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The transformation of state ideology in Turkey:
From Kemalism to Islamism

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PhD Social and Political Thought
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March 2019
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:..................................................
The transformation of state ideology in Turkey:
From Kemalism to Islamism

Summary

This PhD dissertation evaluates how Turkey's state ideology has shifted since 1923 and thus abandoned Kemalism. This research argues that Islamism has replaced Kemalism over state ideological transition and transformation phases, spanning from 1923 until present.

The theoretical foundation to make this research possible is critical systems theory. Thus, Niklas Luhmann’s approach to systems theory will be discussed and amended with Marxist theory in the relevant areas for this research. Namely these fields are the functional systems education and economy and their intersystematic influence, ideology and systems theory, as well as differentiation, coupling and the modernity in Luhmann as concepts that need to be amended to overcome issues of Luhmann’s systems theory. As a result of such discussion I will present a definition of state ideology in the light of critical systems theory. Furthermore, will I depict a possibility to make use of critical systems theory in societies that do not appear to be applicable for systems theory as a result of their lack of differentiation. Lastly, will I depict a theoretical approach to analyse state ideological changes via transitional and transformational phases.

These results will be underlined by the empirical research, which evaluates the unique resources of education programmes from 1923 to present, issued by the Ministry for National Education of Turkey. The empirical approach will focus on ideological shifts in content, perspective and focus of the three school subjects civic, religious and history education on primary and secondary school education levels in Turkey. The empirical analysis will prove that state ideology in Turkey has entered the transition phase away from Kemalism in the early 1950s. I will however argue that this transition is not significant enough to reverse state ideology but ignites the transition to then enter
the transformation phase beginning in 1980. I will argue that the transformation phase will see its finalizing years after the AKP came to political power, i.e. after 2002.

Thus, the empirical analysis will prove the theory to be valid, which argues that shifts in state ideology appear in transitional and transformational phases. This will be a significant contribution to critical systems theory, as it not only defines state ideology with systems theory as foundation of the methodology, but also prove the theoretical claim with empirical evidence.

Furthermore, this dissertation is the first academic research that a) methodologically bases a research of Turkey on critical systems theory and b) by doing so empirically proves that the critical approach to systems theory overcomes the issue of modernity in Luhmann’s systems theory.

Lastly, by using unique materials and a comprehensive depiction of state ideological changes ranging from 1923 until today in the civic, religious and history subjects the empirical study will depict that unlike popular understanding of Turkey, Kemalism was abandoned within state infrastructure very early of its Republican era. The empirical material used is unique. Thus, public discourse of a status quo of Kemalist elites within bureaucracy, the state in general and “key deciding” elements of the state (politics, the “deep state”, the economy, the military) are not valid. This dissertation claims and proves the opposite to be true and that Kemalism as state ideology was abandoned in its core since 1950, in order to transform to a different state ideology, which I will argue to be an Islamist state ideology.
Acknowledgements

When I applied for PhDs in the United States and the United Kingdom, I only had a wish and dream to leave Germany behind. I felt not at home in the country I was born in anymore. After having considered a couple of universities, Darrow replied to my e-mail in the middle of the night (as he usually does). My initial thought was that he had to be crazy for answering an applicant that late at night. However, his answer to my request of possible interest in my thesis was more than I could have expected. His warmth and genuine interest in what I intended to work on surprised me, but immediately injected a feeling of trust towards that person I had never spoken to before. After a couple of e-mails back and forth, I made up my mind to go to Sussex. It has been the best choice I could have made. Long conversations about German football (especially the 2nd League, Union Berlin and FC St. Pauli), our love for Basketball and of course the academic discourse were significant factors for him to be my second academic father. Without Darrow, this dissertation would have not been possible. His friendship, substantial knowledge, interest, ability to listen to my long speeches, patience and backing are what make him a special person to me. I will always be indebted to him.

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In remembrance of Hüseyin Ak and Sevgül Ak
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1. Introduction

When I was a child, my father and I used to vacation in Turkey, as family members of my parents still lived there. The sunny sea-side part of the country was simply not to be compared to any other part of the world. This was at least what my parents believed. Having grown up, I realized that Turkey’s nature and beauty was not the only reason for us to travel there for vacation; in addition, we had Turkish passports and no visas for other European countries. Furthermore, my extended family lived in Turkey and I was to get to know them. But the main reason for my parents’ decision to spend two weeks of our vacation there was to learn the culture of Turkey better.

Not only in retrospect, but also as a child, one name, one figure, one person’s busts and statues always dominated my attention: that of Atatürk. It did not matter where we went—from the bazaar to the beach, to side streets, to small shops or crowded squares—Atatürk was omnipresent. His full name was Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, but as a child the only name I knew for him was Atatürk. I did not know much about him, but what I understood quite early was the admiration and respect of the Turkish people for him. Even in the smallest and most cramped kiosks, space for a tableau of Atatürk could be found. Not only major city squares but also village squares, neighbourhoods and streets appeared to have a bust of Atatürk. His omnipresence was complemented by banners and posters addressing Atatürk which hung out of houses, on bridges, etc.

Among many, one specific salute to Atatürk is burned into my memory: ‘Atam İzindeyiz!’. When I read this sentence, I thought it meant ‘we are on vacation, our father!’; yet my father told me that it actually meant ‘we are following your path, our father!’. In retrospect, my misunderstanding of the word izin, which means “your trace” or “your path” with izin, which also means “vacation” or “holiday” by a child like me, who was born and raised in Germany and had no education, teaching or influence concerning Atatürk, was a naïve and undogmatic interpretation of the cultural shock I faced between the ‘Turkish culture’ at home and in Turkey.

My experiences with the omnipresent Atatürk occurred in the early 1990s. I held the belief that people in Turkey were not merely adoring their founding father, Atatürk, but were also very well educated about him and his ideas, and might even be indoctrinated
into Atatürkism/Kemalism. However, while studying a semester abroad in Turkey in the spring of 2008 at the age of 22, I realized that the admiration was not displayed as much as it used to be. Things appeared to have changed over the fifteen years which had passed between childhood experiences and my impressions as a young student. Gone were the banners in the streets and Turkish flags with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s face hanging out of the windows of almost every flat. This impression of a shift might have been due to the changed perspectives I passed through over the years; however, in conversations with students, I realized that my education regarding Atatürk had not been as complete and encompassing as I had thought. Students saw the subject of Kemalism as taught in schools as an annoyance.

This experience led me to believe that the conservative Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) must have changed the atmosphere of the country over their then six years in power. Instead of forcing admiration of Atatürk, the AKP made admiration of Atatürk a matter for debate. When asked what the AKP had changed in society such that the visible admiration of Atatürk had declined so dramatically, a fellow student pointed out to me that I should look at changes made in education by the AKP.

However, as my academic mentor, Prof. Thomas Philipp, taught me, historical analysis of a field of research will shed light on what we analyse in the present. The official Turkish history was, on the surface, a past of conservative-right wing parties in coalition with the government and three coups d’état (on the 27th of May, 1960; the 12th of March, 1971; and on the 12th of September, 1980). If one analyses the governments and the coups d’état, all seem to be united in their claim to be on the path of the founding father, Atatürk. Thus, a review of the official history did not answer the question of how the AKP seemingly turned the public from adoring to merely respecting Atatürk.

While searching for an answer, it occurred to me that national education had to be a key factor in this change in the ideological mindset of the country. Because I was born and raised in Germany, history classes in my last five years of high-school were dedicated almost entirely to the regime of Hitler. We learnt how the Prussians formed the German Empire and how it collapsed after the defeat of the Germans in World War I, and of the turmoil after 1918, which led finally to the founding of the Weimar Republic and then to the Hitler Regime, which lasted until 1945. However, in our analysis, the history books appeared to prepare the students for the period of 1933-1945. At the
same time, our history, economics and politics classes were also strongly opposed to communism. Thus, our books, curricula and teachers strongly advocated for democracy over the German history of fascist dictatorship and communism. Furthermore, we were taught as students that we as German people—though we were far apart from the generation which had willingly and knowingly participated in those crimes, and though we were immigrant children whose families had nothing to do with German history—were and are guilty of the horrendous crimes of the Nazi Regime. However, the feeling of guilt was planted in our minds, and I personally feel it to this day even. Though again, me and my family were far from having committed any of the German crimes.

This personal experience and consciousness, however, led me to the conclusion that education must be a key factor in the formation and consensus of ideas, beliefs and concepts within a society. These ideas, beliefs and concepts had to vary from state to state. In my example of the two countries, Germany and Turkey, emphasis was placed on different topics they wanted the public to have knowledge, beliefs, ideas and concepts about. This appeared to be the best way to explain how society changes its values and beliefs or, in my instance, how society shifts from admiring Atatürk to respecting him. Yet, with the AKP claiming governmental power in 2002, a transformation in state ideology or, more simply, a declining admiration for Atatürk, cannot be explained with reference to the public, as educational policies do not have a trickledown effect on older generations who no longer attend state education (i.e., the public older than 18, or, if we account for universities, the public 25 and above).

Both in 2008—thus, during the six months of my stay in Turkey—and since the AKP claimed governmental power in 2002, discussions about their policies and anti-secularist intentions have been ongoing. In particular, the then-chief of the Turkish General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, and the then-president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, were in vocal opposition to what they saw as an attack on the basic secular republican order. Thus, refusals to invite the wives of AKP politicians wearing headscarfs to presidential receptions¹ and strong statements emphasizing the army’s need to protect the secular

democratic basic order\(^2\) followed the election and experience of the AKP within a year. These discussions and conflicts have not ended even today. Having had governmental and bureaucratic power for 16 years, critique about the intentions of the AKP are still ongoing and are basically separating the country into two camps: AKP’s conservative, right-wing, Islamist\(^3\) side versus ‘the rest’, i.e., the liberals, Marxists, pro-Kurdish, social-democrats, left-wingers and opposing liberal-Islamists. This was never as clear as it became with the referendum on constitutional change, which changed the political system of Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential democracy in 2017. The much-discussed results—in which speculations of voter fraud and ‘instructions [...] that changed the ballot validity criteria, undermining an important safeguard and contradicting the law’\(^4\) were cause for discussion about the validity of the referendum—revealed a divided country, with the yes votes (i.e., votes for the change of the political system) accounting for 51.41% and the no votes for 48.59%. It appeared that, in the 15 years of power, the country was divided. The division of the country, however, appears to have its roots in the discussion about secularism, the Kemalist state and its collapse and the Islamisation of the country, which again contradicts Kemalist ideology. This division is visible both in the political arena and in the daily lives of the Turkish people. With my yearly visits to Turkey—especially after 2008 and my conversations with academics, students, low-wage workers, teachers, bureaucrats and politicians—I noted a gradual shift in the people’s views on politics. Until 2010, conversations with Taxi drivers, shop owners and low-wage workers could have been dialogues of differing views, expressions of displeasure with politicians and statements on ‘how to do it right’, the very same people/groups are more likely to offer clear-cut and dismissive opinions regarding differing ideas, while expressions of displeasure have since become further silenced, with the note that ‘reis (the leader, the head of state)


\(^3\) I will not specify the term ‘Islamists’ with adjectives such as ‘moderate’, ‘orthodox’, ‘sunni’, etc. as this would lead to a different discussion concerning the terminological use and distinction between the different ideological backgrounds of varying political Islam, which would not be of any use in the context of this study. Furthermore, by doing so, I try to level the field between ‘Kemalists’ and ‘Islamists’ as one could also use adjectives to define the different Kemalist camps, such as ‘conservative’, ‘centre-right’, ‘leftist’, ‘liberal’, etc., thus, one could define both camps to the most meticulous extent, yet not really achieve anything by doing so within this dissertation. Consequently, Islamists and Kemalists will be used as a generic term for all the camps associated with them.

knows best’. Thus, division in the public sphere has become as clear-cut as it appears on television capturing politicians. This sentiment of a division along the lines of Kemalism vs. Islamism is even adopted in historical national events/victories. In his essay ‘Propaganda, Narrative and National Identity: Following the Narrative of Gallipoli From the Early republican Era to Today’, Güven Gürkan Öztan depicts how, in today’s narrative of the battle of Gallipoli, the camps are divided again, with the ‘Kemalist-nationalist’ wing viewing it as an ‘extension of the quest for building a dyke against Islamist politics’ and with the ‘Islamist-conservative’ camp ‘arguing that the war was actually won with spirituality’ rather than with ‘Mustafa Kemal’s genius and patriotism-heroism’. Hence, even events which later led to the founding of the republic are subject to divisive discussions between representatives of Kemalism and Islamism. This division can be explained in many ways, of course. However, what I will focus on in this study is the shift of state ideology. And in this context, it is interesting to determine when, a shift of state ideology occurred in Turkey.

Before continuing I shall clarify my use of the word “shift” here. Although the title states a transformation in state ideology to have happened in Turkey, I will use the word “shift” very often. The reason is, that I will conceptualize the shift of state ideology in Turkey to have happened in two stages, namely a transition phase and a transformation phase. Thus, my title suggests that the transformation has occurred. By using shift, I only observe a general change in state ideology, without detail of which phase I am referring to. Hence, it is solely used to describe that shift or change of state ideology. Transformation and transition on the other hand are used to describe a process that is conceptualized in Chapter 3.

From what has been outlined so far, it appears as if the AKP’s rise to power has fuelled a dualism in politics and society between Kemalists and Islamists. The former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and head of the Turkey Desk at the CIA, Graham E. Fuller, wrote in 2008 about what he saw as a great democratization process in Turkey, which for him was a process of the evolution of Islamic thought and politics in Turkey because, under Kemalism, the state interfered with Islam and Islamic intellectuals stopped trying to force legal discussions but instead

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worked for the people’s moral and spiritual principles.\(^6\) He further states that the new Anatolian class of businessmen are indeed respecting Atatürk as a reformer and rescuer from imperialism yet also profoundly identify with the Ottoman past. This class criticizes Kemalism for belittling the Ottoman and Islamic past while concluding that the reality of the AKP as sole governmental power mirrors the public’s more ‘relaxed’ relationship with its Ottoman history and cultural and religious lifestyles and views, which Fuller interlinks with Turkey’s growing regional power throughout his book.\(^7\)

Thus, for Fuller, the dichotomy within Turkish society as depicted before between Kemalists and Islamists can indeed be found in the principles of Kemalism and the negative results it caused for Islamists. Throughout his book, he describes the AKP as a new form of Islamic party, which for him is aiming to democratize the republic, while moral guidelines are provided by Islam. Rainer Hermann, a German journalist for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung who lived in Turkey for 17 years, describes the dichotomy within society as drastic. For him, the Kemalist elites were like a dogmatic corset to the public, while the presidency of religious affairs tried to enforce its own, state-controlled interpretation of Islam.\(^8\) According to Hermann the ‘new elite’—the AKP and its moderate Islamic view—is leading Turkey to a more democratic system and closer to the European Union.\(^9\) Thus, the AKP is viewed by both Fuller and Hermann as reformist and democratic while Kemalism is depicted as the elitist ideology which kept Turkey from developing. Though both appreciate the Islamist parties which preceded the AKP, they also clearly outline the AKP’s success in the fight against the ‘old Kemalist elites’. Hence, it appears as if the dichotomy between Kemalists and Islamists did not solely break out, deepen or become more visible after the AKP took power but rather was fuelled as the Kemalist bureaucratic elite was challenged by the AKP. Public investigations confirming this claim show that women were gradually more inclined to wear the Islamic hijab throughout the years of the AKP governments. While in 2003, 64.2% of women were wearing headscarfs, this number rose to 69.4% in

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 49f & 66.


\(^9\) Ibid., p. 203ff.
2007\textsuperscript{10} to 71% in 2010\textsuperscript{11} and to 74.9% in 2014.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, either the AKP has fought the ‘Kemalist elite’ and freed peoples’ religious beliefs to be freely expressed in Turkey, or the AKP governments have made the public more religious.

One of the reasons for the increasing number of women wearing a headscarf is the urbanisation I will point at in Chapter 5.1. Simplified and in short, while 56 percent of the Turkish population lived in villages in 1980, with urbanisation the percentage of people living in larger cities rose to 77.3 until 2012.\textsuperscript{13} Nilüfer Göle argues in various articles and books, that the headscarf has become a symbol of a cultural critique to what is considered modernity, i.e. secular, Western modernity, and with that the headscarf is symbolic as well for a new Islamic modernity, especially in Turkish metropoles.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the dichotomy between “modernity” of the metropoles and “conservative” attitudes was deepened by drastic urbanisation especially after 1980. However, not only in social life or on the street did the headscarf become more of an object of a “new wave” or “Turkish style” symbol of modernity, but also in another public sphere. While the ‘Kemalist state’ would not allow women to wear the Islamic hijab in public buildings—thus, not allowing students, teachers, lecturers, lawyers, judges, police officers, etc. to wear what they see as their Islamic duty to wear—this drastically changed with the AKP governments. In 2008, the AKP together with the ultra-nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) MHP changed some articles of the constitution, which meant that the ban on female students wearing headscarfs from entering universities and schools was lifted, while the constitutional court accepted the changes and the consequential lift of the ban.\textsuperscript{15} However, following a decree of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item TÜİK, \textit{İstatistik Göstergeler. 1923- 2013} (Ankara: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014), 7
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Council of Ministers in 2013 (2013/5443), the wording of Article 5(a) concerning female public officers’ clothing decreed by the council of ministers’ in 1982 (8/5105) was changed and the sentence, ‘while at work, the head needs to be open at all times’, was erased. Thus, female students could both attend schools and universities and work in official posts with their head-scarves, which was not possible previously.

