passion but a state, since mutual liking among good people incorporates choice and choice emerges from a state (NE 8.5.1157b30).

2.2 Aristotle’s Friendship and Happiness

According to Aristotle, happiness (eudaimonia) is the chief good which constitutes a complete end, an end “which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1.7.1097a37-38). Happiness is the ultimate end towards which every particular end is oriented and in essence is “an activity of soul in conformity with virtue” (NE 1.7.1098a15). Now, friendship is a virtue or implies virtue (NE 8.1.1155a4). Therefore, friendship for Aristotle is an inherent feature of the good and happy life.

Even rich and powerful people, Aristotle claims, need friends because “what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends?”(NE 8.1.1155a8-9). The assistance towards a friend seems to be a complement of wealth. The sharing of that wealth confirms it and ascribes to it the status of happiness. Benefiting a friend is an action in accordance with the virtue of friendship. Consequently, a rich man using the resources he possesses for
conferring a good to a friend of his can transmute his material prosperity into happiness. The exercising of friendship, to Aristotle, reflects a man’s attitude towards himself (NE 9.8.1168b5-6). Wishing well and doing good for a friend’s sake, and sacrificing his own interest, a man shows that he likes himself (NE 9.8.1168a30-34). He does not like himself in the sense that the majority of people do, namely, by striving for a greater share of wealth and honour, and bodily pleasures, obeying thus the dictates of the irrational element of the soul (NE 9.8.1168b15-20). He is “a lover of self” because he likes his intellect and functions in conformity with it since “this is the man himself” (NE 9.8.1168b29-36). The actions imbued by his reason belong to him and count as voluntary ones (NE 9.8.1169a1). Doing good to his friend out of concern for the latter’s good and generally devoting himself to the performing of virtuous actions for the common good, he obeys to his intellect and secures virtue for himself (NE 9.8.1169a10-11). So, a person who is a good friend, who likes his friend, likes himself too and aims at his happiness since, as mentioned, happiness is activity harmonized with virtue.

Another reason why, a happy man cannot be a solitary one is because: “man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others” (NE 9.9.1169b18-19). Consequently, friendship is a natural predicate of the humanity and as the perfect form of human sociality reflects Aristotle’s ideal of the good life. Aristotle elaborates more on the significance of true friendship in a happy life, maintaining that a virtuous friend helps a virtuous man to become aware of his virtue and that the virtuous friend’s presence multiplies the pleasure that human existence engenders (NE 9.9). In particular, he says that happiness consists in living and being active (NE 9.9.1169b31). The essence of living, of life, is perception or thought of our actions, of our simple, biological functions like walking or hearing, and of our virtuous activities (NE 9.9). Life by its very nature is good and pleasant and thus desirable (NE 9.9.1170a14-27). This quality of life is perceived and felt by the virtuous man whose actions are good (NE 9.9.1170b20-22). So, we could say, the natural goodness of life can be realized through virtuous action. Virtue is the presupposition of the realization of life’s natural goodness, since virtuous action resonates with natural goodness. The awareness of individual virtue derives from the conception of a friend’s goodness which occurs through the contemplation of his worthy actions since the friend is another self and his doings count as our actions (NE 9.9.1170a36-39). In the Magna Moralia, Aristotle elucidates his idea of a friend as a second self who as a mirror reflects our character. He claims that a
friend enables us to form an objective picture of ourselves, to attain self-knowledge because we observe and judge his actions which resemble ours, being free from the favour and passion that hinder us from being impartial towards ourselves (MM 1213a10-26). Precisely because a friend is another self, the virtuous man apart from his existence which is desirable because of the pleasant perception of his own virtue, needs to be conscious of his friend’s existence and virtue as well. It then follows that this will be accomplished in their living together and sharing in “discussion and thought” (NE 9.9.1170b6-13). Therefore, the existence of a friend, Aristotle seems to say, increases the delight and fulfillment that comes from the perception of a virtuous life because the enrichment of life with a plethora of virtuous actions (ours and those of our friend’s, who is our second self) enhances our capability to receive the natural goodness of life.

The presence of virtuous friends is a constituent of a happy life also because it stimulates virtuous activity and provides training in virtue, and in parallel keeps a person from error (NE 8.1.1155a15; NE 9.9.1170a11; NE 8.1.1155a12). Further, it sustains virtuous activity: “for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier” (NE 9.9.1170a5-8). Aristotle here seems to say that people might cease engaging in an activity that they find pleasant or which is pleasant in itself since solitude does not furnish us with the motive and the energy in order to stay active. In contrast, it could be claimed, the sharing of activities renders them more interesting and enjoyable for us because people replenish their interest and commitment to a specific occupation when they see the others confirming the worth of that activity by joining in it, and they are inspired by others’ answers to the challenges of the activity. A shared occupation can become a field where an interchange of ideas and interests occurs, a field of fruitful cooperation for the promotion of a common goal, and a field in which an imaginative dialogue between separate subjectivities, and different intellectual and emotional realities develops. Such a context sounds more attractive for accommodating an activity in comparison to an isolated, private environment, because here the interest and pleasure that come from the occupation is enriched with the interest and pleasure that comes from meeting others with whom we share common interests. Furthermore, when we are active towards others we feel a sense of responsibility towards them and this feeling of responsibility, of duty, may sustain our interest and motivation for our activity. In short, when our action is addressed to someone who will react in a certain way to it either by endorsing it or by
being benefited by it or even by criticizing it, seems like a snapshot of a conversation and thus ceases to be a boring monologue.

The arguments which Aristotle uses to bolster his thesis that friendship is a constituent of a happy life, namely, that friends provide the knowledge of the goodness of one’s life and that they maintain our commitment to fundamental virtuous and intellectual activities reveal, for Cooper, human weakness. As he notes:

> We cannot, if left each to his own devices, reach a secure estimate of our own moral character; nor by ourselves can we find our lives continuously interesting and enjoyable, because the sense of the value of the activities that make them up is not within the individual’s power to bestow” (Cooper, 1980, p. 331).

I think Cooper interprets aptly Aristotle’s conception of human nature though with a nuance of pessimism about the finitude of human capabilities. Aristotle recognizes the finite and incomplete nature of human beings but he does not invest this inference with disappointment. His view is the result of an empirical, scientific observation. He states, in effect, that human nature is social; every person is complementary to another person because human nature presupposes and dictates this complementarity. The human being is considered unable to be self-sufficient, not because s/he is finite but because s/he is social, in other words, is naturally pre-ordained to need the others in order to acquire self-awareness and self-knowledge, to be happy and to find life worth-living. However, the other, the friend, is not an instrument for implementing the above ends. He is a separate person, loved for his own sake and recognized as valuable in himself; he has been chosen to be a second self in order for the two friends-selves to function as a unity, as an enhanced consciousness, an acute cognizance.

Friendship, as a virtue and non-ultimate end, is exercised for happiness’ sake, since the latter is the ultimate and complete end of human actions and the cardinal good in human life. However, it is exercised for its own sake too, since it contains or is identified with its end (NE 1.7.1097b2-5). People enter friendly relations not only in order to become happy but also because they like another person on account of his character and they want his good for his own sake. Liking a person is a connotation of the social nature of the human being and simultaneously an attitude and an activity deriving from human reason. Doing good to a friend entails the realization of human nature that equates to happiness. Therefore, it looks as if happiness results from friendship in such a way that does not allow us to consider a friend a mere means that leads to a selfish happiness.
The happiness coming from a life in accordance with reason is a kind of a universal human good that converts friends’ individual lives into a universal human life and friends themselves into a universal person.

2.3 Aristotle’s Conception of Civic Friendship

Friendship, according to Aristotle, pertains not just to personal relationships but to civic ones too. In particular, friendship constitutes the foundation of the political community:

> Friendship seems too to hold states together, and law-givers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality (NE 8.1.1155a21-28).

Here we observe that Aristotle introduces the notion of civic friendship and defines it as unanimity (*homonoia*). He also prioritizes it over justice because it adds to justice and complements it, whereas justice does not offer any additional benefit to friendship. This notion of unanimity is expounded in another point in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle repeats that it is a friendly relation and contends that a city is unanimous when people are of the same mind concerning their interest, choose the same actions and proceed to the performing of what they have decided in common (NE 9.6).

> Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life (NE 9.6.1167b2-4).

Unanimity thus does not concern an overlapping of views about a neutral matter: in other words, it is not *omodoxia* (identity of beliefs) but a congruence, a consensus on crucial issues that affect the common life of citizens. We understand that common affairs are managed on the basis of a common decision which is the result of a common deliberation and the result of virtue, since Aristotle says in the following line that unanimity is found among virtuous men, because they are unanimous both in themselves and with one another (NE 8.6.1167b5-6). Virtuous people have clear and consistent opinions and resolutions that derive from a reflection on what is commonly fair and advantageous (NE 8.6.1167b8).
In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle again conceptualizes the relation between citizens as friendship and specifically as a utility friendship: “civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself […]” (EE 7.10.1242a6-7).

The city (*polis*) seems to be the milieu within which people can meet their needs and secure their lives. Cooper argues that the secure and comfortable life that a city ensures for its citizens results from the common activity of the citizens, their cooperative working, and their active participation in the life of the city. This cooperative activity is, Cooper claims, the function (*ergon*) of human beings as political animals (Cooper, 1993, p.310-311).

Aristotle holds that civic friendship is a utility friendship; people in the political community are bound together because they cannot rely on their own means for sustaining their life. Their relationship serves their individual goals for survival. The existence and the activity of each one is useful since they contribute to the sustaining of the others’ lives. Certainly civic friends are not personally interconnected, since they are unknown to each other, but as Cooper asserts, their relationship is still marked by mutual liking and wishing and doing good (Cooper, 1980, p. 303).

In order to shed light on the essence of civic friendship it should be examined it in parallel to Aristotle’s position concerning the nature of the *polis*. The city, according to him, “while coming into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well” (Pol. 1251b29-33). The city exists not simply for the satisfaction of basic biological needs but for the implementation of the good life, that is of the virtuous life. The *polis* “does not exist… for the purposes of exchange and use of one another – for otherwise the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and who have agreements with one another, would be citizens of the same city” (Pol. 1280a33-6). A city which encompasses commercial exchanges and trade agreements is quite different from two separate cities connected by commercial alliances, firstly because there is no single, common system of courts arranging the commercial relations between them, and secondly and more importantly, because people who living in them while having trade transactions:

...do not concern themselves about what kind of persons the ones in the other city ought to be, nor are they concerned that no one covered by the agreements be unjust. They are only concerned that they do nothing unjust to one another (Pol. 1280b1-5).
In a single city, people do try to ensure justice in business or in other relations but besides that they concern themselves about the character of their fellow-citizens and want them to be fair and decent; they want their fellow-citizens who participate in civic life to be moral agents, whether or not they have any dealings with them (Cooper, 1993, p. 314). The reason that this moral concern occurs is related to the sort of community a city is, to the type of civic bond among citizens. Citizens are linked with friendship ties since the *polis* accommodates a whole set of practices which show people’s decision to share their lives with others. These practices such as marriage, brotherhoods or religious festivals, hold citizens together and make them interested in one another’s qualities of mind and character (Cooper 1993, p.316). However, I think this concern for the moral character emerges also from the desideratum of the unanimity which grounds the state’s unity and which presupposes moral excellence. Consequently, civic friendship, though classified by Aristotle as a utility friendship since it aims at the eliciting of a gain as a commercial relationship does, is significantly distinguished from the latter because apart from the necessary , it aims at the noble, making fellow-citizens’ well-being matter to one another simply as such (Cooper, 1993, p.318). As friendship, it involves mutual goodwill, trust and doing good, and as civic friendship it contains the mutual interest in another’s character which is considered to be part of the good will and well-wishing (Cooper, 1993, p. 318).

Mulgan attributes an instrumental role to the Aristotelian civic friendship, defining it as a mere instrumental political agreement on the value of respecting common institutions that will advance every single citizen’s good. He argues that Cooper’s position that citizens’ concern for one other’s well-being underpins the constitution lacks explicit textual support (Mulgan, 1999, p.26). For him, in Aristotle’s scheme of values the state’s institutions are justified in terms of justice (Mulgan, 1999, p. 30). Further, he deems that Cooper’s strong reading of the Aristotelian political friendship as a relationship including feelings of mutual care and concern co-exists with his assumption that political participation is an inherent element of a communal good life. And he finds it plausible that the valuing of active citizenship gives rise to friendly feelings towards fellow-citizens (Mulgan, 1999, p.28). However, for Mulgan, the fact that friendship arises in small associations such as brotherhoods and cults and that people enjoy their living in company within their more immediate relationships of family and friends points to the instrumental value of *polis*, of broad civic relationships and of citizenship.
which simply allow for the existence of close friendships (Mulgan, 1999, p. 27). It is true that Aristotle does not invest the relationship between citizens with an intense emotional content, but on the other hand, he chooses to name it friendship, thus not depriving it of the sense of mutual concern for the other’s welfare. Moreover, I think Cooper’s reading of civic friendship is not too strong because he acknowledges that it does not entail close affection and it has simultaneously a necessary-instrumental and a noble character, and it also permits the conception of a common good which does preserve the state’s unity. Finally, I consider, Mulgan is right when he identifies a correlation between civic friendship and civic participation but I cannot agree with his view that political participation might not matter so much for citizens as the enjoyment of intimate relations, because I believe that working together on civic affairs and being mutually aware and concerned for the other and for the city all bring people closer and equalize them in a way: namely, make them friends. Besides this, Aristotle indeed holds that political participation is itself an intrinsic good or an end without which a human life will be poor, and also that the active participation in civic life is a prerequisite for the development and exercise of the individual’s other excellences (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 346).

In line with Mulgan, Irrera (2005) argues that justice upholds civic life, and civic structures and institutions, since the feelings of mutual love and affection, characteristic of the virtue friendship cannot be felt for distant people whom citizens have not chosen to be their friends. Aristotelian political friendship, for Irrera, is a shared utility friendship which resembles more a kind of respect for the other’s interest. In fact, she speaks of a form of legal, virtuous respect that derives either from an intrinsic disposition of the character or from the law (Irrera, 2005, p. 571). Civic friendship to her is mainly the result of the pursuit of the individual interest that is furthered through the common good and much less the concern for the other’s well-being, since the second is more feasible within virtue friendship. The “love” and well-wishing of civic friendship is in essence a constant activity in accordance with justice, which in turn engenders a reciprocal bond of trust and loyalty between citizens (Irrera, 2005, p. 584). In other words, the core of political friendship is not the mutual affection but the mutual respect expressed through the following of the norms of justice which occurs either spontaneously and voluntarily or after legal enforcement.
Mayhew argues for the utility character of civic friendship but he simultaneously stresses the element of mutual goodwill and affection among citizens. He deems that the awareness of mutual benefit that comes from their living together generates a sort of affection between them and an interest for one another’s well-being (Mayhew, 1996, pp.7-8). The awareness of a common good, that is, a common aim and the knowledge that everyone works for its accomplishment is what holds a city together (Mayhew 1996, p.8). Although the citizens do not know one another they can, through the city’s particular associations and through its political procedures, know in general the moral character and the general political views of the citizen body and can also know whether their fellow citizens agree on essential civic matters. In the case where they find one another to be moral and politically of one mind they can be considered to be civic friends (Mayhew, 1996, p.7). Consequently, it can be said that for Mayhew the genuine good will and affection that occurs in virtue friendship can thrive among citizens even though mediated by the pursuing of individual interests.

Bentley acknowledges that civic friendship admits of two readings: the first that says political friendship is a variety of utility friendship which however includes the ethical element of disinterested concern for another, and the second that outlines a thick ethical version of civic friendship more akin to virtue friendship that is underpinned by a conviction about the traits of the good citizen. The basis of this version, Bentley claims, is not fundamentally about disinterested regard for another, but about the perception of the other as another self (Bentley, 2013, p. 13). He distinguishes two sides of Aristotle’s virtue friendship, one positive and another negative. The positive side points to “wishing well for the other’s sake and seeing the other’s flourishing as an aspect of one’s own” (Bentley, 2013, p. 13). This perspective of virtue friendship sounds appealing to draw into contemplating about civic friendship and leads to a citizenship imbued with an active care and concern for fellow citizens (Bentley, 2013, p.13). The negative side of virtue friendship consists in a concern about the ethical character of one’s friend which can be turned into intolerance towards any ethical failing in one’s virtue friend and intrusion into his affairs. This perspective of corrective and intrusive behaviour on the part of a virtuous man caring for the ethical excellence of his friend does not sound quite tempting enough to determine citizens’ attitude towards their fellow citizens. Bentley believes this aspect of virtue friendship cannot and should not
apply to civic friendship since it presupposes sameness, that the other is “like oneself” which is clearly not the case when it comes to fellow citizens (Bentley, 2013, p.14).

It can be deduced that Aristotelian civic friendship has a dual character: namely, on the one hand it has an instrumental character in the sense that it is a friendly bond that serves the individual interests of each citizen through the promotion of the common good, but on the other hand, it embodies a concern for the other’s welfare which constitutes the kernel of friendship in its most complete form, which is virtue friendship. Civic friends care about each other’s material interest as well as about each other’s virtue. The example that Aristotle uses in order to distinguish trade agreements from civic relationships signifies that according to him what should associate citizens is not a mere respect for each other’s interest, an action aligned with justice’s dictates being derived from legal enforcement, but instead a genuine positive concern for each other’s well-being. His position on the significance of citizens’ unanimity interpreted as a friendly relation that preserves the common good more effectively than justice does, shows that for him citizens do not just endorse a political contract which benefits them but they are informed by a sincere concern for their fellow citizens with whom they are of one mind and they conceive them as other civic selves. This idea of a friend as another self does not necessarily, as Bentley claims, point to an enforced moral uniformity but rather encompasses the possibility of conceiving the other’s interest in personal terms, in terms of a genuine empathy and not merely from an instrumental perspective, that is, as a means to the common interest and thus as a means to the strict individual interest.

To sum up, it looks as if civic friendship for Aristotle is a moral relationship which realizes the natural goodness of a life lived in the political community. The human being is by nature a political animal who wishes to live in a political community which preserves its life and which contains the potentiality of its nobility. The arranging of citizens’ common life on the basis of their common good and in accordance with the ideal of friendship promotes each citizen’s interest and strengthens friendship among them for its sake. The city (polis) is a third instantiation of life, incarnating the unity of the other two (namely, of the self and the other), and its preservation through the promotion of the common advantage (which is a moral doing since it benefits all the members of the community), is for the sake of the realization of life’s natural goodness. By placing personal friendship (meant as a friendship with ourselves) and friendship
with the external other within the political context, it seems that Aristotle, wishes to realize them in the most complete way, since the human being is preordained to live in the most comprehensive kind of community, that is, in the city.

2.4 Aristotelian Civic Friendship and Reciprocity

Equality in friendship, to Aristotle, is interwoven with the notion of reciprocity, of mutuality. Friendship entails mutual awareness between friends, mutual liking, mutual well-wishing, mutual doing good, and mutual concern for the other’s ethical goodness. In virtue friendship, mutuality can be accomplished because friends are alike in virtue and in what influences virtue. Consequently, friends can equally reciprocate goodwill and doing good: “in it [in virtue friendship] each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what ought to happen between friends” (NE 8.4.1157a34-35). But also for the utility and pleasure friendships Aristotle states that they incorporate reciprocity:

“however that may be, the aforesaid friendships [utility and pleasure friendships] involve equality; for the friends get the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility” (NE 8.6.1158b37-39).

Aristotle regards reciprocity as an essential element of friendship, since it signifies the contribution of both parties to the friendly relationship. This contribution, however, should be equal. Each friend should show their appreciation for the goodwill and doing good by their friend by returning an attitude or an action of the same worth. The returning of a friend’s benefit counts as the recognition of her friendliness. The kind of reply to a friend’s beneficence shows the extent to which that beneficence and friendliness is recognized and valued. And indeed an equal return of the benefit equates to a full recognition of the other’s friendship. The mutual recognition of each other’s goodwill is what renders a relationship a friendly one. Now, that action of recognition is feasible only on the condition that both friends are equally able to perform it, that is if they are of an equal moral quality in order to perceive and appreciate the worth of each other’s good will and if they possess the means that determine their moral quality and allow them too to carry out that act of recognition. So, a bad man might not be able to recognize the goodwill of a good man because he might not be able to conceive it, and even if he had been able to do so, he might not be able, to reciprocate because of his
moral deficit. Further, a poor man might not be able to fully recognize a rich man’s friendliness expressed through a material provision because he might not be able to reciprocate due to his poverty.

However, for Aristotle there are friendships in which friends cannot reciprocate equally what they have; these are friendships of inequality. Here Aristotle gives as examples the friendship of father and son and generally of older and younger, and the friendship of man and wife, that Aristotle classifies as relationship between a ruler and a subject. In these cases, he contends, friendship should be aligned with the proportional equality that justice dictates, for there is no quantitative equality pertaining to friendship (NE 8.7.1158b31-32). Thus, in the above friendships love should be in proportion to the merit of the parties in order for a sense of equality to arise (NE 8.7.1158b26-27). This means that “the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful” (NE 8.7.1158b25-26). Therefore, when there is a great distance in respect of excellence, or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties they cannot be counted as friends, since we cannot be friends for instance with gods or with kings (NE 8.7.1158b32-36). Justice, which dictates receiving what you deserve according to superiority or inferiority, equalizes the parties and renders them friends but not in the full sense of the term, because it does not make them literally equals.

Aristotle provides us with another illustration of unequal friendship, that between a rich and a needy person, and likewise that between a rich person and the public. Here he says that while the rich man gives wealth to the poor man, the latter ought to return honour, because as he has asserted, the proportion to merit equalizes the parties and sustains friendship. But he states that the poor man is not asked to return money to the rich precisely because “friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case” (NE 8.14.1163b15-16). Consequently, Aristotle considers friendship to be complementary to justice arrangements, thus supporting his view on the superiority of friendship compared to justice, although in other points of the Nicomachean Ethics he has explicitly pointed out their relevance (e.g. NE 8.9.1159b25-31).

The idea of reciprocity incorporated within friendship implies that friends are able to reciprocate equally or almost equally the benefit they have received. This presupposes that they have the motivation deriving from a certain ethical capacity and also the
material resources that allow this motivation to become an actual action of beneficence. Hence, we comprehend that in order for citizens to be true friends they should be equals in respect of excellence and wealth so as to be able to return quantitatively equal benefits to each other. Without that kind of reciprocal give and take they could hardly create and preserve civic bonds.

Inamura points out the reciprocity in the sharing of political authority in the Aristotelian civic friendship, namely, the reciprocal exchange of the roles of governing and being governed. This kind of reciprocity with regard to political authority, he maintains, is the defining characteristic of civic friendship and it is found in the Politics (Inamura, 2015, p.160). In Book 3 of Politics Aristotle defines a polis as a sharing of a constitution by citizens (koinonia politon politeias) (Pol. 1276b1-4), and further he defines a citizen as the person who shares deliberative and judicial office (Pol. 1257b18-20). In addition, in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle explains why civic friendship is a utility friendship, saying that citizens are useful to one another because they exchange goods (EE 7.10.1242b25-27) and also because they exchange authority, sharing thus the benefits and the burdens of authority:

There is here, too, the relation of ruler and subject which is neither the natural relation, nor that involved in kingship, but each is ruler and ruled in turn; nor is it either’s purpose to act with the free beneficence of a god, but that he may share equally in the good and in the burdensome service. Civic friendship, then, claims to be one based on equality (EE 7.10.1242b27-31).

This sharing of political authority not only forms a basis for civic friendship but also fosters it, and thus safeguards social cohesion. This give and take of political authority and the very exercising of political authority, expressing the well-wishing and doing good of citizens, it could be said, offset the economic inequalities that obstruct friendship. However, Aristotle believes that great economic differences undermine this sharing of political authority. Therefore, civic friendship can be preserved only if a polis undertakes to limit the economic gap between rich and poor people. Aristotle does not speak of a sharing of property, though in the Nicomachean Ethics he points out that friendship depends on community, on sharing, because he holds that the degree of this sharing is determined by the kind of friendship (NE 8.9.1159b32-34). “Brothers and comrades have all things in common” (NE 8.9.1159b32-34) precisely because they are intimate friends, but that cannot be the case with civic friends, since citizens are not aware of their fellow-citizens and are not bound together with close ties. Besides that,
his critique on the communization of property in Plato’s *Callipolis* as a means for city’s unity is well known. According to the critique, a common ownership system involving wives, children and property leads to an indifference towards family members and property, since “what is held in common by the largest number of people receives the least care” (Pol. 2.3.1261b33-40). The citizens in *Callipolis* cannot be held together because they lack common concerns. The general indifference or weak care for common ownership does not simply undermine social unity; it also threatens the city’s existence.

Instead of a common sharing of property Aristotle opts for a distribution of property as a solution to the problem of the extreme economic inequality which undercut civic friendship since on the one hand it does not permit citizens to be quantitatively equal and on the other hand it impedes the reciprocal exchange of political authority. Poor people envy rich people and the latter feel contempt for the former (Pol. 4.11.1295b22-4). In addition, both wish to monopolize political authority, thus causing strife (Pol. 4.11.1296a7-13). Also, the disparity between their incomes will surely lead to either a severe oligarchy or to an extreme democracy, and thus possibly to the emergence of a tyrant (Pol. 4.11.1296a1-2). This image of citizens’ relations is not compatible with the idea of political friendship but rather is a depiction of civic faction. In order therefore for a state to prevent the erosion of its unity it needs to devise a distribution policy that will create or foster a middle class and will enable poor citizens to become prosperous. Hence, instead of confiscating the property of the wealthy or of continuously supporting the poor from the city’s surplus, the state should distribute public revenues to the poor to enable them to purchase their own farms or engage in trade (Pol. 6.5). The similarity in incomes will thus protect political equality and will forge civic ties.

As mentioned before Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics* defines civic friendship as a utility friendship since citizens exchange material goods. Continuing his thought, he distinguishes between legal friendship, where there is a sort of contract that arranges the exchange, and moral friendship, in which there are no fixed terms concerning what to exchange (NE 8.13.1162b21-31). In the latter case Aristotle contends that the value of the exchange of a product or a service should be determined by the recipient on the basis of the benefit or pleasure that is derived from it. And he adds that the estimation of the value of a product should be done in advance, before the recipient obtains it (NE 9.1.1164b20-21). Here, Inamura argues, Aristotle’s suggestion of how to measure the
value of a good in fact indicates the reciprocal condition that preserves civic friendship as a relationship between economic agents (Inamura, 2015, p.189).

The equality and reciprocity that civic friendship implies, in effect, shows that the kind of relationships among citizens is determined by their political and economic status: in other words, by their ability to benefit their fellow-citizens and return the benefit received by them. This reciprocity in the exchange of goods and political power reflects their equality and their friendship.

Aristotelian civic friendship points to the importance of respect for law, political institutions and the rules of justice, on the part of citizens, since each citizen cares about the moral character of their fellow citizens. The members of a city should be equal in respect of their virtue, so they should organize their activity in accordance with the moral principles and legal dictates of the city. The virtue of citizens is related to unwritten moral norms that surround them, and to written laws and enacted political procedures that constitute the state’s function. The concern for one another’s virtue is expressed by the laws that warrant citizens’ moral equality. However, civic friendship also calls for the distribution of the commons, namely of the political authority and of the material means of life. Citizens, being regarded as equally virtuous, should be entitled to have an equal share in the exercise of political authority and in adequate access to the economic resources of the city. However, this is not necessarily the case in practice, since citizens are often economically unequal. Aristotle is interested in the impact of economic differences on the state’s unity and suggests ways for overcoming them but does not refer to how they have been produced. What is more, it seems that he emphasizes more the political aspect of civic friendship; namely, the reciprocal exchange of political authority, and he does not examine civic friendship in terms of economic agency meant as material production and commercial activity. His view that menial labour and trade are incompatible with virtuous political activity and the good life is well known. The lack of free time and the pursuit of profit are at odds with human happiness and with a life of political virtue (Pol. 7.9.1329a1; 3.5.1278a20-21; 7.9.1329a16-26). Yet although he does not examine in detail economic action as a form of civic friendship, he often uses examples from economic life in order to elucidate his convictions regarding friendship, and further, as already observed, he conceptualizes civic friendship as an exchange of goods. Thus, his focus on the state’s institutions as the sphere where political friendship is realized does not mean that he does not view
friendship and its basic principle of reciprocity as a regulator of the whole public life of the city.

2.5 Schwarzenbach’s Conception of Civic Friendship

Aristotle repeatedly mentions a mother’s relationship with her child as the most characteristic example of friendship, of a disinterested concern and care for another’s person well-being (e.g. NE 9.4.1166a5-9). This, Sibyl Schwarzenbach (2009) believes, might say something about how a contemporary reconstruction or viewing of civic friendship might be formed. For Schwarzenbach, civic friendship is of great importance for the contemporary state that faces the problem of unity, because such friendship can foster social unity by backing genuine justice. Following Aristotle’s reasoning she underscores the features of wishing the other well for her own sake, and of doing things for the friend, that are present in civic friendship as in virtue friendship. She also draws our attention to Aristotle’s statement that “citizens of the best polis care what ‘kind of person’ their fellow citizens are” (Pol.1280). This statement, she argues, sums up what Aristotle intends by the term civic friendship (politike philia): namely, the general, mutual concern of fellow citizens for one another’s virtue (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p. 105).

As well as its mutual advantage orientation, Aristotelian civic friendship embraces the ideal of disinterested concern for the other’s welfare and aims at the maintenance of inter-subjective relations for their sake. Similarly, a mother’s labour of raising a healthy child includes the reproduction of a flourishing human relationship as an end in itself (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.101). Schwarzenbach distinguishes between biological and “ethical (or political) reproduction” and expounds the second as follows:

With the ethical sense of reproduction I intend all those rational activities (thinking about particular others and their needs, caring for them, cooking their meals, etc.) which go toward reproducing a particular set of relationships between persons over time – in the best case, my thesis runs, relations of philia. These activities are clearly “ethical” because we here have to do with activities which involve choice and which are fundamentally imbued with reason or logos. But such activities are also “political”; they aim at reproducing the best relations conceived now within the context of a polis – whether in the so-called private or civic domain (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.102).
We see that “ethical reproduction”, as distinguished from the mere biological reproduction is permeated by reason, the nuclear element of human nature according to Aristotle, and it aims at the establishment and maintenance of human relations marked by conscious concern and care for the others. Ethical reproductive activity is *philia*, which is a synonym of the good life. Thus, Schwarzenbach argues that ethical reproductive activity falls under the Aristotelian *praxis* or ethical action, since it is harmonized with his definition of *praxis* as a good action that embraces its *telos*, its purpose (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.102); a good action is its own end (NE 1140b6). *Poiiesis* or *techne* (making or production), for Aristotle, differs from *praxis* since it is not identified with its purpose but “has an end other than itself” (NE 6.5.1140b6). The characteristic illustration of *poiesis*, to Schwarzenbach, is economic production, which is a technical activity oriented to the external, physical world and whose purpose is the creation of a product and not the meeting of human needs or the forging of human relations, since its incentive is personal gain (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.103). The contemporary state, Schwarzenbach claims, is organized on the basis of material production, which is placed in the framework of the comprehensive doctrine of the modern market that praises instrumental activity and has rendered the political friendship talk almost outdated (Schwarzenbach, 1996, pp.110-112).

Schwarzenbach does not want to ignore the changes of modernity and thus she develops an updated model of civic friendship. She grants that in heterogeneous and complex contemporary societies the demand for a single ideal of the good life is not applicable. Therefore, the concern for the whole moral character of the fellow-citizen should be turned into a concern for the public political character of the civic friend (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.113). I presume that here Schwarzenbach means that a citizen is entitled to demand that her civic friend adhere to her role as this stems from her social and political identity. Schwarzenbach in fact adopts the Aristotelian position that citizens ought to share a common view of the good life that is led according to the ideal of friendship, but she does not attribute a comprehensive character to this conception of the good life. Moreover, she justifies her decision by the usefulness of civic friendship for deepening justice and, by extension, for ensuring the unity of the state.

Schwarzenbach does not exclude the liberal doctrine of individual rights from her conception of civic friendship, since for her, individual rights may be regarded as “one of the highest expressions of political friendship ever” (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.114).
The recognition and the guarantee of a set of rights to each individual on the basis of her humanity, and further their respect in practice on the part of citizens is a sheer expression of citizens’ general concern and goodwill regarding one another’s interests (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.114). In addition, impartiality - implied by universal human rights - prevents the degeneration of civic friendship into “friendship politics” (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.115).

The centering of civic identity on the value of productivity is not endorsed by Schwarzenbach, since she deems that the overestimation of the value of productivity opposes ethical reproductive activity. The entering of women into the public sphere, she claims, promises a different kind of citizenship relying on ethical reproductive labour. Women’s caring ethos acquired by training on the reproductive praxis should function as a source of inspiration for an alternative, to the productive model, conceptualization of the state and of citizens. In short, women’s presence in the public realm could help to re-introduce the value of friendship into political life (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.119).