At the same time, the AKP appeared to fight the ‘Kemalist elite’s’ influence both in daily-life and in deep-state operations, leading back to the Cold War, anti-communism operations of NATO comparable to the Italian ‘Gladio’, which had supposedly become powerful players within the state. In 2008, high-profile military officers, journalists, intellectuals and writers were indicted for plotting a coup against the AKP government. The ‘Ergenekon’, ‘Balyoz’ and ‘OdaTV’ trials were welcomed even by the Commission of the European Union in their annual report of 2009 as ‘an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law.’ Yet, all the trials were subsequently shown to be show-trials aimed to weaken opposition against the AKP such that the charges of overthrowing the government/planning a coup could not be upheld. However, the AKP was viewed at that time as a means to clean the bureaucracy and the ‘state’ from the old ‘Kemalist elites’ and to push democratic reforms. This of course is a rather intriguing task, especially as bureaucrctratic history, experience and conduct cannot be just “wiped” out within a comparatively short time (from 2002 until today vs. 1923 until 2002), but rather will have continuities as part of its sustainable inner- working. Thus, if Kemalist elites have been in positions of power via Turkish bureaucracy until the AKP came to power, they will have had and still have fundamentally shaped the functional aspects of bureaucracy. Hence, functional actions of bureaucracy cannot be considered in the search of a shift in state ideology but are rather the modus operandi of a bureaucracy. For instance, will the practical task of defining educational goals within bureaucracy


18 For a more in-depth and comprehensive read on the issue of the ‘deep-state’ in Turkey Cf., Fikri Sağlar and Emin Özgönül, *Kod Adı Susurluk. Derin’ ilişkiler* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998)


20 Which also can be read in the Progress Report of the EU from 2009 mentioned above.
not change drastically if a state ideological transformation occurs. What however will change are the ideological underpinnings of said educational goals. Thus, the fight against the “Kemalist elite” cannot solely be counted by the size a purge within bureaucracy reaches, but rather what is ideologically implemented instead, which this dissertation will evaluate.

However, if all the arguments mentioned above are correct, can we then argue that the AKP was able to shift the state ideology within the time-span of 2002 to today? Is it possible to argue that the AKP was solely responsible for changing the climate of the Turkish Republic from the strict rule of the ‘Kemalist elites’ to a more liberal democratic country? Thus, did the AKP change the republic’s then-79-year-old status quo within only 16 years? Or do we rather have to focus on different aspects of the state’s expression of ideological underpinnings? To be more precise, can a shift in state ideology be depicted in terms of the political actions of parties or do we have to analyse other fields, which are at first glance not as visible and public as the political theatre? Is the media coverage of political events and articles about present day politics comprehensive from an historical- and political-development stand-point? Or do we need an approach which allows us to analyse today’s politics and society more in-depth, i.e., with their underlying reasons?

Upon my return from Turkey in the Fall of 2008, these questions remained unanswered to me, and I could not stop thinking about this issue. Thus, came my decision to write my dissertation in political science on the subject of state ideological change in Turkey. From the idea to the fruition of a substantial theoretical background, I came across Louis Althusser. My initial reading of *On Ideology*, and especially his elaboration of ‘ideology and ideological state apparatuses’, answered my demand for an explanation of how state-controlled ideology and education are tightly woven to the concepts, ideas, beliefs and common sense (etc.) of the public. However, I had two main issues with this theory. First, it was not and is not complementary to explaining how state ideology is indoctrinating and thus controlling the public in its activities and thoughts. Second, the lack of comprehensiveness in the theory could not fully initially explain what a study of a shift in state ideology should focus on to demonstrate and date the start of the shift. Consequently, it was not clear to me at that time whether I should study economic or educational changes in Turkey so as to analyse, spot and describe a shift in state ideology. Hence, my dissertation was incomplete as per academic and
word-count limitations. However, as we will see in the study of this dissertation, both issues have been addressed and fully accounted for, to answer the questions posed concerning the AKP and the dichotomy of a ‘Kemalist elite’ in the state and their fight against it, thus, the shift of state ideology in Turkey. The first issue concerning the lack of comprehensiveness in the theoretical framework by Althusser had to be overcome by a critical approach to and discussion of his main argument, which is as follows: State ideological apparatuses are implementing a state ideology formulated by economical elites such that reproduction of the means of production is ensured, thereby also in effect assuring the livelihood of hegemonic power structures. This discussion had to include theoreticians, who would destruct his theoretical approach while complementing the main idea of a state-controlled interaction of ideology and education. And as we will see in the theoretical discussion, research in this field heavily favours a Marxist approach to the analytical and theoretical works of Niklas Luhmann, mainly by complementing Luhmann with the concepts and approaches of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Furthermore, as I worked on this dissertation, it became clear to me that, in the field of critical systems theory, a theoretical approach to shifting/changing state ideologies globally—i.e., on that is not Euro-centric or focused on the analysis only of ‘modern societies’—had not been studied. Hence, the goal of this work is to present an approach to state ideology from the perspective of critical systems theory, which ought to be globally applicable.

Concerning the second issue, a comprehensive study of curricula, school books, teaching programs and subject scheduling appeared to yield a most reproducible and complete analysis of even the slightest shifts in state ideology if we took the main idea of Althusser into account concerning school education as the main institution for indoctrination of the public. However, Turkey’s Education Department provides few to no online sources which date back to the founding of the republic in 1923. Yet, if I wish to make the statement that Turkey was indeed ideologically Kemalist in its education before the AKP came to power, or if I wish to be able to depict a possible timeline of a shifting state ideology, it is crucial for me to access the aforementioned official and historically cemented sources. Furthermore, there has been no comprehensive, comparative and critical academic study spanning 1923 to today which covers the specific needs of my analysis. Hence, I had to search for sources in the archives on-

site in Ankara, Turkey. In the six months I stayed in Ankara, I was able to gather a complete collection of curricula, teaching-programmes (which include teaching-guidelines, subject timelines and general education guidelines) and copies of schoolbooks from different eras and school subjects. This collection has allowed me to overcome one issue that could not be solved by a solely theoretical discussion on education and, specifically, the analysis of a shift of state ideology in Turkey: How to prove the accuracy of the theory? Hence, this dissertation is not solely a theoretical discussion; nor is it solely empirical. This dissertation tries to combine both research methods by discussing the theory at hand, thereby to generate a more comprehensive and complete account of the influence of state ideology in education while trying to prove the theoretical argument with an empirical study based on primary sources of Turkish education. Thus, though I am focused on the shift in state ideology in Turkey, I will try to initiate the discussion and hopefully future elaboration of ways to complementarily describe, define and comprehensively depict state ideology from a critical-systems-theory perspective by analysing the historical development of school education in a country. By using the same terminology, state ideology will be appropriated from Louis Althusser and more accurately defined by using Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory in conjunction with Marxist theory. Otherwise, the analysis of today’s politics and society in any country cannot be fully understood and put into context but rather stays within the realms of fast-paced, short-term memory media coverage—especially in today’s world, where powerful social media influences information and news-cycles. Thus, the impulse for me to study this topic since 2008—i.e., the mediatic dichotomy of Kemalists and Islamists—can and shall be overcome by profound academic research opposing populist beliefs within this dissertation. While writing my dissertation on this exact issue in 2011, I relied solely on Louis Althusser’s theory. However, while researching the issue of state ideology, I found that Althusser’s theoretical elaborations do not delve sufficiently into the sociological aspects of the influence of state ideology on the public. However, this problem will be overcome by my approach to critical systems theory and the empirical study of primary archive sources. The use of both critical systems theory and original sources underlining and proving what is argued in the theoretical discussion are not only the difference to my dissertation, but what make this PhD study unique in its field. On the one hand, this approach contributes to discussions in the field of critical systems theory, which will be discussed in the following chapter, Chapter 2; on the other hand, it emphasises the
claim for a state ideological shift in Turkey away from Kemalism by using unique sources in conjunction with the unique theoretical approach. This, however, makes both the theoretical and empirical approaches within this dissertation feed upon one another. In other words, my theoretical claims will be proven or disproven by my empirical findings, while the empirical findings rely on what was set out in the theoretical discussion if they are to be relevant and are to be put into the context of a state ideological shift.

Finally, the answer to Turkey’s state ideology will not be discussed solely on the basis of feelings and observations; nor will it stand on academically shaky foundations. This dissertation will rather seek to finalize, date and describe the shift of state ideology in Turkey. Thus, my discussion of Kemalism in Chapter 4 will not reference the practical outcomes of the theory of Kemalism. Furthermore, will I limit the use of secondary sources in this chapter and rely mostly on primary sources that can directly be linked to the approval, directive or the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The question of this dissertation is not whether Kemalism is a ‘favourable’ ideology/state ideology in comparison to any other; instead, the principles of Kemalism are in the centre of my depiction. In Chapter 5, I determine how these principles have been translated to the official documents of the state in the field of national education (i.e., in educational programmes). Comparative analysis was conducted to determine whether the very same principles set out in the undoubted era of Kemalism—i.e., the era in which he lived and was the unquestionable leader of the young republic (1923-1938)—are also implemented in the later years after his death in 1938. Hence, the depiction of Kemalism via Chapter 4 is limited to an outline of the principles of Kemalism, while the state ideological manifestation of these principles is shown via an empirical analysis of educational programmes of that time (1923-1938). Any aberration from the principles of Kemalism—especially those contrary to the original principles of Kemalism—are marked non- or anti-Kemalist. I believe that this approach allows us to remain academically objective throughout this dissertation.

Furthermore, the study is compartmentalized into two main parts. First, it focuses on a theoretical analysis of the foremost important issue of state ideology and education. Chapter 3.1 constitutes the theoretical framework for the entire dissertation. It elaborates, critically analyses and determines key concepts for this study, including state ideology and social systems in the senses offered by Louis Althusser and Niklas
Luhmann, respectively. The determination of how I will use the key concepts of both authors will result from a discussion with critical assessments, which make special use of the works of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. Thus, Chapter 3.1 constitutes a complementary and comprehensive definition of what I will use when mentioning state ideology and an understanding and Marxist approach to Luhmann’s Social Systems’ theory. In Chapter 3.2 deals with one of the issues raised in Chapter 3.1: non-educational factors influencing or even commanding shifts in state ideology. Here I especially discuss economic reasons for shifting state ideologies and the economics of education per se. The aim is to critically determine whether and to what extent the economy as a functional system influences education. Thus, the influence of the economy on state ideology is of importance, as is the question of whether and how it determines educational policy. This analysis will be done with a discussion of Niklas Luhmann’s approach to the two functional systems of education and economy and their interrelations. Furthermore, to support the theoretical discussion, the empirical evidence of Pierre Bourdieu and evidence from academic articles in the field of economics which examine the importance of education for the economy are summarized.

Chapter 3.3 amplifies the second issue resulting from the analysis in 3.1: school as a disciplining and punishing institution. This chapter delves into the issue of applying state ideology to children within the classroom situation, thus, to the every-day personal experience of children. It analyses the tools and practices education uses to ‘teach’, yet, as I will lay out are measures to subject children to discipline and punishment as is, while resulting in the furnishing of limitations in behaviour, action and even thought.

Hence, both chapters 3.2 and 3.3 delve into two main issues within the theory and try to answer them sufficiently within the framework of this dissertation. With these theoretical arguments, I will be able to, a) define the basic theoretical principles and definitions of my key author, Niklas Luhmann, while discussing his principles and, if necessary, tweaking them for my purposes in this study and, b) obtain a theoretical framework for the dissertation, on which, most importantly, the empirical study is founded.

The second part of the dissertation is an empirical study on Turkey. As the question is how Turkey’s state ideology has transformed from Kemalism to Islamism, I must define
what Kemalism is, how it can be theoretically grasped and which main issues I shall focus on in the further analysis. This will result in a base-line for the description of what changes occurred after the years of Kemalist state ideological implementation in Turkey. Chapter 4 delves into the question of Kemalism, while mainly focusing on primary sources; thus, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s own writings and speeches are considered when defining and, in the process, contextualizing key concepts of Kemalism. Having defined what shall be understood as Kemalism, Chapter 5 examines Turkey’s educational policies from two different aspects. First, Chapter 5.1 approaches Turkey’s education statistically. There I delve into different aspects of education, such as literacy, school enrolment, the years at school (thus attendance in years), employment statistics for young people, etc. Thus, the analysis is of various aspects of education while the theoretical framework is heavily influenced by the selection of the statistical methods. Furthermore, I will present a dichotomy between male and female education statistics, which I will try to explain with reference to political, social and historical aspects of Turkey. After describing the statistics of Turkish education, I continue in Chapter 5.2 with an in-depth analysis of the primary sources gathered during my field research in 2015. This detailed examination is mainly focused on three school subjects: citizenship, religion and history. The period considered is always from 1923 to the present. And while the analysis focuses on the subjects, comparative analyses (for example, regarding directions/advice given to the teaching body or primary goals of education issued by the department of education) are also examined. The goal is to obtain a thorough set of indicators which may be compared against each other though they are from different fields. Hence, substantial information gathered from one subject, say history, is compared with itself and to the other two subjects as well. Furthermore, changes in the education of these subjects are contextualized as per their information content. Consequently, I may, a) compare what is considered to be the Kemalist education of the early years of the republic until today and, b) label the differences with regards to content as political or ideological perspectives. As a result of this in-depth analysis and comparative study of the primary sources of education, I may exactly identify shifts in state ideology in Turkey by their historical dates and politico-ideological shifts away from Kemalism.

Finally, the dissertation ends by recapitulating the findings of the study. Thus, I answer the question how Turkey’s state ideology has changed and when it did. I also discuss the theoretical approaches used with respect to their viability in analysing shifts in state
ideology, possible future research suggestions where I find necessary and an outreach to how Turkey in the future will politically and socially develop, with the help of my research in both theoretical and empirical fields. This dissertation theoretically argues and empirically proves that shifts in state ideology may be depicted in terms of education and are thus foreseeable. Thus, with the study and its results in hand, I may evaluate the results for the future of Turkey of the present normative and ethical formation of society via state ideology in education.

Yet, following this chapter, and before delving into the theoretical discussion, I consider a brief literature review to outline state of the field specific to this dissertation, which will also help us define the range and limits of my study. Furthermore, in the literature review, I point out issues I encountered in gathering the primary sources necessary for this study, as these might also indicate the uniqueness of this study.

2. Literature Review

This literature review briefly depicts existing research in the field of analysis.22 One might argue that all the fields of analysis to be touched upon must be included within this chapter. This would mean that I would need to depict literature and research in the fields of pedagogy, and, to a lesser degree, Marxist theory, systems theory, critical systems theory, theory of ideology, Kemalism, Turkish education, economy, Turkish economy and political Islam. All the topics mentioned are dealt with throughout the dissertation. However, introducing all of these topics in this literature review would make it unnecessarily long. Furthermore, such an analysis would overshadow what should be in the centre of this literature review: the contribution this dissertation makes to academic research in fields of relevance. Hence, instead of reviewing all of the literature used in this dissertation, this chapter focuses on the two main contributions this dissertation makes. First, I review the literature in the field of critical systems theory and consider what issues it is currently focusing on. Here, I shall also delve into literature specifically on critical systems theory in conjunction with education and

22 Throughout this literature review I will make use of the APA referencing style, in contrast to the MHRA referencing style of the rest of the dissertation. The reasoning behind it is, that I think the APA referencing style is more convenient for the reader in a literature review, while MHRA would make it difficult to follow the literature in the field of research named without being interrupted in reading fluidity.
ideology. Second, I review the current state of literature and research on education in Turkey. Thus, my focus shifts to the empirical facet of this dissertation. There I depict what existing studies in the fields of my empirical analysis has produced, to finally depict, in brief, the uniqueness of the archive sources I was able to gather and the kind of struggle it is to obtain them in general. In both the theoretical and empirical literature review, I furthermore define the limits of the framework in both areas of the study.

I would argue that this attempt to approach the literature review will be more enlightening to the reader concerning the work at hand and its importance or validity as PhD dissertation, rather than a full literature review in all the fields touched upon within this dissertation.

**Literature review in the field of critical systems theory**

As the introduction indicates and the title suggests, Louis Althusser is at the centre of the idea for this dissertation. However, throughout the theoretical discussion and methodological approach, this dissertation relies mainly on a critical approach to systems theory, as will be seen in Chapter 3. To select from among his numerous works was difficult, as they would all contribute to the discussion in some way. Yet, to stay within the realm of my dissertation and to be able to include an empirical approach as well, I had to limit the theoretical discussion of systems theory to some of Niklas Luhmann’s works that are relevant from the point of view of the theoretical framework of this dissertation (Luhmann, 1984, 1998, 2002, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015; Luhmann, Schorr, 1996). Importantly, I decided to rely exclusively on the original works of Luhmann rather than on secondary, introductory literature (such as but not limited to Baraldi, Corsi, Esposito, 2015; Berghaus, 2011; Reese-Schäfer, 1999). The reasoning behind this selection of sources is simply that, a) Niklas Luhmann’s detailed elaboration of his theories and theoretical frameworks is so meticulous that explanatory secondary sources did not appear to be necessary and b) I intended to discuss Luhmannian and Marxist theoreticians on the basis of primary sources. Therefore, interpretational materials that might alter or even change the written words of the original authors would not be helpful in my case. Finally, c) the theoretical chapters must be limited in length if the dissertation is to include both theoretical and the empirical analyses of the matter at hand. Thus, a lengthier discussion or another framework for this dissertation might have allowed for further sources to be included for explaining and depicting Luhmann’s statements in more detail; yet, this will not be the case in this dissertation.
However, adding to his approach to systems theory is literature that critically engages with it. Discussions in the field of critical systems theory vary with respect to field of research. Legal critical systems theory (et al. Opitz, 2010; Teubner, 2003a, 2003b; 2008; Teubner, Nobles & Schiff, 2003) and sociological/political critical theory (Schimank et al., 1995, 2015a, 2015b, 2018; Leibfried, Martens & Schimank, 2017; Kieserling, 2010; Bucke & Fischer-Lescano, 2007; Amstutz & Fischer-Lescano, 2013; Scherr, 2015; Wagner, 2005; Siri & Möller, 2016) are very rich in their analyses of a critical approach to systems theory. All of this literature is focused on a methodological path to coupling systems theory with a critical/Marxist approach so as to describe modern society more adequately and, via the critique, to outline the dysfunctions of the very same. Or, as Andreas Fischer-Lescano argues, ‘Critical systems theory focuses on the antinomies of societal structures; it exercises immanent critique with a nonconformist attitude, also encompassing the “evil eye”, so characteristic for critical theory’ (Fischer-Lescano, 2012, p.4). Furthermore, systems theory as it is, delves into complex social conditions that appear in society. It tries to describe these conditions or relations that appear in society subjectively via systems, rather than individually or specifically. Thus, it might appear generalizing, yet is meticulous in its description of and reliance on universal social interactions such as communication. By doing so, systems theory depicts detailed systems of society (micro-approach), while relying on a universally applicable approach (macro-approach). Hence, systems theory, I suggest, is an underrated theoretical approach of social sciences that is capable of depicting complex social conditions systematically. Adding critical theory / Marxist theory does however amplify systems theory’s applicability and comprehensiveness in depicting society. Thus, the methodological way to merge both systems with Marxist theory appears to be relevant, as systems theory is a very valid tool as a ‘descriptive form of inquiry’ (Fischer-Lescano, 2012, p.3), i.e., for depicting society as it is, while the Marxist impetus to such a clinically precise description will help us point out the flaws of any given society or system analysed. Thus, I will use a small amount of literature on critical systems theory from the already mentioned literature. The reason why few authors in this field are used has already been stated above: The theoretical discussion is based mainly on the primary sources of Luhmann, Marx, Foucault, Gramsci and Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Gramsci, 2003, 2007, 2011; Foucault, 1977; Marx & Engels, 2004) so as not to conflict with the original ideas but rather evolve the discussion of my dissertation within itself. The reason for the limited
use of literature concerning these theoreticians is simple: I will separate the authors’ field of critique to systems theory. Marx and Engels are introduced in the ideological critique of Chapter 3.1, while Bourdieu and Passeron’s 1990 work on education and elite building is the critical empirical analysis of education and economy considered in Chapter 3.2. Foucault is the central counterpart to Luhmann in Chapter 3.3, in which I delve into the classroom situation. The use of Gramsci mainly concerns the issue of hegemony, which is why his writings appear in all three mentioned chapters. Furthermore, my approach to critical systems theory determines whether not-fully modern societies such as Turkey can also be foci of an empirical study of the theoretical foundation of systems theory. Thus, what differs from the authors mentioned above is the application of a theory stemming from a critical Marxist approach to systems theory in a society that might originally not be eligible via Luhmann’s theoretical framework. Hence, the theoretical discussion focuses on the primary sources of Luhmann, Marx, Gramsci and Foucault, and the results of this discussion are proven by the empirical study of state ideological changes in the national educational system of Turkey. This aim is also the main reason why I have limited the use of literature in the field of critical systems theory, as my specific topic and the desired theoretical basis for the empirical analysis is unique in this field. I would argue that an unimpeded theoretical Marxist approach to systems theory which strives to find a theoretical foundation for the very specific question of how state ideology in Turkey has shifted since 1923, as well as when and how it can be depicted by national educational programmes of the state demands a theoretical discussion that limits its scope and perspectives it will delve into of its own.

**Literature Review in the Field of the Empirical Study**

As this work depicts an ideological shift in the state of Turkey, I have chosen education as my field of analysis so as to validate the argument for such change. The theoretical approaches discussed in the above lay the foundation for an empirical analysis of ideological changes translating into education via a Marxist approach to systems

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23 More details on this discussion and what modern society from Luhmann’s perspective truly is can be found in Chapter 3.
theory. However, to limit the vast fields of analysis concerning education, I focus on shifts occurring in educational programmes. These programmes are guidelines for teachers which briefly identify the topics they ought to teach, the differing foci to teach on each topic, the number of hours to be spent on each topic and the educational goals of teaching the topics. I could have chosen to analyse the school books on the subjects. However, the programme directives are issued by the Head Council of Education and Morality (Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu), which is the Ministry of national education department concerned with writing, updating and refining curricula, educational programmes and directives to teachers. Hence, the programmes should be viewed as an official statement of the state regarding the focus in Turkey’s education system. School books, on the other hand, though requiring approval by the Ministry of national education, are not written by state institutions directly. If used, these texts could make my empirical approach invalid in conjunction with the theoretical approach I have discussed. Hence, use of the official educational programmes will provide us with a thorough depiction of state ideology and its shift. However, to further define the limits of this study, I had to decide on the time-span over which I would analyse and the subjects I would delve into so as to depict a shift in state ideology. In Chapter 3.1, I define the different phases of state ideological shifts. There I argue that, especially in my case study of Turkey, a transition and a transformational phase can be discerned in the state ideological shift. This process, however, only becomes visible if I analyse the republican national education in its entirety, i.e., from 1923 until today. Only then can I describe, depict and analyse the different phases in which state ideology in Turkey shifted from a Kemalist to an Islamist state ideology. Hence, my timeline must be from 1923 until the present. However, when analysing the issue of state ideology, I would argue that school subjects such as mathematics, physics, biology or sports are not sufficiently indicative of a shift in state ideology. Of course, one could argue that the hours taught, the pedagogical approaches to these subjects and the quality of education in these subjects all point towards an ideological change. However, this argument can be better analysed if subjects such as history, civic and religious teachings are analysed. All three subjects intrinsically mirror ideological, political, social, ethical and moral positions, arguments and perspectives. For instance, the practical approach to religious education can depict the important societal goals of the governing bodies which decide on educational policies (cf., Jackson, 2004). Hence, religious education should be an important indicator of when state ideological shifts
occurred in Turkey and were mirrored in its educational system. This issue is of further importance, as Turkey has been a strictly secular, laicist state ever since it was founded in 1923. Thus, religious education at a national education level is in itself problematic. If, however, I was to depict a *de facto* shift from a secular approach to a non- or even anti-secular approach through the subject of religious education, my task of depicting a shift in state ideology would be fulfilled. Yet, I would argue that basing my analysis of a shift in state ideology from 1923 until today solely on one school subject is not good practice academically. Hence, I have decided to include all three facets—history, civic and religious education—in my analysis. Only then will my analysis be comprehensive enough to truly prove that a shift in state ideology has appeared throughout the history of the republic of Turkey. Civic education in itself is, of course, a subject that teaches students how the state views civic duties and rights. As for history classes, Johannes Meyer-Hamme’s empirical study of history classes in Germany and their contribution to the cultural affiliations of students depicts what I would argue is my presumption regarding history classes and their results: Through history classes, the state’s perspective on societal historical belonging is conveyed (Meyer-Hamme, 2009). Hence, when a shift in state ideology occurs, history teachings should also change in tone, topics of teaching and focus. As an example with which to support this claim, history classes in Nazi Germany were undoubtedly different in their topics, tone and focus of teaching from history classes taught briefly after the founding of the Republic of Germany in 1949. Hence, I would argue that state ideological shifts in Turkey can be depicted from 1923 until today when analysing history as a school subject.

To summarize, the scope of my empirical study shall be limited to history, civic and religious education from 1923 until today, as all three combined will individually depict and sufficiently crosscheck the findings from each subject.

The national educational system in Turkey is divided into three stages, as in the U.S. system, in which we have a primary education level with two types of schools: primary school and junior high-school. The secondary education level consists of high-school. I will not delve into the numerous changes made to the attendance years in each school, as they are not relevant to my analysis. However, when analysing the school subjects, I delve into all three types of schools as necessary. In my empirical study in Chapter 5, one may note that I have decided to depict a complete analysis of the
subjects both from 1923 until today and throughout the educational life of a student. This decision was made to argue empirically that a student who has followed historical, civic and religious education in the Turkish educational system from the start of primary school until the end of high-school is inescapably subjected to state ideological content. This is the foundation from which to argue that normative, ethical, political, social, psychological and religious notions and the shift of these in society are contingent upon educational efforts.

Having described the scope of the empirical study which must be undertaken if I am to make a statement on state ideological shifts, I will briefly summarize the literature in the field. First, consider general books on the development of Turkish education. These books (Akyüz, 2013; Kirpik & Ünal & Işık & Demirtaş & Akyol & Birbudak & Tokdemir 2012; Önder, 2012; Sarıoğlu, 2012; Türer, 2011) assess education and its changes from a descriptive and global perspective. Instead of delving into the details of changes in Turkish education and discussing them ideologically, these books are historical descriptions of Turkish education. On the other hand, there is literature in Turkey that is subjectively political, which cannot be academic in any way or form, as it lacks throughout in academic standards (cf., Çağlayan, 2015; Gazalcı, 2008). Academic research and articles in Turkey concerning the field of the school subjects I will analyse—i.e., history, civic and religious education—are mostly focused on descriptively comparing changes of a subject, thereby limiting the scope to the former subject curriculum and program dating not more than 10 years back and researching the perception of educators or the forecasted learning success of students while not critically engaging with the changes (Kuş & Merey & Karatekin, 2013; Çengelci & Yaşar, 2012; Tonguç, 2007; Memişoğlu, 2013; Gömleksiz & Cüro, 2011; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2007; Hali, 2014; Ulusoy, 2009; Tokdemir, 2016; Akyürek, 2012; Aşıkoğlu, 2011). These papers might have merit in their field of research; however, for the purpose of my analysis, they are almost irrelevant.

However, Etienne Copeux’s ‘Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islam Sentezine’ is a very good example of a study of an ideological shift in Turkey depicted through educational changes (Copeaux, 2006). The author describes how history books gradually shifted their historical descriptions from the Kemalist approach to history of the Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) to that of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk-Islam Sentezi). Copeux’s analysis spans from the
founding years of the republic until the year he wrote and published his study (i.e., 1993). Thus, the author shows similarities to my work, as he depicts a state ideological shift in Turkey through education by using educational documents (here, books of history are chosen) spanning the time of the republic. However, one large difference is in the use of history books, rather than officially released documents of the Ministry of national education. In the latter part of this literature review, I delve into the reasoning behind using no books to analyse an ideological shift in Turkey. However, it should already be argued that these books, though approved by the ministry, are not, however, entirely produced by the ministry itself. Hence, a methodological flaw could arise within the framework of my study. Furthermore, he gives non-official state institutions too much credit for the shift in official history telling (Copeaux, 2006, p.82-110). There he argues that institutions outside of the Ministry of national education were influential enough to change the content of history books. Furthermore, the shift in history telling is not sufficiently linked to a state ideological shift in Copeaux’s depiction. He points out that a change in ideology does not, however, theoretically engage with the issue of ideology, state ideology or societal shifts in normative and ethical attitudes. He rather remains descriptive throughout his book, even so in his conclusion, which arguably would be an opportunity to link the changes of history telling in school books to underlying reasons for such change (Copeaux, 2006, p. 407-416).

My study has a greater scope as a consequence of analysing history, civic and religious education through official documents. It also approaches the issue of a shifting state ideology in Turkey to theoretically to explain the factors influencing such a shift.

Another work which is similar to mine is İsmail Kaplan’s Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi ve Siyasal Toplumsallaşma Üzerindeki Etkisi (Kaplan, 2005). The author describes how the ideology of national education has changed from the years after World War II until 1992. To do so, he analyses political documents such as party programs, government programs, political events and more importantly education programs released by the Ministry of national education. Furthermore, his work concludes in agreement with this one that an ideological shift occurred in the periods I put forward (i.e., from 1945-1960, 1960-1980, 1980-1992) with the exception of the period from 2002 to the present (Kaplan, 2005, p. 199-226, p. 227-304, p. 305-388). However, his methodology is based on a theoretical approach to socialisation via education and on theoretical approaches to education and pedagogy (Kaplan, 2005, p.19-130). Thus,
Kaplan is translating the shifts in pedagogical approaches and the content taught to the socialisation of children and their political views (Kaplan, 2005, p. 389ff.). Differing from Kaplan, my theoretical approach does not delve into pedagogic aspects of education but rather focuses solely on outlining the ideological and formative nature of education. Furthermore, this dissertation aims to depict factors influencing a state ideological shift. Thus, the scope is not only to depict a shift in state ideology in Turkey but rather to determine which factors are influencing state ideology to change the main promoting institution of the state. Finally, I also depict what the author was not able to do in 1992, which would be the final stage of state ideological shift as I will describe it: i.e., the period from 2002 until today.

**The process of obtaining the primary archive sources – problems, limitations and how these issues were overcome**

Having described the scope of the empirical study and existing literature in the field of analysis, I shall now briefly depict how I obtained the educational programmes. My aim is to be completely transparent and to shed some light on the problems and issues I encountered in accessing these sources. However, I cannot name any of the persons I have met and talked to who have helped me with my research, as I do not want to put them in a dangerous predicament. Turkey continues to excessively penalise even moderately critical voices. The results of this study and its approach in itself might not please the government, for which reason the persons who have been kind enough to help me gather the sources necessary might be in legal jeopardy.

Before I visited Turkey for my official field research in 2015, I stayed in Ankara in May of 2014 to find the sources necessary. For that matter, I met with academics acquainted with me from my time of study abroad in 2008. They directed me to the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), the Ministry of national education and the National Library and the Parliamentary Library, all of which are situated in Ankara. Sadly, the Parliamentary Library did not hold all of the programmes accessible to all private individuals. Hence, a special-permission or staffer position was needed to demand the educational programmes from 1923 until today. Even then I was told by the staff of the library that not all programmes might be available. I then tried to talk to officials in the TÜBİTAK’s educational section. Therefore, I visited two buildings of the council in Ankara. At both sites, the staff was sadly not very helpful. I was not even granted access to any staffer inside the building,
though I showed them my research letters issued by the University of Sussex. After persistent visits to TÜBITAK (five times), a staffer was finally willing to meet me at his desk; however, the private security officer would not allow me in, though I did not pose any threat and did not oppose to searches or refuse to identify myself. Upon telling the official about this issue, he did not help me gain access to the building but argued that the security officer was in the right if he decided this. Thus, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey would not even allow me to ask an official a simple question or talk about sources and developments in education in Turkey, etc.; it rather blocked access to its buildings via private security guards. Hence, I visited the National Library to find sources. Sadly, I encountered similar academically unfriendly circumstances there as well. After being granted access to the library by signing up, I tried to find any source related to my research topic. However, the internal search engine was inefficient and outdated, and, even worse, it did not find anything relevant. At the same time, I was able to talk to a higher official at the Ministry of national education with the help of a friend of mine. I was told that my best chance might be the Head Council of Education and Morality, as the programmes are written and approved there. The official was willing to formally request the necessary sources, yet told me that it might take a long period of time for the council to gather, copy and send me the copied files. Thus, I visited the campus of the council, where again I was confronted with a private security guard who was not willing to grant me access. Having persistently tried on other occasions, I was able to access the campus, however, and was able to talk to officials in the council who are specifically concerned with primary, junior high and high-school programmes. Thankfully, I found an official who was very kind and willing to help me access the programmes. He guided me to the archive of the council and the library. Furthermore, he underwent a deep search of what he accumulated in his own archive of programmes and allowed me to copy his files to my hard drive. Upon his suggestion, I visited the archive of the council, situated in the very same building, and asked for educational programmes from 1923 until today. The initial response to this request by the officials there was laughter and a demand that I research only the last 10 years of education, as ‘education before was not important and relevant. Look at the last 10 years, that will produce something profound.’ When I told them that this was not possible, they argued that the archive of the Head Council of Education and Morality threw away everything they held older than 10 years. Thus, having faced their unwillingness or inability, I visited the library. Sadly, the holdings of
the library were not digitalized and was sorted by entry date rather than by topic, name or title. Hence, searching for any sources there would mean to search through volumes of handwritten entries in the holding’s books. This appeared not to be very efficient. However, my time was sadly already coming to an end in Turkey. Yet, having had the experience of denial of entry and access to sources, and having encountered only two helpful officials in the Ministry of Education and the Head Council of Education and Morality, I knew I had to have a powerful and respected sponsor whose name would open doors and allow me to access what I knew had to be either in the council or at the ministry. After this initial visit, I returned to Brighton and continued my investigations for the sources I needed. I also looked for that powerful sponsor. Thankfully, a doctoral student in pedagogy at the University of Ankara told me that another archive library was situated in the council. This information was given to me by any official, and no sign in the building or declaration of the existence of such a library could be found on the website of the Head Council of Education and Morality’s website at that time. Having doublechecked the existence of the programmes in the archive library with the help of a friend situated in Ankara who visited the library for me, I had to find a person who would be able to open the doors for me and enable me to visit the library for a six-month period, as any form from my university was disregarded by officials in Turkey in general. Thankfully, a friend of my parents who is a Turkish folk singer and was a member of parliament at that time was happy to help me. Tolga Çandar met me in his parliament office and offered me a post as special consultant, which would mean that I had to work for him occasionally. This post gave me unlimited access to any state building and sources. Hence, having guaranteed my access to the buildings and having found the sources necessary, I was able to visit the archive library at the Head Council of Education and Morality on a daily basis. I did so in the period of my field research from January of 2015 to August of 2015. At that time, I only had to fill in a form every day with my name and National ID, and the staff there was very helpful in finding the sources necessary and in discussing the procedures of the council, the ministry and educational policies in general. I was even lucky enough to meet an author of school books on history there, with whom I discussed the procedures of writing the books and having them approved by the council. Without going too much into detail, these discussions were fruitful and enlightening, as they confirmed my initial belief that educational programmes would be the most unaltered documents possible with which to depict state ideological content in education. I was able to find all the existing
educational programmes from 1923 until today, though I excluded many issues of these, as no changes had been made to previous ones. I scanned all the necessary programmes to make them digitally available to me. Furthermore, I scanned other specific programmes, advice of the ministry and school books, etc. However, to stay within the framework of this dissertation, and to limit it to fruitful sources, I made use only of the educational programmes for the empirical study described in Chapter 5.

To conclude, the sources of the empirical research used in this dissertation are not publicly accessible at the moment and were not used in their entirety in any academic study so far. I would argue that an unfriendly climate towards academic research—almost questioning a person’s goals for doing the due diligence as an academic—can limit any academic research in this field.
3. Theoretical approaches to Education and Ideology

In order for us to thoroughly analyse and finalize the results of the analysis and to reach a profound conclusion regarding how Turkey’s state ideology has changed and when, I must lay out a methodological approach to the central issue of education and ideology. Varying definitions and theoretical statements can be found of approaches with which to describe education or ideology. However, within this study, Althusser and Luhmann comprise the centre of my analysis. A critical approach to Althusser’s theory on ideology and a Marxist perspective on Luhmann’s depiction of social interactions and education lead to a comprehensive theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of Chapter 5. Thus, the theoretical discussion offered in this chapter is central to depicting and understanding educational changes in the realm of ideology. It is my firm belief that Luhmann’s thoroughly discussed and researched theory of social systems is globally applicable to all societies in the world. However, as is discussed in this chapter, though Niklas Luhmann was a meticulous academic on the social, I will critically engage with his theory and enhance it with a Gramscian and critical approach. A critical Marxist approach is needed to ensure the overcoming of these hiatus.