She suggests the principle of ‘care’, intertwined with women’s traditional reproductive labour and pivotal to friendship, as the organizing principle of the contemporary state and defines it as an “intelligent and emotionally competent activity which not only perceives both the concrete and general good of a person (or object), but which seeks to bring that good about” (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p.120). She adds that care does not necessarily have the connotations of self-sacrifice or of paternalism, for it can be self-fulfilling and reciprocal, and further it can be placed within the framework of a participatory democracy (Schwarzenbach, 1996 p.120).

The valuing of the reproductive praxis can also change the property of the citizen. Aristotle sees the citizen as a person who actively participate in civic life and so highlights his possessing of practical reason (phronesis). This capacity for practical reason remains of cardinal importance for a member of the contemporary state. However, Schwarzenbach continues, we should recall that the Aristotelian practical reason is more connected to activities of the praxis and thus pertains to women’s ethical reproductive labour. So, the latter’s public presence revives a practical wisdom which means to usher in right – doing, which rests on an educated perception and on a training and habituation of the emotions (NE 2.9). Consequently, for Schwarzenbach, the contemporary citizen should be one who has the capacity to think about the human
good, one who has been trained within the educational milieu of friendship on the exertion of an ethical – emotional intelligence. Thus, we understand that women’s ethical reproductive activity coming into the foreground illuminates not only its hidden role in social cohesion but also it signifies a corresponding manner of thought, an ethical-critical intellectual habit which thematizes issues such as the human good or the right action, which have been ruled out from public deliberation as old-fashioned and vague questions indicative of obsolete intellectual stances.

The salience of the ethical reproductive labour, Schwarzenbach holds, could also re-pose the political goal of equality. For Aristotle, as noted, friendship presupposes equality, and civic friendship in particular rests on equality (EE 7.101242b23). Now, for Schwarzenbach this equality might be a fact or a desideratum in friendship; friends might be equal or might attempt to be such. Schwarzenbach believes that the Aristotelian friendship involves both senses of equality but each sense concerns a different domain. In the private sphere and in the case of virtue friendship, virtuous people can choose their friends on the basis of their equality with them. This equality concerns the goodness of the character and the things that affect it, such as status, wealth, power, moral and intellectual abilities, and age (NE 1158b34-35). Consequently, Aristotelian virtue friendship, she infers, resembles a ‘fraternity’ that renounces any difference. However, she says, “an essential aspect of friendship is the reciprocal goal or desire to establish and maintain this moral equality as well, including the autonomy of the other” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.17). This goal can exist and, by extension, friendship can exist even between people who do not have the same abilities or do not lead their lives in similar material conditions. Women’s friendship with their children, with their spouses or with the sick whom they have tended evidences the compatibility of friendship with difference. This way of looking at friendship, Schwarzenbach continues, sheds light on the existent inequalities in close human relationships, and its political version could support true democracy (Schwarzenbach, 2009, pp.17-18). In the political domain equality is more a desideratum than a reality. Citizens do not have the same traits and their lives are not inscribed within the same material environments.

Inamura claims that Schwarzenbach’s conceptualization of friendship overlooks the egalitarian implications for politics contained in Aristotle’s description of friendship. Her focus on care and striving, on the part of citizens and lawgivers, for the equality of
citizens concerning their moral quality - which, Inamura believes, is an extension of the family’s ties to the sphere of politics - might entail the risk of incorporating unequal relationships into civic friendship (Inamura, 2015, p. 155).

Inamura’s worry sounds justified to some extent, because Schwarzenbach indeed pays heed primarily to the moral goodness of friends and secondarily to the factors that affect it when she speaks of personal friendship, and when it comes to civic friendship she again focuses on the significance of a citizen’s character, on its alignment with the shared conception of justice. However, she does not ignore social and economic differences and inequalities; she simply says that personal friendship can exist between unequal parties precisely because something deeply personal connects people and prompts them to struggle to maintain equality in virtue and achieve equality in everything that has an impact on it. This aspect of friendship, the possibility of a friendship within difference, casts light on the inequalities between friends and calls for concrete deeds to support the other. Therefore, what she wants to convey is that her modification of friendship as ethical-political reproduction, unmasks the inequalities that Aristotelian personal friendship as a fraternity, excludes, and calls for their mitigation and elimination. However, her focus on the primacy of virtue might make us wonder about a possible situation where a friend of ours, though living under extreme poverty, maintains her high moral status. The question is whether we should be indifferent in the face of her poverty since it does not harm her morality. Inamura is therefore right to suspect that Schwarzenbach’s understanding of civic friendship might be proved “friendly” to existent inequalities. On the other hand, her defining of moral goodness in the case of civic friendship, in terms of genuine justice, and her own

11 Schwarzenbach seems to echo Derrida’s (1997) thesis that the Aristotelian virtue friendship equates to a kind of fraternity, a brotherhood. This friendship with a masculine tinge, for Derrida, points to an androcentric and ethnocentric configuration of politics, and he argues instead for a politics and democracy beyond this principle of “the family and androcentric ethnic group” (Derrida, 1997, p.306) or a politics which extends the principle of fraternity encompassing the whole human race. He understands that the concept of fraternity can be inclusive or exclusive of alterity and warns against the latter possibility. Aristotelian friendship of course has masculine connotations but we should not forget that Aristotle elucidates friendship through the illustration of mother’s love for her child. Also, Aristotelian civic friendship does not constitute a kinship of intimate bonds but a relationship between the members of a political community mediated by civic laws and values. Consequently, although Aristotelian (civic) friendship seems androcentric or anchored in a specific nation, in effect, is a historically situated universal idea which designates the relationship between people who are aware of and affirm their political community.
interpreting of civic friendship, in terms of citizens’ attitude and behavior, as well of the state’s constitution and structures, lead us to think that her insistence on citizens’ moral equilibrium is an indirect prioritization of the attempt to close inequalities. By underlining the significance of genuine justice, Schwarzenbach discloses the mechanism that generates inequalities and endangers social unity, that is, action at odds with genuine justice, action deprived of active goodwill and concern for others. But apart from that she has elaborated on the idea of economic equality by developing an economic account of civic friendship which will be examined below.

2.6 Schwarzenbach’s Account of Civic Friendship Applied to the Economy

Schwarzenbach has developed an economic account of civic friendship based on the ethical reproductive labour traditionally linked to women, thus trying to reconstruct Rawls’ moral and political theory of justice. She deems that citizenship could be seen in terms of friendship and care. She clarifies that she understands care as a political principle and contends that it aims at the equality and greater autonomy of the other and not at subordination (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.139). Politically defined, care is characterized by “a heightened awareness of fellow citizens, a competence in understanding their good, and a willingness to bring that good about” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.141), and it is directed towards the flourishing of citizens’ relations (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.280).

Ethical reproductive labour could help for a strong reading of Rawls’ “difference principle”\(^\text{12}\) which would mean the application of the value of fraternity that this principle implies to the economic sphere. In particular, Schwarzenbach claims that Rawls’ “difference principle” admits of two readings which also imply two different conceptions of the self and the ownership. According to the first reading, the weak one, we concentrate on income and wealth among the primary goods\(^\text{13}\) which determine the benefit that the least well off citizens are entitled to have from a certain arrangement of

\(^{12}\) According to the “difference principle”, “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1999, p.79).

\(^{13}\) Rawls states that the chief primary goods are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth. He also includes self-respect or else a sense of one’s own worth (Rawls, 1999, pp.54, 79).
social and economic inequalities, and according to the second reading, the strong one, we focus on the social basis of self-respect14 (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.145, 146). The weak interpretation portrays a person devoted to the pursuing of private gain, a Lockean acquisitive self who works and produces in order to possess. For that person, social institutions and relations are little more than a means to his individual objectives (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.146). The second interpretation reveals a citizen who accepts his greater share on the condition that it does not simply “preserve others in minimal material existence” but on the condition that this share “raises the social basis of their self-respect in the long run” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.147). This citizen is a moral purposeful person who realizes her human capacities and harmonizes her goals with others’ goals (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.147). So:

unlike the acquisitive model, this model views the self as dependent not merely on coordinated, minimally cooperative activity of others, but on the good of reciprocity and the necessity of positive social ties –what Rawls calls “social union” – both in the bolstering of its self-respect and in the development and exercise of its highest capacities (Schwarzenbach, 2009, pp.147-148).

Schwarzenbach seems to be saying that by aiding the others to acquire more self-respect, I acquire more self-respect because I bring to fruition my human nature and my higher human capacities. And by enabling the others to respect themselves more, in effect, I enable them to acquire the means, the material resources and the moral knowledge crystallized in a certain psychological attitude so they can overcome a self-respect deficit and become in their turn generators of self-respect for others. Hence, the raising of the social basis of the others’ self-respect should be read as: I enable the others to cease being just care-receivers and to start being providers of care too, thus reciprocating the good they have received. This construing of the “difference principle” introduces the aspect of reciprocity and neutralizes the convention of the “original position” that produces the detached, self-interested, acquisitive self.

The strong reading of the “difference principle” could be completed if Rawls had brought the “social union” to the economic realm. However, this is not the case, since “when it comes to the economic labour, the acquisitive self seems to retain primacy” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.151). In the economic sphere the pivotal incentive of labour is

14 For Rawls, self-respect (or self-esteem) has two dimensions: first it refers to “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out”, and second it “implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions” (Rawls, 1999, p.386)
exclusive ownership (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.153) and not the cultivation of social, non-instrumental relationships. On the other hand, women’s ethical reproductive labour is a different sort of labour, a “directly social and interactive” one, intended not for the accumulation of wealth but for the fulfillment of another human being’s needs and for the furtherance of their abilities (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.154). This labour points to a moral self that creates social ties, and to a responsible ownership (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.165). Mothers who are the subjects of most thick instantiation of caring labour do not possess their children as private property but do have the responsibility of ensuring their well-being. If we now conceptualize productive labour as another form of caring labour we will achieve “social union” in the economic domain and we could define labour as “a relatively free activity where ends are shared (or at least they are not antagonistic or indifferent to one another) and where background property is treated as a commonly held asset” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.158). The strong reading of Rawls’ “difference principle”, thus resting on an alternative conception of labour, leads to a “socialist ownership”, that is, to shared final ends (social union) in the economic terrain (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.168) or else to a modern civic friendship in the economic realm which can extinguish the vast economic gaps and can be a basis for genuine justice (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.165). Schwarzenbach sees civic friendship in the economy in terms of democratic socialism. Rawls theory, to her, could uphold a workplace democracy and a market socialism where the “differences in individual income and social positions of authority now become conditional, not merely on bettering the financial position of all concerned, but on furthering their conditions of autonomy, participation, and self-governance” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.168).

The political principle of civic friendship, Schwarzenbach asserts, adds to the liberal paradigm of citizens as free and equals the value of a “shared responsibility” in one another’s lives (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.213), a positive political concern that entails that “fellow citizens-through a common constitution, set of social institutions, body of traditions and laws- will not be abandoned in hard times or fall below a certain minimum of well-being, and that all will share in the good times (and wealth) as well” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.214). Civic friendship thus is not the full responsibility for fellow citizens that is analogous to a mother’s caring, nor “a liberal assertion of rights”, but rather a caring political ethos and action oriented to the comprehension and satisfaction of others’ needs. This caring citizenship will emerge through training and
education in the neighbourhood, in economic transactions and in the structures of the state (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.214).

While Schwarzenbach stresses the role of citizens in the accomplishment of an economic friendship, she does not underestimate the state’s role in the foundation of civic friendship, since, to her, only a central organizing political power can demand and achieve the use of economic power for the establishment of a universal doctrine of right in the service of an Aristotelian form of public common care (koinon epimelia) (Schwarzenbach, 2009, pp.241-242). Schwarzenbach agrees with Aristotle that an inclusive political friendship requires not just “private and local civic associations” but “a constitution and public laws of the land” that a central organizing principle can guarantee (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.241). Consequently, the liberal state should stop privileging military defence and regulation of property and productive competition, and begin prioritizing caring for citizens, for the next generation and for the environment (Schwarzenbach, 2009, pp.220, 278).

For Schwarzenbach, civic friendship, as has been observed, is related to a concern for a moral equilibrium; citizens are concerned about one another’s moral character, not however as a whole but specifically for the existence of a caring disposition. Schwarzenbach does not consider friendship to be an overriding principle that delineates a single conception of the good. As care ethicists, she remains loyal to the principle of pluralism that jettisons looking at public affairs in a perfectionist vein. However, she regards civic friendship, together with freedom and equality as constitutive of democracy and thus she seeks to back it institutionally. Hence, she holds that the constitution and the political structures of the contemporary liberal state should be re-formed in order to promote caring goals. They should embrace the virtues of the ethical reproductive labour that women’s presence in the public sphere foregrounds. The economy should also be embedded in a caring framework which does not just dictate the application of policies and measures of a welfare state but requires a participatory economic democracy and a productive laboring activity “done for no other reason than to maintain the social conditions for the possibility of genuine philia” (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.170). This new economic construction would limit material inequalities by completing the dimension of moral equilibrium and would achieve the democratic aim of equality which the liberal state takes for granted and thus conceals the civic inequality that derives from the vast economic discrepancies. However, although
Schwarzenbach lauds equality she believes that there are limits to its pursuit which again civic friendship should pose, just as it poses limits to individual freedom\(^{15}\). Schwarzenbach’s market socialism is not egalitarian in the sense of abolishing differences in income and social positions of authority but neither does she give them a selfish nuance; she ascribes to them a social or friendly character by rendering them conditional on the bettering of all citizens’ well-being.

It looks as if Schwarzenbach views civic friendship as a political principle that keeps a balance between the individual and the society as a whole. The individual is not absorbed by the political whole and society is not compromised by a-social or anti-social civic behaviour. Civic friendship guards a substantial sociality or else a democratic citizenship. However, the question arises as to how the potential different incomes and social positions of authority could be successfully employed in the interests of others within the market context which implies competition and the hunting of profit. In other words, within the same context Rawls’ “difference principle” could not work. And further questions arise. Firstly, as to how one could be sure that the competition between individual market agents would not simply be replaced by competition among worker cooperatives as collective agents; and secondly, how productive labour could count, as she maintains, “in part as a gift-labour” (Schwarzenbach 2009, p.170), that is, labour aiming at the fostering of friendship when it comes to the labouring activity of competitive workers’ groups. Schwarzenbach does not expound her account of market socialism although she accepts the significance of an economic underpinning of civic friendship. Certainly she is more explicit in comparison to care ethicists (Engster’s excluded) about what a caring economy should look like, but in my view she is characterized by the same post-modern anti-essentialist stance that does not allow her to closely examine the features of the market and judge whether they are compatible with the idea of civic friendship. Her economic account of civic friendship is surely more radical than the positions of care theorists on the economic aspect of civic care but it fails to fully achieve reciprocity, the kernel of civic friendship, because it calls for the closing of vast economic inequalities and not for economic equality. The use of economic inequality for the benefit of others - even if this benefit is

\(^{15}\) Schwarzenbach here refers not to the basic liberties but to the libertarian doctrine of un-regulated economic activity and of strong private property rights. For Rawls also “the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g., means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle” (Rawls, 1999, p.54).
not confined to income and wealth, and thus signifies a better reading of “difference principle”- is still an incomplete one. And it rather echoes unilateral care instead of friendship.

The meeting of everyone’s needs in a political community, I believe, can be accomplished not through competitive economic activities but through reciprocal political and economic deeds performed for each other’s sake. Civic friendship is not just another conception of the good but is rather what props up society. Therefore, the economy should operate in a way that evidences the moral superiority of this principle. Citizens’ agreement on the moral superiority of civic friendship is actually the primordial moral agreement that facilitates their concord (omononia) concerning the crucial matters of political life.

**Conclusion**

Care and friendship share many common features but differ in some respects. In particular, both of them are moral values that express the opening of the person to another person, the concern for the other’s well-being. Care derives from the private sphere and is mainly connected with a feminine ethic and with feminine ethical reproductive labour. This presumably is the reason for the underestimation of its worth and for its being ruled out of the public sphere. Friendship now, though coming likewise from the private sphere, when meant as a personal friendship, possesses a superior social status, since its perfect form according to Aristotle concerns the relationship between virtuous men, and very early it was transferred to the public domain as civic friendship. However, civic friendship is regarded nowadays as equally non-feasible in the public sphere because contemporary multicultural society is not pervaded by a single conception of the common good and because it is assumed that citizens should operate more as economic agents pursuing their individual interests.

Care and friendship both dictate that a subject should have concern for the other, be disposed to attend her needs, take on the responsibility to benefit her, and finally perform practical actions so as to meet her needs. This active concern for the other is thought by the proponents of both concepts to be beneficial for the other and self-fulfilling for the self. Consequently, these concepts do not have self-sacrificial connotations though they do not exclude the possibility of self-negation in some cases. Both also focus on the context and the particular traits of each moral situation because
each individual seeks to serve the other for the other’s own sake, which means that the other should receive the help that responds to her needs as she understands and phrases them. Therefore, the giver of the assistance ought to be aware and attentive to the other’s needs. This emphasis on contextuality is linked to practical reason in the case of friendship, and to the sentiments in the case of care. However, in fact both endorse the use of emotions as modes of ethical perception and as ethical incentives leading to moral deeds since practical reason also relies on sentiments.

Care and friendship illuminate the significance of having a responsible attitude towards the other and of promoting her well-being by performing particular actions, but in Aristotle’s conception of friendship this moral stance is connected with a comprehensive conception of the good life, whereas in care theory this is not of an equal weight, for the conception of the good life is a private matter. Helping the other is an element of the good life but it is left to each individual to make their own ranking of the elements which constitute the good life.

By bringing care and friendship into the public realm it can be seen that both require a certain caring ethos and doing good for others as well as a commitment to caring civic institutions, and the enactment of caring laws and policies. Care and friendship as political idioms entail concern for the other being expressed through the political process and through the organization of social and economic structures on the basis of the principle of equality. However, civic friendship seems to offer a better underpinning of equality, since it provides us with an account of reciprocity which points to the equal political and economic status of civic friends, bringing them closer to each other and enabling them to reciprocate the received advantage. Citizens being of an equal or similar power, economically speaking, can equally claim to exercise political authority, having the same possibility to attain their goal and thus to benefit their fellow-citizens, being in parallel sure that their civic friends will also benefit them if they acquire political authority. But besides this, they know that their mutual commitment to the constitution, and their equal voice in political deliberation, evidence the reciprocity in their relationship.

The notion of friendship can better express the concern for the other’s well-being in citizens’ relations because it conceptualizes citizens as equally able to benefit each other. Aristotelian civic friendship entails a caring disposition on the part of citizens and
simultaneously calls for providing citizens with the means for enacting their goodwill towards each other. Their equality before the law and their equal chance to make decisions regarding crucial matters of the state constitute the necessary condition for being sufficient parties to their friendly relationships since they can reciprocate one another’s goodwill. Aristotle indeed sees civic friendship mainly in terms of political equality; however, he acknowledges the economic foundation of this political equality. He admits that the enormous economic differences between citizens undermine civic friendship, since they obstruct the reciprocation of goodwill through the exercise of political authority. The huge economic disparities also prevent citizens from reaching a consensus about the common interest and from working for that because they entrap them into the pursuit of their individual or class interests. Economically unequal citizens are blind and indifferent towards one another’s interest and well-being. The ethics of care now though being inscribed in a liberal and democratic framework which calls for the political equality of citizens before the law and for equal participation in the deliberative procedures for the allocation of caring benefits and burdens does not pose the issue of the sharing of political authority by all citizens. Thus, though it reveals the economic inequalities that prevent the fair distribution of caring burdens and calls for limiting them, it does not connect this request with the sharing of political authority and thus it does not make it strong. So, civic caring seems more an object of social policy meant as a protective or paternalist policy and less an embodiment of a relationship between citizens who are equally able to show and recognize one another’s goodwill.

Aristotle interprets civic friendship in economic terms too since citizens’ friendliness is depicted in the exchange of commodities. Civic friends show their concern for each other’s good by entering into economic transactions since “some have too little, others too much” (Pol. 1.9.1257a17). Aristotle views economic activity as an instantiation of civic friendship but it seems that he asserts a condition in order for it to be regarded as such, since in the Politics he claims that economic activity which aims at the unlimited acquisition of wealth is “censured for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another” (Pol. 1.10.1258b1). Aristotle distinguishes between wealth-getting as a part of household management which aims at the satisfaction of human needs and wealth-getting which consists of making a property out of money itself and not from the natural object of it (Pol. 1.10). For Aristotle, the boundless accumulation of profit is opposed to the acquisition of material resources for satisfying human needs and it
derives from a commercial activity in which the others are seen as the means for profit. Consequently, to Aristotle, economic activity counts as a form of civic friendship in so far as it is geared towards the meeting of the human needs of friends and in so far as the economic agents do not view each other as a means for the accumulation of currency. Thus, although Aristotle does not analyze the economic mechanism which causes economic inequality, it could be said that he determines the condition that safeguards the reciprocal give and take of material goods that civic friendship entails. An economic transaction sensitive towards people’s needs warrants the ability of each citizen to reciprocate equally the benefit she has received. While Aristotelian civic friendship does not exclude productive activity from the activity of friendship by indirectly referring to it or implying it through market exchange, care ethicists understand caring as opposed to productive labour and they do not deal with it. And although care ethics speaks of the necessity for a regulated economy and a reined market in order for people to have the resources so that they are able to care adequately for their dependents, thus echoing Aristotle’s thesis about the natural objective of the economy, it does not see the whole economic activity as a field where caring can and should be realized.

Schwarzenbach’s reconstruction of the Aristotelian civic friendship features between that original conception of citizens’ relations, and the positioning of care in the public realm by care ethicists. Schwarzenbach agrees with care theorists regarding the applicability of care to the public realm but she seeks to strengthen it by framing it in the political idiom of civic friendship. She also distinguishes between productive activity and care or else between productive labour and ethical reproductive activity, but she does not choose to ignore the former and she holds that it should acquire a caring dimension. By shifting her attention to production she is able to view the economy as a whole and not in terms of a distributive market or of a welfare state only. However, the economic democracy she proposes instead of fostering civic friendship, it contradicts it. Finally, political equality, in the sense of the direct participation of all citizens in the exercise of political authority, which Aristotelian civic friendship connotes, does not count as a requirement for her liberal account of civic friendship, as this is also the case in the proposed political actualization of caring by care ethicists.

To conclude, I hold that the principle of civic friendship, though it shares many common features with the concept of care, realizes better the concern for the other, since it places it on the basis of mutuality, which entails a request for equality. In
addition, it points to the political community as a primordial instantiation of life that incarnates the unity of life. Consequently, civic friendship as a moral and political principle could outline the basic characteristics of an economy in harmony with its natural end, as Aristotle would say, an economy that serves life. This does not mean that I disavow care as a value, attitude and action or that I rule out caring terminology from my endeavour to outline such an economy; it simply means that I inscribe care in the overarching principle of friendship\textsuperscript{16}. In order to respond to the question as to what it would mean for the economic sphere to be informed by civic friendship, it is first worthwhile looking at the responses that two basic modern currents of thought have given to it by thematizing the two constituent elements of modern economy, namely the production and the market. The following two chapters are therefore devoted to these modern elaborations of the Aristotelian civic friendship.

\textsuperscript{16} Schwarzenbach (2009; 2007; 1996) integrates care in the notion of civic friendship, developing her critique on the ethics of care that I find unfair in one respect and well-justified in another.
II

Modern Conceptions of Civic Friendship
Chapter 3

Marx’s Account of Civic Friendship

Marx views material production in terms of reciprocity or else in terms of friendship. So he places the ideal of civic friendship in the territory of the economy and of human labour, since he wishes to highlight the bodily, material nature of the human being and its concrete, tangible presence in the world which results in the transformation of the latter. Man’s essence is not reduced to abstract thought as Hegel claims but is activity emanating from material need. This need is what, for Marx, associates people because it constitutes their common nature. Labour, according to Marx, derives from human need and aims at meeting this. Consequently, labour is the primordial human activity, the expression of human essence understood in both its individual and universal dimension. Communism for Marx is that kind of social organization that upholds labour as a “species activity” in contrast to capitalism which dehumanizes and de-socializes it. The present chapter refers to this sharing of labour as another way of doing politics and of sharing political authority which focuses on economic equality. “Social production” points to the economy as a sphere for realizing civic friendship.

3.1 Labour as a Species Activity

Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts develops a kind of anthropology which functions as a kind of normative basis for his critique of capitalism. In particular, he contends that man is a species being “not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but – and this is only another way of expressing it – also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being” (Marx, 1988, p.75). Man is that kind of being which can understand itself as belonging to a certain species and which can identify and examine the features of that species. Also, man is able to treat his self or acts in a way that reflects his conception of his nature, which is characterized by universality and freedom. By the word ‘universal’, Marx, in
effect, repeats the idea that the human being is conscious of his membership in a specific species, of his self as an instantiation of his species. The awareness of this universality is what enables human beings to be free. But what does Marx mean by the word ‘free’? The answer to this question is found in his statement that man’s species character is contained in his life activity, which is free, conscious activity because man in contrast to animals is not immediately identical with his life activity, he is not his life activity. His life-activity stems from his will and from his consciousness (Marx, 1988, p.76). Humans can see themselves as subjects of various potential actions and can choose among them the one they will perform, thus enacting their will. Chitty asserts, that here Marx echoes Hegel, since “just as Hegel says that subjects exercise ‘free will’ only in so far as they are universally self-conscious, so Marx says that individual human beings make their own life-activity an object of their willing only because they are species beings” (Chitty, 2018, p. 26). For Marx, the awareness of their universality makes humans free, that is, it enables them to act voluntarily or in a non-naturally preordained way.

However, Marx maintains that life-activity, though conscious and free, is of a certain kind: namely, it is labour. And then he claims that practical activity is that activity in which man works-up inorganic nature, he creates an objective world and thus proves himself a conscious species being (Marx, 1988, pp.76-77).

It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a species being. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created (Marx, 1988, p.77).

Human beings’ universality is realized through working upon inorganic nature, through the creation of a world that depicts itself. Human creation is thus the trace of human life on nature. Man’s labour is, in essence, his interaction with nature which aims in the first place at the maintenance of his physical existence (Marx, 1988, p.76) but also aims at sheer activity and creation. “Man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom” (Marx, 1988, p.77). He also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty (Marx, 1988, p.77). For Marx, therefore, production is an expression of human energy that can take the form of poiesis having external ends or the form of praxis which includes its ends or can merge these two forms. Non -
instrumental production is another proof of man’s universality since: “an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, while man produces universally” (Marx, 1988, p.77).

Human labour is human’s function meant as the processing of external inorganic nature and the forming of a new world that mirrors its creator. Nature is seen by Marx as a crude material that should be altered to man’s world where man would be able to contemplate himself. It seems that Marx wishes man to contemplate himself within himself, within a world where the object has been absorbed by a tremendous subject which has been transmuted to a self-referring thought, a thought absorbed in itself and lacking an object, a thought condemned to be abstract without a possibility “of being something” (Marx, 1988). Marx’s promethean conceptualization of labour thus underlying his materialist philosophy brings him close to Hegel’s idealism from which he meant to depart.

3.2 Estranged Labour

Capitalism, to Marx, has degraded human labour, thus eroding the essence of the human being. Workers have been alienated from the products of their work. This alienation means that the object that a worker produces is something alien to him, a power independent from him, and so the more objects a worker produces the fewer he can appropriate and the more he is subsumed under the dominion of his product, namely, capital (Marx, 1988, p.71). However, this alienation has an additional hidden dimension: the worker is not just alienated from the objective world he creates by his labour but is also alienated from nature which provides him with the material of his labour and with the means for his physical subsistence (Marx, 1988, p.72). By appropriating and consuming the physical resources, man deprives himself from the means of his labour and of his life and becomes more dependent on the object, on the artificial world that mass production has created (Marx, 1988, p.72). This alienation is certainly the outcome of the fundamental estrangement from nature: namely, nature being confronted as an alien power that has mere utility (Marx, 1988, p.107).
Apart from being alienated from the product of his labour, the worker is alienated from the activity of his labour too. His labour, by becoming just a labour to earn a living, is external to him, to his essential being, since:

[...]in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind[...]his labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it (Marx, 1988, p.74).

Here, this perverted image of labour is far away from the initial description of labour as an essential conscious and free human activity in which human universality is manifested. Alienated labour does not have its grounding in its subject, it does not stem from the worker’s consciousness, volition and need; so it is not his property but rather, it belongs to another person, that is, to the capitalist. Working under capitalism, therefore, equates to the loss of the worker’s self, to his self-estrangement (Marx, 1988, p.75), which is the worst kind of violence that a human could suffer. Labour is interlaced with life; a human being cannot but be active, cannot but interact with the physical world. This interaction of subject with the world belongs to it since it derives from its bodily and intellectual essence. An alien intrusive power mediating between the subject, as a biological entity, and its activity, cannot but be alienating.

A third aspect of the alienation under capitalism is the one from man’s species being (Marx, 1988, p.77). Estranged labour alienates workers from their species-being since they do not work spontaneously or universally as instantiations of their species that are aware of their universality but as individuals drained of their universal potential. Hence, their labour, their species life, becomes a mere means to their individual existence.

Finally, estranged labour alienates man from man since each man is alienated from his essential nature (Marx, 1988, p.78). By being alienated from the product of their labour, from their life activity and from their species, that is, from their self and from their human nature, workers alienate themselves from the others. We understand that agreeing with Aristotle, Marx believes that people’s relationships with others reflect their relationship with themselves. Intersubjective relationships are, in fact, reflections of the identification or not with the self in its twofold sense: as a concrete situated person and as a universal subject. The features of labour are indicative of people’s quality and of their life’s quality. Estranged labour undermines human essence because
it stunts human creativity and imagination; it blocks the exercise of free will, prioritizes objects over people and ruins human relationships. Therefore, capitalist production is at odds with people’s humanity and sociality and prevents them from living a good life.

3.3 The False Community

Marx argues that estranged labour originates from the act of products’ exchange. People, he asserts, started to exchange the surplus of their production, thus initiating the division of labour (Marx, 1978, pp.220-221). In the first crude form of exchange, people exchanged goods they had produced and that were not necessary for their subsistence with other goods that were needed, or with products that they simply lacked. Thus, their labour started to “become partly a source of income” (Marx, 1978, p.220). And, further, as production became more diverse and as the activities of the producer became more one-sided, labour fell “into the category of labour to earn a living” (Marx, 1978, p.219). So, labour ceased to be the enjoyment of the producer’s personality and the “realization of his natural abilities and spiritual aims”, and the relation between the producer and his product ceased to be one of “immediate enjoyment and personal need” (Marx, 1978, p.220).

While the exchange of products seems to be a social relationship - since people enable each other to meet their needs by mutually providing goods that correspond to those needs - for Marx, exchange is the opposite of a social relationship: it is an alienated community precisely because exchanged products have not been produced with the intention of satisfying another person’s need but with the intention of being exchanged for other products that correspond to their owner’s needs. Therefore, the act of exchange is not a social relation, because it does not imply social production where a human being has produced for another human being as a human being (Marx, 1978, p.225). In addition, since exchange is selfish, it entails that both parties seek to deceive

17 This idea of instrumental reciprocity in exchange-relationships occurs also in the *Grundrisse* where Marx says: “[…]as such it is irrelevant to each of the two subjects in exchange, and […] this reciprocity interests him only in so far as it satisfies his interest to the exclusion of, without reference to, that of the other. That is, the common interest which appears as the motive of the whole is recognized as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is not the motive but rather proceeds, as it were, behind the back of these self-reflected particular interests, behind the back of one individual’s interest in opposition to that of the other” (Marx, 1973, p.244).
each other in order to “get the better of that of the other” (Marx, 1978, p. 226). Property owners do not wish to complement one another but to plunder one another. Consequently, exchange counts as “reciprocity in alienation” rather than as a social act, a species act (Marx, 1978, p. 218).

Now, things become even worse in the case of the most developed form of exchange: namely, trade, since money intensifies alienation in the act of reciprocating material goods by enhancing the power of the object over the man. Money mediating between people renders the demand that human needs make within the act of exchange even weaker and separates people more from one another and from themselves too. The objects they produce are doubly alienated from them, since they do not stand just as indifferent objects that are still to be exchanged while retaining some properties, but they are converted into money, becoming thus even less immediately connected with their needs (Marx, 1978, p.220). This estrangement, however, from the commodities they produce extends also to the goods that seek to acquire through exchange since the latter do not necessarily respond directly to their needs (Marx, 1978, p.221). Being thus gradually estranged from their needs, individuals cannot be attentive and responsive to the others’ needs which are similarly phrased in the language of money that though formed to function as a kind of lingua franca which would ensure people’s communication, tends to rob them of any linguistic content. In other words, instead of expressing human needs, money alienates these to the extent that it turns them into a single need, the need for money (Marx, 1988, p.116).