Thus, the theoretical discussion of this chapter is crucial to my analysis of Turkey, as it will provide us with a methodological basis with which an understanding of the results of my empiric study can be achieved. I will first delve into the discussion of ideology and education, which will amalgamate and lead us to a differentiated definition of what Althusser called state ideology and its interaction with education. I will even go further to sue the term state ideology, while I will redefine it conceptually completely from a critical system theory perspective. Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 delve into the outer and inner areas of ideology in conjunction with education, respectively. Thus, the outside factors influencing education—especially economic functional systems and their defining power over ideology and the functionality of education—comprise the focal point of Chapter 3.2. Chapter 3.3 analyzes the classroom as a source of the institutional, personal and individual communication of ideology for the child. Finally, I will revisit the findings of the theoretical discussions in Chapter 3.4. Thus, my theoretical discussion, especially chapters 3.2 and 3.3, delves into what Uwe Schimank describes in his article, ‘Die Moderne: eine funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft’, as a ‘three-component analytical model of capitalist society’ by which the economy is
influencing, a) ‘inter-systemic structures and dynamics’, b) ‘intra-systemic governance structures’ and c) capitalism as economic structure becomes a ‘general cultural pattern of orientation…becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.’ With this approach from critical systems theory, I will be able to describe a state ideological shift in general and with regards to Turkey specifically. The theoretical discussion includes consideration of economic developments in Turkey to underline the validity of the theoretical discussion and to depict a historical development and describe it theoretically.

Lastly, this chapter depicts the possibility and even validity of critical systems theory for societies, which, according to Luhmann’s definition, are not modern societies. The details of this discussion, Luhmann’s exact definition on this issue and my critical approach to his claim are left to the discussions of this chapter. However, by theoretically discussing the issue of modernity and Luhmann and how it can be overcome with critical systems theory, and by applying the theoretical outcomes to the empirical study of Chapter 5, I will be able to outline a function of systems theory not only from a Euro-centric perspective but globally. Hence, I would argue that it is crucial to discuss Luhmann’s systems theory in conjunction with Marxist Theory to make parts of it applicable generally which would have been excluded from ‘non-modern’ societies, such as Turkey. Here, I focus on Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The importance of these theoreticians lies mainly in my critical approach to systems theory. Uwe Schimank, Albert Scherr and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, among others, have engaged in critical theoretical discussions, introducing especially Marx, Adorno and Foucault to systems theory. This approach has widened the spectrum for the analysis of capitalism and capitalist societies with systems theory. Thus, in my attempt to contribute to the field of research in critical systems theory, I will try evaluate the validity of critical systems theory concerning state ideology and education. The result will be a more general and globally applicable theory of state ideology and education. Returning to the argument above, such a theoretical approach will prove to be a valid methodology for the analysis of a shift in state ideology in Turkey away from Kemalism since 1923 until today. However, in return, the empirical analysis

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24 Uwe Schimank, ‘Die Moderne: eine funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19.3 (2009), 327-351 (p. 327f.)

25 The details of the author’s contribution in this field can be read in Chapter 2. There the relevant literature is listed and discussed.
of Chapter 5 concerning the topic of this dissertation will validate the theoretical findings.

**3.1 Ideology and Education**

This chapter is focused on providing a framework for the dissertation. The most obvious theoretical issue analysed and depicted is therefore what must be understood by *state ideology*. It should be stated that, at the end of this chapter, I use *state ideology* to describe a concept excavated from the critical analysis and discussion of Louis Althusser by using the discussions of Niklas Luhmann, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Marx and Michel Foucault, among others, with the intention to achieve a theoretical foundation for this study. The reason for not being able to make use of any theoretical approach to ideology in education without critical discussion is the country the study focuses on: Turkey. I believe that only a critical engagement with Marxist theory’s diverging approaches to education and ideology and Niklas Luhmann’s extensive methodology concerning inter- and intra-social interactions can satisfy the standard of a truly applicable theoretical fundament for this study. Thus, this chapter engages in a critical discussion of what will be summarized under a distinct definition of *state ideology*.

However, before I delve into the theoretical discussion, I must point out the importance and reasons behind using Louis Althusser first. As for Niklas Luhmann, I have already stated that his extensive analysis of society appended to Marxist Theory results in a comprehensive theory of society globally, rather than only Euro-centric. Yet, the use of Althusser is debatable in many ways, as is laid out in the discussion below. However, I think it is important to discuss Althusser for three reasons: first, his theory of ideology and his understanding of society and the social culminate in a perfect antithesis to Niklas Luhmann and Marxist Theory. Thus, to enrich my discussion, Althusser serves us with a good antithetic approach. Second, as mentioned in the introduction, Althusser’s theory was the initiating basis for this study. As such, I want the reader to be able to track the development and evolving character of this study while at the same time not leave any doubt about my engagement and willingness to make Althusser
applicable to my methodological approach. However, as will be seen in the discussion below, his basis of society and understanding of ideology made it impossible to use him to the extent I planned to. Finally, his theory is used methodologically in present-day academic studies in the social sciences. Wright and Roberts use his framework of ideological state apparatuses (ISA) to study children’s television and its ideological influences.\textsuperscript{26} Margulies revisits ‘the ISAs as a theoretical framework for studies in political ecology and conservation’ and marks Althusser’s theory as emancipatory.\textsuperscript{27} Mathews and Ng use the theory of Althusser without even mentioning him, thereby showing that Althusser’s theory must overall be accepted as common sense.\textsuperscript{28} Finally, Wolff goes so far as to claim that his theory was a ‘pioneering concept’ able to teach the U.S. left a lesson if applied to consumerism and capitalism in the U.S..\textsuperscript{29} These four examples from diverging fields of social sciences should show that Althusser is still very much used in academic research, especially if ideology and the state are the central issues. Thus, to not discuss his approach to ideology and society as central pieces of his concept of state ideology and the ISA, at least as antithesis, would be denying the obvious.

**Louis Althusser and his understanding of (State) Ideology**

In his 1971 publication, *On Ideology*, Louis Althusser offers his perspective on the issue of ideology and its use by the dominant classes. For Althusser, ‘ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ on the one hand, while at the same time it, ‘has a material existence.’\textsuperscript{30} With his first claim, he argues that, through ideology, a depiction/mirror of the social relations of people is presented which is not the true relation of people is but rather the envisioned/illusion of social relations under the rules and through the scope of ideology. Thus, for Althusser, in a Marxist sense, ‘all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production […], but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive

\textsuperscript{26} Benjamin Wright and Michael Roberts, ‘Reproducing “Really Useful” Workers: Children’s Television as an Ideological State Apparatus’, *Rethinking Marxism*, 25.4 (2013), 566- 591


\textsuperscript{30} Althusser (2008), p. 36ff.
from them." Thus, ideology for Althusser is the individual's reflective abstraction of their every-day life social interactions. These social interactions in themselves are marking the material-existence claim. He states that all actions are 'by and in an ideology', which in turn leads to his conclusion that 'there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subjects.' Thus, every action of a human being can only be within the realms of ideology for Althusser, while the action itself constitutes a reproduction of ideology, which again is a reflective abstraction of the individual's social interactions. Hence, I must conclude that Althusser's account of ideology is a self-reproducing circle by individuals. However, this interaction of human beings is what makes individuals subjects, as 'all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject.' Thus, the calling of the individual by ideology is what makes the individual a subject; hence, a recognition of the individual and vice versa the subject then gains a "consciousness' of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition – its consciousness'. So, to summarize Althusser's depiction, ideology is a self-reproducing circle of actions which lends individuals consciousness and subjectivity by its own conscious account. Thus, for Althusser, ideology precedes consciousness and action; it is existent before the individual and consequently is the source of becoming a conscious subject. Though Antonio Gramsci agrees that ideology produces consciousness, he differentiates himself from Althusser in that not ideology per se and precedingly constitutes consciousness in individuals, but it (consciousness) manifests rather through ideology born in the disparity of existing economic conditions of individuals against their collective demand for change. He makes this clear in his *Analysis of Situations. Relations of Force*, where he describes the development of growing consciousness in shared economic situations, which finalize in the battle between their and preceding ideologies, and consciousness for the individuals is won. Consequently, Althusser’s ideology describes a unifying momentum for the individual, as consciousness is won, yet, solely as an illusion of the individual’s relationship of production, while Gramsci conversely draws the parallel momentum of the birth of consciousness and ideology to its origin of the appreciation of the individual to the reality of the relationship. Thus,
Althusser’s conception of ideology in society is preliminary, invariable and indispensable. As he says,

‘ideology, as representation of the world and of society, is, by strict necessity, a deforming and mystifying representation of the reality in which men and women have to live, a representation destined to make men and women accept the place and role that the structure of this society imposes upon them, in their immediate consciousness and behaviour.’

Gramsci accepts the existence of a hegemonic force in ideology, yet he points to the differences a human being experiences between hegemonic imposition and the realities of life, which in turn lead to ‘a struggle of political “hegemonies” and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one’s own conception of reality.’ Hence, while Althusser’s account presents a hard-to-overcome situation in which people live, Gramsci acknowledges hegemonic ideological impositions yet does not see them as eternally insuperable. Furthermore, Althusser’s ideology would imply that a shift in hegemonic ideological power would still be within the realms of the former ideologic hegemony, as all actions are ‘by and in ideology.’ Thus, his approach to ideology cannot account for any changes in hegemonic ideology. Within his approach, any other form of hegemonic ideology must be shaped and shaded by the preliminary, ‘original’ ideology. Leonard Williams concludes from his analysis of Althusser’s approach to ideology that, ‘he [Althusser] rarely discusses or analyses ideological practice in any extended or satisfactory way. At best, his thinking on this matter returns us to the process of interpellation, whereby individuals are constituted as subjects. [...] In this way he conflates a functional imperative with a negative concept of ideology. The result is that ideological distortions can never be abolished, even if social contradictions disappear.’ And though John Oakley tried to praise Althusser for his ‘purpose of creating (“for us”) what, like the Grecian Urn, stands over and against the warmly human’, as he, Oakley, tries to offer ‘a testimony that at least one member of the

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38 Althusser, (2008), p. 44.
CPGB has read Althusser to possible advantage, he does not delve into the issue Althusser’s theory of ideology bears conceptually. Jaques Rancière famously criticised Althusser’s concept of ideology as ‘firstly an instance of the social whole. As such, it is articulated with other instances, not confronted with any opposite.’ Thus, one of the main critiques of Althusser’s approach to ideology is the social, which I have also pointed out. The question remains: Is ideology permanent and indispensable? This issue is important in light of this study, as I discuss the shift of state ideology in Turkey, and Althusser’s approach to ideology does not indicate any possibility of change but rather a continuity. Hence, I shall examine an analysis of the social and how it is constituted via Niklas Luhmann, then return to the question of hegemonic ideological power and the change of such.

**Social Systems – A critical approach to systems theory**

In the following depiction of Luhmann’s definition of social systems, I resort to the primary source *Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie*. For this passage, I beg the reader to bear with the one-sided source selection, as after this brief depiction I delve into consideration of a critical Marxist approach which will introduce far more varying sources.

The first important matter of Luhmann’s view of the social is the differentiation of the system from the environment with which human beings are not part of society *per se*. They are rather part of the environment of society. However, to better explain his claim, I need to take a step back and briefly explain how Luhmann developed his theory of social systems to come to this conclusion. Contrary to Althusser, for instance, Luhmann does not resort to a methodology of structures to describe society, the state, and subjects. He instead functionally analyses sociological topics. For him, an analysis of the function rather than of the structure unfolds a more complex and thus more thorough analysis of the subject in question. It is the functional perspective which leads him to underscore systems theory as, a ‘unity of the difference of system and environment’ in which ‘the differentiation of the system is nothing else than the repetition of the difference of system and environment within the systems. The total

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41 Ibid., p. 276.
44 Ibid., p. 90.
system uses itself as environment for its own creation of subsystems and achieves with that on the level of subsystems larger uncertainties through increased filter effects against an ultimately uncontrollable environment.\textsuperscript{45} Hence, for Luhmann, systems are not simply countable and to be named via traditional ways. Instead, they are functional systems which, on the operative level consists of applicable system-environment differentiations which, in turn, depict the total system as a unity of subsystems and environment.\textsuperscript{46} Consequently, for him to describe ‘the social’, one cannot solely use formative connotations to preconstructed structures, as the social consists of countless functional systems which were produced in the differentiation of system and environment and that have a mirroring function with respect to the total system. Thus, differentiations and creations of systems/subsystems occur as dissociation from the ‘self’ (system) to the ‘other’ (environment), and with that act are defining themselves in contrast to the other, which makes them in turn define the other and more importantly a part of the other, as the other will differentiate themselves against the differentiated through the prior differentiation of the self; hence, both the self and the other construct the total. However, social systems ought not be understood as people but as communication. If I return to the question of the human being as part of his approach, society as per Luhmann consists solely of communication, while any detailed and differentiated systems (psychological, physical, molecular, etc.) belong to the environment.\textsuperscript{47} Within his conception of society, the complexity of the environment within society would not be functional. Yet, interdependencies between the environment and society exist as the already mentioned unity of system and environment, which he calls in this particular matter the total social system of society.\textsuperscript{48} However, as society, it is indisputable that norms and behavioural standards are conceived as coincided. Thus, society entails of standards that originate from its humanly environment, which however, are also subject to change, without over-complexifying the system. Luhmann describes such an interaction between the system and environment as ‘interpenetration’.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, the exchange of the environment and the system lend to each aspects of their own inner-workings. While the human environment consolidates globally acceptable norms and standards from the multitude

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 289 & 22.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 249.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 249.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 289ff.
of communications in the multitude of subsystems, society as a system influences the environment with what it offers most: structure. If I was to exemplify this specific interpenetration of society and its environment, general minimum standards of acceptable behavioural standards find their conception within society, while these standards on the other hand become formative, legislative and normative structures in the human environment of society. Consequently, Luhmann says that ‘the stability (= predictability) of specific actions is thus the result of a combinatory game, a mixed-motive game.’\textsuperscript{50} Hence, societal standards are results of the evolutionary selection processes of the system in conjunction with its environment.

In returning to Rancière’s critique of Althusser, we can now see a more differentiated depiction of society by Luhmann, who does indeed talk about a total societal system—not as a homogenous body of programmed human machines but rather as the interactive symbiosis of system (society) and environment (generalized as humans). Within this concept, differences between different humans is possible as is their interactive participation as social systems with society through communication. Only this communication facilitates the normative stability of specific actions, as Luhmann has elaborated. Thus, all systems are connected, differentiated and interacting with and against all environments. The state, society, economy, etc., cannot be simplified and located in a pyramidal schema; they are rather interconnected while maintaining their own unique situations in connection with the system. Consequently, communication and differentiation processes appear throughout the systems and environments, which means that the ‘stability of specific actions’ as a ‘result of a combinatory game’ of communication, as quoted above, is an interactive action, and its differentiated outcomes suffuse all systems and environments. However, Luhmann accepts that not all systems within the societal system are equal, as

\begin{quote}
\textit{das System mit der höchsten Versagensquote dominiert, weil der Ausfall von spezifischen Funktionsbedingungen nirgendwo kompensiert werden kann und überall zu gravierenden Anpassungen zwingt. Wenn Recht nicht mehr durchsetzbar wäre oder wenn Geld nicht mehr angenommen werden würde, wären auch andere Funktionssysteme vor kaum mehr lösbaren Probleme gestellt.}\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 291.
Thus, Luhmann accepts functional differences between systems, while their importance for societal system is dependent on the degree of their functional interpenetrations. To put it in other words, the stability the system economy offers to any of its environmental systems through its codes (= money, promise of prosperity through labour, etc.) is manifested inasmuch as it is conceived inevitable and thus indispensably dominant. The differentiation process that causes this constitution, however, is, according to Fischer-Lescano, not exclusive to the system economy but rather in today’s world constitutes ‘an endangerment for individual and societal spaces of autonomy’ by ‘global societal organisations and institutions with an urge to totalize.’

He goes on to state that, given the economic system’s dominant situation in the functional societal system, capitalism is not a determination schema of the base-superstructure relation but is rather a very distinct system arrangement in the differentiated global society. Uwe Schimank suggests that as part of this arrangement, capitalist society is functionally antagonistic in the sense that capitalist society might demand for the correction of its flaws, yet it would not accept the removal of capitalism, which leads him to the conclusion that ‘modernity is a functionally differentiated capitalist society, which as a welfare society – in order to permanently reproduce itself – has to establish mechanisms of correction against the effects of capitalist economy, which of course remains a permanently asymmetric functional antagonism.’ Thus, though from a societal, systematic and individual perspective the functionality of capitalism as a mode of economy might not be sufficient anymore, its abolishment is not part of the argument. Though used in a different context, Antonio Gramsci’s remark, ‘hegemony protected by the armor of coercion’, appears to be relevant and appropriate here. As the circle of the Althusserian approach to ideology and society closes, Luhmann’s depiction of society and systems lead us again to ideology. Of course, Althusser’s account of society is dismantled with the much more comprehensive approach to which Luhmann has introduced us, yet both, though from diverging perspectives, result in communicative and behavioural determinations by the

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53 Ibid., p. 21.
economic system. The domination of economic systems above all systems are, in Gramsci’s words, ‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.’ Thus, not only will the economic system be a dominant arrangement in its functionality for the system, as Fischer-Lescano has said, it will also interpenetrate ideological aspects of the societal system (i.e., beliefs, actions, thoughts, communications, etc.). This, however, leads to a continuous loop of functionality-ideology reproduction for the totality of the systems and environments. Thus, I shall conclude that ideology is not a ‘deforming and mystifying representation of the reality’ as Althusser has argued but is rather a compromised evolutionary selection process of the most functionally plausible. Furthermore, if I was to define state ideology within this concept, it seems to be the compromised accumulation of hegemonic ideologies, which, through the results of differentiation processes, distinguish core functional premises in need of reproduction. The state must be defined as a generic term for the concentrated junction of functional systems. Thus, though syntactical state ideology reminds one of Althusser’s account, my approach appropriates the wording, yet in a different context, as state ideology is indeed a centralized culmination of hegemonic ideological power. State ideology is what Gramsci points calls ‘a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and beliefs itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’’ Thus, the common sense of normal times concerning the main functional issues of the systems is what I define here as state ideology. What Gramsci describes here as normal times, he puts into contrast with the ‘exceptional (and hence, potentially revolutionary) moments in history’ which lead to abandonment of the borrowed conceptions and unifies with its philosophical and political (i.e., ideological and practical) being. Hence, both Luhmann and Gramsci point towards the interactive character of social systems, while an acceptance of common-sensical, standardized ideological issues is depictable, which I will encapsulate in the term state ideology. However, Gramsci has already pointed out differences between normal and exceptional times which result in a change of

\[56\text{ Gramsci (2003), p. 181f.}\]
\[57\text{ Ibid., p. 327.}\]
\[58\text{ Ibid., p. 327.}\]
hegemonic ideological acceptance. Amalgamating Gramsci and Luhmann, I would suggest that there are stages to changes of state ideology. A change cannot effectuate solely via exceptional or revolutionary times but must rather be differentiated. I suggest defining the stages of changing or shifting state ideology in terms of transition and transformation. The transitional phase of state ideology is what Luhmann describes as a constant interaction of functional and social systems via communication, hence, the prolonged and constantly adjusted compromise of social and functional systems concerning the necessities, possibilities and differentiational lines and borders. Transitions of state ideology appear in every state; these are natural adjustments per the nature of the structural composition of systems. This is not a phenomenon but is rather due to the communicative character of social systems, the differentiation process between system and environment and the importance of select functional systems, such as the economic system. I would argue that in ‘stable’, constant and functionally developed states, the transitional phase is the constant movement from the diverging acceptances of hegemonic ideological common sense. This shift is not drastic but rather subtle. To make this clearer, one needs to think only of the shift from the Fordist to the neo-liberal economic era, which did not result in a revolution or a break-down of the power of states but was instead a subtle shift which lasted for more than a decade. David Harvey describes this shift excellently and briefly in his *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* in a chapter he fittingly entitled ‘The Construction of Consent’. He argues that, in Britain, ‘Thatcher forged consent through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys of home ownership, private property, individualism, [...] middle-class values spread more widely to encompass many of those who had once a firm working-class identity.’ However, after the various crises of neoliberalism, a renunciation of neoliberalism has not presented itself in the functional-system economy. Instead, austerity politics have deepened, while institutions which have profited and continue to profit from neoliberal standards of economy were, as was famously argued at the time of the U.S. financial crisis in 2008, too big to fail, as Mercille and Murphy depict with respect to the example of Ireland, which could be expanded to

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61 By which especially the various crises after 2000 worldwide, i.e., intra-and international, are meant, of which the financial crises following the housing crisis in the United States in 2008 and European financial and state debt crises in Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Italy are meant.
every country in Europe and the U.S. Hence, financial crises did not result in revolutions in Europe or North America, a fact which must be attributed to the functionally developed character and deep acceptance of capitalist state ideology. And though Luhmann clearly criticises the negative results of what has become modernity, his statement that functional systems are not ‘working together’ for the improvement of human life is incorrect from the perspective that the functional-system economy has become as dominant and ‘irreplaceable’ for other systems and society. Indeed, I could argue that other functional systems are working not together but in-line with the demands and needs of the functional-system economy. Or as Uwe Schimank argues, modernity has produced a functional-system economy that demands ‘subordination’, which consequently was followed by ‘functional antagonism’ via the welfare state for example, as an attempt to balance the overpowering hegemony of the functional-system economy on all areas of society and other functional systems. However, neoliberalist economy contrasts conceptually with this attempt at balancing by the state, which thus leaves us solely with the dependency of other functional systems and society as whole on the functional-system economy, which in turn influences other functional systems to a degree that I might not even argue that their independence in a Luhmannian sense is given. I will delve into this issue, however, in the following chapter. For now, and returning to the issue at hand, I state that the acceptance of a capitalist state ideology is ensured by the constant interaction of social and functional systems, which, as depicted, lend each other communication and structure, respectively, while at the same time reinforcing/reproducing the stability of the whole system. Subtle transitions of state ideology can and will appear in these systems.

However, transformations are not subtle and prolonged periods but rather shifts of state ideology contrasting what was previously accepted as such, thus not changing the function of the state *per se* but rather common sensical and communicative interactions. Transformations can appear in the form of revolutions or may affix themselves to the end of the transitional phase. One such example of a transformation is the Cuban Revolution of 1959, which was a drastic shift of state ideology from Batista’s capitalist, dictatorial and suppressing government to the socialist state it

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64 Schimank (2015), p. 84.
became on a political and state level with a shift in the hegemonic ideology, which means it changed the channels and influence of communication of social systems in interaction with functional systems. Concerning the affixing to the end of the transitional phase, I argue that Turkey has experienced both the transitional and the transformational phases, as will be analysed and proven with the empirical part of this dissertation in Chapter 5. However, I can already depict economical shifts in Turkey, which point towards both transitional and transformational phases. As one of the leading and most renowned professors of economy in Turkey explains it in his Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005 Turkey’s economic development since the foundation of the republic can be separated into three general eras. The first covers the years between 1923 and 1939, during which Turkey underwent a protectionist national industrialization phase, which, regarding state ideology involved the transformational phase away from the economic and state ideological influences of the Ottoman Empire and the birth and spreading of Kemalism as a state ideology. After the Second World War, Turkey slowly gave up its protectionist economic policies by becoming part of the Marshall Plan in 1948 and joining the IMF in 1961, thereby transitioning economically and ideologically from Kemalism and its protectionist economic policies. This transition was furthered by the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in the mid-1970s and especially after the coup of 1980, which finalized after the 2000s in privatisation waves and Turkey fully integrated in the neoliberal conception of global finance. With this last economic era, I would argue, Turkey has entered the final phase of transition to finalize in the transformation, which again started with the transition after World War II. Of course, this short description is not satisfactory, but it will be complemented with more detail in Chapter 5.1. However, for my argument here concerning the phases of transition and transformation, Turkey’s economic development since its founding indicates that, according to the definition and description of state ideology and its shifts, Turkey has experienced three main economic phases: a transformation to Kemalist state ideology, a transition away from Kemalist ideology and finally, in recent history, another transformation to a state ideology. Thus, instead of further theorizing about the possibilities of such transitional and transformational phases, I suggest finalizing the discussion of state ideological

66 Ibid., p. 93-144.
67 Ibid., p. 145-204.
shifts after depicting the empirical evidence of Turkey’s education in Chapter 5 when we have a better understanding of the specifics of shift sequences. Yet, the reason education is the focus of my analysis of state ideological shifts and how I will approach education going forward is the topic of the next section.

The functional-system education as site of state ideology?

Luhmann classifies education as a functional system, hence, as a primary subsystem with a specific function, like the economy. However, it is specified inasmuch as, according to Luhmann, it does not have to care about ‘own financials, nor own political influence, nor own research results’, which indeed are all provided for the system of education by other systems, such as the economy, the state and universities.68 The economy indirectly provides economic needs, which will be delved into in more depth in Chapter 3.3. It is at the same time an indispensable part of the definition of the state ideology, as stated above. The state provides the functional system of education with infrastructure—i.e., with school buildings, teachers and their appointments, curricula and teaching programs. Finally, universities update knowledge through research results while at the same time training future teachers to become pedagogues. Thus, education in its functionality is not responsible for possible changes in any of these fields, but individuals or organizational structures which stem from education, such as teachers’ unions, play an advisory role at most. Or as Luhmann depicts it, education as an operatively closed system cannot be active in its environment but is rather limited to system-internally formulating solutions which distort its closedness from the outside.69

Thus, for Luhmann, education as a system must be functional relative to its task, which society has decided upon it through the process of differentiation. Yet, what is its task? After a detailed discussion of different approaches to the aims of education, he concludes that it ‘really is solely about the preparation of the individual person for its later life, it is about its ‘curriculum vitae’.70 This approach might appear to be labour-force centric and thus almost Althusserian. Yet, the preparation of the individual person for later life or the curriculum vitae also comprises other factors which I shall depict in more detail. Luhmann agrees that the task of education is also to prepare children for

69 Niklas Luhmann and Karl Eberhard Schorr, (Eds.), Zwischen System und Umwelt. Fragen an die Pädagogik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996a), p. 37
later social life, thus, to learn common-sensical behavioural norms; however, he argues that education is not socialising per se but is rather a communicative social process which ‘complements or corrects what is to be expected as a result of socialisation.’ Hence, education is tasked with producing a foreseeable future for present-day children by interfering in their socialisation with normative standards communicated to them. This communication is mainly focused on grading their behavioural and academic success with regards to norms, which makes the tool of grading the central tool with which to translate what might be lacking in a verbal communicative form. It is written and universally understandable, but it also influences what Luhmann has underlined as the primary goal of education: the curriculum vitae. It is indeed a tool which is used to punish and discipline the student for aberrations from what is set out to be the norm, and I will delve into this topic in more detail in Chapter 3.2. However, it is also a manifestation of a child’s personal capacity, will and behaviour, which in turn involves branding that child for future life, not only as a member of the labour force but also in society in general. The normative and functional forming of a child in society is being taught in the educational system; this is its task. Hence, it would be fair to argue that state ideology as I have defined it is a central theoretical concept for educational content, as both the normative/societal and functional/labour-force behavioural patterns and rules are what Luhmann describes as the main task of education. Or in other words, both education and state ideology overlap in their content as accumulations of common sense which need to be reproduced for society and for the primary/most important functional systems, such as the economy. Both education and state ideology, as I have defined it, demand that the individual adopt, a) agreed-upon rules of society and b) a reproduction of the functional-system economy. However, state ideology might shift independent from education, while education must change according to state ideology. Consequently, system of education is indeed the functional site of society which ensures the ‘core functional premises in need of reproduction’ part of my definition of state ideology given above, which inherently demands a united, agreed upon mindset in society on specific matters. In parallel, Luhmann describes education’s perspective on children as follows: ‘This homogenisation of the entry population is one of the most distinctive indicators of the differentiation of the educational system.’ And further education tries to ‘neutralize
all given differences in talent and socialization, to then account the school for what appears as uneven achievements. Children are thus viewed and treated as equals, are presumed as homogenized population’. Homogenisation, however, is an effect of technical and social knowledge mediation in conjunction with grading. Thus, children learn what is taught to them by a curriculum, and they are tested and graded based on their level of what is seen as ‘correct’ knowledge regardless of their social, economic or intellectual pre-sets. For us it is intriguing, of course, to note the social knowledge, which roots in what I have defined as state ideology. Hence, though teachers are facing individuals with diverging beliefs and thoughts, they are viewed as a homogenous unity which must internalize state ideological norms in order to succeed academically.

However, the conclusion of state ideology directing education begs the following question: Does education adapt to every slight shift of state ideology, as state ideology is not a rigid construct, but rather the product of continuous compromises of hegemonic ideologies? It does not. As depicted above, I would classify shifts in state ideology into transitional and transformational phases. Transitions in particular cannot materialize if a societal agreement and understanding about them is not achieved. As described by the example of neoliberalism, transition is a process of consent which finalizes in the actual implementation of state ideological practices. Education as a functional system preparing children for their futures must then be a site at which future consent is obtained with present teachings. Consequently, education is not adapting to daily shifts of state ideology but is rather acting preveniently. Its natural state is to prepare children for the labour market a decade later. The same argument can be made for state ideology. While its normative standards are based in the present societal consensus, it is preparing children for the normative standards of the future. Hence, the functional system education the functional system education does not have to adopt to the slightest shifts in state ideology but is rather anticipatory. In the present, however, it will adapt to transitional changes when the then-present-day teachings are no longer sufficiently anticipatory.

However, to analyse the mechanisms of education and its functionality concerning state ideology, two influential factors are analysed in the following chapters. First, the internal interactions of education are analyzed: i.e., the classroom situation as the site of communication of state ideology. Second, outside factors influencing education’s

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73 Luhmann and Schorr, p. 25.
space and content of interaction. These analyses will further enlighten the argument of ideology in education.

Yet, to conclude this chapter, I must define education as a functional system, which is limited to the task of providing children with behavioural and interactive norms for society while at the same time preparing them for the labour market through state ideology as I have defined it. In parallel, the role of education is to prepare children for present-day and future shifts in state ideology. Hence, as Luhmann depicts it in conjunction with the shaping of the curriculum vitae of children, education lends individual children a security on which they can base their future actions. However, there is always an uncertainty regarding future events which cannot be abrogated but which can be lightened. This knowledge is, on the one hand, technically functional knowledge, such as mathematics, physics, etc. Above all, it is also socially functional through the mediation of state ideology.

3.2 The interrelation of the functional systems education and economy

Both education and economy depend on and are interactively linked with each other, as I have already argued in Chapter 3.1. Also, it has been argued that the functional-system economy is of primary importance for society as a total, inasmuch as its failure would affect all social systems and individuals. I have also touched upon the possible influence of the functional-system economy in education, yet I have delayed the discussion to this chapter. Here I shall analyse the issue of the interrelation of the two functional systems at hand more closely. As we shall see in the following, the issue of the system economy influencing education is, on the one hand, supported by academic research in various fields which range from economics, sociology, pedagogy and anthropology while on the other hand is denied by Luhmann as a direct communication or order by the economy to education. To be more precise, research on this issue suggests that education is increasingly directed by macro-economic concerns, while Luhmann’s theory on operatively closed systems, such as education, argues that both functional-systems economy and education are differentiated and are as such not able

to exclusively command or decide on actions to be taken within the other system. This chapter addresses the question whether and how the functional-system economy can influence the substance of communication and action in education. Though Schimank has already profoundly argued that capitalism is the result of the differentiation processes of modern society, which has resulted in capitalism as a functional-system economy dominating other sub-systems of society\textsuperscript{75}, I will specify this claim by, a) focusing on the field of the relation between the functional-systems economy and education and b) by supporting this claim with empirical research concerning the issue of economic factors in education. Thus, my theoretical discussion of the influence of the functional-system economy on education will critically discuss Luhmann’s statements on this very issue both theoretically and empirically.

However, this issue is not only important from a theoretical perspective but also concerning my field of research in Turkey. Turkey’s economy has naturally changed since 1923. Yet, the economic policy shifts are, as is argued in this chapter, influencing and even commanding state ideological shifts, which directly and indirectly change educational practices. To underline this claim, I anticipate a state ideological shift in Turkey starting with a transitional phase in 1950 until 1980, after which the finalization of the transitional phase started and finished in the early 2000s to then shift to the transformational phase, which appears to continue until today. The empirical study of Turkey in Chapter 5 will prove whether this thesis on Turkey’s education and thus state ideology is correct. However, approaching this issue solely from an economic perspective, the acclaimed professor of economics, Korkut Boratav, depicts the economic policy shifts of Turkey roughly within the same time-spans. For him, Turkey’s economic policy between 1923 and 1939 was based on a protectionist, national-investment based, development-centred economic policy, which, parallel to the development and building of nationally and state-owned factories, was subsidising the farming industry to be competitive in national and international markets.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, Turkey’s economic policy was aimed specifically at strengthening its strong farming industry while investing in developing the country’s manufacturing industries—all in a national context, with national investments from the private and the public sectors. However, after World War II, Turkey received development help via the Marshall Plan. It also joined the IMF in 1947, the OECD in 1948, the European Council in 1949 and

\textsuperscript{75} Schimank (2009), p. 346.
\textsuperscript{76} Boratav (2006a), p. 46.
NATO in 1952, which was ipso facto an abandonment of Turkey’s statist economic approach demanded by the strengthened Turkish bourgeoisie and solidified politically by the government.77 As Öniş and Şenses point out, Turkey economically tried to integrate to the World Economy after World War II, which lead to a ‘protectionist import-substituting industrialization strategy’ from the 1960s until 1980.78 As a consequence of Turkey’s shift in economic policy, the previous constant positively exceeding export/import balance of Turkey of 180% at its peak in 1946 exports covering the imports, was since then never achieved again. Thus, Turkey has been since 1947 and is until today always importing more than exporting from an overall value perspective.79 Yet, despite of the author’s claim that an industrialization strategy was in place, the manufacturing industry held only 13.9% of the total employment among all sectors in 1980 while agriculture fell from 90% in 1923 to 70% in 1960 and 50% in 1980.80 Thus, Turkey’s development from 1946 to 1980 was marked by a decreasing agricultural sector and a very slowly increasing manufacturing industry, which explains the negative export/import balance very well, as the service sector developed immensely in this time frame. Hence, without developing and thriving manufacturing and agricultural industries in the present, both sectors share almost 20% of the total employment each, while the service sector is at 60% of employment among all sectors. This makes the dependency on import goods more drastic.81 With the dependency on non-Turkey-based markets and producers, Turkey’s increasing external debts and external influences on Turkey’s economy are indicators of the neoliberal economic policy to which Turkey shifted after 1980. As Boratav says, Turkey implemented neoliberal economic policies with the help of a military coup in 1980 and with willing politicians implementing neoliberal legislative and executive policies with the generals in power (1980-1983) and after they stepped down.82 These policies came to fruition especially after the 2000 economic crisis in Turkey, which increased the external debts from 30 billion U.S. Dollars in 1989 to 68 billion U.S. Dollars in 2000.83 Yet, as claimed previously, the transformation of Turkey’s state ideology started after 2000—especially

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77 Korkut Boratav, Türkiye’de Devletçilik (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2006b), p. 349ff.
83 <https://www.hazine.gov.tr/File/Index?id=e0d1ff67-8ae5-41d7-881b-2833deea2147> [accessed: 14.06.2018]
with the AKP's first government after the 2002 elections. In its year of economic crisis, Turkey's debt reached 68 billion U.S. Dollars, as mentioned; yet in the 16 years of government by the AKP, this debt rose to 303 billion U.S. Dollars.\textsuperscript{84} In the same period, the household debts increased from 13.4 billion Turkish Liras in 2003\textsuperscript{85} to 541.7 billion Turkish Liras in 2017.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, companies and the state increasingly incurred debts internationally while nationally households also spiralled into a debt trap. Furthermore, Sönmez points out in detail how governmental policies lead to investment in the building sector rather than to industrialization efforts. Thus, the author talks about 'deindustrialization' as a result of the economic policies.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, if these indicators and economists' statements are taken into account, Turkey underwent roughly three phases of economic changes since 1923. The first was the statist, protectionist, national economic approach from 1923 until 1945; the second was the more liberal, global economic approach from 1945 until 1980; and the last is the neo-liberal era from 1980 until today. Within these timelines, state ideologically I would argue that the first period mentioned was a Kemalist period while the post-war era until 1980 was the transitional phase of state ideology away from Kemalism to the finalization of the transition after 1980 until 2000. Finally, we are witnessing the full transformation of Turkey's state ideology from Kemalism to something I would have to define with the help of empirical proof from Turkey's education as a mirror of the present-day ideological implementations of the state.