Exchange is not the real community of men, according to Marx, but rather the “civil society in which every individual is a totality of needs and only exists for the other person, as the other exists for him, insofar as each becomes a means for the other” (Marx, 1988, p.128). By exchanging products, people function as separate individuals, as particular beings and not as humans, as universal beings, as species beings. They pursue their interests at the expense of the others’ needs. They treat themselves and others just as property owners (Marx, 1978, p.218) and they realize their human nature, their community, their mutual complementing in a perverted, alienated mode, the mode that private property dictates. Private property for Marx is “the material, summary expression of alienated labour” (Marx, 1988, p.83). Consequently, human relationships that are built on the basis of private property cannot but be estranged relationships.
Marx, I think, sees the exchange of products as a rite that establishes and validates the alienation of species activity, and confirms the alteration of the whole human nature into ‘something else’ and its subordination to an inhuman power. The use of objects as exchangeable values and not as what they really are - namely, use-objects that directly satisfy a human need - counts for Marx, as for Aristotle in his *Politics*, as an improper use (Pol. 1.9.1257a9-10). The universality of people cannot be realized through trade with the mediation of money. The reciprocal exchange of goods cannot stand for human community or for human friendship. The reciprocity that friendship implies, for Marx, should be placed in the field of production. Thus, human life activity will escape alienation and become not just free and conscious but community - affirming too or it will become free and conscious precisely because it will become community-affirming as we shall see.

3.4 Human Friendship as Reciprocal Production

In the *Comments on James Mill*, Marx outlines a completely different kind of production from that of capitalist production marked by alienated labour, a communist kind of production or, as he characteristically says, a production performed by people as “human beings”. In particular, he states, in that production:

1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt.

2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man’s essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man’s essential nature.

3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognized and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love.

4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature (Marx, 1978, pp.227-228).

This picture seems to restore labour as the primordial species activity, since in a way it refutes the traits of alienated labour. By working as a human being, the subject realizes
its “individuality” and enjoys the process of production because the latter constitutes the “expression” of its life. The person feels happy and content while working since his course of actions originates from his volition and from his consciousness. His labour is harmonized with himself; actually it is the “manifestation” of himself in the external world. Moreover, the object of his labour as ‘congealed labour’ is not a “hostile”, “alien power” confronting man but a positive, creative and familiar power, an objectification of his personality that gives him pleasure. We could say that the labourer loves the product of his labour because it is in a sense “his self in activity”, as Aristotle observes describing the relation between the craftsman and his handiwork (NE 9.7.1168a6-71846). Apart, however, from the satisfaction of labourer’s need for creation, labour is oriented towards the meeting of another person’s need. The worker wishes his product to be used and enjoyed by someone else. He consciously produces a good so as to satisfy a human need and is aware of the fact that doing so realizes man’s essential nature. And again he feels happy because he has benefited another subject and he has thus realized his species essence. Certainly in capitalism workers produce for others, but that fact is rather trivial and not vital for them or constitutive of the human good (Brudney, 1998, p.185). Labourers work in order to produce commodities that will be sold and consumed or else they work in order to earn a wage.

Further, by producing for another person, the worker becomes the “mediator” between that person and the species. Here, Marx seems to say that the activities of production and consumption equate to an act of reciprocal recognition of the species identity of the producer and of the consumer since the producer, by forming an object for a consumer, shows that he regards him as a human being, and on the other hand, the consumer, by using that object, evidences that he equally considers the producer to be a human (Brudney, 1997, p.392). The receiver of the commodity recognizes and feels the producer as “a completion” of his own “essential nature” and as “a necessary part” of himself because that commodity meets a need that he himself is not able to meet, and the producer does and feels the same because the use of his product verifies and completes his act of production.

Finally, in his labour, in his individual objectification of his life, the worker directly creates the consumer’s “expression” of his life and thus “confirms” and “realizes” his “human nature” or else his “communal nature”. Here, Marx means that by producing for a consumer, the worker provides him with the means for staying alive and for pursuing
his life-goals, and he actualizes his human essence by creating a community, a bond with another human being. Labour becomes the point where people meet each other as species beings and confirm their common human nature which, in essence, is a communal one.

It is important to notice that Marx stresses that the relationship between producer and consumer is reciprocal: “this relationship would moreover be reciprocal; what occurs on my side has also to occur on yours” (Marx, 1978, p.228). Both parties perform interchangeably both actions of recognition of each other’s human nature: namely, they both animate the roles of producer and consumer in rotation. This reminds us of the reciprocal exercising of political authority as the incarnation of Aristotle’s civic friendship. Marx, indeed, gives us his economic account of civic friendship by sketching the features of a human, a “social production” where individuals are engaged in mutual production, thus showing their concern for each other’s well-being. Brudney believes that the notion of “concern” is the right one in order to describe the bond that links producers to one another, because concern can be addressed towards unknown people, in contrast to love or sympathy, which require individuated objects (Brudney, 2010, p.161). Although producers in a communist society do produce with the intention of meeting a person’s need, do not know that person. Consequently, as in the case of civic friends, the members of a communist society do not love each other but are concerned for each other’s good and do good to each other. Brudney understands concern as a practical attitude that involves “a disposition to act in certain ways toward others (and to do so for their sake), to have beliefs (e.g. about the value of these others) and surely at times to have feelings with regard to others” (Brudney, 2010, p.162). So for him, reciprocal production embodies a kind of structural, impersonal friendship that does not imply the existence of any organic community (Brudney, 1998, p.183; Brudney, 2010, p.167). Indeed, communists produce for each other and recognize as well as appreciate mutually this mutual expression of concern, but it cannot not be said that they pursue a common good meant as an externally posed goal. They do not feel that by reciprocally producing they subject themselves to an alien objective and sacrifice their individual projects for the sake of a community’s good. This is not the case because the individual interest resonates with the species interest or with the species function, and thus, as Brudney claims, people’s ends are internally intertwined and shared (Brudney, 1997, p.398). Moreover, the enjoyment of one’s object by
someone else becomes the labourer’s enjoyment as well, since in a communist society the subject appropriates the senses and the enjoyments of other people and also “need or enjoyment have lost their egotistical nature” (Marx, 1988, p.107).

Producing for others in a communist society, people work for the sake of others but not under their domination. They work for the others as they would work for themselves or else they work for the sake of others by working for their own sake. Certainly social need could count as an alien, domineering will that alienates labour, but in my view it could not count as more alien than the need that generally derives from scarcity and is felt by all human beings. But again we could say that social need might prescribe a certain way for its satisfaction, that is, a certain kind and amount of work determined by the community which might not match a person’s inclination and abilities with their assigned kind of work, and might even violate their will concerning the length of their working day. In that case labour could again be alienated, but not to the same degree as labour for gaining a wage might become in conditions of over-exploitation where the need is not experienced to the same degree by the worker and by the owner of the means of production. Labour can indeed be a species life activity on the condition that it serves a human need, is reciprocated, and is performed freely and consciously and in a way that realizes a person’s potential.

People engaged in a communist production are interdependent because they rely on one another in order to maintain their biological existence, in order to realize their individuality and in order to realize and confirm their human nature. This interdependence is captured by the idea of mutual completion, which constitutes its acknowledgement and affirmation (Brudney, 1998, p.185). Self-realization in Marxian human production is accomplished through the others or it “is integrated with [the] community” (Elster, 1986, p.119). Thus, individuality does not have a self-interested character but is rather a “social individuality” (Keat, 1981, p.12). People’s interdependence can be considered to be a relationship of friendship and differs from the interdependence of individual interests of mutually indifferent subjects in market exchange or else from “individualistic sociality” (Keat, 1981, p.14). Like Aristotle, Marx interprets people’s mutual dependence in terms of a mutual completion that derives from their universality. The other person is thus another self who not only provides us with the knowledge of ourselves, who enables us to think and act better but also provides us with the means for our subsistence and the sources of our self-worth.
3.5 The Feasibility of the Marxian Version of Civic Friendship

Marx deems that non-alienated production fosters social ties among individuals, since the production of an object for the satisfaction of someone else’s need demonstrates the concern on the part of producer for the well-being of the consumer, which is recognized and appreciated by the latter. The producer becomes aware and enjoys this appreciation and confirmation of his friendly gesture. In this relation a human being completes the essential nature of another human being and both parties establish and confirm their common species membership and contribute to the building of a friendship, of a community. The underlying idea in this picture of a communist society is that the objects that are produced fit in with respective actual needs. However, what would it happen if we had not a harmonization between the products that humans enjoy making and human needs? This is Brudney’s “coordination problem”, which has two aspects: first, how we can guarantee that while each person produces according to their abilities, together we achieve the generation of a sufficient quantity of goods to meet everyone’s needs, and second, how we can prevent the possibility of an over-production of goods that no one would use (Brudney, 1998, p.174). This problem actually echoes the question as to whether Fourier’s position on the organization of societal work in such a way that all work is aligned with specific human passions and is thus enjoyed by people engaged in it, is plausible (Schmidt am Busch, 2013, p.1163). Marx, according to Schmidt am Busch, seems to have affirmed Fourier’s position and to believe that societal work could be organized so as to constitute a human life activity (Schmidt am Busch 2013, p.1161). Based on the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Schmidt am Busch claims that for Marx, human life activity, labour, is crucially characterized by two elements: first it is “something that people like or enjoy carrying out”, and second its course and results are determined by its subjects (Schmidt am Busch, 2013, p.1159).

Indeed, the fact that people feel happy and content performing non estranged labour means not only that labour is enjoyable for them because it is harmonized with their inclinations or abilities but also that it is carried out in a way that people freely develop their “physical and mental energy” (Marx, 1988, p. 74). The condition of material scarcity under which humans live calls for the performing of necessary work that is not always fully pleasant in the sense of stemming completely from humans’ talents. However, it can still belong to them and it can be an expression of species life if it is freely organized and performed. In addition, what makes work enjoyable and
contributive to human’s self-fulfillment is that it constitutes a caring labour done for someone else’s sake. Consequently, in a communist society, even if necessary labour is not always absolutely enjoyable, it is not nasty to the extent that people would abstain from it and thus neglect existent needs. Besides, people could rotate in the exercise of less pleasant necessary works in order to share societal burdens fairly. In short, communist friendship does not seem to be at stake, due to its underlying self-realization principle: namely, the need for the producer’s self-realization, since the latter refers to the whole potential of the individual and not only to that person’s specific predilections and inclinations. What is more, self-realization is implemented through the others.

Material scarcity is what brings people together; their joint attempt to overcome that shortage reveals their communal nature and warrants their society.

One could also ask what would happen if material scarcity turned into material abundance, and whether it would that mean people had returned to a state of particularity where any sense of communality would be extinguished. As has been observed, Marx, in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, contends that man truly produces when he exercises his life activity in freedom from the need, since his species activity is by definition free and conscious, thus implying that the elimination of scarcity should be an end for humans. In addition, in the third volume of the *Capital* he claims that:

> the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production… freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite (Marx, 1991, pp.958-959).

So, does Marx consider the human community a highly significant attribute of species being in the realm of necessity and a trivial attribute, in a realm of freedom? I do not think this is the case, because on the one hand material abundance will always presuppose, as Marx in fact says, a free and social handling of necessity, and on the other hand, the limitation of productive labour would not mean less manifestation of the human community. Life activity should not necessarily be confined to the production of
commodities; it can include caring labour. Consequently, even in a state of relative abundance, people still would need the help of others in order to flourish. In a wealthy society there would still be infants and elderly people needing our care or students needing to be educated or patients needing to be healed. So, people would still realize themselves through others to a great degree and the community would still be the expression of human life.

But even if all services were to be delivered by robots, I deem, people would feel the need to communicate the products of their activities to others. In order to understand this one can think of the artists who do not keep their works for themselves but they wish to communicate them to the public since the enjoyment of those works by other people is in a way the last phase in their creation. In short, as Marx asserts, human nature is the true community of men that appears due to human need and so “it does not depend on man whether this community exists or not” (Marx, 1978, p.217). Human need is human community since it points to a shortage, a lack that needs to be filled by others. However, whether that community can develop into a thriving and cohesive society depends on the kind of human need and on the way in which people choose to meet it.

3.6 The Implications of Marxian Economic Friendship

“Social production” entails the abolition of the market and the joint planning of the economy. These implications of communist production are not explicitly phrased in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and in the *Comments on James Mill* but are easily conjectured. Indeed, in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* Marx notes that in a communist society labour will be emancipated, since the instruments of labour will constitute the common property of society, total labour will be co-operatively regulated and the proceeds of labour will be fairly distributed (Marx, 2009, pp.5-8). Furthermore, the production and the distribution of society’s wealth will be arranged not according to the “narrow horizon of bourgeois right” but according to the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (Marx, 2009, p.11).

Reciprocal material production presupposes or entails the abolition of private property because self-realization through contribution to the other’s well-being is hardly
conceivable in the case of coerced labour, of labour to earn a living. People could produce for others, I believe, only on the condition that others have consciously and voluntarily produced for them, on the condition that they share the stress of their individual survival with others and know that they mutually strive for one another’s survival. This is not because humans are selfish or vicious but because they are biological beings that are primarily interested in their own subsistence. This of course does not mean that they are not able to prioritize someone else’s life over their own life; parents’ or close friends’ actions of self-sacrifice show that people can ignore their instinct of self-subistence for the sake of another human being. However, they cannot organize their relations with unknown and distant others on the basis of self-sacrifice, even though they do often act altruistically.

Private property is actually the outcome of the attempt of the particular individual to handle the stress of their own survival by separating themselves from the others whom they conceive as contributors to that stress. For the individual, the others are a threat to his or her life, along with hostile natural powers. Consequently, these others should be treated like nature, in a way that nullifies their hostility and converts them into a means for the individual’s subsistence. The individual thus acts as if unaware of his or her universality or rather as if conceiving it in a wrong way, which would be indicative of his intellectual confusion, as Marx would say.

However, I believe the treatment of others as a means and the endeavour to subordinate them under one’s power, reflects the previous treatment of self as a means for an individual’s own survival. Human beings first used their life activity as a mere means for subsistence and then strove to appropriate the labour of others, namely, to become owners. Marx constantly underscores the antithesis between private property or an alienated sort of ownership which comes from the will to possess and use, and true belonging which emanates from a need for life’s expression. The senses of the property owner are estranged to the extent that they are reduced to the sense of having whereas the senses of the individual who works for the other are “theoreticians”, that is, they “relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa” (Marx, 1988, p.107).

So, as well as the abolition of private property, social production would generate a different anthropological type. Marx, in effect, believes that the abolition of private
property will free people from an instrumentalist mentality that derives from the a-social way of confronting material scarcity and will enable them to re-relate with the world in a spontaneous and theoretical mode. They will re-appropriate their senses and attributes as well as other’s senses and enjoyments precisely because they will feel safe to do so. The absence of fear that scarcity engenders will allow them to care for the other, since the other’s happiness will count as their own ‘property’.

Conclusion

Like Aristotle, Marx views friendship as contributive to the human good, to human happiness. Reciprocal production objectifying individuals’ friendship and community constitutes a species activity penetrated by reason, since it is performed for a human being, and it is conscious and free. We could say that “social production” reflects the function of the soul in accordance with reason or else in accordance with virtue, the virtue of friendship, and so it realizes human nature. Marx indeed sees the human being’s communal nature as a sign of virtue and nobility. In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts he characteristically says, referring to workmen’s need for society, which features after their association with one another for the promotion of their common interests:

such things as smoking, drinking, eating etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring together. Company, association, and conversation, which again has society as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies (Marx, 1988, p.124).

Reciprocal production realizes friendship and society among people unknown to each other, just as the reciprocal exchange of political authority incarnates civic friendship. In both kinds of friendship there is a reciprocal and mutually recognized and appreciated concern for each other’s well-being and both attest certain attributes of both parties; namely, their humanity in the case of Marx and their citizenship and humanity in the case of Aristotle. Furthermore, both friendships are manifested in unanimity: unanimity on the organizing of productive procedure and unanimity on civic matters respectively. However, in a communist society unanimity is more a commonly acknowledged, fixed principle rather than a consensus deriving from a common deliberation and negotiation between conflicting interests. In addition, this unanimity rather entails the absence of a
dialogue about issues concerning jurisprudence or concerning a political community’s relations with other political communities, since it looks as if, for Marx, communist production will extinguish the cause of injustice and crime, and of collisions between different national, cultural and religious communities: namely, the pursuing of individual interest at the expense of others.

Unlike Aristotle, Marx does not believe that common property will make people indifferent towards it and he tends to share the Platonic vision of Callipolis. However, his sharing of property is not confined to mere objects, that is, the means of production and the products, but it extends to the very act of production. Aristotle affirms private property and thus the concomitant scission between individual and common interest, though in parallel he argues for the need for individual interest to be subsumed into the community’s interest, since the promotion of the latter equates, in essence, to the promotion of the former, while Marx preserves common well-being by integrating common interest into individual interest, thus rescuing the subject from the coercion that a hypostasization of community might generate.

By blurring the boundary between individual and common interest, Marx blurs the border between individual and community. For him each producer is not just a representative of the community but is the community itself. His interest is the community’s interest too. That community is not a specific one but the whole community of producers, namely, humanity. Consequently, this merging of individual and community does not result in the absorption of the former by the latter but simply in the freeing of the whole person. However, it should be admitted that the planning of cooperative production and of distribution of goods presupposes a situated community and so the individual might be subjected to the community’s volition, thus losing his or her individuality. Therefore, the attempt to eliminate the division between individual and common interest might result in subject being lost within the community unless politics and a democratic dialogue regulate the community’s life.

By affirming private property and thus private interest, Aristotle shows that these factors are connected with the individual and contribute to each person’s very constitution. Marx, on the other hand, does not believe in this function of property. He believes rather that it impedes the full actualization of individuality. I assume that for Aristotle, the dialogue that the negotiation of the opposed individual interests entails,
also contributes to the individual’s constitution, but on the other hand, it allows for founding the common interest and thus for the preservation of the community. Marx now, does not view individual interest as being linked with property and so he does not see dialogue but mutual production as constitutive of community. This, I think, does not mean that he underestimates the usefulness of dialogue in a community but that he simply does not give it the form of negotiation among different economic agents.

Aristotle considers private property a necessary presupposition of citizenship since the latter requires virtue that can be acquired only if people have enough leisure time and abstain from menial labour which is dehumanizing and incompatible with virtue and happiness (Pol. 7.9.1329a1; 3.5.1278a20-21; 7.9.1329a16-26). It could therefore be said that Aristotle locates civic friendship ideally in a realm of non-scarcity and thus he conceptualizes it in terms of reciprocal exchange of political authority. Civic friend are people who lead their lives free from the stress of self-subsistence because some others, namely slaves, craftsmen and farmers work for them. Aristotle could not see civic friendship in terms of material production because of his repulsion for manual labour; in contrast with Marx he deems that labour hinders human beings’ functioning in accordance with reason and thus undermines human happiness.

Marx, however, rejects the dualism of spirit and body and the prioritization of mental labour over manual labour, and so he thematizes material production as the guarantor of human society. He is convinced that everyone is able to acquire the virtue of friendship regardless of their occupation. Material scarcity is not necessarily an obstacle for acquiring this. On the contrary, it can allow for it. Consequently, while Aristotelian civic friendship might exclude certain categories of people, Marxian ‘productive’ friendship is inclusive of every single human being.

Marx construes civic friendship in terms of economic equality. Two other modern thinkers, Smith and Hegel, offer their economic accounts of civic friendship but they do not speak of equality. Moreover, they do not place civic friendship in the productive process but in the market. These additional, modern economic accounts of civic friendship will be addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

The Moral Promise of the Market

As seen above, Marx regards market exchange as a semblance of community because it does not imply a ‘human’ production, a production by a human being for another human being, but an alienated production and an intention to plunder and deceive. Consequently, for him, the market does not embody a real, conscious concern for the other’s well-being and thus it cannot be said that it accommodates true friendship. However, it has been maintained that the pursuit of material self-interest in the market realm could promote or it does promote the common welfare; human well-being which is the political community’s purpose could be implemented through the market. Adam Smith (1976a) views the market’s “invisible hand” as a guise of civic friendship. He supports the beneficial role of market relations for society, thus offering an account of civic friendship that corresponds to Aristotle’s embodiment of civic friendship in the exchange of material goods. Hegel (2001) interprets civic friendship as the mutual conditioning of the “principle of particularity” and the “principle of universality” in the market or as the institutional embedding of “social freedom”, as Honneth (2014) puts it. Hegel’s view of the market elucidates its moral dimension, although it sheds light on its moral frailty too. The present chapter is devoted to this counter-argumentation on the market’s moral-friendly character, on the modern instantiation of the Aristotelian civic friendship as market transaction.

4.1 The ‘Invisible Friendship’ or Adam Smith’s Account of Civic Friendship

In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith locates the market in a framework of personal rights and property rights. Every person, as long as he respects other’s rights, is “free to pursue his own interest his own way and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man” (Smith, 1976a, p.687). Economic agents are
free to pursue their own interests without interfering with others’ rights to advance their interests respectively.

People engage in market transactions in order to promote their self-interest and to better their condition. This, for Smith, is related to human reason and speech (Smith, 1976a, p.25). Commercial transactions could be compared to argumentation as he says in his Lectures (Smith, 1978, p.352); as the interlocutors attempt to convince one another of the correctness of their opinion so likewise economic agents try to persuade each other of the worth of their economic offer. “The propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another”, to Smith, led people to the division of labour and thus to wealth (Smith, 1976a, p.25). The market, for him, brings opulence to all members of society. He defines opulence as the situation in which prices are low and wages are high, so that goods are accessible for the majority of people and specifically for the least well off (Smith, 1976a, p.96).

Market participants, though interested only in their own good, promote the common good by their mere participation in the market race. General welfare derives not from human benevolence and mutual concern but from sheer self-interest and indifference towards others. This idea of the achievement of good purposes without good intentions originates from the Scottish Enlightenment and in Smith takes the form of the metaphor of the market’s “invisible hand” (Herzog, 2013, p. 25).

According to Smith, through price mechanism the market coordinates supply and demand, and hence it adjusts the quantities of goods accordingly (Smith, 1976, p.74). The balance between supply and demand entails the adequate meeting of people’s needs, since the goods and services that respond to those needs are provided in the market and their price is affordable. The market gives people who want to further their interests the right information about how to best use their human capital and money in order to make a profit from them. This successful coordination of supply and demand by the market, to Smith, is not feasible for a human subject nor for a government, since “no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient” for it (Smith, 1976a, p.687).

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18 The thought that individuals’ vices can produce beneficial outcomes for the society occurs earlier than Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), in Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1724), which is characteristically subtitled Private Vices, Public Benefits.
Furthermore, the “invisible hand” of the market maximizes the national product and distributes wealth in society. In particular, investors, by furthering their interests, invest mainly in agriculture and then in manufacturing and trade, thus contributing to meeting a country’s needs. What counts as advantageous to them is optimal for other people as well (Smith, 1976a, p.606). Regarding the distribution, Smith claims that wealth is transferred from the rich to the poor because the rich cannot consume all he owns. Consequently, “he is obliged to distribute among those, who prepare [...] that little which he himself makes use of” (Smith, 1976b, p.184). In addition, the rich give employment and thus income to the poor. The poor benefit from the accumulation of wealth by the rich. The prosperity of the latter entails the welfare of the whole of society, since the rich:

are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species (Smith, 1976b, pp. 184-185).

However, in order for the market to work in such a beneficial way, the economy must be growing. Economic growth ensures high wages whereas a declining or even a stationary economy leads to the lowering of wages (Smith, 1976a, pp.89, 90). Herzog infers that the growing of the economy for Smith thus means new investments and hence new profits that are distributed to people, whereas economic decline means the redistribution of profits that already exist (Herzog, 2013, p.35).

As has been observed, although Smith argues for the legal equality of all citizens he allows for economic differences among them. However, in order for those differences to be acceptable to an impartial spectator, they should result in the benefit of the whole of society and should be fair in the sense that virtuous people should be rewarded by the market because their economic behaviour is prudent and buttress the social order (Herzog, 2013, p.100). While Smith holds that prosperity should be a prize for the virtuous economic agents, he does not base social order exclusively on the moral qualities of people. Rather, he links social order to social welfare that comes from the mechanisms of the market which stand for the contrivances of nature in his deistic universe (Herzog, 2013). However, in order for the market to function properly, politicians should safeguard the legal equality of all since without secure property rights people are not keen to work in socially useful ways. Legal equality is a necessary
condition for the active participation of the members of society in the market so as to better their own condition and by extension others’ condition too. Furthermore, politicians should resist the pressure by powerful merchants and manufacturers who seek to restrain open market by privileges and monopolies (Smith, 1978, p.260). Self-interest, for Smith, should be kept out of the sphere of politics in order to be beneficial for all in the sphere of the market.

Smith does not believe that people are able or naturally endowed to care adequately for distant others. They care most for those close to them: their children, their parents, friends and benefactors (Smith, 1976b, p.227). However, their relationships with their fellow citizens, the unknown people with whom they share a common public space are anchored in “a generalized atmosphere of goodwill, generosity and trust”, and they are “predictable, civil, calm and friendly” (Mallory, 2012, p.599). Citizens’ relations are regulated by sympathy as are the relations between close friends. Sympathy is not an intimate feeling but “a social practice”, “a leap of the imagination” where we try to ‘enter into’ other sentiments, opinions and tastes as well as into the instances that generated them and the actions that originated from them (Mallory, 2012, p.595-596). Sympathy, however, does not presuppose only the endeavour of the person who wishes to ‘bring home’ the experience of the other but also the attempt of the person who wants to be sympathized with, to moderate their sentiments, “to flatten the sharpness of their natural tone” because otherwise those sentiments cannot be felt by the other person who still remains a different person (Smith, 1976b, p.22). Sympathy is thus a social, joint venture to bridge the distance between unknown people, which can lead to a social bond.

Sympathy could be regarded as a basis for civic friendship, since it signifies goodwill among strangers, but it fails to count as such because it applies only to people who benefit from the market mechanism. “In Smithian ‘strangership’”- namely, the relationship between strangers which is characterized by sympathy - “the stranger is formally the same as the self. It is premised not just on equality, but equivalence, and presupposes a common lifeworld” (Mallory, 2012, p.600). But apart from this kind of “strangership” there is another one which is marked by exclusion, and lack of sympathy and recognition. People refuse to sympathize with the poor, thus showing that they do not recognize them as equal members of a thriving commercial society:
The poor man [...] is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is mortified upon both accounts [...]. The poor man goes out and comes in unheeded, and when in the midst of a crowd is in the same obscurity as if shut up in his own hovel [...] [Others] turn away their eyes from him, or if the extremity of his distress forces them to look at him, it is only to spurn so disagreeable an object from among them. The fortunate and proud wonder at the insolence of human wretchedness, that it should dare to present itself before them, and with the loathsome aspect of its misery presume to disturb the serenity of their happiness (Smith, 1976b, p.51).

Smithian sympathy hides this kind of “strangerness”, the attitude towards people who live at the margins of commercial society, and it does not question the unequal division of wealth and power. So, it cannot be contended that it embodies civic friendship, since the latter implies an active concern for the other’s well-being, an undertaking of action for improving the other’s condition and volition for limiting economic differences.

Summing up, it may be said that the market, its ‘providence’, its “invisible hand” is what guarantees the good life in modern society according to Smith. Citizens involve themselves in trade and entrepreneurship, they communicate with each other in terms of trade, seeking their own interests, and thus automatically they further one another’s purposes. They do not produce for one another but for themselves, in order to make a profit from their labour. Smith holds that the “property which every man has in his own labour” should be “the most sacred and inviolable” since “it is the original foundation of all other property” (Smith, 1976a, p.138). The ability to work is man’s “human capital” that he can sell in the market so as to ameliorate his condition. Smith cannot imagine people working with the intention of advancing the well-being of one another because for him it is self-interest and not altruism that can make individuals industrious and because humans as finite biological beings cannot care for the whole of society. However, what they can do for one another is to respect one another’s legal rights, and one another’s freedom to pursue their interests within the market. This kind of respect, it could be argued, along with the indirect support for one another’s good and his “strangerness”, constitute the weak Smithian friendship.

Smith seems to conceive society in contractual terms and he bases society’s cohesion and advance on the market and on the lawful participation in the market. He conceives citizenship and citizens’ relations in terms of an economic contract. Thus, commercial society resembles the commercial agreements that Aristotle uses in order to determine
what a *polis* is not. For Aristotle, as we have said, a *polis* is considered as such because citizens care for one another’s character, for one another’s virtue in political terms. In contrast, Smith models political community and citizenship on the basis of the market logic and thus his civic friendship is rather frail. Although the market is to benefit all citizens, it does not do so, nor does it extinguish economic differences since the latter are necessary for the market to function as a structure of impersonal co-operation, and for the full development of the division of labour. Besides this, economic inequalities are justified because they arise from “the various degrees of capacity, industry, and diligence in the different individuals” (Smith, 1978, p.338). So, while the purpose of the market is to ameliorate the material status of the poor, a closing of economic inequalities would undermine its function. Smith, however, acknowledges that being at ease leads to more sympathy towards others (Smith, 1976b, p.205) but on the other hand, he seems to believe that the ‘amount’ of this moral attitude should be determined by the market. In other words, the degree of friendship among citizens should not overcome the limits that the market poses in order to safeguard its proper functioning. This is another piece of evidence of the heteronomous character of Smith’s civic-market friendship.

### 4.2 The Vulnerability of the ‘Invisible Friendship’ or Hegel’s Account of Civic Friendship

Like Smith, Hegel views the modern individual as a possessor of property rights and economic liberties. A human being, for him, should “translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea” (Hegel, 2001, §41). By appropriating external things, that is, “putting” them “his will” and thus giving them “destiny and soul” (Hegel, 2001, §44), the human subject externalizes his freedom. Hence, “property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end” (Hegel, 2001, §45). Consequently, the allocation of property rights to citizens signifies a recognition of their freedom and their personality, since, as Hegel also claims, “property is the embodiment of personality” (Hegel, 2001, §51).

Motivated by need, impulse or caprice, people acquire things by entering into contractual relationships. Through the market, they seek to satisfy their needs and
interests, thus exercising their freedom. Hegel positions the market or, as he says, the “system of needs” within civil society which is organized according to two principles, namely the “principle of particularity” and the “principle of universality” (Hegel, 2001, §182). By the first principle, Hegel means that the person in his relationships with the others seeks to advance his interests and purposes, and by the second principle he means that each person’s attainment of his goals presupposes the respective accomplishment of the others’ goals. So, these two principles are intertwined, thus making a complex web of relations of interdependence:

In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends – an attainment conditioned in this way by universality – there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all (Hegel, 2001, §183).

This interdependence certainly holds true more specifically in the market where something like the Smithian market’s “invisible hand” seems to arrange economic transactions:

when men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally related to one another in their labour and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else (Hegel, 2001, §199).

The division of labour by itself embodies the principle of universality since producers depend on one another in order to meet their needs, but on the other hand, this interdependence does not necessarily entail that peace and sympathy reign in the market sphere. Hegel notes that “in civil society universal and particular have fallen apart” (Hegel, 2001, §180) and that the market is rather a “remnant of the state of nature” (Hegel, 2001, §200) where each pursues his own interest at the expense of the others and also at the expense of the common good of the political community (Hegel, 2001, §289). The market is not an idyllic place where people co-operate and everyone improves his condition but an arena where opposing economic agents fight against each other. In the market there are people who lose in that race or they cannot take part at all in it. The market does not result in opulence for all social strata but pauperizes large segments of the people, since the changing of needs and the arbitrary preferences for material goods brings turmoil in the labour market; the demand for new and different
commodities can lead “entire branches of industry” to bankruptcy, and workers to unemployment and poverty (Hegel, 1983, pp.139-140).

Given this state of the market sphere, Hegel does not believe that the market can correct its flaws by itself; in other words, it cannot be self-regulating and self-healing. An ancillary mechanism is therefore needed in order to preserve the element of universality in it. The role of this mechanism is played by the other parts of civil society: namely, by the administration of justice, by the police and by the corporations. The police have two basic functions: first, to remove “all fortuitous hindrances” that might threaten person and property, and, second, to secure “the individual’s subsistence and happiness” as a right (Hegel, 2001, §230). Corporations, “the second ethical root of the state”\(^{19}\) (Hegel, 2001, §255), are professional associations that provide their members with recognition and respect, and support them in times of poverty without humiliating them (Hegel, 2001, §253). However, the principle of universality, according to Hegel, is best served by the state, “the actuality of the Ethical Idea” (Hegel, 2001, §257), where people encounter each other not just as bourgeois who pursue their private interests but as citoyens who understand themselves to be members of a social whole and who commit themselves in the promotion of a common good. “The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality” (Hegel, 2001, §258). The citizen is aware of his universality and of his destiny to live “a universal life”. The rationality of the state “consists in the thorough-going unity of the universal and the single” (Hegel, 2001, §258). In other words, the state does not just preserve the good of the private individual – this is the task of civil society, as he states (Hegel, 2001, §258) – but it cares for what is good for the life as a whole, as Aristotle would say. It seems that to Hegel, citizens are able to abstract from their private interest and see themselves as universal subjects belonging to a superior, compared to the market, political-rational sphere. This universal-political identity of citizens is what binds them together and prevents them from being mere commercial or contractual partners. Hegel rejects Rousseau’s idea of the state as a contract, since it bases the state on citizens’ “arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capriciously given express consent” (Hegel, 2001, §258). The Hegelian state principles are not contingent but substantive and they are derivations of mind, of the “ethical Idea”.