For that matter, I will depict Luhmann's analysis of the interaction of both education and economy, which I will contrast with empirical studies concerning economic influence in education. From the comparison between theoretical and empirical analyses, an applicable theoretical conclusion shall be drawn. Thus, from the theoretical findings, I shall be able to preveniently underline the assumptions about shifts in Turkey's state ideology made above.

In Chapter 3.1, education as a functional system was established as an autopietic, differentiated, dependent, independent and autonomous functional system. However, as was touched upon in Chapter 3.1, the economy is of crucial importance to the

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TİSK Aylık Ekonomi Bülteni, 49 (March 2013), p. 12.
\textsuperscript{87} Mustafa Sönmez, AK Faşizmin İnşaat İşkelesi (İstanbul: Notabene Yayınları 2015), p. 104-113.
system as a whole and, as such, is indispensable to the formulation of state ideology and education. Thus, what is the dependency relation of education to economy? As Luhmann argues: ‘Education costs money for instance, which however, cannot be paid by the economy in the form of a barter trade.’ Yet, how then is education generating the necessary money? The initial and coherent answer would be the state, as the previously mentioned supplier of infrastructure to the system of education. Teachers, school buildings, basic commodities, etc., are all paid for by the central governing body of the state. Furthermore, the state organizes the appointments of teachers to specific schools so that there is no (drastic) shortage of teachers in other parts of the country, and the state ratifies and implements curricula. Hence, the initial answer of the financier of education being the state would be correct at first glance.

However, instead of asking who is paying the existence of education *per se*, one must ask what economic implications education has. Thus, instead of analysing the initial and most obvious ‘flow’ of money (state to educational system), I shall shift the perspective to the influence of education on the economy, hence, to the consequence of education and its ramifications on the economy. Only then is it possible to close the circle of dependencies, as children having finished school in any shape or form will end up working, which in turn means they will become working forces in the national economy.

Furthermore, as was established already in Chapter 3.1, Luhmann describes education’s task as ‘really is solely about the preparation of the individual person for its later life, it is about its ‘curriculum vitae’.’ Thus, one could argue that the state investment in education is indirectly an investment in economic growth, stability and predictability. Furthermore, is the investment by the state then not also the fulfilment of its very own functional task of upholding and guarding the compromises, agreements and consents of society and the system by trying to generate human labour for the functional-system economy? Hence, the analysis should focus on the influence of education on the economy rather than on the economics of education. Turning my focus on this aspect, however, leads to the following question: If education plays an influential role in determining the working forces of the future, thus, in influencing the

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economy of a country, can education be free of any form of control by those directly influenced, i.e., the state and foremost the economy?

However, Luhmann describes the differentiation process of the educational system not only and simply by a demand of capitalism to reproduce its means of production, which I have also not argued for. But for Lumann, various processes take place. One of them is the differentiation process, which leads to the autonomy of the system at hand.\(^9^0\) This autonomy, however, generates the ‘necessity of self-organisation’ and, as a consequence, produces the growth of a system.\(^9^1\) This process can easily be explained, especially within the aforementioned argument. Education as a functional sub-system of society will continuously demand a more distinct and autonomous structural approach as per its nature as system, which is the differentiation process, and it ensures the autonomy needed to proceed in a free space. More importantly, this is a necessity of the system to be effective. Hence, tools with which to assure the balance between autonomy and dependence on other systems are necessary. These can be decisive inner-circles of education, which decides, for example, how much the presence of companies at a school will make them influential or not. Or boards inside the system education, which constantly approve of the quality of teaching, ranging from the core teaching to schedule issues. These examples depict the self-organization of a school system, however micro-based the examples may be. One such organization within education is analysed in Chapter 3.3 as the pedagogical organization. As Luhmann claims, with the self-organization through the autonomy of the system, the growth of education becomes uncontrollable, as education claims its autonomy as system, losing its ‘semantic of nature’ and exchanging it with a ‘semantic of values’.\(^9^2\) Thus, education is no longer a necessity of society as a teaching body with which to educate children for the sake of society, as Durkheim has defined it, but it rather generates self-sustaining mechanisms for the sake of the system.\(^9^3\) Yet, though education gains increasingly more autonomy as a system, it cannot be fully independent of other systems, as certain dependencies, such as money and infrastructure, remain. Therefore, notwithstanding its degree of autonomy as a functional system, structural bonds to, for example, financial guarantors, cannot be

\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 123.
\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 123.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., p. 123.
abolished. Though Luhmann tries to evaluate this relationship between the systems, he loses himself in a discussion away from the economical question of the educational system in favour of an evaluation of other environmental influences such as the family. Nonetheless, the question remains regarding how independent and autonomous a system can be if it is dependent on vital means it cannot produce itself. Furthermore, I must ask what importance education has for the financier. It should be questioned whether the state has only a general interest in paying schools money without expecting more than morally and socially skilled human beings in return for its investment. Moreover, studies such as those of A.H. Halsey show that there is a vital (national) economic interest of the state in education. Thus, Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder try to determine, in their 1996 article, *Education, Globalization, and Economic Development* ‘why education is crucial to future economic development.’ Brown and Lauder analyse how the development from the Fordist era to the new global neoliberal economics changed the approach towards education. And for the authors, a crucial factor needed to regain the ‘diminished power of nation states to control economic competition has forced them to compete in what we call the global knowledge wars’, which means that the focus of nation states for a more foreseeable and controllable national economic system could not be reinstated within the boundaries of intervening and planning state institutions, but, moreover, had to concentrate on the educational level. Otherwise, the authors argue in 1996, nation-states would not be able to compete in the world market with their economies. 22 years later, this prediction appears to have come true, considering the growth and power data-collecting and selling companies such as Google and Facebook have in the present. And as Henry M. Levin and Carolyn Kelley show, education is the institution with which areas such as ‘economic competitiveness [...], crime, public assistance, political participation, health’ can be effectively influenced by state intervention. Moreover, the authors assume that ‘[e]ducation has the potential for powerful impacts in each of these areas if the proper supportive conditions and inputs are present.’ These rather academic

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97Ibid., p. 174.
99 Ibid., p. 250.
economic analyses, which are mostly based on the value of investments and their possible outcomes, show that, from a purely economic mind-set, neither nation-states nor economy in general can have no interest in education. Furthermore, they underline what Marx wrote in *The German Ideology* when he said that,

*The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.*

From Luhmann’s perspective, education as an operatively closed system cannot interact with its environment, yet it would allow for system-internal descriptions of what it considers the environment and would code these descriptions concerning their situational relevance. If I couple this one-sided communication of the environment with education as an operatively closed functional system with needs it cannot produce itself, one could argue that both the empirical and the theoretical approaches suggest that the concerns of the functional-system economy can indeed be influential in education, even in systems theory. Hence, I need to conclude that Luhmann’s autonomous functional system education’s freedom of decisions is not as inner-systematic as he tries to depict it, but that it instead translates the demands of functionally indispensable systems (economy, state and knowledge providers, such as universities) to its own coding and thus makes them inner-systematically applicable.

Furthermore, he states that, in modern society, the ‘repeating of, multiplying with and reflecting on the difference of inner and outer’ of the system has replaced the hierarchical conception of unity, which, however, has not lead to arbitrariness but rather to systems that are concerned solely with their differentiation in the environment and to solving the paradoxes introduced by environmental communication translated to system-internal codes. This account however, would negate the possibility of a continuous, one-sided communication of the state to education, for example, as this

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101 Luhmann and Schorr, p. 37.
102 Ibid., p.40f.
would be considered hierarchical. However, the argument that a system is solely differentiating is not applicable to the reality of schools and education—not even if one tries to customize the theory to the practice. For Antonio Gramsci, this practice is not simply a differentiation process of a sub-system but is moreover a systematic answer for the demand of capitalism; hence, the sustaining of the hegemonic relations in society. More specifically, differentiation within the educational levels of the system, resulting in an education for a specific profession are described by Gramsci as ‘a whole system of specialised schools, at varying levels, has been being created to serve entire professional sectors, or professions which are already specialised and defined within precise boundaries’.

He also acknowledges what I depicted in Luhmann’s description of the differentiation process: the complexity of modern day life, which leads to specialization in different fields. This, of course, is within the realm of Gramsci’s approach to the dominant classes’ ideological struggle with the dominated classes and vice versa. Hence, the differentiation/compartmentalization of education, as the specialization process as Gramsci describes it, inherently causes a separation within the student body which in turn would not allow for a unified ‘student front’ and impede the efforts of what he calls ‘organic intellectuals’. Gramsci further acknowledges that ‘complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality.’

However, for Gramsci, this is not achievable with a ‘regulated society’, thus, with laws proposing or guaranteeing equality, but is rather achievable with a classless society. Hence, so long as capitalism is the dominant form of production and classes exist, Gramsci does not foresee any possible solution to equality within capitalist society. This in turn means that the dichotomy of ruling and ruled classes will prevail in any society other than communism. Consequently, both Marx and Gramsci can be read equally as agreeing upon the implementation of the ruling class’ ideology in education, while both describe the struggle of the dominated classes against the dominant ideology. However, with Marx using the term ‘im Durchschnitt’ (on average), I must conclude that the ruling-class’ ideology, or as I have redefined it, the state ideology, will for the most part be the dominant ideology for the dominated classes as well. Thus, education must again be described as portraying and reproducing the present societal

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107 Ibid., p. 11.
structure and its agreed-upon hegemonic ideology with an outreach to the uncertain future, as I have done in Chapter 3.1. Hence, this conclusion does indeed include Marx’s perspective on the dominant ideology, Gramsci’s base/superstructure argument and Luhmann’s view of education and its task. Within this conception, however, a child would be limited to the class of his or her parents, as education treats all individuals as equals according to Luhmann; furthermore, the state’s ideological projection of education, as just argued, demands for a reproduction. Hence, the educational and labour career of a child would lead to the same results with which the working-class parent is confronted in every-day life, and exiting it becomes difficult. Though Althusser, for example, sees a chance of exiting one’s own class via education, this possibility is limited to the level of a petite bourgeois such as technocratic occupations of bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{108} Yet this does not mean that Gramsci’s claim is mistaken; it simply means that the boundaries of exiting the parental class is possible only to an extent and has limits, which finally means that the hegemonic relation between the ruling and the ruled classes remains. Luhmann argues that,

\begin{quote}
the evolution of the system type of organisations remains a social, thus, societal determination of labour relations. Its’ (of the determination) differentiation facilitates however, a disengagement of societal parameters of objective and motivation [...] We can summarize these thoughts in the thesis, that the formation of organisations gains momentum on a grand scale, when society enables the recruitment of individuals while abandoning the ballast of origin, group membership, social stratum, which restricted the acknowledgment of the quality of work.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

He also states that the economy has already established this system by differentiating and, in consequence, ranking workers hierarchically, which for him is the rationality of capitalist economy.\textsuperscript{110} He even goes so far as to argue that functional differentiation has detached individuals from their societal sub-systems inasmuch as they have to be assumed to be ‘socially placeless.’\textsuperscript{111} Hence, for Luhmann, social classes, race, origins, socio-economic statuses, etc., are of declining significance in today’s world of increasing organisational structures and ongoing differentiation-processes in society.

\textsuperscript{108} Althusser (2008), p. 29.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 381ff.
\textsuperscript{111} Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion. Zur Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2015), p. 16
However, PISA studies in 2015 indicate, that in the overwhelming majority of OECD countries, children with migration backgrounds are clearly underperforming in natural sciences compared to their peers without a migration background.\footnote{OECD, PISA 2015 Ergebnisse (Band I): Exzellenz und Chancengleichheit in der Bildung (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Verlag, 2016), p.270, Abb. 1.7.4.} Furthermore, we can see the same results for children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families: They perform worse than children from middle-class families and above.\footnote{Ibid., p. 241, Abb. 1.6.9.} Hence, Luhmann’s claims of dissolving disadvantageous statuses cannot be proven statistically in the developed countries of Europe and North America, which are indeed leading capitalist societies. Furthermore, even higher qualifications, such as graduation from university, do not ensure equality in the labour market, but again, origin, skin colour, socio-economic roots are defining factors in chances for employment.\footnote{Leo Kaas and Christian Manger, ‘Ethnic Discrimination in Germany’s Labour Market: A Field Experiment’, in Discussion Paper No. 4741 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour, 2010) & Rolan Verwiebe, Lena Seewann, Margarita Wolf and Melek Hacıoğlu, ‘I have to be very good in what I do’. Marginalisation and discrimination in the career- entry phase – experiences and coping strategies among university graduates with migrant background in Austria’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42.15 (2016), 2468- 2490.}

In an attempt to solve this discord between Gramscian/Marxist theory on the one hand, and Luhmann on the other, we must approach the question at hand of whether societal structures are being mirrored and reproduced. I shall try to discuss Luhmann’s theoretical approach to education from a Marxist perspective. Therefore, I shall put forward the thesis that educational diversity, or the differentiation process Luhmann describes, should not be analysed only as a systematic step of education for self-sustainment but must also be linked to socio-economic class-relations which are reproduced through and within education.

The issue of socio-economic class-relations will become significant for us, as Turkey’s economic shift, has also meant an urbanization of the population, leaving agricultural family businesses to work in the service sector in metropoles with higher living costs. Thus, giving the children of families who have moved to cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir the opportunity to educate themselves, yet no providing them with a similar economic development.
Therefore, I might try to evaluate a slight change in the argument. Though Luhmann makes a claim for the totality of education as a system, I shall argue that the autonomy of the functional sub-system is restricted to the technical functions of the system itself. These specific actions within the system rely heavily on the system’s own historical contingent heritage. Therefore, educational processes enacted on, for example, the micro-basis of the classroom, pedagogical approaches, or teaching as an act itself, remain in the autonomous differentiation-processes as consequences of the functionality of the sub-system. But educational decisions—such as the topics to be taught, the level of average knowledge necessary, curricula, etc.—cannot be in the sole hand of the system of education or its inherent pedagogical organisation but must instead be communicated with systems in the environment. This communication, however, can only start with the question of the environment, i.e., with state and economy: What do we want? Which outcomes do we expect from the investment? What needs to be done to achieve outcomes that are more within our expectations from education? Without asking what results one wishes to have, it is not possible to constructively engage in the communication—especially not from the point of view I mentioned before with the economic importance of education.

I have already touched upon the limited communicational grounds of education with its environment above. To reiterate my last thought on this issue, as a reference-system, education has a self-reference and an external reference.\(^{115}\) However, education concentrates and reproduces its self-reference simply for reasons of self-sustainment, which also enables it to discuss issues of environmental influences within itself and to claim that this is the only mode of organisational problem solving.\(^{116}\) As for the specific question of economic influence, Luhmann simplifies and tries somewhat to avoid the discussion by claiming that the solution which is enacted for guaranteeing the autonomy of education lies in education specialising and generalising itself at the same time.\(^{117}\) In other words, the functional system of education differentiates by specializing for the necessities of the labour market (special schools to learn handicrafts for example) and by generalizing it guarantees the same chances for every person in society and with that produces the best working forces for economy.\(^{118}\) However, his

\(^{116}\)Ibid., p. 124f.
\(^{117}\)Ibid., p. 125.
\(^{118}\)Ibid., p. 126.
very idealistic view on pedagogy and education leads to the argument that the educational system is always objective and only differentiates between the students via the objective and comprehensible marking system. Though the specialization and generalization together with the marking system seem to produce parameters which are as objective as possible, Luhmann is clearly not taking into account real-life, eliminating the objectivity towards a correlation of social background and success at school. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron claim concerning direct and indirect marking mechanisms at school, that

*The subjective expectation which leads an individual to drop out depends directly on the conditions determining the objective chances of success proper to his category, so that it must be counted among the mechanisms which contribute to the actualization of objective probabilities.*

Furthermore, for them, this process is far from being objective and neutral but is rather systematically disadvantageous for specific classes, thereby reproducing social structures in society for next generations. Jeannie Oakes emphasizes this argument as well with her research on education in the United States by stating that,

*For the past century, at least, schools have provided students with separate, different, and unequal schooling experiences, as was seen to be appropriate for that economy. Citing students’ differential merit, differential schooling has been deemed to be both fair to students and compatible with democratic capitalism.*

And, as Michael W. Apple argues in *Comparing Neo-liberal Projects and Inequality in Education*, the state rather blames schools, parents and children for the apparent inequalities concerning access and results in education. Thus, inequalities as laid out are not only reproduced but are also individualized in their causes rather than rectified by the state. These arguments, however, completely contradict Luhmann’s premise of the school being the ‘central navigation point for chances later in life’ while at the same time claiming that the origin of a person, thus, the socio-economic

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120 Ibid., pp. 164-167.
background, has suffered a deprivation of legitimacy by ‘the transposition of societal systems towards a primacy of functional differentiation’, thereby making family-ied affiliations obsolete. However, Ricardo D. Stanton-Salazar argues that working-class minority children must ‘participate in power’, thus, must learn ‘how to engage socially those agents and participants in mainstream worlds and social settings who control or manage critical resources’, as otherwise they do not have a chance to successfully compete with their peers and have a successful educational career, and hence, will prospectively continue to be disadvantaged. Other studies focusing on the same issue in Europe do not provide a linear and matching outcome. For example, consider the analysis of Walter Müller and Wolfgang Karle. Such studies rather show that there are differences in the premise of an all-including educational system within all countries. However, does this conclusion not already contradict the claim of the educational system as Luhmann depicts it, as objectively selective, yet not class-driven? Furthermore, Luhmann describes the differentiation process as an evolutionary act of society which eventually will fully abrogate class as a decisive factor. However, the economic development paralleling this evolution was the rise of neoliberal economy. As David Harvey points out, a core concept of neoliberalism is the privatization of ‘Sectors formerly run or regulated by the state’. As a result, one can observe the rise of neoliberalism in the educational system as well. As Clyde Chitty points out, ‘privatisation in the purest sense has not so far been achieved’; yet state schools heavily rely on support from the private sector and a ‘cut-throat competition to attract pupils’. How can education be simplified as a functional, operationally closed system in a neoliberal economic environment if it has to attract pupils, advertise itself and thus actively interact with its environment? Furthermore, in its attempt to appeal to the parents of the children, schools will have to differentiate concerning which characteristics of the school they want to present, thereby deciding on their ‘clientele’.

This competition between educational institutions does not have equal resonance respecting the choices diverging classes make, as Diane Reay and Stephen J. Ball

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depict; classes are rather influenced by their class-related predefinitions and perspectives.\textsuperscript{128} Hence, a child cannot be treated objectively by the pedagogue anymore but is selectively chosen as per the differentiation process of his or her educational institution. At the same time, education is then no longer a socially differentiated construct, which was how the system of education became functional and globally accepted in society, but rather some institutions of the system of education are accepted by some sub-systems in society. Thus, according to the statements of Luhmann put forward so far, the selection of socio-economic classes by institutions of education and the class-related predefinition which is made when selecting a school by the families deteriorate the main characteristics of Luhmann’s accounts of education.

A more drastic involvement of economic actors in state education was studied by Andrew Hodgkins in Alberta, Canada, who states that,

\begin{quote}
    a legacy of neoliberal reforms has resulted in increased pressures to develop education-business partnerships in order to align instrumental values of the market with educational needs to the point that industry sponsorship of curriculum materials and professional development activities for educators is now commonplace.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

Thus, if I combine all the findings, it becomes clear that the success rate of the children of working-class families is based upon their extracurricular efforts in conformity with the system and upon greater effort compared to their peers situated in the middle-class. Consequently, academic research in the field does not support Luhmann’s claim of modernity abrogating class-differences in the education of children; it rather suggests an intensifying and deepening gap between classes in society concerning education.

Furthermore, these studies show a more obvious and clear relationship between economic actors and education than what the theory of Luhmann acknowledges. Moreover, the degree of interactions and educational institutions adapting to economic needs, the socio-economic conditions of parents and the self-reflection of these

\textsuperscript{128} Diane Reay and Stephen J. Ball, ‘‘Spoilt for Choice’: the working classes and educational markets’, \textit{Oxford Review of Education}, 23.1 (1997), 89-101

institutions regarding which classes to attract show that neoliberal economic standards in capitalist societies have influenced the differentiation, communication and decision-making processes of education. Education can no longer solely assume what would be best for the children in their future lives, as Luhmann has suggested; instead, the economy must increasingly make decisions for education and thus translate the demands of the system economy directly to education’s coding.

Consequently, the demands of the labour market factoring in to curricula and the basic qualifications taught at schools must be briefly discussed. It can hardly be denied that educational directions in an overwhelmingly producing national economy demand the same skill-set as an economy mainly based on the informational sector. Or, to be more precise, one can hardly argue that national education in developed countries can have fully overlapping thematic and knowledge-based emphases as much as developing countries. Therefore, the necessities for the prosperity of the economy will have to be adapted to the educational system, which again has direct implications for my analysis of Turkey. Yet, is it feasible in practicality to argue that economic demand for personnel with specific knowledge and behaviour-based pre-sets translates to a direct application and tweaking of curricula? I would argue that it is not. First to consider is the time constraint, which would not allow for swift changes of curricula on demand. However, economic factors do not simply present themselves as they appear but are rather foreseeable developments. As stated in Chapter 3.1, the unpredictable future is part of the practice of education. Education prepares children for a non-disclosed future—even perhaps in the present yet non-existent job. However, it cannot do so without any input from the demanding systems in question, i.e., from the functional systems of state and economy. I have already established above that, in practice, the functional-system economy is involved in educational policy-making. However, the contradiction to this argument has constantly been the definition of education as an autopietic, referential and differentiating functional system, solely communicating allowing communication for differentiation purposes in the concept of system/environment. Yet, Luhmann states that, ‘Since the future cannot be guaranteed by origin sufficiently enough anymore, […] it has become normality that education must prepare for a self-contained, family independent professional life.’130 Thus, the interconnection of the educational system and the economic system are for Luhmann incontrovertible as well. The issue of how

130 Luhmann and Schorr, p. 20.
the outcomes demanded by the state and economy can be achieved, however, stays within the system's dynamics and autonomy. In other words, the dynamics of the classroom remain within the borders of the classroom and cannot be interfered with by environmental systems. Or, as Luhmann expresses it, a 'difference of not teaching reflection-and planning elites on the one hand, and the classroom activities on the other' constitues. Even if changes in pedagogy are demanded by the necessities of the labour market in the present or future, the demand itself will have to stay abstract, while the practical approach to the demands will be a decision and result of the practical approach of the inner-dynamics of the system.\textsuperscript{132} Abstract does not imply a sketched, unclear description of what ought to be taught. It rather refers to the abstract nature of the future outcome demanded. Curricula, topics to be taught, teaching programs, pedagogical education, infrastructural measures, etc., are all direct actions and implementations by the state in conjunction with the functional system of the economy. However, the practical approach to all these measures is left to the inner-dynamics of the classroom. Yet, this approach leads to the following question. How much interference from the environment can education as an operatively closed functional system bear before its autonomy as such a system is in question? Luhmann accepts that there is a paradox between the demand of the educational system concerning its independent character and its dependency. He does so with remarks about the necessary resources: i.e., financial, curricular, personnel, infrastructural. However, his 'magic formula' is 'relative autonomy', in which a 'modus vivendi is reached that constitutes a changeable compromise of which issues can be politized and which cannot'.\textsuperscript{133} In other words, the state and the system of education agree upon borders of influence to each other. While the classroom situation is going to be under pedagogical command, fields which cannot be reproduced by education will be under the authority of the state. Thus, curricular, financial, infrastructural and personnel recruitment must for Luhmann be located in the decision-making authority of the state. Intriguingly he very casually mentions that through 'deregulation and orientation from marketplaces, thus demand' the state is trying to outsource some of the decision-making authority it has in relation to the educational system.\textsuperscript{134} But as I have argued in my analysis, this very approach of the state is a neoliberal economic enterprise,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 33.
\end{itemize}
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which leads to an increasing influence of the functional-system economy in the abstract, outcome-based influence, such as curricula.

Reminding ourselves of the economic shifts in Turkey’s economy, it was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that Turkey gave up its statist, independent, national economic policy of its founding years in favour of an externally dependent, not-sufficiently producing country in both manufacturing and agriculture. These economic developments, paired with the last statements, imply that Turkey’s education as a functional system was not and is not in a position to make autonomous, pedagogy-driven decisions concerning curricula but rather had and continues to have to comply with the input the environmental factor economy presents to education. In doing so, shifts in curricula, teaching programs and the content of subjects would have to have changed along the dates indicated as economic and thus as state ideological shifts: 1945, 1980 and 2000.

Thus, Luhmann’s account of education—as a relatively autonomous functional system which is not directly dependant on economy and the state insofar as it would end in an institutionalized reproductive mechanism of education—must be amended by the findings of this chapter. Agreed, Luhmann’s approach to education is correct in the sense that education as a functional system is neither *ab initio* nor per se in existence to reproduce the means of production. In other words, education as a system with its inter-organisational structures of pedagogues does not, in its reflective and differential process, include productional aspects but rather societal and normative considerations. Hence, its’ members, i.e., pedagogues and administrative staff, do not argue about economic agendas and ways of reproduction from economic aspects but rather communicate issues concerning normative and socialization standards. However, what Luhmann does not discuss is education’s special position in society, specifically its importance for the functional systems of economy and the state. He does agree upon education’s important role for society, as was argued in this chapter. However, its special role is rather rooted in its unique configuration as a functional system. As we have seen in this chapter, it is not a system as defined by Luhmann, in which communication of the system with its environment is limited. Quite contrarily, constant communication and interference with the substance of the functionality of education are central characteristics of the economic functional system. In contrast to other functional systems, such as the economy, individuals within the functional system
of education, i.e., pedagogues and pupils, cannot decide upon the central issue of what ought to be taught, what the systematic structure should be or what its very own financial aspects; they are rather presented with decisions made outside of the system. While Luhmann predetermines these very points as education’s cause of independence, in practice, this aspect determines its functionality in its core. Hence, the structural and systematic functioning of the system of education is, by virtue of its environmental dependencies, ultimately diminishing education to the role of reproducing social/class relations with a pedagogical neutrality, as Luhmann stated, and effectiveness that is only comparable to bureaucracy. Though the reproduction of these relations is not the proclaimed aim of education, it becomes a necessary consequence of its state- and economy-dependent structure.

### 3.3 The Classroom: Space for creativity flow or disciplining cells?

The classroom situation is an important constituent to consider when analysing state ideology, as, per my definition, the compromised accumulation of hegemonic ideologies, and education, specifically when asking the question, ‘How much influence does and can state ideology have in the education of children in their formation as future citizens, social individuals, working forces, voters, and so on?’ Thus, the question is not based on the issue of how the classroom situation is impacting children in their creative development but rather on how state ideological influences are major factors in the formation of children as fully ‘conscious’ adults. Within this realm, the institution of schools is to be discussed in what follows. Not only is it compulsory for children to attend, but schooling is set out to be for ten or more years, while of course it is not fully compulsory for the full time-span. However, attendance of schools reserves most of the time of a child and later teenager. Hence, a human being is briefly after its mirror recognition/self-construction of the I, the subject, the object and consequently the ego à la Jacques Lacan, institutionalized within the educational

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135 Conscious is put in quotation marks, as via ideological formation the question of the possibility of a truly fully conscious being may be raised of course. Not only in this chapter, but throughout the study the ability to independent thought, without the constraints of taught state ideological factors is viewed as a utopian thinking, thus, denied every human being having been in formational institutions as especially schools.

realms of the state. One major question here is how the classroom situation is contributing to the formation of the child beyond mathematics and the alphabet as a disciplining institution and mirror of social and legal standards. This very issue is my central focus in the empirical analysis of Chapter 5. There, curricula, education programs, timetables and weights to specific subjects and their contents are analysed. From changes in these topics, this study seeks to argue for a shift in Turkey’s state ideology. However, if we cannot apprehend the importance of the classroom situation for children per se and thus analyse the ideological influence attending school, sitting in the classroom and teacher-student interactions, the argument of education being strongly linked to state ideology and the formation of future generations of Chapter 3.2 cannot be supported. In other words, I have argued in the previous chapter that the economy is the main influential system in the translation of state ideology into educational policies. However, the application of such policies is left to the classroom situation. Hence, an analysis of how state ideology is implemented through education and which tools education uses are crucial to my argument. Thus, to prove any shift of state ideology through education in Turkey, the principles of the interactive field of teacher and student, i.e., the classroom, must be analysed, so that a study focusing on the taught element of Turkish education bears validity for the findings concerning state ideology.

Further, I will have to delve into the role of the teacher/pedagogue. Important here is the mediating role of the pedagogue both between the social systems of the parents and the child and also between the state and the child. Furthermore, in all these relations, the teacher is the integral part of the educational body and the classroom situation; thus, I shall ask how that role affects the position of the teacher conceptually, when the mediating, teaching, disciplining and personally integral roles culminate to the pedagogue. Furthermore, the teacher plays an integral role within education. Yet, if the system is functional, what must a labourer of that system be? Must that person be functional as well, or can that person be non-functionally ‘individual’? In asking this question, an attempt to draw the limits of pedagogues shall be made which shall address the issue of teachers as individuals via the theory of organised social systems of Luhmann. I will thus be able to theoretically describe the teacher within the limitations of the job.
And finally, I shall depict the problem of double conditioning and double contingency as integral parts of the daily challenges the classroom situation faces in the interactive communications of the participants of the classroom and their immediate non-participants. In other words, this discussion is about what I have already mentioned as the differentiation process of systems, in which inter-systematic communications serve as differentiation lines between the system and the environment. This system/environment differentiation can also be made with the participants of the classroom (children, teacher) and parents. The discussion is directly linked to my claim of Chapter 3.2, that state ideology is set not only in the present but also carries future implications within education. Thus, parental influence in the classroom situation and how parents must be viewed is a central issue in the analysis of state ideology and its shifts if, as has been argued numerous times in this dissertation already, education is one of the institutional fields in which state ideology is implemented and reproduced.

Every child in society is subjected to education from childhood until an age at which that person is legally allowed to work. Grades, class-levels, activities of socialization and hierarchal structures are the main components a student faces while in the educational system. The requirement to entering education is simply being a part of society as a child and within a range of age, while expulsion from a branch of the functional system of education is directly linked to the success of the child as measured by grades and behaviour. Thus, they are strictly based upon the child’s ability to complete the demanded tasks and behaviours. A child spends the majority of the time in a classroom; thus, the classroom situation is the main source of experience for individuals within the system of education. Yet, every classroom situation is experienced differently and strongly depends on the human, socio-economic, geographic, cultural, historical and educational-level philosophy of education plus many other humanly micro-transactional parameters. Thus, if there is no single experience of the classroom for the child, how are we to talk about a ‘classroom situation’? If every experience is unique, how can I argue about a situation rather than about multiple situations? While it is true that the unstable factor in this equation is individuals, especially children and their experiences, there are three commons in any classroom: the classroom as a limited space, the curriculum as a limiting schedule and the teacher as a member of an organised social system within the system of education. All three are constants in shaping the classroom situation to a singular expression, while the way they are experienced might differ from child to child. To understand the
matter of the stable situation in the classroom better, I shall delve a little into the pedagogues’ situation within education. Luhmann argues that the functional independence of education is in doubt, as I have argued in the previous chapter in length already, as per its administrative dependence to the state.\textsuperscript{137} However, to solve the discrepancy between ostensible autonomy as a functional system, education has differentiated within its system, which in turn has resulted in an autonomous organisational field of social systems within the functional system of education.\textsuperscript{138} In other words, the paradox of theory and practice has led to the formation of an organisational differentiation within education, thereby allowing for an independent field in the system itself. This has led to the creation of a sub-system of education. Through differentiation, pedagogues have thus gained their ‘free space’ in which to act on matters such as decisions about curricula or the formation of school-specific boards deciding on the severity of punishment of children disobeying school rules, etc. Furthermore, as a reform demand of the organised sub-system of the system of education, the profession of the teacher was constituted in the second half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, which included the fact that the profession of the teacher to be accepted as a profession, rather than an ancillary activity; thus, teachers had to be trained and, if employed, payed sufficiently.\textsuperscript{139} Moreover, Luhmann explains, that to enter and remain in an organisation such as the sub-system teachers are part in demands compliance to the rules of the organisation.\textsuperscript{140} Organisations accumulate their own system-specific history with which system-identity, a self-referential structural constitution and decision making are made possible making the organisation quasi-independent from its environment and in autonomy.\textsuperscript{141} In practice, this means that rookie teachers entering their jobs must accept and obey the organisational rules of their profession, which are based on intra-historical information. This information and with it the rules are passed on to the next generation. Changes to the rules are possible, yet they would have to be able to sufficiently replace the old standards. Thus, though this organisational structure guarantees autonomous space within education for the organisation, it limits the individuals (teachers) who are members of the organised social system. Hence, as part of my argument that the teachers are stable pieces of the classroom situation, the

\textsuperscript{137} Luhmann (2002), p. 146.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 150.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 59.
teachers’ actions in the classroom are in coherence with the rules of their organisations, as they can otherwise be expelled from the organisation. Furthermore, these rules are influenced by historically gathered information; thus, pedagogical approaches and ‘the best way to teach’ might differ individually and according to experience, but guidelines limiting the individual’s freedom of action still appear. One such example is the punishment of the student using physical force. In Turkey, for example, teachers have had the right to discipline pupils with a stick. Especially in primary schools, examination of the length of fingernails and punishment by hitting the student on the fingers if the fingernails were not cut or were dirty was a common practice in Turkey. However, the use of physical force on students has been forbidden since the signing of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1990, which was ratified in Turkish law in 1995. It would in the present be a reason for a pedagogue to be expelled from teaching. Thus, changes in practice can be influenced by the environment as well; however, rules are made within the organisation and must be abided by the teacher.

A similar differentiation of the teachers’ organized social system within the system of education can be examined in the classroom as an architectural instance of what Michel Foucault describes as ‘The art of distributions’. In paralleling barracks and schools, he describes the similarity of disciplining techniques used to create what he calls ‘docile bodies’. The statements of Foucault are important to understanding both the initially posed thesis of the classroom situation and its three constant factors independent from individual experience and to understanding Turkish education. By law, pupils must attend flag-rising ceremonies and the singing of the national anthem in their school yards. Various memoranda and laws are issued by every government and minister of education. Thus, it is a commonly accepted ceremonial act, comparable to flag raising in barracks. Consequently, the depictions of Foucault regarding the art of distribution and disciplining techniques are of great importance for my analysis of Turkey.

143 Ibid., p. 138.
By appealing to enclosure, partitioning, functional sites and rank, Foucault describes four techniques with which the principal of distribution is approached. Applied to our specific matter, the classroom would be ‘the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself’, which signals to the student a ‘protected place of disciplinary monotony.’\footnote{Foucault (1977), p. 141.} However, within the classroom, every student has his or her own seating order/place, i.e., enclosure, while the design of the classroom itself always allows the teacher to physically reach every student individually from a hierarchically superior observant position, in which ‘each gaze would form a part of the overall functioning of power’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 171.} Classrooms are thus turned into functional sites. For Foucault this is ‘a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 146.} Thus, rank within the classroom situation is dependent on personality, relative success in examinations (i.e., the expression of success within the competition of tests between the students), and age-dependant factors such as physical appearance for teenage students, for example. Thus, rank can also be translated to the functionality of the social system of the classroom, in which students ‘know their role/position’. Furthermore, the classroom serves the control of activity, as students are subjected to sitting on their chairs silently, for specific hours, for specific subjects and specific activities that are predetermined by the organisational social system of the pedagogues of the respective school they are attending.\footnote{Ibid., p. 149-162.} Within the classroom, the student will further learn codes which are indispensable to the disciplining of the student such as bells, raising hands, standing up. These are learnt signals or forms of coded communication by the student.\footnote{Ibid., p. 166.} Foucault describes these forms as the techniques, disciplining is expressed in their separate, yet intertwined forms. Hence, the classroom as a closed entity is not solely an expression of the enclosed bodies of students relative to social systems but rather of the sub-departments of the system of education. Thus, education as per Luhmann is with respect to the classroom alone a compulsory social system aiming towards the production of docile bodies rather than an organisation, unlike the organisation
teachers are a part of, with members having similar aims, views and perspectives concerning pedagogy, to constitute their organisation.