\(^{19}\) The first ethical root of the state, for Hegel, is the family (Hegel, 2001, §255).
Marx does not believe that the state can unify particularity and universality. Citizens cannot live “a universal life” in the state because for them “life in the state is nothing more than an appearance [shein], or a momentary exception to the essential nature of things and to the rule” (Marx, 1975, p.220 cited in Basso, 2012, p.41). The real life for him is in civil society and more concretely in the market where the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes takes place (Marx, 1970, p.41). The citoyen, the Hegelian citizen, for Marx, is “simply abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person” (Marx 1975, p.234 cited in Basso, 2012, p.41). Consequently, Marx seems to say, political man has not the strength to overcome the demands of particularity, to subordinate these demands to the common good of the political community, and to unify particularity and universality, because market life has a material, sensuous, immediate status that makes the demands of particularity more appealing and inexorable. Presumably even Hegel was not convinced about the feasibility of this type of citizen, because he does not assign the regulation of public affairs to citizens but to “executive officers” and “a college of advisers” who report to the monarch (Hegel, 2001, §289). These civil servants do not follow the common sense, mundane morality of a Smithian impartial spectator but an absolute morality that does not simply guarantee a well-functioning market but aims at the actualization of the ethical idea and at social unity. However, the question arises: if citizens are not able to serve the universal principle, thus making their actual identity, namely, their political identity, matter more than their real identity of the economic agent, how can one be sure that these executives will be immune to the dictates of particularity and will promote the common good?

According to Hegel, while the mechanism of supply and demand calls for attention to the needs of others, the market is not an area where friendship obtains. Rather, for him the market is a battlefield and it calls for a stronger regulation than Smith’s. However, he is against complete regulation of the market because that would stunt its dynamics and it would violate subjective freedom. Although the market engenders poverty and inequality, it should not be regulated so as to abolish economic differences, since the latter stem from people’s different “subjective aims, needs, arbitrariness, abilities, external circumstances, and so forth” (Hegel, 2001, §49). Therefore, an attempt to eliminate them would infringe upon the principle of particularity. Certainly people are

\[20\] The work by Marx to which Basso refers, is the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, Moscow: Progress Publishers.
equal with respect to the right to own property, since they are equally entitled to own goods and wealth. The right to property underpins particularity and affirms the equal status of people as persons but the elimination of differences in the economic status would violate particularity, that is, the objectification of human personality in civil society. However, Hegel knows that inequalities are very often due to an unfair market play and also that wealth tends to be maximized by those who already own wealth, since as he asserts in his Jena manuscripts, “a greater mass attracts the smaller ones to itself” (Hegel, 1983, p.140), but he still insists that inequalities are justified and that “wealth depends on diligence” (Hegel, 2001, §49).

The exercise of subjective freedom in the market, even though it is intertwined with animosity and rapacity, and thus refutes the principle of universality, is something sacred for Hegel. As Herzog aptly states, while Smith’s theodicy is summarized in the idea that in commercial society “virtue pays”, in Hegel “the theodicy lies in understanding that world-history, with all its injustices and cruelties, is the development of freedom. Just as people and civilizations have to be sacrificed on the path of freedom, the principle of subjective freedom is so central that concerns about justice in commercial society have to be sacrificed to it” (Herzog, 2013 p.100). But then what is the state’s role if subjective freedom is not conceived in a necessary unity with universality? Should not the state favour the unification of particularity and universality? The police and corporations try to correct the market’s flaws, thereby trying to reconcile particularity and universality in civil society. But what is the contribution of the state in the struggle for a universal life? If executives are not entitled to make subjective freedom compatible with the dictates of universality, then the proportion between particularity and universality in the political life of the state is determined and conditioned on the advance that civil society, the bourgeois make concerning the understanding that particularity presupposes universality and vice versa. Thus, I think, we could explain Hegel’s position that “in considering the Idea of the state, we must not have our eyes on particular institutions. Instead, we must consider the Idea, this actual God, by itself” (Hegel, 2001, §258). And so “the state”, meant as a random instantiation of Idea, “is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects” (Hegel, 2001, §258). Consequently, it looks as if Hegel says that people should exercise subjective freedom in the market, bearing in mind that in this way they
join the course, the development of freedom in the world, and being sure that in the long run the state will reach its ideal form. This reminds us of Smith’s thesis that people should care for their interest and entrust nature’s contrivances with general welfare. Hence, while Hegel assigns the restoration of the unity of particularity and universality to the state, in fact, he seems to believe that civil society is a significant contributor to the development of freedom and the formation of the state’s character.

4.3 Honneth’s “Social Freedom”

As already observed, for Hegel, in civil society particularity and universality have fallen apart. However, as he then continues, in essence, “both are still reciprocally bound together and conditioned” (Hegel, 2001, §184). The market as a constitutive part of civil society, regardless of its present perverted image, has been founded on the same normative principle: the universal and the particular condition one another. Honneth has focused on this point and examined the market as an institution of “social freedom” in which subjective freedom can be realized. In particular, Honneth maintains that Hegel, in the *Philosophy of Right*, supplements reflexive freedom, that is, the ability “to direct […] our actions toward aims that we have set autonomously, or toward desires that we have uncovered authentically” (Honneth, 2014, p. 43) with an institutional kind of freedom that refers not just to the non-interference of others with our ends but to their providing of aid for the implementation of these ends. Thus the objective reality is not just non-obtrusive and non-inimical to our ventures but friendly and helpful. This idea is linked to Hegel’s notion of reciprocal recognition; in social institutions, subjects are “with oneself in the other”: namely, they view each other as the “other of their own selves” (Honneth, 2014, p.44). The others’ goals do not oppose our goals but promote them. We are confirmed in the desires and the aims of the others, because the others’ existence represents a condition for fulfilling our own desires and aims (Honneth, 2014, p.45). Social institutions constitute the environment that allows for the development of a relationship of mutual recognition, since they contain normative practices that point to goals which can be fulfilled in a complementary way (Honneth, 2014, p.48). Living in such institutions, individuals learn to set and pursue universal objectives: namely,

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21 Honneth, as he himself says, has borrowed the term “social freedom” from Frederick Neuhouser (Honneth, 2014, p.43).
objectives “that require complementary action, aims that can only be achieved through the reciprocal practices that sustain these institutions” (Honneth, 2014, p.48). The market constitutes an institution that can accommodate mutual recognition; in the market, people’s goals are complementary and each individual’s interest is promoted through the others. Consequently, if people wish to profit, they should take into account the others’ well-being:

The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference to others introduces here the form of universality. It is from others that I acquire the means of satisfaction and I must accordingly accept their views. At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce means for the satisfaction of others. We play into each other’s hands and so hang together. To this extent everything private becomes something social (Hegel, 2001, §192).

Honneth views the Hegelian market as an institutionalization of “social freedom” that grounds and expands “reflexive freedom” or as a field where reflexive, subjective freedom is transmuted to a deeper and more comprehensive sort of freedom that integrates both particularity and universality, thus confirming universal self-consciousness. “Social freedom” expresses a concern for the other’s good; economic partners seems to be connected with a kind of friendship which resembles the Aristotelian utility friendship, since they care for others and promote their purposes in so far as the latter are considered to be the means for the promotion of their own interests. The element of universality in the setting of personal goals according to the others’ interests in a way makes the others, into other selves and thus utility friendship approaches virtue friendship. In civil society people should enact their reciprocal recognition as free subjects by treating one another as universally self-conscious and free (Chitty, 2018, p.20). So, citizens engaging in market interchange could recognize one another as persons with an equal ontological status, namely, as beings, aware of their embodying of “pure I” and entitled to be free, that is, to exercise free will. Having this in mind, they can see one another as another self and can adopt one another’s objectives. The Hegelian market friendship, to Honneth, is not just an automatic Smithian civic-market friendship but, in its ideal form, it is a voluntary, intended social cooperation. Hegelian market agency resembles civic friendship because people form their ends and desires not only as separate individualities but as social subjects too, that wish to expand one another’s freedom, and thus they result in becoming interdependent.
In identifying the features of “social freedom”, Honneth uses Marxian terminology; he speaks of “confirmation”, of “completion” in order to elucidate Hegel’s “recognition” and “being with one self in the other”. These terms, as we already mentioned, are encountered in the Notes on James Mill where Marx outlines “human production”. Specifically he states that if “I produce as a human being, I will become recognized and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself”, and consequently, “I will know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love” (Marx, 1978, p. 228). Honneth adopts Marxian terminology in order to stress his thesis about the moral potential of the market and to show that mutual completion is feasible in the market. Hence, the market can cease being a mere appearance, a mere semblance of community as Marx deems it to be. It looks as if he claims that the human community does not necessarily presuppose the elimination of self-interest and of private property. What is needed in order to render the market an institution of social freedom, is simply to strengthen the universal dimension that is inherent in the market.

Hegel, in Honneth’s view, holds that the market can work effectively coordinating the various interests only on the condition that “the subjects involved antecedently recognize each other not only legally as parties to a contract but also as morally or ethically as members of a cooperative community” (Honneth, 2014, p. 182). Without that conception of the market as an institution that incarnates a sense of solidarity, market actors will be apt to infringe upon the contractual terms of the market and use the opportunities given by the market so as to override and exploit others and to accumulate wealth (Honneth, 2014, p.182). The market rests on a core of pre-contractual moral norms, on the intention to guarantee benefit for all market participants. That conceptualization of the market as a social mechanism which serves the aims of all members of the political community and furthers their freedom is what justifies and legitimizes the market in people’s eyes, and what elicits their consent (Honneth, 2014, p.183). Precisely because Hegel believes that the market bears the promise of “social freedom”, he invents institutions for ensuring its proper function; police and corporations are responsible for checking whether market participants...

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22 For Hegel, the police and corporations, as well as the administration of justice, are not part of the proper state but of the “external state”: “This system we may in the first instance call the external state, the state which satisfies one’s needs, and meets the requirements of the understanding” (Hegel, 2001, § 183).
adhere to market laws, that is, to its intrinsic moral rules that safeguard its character as a moral-social institution. For Honneth, Hegel as Durkheim, places corporations within the market presumably because Hegel regards them as belonging to the “external state”, the state based on need. Honneth claims that Hegel and Durkheim stress the importance of professional corporations for promoting cooperation between economic agents since within corporations, sensitivity towards others’ interests can be achieved. Professional groups constitute public spaces where deliberation and negotiation among their members allows the switching of perspectives (Honneth, 2014, pp.193-194) and thus the creation of universal goals.

Honneth, to be sure, does not argue that the contemporary market economy realizes social freedom (Honneth, 2014, p.176) but he thinks that it could do so if the market were to be regulated according to the normative principles that underlie it. The market of consumer goods and the labour market should harmonize the interests of producers and consumers, and the interests of employees and employers respectively. Coordination of consumers’ needs, constraining of companies’ profits and ensuring that the goods offered for sale are in fact ethically acceptable, would make producers and consumers to see the market as a medium for mutually furthering their ends (Honneth, 2014, p.210). Moreover, in order for the labour market to be legitimate in the eyes of labourers, it should guarantee a minimum wage, equality of opportunity, improvements in the workplace and the involvement of labourers in decision – making processes within firms (Honneth, 2014, pp. 249-253). Honneth highlights the role of a discursive mechanism in this venture for accomplishing the moral promise of the market, since through deliberation between market participants universal will could solve the problems that absolute faith in the market’s blind law of supply and demand has caused. For him, massive economic inequalities and workers’ exploitation constitute deviations from market norms that can be corrected within the market system itself, and not structural deficits that call for abolishing the market economy in its entirety (Honneth, 2014, p. 196).

Jutten attacks Honneth’s reading of the Hegelian market in the logic of a normative functionalism, arguing that Honneth is wrong in interpreting the mutual completion of individual ends as a token of a conscious solidarity. He invokes Hegel’s words in order to underscore that the mutual furthering of market actors’ needs is an unintentional result of their self-interested actions of which they are very often unconscious (Jutten,
“Through the dependence and co-operation involved in labour, subjective self-seeking is converted into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the wants of all others” (Hegel, 2001, §199). In Jutten’s view, for Hegel the market is not imbued with pre-market moral principles but rather is governed by the Smithian automatic logic of an invisible hand that harmonizes the various centrifugal powers in a way that preserves common good. According to Jutten, Honneth in a way reconstructs social freedom from the perspective of Marx’s mutual completion of producers who engage in a human-social production that points to a sense of solidarity among market participants, because he does not pay heed to the fact that Marx’s producers work consciously for one another, in order to provide one another with the goods that will meet their needs. They are concerned about one another’s well-being and they do not regard the latter as a means for furthering their own interests (Jutten, 2015, p.191). Hegel’s economic agents, by contrast, are motivated by an instrumental logic and not by solidary incentives. Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s account of the market, however, is a strongly solidary one.

As mentioned earlier, Honneth presents citizens’ relationship in the market as a utility friendship. However, as has been noted, in utility friendship though friends see one another’s good as a presupposition for their own good, they still care for one another. Utility friendship has the potential to become true friendship, namely, virtue friendship and can still be regarded as friendship. “Social freedom” sounds like utility friendship but, as I said, it can approach virtue friendship if the inclusion of the universal element is indeed related to a mutual recognition by both market actors of their universal self-consciousness and freedom. If citizens, as Hegel asserts in his Philosophy of Mind, realize that they can each be truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by them as such (ES220/§431A cited in Chitty, 2018, p. 17) then, one could assume, they will consciously seek to further one another’s freedom by organizing their economic activity in accordance with universal purposes. Of course they will still care for their interests but the promotion of self-interest, and the acquiring and sustaining of property, are considered by Hegel to be morally justifiable objectives since they are constitutive of subjective freedom and of personality. “Social freedom” stands for the unity of particularity and universality but it does not call for ruling out particularity for the sake of universality, since “universal and particular turn into one another and exist only for and by means of one another” (Hegel, 2001, §184).
Jutten also asserts that Honneth ascribes moral concerns to the market because it gives it a broader space compared to Hegel. Corporations which count as a source of moral considerations, do not belong to the market but are independent institutions of civil society, whereas in Honneth they feature as parts of the market sphere (Jutten, 2015, p.194). For Jutten, this broad understanding of the market is wrong and moreover leads to incorrect positions about the normative function of the market. The members of corporations provide one another with recognition and dignity because of their common social and professional status but they do not complement each other in terms of market exchange (Jutten, 2015, p.194). Their solidarity, therefore, is not a market one. It rather compensates for the market’s lack of “social freedom”. In addition, by enacting discursive processes, corporations along with similar institutions, mean to limit the scope of the market from the outside (Jutten, 2015, p.195).

It is true that Honneth expands the field of the market by including corporations in it, but in my view, he does that because Hegel places corporations and the “system of needs” - namely, the market - in the external state, which is based on need and is distinct from the proper state, the state of reason. Civil society is the sphere of need. Its institutions derive from the human endeavour to manage need. Consequently, corporations and the market inhabit the same sphere, the sphere of need, in the way that two concentric circles are nested in a broader one. Corporations also arise from the division of labour, which is the result of market exchange. Having crystalized a conception of the fundamental goal and the proper function of the market, people take part in the labour market, and that conception for the market’s normative goal is reflected within their relations in their professional bodies. This might explain why Honneth places corporations within the market sphere and regards them as institutional powers that can animate the market’s “social freedom”.

For Jutten, the market has no intrinsic connection with “social freedom”, because its defining principles of competition and of determination of prices through supply and demand are in conflict with some practices oriented towards “social freedom”, such as the negotiation for a minimum wage. Moreover, market participants act not out of concern for others’ welfare but out of greed and fear following the market logic of competition (Jutten, 2015, p.196). The market, by its very nature, Jutten in effect says, is incompatible with social freedom, since it points to a struggle for domination over the other and not to social-economic cooperation. The market prevents citizens from seeing
one another as other selves and mutually supplementing one another’s ends. To that objection Honneth would reply that one should not confuse market automatism with the market as a whole institution that encapsulates the subjects’ pivotal intention for mutually complementary action. Honneth seems to understand the market’s shortcomings and deficits as results of adherence to the market’s automatic function and the neglect of its normative framework. The exhaustive competition and the will for domination equates to a loss of the market’s identity, since it constitutes abandonment of its promise of “complementary role obligations”.

Nor does Jutten find convincing Honneth’s argument that the market institutionalizes “social freedom” precisely because people agree on its existence, thus showing their belief that the market serves or can serve essential moral principles once it lives up to its potential, since people’s beliefs and expectations might be false (Jutten, 2015, p.198). Bread riots, for instance, which Honneth uses as an example for people’s conviction about the moral character of the market, are not, for Jutten, evidence that the market institutionalizes “social freedom” but simply that people hold that the market ought to do so. In addition, the very demand for a “fair price” for commodities and the protesters’ right to subsistence signify their will for a prioritization of moral principles over the market ones (Jutten, 2015, p.198). I think Jutten’s view that the market’s legitimacy does not prove its potential for being an institution of “social freedom” is quite plausible and I would add that people’s participation in the market does not necessarily equate to affirmation of its existence but it might manifest an unreflective adaptation to the socio-economic milieu. People take it as a fact that in order to meet their needs they should involve themselves in market interactions, given the absence of any other alternative structure that could provide a means of subsistence. However, Honneth’s claim that market actors’ consent indicates their faith in the market’s moral potential, which in turn proves the existence of that moral potential, might, I think, show Honneth’s belief about a primordial conceptualization of the market that can be traced back to the moment of its invention. Honneth seems to say that the market started as a social instrument for a reciprocal meeting of human needs; people exchanged a less useful good for a more useful good and then they institutionalized that action. Thus, exchange became a stable moral and legal environment designated to accommodate similar actions of reciprocal completion. So, people’s consent to the existence of the market concurs in a way with the invention of the market and the determination of its
rules. But, over the years the market, certainly, has departed from that primordial intention – if we accept that this was once the case - of reciprocal completion to such a degree that it can hardly be said it holds any promise for “social freedom”. Hence, it looks as if market participants’ conviction concerning the moral potential of the market is more an ideological illusion or the outcome of a projection of non-market normative principles into the market sphere, rather than a plausible position based on their experience.

**Conclusion**

Smithian indirect or side effect friendship is a civic bond of sympathy that connects the successful economic agents, a civic tie that depends on the market’s effectiveness to generate wealth, and on citizens’ ability to benefit from the market’s operation. It is therefore a kind of Aristotelian utility friendship, which could over time evolve into true friendship since both parties are equally adept economic agents. However, true friendship presupposes spending time together, which is something the mere participation in market exchanges does not ensure. So, Smithian friendship resembles more a civilized “strangership”.

Hegel’s account of citizens’ relationship within the market looks like an indirect, instrumental friendship too, but according to Honneth, it contains the possibility of realizing “social freedom” or, as we might express it, of becoming a true friendship, because the market as a social institution could interlace particularity with universality. For Honneth, I infer, true friendship can occur in the area of the market as a structural inter-completion if the state, by contrast to Hegel’s position, abandons tolerance towards economic unbridled freedom and rehabilitates the unity of particular and universal, thus actualizing substantive freedom. Honneth in a way attempts to accomplish the Hegelian state as the incarnation of the Idea, through the proper functioning of the market, knowing that the heart of the contemporary state is the sphere of needs, which is completely absorbed by the market economy, and conceding that the market is not able to activate its moral potential by itself.

Marxian, now, ‘productive’ account of civic friendship achieves to link particular and universal, and it could count as a virtue friendship, as a species-natural community
within which human beings are happy, by dialectically transcending their individuality without however nullifying it. Marxian relations of social production are relations of friendship where labourers conceive one another as another self, as owners of an equal ontological status worth preserving. As the embodiment of civic friendship, reciprocal production - as has been noted - in a way is a substitute for the Aristotelian reciprocation of political authority as an expression of civic friendship. However, I think that even if social production implements economic equality, politics should be maintained as the source of civic friendship, since politics should not be reduced to reconciling and harmonizing conflicting interests but should be about thematizing and organizing our living in company. So, “social production” should be realized in a way that nourishes politics rather than abolishes it. This means that one should appreciate Marx’s critique on Hegel’s thesis that the ideal state can raise more powerful demands than the ones’ coming from the market, but on the other hand, I hold, the economy should not exhaust politics. “Social production” is Marx’s precious contribution to the re-politicization of the economy, since the common regulation of labour that social production implies can constitute a field for politics, for an all-inclusive democratic dialogue. Keeping in mind Marx’s thought on ‘productive’ friendship, I shall proceed to the next unit where I shall endeavour to identify what might be the content of a contemporary version of civic friendship and then I shall consider whether and how the contemporary suggestions-movements for a post-capitalist economy could work as a lever for fully realizing civic friendship in the economic sphere.
III

A Positive Proposal
Chapter 5

Reconstructing Civic Friendship

The notion of civic friendship embodies a primordial conception of the good life that derives from citizens’ membership in the political community. What constitutes a city’s good life or its primordial goal serves its citizens’ well-being too. And conversely, what is good for citizens as human and political-social beings is also good for the polis as the institutional incarnation of their being together. The primordial conception of the good life, which is contained in the concept of civic friendship, delineates a field of shared praxis for civic friends. Individual economic activity does not dwell in that field but rather it designates its own autonomous province. However, shared political praxis needs to be expanded to the economic area. This chapter presents my reconstruction of civic friendship and refers to political proposals for integrating economic agency within political, democratic procedures. Market socialism, Neurath’s associational socialism and the solidarity economy are examined under the lens of this reconstruction of civic friendship furnishing it, in parallel, with certain economic content. The solidarity economy is compared to market socialism and Neurath’s associational model, as a contemporary economic-political movement to its theoretical precursors, and light is cast on its weak points but also on its potential for transforming dominant capitalist order.

5.1 Civic Friendship and the Implied Primordial Conception of the Good Life

Aristotle repeatedly states that the human being is a political animal (zwon politikon) (Pol. 1.2.1253a2, NE 9.91169b18-19), a creature naturally impelled to live with others and to create communities, since it is not sufficient in itself; in other words, it cannot achieve its self-subsistence by its own means. The family and the village are the first forms of community, and the city (polis), the political community, is the most developed and best form of community that contains the earlier forms of community
Although people initially invented the political community in order to meet their basic needs, this social scheme acquired its own dynamics and ensured not just mere life but the good life. Thus, while particular associations aim at particular goods, the political community “aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good” (Pol. 1.1.1252a6-7) or it aims “at what is advantageous for life as a whole” (NE 8.9.1160a22-23).

Language is the instrument through which human beings built the smaller communities of families and villages and the highest sort of community: namely, the polis. Through speech, people communicate with one another what is expedient or inexpedient, as well as their sense of what is good or bad, just or unjust (Pol. 1.1.1253a15-20). Speech has enabled people to live in company with one another by enabling them to vocalize their intrinsic sense of ethics and to arrange their common living in accordance with that sense. The moral sense is inherent in human beings just as the social instinct is implanted in them (Pol.1.1.1253a31). The awareness of what is good can be called the flip side of the social instinct since the living in company cannot but imply a peaceful co-existence that presupposes the exercising of good actions, actions that underpin people’s will to share their lives in a common political space.

Now, when Aristotle says that the polis ensures a good life, he means a happy life. As noted, happiness (eudaimonia) for Aristotle is the chief good, a complete and self-sufficient good (NE 1.7.1097B9-11), and it consists in living in accordance with reason in its best realization in the form of virtue. The polis is self-sufficing (Pol. 1.2.1252b27-29) precisely because it aims at the highest good. Therefore, the good life, which is the goal of the polis, is a life in accordance with reason in its best realization in the form of virtue. A virtue pertaining to common living either at the personal level or at the level of the political community is the virtue of friendship that realizes human sociality in the most complete way, since it constitutes a social bond that bolsters social cohesion.

The moral character of citizens is pivotal for state’s concord and welfare. Consequently, one can understand why Aristotle considers concern for the virtue of the fellow citizen as a critical feature of the relationship between the members of the city. Citizens, as has been said, should not merely act in a just way but should be just. By this, I think, Aristotle means that a virtuous citizen exercises citizenship virtuously and does not simply follow the legal norms out of a fear of sanction. A citizen of the ancient city-
state was not a passive member of the political community but an active participant in political procedures. Hence, he had to be endowed with practical reason in order for his decisions and actions to promote the city’s interest; living alongside one another in the political community, citizens had a good training in virtuous practical reason and thus they became virtuous and capable of thinking and acting in common for the sake of the common good. That common good was not just the satisfaction of bare needs, as we saw, but the accomplishment of the good life. While civic friendship has an instrumental aspect, since upholds a community within which humans can safeguard their self-subsistence, has a virtuous character too because political community aims at the best life, at happiness. The concern for fellow citizen’s prosperity and virtue is a concern for their happiness. One could say that again, this concern is an instrumental one that ensures the selfish interest that is served through the others’ interest. However, the way Aristotle conceptualizes virtue friendship and his insistence that the city exists for the best life makes me think that the city is a dialectic association of the citizens who care for one another as another self-citizen. The others’ interest holds the same worth as one’s own interests precisely because each citizen has fathomed that their happiness is incomplete without experiencing others’ happiness too.

In personal friendship Aristotle underlines the fact that one wishes a friend well, and does good for that friend’s sake. Yet though a friend matters the same as the self, he retains his difference. And although he is equal in respect of virtue and in what influences virtue he has different views, tastes and life-plans. The same I think holds for civic friendship: namely, although civic friends are concerned with one another’s well-being they allow one another to interpret it in their own way and to pose their own life-goals. However, in both cases there is a limit that should not be transgressed in the name of individual difference, and that limit is defined by virtue. Friends cannot be indifferent towards each other’s ethos because that would undermine the maintenance of their relationship. Unconditional well-wishing and doing well by presupposes a virtuous character. Consequently, the particular conceptions of the good that each friend develops because of his personal features should not be in conflict with the virtue of friendship, and friends should flourish within friendship and enrich it. Friends’ different interests, aspirations, hobbies, views and, talents can enrich one another’s lives and each subject can extend his horizon of thought and feeling (O’Neill, 2007, p.141). But an individual purpose or an interest which harms one’s friend’s well-being and in effect
harms the agent’s moral character by deviating from reason should not be left out of a friend’s firm critique.

While this Aristotelian thesis seems plausible in relation to intimate friends in the case of civic friends it might entail an intrusion into a citizen’s life and a limitation of her freedom to form her life-goals and pursue them. Also, the good life as the city’s objective, meant as a certain kind of life marked by virtuous activity, might signify again a comprehensive conception of the good which is imposed on citizens, thus encroaching upon their freedom to choose their conception of the good. These objections come from a liberal school of thought, which deems that public institutions should be indifferent towards citizens’ conceptions of the good and that the role of these institutions is to leave the citizens free to choose and pursue their life-goals. However, it should be borne in mind that the laws that regulate liberal states constitute a conception of the good that is imposed on citizens and its violation entails legal punishment. Aristotle’s civic friendship contains a similar primordial conception of the good since citizens were to show their friendship through following the state’s laws. However, in addition, they needed to be sure about the worth of these laws and needed to have trained their practical reason, their moral thought because their role was more active than the role of citizens in the contemporary liberal state since they were required to participate in the public dialogue, to animate institutions and to share public authority. On all these occasions they had to form their positions and to result in common decisions on principal political affairs. In other words, they had to animate the state and to safeguard social cohesion. Hence, it can be seen that the functioning of the city implied an agreement on a corpus of vital moral convictions and a moral training in core political values. Liberal states ask their citizens to be law-abiding but they do not ask them to fully grasp and consciously affirm the values that underlie legal rules because the regulation of their living together is not every citizen’s obligation. The active participation in a political community’s government allows people to comprehend what ensures community’s well-functioning and citizens’ happiness. The teachings derived from that common learning amount to a common conception of the good which is primordial and overarches the other particular conceptions of the good that each citizen has, in the same way that the good at which the city aims is the highest good, which embraces the particular goods at which the particular associations the city contains, aim.
For Aristotle, friendship is indispensable for the state because it guarantees its unity; either in the form of intimate friendship or in the form of civic friendship builds ties which hold people together and maintain peace in society. The political community, through its laws, institutions and structures, and every single citizen by taking part in political deliberation and by exercising authority or by simply behaving towards his fellow citizens, should realize civic friendship, should transform civic friendship from an ideal into a political reality. The well-being of citizens and the forging of friendly civic ties are the moral ends that civic friendship poses. Political institutions should serve those purposes that in fact constitute a conception of the good life affirmed by each citizen. This idea, derived from the Aristotelian civic friendship, could work as an organizing principle in modern societies even though the latter accommodate a plethora of cultural identities and conceptions of the good life. The well-being of people is determined not only in subjective terms or in particular terms, in terms that people’s subordination in particular groups or people’s individual convictions dictate but it can principally be defined as the well-being of any human being. But in order to identify this primordial well-being one should determine the core features of the human being, which could be regarded as its essence. Martha Nussbaum (1992) has formed a list of “basic human functional capabilities” that reflect her conception of the “shape of the human form of life”, of the integral characteristics of the human being which describe human life. Her list of basic human capabilities is in fact her suggestion about the goals to which public policy should be geared in order to ensure not just human life for citizens but a good human life. It is worthwhile noting that she speaks of functional capabilities and not of functionings, because, to her, people should be left free to choose whether or not they want to change the capabilities into real functioning. Her list outlines the human being as a biological, rational and social being and, in effect, calls for the meeting of needs that those dimensions of the human being generate. More specifically, for her, citizens should be able:

1) to live their whole of life;
2) to be healthy; to meet their needs for food and housing; to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction; to be able to change places;
3) to avoid unnecessary pain and to enjoy pleasure;
4) to exercise the five senses; to imagine and to enjoy reasoning;
5) to develop attachments to things and persons; to love the people who love and care for them, to feel sad at their absence: in other words, to be able to experience basic emotions;
6) to form a conception of the good and to create a plan of life;
7) to live with others, to recognize and care for other human beings; to cultivate familial and social relations;
8) to be concerned with and be related to plants, animals and nature in general;
9) to laugh and to play;
10) to live one’s own life in one’s surroundings (Nussbaum, 1992, p.222).

It can be seen that for Nussbaum, a subject can be said to lead a good life when she is able to preserve her existence, to develop her cognitive and emotional potential, when she is able to inscribe her living in a web of positive interactions with the others and with nature and when she is able to use practical reasoning. Nussbaum, like Aristotle, emphasizes human sociality as a caring relatedness, and practical reason as an organizing principle of life.

Similarly to Nussbaum, Amartya Sen has developed a theory about the quality of life based on people’s capability to achieve various valuable functionings. This ability to achieve different functionings in fact depicts, for Sen, their freedom to live different types of life (Sen, 1993, p.33). The capability that an individual has to be and to do what she believes is good, is not of course only an individual achievement but is also linked to the means and opportunities that a state furnishes to its citizens. Sen’s capability approach, like Nussbaum’s theory, connotes a political claim that all citizens be equally entitled to positive freedom. Both theories oppose the logic of assessing the quality of life through the gross national product per capita since the latter does not demonstrate the distribution of resources and thus a good mark in that measure does not necessarily exclude the possibility of enormous inequalities, and by extension a poor quality of life for large sections of the population. Their approaches likewise differ from utilitarian ones, since they do not prioritize a total of satisfactions as indicative of citizens’ well-being, because they are interested in the well-being of every single citizen.

Nussbaum and Sen distinguish their approaches from the Rawlsian conception of distributive justice, since, as they contend, Rawls seems to value primary goods, mainly income and wealth as such, because people are ranked as “better off” and “worse off”, and not as instruments that promote capabilities or actual functioning (Nussbaum, 1992, p.233; Sen, 1993, p.48). Nussbaum and Sen form a thin conception of the good that Rawls’ theory implies too, and their outlining of a thin conception of the good life does not amount to extinguishing citizens’ personal conceptions of the good. They simply make clear in what sense a citizen’s certain conception of the good could impede other citizens from forming and pursuing their own conception of the good life.
Nussbaum’s thesis about human functional capabilities, in effect, denotes what is good for a human being and thus it interprets what doing good for the sake of a civic friend means. What is good for a human being actually reveals the essential characteristics of being human. Therefore, the realization of human capabilities amounts to a human, species-character realization. The enabling of a citizen to realize her species character, one could claim, is what the political idiom of civic friendship implies. Enabling a citizen to realize her species potential equates to recognition of her human ontological status, which leads to an internalization and confirmation of her species identity, and a feeling of acceptance that generates a sense of self-worth.

However, a citizen is not only a human being but a particular person too with particular traits. So civic friendship should include a concern for a citizen’s personal traits and abilities. Civic friends should act beneficially for the sake of one another, as subjects with a certain personality, which means that they should assist one another to implement their personal capabilities, to actualize themselves. According to Carl Rogers, man has a “tendency to actualize himself, to become his potentialities…to express and activate all the capacities of the organism, or the self” (Rogers, 1961, p.351). Maslow too speaks of a human desire “for self-fulfillment, namely a tendency for him (the individual) to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming” (Maslow, 2000, p.382). As well as Nussbaum’s list of human functional capabilities, human beings have a need or else a desire or a drive for self-realization, meant as a full development of their individual potential, of their capacities and talents, and also a need for being recognized and valued by other human beings not only in their universality but as well as in their particularity, as particular persons with certain characteristics. A political community should strive for the meeting of these human needs, which means that the public institutions and structures should serve them, and citizens should care for one another’s good.

By aiding a civic friend to realize herself one actually recognizes and affirms that fellow citizen’s capacities, and values her personality. This recognition and affirmation of the other’s peculiarities and traits, for Honneth, expresses a social esteem which enables an individual to feel self-confident and to develop self-esteem (Honneth, 1995, p.128). What however underlies this “societal solidarity”- defined as the capability of “every member of a society to esteem himself or herself” (Honneth, 1995, p.128) - is the
existence of broadly adopted values that “allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis” (Honneth, 1995, p.128). Honneth, therefore, places “societal solidarity” in an intersection of subjects’ features and publicly accepted values; he bases it on a convergence of the particular and the universal that favours shared goals and common action for the accomplishment of those goals.

Honneth’s notion of “recognition” associated with “societal solidarity” elucidates the way in which a subject’s social-civic identity fosters self-esteem and contributes to the formation of self-identity and to self-actualization. Aristotle does not speak of self-esteem but he does speak of self-loving (NE 9.8) and defines it as the love of the intellect and the gratification of the intellect through the action that obeys it (NE 9.8.1168b29-31). A person who loves his own self is a good friend and a good citizen since by benefiting a personal friend or a civic friend he acts according to reason. Self-loving has a social root because while it seems a personal affair since the others should not necessarily be aware of the performed virtuous action (NE 9.8.1168b2-3), the features of a virtuous action are generally known in a political community and point to common values. A citizen who loves herself acts politically, that is, she participates in the exercise of political authority in a way that uses her capacities and talents in order to help her fellow citizens for their sake so as to develop their own respective traits precisely because she knows that their abilities will be used for equally virtuous purposes. The exercise of political authority is the field where personal abilities are deployed and valued for their contribution to the common good.

Rawls, too, inscribes self-esteem (or self-respect) within social esteem since, as he states, a person’s sense of her own worth rests on the possession of a rational plan of life and on the appreciation of her person and her deeds by those others whom she esteems, and whose association she enjoys (Rawls, 1999, p.386). However, Rawls finds it inexpedient for “societal solidarity” to be rested on an affirmation of a certain corpus of values by the whole political community, since that would mean the adoption of a standard of perfection as a political principle that would allow the assessment of citizens’ chosen way of life (Rawls, 1999, p.388). On the contrary, he argues for the importance of the existence of associations whose “internal life […] is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of those belonging to them” (Rawls, 1999, p.388) since in these particular groups people can acquire self-esteem through the others’ esteem for them. We see that a lack of a common praxis in the broader political community inhibits
the embrace of a common conception of the good, of common values that could constitute the basis for the individual conceptions of the good life and for the individual self-esteem.

Civic friendship as an ethical and political relationship between citizens reflects political community’s objective of ensuring a good life for its citizens as human beings, as particular persons and as members of the political whole. Citizens as human beings have basic biological needs that the institutional environment within which they find themselves should enable them to fulfill. In addition, citizens are naturally capable of developing in fully fledged sensuous, rational and emotional entities, and experiencing their existence in a virtuous-friendly relation to other human beings and to nature. The political community should aid them in their becoming real (energeia) human persons, fully developed human entities. This can be achieved if political institutions and structures are organized in a way that calls people to realize their human potential through activating their individual capabilities and talents in a civic mode or in a mode that confirms their political identity. This institutional realization of citizenship would, in essence, count as a political recognition of each particular citizen as a human person and as a civic friend. Civic friendship could be enacted if citizens, having a genuine concern for one another’s well-being, were able to benefit one another by debating and deciding directly about political affairs, and by collectively and individually organizing their actions so as to be consistent with their common decisions.

5.2 The Civic Friendship Deficit of the Economy and an Inefficient Socialist Solution

The economy is a pivotal public institution that should serve life and the good life by embracing the principle of civic friendship. By acting economically, citizens should be able to subsist and to realize themselves as human beings, as particular persons and as civic entities. This economically achieved self-realization would entail a desirable recognition of citizens’ species, civic, and individual identity by others on the basis of common values and of shared praxis. This shared praxis which presupposes complementary or common goals, in the economic field would concern the production and distribution of material resources as well as caring labour. Citizens would
contribute to one another’s well-being by jointly discussing, organizing and performing the productive and distributive process, and the provision of direct care too. This would mean that they would deliberate about social needs and about the way in which labour should be performed in order to be attentive and responsive to these needs.

The economy as an institution related to the material reproduction of society was in the past, as Polanyi argues, submerged in society, in man’s social relations, as recent historical and anthropological research has shown (Polanyi, 2002, p.40). However, the self-regulation of the market that started at the end of the eighteenth century and the resultant separation of society into an economic and political sphere led to the subordination of social relations to the economic system (Polanyi, 2002, p.60; Polanyi, 1947, p.112). The contemporary market economy is a system of markets which is self-regulated, namely, directed by market prices alone (Polanyi, 2002, p.58). Human needs do not play a role in the production and distribution of goods, since what fuels the market economy is the motive of individual gain (Polanyi, 2002, p.44). Consequently, the market economy is not close to the art of wealth making that Aristotle calls oikonomike, but to chrematistike, since in contrast to oikonomike, which uses wealth for the fulfillment of a household’s needs, chrematistike aims at the accumulation of wealth for wealth’s sake. And although oikonomike poses a limit to the accumulation of wealth, chrematistike does not know any limit.

In the market economy people are free to buy and sell goods, services, labour, land and money, and to make “rational” choices that maximize their profit. Material interest and not human need is what is prioritized in market interchanges. Marx, as has been pointed out, has insightfully described market transactions as perverted instances of human community. While Adam Smith assures us, as we saw, that the pursuing of self-interest will end up in a generalized opulence, there is something odd in the fact that in a certain social situation, namely, market exchange, people do not communicate genuinely, do not attempt to even understand others’ needs but remain anchored in their own needs and wills, being in a sense absorbed in a dialogue with themselves which is interrupted only in order to convince the others of the worth of their economic offer.

23 For an interesting discussion on the dialogical procedure of needs interpretation which has a contingent and contextual character see N. Folbre (1989).
A self-regulated market economy that is separated from politics does not favour political ends or moral concerns. It is an apparatus with its own rules and its own abstract logic. Economic actors view each other not as members of a political community but as competitors in a game in which the victory of one would entail the defeat of someone else. They have accepted this rule without any doubts as to its rightness. What matters for them is only to win. What is more, they consider the losers in that game as inept players who deserve their defeat. The fact that this defeat means the impoverishment of the life of a fellow human is a secondary thought which the calculative, abstract reasoning of the market marginalizes. These individuals possibly do not even feel compassion for the losers because in order for a moral sentiment to be felt for one’s suffering, according to Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 1992, p.237), three cognitive elements are required: a belief that this suffering is serious, a belief that the person who suffers did not cause his suffering deliberately, and a belief that we have similar possibilities as vulnerable human beings to those of the person suffering. Economic actors, however, do not spend time in attempting to understand what the impoverishment a person’s life might mean, since they are “indifferent to the human needs of their competitors” (Ollman, 1998, p.83). Moreover, as mentioned, they hold that it is not unfair if someone fails in the market territory, because it is due to his reluctance to follow the market’s explicit laws or to his inefficiency. Finally, they do not believe that they share similar possibilities of becoming losers, because they consider themselves to be adept economic agents and because the market, to them, is fair and cannot but reward them. Indeed, they might even think that they are keener or better at cheating the others: this of course excludes in principle the potential of feeling pity for the suffering others.

Aristotle, we recall, understood the role that the sufficiency of means for the confrontation of need plays in the development of civic friendship and in sustaining the state, and thus he suggested the closing of economic discrepancies through the enactment of certain policies that allowed citizens to ameliorate their economic situation through their work. The limitation of economic inequalities in contemporary societies, I deem, should also be pursued not only through welfare policies but through re-conceptualizing and reorganizing work. Work cannot but be conceived as the sort of activity that enables people to express and actualize themselves through their positive communication and interaction with their fellow humans and with nature, and thus to
achieve the sustaining and flourishing of the social and natural environment. Human labour should cease being another natural source that is used for the functioning of the market apparatus and the accumulation of wealth by a few powerful people.

Work as a crucial element of the economy can promote the goal not simply of a merely basic life but that of the good life too, in so far as “the working subject structures and regulates his own activity on his own knowledge, in a self-contained process” (Honneth, 1982, pp.52, 53). However, in order for each working subject to shape and control the work process, the work should be conceptualized as a free activity by the whole political community. Furthermore, the stance towards need should be a political issue that calls for common deliberation and decision making, and not a personal affair, an overwhelming concern which engulfs people and separates them from one another. Citizens should reflect on their other identity, that is, of a worker, of an employee, through open and inclusive deliberative procedures in their workplaces, and try to find whether their work guarantees a human form of life and if not how they could do so. This could lead them to demand not only higher wages but even a change in the goals of the firm where they work. Since employers and politicians do not intend to regulate the market economy or prioritize moral ends, citizens should undertake that task jointly, through the public space which their work provides.

Market socialism could offer a necessary structural condition for gaining control over the work process on the part of workers that would entail the privileging of human flourishing and the fostering of bonds of civic friendship or solidarity. However, the sufficient condition for the implementation of these ends is, I hold, a non-market surrounding or a total transformation of the market mechanism. In the context of economic democracy:

workers own and/or control their enterprises and collectively, or through the managers they elect, make the decisions now made by the capitalist owner and his manager. The capitalists, as a distinct class, are either abolished or, in cases where a small private sector remains, have their power severely restricted (Ollman, 1998, p.99).

Market socialists like John Roemer (1994) and David Schweickart (1992) have proposed well-designed models of economic democracy which promise workplace democracy, solidarity and cooperation as well as efficient functioning of worker managed firms. However, in my view, workers’ solidarity in these firms cannot be fully
fledged, and what is more, cannot be extended to the whole of the worker community and transmuted to a civic ethos. In addition, I believe that in the dialogue that takes place in these cooperatives there cannot be easily thematized issues such as the moral footprint of the firm on society nor the consequences that the aim for higher productivity might have for natural resources.

Worker managed/owned enterprises allow income differences since more complex tasks might be remunerated more highly. But a wage gap is not conducive to workplace solidarity because those workers who earn less might feel they are being treated unjustly. Equality as a principle of socialism is violated, and since these income differences, in market socialism, cannot be attributed to differences in social opportunities, workers might feel that they are disdained due to their lack of natural abilities. Socialism, Cohen asserts, should:

correct for all unchosen disadvantages, that is, [those] for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune (Cohen, 2009, p.18).

Income differences may be permitted, to him, only insofar as they demonstrate workers’ choice to work long hours and consume more or little (Cohen, 2009, p.18). Moreover, one could add, inside firms workers’ needs cannot be fully taken into account because the target of the maximization of production and profit forces workers to labour more, under possibly bad work conditions or to join tasks they find morally wrong, and thus they might experience the same cognitive dissonance and stress that they would experience under capitalist ownership. As Robert Lane aptly notes:

Marx was right, the market economy is unfavorable to worker priority […] because any costs devoted to improving work life in the competitive part of the economy make a firm vulnerable to reduced sales and profits because of the violation of the efficiency norm (Lane, 1991, pp.333-4).

Workers are forced not only by the firm but also by themselves, as co-owners, to succumb to market laws as other natural laws. They are again alienated from their labor and again they are exploited but this time by themselves too as other capitalists24. Their participation in cooperatives “adds capitalist alienation to their alienation as workers” (Ollman, 1998, p.114). This means that they neglect their own needs and those of their

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24 Marx in the Capital states that cooperative enterprises “make associated laborers into their own capitalists, i.e. by enabling them to use the means of production for the employment of their own labor” (Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p.431, cited in Ollman, 1998, p.114).
co-workers by attempting to facilitate the growth of capital. Workers do not merely act involuntarily under the pressure of the need for self-subsistence; they consciously dominate themselves and others in order to serve an alien, impersonal “agent”, namely capital. They seem to reciprocate domination and alienation by employing a weird kind of solidarity which supports their life but not their flourishing.

Solidarity, in market socialism, prevails in the interior of cooperatives but does not extend to their interactions with other cooperatives, since the market framework in which they function, calls for competition, not cooperation, between different enterprises. Firms compete for a larger share of the market, and for higher rates of productivity and profit. Moreover, in order to become more competitive, as well as reducing the cost that the bettering of work conditions would entail, they might not care about the quality of the goods they sell, thus showing a lack of solidarity and care towards consumers. This competition between firms is simply a reflection of the general competition, since in market socialism people still compete in the labour market and in the commodities market (Ollman, 1998, p.99). The very existence of these markets triggers a competitive form of behaviour; a particular job can only be gained by one person and goods can only be bought by the person who possesses the appropriate amount of money. So, under market socialism it is more likely to be noticed between workers as a collective and between them as members of the society, not an active concern for one another’s welfare but rather the sort of conduct and the sort of ethos that are more usual under capitalism. Competition, hostility, anxiety, greed and lack of compassion it is more possible to obtain in a market context even if workers theoretically are free to cultivate work solidarity.

While workers can make plans and decisions about the organization of work process, they cannot question the rule of efficiency and the overarching goal of the accumulation, investing and expanding of capital which to a significant degree entails sacrifices of socialist standards such as the elimination of inequality, the prioritization of people’s needs, the overcoming of alienation and exploitation, or the founding of solidarity. Yet, the decrease in pollution or the use of sustainable energy resources cannot easily become a firm’s goals if they would entail lower rates of productivity. The firm would presumably prefer to pay an environmental tax and continue polluting and depleting natural resources. In short, the control over work by labourers should not just take the form of managing work understood as a means for accumulating wealth but
employees should rehabilitate work as an important human invention that enables people to realize and develop their powers and abilities, to realize and confirm themselves as living beings, and to establish a community. Work is a mode for people to communicate and mutually confirm their humanity and their sociality and it is also a way to communicate with nature. Human beings do not need to conquer nature; nature has already been conquered and tamed, and it tends to cease being a “means of life” as Marx would say. We should stop stealing or abusing its care and start caring for it.

Work was the way to invent ourselves, to acquire life-consciousness, species-consciousness and self-consciousness; it was the path through which we discovered our existence, and we established and regulated our relation with the others and with nature. An insightful scheme of these relations has been given by Cohen, interpreting Marx. In particular, while in traditional pre-capitalist, more natural societies, people in virtue of their identification with their work, were in an “undifferentiated unity” with their social and natural environment, and in capitalist society, in virtue of their different relation to their work - namely their alienation and, detachment from their work, - people were in a “differentiated disunity” with fellow humans and nature, in a communist society they are thoroughly engaged by what they are doing and they are in a “differentiated unity” with the world (Cohen, 1974, pp. 255-259). The third stage in the evolution of people’s relations to their labour and the world, in this model, seems plausible and feasible because people now have the knowledge and the technological means to integrate in their labour without being identified with it or being devoured by it, and they also have the historical knowledge and experience in order to restore their relationship with the others and with nature, which will aid them to rehabilitate themselves in their particularity and universality. The market economy, I think, impedes people from re-appropriating and using work as a political instrument that will re-vitalize the political community either because it has persuaded them that such a task would be worthless - since well-being is achieved through market free choice and preference satisfaction - or because it has persuaded them that such a use of work is not incompatible with the market mechanism (in case of market socialism).

Although I have been criticizing market socialism for its adherence to the market as an organizing principle of production and distribution, I do not mean to suggest a central economic planning with a totalitarian nuance as an alternative to the market. I simply want to make clear that the market itself might include some authoritarian traits. The
market is not a neutral means for distributing social wealth, as market socialists seems to hold, but an integral capitalist mechanism that has formed capitalism as we know it. The alienation of labour, the appropriation of surplus value and the accumulation of capital are organically tied with the market (Ollman, 1998, p.109) and do not feature in the economy generally but in a specific economic system. The market, however, by hiding production (Ollman, 1998, p.95) and the nested capitalist relations is presented as definitional of the economy. Moreover, the market structuring of the economy has created values and behavioural motifs which invade other spheres of life such as politics, education, or healthcare, and rob them of their intrinsic laws that constitute them as distinct expressions of the multifarious nature of human social life. Therefore, the market looks like a totalitarian power that allows for solely one type of man, the *homo economicus* who is completely identified with his economic agency and who lacks the time, the incentive and the normative cognitive tools to reflect on the poverty of his life. The autonomy promised by market choice cannot compensate for this poverty, precisely because the choice is a false one and is the market’s trick to conceal its inexorable necessity; in order to earn a wage, an employee has no other choice except to sell her labour power to someone who becomes wealthier by exploiting the surplus of her labour and who determines the nature and the goals of her work; a consumer cannot but make a decision among similar products of different firms whose acquisition is not direct and the result of her will but the result of her capacity to pay for them.

While the market can be denounced for all the above reasons it could be maintained that, as Adam Smith argued, it achieves the successful coordination between supply and demand through the price mechanism which informs producers about the needs of consumers. The proponents of the market as a neutral distributive means presumably agree with its capitalist defenders that the market can be more attentive to people’s needs than a centralized planning agency because the latter - as O’Neill says, interpreting Hayek’s thesis - cannot know everyone’s needs since those of an individual cannot always be articulated; needs change over time along with the progress of knowledge that leads to the production of new objects which engender new needs. Consequently, centralized forecasting and planning could not be successful and responsive to relentlessly evolving needs and desires (O’Neill, 1998, p.130). However, the market is not necessarily an effective coordinator of supply and demand because
competing producers do not communicate their productive plan or technical information and thus their productive activity results in over-production. So the given information about supply and demand by the market cannot lead to a mutual adjustment of productive acts and thus to a beneficial, for all involved, matching of supply and demand (O’Neill, 1998, pp.132-135).

An additional argument in support of the market as an economic institution that ensures human well-being comes from Hayek again, as O’Neill reconstructs it: that the market encourages local and practical knowledge about, for instance, effective agricultural methods, pertinent to a particular place, to come to the surface, whereas a planned economy reliant on a Cartesian rationalism ignores local and practical knowledge, and generally treats knowledge as abstract technical knowledge that can in principle be used by a central planning agency (O’Neill, 1998, p.139). However, although Hayek’s concern about reducing situated and practical knowledge to abstract technical knowledge is plausible, we view that in the contemporary market economy the knowledge of indigenous people has been bypassed or even fiercely replaced by a productive technology which aims at the optimization of profit and not at the effective meeting of human needs. Local farmers are often forced to use genetically modified seeds and harmful pesticides, abandon their ancient knowledge of the agriculture of their place, and to replace their caring stance towards their soil with a cruel productivist-commercial attitude (Magdoff, Bellamy Foster, and Buttel, 2000).

The market economy does not appear to be an appealing alternative to a centrally planned economy with respect to its epistemological functioning, but neither does a centrally administered economy seem to heal this epistemological deficit. Moreover, the market economy cannot be proposed as an economic system that rules out a one-dimensional or else a totalitarian view of society. Consequently, the solution about the economic organizing in a democratic political community which serves a “differentiated unity”, or in which citizens care for one another, presumably rests on transparent and interconnected economic associations anchored in the political community which share common political values and knowledge, and contribute to the promotion of one another’s economic goals.

Civic friendship seems to be the political call for exerting practical reason in the best possible way for the sake of the political community meant not as an undifferentiated
and suppressive whole but as an association of persons. Economic planning is not necessarily a bad thing and it is not necessarily undertaken by a centralized bureaucracy of experts that eliminates democratic participation and democratic decision-making. On the contrary, it is one of the fundamental political matters which a community has to handle, in a way that will guarantee the good life of every citizen. Planning reflects the unanimity or friendship of citizens because it shows that citizens have become of one mind after conducting political debates on the production and distribution of the means of life. The market mechanism, on the other hand, is a substitute for democratic economic planning, emphasizing the freedom of economic actors in planning their economic agency according to their own interests. Individuals organize their action on the basis of decisions that will result in utility optimization while they neglect substantive reasoning that concerns social and political values (Zafirovski, 2003), since it is not compatible with the economic rationality that the market requires; economic profit is not attainable if one sacrifices her gain because it could cause unemployment and poverty for her fellow-citizens.

5.3 Otto Neurath’s Associational Socialism

Democratic economic planning need not be centralized but it could be implemented by decentralized institutions. Otto Neurath suggests such a decentralized planning as the basis of his associational model of socialism. He argues for a non-market socialist society that incorporates a set of associations, a “societas societum” that can replace “the internationalism of the ‘money order’” (Neurath, 1973a, p.434). That societas societum could guarantee the “happiness conditions”, that is, “food and shelter together with friendship and freedom” (Neurath, 1973a, p.423). His planned socialist economy, for him, differs from the economy of a dictatorial one-party state because it rests on democracy: “each person is permitted to have more than one loyalty, e.g. to his family, to his local community, to his profession, to his political party, to his church, to his lodge, to a an international movement and to his country” (Neurath, 1973a, p.429). In contrast, in a dictatorial state’s centrally organized economy “there is a strong tendency for one, and only one loyalty to ‘devour’ all the others, and various loyalties are not permitted to grow up side by side” (Neurath, 1973a, p.429). But also, for Neurath,
associational socialism allows an economic pluralism that the market economy rules out:

Within the framework of a deliberately devised economic plan it is possible for forms of economy of various kinds to co-exist without being forced into competition: craft co-operatives, special settlements with shared work, industrial associations. In this way perhaps the intolerance of the market economy will be overcome, which destroyed everything that stood against ‘laissez faire’ and the wish of expansion for capitalist gain (Neurath, 2004b, p.397).

We view that Neurath considers freedom and self-government to be constitutive of happiness, of a good life; he deems that citizens should be free to develop their inclinations, and embody different roles by being members of different associations even if the existence of various “loyalties” might cause disagreement and tensions.

Decision-making on economic planning in his socialist non-market order, though rested on scientific knowledge, is not assigned to a group of technocrats but it is citizens’ joint venture. “How to compute […] items of ‘happiness conditions’ would be the subject of discussions and finally of decisions based on common sense and influenced by the scientists’ information” (Neurath, 1973a, p.427). Neurath stressed the role of science in good economic planning. As a positivist, he defended the project of unified science and he specifically believed in the importance of orchestrating the sciences (O’Neill, 1995, p.33) that could allow different scientists to contribute to the good of society. His subscription to the orchestration of knowledge initially smacked of technicism that hindered him to appreciate non experts’ knowledge and to reckon their view as worth consulting in the process of decision making (O’Neill, 1995, p.35). However, as we have already seen, in his later writings he recognizes the significance of practical reasoning, of common sense in the arranging of issues that would further the happiness of all citizens. Thus, the various associations people join, function as sources of practical knowledge that can “test” and be tested by propositional scientific knowledge. Advocating decentralized and democratic economic planning, he rejects the “technocratic” movement and the concomitant tendency to find:

the one best solution with its ‘optimum happiness’, with its ‘optimum population’, with its ‘optimum health’, with its ‘optimum working week’, with its ‘optimum productivity’ or something else of this kind. From this argument sometimes arises the tendency to ask for a particular authority which should be exercised by technicians and other experts in selecting ‘big plans’ (Neurath, 1973a, pp. 426-427).

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25 Neurath was a central philosophical figure in the Vienna Circle.
Neurath admits that there are limits in the use of scientific knowledge for particular matters. Not only a scientist of a certain discipline can be unable to make judgements about a particular issue, which is the conclusion that could be drawn from the positivist project of knowledge coordination (O’Neill, 1995, p.34), but also scientists, in general, cannot be entitled to make decisions about matters that affect people’s lives. It seems that, for him, decentralized public deliberation can metabolize practical rationality and scientific expertise, and fruitfully overcome dissents through a cooperative educational process.

Neurath’s valorization of practical rationality can also be traced in his debate with Mises about the role of monetary units. In particular, Mises contends that rational economic decision-making presupposes commensurability; in order to make a choice between two alternative options we should be able to calculate the worth of each option, which in turn means that we should have a common unit of measurement. Monetary prices can stand for such common unit of measurement; exchange values can provide a measure in order to compare two options and find which is better, whereas the simple use-values of a non-market economy cannot be of any help (O’Neill, 1995, p.30). To this thesis, Neurath responds that when we have to decide between two solutions we should do so without resorting to commensurability to furnish us with the best decision. “There are no units that can be used as the basis of a decision, neither units for money nor hours of work. One must directly judge the desirability of the two possibilities” (Neurath, 1973b, p.146). Here, Neurath asks people to employ their rational practical thinking in order to choose the most desirable between alternative economic actions. The criteria which determine the desirability of each possibility are not monetary nor necessarily self-interested. By not being monetary, they allow for non-selfish incentives to instigate economic activity. Thus, in his article Personal Life and Class Struggle, Neurath says:

The question might arise, should one protect coal mines or put greater strain on men? The answer depends for example on whether one thinks that hydraulic power may be sufficiently developed or that solar heat might come to be better used, etc. If one believes the latter, one may ‘spend’ coal more freely and will hardly waste human effort where coal can be used. If however one is afraid that when one generation uses too much coal thousands will freeze to death in the future, one might use more human power and save coal [...] we can see no possibility of reducing the production plan to some kind of unit and then to compare the various plans in terms of such units [...] (Neurath, 1973b, p.263).
Neurath here plainly argues for moral criteria that should inform a person’s economic conduct. Furthermore, he suggests as such criterion, the intergenerational solidarity regarding the use of natural resources. The socialist non-market economy, Neurath seems to say, allows people to think as human beings integrated into their natural setting and as parts of the human intergenerational chain, as instantiations of their genus, and thus to behave as such.

The ecological sensitivity that is manifested in the aforementioned article pervades Neurath’s whole socialist scheme of the *societas societum*. His decentralized economic planning which disperses power in many associations discloses an ecological thinking, as these associations are tasked with the management of natural resources. And because natural resources have an international character and their distribution or sharing generates tensions between countries, he claims that the authorities which are to administrate natural resources could be international, apart from narrowly national, and overlapping:

> We know from the Middle Ages how ‘overlapping’ authorities can work. There could be international organizations, which would be responsible for the administration of the main natural resources, e.g. an organization dealing with iron, others with coffee, rubber or foodstuffs which could act as members of an international planning board – such organizations could be in action before a world common-wealth would be organized. Irrespective of the organization of production and distribution in single countries, such international centers presumably would fundamentally reduce many tensions (Neurath, 1973a, p.433).

In addition, he asserts that “the big rivers with their banks could be ‘internationalized’” (Neurath, 1973a, p.434). Natural resources should be used and distributed in a way that will allow nations, whose economies depend on import, to co-exist peacefully. This cooperative model of overlapping associations has not only an international character but a national and regional one too in order for technical knowledge, common sense knowledge and judgements to contribute to that social and democratic planning of the economy.

With regard to the national socialist economic planning, Neurath envisions an analogous scheme of overlapping authorities, such as “craftsmen’s cooperatives”, “associations of industry”, “peasants’ cooperatives” and “agricultural associations” functioning at a regional and at a national level. These associations “control the production from the raw
material till the end product” and ensure that products will be available to all people (Neurath, 2004a, p.363). Moreover, he speaks of a system of statistical institutions, namely, the “accounting offices”, united in a “Centre for Calculation in Kind” which “produces a topography of the different conditions of life, the flows of raw materials and energy for inclusion in the economic plan” (Neurath, 2004a, p.364). These overlapping associations are situated in particular regions but not separated from one another like small isolated communities. They are interwoven and transparent, and they coordinate their activities in such a way that an economic plan is formed and followed without being the result of a central will or a central power but rather the outcome of locally rooted and nationally affirmed decisions; their coordination is undertaken by the “Central Economic Administration”, a central body which “must design the economic plan in accordance with all those institutions involved, ensure uniform enactment, and must only allow differences that are compatible among themselves” (Neurath, 2004a, p.362).

Neurath holds that the socialist economy should adopt the aims of efficiency, innovation and productivity, and the idea of the scientific management as well as the technology of labour which characterize the market economy, but he states explicitly that the economy’s efficiency should be the means for the improvement of happiness of all (Neurath, 2004a, p.358). And because happiness, quality of life depends on the meeting of biological but also of spiritual needs simultaneously, socialist economic planning should not prioritize one sort of needs over the other. Hence, scientific management should not only satisfy people’s needs for food, housing and clothing but also their need for obtaining pleasure from their work. This entails that the selection of workers for a certain job should not comply solely with the criteria of productivity, namely, whether these workers can be productive in that job but it should also take into account workers’ talents, inclinations and interests in order for the combination of workers and jobs to lead to the greatest happiness for these people (Neurath 2004a, p.360). We see that for Neurath, scientific or technocratic reasoning should be mixed with moral and political concerns. It seems that within a socialized economy this merging can be accomplished since rigid labour technology can be humanized through the activation of a sort of ‘technology of happiness’.

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26 Neurath is not in favour of market socialism where worker cooperatives compete since they would thus function like capitalist groups (O’Neill, 2003, p.193).
Neurath’s associational socialism could be regarded as a suggestion for a social order that realizes civic friendship in a democratic framework, and reconciles freedom and equality. Neurath considers friendship to be an item of “happiness conditions”. So, he would not suggest an economic model that would not foster friendship among people even if they were unknown to one another. Citizens participating in the various associations of their broader national or international community are able to contribute to one another’s happiness. The associational structuring of their political community calls for conscious and voluntary acting for the others’ sake because the functioning of Neurath’s socialist society does not rely on a technocratic automatism; by animating different social roles, people are called to make moral judgements and choose between alternative possibilities. Their agency is not dictated by abstract scientific rules of ‘social engineering’ but should be the outcome of a concern for the others’ good and of training in rational practical thinking. What is more, exerting their roles presupposes common deliberation and action which means that they cannot but exercise their roles successfully for, as Aristotle states, “with friends men are more able both to think and to act” (NE 8.1.1155a15-16). Neurath’s associational society being a political whole of smaller interlinked communities, as another ancient city-state, requires an active citizenship. Further, it achieves to include work world into political agency or to extend the latter to the economic sphere, and to re-appropriate it as a means for genuine economic activity meant as household management (oikonomia).

5.4 Solidarity Economy: A Contemporary Venture for Realizing Civic Friendship.

5.4.1 Solidarity Economy: Definition and Values

The solidarity economy is a kind of an incomplete associational economic model or else an umbrella term for a set of alternative economic activities that take place within the framework of the market economy. It is an economy which functions in parallel or in the margins of the capitalist market and very often accomplishes its purposes through the market mechanism. The solidarity economy features in Latin America (mostly in
Colombia, Chile, Brazil), as economía solidaria\textsuperscript{27} where it started as a bottom up initiative seeking to offset the malfunctions of the neoliberal model of development and to provide poor people with work and a welfare service, and now it constitutes a mass movement informed by a strong sense of social justice (Allard, 2008, p. 4). Also, in Europe, the solidarity economy traces its roots back to the social economy (économie sociale), to the cooperative movement and workers’ unions which were a response to the injustices of capitalism at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Dubois and Lasida, 2010/1, p.39), and it continues to develop in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century through various collective initiatives. The solidarity economy however, is not confined to Latin America and Europe but it occurs in Canada, in the USA and in many other countries throughout the world. The practices of the solidarity economy, now, in the different places of the globe are not the same; in the North, and among the privileged classes, they are characterized by social and ecological responsibility, including fair trade and simple living, social entrepreneurship and corporate surveillance. In the South and among the poor people, “they focus on peasant resistance to proletarization, such as Villa Campesina and the MST\textsuperscript{28}; income generating actions such as microcredit, the creation of cooperatives of all types, and factory take-overs; and resistance to corporate encroachment especially among indigenous peoples” (Matthaei, 2009, pp.304-305).

Solidarity economy projects are connected through networks like the “Chantier de l’economie” in Canada, the “Brazilian Forum on the Solidarity Economy”, the “U.S. Solidarity Economy Network” (U.S. SEN) or the “Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of the Solidarity Economy” (RIPES) (Neamtan, 2009, pp.342-343). Those national, continental and intercontinental networks seek to exchange knowledge and experience, and to promote the solidarity economy, to render it a forceful economic movement.

While there is not a unified theory of the solidarity economy, the empirical observation of grassroots practices of solidarity economy exponents allows for the construction of its schematic portrait. The most commonly accepted definition of solidarity economy is one provided by Alliance 21, the group which organized the Workgroup on the Solidarity Socioeconomy:

\textsuperscript{27} The term was firstly used in 1937 to describe the economic relationships between worker collectives during the Spanish Civil War (Miller, 2009, p. 26).
\textsuperscript{28} MST is an acronym for Landless Rural Workers Movement in Brazil (Vergara – Camus, 2017, p.13)
Solidarity economy designates all production, distribution and consumption activities that contribute to the democratization of the economy based on citizen commitments both at a local and global level. It is carried out in various forms, in all continents. It covers different forms of organization that the population uses to create its own means of work or to have access to qualitative goods and services, in a dynamics of reciprocity and solidarity which links individual interests to the collective interest. In this sense, solidarity economy is not a sector of the economy, but an overall approach that includes initiatives in most sectors of the economy (Allard, 2008, p.6).

Solidarity economy initiatives are of various sorts such as:

- worker, consumer and producer cooperatives;
- fair trade initiatives;
- intentional communities;
- alternative currencies;
- community-run social centers and resource libraries;
- community development credit unions;
- community gardens;
- open source free software initiatives;
- community supported agriculture (CSA) programs;
- community land trusts and more (Miller, 2009, p.25).

Despite being extraordinarily diverse, all those practices share a common ethical horizon, namely a set of basic values. The solidarity economy prioritizes the fulfillment of human needs, equality, sustainability and regeneration of the planet, cooperation, re-localization and community development, participatory political and economic democracy, and pluralism (Matthaei, 2009, p. 305). The solidarity economy is an economy in the service of human life. The meeting of human needs, human subsistence is not conceived as an individual end but a commonly shared concern that points to mutuality and cooperation. Economic actors do not compete but assist one another and care for one another’s well-being. “They work and consume in order to produce for their own and other people’s welfare rather than for profit” (Mance, 2010, p.67). The principle of reciprocity is fundamental in the solidarity economy; people give gifts with a hope of return (Dubois and Lasida, 2010/1 p.38). They exchange gifts or reciprocate beneficial economic actions out of solicitude and out of a cooperative ethos. Therefore, “solidarity economy”, as Mance notes, “is a way of working, producing, commercializing, consuming and exchanging values. It is a way of satisfying individual and personal needs in the interest of the welfare of all” (Mance, 2010, p.73).

The communities which make a living through the diverse practices of the solidarity economy, in essence, realize civic friendship, since their members contribute consciously to one another’s well-being through their work which is not only an “income-earning activity” but it “includes being active for one’s own sake, for the community and for the usefulness of others” (Dash, 2016, p.72). Thus, “domestic work, voluntary work, subsistence farming, community service, reciprocal labour exchange”
(Dash, 2016, p.71) are considered to be work even if they are unpaid occupations\textsuperscript{29}. Work is not a means for self-subsistence linked to the individual anguish of survival but a way for people to confront necessity by being in common. Work associates and does not separate people from one another. It enables them to express their sociality, their tendency to care for the others.

Moreover, precisely because work in the solidarity economy has a multifaceted character, we understand that it permits everyone to realize their abilities and inclinations by being useful to the others. People realize themselves and are recognized as beneficial to the whole community because of their particular traits. Hence, economic solidarity implies a “societal solidarity” where the members of community “esteem one another symmetrically” (Honneth, 1995, p.128) because they consider one another’s abilities as worthy and contributing to the promotion of one another’s well-being, and to the flourishing of the community.

The participation in common democratic deliberation and decision-making that the solidarity economy presupposes is another area where community members can realize themselves by striving for the common good. The exercise of their practical reasoning and the moral choices in the light of common values are a way to use their intellectual and moral potential for one another’s good, and another source of self-esteem and social-esteem. Decision-making in solidarity economy projects is not assigned to a class of experts but it is a common task, a common responsibility of the members of collectives who are aware of the social, cultural and environmental specificities of their setting and thus they are able to plan a sustainable future for themselves and for their community.

The aim of sustainability is fundamental in the solidarity economy and is linked to environmental sustainability and to social sustainability (Mance, 2010; Dacheux and Goujon, 2011; Dubois and Lasida, 2010/11). The preservation of the natural environment and the maintenance of social tissue are moral concerns that the solidarity economy prioritizes over economic efficiency and profit, since the meeting of human needs presupposes a flourishing nature and a thriving society. The pluralism of the economic activities of the solidarity economy reflects the cultural pluralism of the

\textsuperscript{29} “Nowtopia” is a term which describes that kind of unpaid work done for social and ecological reasons (Carlsson and Manning, 2010).
diverse communities which are located in different territories. The solidarity economy, being attentive and sensitive to human needs, does not determine these in a certain way but leaves their determination to the communities of people who intend to govern their economic agency freely. The respect and preservation of the natural ecosystem extends to cultural ecosystems and to the free will of different communities.

The solidarity economy combines freedom and responsibility (Dubois and Lasida, 2010/11, pp.41-42) since though free and self-governed, economic action is informed by the prospective responsibility for others, nature and future generations. Moreover, it combines the aim of equality with that of pluralism since the struggle for the elimination of economic inequalities does not justify the imposition of ready-made economic schemes by an external power. Freedom is not understood in terms of an economic rationality, namely, a choice aiming for the maximization of utility and preference satisfaction. In contrast, it is conceived in terms of self-governance and control over one’s economic agency meant as human agency not drained of its social and moral dimension. Economic action is accompanied by a sense of responsibility for the others’ capability to be, and function, as they want to. Consequently, free economic action entails enabling the others, as individuals and collectives, to be free, to form and pursue their own conception of the good life.

Reciprocity and cooperation as cardinal principles of solidarity economy, rest on the understanding of human vulnerability and interdependence. According to the solidarity economy, we are part of an interdependent whole and:

we can not assure our own flourishing if we do not also assure the flourishing of everyone else, including the most downtrodden, and of earth. We can not experience well-being if we are not also in right relation with other human beings, and with nature (Matthaei, 2009, p. 311).

This idea of interdependence, as we have seen, is pivotal for the feminist ethic of care and along with the prioritization of the meeting of needs constitutes a point of convergence for the solidarity economy and feminist thought. Besides, women play a significant role in the thriving of solidarity economy movement by being involved in the setting up of producer and worker cooperatives, in social enterprises and in “food-sovereignty movement” which raises a demand “that all people should have the right to healthy food” (Matthaei, 2009, p. 309). The feminist thesis for an economy directed to
the provisioning for human life, as the proper focus of economics, seems to find in the solidarity economy a good illustration.

Solidarity economy initiatives reflect women’s caring ethos and “built it into the core motivation for production and consumption” (Matthaei, 2009, p.309). Thus, caring ceases to be devalued and it changes from an activity linked to subordination and oppression to a strong feminine activity which “emphatically and nonviolently affirms life, and refuses to collaborate in the mistreatment or abuse of oneself, of others, or of the earth” (Matthaei, 2009, p.311). Feminist ethicists have underscored women’s concern and important work on relationships’ development and maintenance as another aspect of their contribution to social reproduction. For the solidarity economy on the other hand:

Workplaces are not just places to produce output – they are places where workers spend time together, and are in relationship. The creation of more egalitarian, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relationships in workplaces is a focus of the solidarity economy, not just because it results in a better product, but also because of the positive effect of such work relationships on workers themselves (Matthaei, 2009, p.309).

Consequently, the solidarity economy is imbued with women’s sensibility and caring ethos since it deems human labour as a caring gesture, a social provisioning activity, and it privileges healthy and mutually supportive relationships as indicative of people’s well-being.

5.4.2 Solidarity Economy and Democracy

As has been pointed out, the solidarity economy continues the tradition of the social economy, of the “third sector” practices which address social and economic exclusion (Miller, 2009, p.26). However, while the social economy in a way supplemented the existing social order, the solidarity economy is rather a transformative movement, namely, a movement for a different economy (Miller, 2009, pp.26-28). The Solidarity economy is not a charitable economy (Dacheux and Goujon, 2011, p.2) which simply supports poor people and maintains the social fabric but it rather expresses the volition of civil society to establish a new relationship with the market and the state (Neamtan 2009, p. 347), and to control capital (Lewis and Swinney, 2008, p.31).
The Solidarity economy is supposed to be a movement for economic democracy (Neamtan, 2009, p.346) and a chance for re-activating citizenship, and enforcing democracy (Neamtan, 2009, pp.345-347). Local communities enacting the solidarity economy regulate their economic projects through democratic deliberation. Collectively-owned enterprises’ productive and distributive plans are the outcome of democratic decision-making. That key role of democratic procedures in the solidarity economy initiatives, is deemed, that it does not just correct particular economic and social injustices but it can correct the way we conceive the economy. The economy should be seen as the means for meeting human needs and as a subject for democratic dialogue. According to Dacheux and Goujon (2011), democratic deliberation in the solidarity economy points to an alternative viewing and structuring of the economy for a series of reasons. Specifically, the adjustment of supply and demand which is now left to the price mechanism of the market should be implemented through collective deliberation on the basis of the principle one person one vote. In addition, common dialogue should determine what can be considered to be a commodity that can be sold and bought in the market, and what escapes the area of monetary transactions. Also, money should be used as a means for economic transactions, as an incentive and measure of production and not as an end in itself. Everyone should have access to money as a medium for exchanging goods and services, a medium for engaging in social interaction (Dacheux and Goujon, 2011, pp.9-10). The control of economic activity by politics and the embedding of democracy in the economic sphere could lead to a new insight into sustainable development as economic development defined “by territorial, democratic intelligence” and subjected to “collective rules which respect the cultural, social, and environmental specificities” of the community (Dacheux and Goujon, 2011, p. 8).

For Neamțan, the solidarity economy could be a way to strengthen democracy in the context of a globalized economy (Neamțan, 2009, p.347). Representative democracy, to him, is weak and needs to be supplemented by institutions that realize participatory democracy. Citizens should be active members of the political community and not spectators of the exercise of political power by strong centralized institutions which regulate every aspect of socioeconomic development (Neamțan, 2009, p.344). The solidarity economy, as a totality of economic activities which are permeated by democratic logic and connected through networks in which people share their
knowledge and experience and discover new economic possibilities, offers civil society the chance to participate in the exercise of political power by determining the nature and the functioning of the economic sphere. However, according to Neamtan, civil society needs the contribution of the state. The solidarity economy needs to be institutionalized and citizens should take part in the creation of institutions and apply policies that buttress the solidarity economy (Neamtan, 2009, p.348). Political power is necessary for the establishment of economic democracy, and the solidarity economy can play a critical role in the appropriation of political power by revealing the latter’s economic dimension.

The rootedness of solidarity economy practices in particular territories and their concomitant anchoring in a common culture and in relationships of proximity, can produce new political institutions which could respond to the specific needs of a certain community and ensure its sustainable development taking into account economic, social, cultural and environmental concerns and ends (Neamtan, 2009, pp.345-346). These institutions emanating from the political regulation of economic activity should “work hand in hand with national governments”, for Neamtan (Neamtan, 2009, p.345), in order for the solidarity economy to become a real transformative power of the dominant neoliberal economic order. So, democracy to him, as for Dachéux and Goujon, can lead to dispersed informal political communities which enroll the economy in the overarching goal of fulfilling human needs, and the fostering of communal ties denote the need for enhancing democracy through the active participation of citizens in the organization of economic life in a way that will be economically, socially, culturally and environmentally sustainable.

We understand that although the solidarity economy is a marginal economic project or else civil society’s way to respond to the economic and ecological crisis that capitalism has caused, its advocates believe that it can change the dominant socioeconomic order. The democratic procedures that lie at the heart of solidarity economy practices can lead to a plural economy in which “market, public and reciprocal economies co-exist” (Dash, 2016, p.3). The solidarity economy does not seek the abolition of the market; many of its projects employ the market mechanism or create local markets and local currencies. Collectively owned enterprises, worker cooperatives function in a market context and aim for profit although their surpluses are shared by their members. The communities that rely on worker cooperatives like Mondragon, “the world’s largest and most
successful industrial workers cooperative” (Kawano, 2009, p.18) seem to apply a market socialist model which co-exists with capitalism. Worker cooperatives compete with private enterprises aiming, as the latter, at economic efficiency. This goal does not seem to be thematized in workers’ deliberative procedures; workplace dialogue rather revolves around how this goal could be achieved. However, these cooperatives can resist the competition and support a community which possibly otherwise could not subsist. The very fact of common ownership of these enterprises and the small scale of these initiatives allow for the adherence to the purpose of provisioning for life. But when it comes to the case of privately owned enterprises which are not situated in a particular territory and which have to compete with one another, it is difficult for one to imagine how citizens could be entitled to regulate the distribution and investment of surplus value. Also, it does not seem feasible that citizens could guarantee that money will not be an end in itself and that every citizen will have access to it. Market economy is not compatible with an external determination of supply and demand; that arrangement presupposes democratic planning and abolishing of the price mechanism which is not compatible with the simultaneous existence of monetary units as indicators of economic value of a product, of its ability to be exchanged. Moreover, market competition and the proliferation of capital deprive many people of the money they need in order to participate in economic interchange, and cause huge economic discrepancies that jeopardize social coherence. In other words, I hold that democratic dialogue does not suffice for the subordination of the economy to politics and cannot easily disconnect the market from its capitalist corollaries.

Neamtan’s suggestion for the institutionalization of the solidarity economy for achieving participatory democracy and active citizenship could be a version of associational socialism, if the sustainable development of local communities was based on the joint, direct democratic governing of local natural resources. State officials could just coordinate the various associations-communities along with members of these associations. Neamtan’s proposal for establishing economic democracy, as a presupposition for participatory democracy, and for a decentralized functioning of the state, could entail a new definition of civil society as the whole of reciprocal, not

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30 Elinor Ostrom in her work *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (2015) has argued that the imposition of full private rights or centralized regulation could not guarantee the sustainability and the long-term, productive use of natural resources, and has suggested an empirical valid theory of self-organization and self-governance which emphasizes patterns of reciprocity among individuals as a solution to the “common pool resource problems”.
competitive relations of citizens. However, Neamtan like Dacheux and Goujon, and the other advocates of the solidarity economy, does not reject the market but he places it in a different relationship with the state and civil society. He seems to believe that the market could be transmuted to a neutral instrument for distributing goods and services because democratic deliberation in local communities and in new political institutions could make capital caring, as feminist ethicists would say, by imposing firm rules on the market’s unbridled functioning, or it could progressively eliminate the tendency for speculation and wealth accumulation. I think, by focusing on the fostering of the solidarity economy instead of facilitating the market economy, the state could contribute to the withering away of the market economy. If entrepreneurs were not able to accumulate and re-invest capital since the automatic mechanism of the market would not work, and if citizens being accustomed to the principles of reciprocity and solidarity, demanded and took over the management of natural resources in their territory, then the market economy could change to a commonly regulated economy which would not need the market in order to distribute goods and services. Other mechanisms could be ensued from the democratic deliberative process that could issue caring means.

The self-preservation of all members of the community, the self-government and the cultivation of friendship as well as the protection of natural resources, are fundamental, as we have seen, in Neurath’s associational socialism and they also constitute the kernel of the solidarity economy. However, these two economic schemes differ in the clarity of their suggestions. While associational socialism describes in a precise way a desirable socioeconomic order, the solidarity economy does not give a certain economic blueprint but it rather “builds organically on existing and emergent practices, informed by principle as well as theory” (Kawano, 2009, p.13). As a political and economic project, the solidarity economy is humble and could be regarded as a process of economic organizing and collective visioning (Miller, 2009, pp.28, 41). However, as the associational socialism it seeks to make linkages: namely, to connect the communities that create their livelihood through reciprocal and cooperative economic activity. The sharing of knowledge and the common learning is also pivotal for associational socialism and the solidarity economy as well as the respect for local knowledge, for indigenous people’s experience and for local realities. And of course, both of them are
political ventures that call for citizens’ involvement through democratic deliberative procedures.

Finally, while associational socialism clearly jettisons the market mechanism, the solidarity economy wants to purify it from its speculative dimension. It seems that for solidarity economy advocates, the exchange of commodities does not necessarily equate to a false community or a community by semblance in which each agent wishes only to elicit gain for themselves but it can be a real community where both parties want to benefit themselves without necessarily cheating one another; on the contrary they may wish to benefit one another as market friends.

5.4.3 Solidarity Economy and Community

As mentioned, the solidarity economy does not offer a blueprint of an alternative economic system or a rigid ideology but simply constitutes a space where economic subjects can imagine, debate and create visions for a different economy based on shared values (Miller, 2009, p.41). However, according to Gibson-Graham the solidarity economy does not just offer an ethical space of decision but rather the outlines of a positive economic ideal (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.97). The underlying principles of solidarity economy, such as, “the use of resources based on needs, management strategies involving democratic processes of cooperation and participation, value placed on collective knowledge and collective work, equal distribution of benefits, and making use of natural resources without depleting them” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.97) although are broadly accepted and valued, might lead to the inclusion or the exclusion of certain practices thus posing a sort of positivity (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.98) and crystallizing a specific form of a community economy.

Gibson-Graham place the solidarity economy among the post-capitalist economic movements and practices, which aim at re-socializing economic relations (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.79), and which signify the economic activity of a community. The re-socialization of the economy, according to Gibson-Graham:

involves making explicit the sociality that is always present and thus constituting the various forms and practices of interdependence as matters for reflection, discussion, negotiation, and action (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.88).
The economic activities of a community cannot but be the outcome of interaction between people, of public deliberation and negotiation, that is, of “ethical praxis”. The kind of economic practices that feature in a community should be the result of negotiations around key coordinates like:

what is necessary to personal and social survival; how social surplus is appropriated and distributed; whether and how social surplus is to be produced and consumed; and how a commons is produced and sustained (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.88).

Consequently, a community economy should not have a pre-determined scheme but it should contain a plurality of economic initiatives and institutions.

Gibson-Graham, being influenced by Nancy’s vision of community and communism, as “a being in common” and not “an organic whole” (Nancy, 1991a, pp.75, 76), a “common being” (Nancy, 1991b, p.4), view the community economy as an economic “being with”, an economic “being in common”. As a community, for Nancy, has not a certain substance likewise the community economy should be an open project characterized by a pluralism which produces different versions of economically “being together”. The reflection and deliberation on economic issues ensures the economic being in common since economic subjects form their agency by interacting and not by following an economic plan or a pre-established economic model which points to an ossified form of community.

I think, Gibson-Graham see in the normativity or in the morality of the solidarity economy a danger of fixation and of another post-capitalist domination. It looks as if they believe that the public deliberation of the solidarity economy cannot protect its multifarious and creative character because the strict pre-established framework of specific values will undermine its free operation. To Gibson-Graham, a dialogue can be genuine if every economic practice is under question and not pre-judged on the basis of normative schemes. That means that we should not eradicate already existent practices as incompatible with a normative orthodoxy because they might function as a resource for other projects. It seems that they warn solidarity economy advocates not to be entrenched on an anti-capitalist fundamentalism, pursuing a fixed communist, or solidarity positive, economic ideal.

Gibson-Graham also seems to worry about the consequence of delineating a positive figure of a community economy and of a commonality, a being and living together for
the human subject and her freedom. The possibility of subordination of the individual to the will of the community in the name of social wholeness and collective interest, which is protected by a corpus of moral principles, is always present when we think in community terms, when we shift our attention to the community. The ethical praxis of the open and all-inclusive dialogue guards the subjectivity, the sovereignty of the individual and her genuine sociality, and also the effectiveness of the solidarity economy as a collective venture for life’s sustaining and enrichment.

However, I do not believe that the principles that the solidarity economy espouses create a mold for the community economy. The agreement on a moral minimum does not limit the unfolding of human creativity and innovation. It simply channels the diverse economic actions to socially and environmentally responsible projects. Starting from scratch in determining what is morally right or wrong in economic acting, might result in a confused and noisy dialogue between different stakeholders who do not share any moral conviction that would allow a potential consensus. Gibson-Graham, I think, do not imply such a case; they rather admit that on the one hand, there are some ethical ideas to which we are committed and they should be un-negotiable, and on the other hand, there are some moral prejudices or ideological fixations that are not practical, and might block the ethical praxis of the dialogue. However, I am not sure whether the unconditional character of their discourse will be limited to ideological biases regarding only the means for the implementation of a community economy or it will extend even to the very basic principles of the community-solidarity economy thus endangering the “essence” of the latter, as a post-capitalist or alternative economic theorizing and acting, and finally the sustenance and cohesion of the community itself.

The common values which make the solidarity economy and societal solidarity possible do not necessarily dictate a pre-determined common being or else a totalitarian social and economic order; on the contrary, they make possible a “being together” where individuals flourish as particular fully-fledged persons as well as interdependent members of a whole whose thriving mirrors every single subject’s well-being. The principle of civic friendship, as pointed out, encapsulates a primordial conception of the good life which is interlaced with essential human functional capabilities. The solidarity economy seems to render possible that essential human functioning precisely because it privileges human life and friendly bonds among cooperative subjects. These values do not point to a positivity in respect of the economy and community that Gibson-Graham
denounce as undermining economic difference and imposing a social sameness, “a common being”, but they prop up political deliberation, “ethical praxis” as a medium for “exploring interdependence” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.86).

Gibson-Graham’s anti-essentialist thesis for the community economy echoes Nancy’s anti-essentialist view about the community as not constituting a common substance. The economy, to them, should be “an ethical space of decision, rather than a specified set of qualities, forms, and functionings” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p.86). However, to a great extent, the solidarity economy is a space for debating an alternative economy which might be a plural one as Dacheux and Goujon say.

Solidarity economy movement lacks a single set of shared ontological presumptions or analytical frameworks that fill the term with necessary positive content. The name itself functions as an empty signifier, filled only with the partial and always contested positivity that is granted by ongoing processes of articulation by and among the initiatives themselves (Miller, 2013, p.528).

Although the participants in the solidarity economy share core normative commitments, solidarity economy leaves a lot of space for economic pluralism, since the common values that penetrate the solidarity economy efforts do not constitute a firm theoretical basis for the latter. The solidarity economy lacks the positivity that would render it a well-ordered and might broadly accepted alternative economic model.

Solidarity economy advocates do not have a common position concerning the state and the market. Some of them view the solidarity economy running in parallel with the state and the market, assisting the first and correcting the second, and some others believe that they should be gradually limited. However, all agree that the solidarity economy should change the state’s operation and should initiate its new relation with the market. The state should be more open to civil society and should institutionalize participatory processes that will activate citizenship and will democratize economy. Consequently, solidarity economy exponents wish to influence the economy to a large scale and they do not think that the solidarity economy activities should remain a tolerable exception.

The ethos of a different anthropological type, that is, of homo solidaricus (Kawano, 2009, p.14) or homo reciprocans (Dash, 2016, p.80), and the ethic of generosity and sharing (Diskin, 2013, p.480) that emerge in solidarity economy projects can hardly replace the ethos of homo economicus, of the calculating, self-interested fellow because although these denote that the economy can be run by important non-economic motives
(Dash, 2013, p.79), they remain a marginal aberration. Of course, that alternative ethos, by occurring more often within society due to the endeavour of developing a dense network of solidarity economy initiatives, may strongly dispute economic rationality and bolster substantive rationality. However, this sort of objection raised against the capitalist order cannot go far if it cannot become a radical critique on the fundamental institution of the market and on its concomitant principles.

Solidarity economy exponents seem not to fully understand that the market has inherent laws that democratic deliberation can hardly eclipse or efface. In contrast, associational socialism has grasped the intrinsic relation between the market and the capital. The comprehension of that relation could help people to envision a more concrete alternative economic future, which will be not simply a response to the crisis that capitalism has engendered but a response to a genuine political question about how people, as political beings, can organize their being in common so that the living of a good life could be a functional capability for everyone. This primordial political question cannot be posed within a context in which the capitalist positivity of productivity and growth has excluded political reasoning or if a clear alternative economic and social vision is rejected in the name of anti-essentialist orthodoxy.

**Conclusion**

Aristotle’s civic friendship implies a primordial-political conception of the good life; a good life is a life within the political community and within friendly relationships, personal and civic ones. Citizens can live a flourishing life if they care for their friends’ subsistence and well-being. Nussbaum has elaborated on the meaning of good life for citizens by giving a series of basic human functional capabilities which designate the objective of the political community to enable citizens’ self-subsistence and species realization. Nussbaum’s theoretical scheme could be supplemented with the capability and need for individual self-realization, that is, with each citizen’s capability to realize her specific traits and abilities through socially recognized and valued shared praxis. Therefore, benefiting a civic friend would mean to contribute to a fellow citizen’s self-preservation and self-realization by joining shared praxis and serving complementary civic goals.
The economy, as a public institution, does not seem to serve civic friendship and its political dictates since it has been separated from politics. Market socialism has suggested the alignment of the economy with the satisfaction of human needs and a way for implementing civic friendship. However, the market mechanism rather renders market socialism an oxymoron. In contrast, Neurath’s proposal for a decentralized associational socialist model seems that it could uphold civic friendship through an effective promotion of “happiness conditions”. The solidarity economy, as a contemporary venture for realizing civic friendship, is akin to Neurath’s economic model but it also shares market socialism’s position of subjecting the market to social purposes. The solidarity economy features as a promising economic movement for an alternative economic order imbued with the ethos of civic friendship but it needs to develop a more precise political vision. This would presuppose a questioning not only of the market but also of the economic imperatives of growth and productivism. The next chapter constitutes a move towards that direction.
Chapter 6

The Economic Realization of Civic Friendship

Aristotelian civic friendship presupposes an instinctual need for living together. That instinctual root of civic friendship seems to have been lost in the capitalist economy. Marcuse has shed light on the suppression of life instincts under capitalist domination speaking, in other words, about the stunting of human sociality, but his proposal for an ‘automated’ socialism that excludes human labour does not seem it can regenerate the primordial human sociality. In contrast, contemporary degrowth movement suggesting a simpler, ecologically friendly economic setting that doubts productivist ideology and banal materialism, allows people to re-find the pleasure that harmonious human relations provide. However, in order for that reviving of the instinctual root of civic friendship to lead to a political order of civic friendship, degrowth movement should become a decisive, positive proposal for a post-capitalist society. Socialist thought and more specifically Neurath’s associational socialism could assist significantly this development. The present chapter, further deepening on the notion of civic friendship, is articulated around the aforesaid points thus illuminating the diagnostic role of civic friendship with regard to the pathogeny of the capitalist economy, and its power as a political institution and institutionalizing political means for establishing an economy that affirms life.

6.1 The Instinctual Root of Civic Friendship and its Economic Implications.

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle referring to civic friendship states that “men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself though they would have come together anyhow for the sake of living in company” (EE 7.10.1242a6-8). Here, again, he underlines the sociality of humans but he makes clear that their social instinct is not necessarily linked to any purposefulness or instrumentality. Human beings need to live together; that need for closeness seems to be a biological one, a species need.
Common living provides them with sheer joy, free of any self-interest. This joy emerges from the mere experience of the others’ presence and evolves into the happiness that life in the *polis* aims at. Living a virtuous life together with virtuous fellow citizens and virtuous fellow friends leads to fully-fledged happiness which was contained in germ in that primordial, instinctual joy of the not yet refined social creature. This joy, could possibly be interpreted as Freud’s “oceanic feeling” (Freud, 1961a, p.11), that feeling of total fulfillment and pleasure the human being had in times when particularity was interlaced with the life of their species, with the universal (Marcuse, 1966 p.142). The “ideational content” of the “primary ego-feeling” of the political animal was an “oneness with the universe” (Freud, 1961a, p.19). This sense of universality, I hold, occurs again in the civilized political community and in particular within civic friendship but this time, the human being is aware of her individuality.

Aristotle’s conceptualization of the human being as a political animal, that is, a being which wishes to live with others and feels happy aiding them, responding to their needs, echoes a long ancient Greek tradition that stretches from Homer to the tragic poets who compare anthropomorphic creatures to humans in order to elucidate the traits of human beings (Nussbaum, 1995). In Homer, for instance, Cyclopes “have no institutions, no meetings for counsels; rather they make their habitations in caverns hollowed among the peaks of the high mountains, and each one is the law for his own wives and children, and cares nothing about the others” (Odyssey 9.112-15). Humans, in contrast to Cyclopes, live together and what is more, they are characterized by an “ethical intention” in the sense that they aim “at the ‘good life’ with and for others in just institutions” (Ricoeur, 1992, p.172). They care for their fellow humans and their solicitude is the result of their social instinct, “of their benevolent spontaneity” (Ricoeur, 1992, p.190), which in the context of the political community becomes a virtue intertwined with the end of the good life.

An ideal friend, for Aristotle, is the person who wants mostly to benefit his friend and who does not pursue his friend’s benevolence (NE 9.11.1171b24-26)31. Friendship thus

31 Derrida (1997) has pointed out that there might be a contradiction or a conflict between this Aristotelian position concerning the priority of loving (*philein*) over being loved (*phileisthai*) and his thesis about the reciprocal character of friendship, the symmetry of mutual and equal affection and beneficence of friends. However, by arguing for the priority of loving over being loved, Aristotle does not mean to abolish the feature of reciprocity but he rather analyzes the phenomenon of friendship by focusing on its principal moment, namely doing good for the other’s sake. A friendship starts when one
is a generous giving. This idea of generous giving, for Bataille, reflects the archaic sensibility of “glorious deed”, of “energy expenditure” (Bataille, 1988, p. 29) which is rooted in the conception of the sun as a giver of energy, as an inexhaustible source of energy that generates and nourishes living matter in the earth (Bataille, 1988, p.29). People in the distant past, when they felt themselves within the shell of nature, imitated nature. Hence, they valued giving, benevolence towards others. Bataille, like Aristotle, seems to hold that ethical action stems from nature and could be regarded as a natural phenomenon.

An economy permeated by the ideal of civic friendship should nourish the instinctual drive for friendship. Thus citizens would be disposed to benefit one another by acting economically precisely because they would be able to enjoy one another’s presence, to derive pleasure from their encounter. In the capitalist economic order, citizens enjoy others’ presence when they can elicit some gain from them or they simply enjoy that gain without enjoying at all the others’ presence. The others are rather a necessary bad for acquiring a desirable good. Consequently, the others are either competitors and threats or utility friends, or in the worst case, a nasty means for profits. People seem to live together only because they are not sufficient in themselves to subsist and not as Aristotle says “for the sake of living in company”. The capitalist economic activity seems to have perverted human instinctual sociality. Human agency is organized in economic rationality terms, that is, in terms of sheer utility, productivity and profitability. The others are pleasant on the condition that they are useful, and one’s life is pleasant or worth living if it hinges on economic utility. A desirable life is not a naturally pleasant life or a virtuous life organized on the basis of reason but a useful one, organized on the basis of a perverted form of reason, namely, of economic rationality.

Economic rationality is identified by Marcuse (1966) with reason; the measuring and mastering reason which suppresses life instincts serving thus the goal of domination. Being influenced by Freud, Marcuse asserts that the creation of civilization relies on a
“basic repression” of natural instincts and inclinations. Man suppresses his instincts, desires and needs because of the material scarcity; the procuring of means for the fulfillment of human needs presupposes work. Therefore, scarcity entails restraint, delay of pleasure deriving from the fulfillment of needs and instincts, and work. However, apart from that primary suppression, industrial civilization requires a “surplus repression” which serves domination, that is, the domination of some people over the others. Reason becomes an instrument of domination and suppression of Eros, namely of life instincts, of pleasure. According to Freud (1961a) the essence of human being is pleasure, the pursuing of pleasure. Also, the “affirmative materialism” (Marcuse, 1955, p.294) of Marx presents man as a creature which pursues happiness. Both thinkers underscore the bodily nature of the human being departing from the traditional thesis that man is reason (logos). Marcuse adopts that materialist definition of man and believes that human materiality has been degenerated and distorted within the productivist economy, to the extent that the human body has become a tool subsumed to the productive apparatus; people need to perform mechanical and routine labour in order to stay alive (Marcuse, 1966, p.105). Their whole life has been reduced to a means for life. In other words, their life is not a human praxis, an action which is an end in itself but drudgery like the labour they conduct.

In the most advanced form of industrial society where labour does not require a lot of bodily effort and commodities are more approachable, still people are not happy; they live within a sort of artificial euphoria within repression. Happiness, as Marcuse says, presupposes knowledge and freedom which are absent from their life (Marcuse, 1966, p.103). They consume material goods that satisfy their needs, which in fact, are not their own but imposed on them by alien vested interests (Marcuse, 2002, p.7). Their life, either in labour time or in leisure time, does not belong to them. They are administered and indoctrinated down to their instincts (Marcuse, 2002, p.8). Therefore, they are not free but heteronomous, a sort of slaves, of voluntary slaves. The relentless production, consumption and throwing away of industrial objects which sustains domination, satisfies human instincts but these are not life instincts but destructive ones (Marcuse, 1966, p.86). In the productivist economic model, pleasure comes not from affirming life but from wounding life.

The healing of this situation, the overcoming of that “political problem”, as Marcuse maintains, following Schiller, can be found in reason’s polar opponent, namely,
sensuousness which is not mastering and domineering as reason but receptive and passive (Marcuse, 1966, pp.176,187). Sensuousness implies a connection of the subject with the world, living of life as pleasure and play, and its principle is aesthetic, that is, beauty (Marcuse, 1966, p.187). The struggle for existence by being synonymous with striving for domination has severed the bonds that bind people with one another and with nature. Being posed in the service of domination and thus being a part of the “political problem”, reason cannot provide a solution. In contrast, undervalued and neglected sensuousness could assist people to re-appropriate the genuine pleasure of life by unfettering them from the desire for domination and by reconnecting them to one other and with nature, in other words, by invigorating their universality. Instead of the desire for domination they would develop a need for freedom, peace, silence and beauty, for an aesthetic reality (Marcuse, 2005, p.83) in which life is lived for its sake, it is lived as a play. The idea of play, again lent by Schiller, is used by Marcuse as a counter concept of work which is intertwined with necessity. Play is not subordinated to any necessity but reflects man’s play with his faculties and potentialities; it is life’s play with itself (Marcuse, 1966, p.187). Therefore, play symbolizes freedom as the negation of the lust for domination and as a positive initiation of possibilities.

Work, to Marcuse, has a multiple connection with necessity since it is always a means and not an end like play. Work is primarily subjected to the law of the thing, in contrast to play, which does not follow any rule or follows the rules the subject has devised (Marcuse, 1973, pp.15-17) and thus in a way it is self-legislated. Work is done for an object’s sake, in order to produce an object which will be used as a means for subsistence. Therefore, we infer, work, for Marcuse, obeys the object’s necessity, existence’s necessity and domination’s necessity. It is primordially alienated and expresses man’s alienation and objectification as a presupposition for his self-realization.

Marcuse, following Marx, deems that work belongs to the realm of necessity (Marcuse, 1969). The realm of freedom extends beyond the realm of necessity when people do not need to labour but they are free to play with the potentialities of their existence and those of nature without having an external determining principle of their activity. Hence, their action becomes a play or a display of their faculties and potentialities, or maybe contemplation, a purposeless life process. By placing work and play in two distinct areas marked by the presence or the absence of freedom, Marcuse, in fact, ranks
those two forms of human action. So play counts as a superior mode of doing and work an inferior one. Work even if performed under non-alienating conditions, even if it is not inhuman labour, still is a productive procedure, to Marcuse, tied with necessity, with the purpose to overcome necessity, whereas play is, by definition, purposeless and free. Marcuse admits that this ranking is rooted in Greek “hierarchical order” of the modes of praxis which emerges from a thesis on what human existence truly is, according to which the highest mode of praxis is “theory” (Marcuse, 1973, p.31) or contemplation, namely a purposeless intellectual process, a sort of intellectual play.

The aesthetic reality that Marcuse envisions, as another Eden, as a realm of freedom, does not accommodate labour; people do not need to work in order to meet their needs and they live under the “pleasure principle”. The abolition of labour, to Marcuse, can be implemented under the condition of total technological automation (Marcuse, 1966, p.156) when “material production becomes scientific” (Marcuse, 2005, p.82) and the human subject confronts it as a “supervisor, inventor and experimenter” (Marcuse, 1969, p.3). Consequently, productive labour in a society of material abundance would have been sublimated into a play “with the technical material, with the possibilities of the machines and of the things produced and transformed by the machines” (Marcuse, 1969, p.3). This society where Eros, as pleasure, as satisfaction of individual needs and inclinations (Marcuse, 1966, p.85), is not suppressed is, for Marcuse, a socialist society which, however, will ensue not only from political and social changes but also from organic, instinctual, biological changes (Marcuse, 2005, p.82). The transition to a socialist order presupposes “the emergence of a new type of man, with a vital, biological drive for liberation” (Marcuse, 2005, p.81). The subject of a socialist society should be free of the needs that productivity has imposed upon it, and should guide production in concert with others and in accordance to their new goals, values and aspirations (Marcuse, 1969, p.5). The new society, a society as “a work of art” is not characterized by the capitalist model of progress (Marcuse, 1969, p.5), of constantly rising productivity because freedom for Marcuse is not as he says, like in case of Marx, subordinated to productivity, to the unfettered development of the productive forces (Marcuse, 1969, p.3). The conquest of scarcity that underlies freedom does not mean material abundance for all since “the level of living” in a socialist society “would be measured by other criteria: the universal gratification of the basic human needs, and the
freedom from guilt and fear – internalized as well as external, instinctual as well as “rational” (Marcuse, 1966, p.152).

Marcuse ostracizes work from the new socialist society and replaces it with play because, to him, work is a means of domination being interwoven with necessity, with scarcity and because as such, undermines Eros, namely life instincts. However, assessing his position we could claim that work is not necessarily opposed to play and freedom, and that can foster Eros even if it is not transmuted into play. Work meant as a non-alienated, human, productive procedure, and play have similarities apart from their obvious difference. Play, I deem, is not completely purposeless; the individual playing with her potentialities and nature’s potentialities wants to view them, to “receive” them. Besides, she unconsciously wants to organize them in intelligible cognitive units in order to experience them fully and feel pleasure. Basic scientific research as another play does not have a certain purpose but ends up with the construction of knowledge units since human beings play with phenomena in order to “save” them, and thus to organize chaos in a meaningful whole (cosmos). Work often helps the survey for meaning since provides the individual with conceptual schemes, analogies which engender hypotheses which advance reasoning, and on the other hand, play enriches work by making it more creative and human. Also, though work has a clear purpose, work procedure is not always predictable and workers need to face challenges, which might lead them to change the initial plan and improve working method through trial and error. Work, again, is a way to live life more fully since the very posing of small goals in a continuous process and its successive achievement gives the individual a sense of fulfillment, and enhances its self-esteem. Work also constitutes a limit which gives play its identity, and renders it a meaningful and pleasant action. Small children, whose parents do not pose any limits on their play, feel anxious and do not enjoy their play precisely because this looks like a chaotic condition which puzzles them.

The production of certain objects, which satisfy respective needs, is a way for a human being to experience its bodily nature in a fashion that play cannot furnish. Material goods as fruits of our labour, as products of our bodily effort, make us consider the human body and human needs as sacred expressions of life. By working, individuals reflect on their bodily nature and can conceive necessity not as scarcity but as a natural condition which instigates their action in order to communicate with nature. Work, could be said, is a kind of biological function or a part of a biological function like
breathing; the other part of this function could be play. As we cannot breathe by either only inhaling or only exhaling, likewise, we cannot live as human beings not experiencing our dual nature, namely, our bodily and spiritual nature, and we cannot enjoy life without the two complementary incarnations of human action which are equally informed by reason as a whole.

Marcuse does not consider Eros incompatible with work meant as purposeful action. Thus, he claims that under changed, non-repressive existential and societal conditions “the resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality” (Marcuse, 1966, p.199) can render again the human body “subject-object of pleasure” (Marcuse, 1966, p.212), and work can be transformed to a purposeful action that upholds “the eroticization of the entire personality” (Marcuse, 1966, p.202). Hence, work can take the form of “the abolition of toil, the amelioration of the environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the creation of luxury” (Marcuse, 1966, p.212) which are projects that can “associate individuals to greater unities” (Marcuse, 1966, p.212). Consequently, work under non-repressive conditions can have a new character by ceasing being a productive procedure and can lead to a spread of libido as self-sublimated sexuality, as life instinct, as Eros, over private and societal relations thus bridging “the gap maintained between them by a repressive reality principle” (Marcuse, 1966, p.202). So Eros, to Marcuse, as pleasure coming from the fulfillment of human needs and inclinations, and as an impulse for combining “living substance into ever larger and more durable units” (Marcuse, 1966, p.124), can render transformed work a kind of catalyst for an aesthetic reality, a higher form of civilization which is not identical with noisy, productivist overdevelopment but it is a society where people are bound together through “the great unifying force that preserves all life” (Marcuse, 1966, p.22).

However, the question that arises is why under the contemporary advanced technological condition, Eros is suppressed and people are separated from one another. The answer Marcuse gives is: because labour still prevails. Economic elites want to sustain labour in order to maintain their domination and thus they create false needs which perpetuate the productive apparatus. But again, although people live in a regime of semi-automation where scarcity does not threaten them and they have more free time to develop human ties, they remain away from each other. Semi-abolition of productive labour does not seem to have brought them together but it has rather torn them asunder. How then could the abolishing of labour, through total automation, bind them? I think it
could not because it would mutilate human bodily existence, it would make people incapable of fully conceiving their bodily existence, of fully experiencing themselves as biological, natural entities. Living their life as a play people can experience the materiality of their selves through their interplay with natural laws but that kind of experience of necessity is not the same with the one that purposeful productive action provides us with. The very idea that we, as natural entities, metabolize nature in order to sustain ourselves makes us experience ourselves as integral parts of nature which work with it so as to combine living matter into larger and durable units. By working, human subjects feel that they participate in the broader function of nature not as external contributors but as internal parts of the natural body. Work thus becomes a natural function that not only sustains human life but allows individuals to feel that they are alive and enables them to derive pleasure from their body. Consequently, in a world where machines mediate human interaction with nature or, better, extinguish it, individuals would not be able to fully perceive and enjoy their materiality as the human embodiment of nature, and they also could not derive pleasure from others’ bodily presence; they could not thus have a strong natural incentive, a natural need for living in common.

Substituting machines for human labour and thus mutilating human instinctual need for developing human relations, individuals could not become subjects of a new sensibility but they would rather understand themselves in terms of a profane materialism which would perpetuate the drive for economic growth. Material affluence instead of being a realm of freedom would rather be an Eden of isolated subjects who do not realize their selves through others but forget or nullify themselves by enjoying a plethora of material objects, yielding thus to the other human instinctual impulse, namely the destructive impulse or Thanatos\textsuperscript{32}.

The exclusion of work, instead of liberating life instincts, would possibly release destructive human inclinations as alienated labour does. Moreover, individuals would remain incapable of distinguishing between true and superimposed needs because having lost the sense of their physicality they that the process of attempting to fulfill their

\textsuperscript{32} Freud in his \textit{Beyond the Pleasure Principle} (1961b) refers to the polar opposite of “Eros”, of “life instinct”, that is, the “death instinct”, the instinct of destruction. Death instincts are equated by him with “ego-instincts” in contrast to life instincts which are directed to external “objects”, namely, other persons. The ego-instincts, Freud assumes, “arise from the coming to life of inanimate matter and seek to restore the inanimate state” (p.38).
needs gives, they would be estranged from their real needs as that happens when they work in order to gain a wage and not to satisfy a direct need. This certainly would entail their estrangement from others’ needs too. Therefore, the solution to the degeneration of work cannot be its abolition but its restoration and re-appropriation, as a natural necessity that resembles human organic functions which underpin life. Work is another caring labour which aims at life’s sustaining and flourishing as well as at the enjoyment of life; fully experiencing life implies the satisfaction of primary biological needs as well as the fulfillment of the primordial need for living in common and forming strong human relations.

The necessity for work which, for Marcuse, upholds domination is rooted in a material deficit. Marcuse, following capitalist and Marxian imaginary, conceives the economy in terms of a “restrictive” and not of a “general economy”, to use Bataille’s terminology. Human subjects, to him, should acquire and accumulate material goods in order to liberate themselves from poverty and affluence! Although he agrees with Freud that man is a source of energy that needs to be channeled to action, he does not view human life as “a luxurious squandering of energy” (Bataille, 1988, p.33) which mirrors the spending of excess energy (wealth) in the globe. Life “is an overflowing by its very nature” (Bataille, 1988, p.38), as Bataille eloquently states, and not an accumulation of energy. Marcuse believes that man should create material abundance and an imaginative and generous technological setting since he may find nature ungenerous. He affirms productivity as an objective of the economy but he disconnects it from human labour, and he also enrolls it in socialist collective decision-making. While he denounces overdevelopment and productivism, does not seem to believe that “the starting point for socialism should be that there has always been enough for everyone, if only we shared” (Kallis, 2017, p. 2). How then could his subject of a new sensibility be absolutely free of necessity if he stays under its domination, that is, under the threat of necessity? The technological environment, which is to arrest necessity, will not necessarily guarantee self-determination and freedom because it might impose a new domination, namely, technical experts’ domination. Moreover, in this new society of artificial abundance, sensitivity and sensibility might not be given their own right, since “all sense of wonder” in the face of creative abilities of human skill would be destroyed, and the subject would find herself in “a disenchanted world” (Latouche, 2009, p.104).
However, if people comprehend that are generously endowed by nature with its gifts, they would not feel that should conquer it and they would simply enjoy their life by metabolizing these gifts, turning them into objects which satisfy their needs. The desire for domination stems from the fear of need, the sense of frailty and vulnerability, and not from scarcity as such. Moreover, that fear and anguish, as Bataille states, “arises when the anxious individual is not himself stretched tight by the feeling of superabundance” (Bataille, 1988, p.38). The desire for domination over nature and over others certainly is the opposite of generosity or of life’s overflowing. The modern economic model has rested on the fear of need which comes from a lack of generosity. Marxian “social production” could not be implemented under that fear. A truly human production where the individual produces as a human being in order to meet the needs of another human being can be accomplished not only if people, by facing and handling necessity collectively, nullify it but if also conceive human need as a motive for sharing the already existent natural abundance. By imitating nature, people could organize work on the basis of generosity and reciprocity, and thus work could serve Eros which as other cosmic philotis33 unifies living matter and as civic friendship holds citizens bound in polis. That restoration of work could be attainable only in a simpler, non-productivist economic framework. Degrowth movement suggests such a framework.

33 According to Empedocles philotis (love) is the attractive force that brings about the mixture of four cosmic elements (roots), that is, fire, air, water and earth. Neikos (strife), on the other hand, is the repulsive force which separates them (Zeller, 1889, pp.72-74)
6.2 The Compatibility of Degrowth Movement with Civic Friendship

6.2.1 Degrowth: Definition and Values

Degrowth (decroissance in French) is a term coined by Andre Gorz and advocated by him in his work *Ecology and Freedom*, in which he refers to the economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen who, as Gorz says,

had the common sense to point out that, even at zero growth, the continued consumption of scarce resources will inevitably result in exhausting them completely. The point is not to refrain from consuming more and more, but to consume less and less – there is no other way of conserving the available reserves for future generations. This is what ecological realism is about (Gorz, 1980, p.13).

Georgescu-Roegen, in his *Entropy Law and the Economic Process* (1971), claimed that classical economics ignores the principle of Entropy, the second principle of thermodynamics, according to which although energy does not get lost, it is transformed and cannot be used again in the same way. Hence, the growing use of natural resources will bring about their depletion.

Degrowth movement views economic discrepancies and ecological degradation not only as the outcomes of the capitalist economic model but also of the ideology, of modern faith in productivism and growth. According to proponents of degrowth, growth tends to exhaust non-renewable energy and material resources (Kallis, 2011, p.874). Natural resources are turned into waste faster than nature can alter them into new resources (WWF, 2006, p.1). In addition, growth is unjust because rests on the invisible and underestimated feminine reproductive work in the household, and because poor countries and territories suffer the consequences of the extraction of materials which are used for the production of commodities in wealthy countries. What is more, the living quality in these countries is deteriorating because of the waste and pollutants that end up there (Kallis, 2015, p.5). Therefore, economic rates should be decelerated and the economic resources should be equitably distributed.

For ecological economists, degrowth refers to “a socially sustainable and equitable reduction of society’s throughput (or metabolism)” (Kallis, 2011, p.874). Throughput is “the materials and energy a society extracts, processes, transports and distributes, to consume and return back to the environment as waste” (Kallis, 2011, p.874). A more
comprehensive definition of degrowth, not simply as a scientific term but also as a social goal and movement, has been given in the declaration from the Paris conference:

We define degrowth as a voluntary transition towards a just, participatory, and ecologically sustainable society…The objectives of degrowth are to meet basic human needs and ensure a high quality of life, while reducing the ecological impact of the global economy to a sustainable level, equitably distributed between nations… Once right-sizing has been achieved through the process of degrowth, the aim should be to maintain a ‘steady state economy’ with a relatively stable, mildly fluctuating level of consumption (Research and Degrowth, 2010, p.524, cited in O’Neill, 2012, p. 221).

Proponents of degrowth are aware of the fact that a reduction of production and consumption will possibly entail a reduction of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) (Kallis, 2011, p.874). However, degrowth cannot be equated to “a negative GDP growth in a growth economy”, namely, with economic recession and depression and with their effects of unemployment and economic insecurity (Kallis, 2011, p.874-875). This is because degrowth incorporates the purpose of sustainability, which dictates that the costs of transition to an economy with a lower metabolism are equally distributed and that “no one falls out of society’s safety net” (Kallis, 2011, p. 878). There is a plethora of ideas about how a “secure” transition to a degrowth society could be achieved, such as, “eco-communities, online communities, communities of back-to-the-landers, cooperatives, urban gardens, community currencies, time banks, barter markets, associations of child or health care” (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015). These grassroots economic practices resemble solidarity economy’s initiatives since people involved in them aim to make a livelihood by departing from the heteronomy of the market apparatus. Apart from those grassroots activities, degrowthers suggest welfare policies and institutions, such as a job guarantee scheme, an unconditional basic income granted to all citizens, work-sharing namely, “a redistribution of work between the employed and the unemployed via a reduction of working hours without loss of income” (Kallis, Demaria and D’Alisa, 2015). Moreover, care, education, health and environmental restoration services could constitute the backbone of a prosperous economy without growth, providing meaningful employment for many people (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015). Redistributive taxation, taxes on the international capital movement, taxes on environmental damage, caps on CO₂, on energy and resource extraction and use, could also be other systemic interventions (Kallis, 2011, p.876). In addition, the relocalization of the economy is highlighted as another hallmark of a degrowth society. Community currencies and local exchange trading schemes are
proposed as contributive to that enhancement of the local economy. However, local currencies do not mean to substitute for state money; a degrowth transition should focus on how state money can serve the goal for an alternative economy. Taxes are paid in state money and international trade cannot work with local currencies. Consequently, the state should take back the control of the creation of new money from private banks because the latter issue money as debt which generates interest and this in turn requires growth in order to be paid back (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015).

We understand that while degrowth focuses on grassroots economic projects, it acknowledges a significant role for the state too, since the state as a central organizing political principle can guarantee a sustainable and equitable downscaling of the economy. Moreover, degrowthers believe that parliamentary politics can, along with grassroots action, contribute to the degrowth venture (Latouche, 2009).

Degrowth signals an endeavour for re-politicizing environmental problems that the mainstream discourse on sustainable development in 1990’s sought to render an object of technical knowledge of experts and policy elites (Kallis, 2015, p.1), in order for growth to become compatible with the protection of natural systems (Kallis, 2015, p.1). Radical environmentalists in 2000’s foregrounded the provocative concept of degrowth trying to show that environmental issues are political ones. Growth, as we have seen, for degrowthers, has caused economic inequalities along with the degradation of the environment. The exploitation of natural resources goes hand in hand with social injustice and poverty for large segments of the population even in wealthy nations.

Degrowthers criticize growth, capitalism and commodification, and suggest a different economic future based on equality, solidarity and democracy. In particular, Latouche speaks of the need for decolonizing our imaginary (Latouche, 2009, 2015), for liberating our thought and our institutions from growth logic, for escaping economic rationality, and the cult of progress and development (Latouche, 2009, p. 8). Growth for growth’s sake seems to be an irrational goal or a goal which “is promoted by nothing other than a quest for profits on the part of the owners of capital and has disastrous implications for the environment and therefore for humanity” (Latouche, 2009, p.8). Latouche draws on Cornelius Castoriadis thought who stressed the need for a new “social imaginary”, a new “attitude towards life”, a new “psychosocial structure” of people. People, to Castoriadis, should abandon the mad race for more production and
consumption, should cease prioritizing economic values, and relocate the economy in its place, that is, “as a mere means for human life” (Castoriadis, 1996, pp.143-144, cited in Latouche, 2015).

The idea that the only goal in life is to produce and consume more is an absurd, humiliating idea that must be abandoned. The capitalist imaginary of pseudomastery, and of unlimited expansion, must be abandoned (Castoriadis, 2010, p.199, cited in Latouche, 2015).

Degrowth is not only a firm objection to growth but a call for an “exit from the economy” (Kallis, 2015, p.1) too. Advocates of degrowth are skeptical towards commodification; they criticize the extensive conversion of goods, services and relations into commodities that can be sold and bought in the market, since linking human action and human relations previously excluded from the market field with a monetary value, is considered to be responsible for cultural and spiritual decay (Kallis, 2011, p.877). We see that degrowthers share the same concern with care ethicists with regard to the invasion of the market into domains of life characterized by non-profit incentives. However, as we saw, they do not reject measures like putting a price on or taxing pollutants such as CO₂ emissions in order to achieve their reduction thus dealing with the protection of the environment with economic logic.

Degrowth, apart from being a refusal of the ideology of growth is a strong critique on capitalism because growth is the result of accumulation and productivity (Kallis, 2017, p.8) which are the essence of capitalism (Kallis, 2015, p. 4). Growth is a structural element of capitalism and it is not derived from the personal feature of greed (Kallis, 2011, p.875). Vergara-Camus although shares the same critical stance toward capitalism, does not believe that growth is bad per se because it aims at satisfying human needs, and because it could be based on sustainable energy resources and on more efficient and sustainable technology (Vergara-Camus, 2017, p.11). For him the problem is not growth but the intrinsic features of capitalism that attribute a certain form to growth; private property of the means of production, alienated labour, accumulation of the capital and separation of the economic from the political do not permit the “greening of growth” (Vergara-Camus, 2017, pp.10,13). Consequently, the abolition of capitalist institutions and the democratization of all aspects of life, and in particular of the domain of productive activity (Vergara-Camus, 2017, p.13), would give a more humane form to growth. This thesis could be persuasive if we ignored degrowthers’ abhorrence of complex technological systems of green growth because, to them, they
threaten autonomy (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015). Degrowthers influenced by Illich, hold that complex systems require specialized experts and bureaucrats to manage them, and thus generate non-egalitarian and undemocratic hierarchies (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015). In contrast, “convivial tools”, namely tools that can be easily used and controlled by everyone in order to accomplish a freely chosen purpose by them (Illich, 1973, pp.25, 35), such as “an urban garden, a bicycle or a Do-It-Yourself Adobe house” (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015) which occur in a non-intensive energy society of a limited size and complexity, favour autonomy and equality.

Degrowth points to escape from economic thinking and it stands for a return to politics, a re-politicizing of the economy, and a demand for deepening democracy. Degrowth, as a political alternative, stresses the importance of democracy and citizenship (Fournier, 2008, p. 528) since the economy becomes an issue of democratic debating and decision-making. The economic end of growth is questioned and is no longer regarded as self-evident or as an imperative that should be followed; capitalist economic rules are not considered to be universal, immutable laws but for the exponents of degrowth, should be tested through democratic dialogue. Growth is examined under the lens of humanistic values and not simply with respect to ecological criteria. Degrowth is not “an ecological imperative (although it may be that too), but an opportunity to initiate debates and reclaim decisions about the organization of economic and social activities” (Fournier, 2008, pp. 535-536). Degrowth could be considered a way of avoiding a potential ‘ecocracy’, a reinforcing of the state’s authority that might emerge from the intensification of the environmental crisis. However, degrowth mainly calls for reflecting on human values and social justice (Aries, 2005, Latouche, 2006, cited in Fournier, 2008, p. 536). Growth not only devastates the natural environment but also causes poverty, undermines solidarity and destroys social tissue. The ecological crisis mirrors a social and humanitarian crisis. So by disputing growth, degrowthers are led not only to devise solutions to the environmental problems but also to reflect on what good life might mean for the society in its entirety. Citizens thus should stop being over-determined by the identity of the consumer and re-appropriate their civic role thus re-animating their citizenship. Consumption strike is proposed, by degrowthers, as a mode for reclaiming their citizenship (Aries, 2006 cited in Fournier 2008, p.537) along with demands for laws and institutions that privilege human rights. The purpose of that abstinence from consumption is not the enhancement of citizen’s power through the use
of consumer’s power but rather the departing from the ethos of consumption (Fournier, 2008, p.537).

Degrowthers emphasize the deepening of democracy as a vehicle for degrowth transition. While direct democracy is crucial for the enhancement of democracy, representative democracy is not dismissed. Relocalization of the economy, meant as a self-sufficiency in food and general economic and financial self-sufficiency of a territory (Latouche, 2009, p.47), could play a crucial role in promoting direct democracy since economic decision-making would entail a relocalization of politics and an active engagement of citizens in politics. This thriving of direct democracy could change the functioning of the state from within (Kallis, 2015, p.4). However, representative democracy and a certain degree of hierarchy is unavoidable because degrowth transition, in the current condition of economic interdependence, cannot but be global in order to be effective. “The redistribution of burdens and resources among more and less privileged localities will require intermediation and decision-making at broad geographic levels” (Kallis, 2015, p.5). This combination of direct and representative democracy might not, of course, be free of tensions since decisions made out of a territory may contradict those within it, and encroach upon the territory’s self-determination and autonomy, thereby undercutting direct democracy.

The society, degrowthers envision, is marked by simplicity, sharing and conviviality. Equality, relation and simplicity constitute human well-being (Kallis, 2011, p. 879). A society of a low metabolism is a simpler society which prioritizes human relationships, altruism and cooperation (Latouche, 2009, p. 34), and living in harmony with nature. Illich has used the term “conviviality” to describe such a simple society. As he explains:

I choose the term ‘conviviality’ to designate the opposite of industrial productivity. I intend to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment […] I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value (Illich, 1973, p. 24).

The reclaiming and sharing of commons, and the creation of new ones (Kallis, Demaria, and D’Alisa, 2015), and the relocalization of the economy and politics foster human relationships, and thus conviviality seems to invigorate Aristotelian friendship.

A smaller economy, an economy of a lower ecological footprint does not necessarily entail scarcity and misery. Material abundance, on the other hand, does not guarantee
happiness. Quality of life can be improved without growth if people start valuing human
ties and not material goods, and if society redistributes wealth. There is poverty which
causes misery, degrowthers grant, however poverty is not due to an absolute scarcity but
it depends on “the relative position and the competitive access to privatized commons
based on one’s class and purchasing power” (Kallis, 2017, p. 13). Also, wealthy people
are happier but the acquisition of more positional goods does not increase happiness
(Kallis, 2015, p.3)34. In a simple and convivial society, everyone will be equally entitled
to have access to the existent material resources, and thus everyone will be able to enjoy
a decent and meaningful life.

The advocates of degrowth underline the importance of leisure, of free time and the
ethos of play (Latouche, 2009, p. 34). The obsession with work has decreased free time
and further, free time “is becoming more and more professionalized and industrialized”
(Latouche, 2009, p.85). Consequently, people’s lives tend to be wholly absorbed by the
productive apparatus. Leisure and free time are fundamental features of a “serene
degrowth society” since they are necessary for exercising citizenship, for engaging in
freely chosen arts and crafts activities, for playing, contemplating, meditating,
discussing with others and generally feeling content being alive (Latouche, 2009, pp.40,
41). Degrowthers, like care ethicists, denounce the work ethic of the modern
productivist model which reduces living to laboring, and they seem to mean to establish
a different conception of time which permits a slower and meaningful unfolding of
human existence.

While degrowthers condemn the obsession with productive labour, they value care and
reproductive labour. They contend that a degrowth economy could rely, to a great
extent, on reproduction, on caring labour that aims at sustenance and restoration (Kallis,
2015, p.2), and they insist on the equal distribution of care work between genders. They
do not jettison labour but they seek to put it in the service of life and to free it from
productivist goals which promote growth for growth’s sake. Their conception of care
resembles Tronto’s (1993) definition of care which describes care as a species activity
that means to maintain world, that is, the condition within which human life is possible,

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34 According to Richard A. Easterlin’s (2001) findings of a measurement of subjective well-being through
direct questioning, the growth of income does not entail an increase in happiness because material
aspirations grow along with income, thus creating a lack that undercuts subjective well-being.
thereby extracting care from the confined purview of the household and rendering it a political idiom.

While degrowth implies collective self-limitation, in the sense of the downscaling of production and consumption, on the other hand, it calls for a different surpassing of limits, namely, an “unproductive expenditure of the social surplus” (Kallis, 2015, p.2). This expenditure, however, is not similar to individual consumption but has a collective or else a political character. It can take the form of “a collective feast, a decision to subsidize a class of spirituals to talk about philosophy or to leave a forest idle” (D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria 2015). This use of capital sounds irrational, economically speaking, because the proper use of capital, in the capitalist economy, is its investment so as to yield profit, and not its waste. However, the accumulation and maximization of capital is what degrowthers want to avoid. According to them, the only way to avoid growth is the unproductive use of capital, its “burning out”. They seem to speak from the perspective of Bataille’s “general economy” which views the economy in terms of energy, of energy’s abundance and not in terms of the dominant “restrictive economy” which starts from the postulate of scarcity and identifies economic activity with the development of productive forces. According to Bataille, solar energy is the source of life across the globe (Bataille, 1988, p.28); a living organism receives more energy than it needs in order to maintain life. This energy is used for the organism’s growth but when the organism can no longer grow “must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically” (Bataille, 1988, p.21). For Bataille, the limits of the biosphere, is what rules out eternal growth and predicates the squandering of energy. Indeed, economic growth, apart from causing a depletion of natural resources, leads to deforestation, to over building activity, to an ever growing bulk of waste that the planet cannot assimilate; in short, it leads to an explosive situation which, in essence, depicts the genuine “explosive character of this world” (Bataille, 1988, p.40) which needs pressure valves to channel excess energy or else social surplus.

The dissipation of capital in the public sphere, to exponents of degrowth, points to a collective construction of meaning, a common conceptualization of the good life and a new realm of politics beside the realm of necessity which is marked by the fulfillment of basic needs (D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria 2015). This collective construction of the

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35 Bataille refers to the construction of the Pyramids and to war as examples of glorious and catastrophic spending of energy respectively.
meaning of the good life refutes the individual pursuing of the good life through the accumulation of material resources which drives the economy to constantly grow (D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria 2015). Finding the meaning of life individually, for degrowthers, is an “anthropological illusion” that the sober subject of degrowth, who knows that meaning can be found in relations, dismisses (D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria, 2015).

The idea that the individual searching for the good life is an anthropological illusion which engenders ecologically harmful and socially unjust results, though seems plausible and it contains a kernel of truth, I think, it might be dangerous. The rooting of the concept of the good life, exclusively in the public realm and its confirmation through public rituals, could lead to devouring a person’s privacy and sovereignty. Freedom and democracy which degrowthers explicitly recognize as predicates of degrowth society, presuppose a variety of conceptions of the good life which uphold people’s autonomy. The political searching for the meaning of the good life is promoted by personal reflection. A degrowth transition should not result in an authoritarian political condition in which a person suffers under a social heteronomy which pretends to be the guarantor of meaning. The danger of communitarianism looms in such an ambiguous collective ownership of the meaning of the good life, and it increases if relocalization of the economy would be accompanied by a regional egotism and isolation.

6.2.2 Degrowth: the Potential Positivity

As we have noted, there is a diversity of practices and institutions that promise a degrowth transition, such as eco-villages, consumer-producer cooperatives, permaculture, non-monetary exchange systems, and reformist policy proposals comprising basic income, work-sharing, reduction of working hours, caps on resource extraction and use, and pollution taxes. Degrowth movement does not provide a concrete blueprint that could replace the dominant growth-centric economic model and it rather functions as a means for opening a space for the critique on the omnipotence of economic rationality, on productivism, and for imagining and exercising economic activities which point to a non-energy intensive economic future (Kallis, 2015, p.1).
Degrowthers prefer to remain agnostic and pluralistic about the traits of the future degrowth economic order since they contend that the forming of the new economic scheme should be done by people and not by scientific experts or politicians (Kallis, 2011, p. 877). But while they do not offer a certain economic blueprint or a specific corpus of clear policy proposals with measurable goals (van den Bergh, 2009), they unequivocally state that the degrowth future, they suggest, is anti-capitalist or post-capitalist (Kallis, 2011, p.875; Latouche, 2009, p. 92) since growth is an internal feature of capitalism, stemming from its institutions. They admit, however, that the target of growth and the ideology of productivism were adopted by socialism too (Kallis, 2017, p. 11), since the development of productive forces for humanity’s progress is rather synonymous of modernity (Latouche, 2009, p. 89). The maximization of production is a pivotal modern economic project that both capitalism and socialism joined.

Although degrowth is explicitly an anti-capitalist movement, its exponents do not reject outright the institutions which have been identified with capitalism but they argue for their transformation. Thus, Latouche claims that money, markets, profits and the wage system are not necessarily excluded from a post-development society because they can be embedded in a different logic (Latouche, 2009, pp.91, 92). He invokes societies in Africa that use these economic tools without articulating them in a whole system:

They are neither market societies, wage-based societies nor industrial societies, and still less are they capitalist societies, even though both capital and capitalists can be found in them. The imaginary of these societies has been colonized by the economy to such a minor extent that they do not realize that they have an economy (Latouche, 2009, pp.91-92).

Latouche (2003) also holds that the market can be re-shaped in terms of the ancient Greek Agora, namely, it can again become a social and political space where people could be accustomed with the other, the different, and debate political affairs thus realizing their citizenship and forming public life (Fournier, 2008, p.538). It looks as if Latouche wishes to re-invent capitalism or to embed it in social relations, turning back the clock to the economic past before the “great transformation”, as Polanyi describes it, that is, before the functioning of the market as an organizing principle of the economy through price mechanism. Degrowth, like the solidarity economy, sees basic capitalist institutions such as the market and money as neutral economic instruments but both movements seem to underestimate the anchoring of these tools in an immense web of economic relations that feed capital. The cultural revolution, Latouche envisions,
(Latouche, 2009, p.32) does not suffice for altering the market to a political space. Besides that, it sounds awkward to say that the market was moral before the great “sin”; the market is an institution, by definition, oriented to individual advantage because otherwise people would exchange gifts instead of commodities. The incentive for gain over the years, along with the technological advance of society, have led to the evolution of the market and have optimized its functioning as an instrument of wealth for some people and as a cause of pauperization for others. What the illustration of Africa, Latouche uses, might show, is not that the market or money are not obstacles to a degrowth transition but that a low level of cheating and exploitation is tolerable or even functional in an ostensibly post-capitalist order, since among other things these are not discernible by people.

Kallis (2017) though acknowledges that the communist regimes of the 20th century espoused the growth ideology, asserts that degrowth transition would be more compatible with a socialist economic ordering of the economy because socialism as a political ideal prioritizes human needs, condemns exploitation, and values self-determination and equality. In particular, he states that the satisfaction of human needs presupposes the production of use values and not of exchange values. Use values, being democratically determined, cannot “grow” in the aggregate and cannot drive to more growth (Kallis, 2017, p.2, 3). Growth requires surpluses, which accrue from the exploitation either of workers or of ecosystems (Kallis, 2017, p.3). A genuine socialist economy, Kallis says, would not sacrifice living standards or deplete natural resources to achieve a surplus product. Moreover, such a socialist economy:

would not exploit the work or resources of other economies (through plunder, colonization, unequal exchange under the disguise of trade, etc); it would share care work, evenly rotate unpleasant tasks and compensate care workers with their dues for their reproductive work. It would not shift its pollution upon others; it would pay its accumulated ecological, carbon or colonial debts, and it would restore the environments that it uses (Kallis, 2017, pp.9-10).

Socialism, indeed, is opposed to exploitation but until now, has determined it as the exploitation of human beings and not of the natural environment that sustains human life. Kallis, in fact, holds that a contemporary socialist venture would need to be enriched with that concern for nature. Socialism could aid degrowth transition since it poses too at its centre the meeting of human needs albeit it should be updated in order to help effectively. Kallis seems to be right when he claims that degrowth and socialism
could ‘collaborate’ but, I think, socialism though privileges use values is away from the thesis that ‘we already have enough material goods’. Communism formed a gigantic productive machine - while people were forced to a ‘non- liberating austerity’ and still socialists share the same lust for material goods with the champions of capitalism. Their suggestion for growth as a response to the current economic and financial crisis although recommends the state and not capital as the generator of growth (D’Alisa, Kallis, and Demaria, 2015), it indicates that socialism should not simply be updated but also should be taught a new ethos by degrowth movement, the ethos of “joyful sobriety”.

Degrowth, as the solidarity economy, does not offer an economic positivity, a certain economic model but it works as a critique which has a radical and a reformist nuance too. However, it arguably aspires to inspire a non-violent and democratic transition to a post-capitalist future. And, like solidarity economy, it works “at the macrolevel of economic and political institutions and at the microlevel of personal values” (Kallis, 2011, p.878). Both economic movements struggle for an institutional change but also for a cultural change in the people’s imaginary; they strive for an economy and by extension for a society marked by solidarity, cooperation and friendship or, as degrowth movement puts it, a convivial society. Both have incorporated a caring ethos and a concern for fair distribution of caring work, as well as for fair remuneration, and valuing of caring labour. However, degrowth movement seems to have formed a more complete image of capitalism’s moral weakness since by doubting the ‘truth’ or rightness of development, even of sustainable or green development, and speaking of individual sobriety, it seems to say that friendship and solidarity are not compatible with the seeking of material abundance.

Late capitalism, as early capitalism, separates people from one another since either through austere living or through the hunting of luxury, people are entrapped in an empty materialism which encloses them in themselves and renders them incapable of experiencing their species universality and genuine concern for one another. The revolving of life around production and consumption activity, and the market rationality which finds irrational and meaningless whatever is not profitable and productive, do not leave free space for ‘useless’ and unproductive caring for the others and for nature.

36 Here, I am paraphrasing Illich (1973).
37 Again I am using Illich’s (1973) terminology.
Degrowthers, I think, have fathomed this fundamental severing of human tie that Marx described so insightfully in his theory of alienation which for him, however, was necessary for the development of productive forces and the growth, a necessary stage in social and historical progress.

Self-government of workers is a trait that degrowth and the solidarity economy share. The collective management of commons and the gradual transformation of capitalist institutions through their democratic control is a desideratum for these anti-capitalist projects. The subjection of private property, money and the market to democratic deliberation is supposed to bring about their conversion into convivial tools which will allow people to “work together and care for each other” (Illich, 1973, p. 64). Both movements, however, though argue for the feasibility of this conversion are not clear about how people could ‘expropriate’ them within their ‘habitat’, that is, capitalism, and under current economic crisis where what is repeated as mantra is ‘growth or collapse’. How could people’s democratic will substitute for the economic elites’ decisions regarding the management of their own property given that the representative democracy serves, to a great extent, the interests of economic elites? Grassroots degrowth initiatives, like solidarity economy ones, surely challenge capitalism and its ‘truth’ but they could be assimilated by the system and become a harmful aberration. The bottom up construction of a different economic reality is certainly preferable compared to an imposed economic positivity which will neglect people’s volition and which will identify and interpret arbitrarily their needs but on the other hand, I hold, these fruitful and promising movements need to cultivate a kind of functional unanimity with regards to their core ends and to the path that could lead to their implementation. The forming of a blueprint, instead of being suppressive of free thought and action, could be supportive.

6.3 Degrowth Associational Socialism

Degrowth movement points to an economy that could fully realize civic friendship because it nurtures its instinctual root and does not simply prescribe reciprocal economic benefiting. Degrowth does not aim at artificial material abundance but at a simple life with fewer material goods and more relational goods. Within degrowth economic setting work could be simpler allowing individuals to interact directly with
natural material and manage machines without the mediation of a domineering class of scientific experts. Also, work could be collectively determined; its mode, its goal, the needs it aims to meet, the distribution of the produced objects, and the sources to be used, would be decided by the citizens-workers themselves. In addition, farmers-citizens would be able to produce, namely to grow crops or raise livestock being informed by a forgotten caring ethos. By being freed from the productivist logic of industrialized agriculture which threatens human health and destroys the environment through the extensive use of fertilizers, pesticides and genetic engineering, farmers could be reconnected with the land and the traditional knowledge concerning farming and livestock, and could re-appropriate their lost autonomy (Pretty, 2002). Organic farming would replace agribusiness, and farmers would become “reflexive” (Stock, 2007, p.83); they would care for “the land and thus for people affected by its health” (Kneafsey et al., 2008, p.44). Production of healthy food, restoration of the relationship with land and nature in general, and self-government of farmers would be the goals of the agriculture in a degrowth socialist economy in which processors and retailers will not mediate between farmers and consumers, but the latter could interchange their roles in order for citizens to be re-linked with nature and with one another.38

But in order to achieve the transition to a different, post-capitalist economic order and not be another reformist movement which sooner or later will be integrated into the prevalent economic system, degrowth project should solve the problem of concentration of the economic and political power that characterizes the system of the market economy (Fotopoulos, 2007). As mentioned, degrowth proposals, on “how to degrow” “are still fragmented and diverse” (Kallis, 2011, p.876) showing a lack of agreement on the features of an alternative future economy, or a conscious decision not to blunt the dynamics and the potentialities of degrowth movement. However, if the question about the future of degrowth movement, namely whether it will formulate an alternative economy or it would be a systemic ‘aesthetic’ reality, can wait for a response, the ecological crisis that threatens human life and social sustainability, cannot wait for a solution.

The declining of society’s material throughput is certainly a tangible goal but the rejection of capitalism without a simultaneous rejection of its basic institutions does not

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38 For the de-humanizing effect of the loss of connection with nature see Pretty, 2002, p.10.
seem to promote this goal. The market is inextricably connected to private property and profitability. Money is used in the market situation to maximize private property which means an enhanced ability and maybe a legitimate right of the owner of the capital to dominate over nature and others, and exploit them. It is difficult to take away its function of “serving as an instrument for the individual accumulation of wealth and the acquisition of the means of production”, and keep that of serving as “a unit of value and a means of exchange” (Castoriadis, 2005, p.198, cited in Latouche, 2009, p. 92) even if we reduce the market’s scope or even if we cap the energy use. Instead of using money as a neutral exchange means, we could be highlighting its neutrality “as regards its intrinsic value” (Simmel, 2011, p. 162) in order to achieve its obsolescence in a transitional phase towards a post-capitalist economy, by using it in an economically irrational mode like paying according to our ability and forming the price of goods according to the “need of those with the least ability to pay” (Simmel, 2011, p. 235).

Kallis contends that socialism is “better positioned” to bring about a transition to a society of a lower energy and material throughput (Kallis, 2017, p.2) but does not clarify whether that new kind of socialism, a socialism which is not geared towards the continuous increase of productive forces and to accumulation, should be a market socialism or a democratically planned economy. However, I think, the fulfillment of human needs and the ruling out of exploitation of human labour and of natural resources are more plausible within a democratically planned socialist economy rather than within market socialism since the latter harbours growth dynamics. A socialist economy where worker enterprises endeavour to be more competitive and efficient by lowering costs and increasing profits thus causing a degradation of people’s quality of life, is obviously reluctant to implement degrowth.

The relocalization of the economy through local, economically self-sufficient communities, that degrowth proposes, surely could contribute to the decentralization of economic and political power. The economic self-sufficiency of a particular territory calls for the knowledge of local specificities and the protection of local natural resources. The local population would protect its natural surroundings precisely because its subsistence would be dependent on it. People would be responsible for preserving their commons and would be entitled to make decisions about their management to
everyone’s benefit. However, the localization of the economy inevitably brings citizens before the dilemma of maintaining direct democracy within their small territory or expanding their territorial political constituency and substituting representative democracy for direct decision-making in order to sustain their territory’s sovereignty, since broader ecological issues cannot be handled at a limited local level (Latouche, 2009, p.45). To that outlet of localism, I think, Neurath’s associational socialism could provide a reliable solution since through its cooperative model of overlapping associations at regional, national and international level, citizens are allowed to decide their future by thinking locally and globally at the same time. The structuring of the overlapping authorities in a system of concentric cycles would render local communities interdependent and inter-transparent. Small communities cannot be absolutely self-sufficient, as degrowth’s regionalism implies, since in each territory there might be an abundance of a natural resource and a lack of another. Each local community could be sovereign only if it is interdependent with other local communities, and all of them organize their economic activity on the basis of a broad economic plan, which distributes equitably natural resources and restores them too.

The very existence of international organizations which would be responsible for the administration of main natural resources or the internationalization of big rivers seems to undermine self-determination of particular regions but, in essence, rules out possible future tensions between them and maximizes their capacity to preserve their local natural environment. The association of local communities or bioregions, which has been proposed by degrowth movement (Fotopoulos, 2007) though could break narrow localism, would not necessarily associate these communities with transversal relations that would guarantee nature’s protection on a global scale. In addition, the involvement of guilds in the decentralized planning of the economy would extract people from a regional egotism since through their identity as workers, they could become global citizens. Therefore, work would have been assigned to activate citizenship not only at regional and national level but at an international level too.

A last important contribution that Neurath’s associational socialism could have in degrowth post-capitalist future, is the keeping of balance between scientific and

39 The “environmentalism of the poor” (Martinez Alier, 2009), that is, the movement of local populations whose livelihood depends on the biodiversity and on ecosystem services, against nature’s destruction as well as against the annexation of land, water and other natural resources by governments or business corporations, shows the already existent active concern of people for their local environment.
technical knowledge, as well as practical reason. While Neurath’s thought converges with degrowthers’ refusal of technocratism and the concomitant power hierarchies, it could be said, that it also warns against a sterile suspicion towards scientific knowledge and technological achievements. Science and technology can and should be used for ameliorating human life, and people should be enabled to embrace them through “convivial tools”. Thus, degrowth could be guarded against slipping into a fruitless conservatism.

With regard to the non-productive caring sector of the economy comprising childcare, education, healthcare, elderly care, and care for disabled individuals, I hold that these caring services, should be organized by all involved, namely by those – experts and lay people - who care for and by those who are in need of care. Experts’ knowledge should be supplemented by the practical reason of lay people as well as by the experience of the individuals who are to receive care. Care ethicists have underlined that caring presupposes being attentive to others’ needs. How people understand and phrase their needs and also how react and assess the received care, are of a high importance in organizing the caring process. Caring labour, like productive labour, is a means for self-realization and for the cultivation of civic friendship, as well as a source of meaning and self-esteem. However, there are forms of caring that look like a burden. In this case, as in the case of productive labour, care givers could rotate in the provision of care.

Caring labour could be organized in a decentralized manner, such as, on the basis of neighborhood, as has been described by Scwarzenbach (2009). The participation of citizens in caring could accustom them to very different needs from their own and this could de-marginalize individuals whose caring and even socializing is totally medicalized. Public, participatory caring would help people to experience human vulnerability and to cultivate empathy for all instantiations of human nature. Caring labour could be a learning process for both care givers and care receivers which would enrich their knowledge of human psyche. Friendship, as Aristotle maintains, requires spending time together. Therefore, caring, either as production or as “ethical reproduction”, could foster friendship between people by bringing them together so that they share “in discussion and thought”.

A decentralized associational socialism of a low ecological footprint, may not just restore the meaning of work as a basic existential action but it could also re-inscribe the
economy within politics or reveal the economy as another instantiation of politics. Citizens working in a human way, that is, producing for fulfilling human needs and not for the sustaining and growing of an impersonal apparatus, as well as providing direct care, can consider themselves to be members of a political community and not abstract economic agents. And being citizens who through their work contribute consciously to one another’s well-being can be regarded as civic friends. Organizing and performing productive process and direct caring labour according to the purposes and in the mode they themselves have decided through dialogue, would enact politics. Work consisting in bodily action as well as deliberation and speech would become the vehicle of people’s disclosure to each other, of their appearance to each other, and thus it would establish the public realm.

While speech and action in human, non-alienated productive work are not purposeless and spontaneous, they can allow for “new unprecedented processes whose outcome remains uncertain and unpredictable” (Arendt, 1998, p.231), as political action, to Hannah Arendt, does, since non-alienated work is not subjected to a blind productivism which undercuts substantive rationality and the exercising of free will. Although work would remain geared towards a certain external end, that is, people’s collective subsistence, it would not be a closed, heteronomous procedure but an open one, a political space which “breathes” and does not exclude the unpredictable and the new. By working together, people would act in concert and become a powerful whole, a political community which confirms itself in the political appearance of every single worker, as a particular, distinct political subject.

The economy, in a degrowth associational socialist order, would be part and parcel of politics, and it would safeguard politics since it would underpin human plurality-interpreted into equality and distinction- which conditions action and speech, according to Arendt (Arendt, 1998, p.175). Workers labouring for one another, benefiting one another for their sake, as civic friends, would be economically and politically equal. In a decentralized planned economy there would not be a concentration of economic or political power; citizens would be able to reciprocate their civic friends’ good and mutually foster their relationship thus upholding the political community’s cohesion. Their deed for the sake of their friend would affirm their friends’ and their own particularity since that deed would express their own distinctness as persons. Their
friendship would rely on a reciprocal recognition of both parties as particular and universal-civic individuals, or else on a real encounter (Debord, 2002, p.217).

Within an alternative degrowth socialist reality which would resonate civic friendship, the economy would become an instantiation of politics and a field of democratic praxis and would incorporate reason as a whole and not as a poor, narrow-minded economic reasoning. Therefore, that reclaiming of reason, we can assume, along with the rehabilitation of productive labour as human action, and the valuing of non-productive caring labour could postulate the autonomy and worth of all activities that spring from an “ethic of passivity” namely, of activities which do not reinvest their products (Zweir et al., 2015, p. 369).

However, what this return of reason and politics through the conceptualization of the economy in terms of civic friendship could principally restore or rather heal is the trauma of man’s radical break from others and the world, manifested in the Lockean “discovery of the world as private property” and deepened in neoliberal economic thought (Featherstone, 2016) The modern individual by viewing the world as an economic object saw itself as its own property (Featherstone, 2016) and identified itself with its possessions, slipping thus to a “possessive individualism” (Featherstone, 2016). This possessive individualism underlies the capitalist economic model and engenders the illusion that human freedom and individuality emanate from profitable economic agency. The political principle of civic friendship bearing the knowledge of the primordial interdependence between human beings, and between them and nature could re-invent the economy and regenerate citizenship and genuine political praxis. Hence, it could provide a path for escaping the hubris of man’s arrogant separation and domination over others and nature. An economy in the service of life would be a virtuous exercising of politics, -without, however, exhausting the latter- an *ergon tou anthropou*\(^{40}\) that could ensure every citizen’s well-being meant not as personal happiness but as a functional capability, an enabling condition of it, of that freely defined and experienced form of the good life.

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\(^{40}\) Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* argues that man’s function (*ergon tou anthropou*) and by extension man’s happiness (*eudaimonia*) is an activity in conformity with virtue. (NE 1.7).
Conclusion

Aristotle understood that civic friendship is rooted in an instinctual, organic need, and hence it should not just be reduced to instrumental relations between citizens but should be evolved into true friendship. He knew that the drive for living in common is not confined to the private realm, in personal relationships but it pertains to the public realm too; it can create the public realm as a political condition which makes people happy. Degrowth movement which harbours human sociality could be empowered by the political positivity of Neurath’s decentralized associational socialism, and could lead to a post-capitalist economy of generous political subjects who cooperate and arrange their living in common reasonably.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have argued that the market economy does not serve life, since it does not prioritize the fulfillment of human needs and the maintenance of the natural environment on which human life depends but the creation and maximization of capital which is conditioned on the exploitation of man and nature. That happens because the economy has been separated from politics; the non-interference of the state with the function of the market economy was accompanied by the exclusion of political issues and concerns from the field of economic action. The state’s intervention, to be sure, was not equivalent to politics but it was surely a regulating institutional principle which stood for a collective responsibility for the common living. The modern state does not incarnate politics in the way the ancient polis did. Thus, the autonomization of the economy from the state extinguished the last relics of politics from the economic sphere, the sphere of needs.

Aristotle, however, conceived politics and life within the political community in terms of civic friendship, of concern for the others’ well-being. Modern society, organized to a bigger scale than the ancient political community through the market’s associative operation, has been regarded as incompatible with the exercising of politics in terms of concern and responsibility for the others. Also, the independence and self-sufficiency of the modern citizen derived from his entitlement to participate in the market has been synonymous of indifference towards others and dis-connection. The individual feeling able to provide for his life by its own means, felt independent from the aid of others and, what is more, free from any responsibility to care about and for them. The market was supposed to be an omnipotent and fair care giver for all and a substitute for politics or rather an improved and more effective mode for doing politics. However, the collision of different individual interests in the market does not result in their harmonization and in the promotion of everyone’s good. Consequently, politics might not be a primitive means for arranging living in common but a wrongly neglected aspect of human life.

Feminist thinkers have pointed out that liberal societies, having being founded on production and work ethic, have undervalued care and feminine caring labour. The lack of connection between citizens, caused by the sense and the ideology of independence and self-sufficiency that productive labour and the market agency have generated, has
resulted in a disdain towards care as a value and unpaid caring labour, as well as paid labour. Care, defined as sensitivity and response to others’ needs, is the polar opposite of self-interested behaviour in the economic field and generally in the public life. The underestimation and non-remuneration or the underpayment of caring labour not only reflects the inferior social status of women but also the inferior symbolic status of care which was not always feminine or it is not substantially feminine. Giving care its due, according to care theorists, would not only ameliorate women’s social position but it would improve the quality of life of all citizens because not only would needy and dependants receive proper care but every citizen could access the means that would satisfy her needs, since political and economic structures would be care oriented. Thus, they believe that politics, and more specifically democracy, could be revived through the valorization of care as a political principle. Indeed, caring entailing undertaking a responsibility for the others’ welfare and acting for meeting others’ needs resembles politics as *koinon epimelia* (care for the public affairs).

While care can function as the Trojan horse of politics, it cannot on its own re-politicize the economic sphere. Care ethicists’ proposals for a caring polity and a caring market equate to the investment of the economy with a caring sensitivity but not to its subsuming to the goal of meeting human needs. For that to happen, citizens’ relations should be modelled as two-way, dynamic relations of equal contribution of care. That kind of relationship is the relationship between friends and it has been described in detail by Aristotle. Friendship, according to Aristotle, is a mutual goodwill that is combined with a reciprocal doing good for the sake of one’s friend which is recognized by both parties. Friendship is interwoven with happiness (*eudaimonia*) because it is an exercising of reason which constitutes the essence of the human being where one can benefit and be benefited by his friend. Friendship thus is a cooperative relationship that forms a basic community (*koinonia*) where friends share their goodwill and action, and the goal of maintaining their relationship. Precisely because friendship creates community, Aristotle conceives citizens’ relations as friendly ones and not as contractual ties analogous to those of an economic alliance. Hence, civic friends care about one another’s well-being and contribute to that, formulating and thus confirming a larger friendly community, namely, the political community, and promoting its good which equates to each citizen’s good. Therefore, the presupposition for a political
community’s flourishing is the virtue of citizens which enables them to bind to one another by benefiting each other.

The elements that make civic friendship a precious political and democratic relationship is that the subjectivity of friends is respected since doing good counts as such because this furthers friend’s consciously chosen purposes, and that the reciprocal beneficence for one another’s sake implies and calls for the equality of friends. Aristotle has referred to political equality as an expression of civic friendship and he has shown that political equality requires the overcoming of huge economic inequalities. Consequently, the repoliticization of the economy, meant as the economy’s subordination to the satisfaction of human needs, could be accomplished if citizens’ economic interaction resembles civic friendship. Aristotle, however, has not expounded on civic friendship in the economic sphere. He has only mentioned the exchange of goods as an economic instantiation of civic friendship and he has posed a condition for considering the market exchange as an expression of civic friendship, that is, not using the others as means for profit. Schwarzenbach’s economic reconstruction of Aristotelian civic friendship though has thematized productive labour which has been neglected by care theorists, as a potential caring activity, it does not fully meet the requirement of reciprocity and seeks to realize civic friendship in an economic context which favours competition.

In order to find how civic friendship could apply to the economy, it was necessary to view the two pillars of the modern economy, namely production and the market distribution of material goods. Those two constituent parts of the modern economy have been examined by Marx, Smith and Hegel in a way that, we could contend, continues or updates Aristotle’s thought.

Marx dealt with manual labour, and in effect, conceptualized civic friendship in terms of labour as “species activity”, as the most characteristic expression of human essence in contrast to Aristotle who regarded labour as a menial occupation that hinders the cultivation of virtue. Marx, in essence, deemed that labour although springing from human materiality and need, can be an emanation of reason and it can realize virtue. “Social production” seems to be a virtuous performing of labour because it is a free, conscious activity that actualizes man’s intellectual and physical potential through meeting another human being’s needs. It is a reciprocal virtuous doing precisely because it benefits another human being by exerting reason. Producing for another
human being is a virtuous activity that pleases the subject because not only reflects and objectifies his personality and life, but also because the produced good is enjoyed by another person. The pleasure of a friend, stemming from the use of the object, is added to the producer’s pleasure or rather it is integrated to his pleasure. This pleasure is not a superfluous one since it rests on the knowledge that the virtuous performing of labour constitutes a universal condition in which the human nature of people is understood, recognized and confirmed by both parties not only in terms of consciousness but in terms of sentiments too. Hence, virtuous labour leads to a community, a sharing of happiness, of pleasure or else a community of reason. Marxian reciprocation of labour establishing economic equality by situating economically civic friendship, renders productive labour a field for enacting politics, and paves the way for real political equality.

Smith did not conceptualize market relationships as directly-literally friendly ones mediated by virtuous economic action but as economic transactions that, though motivated by sheer self-interest, result in the common good, as friendship does, and thereby favour mutual sympathy and respect between citizens. In other words, the market mechanism, functioning as a philosophers’ stone, transmutes self-interest, rapacity and greed into a kind of friendship, a good disposition towards others and a civilized public conduct that allows peaceful social co-existence.

Hegel, on the other hand, held that while the market is a terrain of race between opposed interests, it also has a moral potential due to the axiomatic mutual conditioning of the “particular” and “universal principle”. The market, according to Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought, can change from a battlefield into an institutional “being with oneself in another”, into a mutual completion of interests and goals to the extent that those particular moments could become instantiations of a universal moment, of a shared praxis. Hegel seems to assert that though market interchanges manifest as hostile relationships, are in fact incarnations of utility friendship which can evolve into a virtue friendship over time or through institutional improvements, as Honneth claims. However, I have maintained, the very existence and competition of particular interests in best case can bring about their instrumental completion but not their fusion. The modern market, hinging on unlimited wealth acquisition, will always end up sacrificing universality on the altar of particularity, using the other as a means for profit, thus
undermining the Aristotelian condition for considering market exchange as a form of civic friendship.

After those readings of civic friendship from the perspective of the modern economy that led me to deduce that production, and not the market exchange, could be the catalyst for realizing civic friendship economically, I ventured to reconstruct civic friendship by seeking to find what doing good for the sake of a friend would mean or what caring for her well-being might mean. Thus, I argued that civic friendship incorporates a primordial conception of the good life, which cannot but derive from the primordial objective of the political community.

Aristotle states that the end of political community is the good life or the virtuous life and that civic friendship should safeguard the virtuous character of citizens. So, in what a virtuous, a good civic life might consist in contemporary societies? A good life is a life lived within a political community which enables its members to subsist, namely, it guarantees their life. In addition, the structures and institutions of the political community should enable people to realize themselves as sensuous, rational and emotional beings, naturally inclined to experience themselves in a positive relation to other species’ members and to nature, as well as concrete individuals with particular traits and talents. This dual self-realization which mirrors the dual human nature, that is, its universality and its situatedness should be the case for all citizens, and thereby it delineates a shared human goal that forms a shared praxis and complementary particular goals that, in essence, constitute the political community. The sharing, now, of that primordial praxis, of constructing self-identity as species and ego-identity, entails social recognition and confirmation of particular self-identities. This shared primordial praxis in the political community receives a concrete civic form and renders the individuals that join it fully-fledged citizens, that is, civic friends. Shared praxis thus becomes a reciprocal beneficence for one another’s sake that attributes not only the property of the political actor to those participating in it but also that of the civic friend who contributes to the welfare of fellow citizens. So, civic friendship implies being a member of a political community which confirms the membership of individuals that dwell in it by enabling them to maintain it through positively connecting them. Therefore, civic friendship points to a democratic citizenship which relies on a community of primary ends which are served on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
Reciprocal doing well by, in the economic domain, would concern the productive and distributive procedure of social wealth, and also the delivering of direct caring services because the Aristotelian conception of the economy (*oikonomia*) as household (*oikos*) management implies the meeting of existent needs and not simply the production of material goods. The material reproduction of society meant as life’s sustaining, comprises productive and caring labour, namely indirect and direct care, fulfillment of human needs. Care theorists have illuminated the worth of direct caring labour as a component of the economy and so we could not leave it out from a conception of the economy as a territory of politics. Doing politics or applying civic friendship, in the realm of labour means organizing and conducting labour in a civic-democratic manner. Citizens being workers too, should be able to democratically deliberate and decide about the goal and the nature of their labour, the needs it is to satisfy, and they should democratically control its performance. Moreover, they should decide and organize the distribution of the produced wealth. This complete control over the work process presupposes the owning of commons, that is, of the technological means of production and the natural resources, by citizens. Further, caring labour could not be only experts’ responsibility but lay citizens’ too in order for civic friendship to be nourished by the awareness of man’s multifarious vulnerability or man’s multifaceted nature.

The democratic control of work and the self-government of workers could be possible in a socialist economic system which could employ the market mechanism. However, the competition that the market engenders would contradict the full realization of civic friendship since the aims of efficiency, of optimization of profit, would remain unquestioned doctrines for worker cooperatives, as in the capitalist economy, and they would legitimate sacrifices of socialist standards and civic friendship’s good life implications. So, distributive procedure, as determinant of the productive procedure, should be politically embedded or democratically planned. Neurath, a socialist thinker, conceived such a planning of the economy that excluded the market as a regulating mechanism of production and as a distributive instrument, and money as means of commensurability. Although he initially conceived the economic planning mainly as scientific experts’ responsibility, in a second stage he acknowledged a critical role for lay labourers and for the practical reason in this planning which enhanced the moral orientation of his economic scheme. Hence, he envisioned economic planning carried out by various decentralized and overlapping, interconnected and inter-transparent
social associations as well as guilds. What makes his socialist model undeniably resonant with civic friendship is its focusing on the meeting of human needs, the placing of friendship among the “conditions of happiness”, and its ecological sensitivity.

The solidarity economy is a contemporary grassroots movement that springs from socialist thought; it incorporates a similar to associational socialism, economic pluralism but by contrast to it, does not rule out the market thereby echoing market socialism. It prioritizes, as a socialist ramification, human needs over profits and like Neurath’s version of socialism, inscribes labour in democratic deliberation. Solidarity economy proponents, as care thinkers, do not consider the market as an immutable, petrified structure but as a social institution which, like society, is under constant change. So, for them too, the market can be a caring mechanism. Solidarity economy projects have indeed invented caring forms of the market but they are not clear about how the market would look like in a post-capitalist economic order.

The solidarity economy realizes civic friendship in small communities of livelihood but its shared economic praxis is not equivalent to a re-politicization of the economy as a whole. Reciprocation of economic acting is the foundation of the economic realization of civic friendship but the complete actualization of civic friendship requires an institutional framework that combines marginal communities of the solidarity economy into a complex political community which sustains and reproduces itself by enacting civic friendship. Consequently, it should be determined what would count as a post-capitalist actualization of the solidarity economy. That could be achieved if we deepened our comprehension further with regard to the incompatibility of the capitalist economy with civic friendship so as to come up with an alternative economic proposal.

Civic friendship, I have argued, is rooted in an instinctual need of living in common. The others’ presence fills the human being with joy which in the political community becomes happiness stemming from a virtuous co-existence. Wishing well and doing good for the sake of a civic friend releases a feeling of pleasure and makes one’s life meaningful. Acting according to reason by benefitting civic friends, allows citizens to feel the political analogue of that spontaneous, instinctual joy of living in company. Capitalism undermines this need for being in common and the joy coming from being in common through the alienation of labour and the creation of false needs which perpetuate the estrangement of labour. The alienation of the labourer from his labour
connotes his alienation from his needs, his self, from the others and their needs, and from nature too. That triple alienation is confirmed by a corresponding triple domination. The super-imposition of false needs nourishes productive apparatus by maximizing it, thus leading to an over-production of commodities which intensifies the triple alienation of individuals. Labourers do not simply work to subsist but to enjoy as many material objects they can. Marcuse has contended that the unchaining of life instincts, of *Eros*, which brings people together, would be feasible through the overall abolition of labour and the complete automation of production, however, he has not supported productivism. In contrast, he spoke of an aesthetic reality of less materialist noise and ugliness thus rendering himself a kind of theoretical precursor of the degrowth movement.

The exclusion of labour from a non-productivist economic order, I have asserted, would not overcome human being’s alienation from herself, from others and nature because productive labour provides people with a certain sense and experience of their bodily nature that other sorts of activity such as play, bodily exercise or even caring labour cannot do so. Producing to meet a human need, the individual, mediates between nature and the species, and becomes aware of her belonging in those two life-categories through her bodily and vulnerable nature. The satisfaction of human needs by the human being itself presupposes that she is aware of and attentive to human needs as well as whole heartedly inclined to respond to them by using her mind and hands. ‘Productive caring’ fills the human being with genuine pleasure that the exclusive mechanical satisfaction of her own or others’ needs would eliminate. That pleasure is what connects people, being the flip side of need or the ripe fruit of need which primarily links people. The overcoming of individuals’ estrangement from their selves, others and nature would then be possible through overcoming labour’s alienation. Therefore, civic friendship calls not only for producing for the others but for producing for the others in a way that pleases the worker, and feeds her volition to produce for them and live with them. Degrowth movement suggesting the downscaling of the economic rates facilitates the de-alienation of labour, and the embedding of social production in democratic deliberation and decision-making.

Degrowth is the right context for realizing civic friendship and thus re-politicizing the economy because it emphasizes human relations instead of material abundance. By producing less and consuming less, people could re-align themselves with their real
needs and restore their relationships with themselves, others and nature. Hence, they could affirm the primordial conception of the good life that civic friendship encapsulates. If others matter to us instead of material objects, then we could find meaning in realizing ourselves by producing for them, by organizing our work as a species activity anchored in democratic dialogue. If others matter to us, then we will be able to appreciate the worth of politics and we will re-invent the economy as a political activity that binds citizens and renders them civic friends. By re-politicizing the economy, we will debate on different human needs and on the mode that can be met thus invigorating the political community. The rehabilitation of productive labour as caring labour, as a productive procedure intended to satisfy human needs and not to respond to whims and caprices of the market, can be the catalyst for establishing an economy that realizes civic friendship.

However, in order for the degrowth movement to become a post-capitalist economic order that actualizes civic friendship, it should be pinned down the growthism of the market and it should be grasped its role in the concentration of economic and political power. The decentralized socialist-democratic planning of the economy, I have finally argued, would counteract the last obstacle for an economy of a low ecological footprint, an economy that would serve life by realizing civic friendship.
Bibliography


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