However, as is the case in an organised social system, rules to remain within the social system of the classroom apply. These rules are, on the one hand, misdemeanours concerning the controlling mechanisms described above (i.e., not sitting still, not attending classes), and on the other hand include examinations, presentations and, in some cases, behavioural grades/marks handed to the student. In both instances, the use of disciplining and punishment tools are used, via admonition, reprimand, or even expulsion for behavioural misdemeanours, while marks and grades are far-reaching tools concerning the rank of the student in class and beyond the child’s school-life, i.e., labour career. A study conducted by Rosenthal and Jacobson has shown that the teachers’ expectations of their students related to their social status, rank in the classroom, socio-economic background, family background, etc., do influence their marking, investment in their students and consequently performance differences between students directly connected to the teachers’ expectations.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, though theory would not allow for subjective interference by the teacher, in practice, the teacher does consider rank based subjectivity, thus influencing their own effort in teaching, drawing expectancies towards individual students according to their rank and levelling the cap of maximum possible outcome of a student (i.e., a maximum mark they would give for excellent work by a student which, considered objectively, should really be marked higher) and consequently interfering with their students’ development, which results in the reproduction of already pre-existing socio-economic and socio-cultural situations of the child. The marking system intensifies this notion, as it punishes the student not based on objective grades but rather reinforces, via marks present and future, for matters the student cannot influence. Thus, the student is left to the grace of the disciplining and punishing body, i.e., the teacher.

I would argue that the marking system itself is, though not apparent in its form of immediate impact as admonitions, the most drastic, influential and controlling punishment and disciplining tool of education. Niklas Luhmann would not accept my notion of marking as a form of the use of power \textit{per se}; he would instead regard it as on par with an indispensable selection process. The selection process is itself based

upon the analysis of Luhmann concerning twofold criteria of education. First, education needs to be complementary to socialization outside of school; thus, it must produce a ‘contingency of determinations’ to then ‘add or correct, what is to be expected as a result of socialisation.’\footnote{Luhmann (2002), p.53f.} And second, education needs to provide and project ‘central objectives of education as good and the teaching programmes as correct and beneficial’.\footnote{Ibid, p. 56.} As students are not all on the same level of apprehension of the subjects taught, the selection process warrants the students to correct their behaviours or knowledges for the aimed socialisation process is demanding a set of rules to be learnt. Thus, Luhmann does not accept marking as a use of power, as only the use of power can be connected to ‘negative sanctions’, which in the ‘decisions of selection of the educational system it is factually precluded.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 69.} This approach of Luhmann also includes elements of his remarks concerning legitimacy in the jurisdictional system, in which he states that, ‘The inner consistency of the legal system established through decisions is therefore an important factor of legitimation.’\footnote{Niklas Luhmann, \textit{Legitimation durch Verfahren} (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2013), p. 36.} Hence, the selection process of marking is not based solely upon objectively evening the accessibility of every student in the socialisation process but rather is a constantly reproduced self-legitimizing process of clarifying and enforcing the rules within which socialisation processes occur. And though Luhmann correctly does not depict the ‘aims of education, subjects to be taught, etc. as programmes of decision of the selection-codes’\footnote{Luhmann (2002), p. 74.}, as they in themselves are solely a set of knowledge, the combination with the disciplining and punishment measures makes marking a central piece of the ‘recruitment-and expulsion processes’, which for Luhmann is indeed contextually to be considered as an instrument ‘of social control.’\footnote{Luhmann (2009), p. 37.} Thus, not only is the marking system a tool of punishment by education, but also ‘students adopt the results of the selection process as certificate of quality in their mutual evaluation.’\footnote{Luhmann (2002), p. 63.} The individual understanding and evaluation of the student, and the punitive or rewarding tool of marking parallel what Gramsci described in his ‘Question of the Law’, in which he asks ‘how will each single individual succeed in incorporating himself into the collective man, and how will educative pressure be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their
consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom’?" He argues that, beside its punitive nature, the ‘prize-giving’ activities of individuals and groups, etc. must also be incorporated in the conception of the Law." Thus, the adoption of their results as evaluations of their individuality can be paralleled to the incorporation of the person in question to the ‘collective man’, or in Luhmann’s terms, to society.

Consequently, marking as a selection process does not solely affect the degree of socialisation and differentiation between students by the pedagogue or the school in general; it rather affects the socialisation of the student in his or her everyday life, the social status in his or her family, the future occupation of children, etc. However, if I reach this conclusion, Luhmann appears to have contradicted himself when stating that the marking process is not a use of power. In actuality, it is the most powerful tool of disciplining and punishment, as education is given the task of socialisation with contextual material (school subjects) for a ‘correct’ education of the youngest, while non-compliance indeed has consequences for children in their present and future. Thus, the legitimation of marking through consistency and confirmability must then be understood in line with the legitimation processes of the judicial system rather than as an educational tool: I.e., it is a self-referencing, self-reproducing legitimation process for societal trust in the system of education. However, Foucault argues that part of disciplining in education is the systematic ‘normalizing judgement’ of education, as it constitutes ‘a small penal mechanism’ in which ‘each subject find himself caught in a punishable, punishing universality’ while the ‘whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming is punishable’, and yet it shall remain at its core a corrective measure.

To diversify this penal system, gratification punishment, which rewards ‘correct’ behaviour is practiced as an incentive for reluctant students and for the differentiation of students by correlating their ranks to the severity of punishment. Thus, Foucault argues that this educational judgmental system is ‘opposed [...] to a judicial penalty whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered.’ Furthermore, the examination and subsequent marking of students objectifies, individualizes and makes all

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159 Ibid., p. 247.
160 Foucault, p. 177-180.
161 Ibid., p. 180f.
162 Ibid., p. 183.
individuals the matter of a case; thus, ‘each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to features, the measurements, the gaps, the ‘marks’ that characterize him and make him a ‘case’.\textsuperscript{163} Though Foucault sees the educational judgment as opposed to the judicial judgement, one can nonetheless depict parallels between both. In both scenarios, a set of rules is set out. Both carry out correctional punishment, both are applied in circumstances in which humans do not abide to moral, ethical, socially non-acceptable behaviour and, finally, both individualize with punishment the person and rule over their future physical and psychological being. One can hardly deny that, though the judicial system in democracies aims towards equality in the court of law, societal rank does indeed play a role in the severity of punishment. While petty theft by economically poor persons almost certainly can lead to imprisonment, the bankers, economists and politicians who played a large role in the global financial crisis since 2007 have not really been subject to any punishment, let alone to imprisonment.

However, the educational system does indeed provide a set of codes to which a person shall abide in life. As Foucault argues, ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.’\textsuperscript{164} The systematic production of the objects and rituals of truth is based upon the coding of the child, which can be described as the wild, unbound and free. In contrast, the adult who has gone through the process of socialization and has adjusted behavioural patterns and obtained underlying knowledge of action and reaction is conscious that ‘abnormal’ behaviour will result in punishment and disciplining. Luhmann compares this interaction of the human being with trivial machines. These machines always produce the same outcome for the same operation, like mathematical problems which always have the same results.\textsuperscript{165} However, Luhmann does not accept that human beings are trivial machines but rather regards them as non-trivial or self-referential. Thus, is the conclusion I drew about the human being and its codings and patterns totally wrong? Luhmann asks the same question:

\textit{However, what happens when non-trivial systems find themselves in situations, in which they are facing trivialization? They are preparing themselves for that by

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 187-191, 192.  
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 194.  
\textsuperscript{165} Luhmann (2002), p. 77.
self-socialization [...] They set up a reflection loop, which illustrate conditions in which one’s behaviour congeneric to a trivial system is recommended.\textsuperscript{166}

Consequently, one can argue that the mechanisms of disciplining and punishment inherent to education are based mainly upon the coding of interactive patterns that appear in individuals’ lives and with which they learn how to be obedient, docile personalities. Thus, education is not merely a socialisation process, an institution to teach and enhance the knowledge of the child, but rather it is an institutional mechanism that institutes the control of the body and of the psychology of the being. As I explored in Chapter 3.2, the control of education by the state and the functional-system economy is indispensable. An education which is free of state ideology, as I have defined it, and free of attempts to meet the needs of the functional-system economy is not plausible.

In line with these results, the disciplining and punishing measures of education are the practical approaches with which to ensure the prevalence of socially docile, obeying and abiding human beings, while the reflection loops the non-trivial humans build are of crucial significance for children who would be future labourers and ‘conscious’ members of society. Thus, the classroom situation represents a space for the ideological and—concerning possible actions—the docile-making process of the child.

Until now, I have discussed the classroom situation as a disciplining and punishing factum for the student. In this, the teacher plays the central role, while the tools of control are pre-determined by the organised social system of pedagogues and the functional system of education. However, the family of a child is another influence on his or her socialization. Not only have a child’s parents been in educational institutions but they play as parents an indispensable part in a child’s early childhood education. One must accept this circle of education as part of societal formation in society. For my research on Turkey, this issue will become more significant, as I will discuss a state ideological shift and try to prove it via education. If one adds the result of my discussion in Chapter 3.2—which argued that state ideology is not only permanently discussed and transitioning but also bears an outlook for the future—the transition and transformation of Turkish state ideology could not be successful solely due to a sudden change in educational policy but would also have to be commonly agreed upon in

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 79.
society, i.e., also by the parents of children. In other words, if I am to argue that transitional and transformational phases have taken place in Turkish state ideology away from Kemalism and that they can be depicted by changes in education, parental socialisation according to this shift in state ideology must also have been a factor for the ideological change to successfully appear. Thus, parents as environmental influences on the individuals in the social system of a classroom must be discussed if I am to fully grasp the classroom situation.

So far, I have focused on a vacuum of time in which there are children, their parents and teachers. However, these children’s parents have also been subjected to education; thus, the parents have also been socialized by the classroom situation. Thus, the parental socialization of the child has implications for the societal set of rules, which consist of discipline and punishment. Yet the parental socialisation might not be fully defined by the initial education of the school; it might rather differ from some norms, socialization elements, etc. Thus, the parental education might even contradict the state’s teachings. This instance opens the child or even the social system of the classroom to double contingency, which ‘allows the differentiation of a unique world dimension for socially diverging Sinnperspektiven (social dimensions), and it allows the differentiation of unique action systems, namely social systems.’

In other words, double contingency appears when actions, that might be of cultural, social, historical, etc. nature, can repeat themselves in differing forms each time performed. The question then is which set of rules and ways of action are producing action, if any. In my setting of the child situated between the contingencies of formal school education and family education, the question is which act the child would prefer. And if the child does prefer the diverging (from school) action system of the family, how can I still defend the argument that education is using the power of disciplining and punishment as way of producing docile bodies? Luhmann primarily solves this issue by arguing that, in a situation of uncertainty of action produced by double contingency, any implementation results in selection, while any selection means limitation.

With continuous repetition of selection processes, social systems build a history of selections, which limit the world of the possible ‘other’ action more and more. At the same time, collective action ties the whole system to a singularity of choices in specific

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168 Ibid., p. 168.
169 Ibid., p. 185.
instances, which changes the limits of the mind of the system as well.\textsuperscript{170} Collective action is also an agreed upon way of action; thus, double contingency does have societal limits by virtue of the selection process of the self on the one hand and collective action on the other. Hence, Luhmann suggests that

\begin{quote}
the stability (= expectable) of actions of a specific kind are thus results of a combinatory game, a mixed-motive game. Evolution filters out, what is acceptable both psychologically and socially and then again destroys types of action, situations of action, contexts and systems of action by withdrawing their psychological and social conditioning.\textsuperscript{171}
\end{quote}

Hence, the circle of evolutionary social conditioning affecting the child’s freedom of actions or double contingency is closing and reproducing itself by passing over generationally, according to Luhmann. This issue intensifies if moralization is linked to possible actions. It is a ‘reduction of contingency’, in which the communication leaves no room for non-acceptance, but rather ‘trims the behavioural options of the parties to a tolerable proportion of variety.’\textsuperscript{172} For Luhmann, the moral is a ‘symbolic generalization, which diminishes the full/vast reflexive complexity of double contingency’ to a ‘(1) scope for conditioning and (2) the possibility of reconstruction of complexity through the binary schematism of regard/disregard.’\textsuperscript{173} As elaborated above, the docile-making of the body teaches morally dichotomies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour and enforces this notion by disciplining and punishment. The moralization issue is a central field of research in my depiction of state ideological change in Turkey, as I will analyse emphasis shifts via curricular and content changes in religious education in Turkey from 1923 to the present. Hence, within Luhmann’s theorem, a shift from a secular to a more Islamic moral would diminish possible choices of action for a child to be solely moral/immoral not only in the classroom, possibly in the eyes of the teacher and the classmates of a child, but most importantly in society. Thus, the child does not face a double contingency of family vs. educational action choices but is rather left with a singularity of behavioural options set out by evolutionary filters, norms and morals enforced and taught if necessary by punishment. Hence, the child

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\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 273.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 291.
\textsuperscript{172} Luhmann (2009), p. 39.
\textsuperscript{173} Luhmann (1984), p. 320.
is left in the realm of ‘conditioned conditions’. Consequently, I must argue that the child is not in a situation of true double contingency but rather of double conditioning. It is indeed facing the ideological reproduction via its family and educational institution.

To conclude, I have discussed two main aspects in my short analysis on the classroom situation. The discussion about disciplining and punishment measurements is a core element of education—not only as depicted by Foucault by virtue of its architectural construction and the interactive nature of the teacher/student relations and the marking system. Also adding to the inherent nature of education as disciplining and punishing institution is the pedagogues’ organised social system, within which teachers have guidelines and rules to abide to, such as the punishment and disciplining via marking, which works as a reproducing and reassuring element of uncertainties of individual behaviour of teaching staff. Furthermore, the acceptance of education in society as compulsory paired with parental (environmental to the classroom) input has raised the question of double contingency, which was theoretically determined not to be an influencing factor to the children, as, on the one hand, commonly accepted standards limit the influence of double contingency while, on the other hand, the moralization of certain behavioural issues leads to binary coding of possibilities, thereby making choices of action either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Both aspects lead to the conclusion that the classroom situation cannot be seen solely as the interaction of individual teachers and students but does indeed have systematic, architectural and societal boundaries. The classroom situation does, as we have seen in the analysis, act as a disciplining institution and mirror of social and legal standards, besides teaching mathematical, physical, biological (etc.) knowledge. Thus, its function is not only to produce a CV, as Luhmann has argued, but also to reassure the commonly accepted standards in society via punishment for ‘false’ behaviour. Lastly, the classroom situation is the very embodiment of social control, as it enforces behavioural limitations on a child and thus limits the sphere of the ‘thinkable’. It consequently ensures the reproduction of that limitation, disciplining and punishing notion, as those children will live in society and reinforce its rules upon other human beings. These conclusions of the classroom situation will become of importance to my analysis of the changes in Turkish education, as my thesis is that the shift in state ideology in Turkey has happened and continues

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to happen over decades, which would make a transfer of changes spanning the generations necessary.

3.4 Conclusion

The theoretical discussion has, as argued at the beginning of the chapter, enlightened us concerning the theoretical approach this entire study is based upon. One crucial finding must be that Althusser was the initial idea-giving source for this dissertation; however, given his incomplete approach to society, he was neglected as a source for theoretical discussion after I accepted Luhmann’s social systems as a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of society. Thus, ideology and more importantly state ideology was redefined to my purposes. To reiterate, state ideology was defined in Chapter 3.1 as the compromised accumulation of hegemonic ideologies, which, through the results of differentiation processes, distinguish core functional premises in need of reproduction. The state, on the other hand, must be defined as a generic term for the concentrated junction of functional systems. This definition was proven to be appropriate, as it helps us understand outside factors influencing education and the classroom situation as the practical communicative realm of education.

Furthermore, two main tasks of education Luhmann depicted were discussed. First, I discussed the production of CVs. I discussed this issue in conjunction with the functional-system economy and concluded that education is in practice not autonomous, as Luhmann argues, but is even dependent on and limited in its functionality by the economy as a functional system. This means that education as a system is not able to decide on central issues concerning education but rather implements the demands of the state and the economy. Second, Luhmann argues that education is preparing children to live in society; thus, it is teaching them commonly accepted rules of behaviour, action, communication and thought. However, it is not only teaching children basic standards, such as not to cross the road on a red light, but also state ideological knowledge. Combining both, the first and the second task of education, I must argue that the second task of education is influential on the first one as well. Both are united under a state ideological roof, as not only socially acceptable
behaviour is necessary at a workspace but also the child as an individual having accepted core functional premises agreed upon in society. Furthermore, state ideology changes and is not stable; thus, education also has the double role of re- and pre-enforcing state ideological rules. It does so by disciplining and punishing, thus paralleling the legal system, while adding rewarding elements to its arsenal via a marking and ranking system.

In conclusion, education is not only a functional system which prepares children for life in society but also a system which is overwhelmingly directed by the demands of the functional system economy in particular and state ideology in general. Teachers might have the power to decide at which time of day they want to teach certain subjects; however, the content is not their decision. Furthermore, teachers are limited by the rules of their own organised social system within the system of education, which means that not abiding to the rules of the organisation can result in expulsion, i.e., in teachers losing their jobs. Thus, as conclusion of the whole chapter, society is based upon acceptance: acceptance of the importance and indispensability of certain functional systems, such as the economy and education; acceptance of rules of the social systems individuals are part of, such as the organised system of teachers; acceptance of commonly agreeable sets of normative behaviour; and finally, acceptance of a culmination of hegemonic ideological consensus. Hence, education as a functional system of society is tasked with teaching and coloured by state ideology, as state ideology is the central system of belief and understanding with which to ensure accepting individuals in society.

These results provide the theoretical centre for our understanding of state ideological shifts in Turkey, as I will try to prove with reference to changes in Turkish education. Thus, this study depicts the centrally tasked institution for reproduction of state ideology to precisely understand when, how, to which extent and to which new consensus state ideology has shifted in Turkey. Furthermore, the empirical approach will underline and validate my theoretical discussion in return. If I am able to find that state ideology has shifted in Turkey away from Kemalism and is depictable with reference to educational programmes issued by the Ministry of national education, while such shift was paralleled by profound economic changes, that, according to my theory, demanded for a shift in state ideology, I will have in return proven my findings in the theoretical discussion to be valid. Thus, not only will the empirical research in
Chapter 5 aim to underline my claim that a state ideological shift in Turkey has occurred and is non-or even anti-Kemalist, which is the main task of this dissertation, but I will also have underlined and proven my contribution to the discussion of critical systems theory. Three main arguments have to be pointed out concerning the contribution.

First, I defined state ideology in a conceptually sound manner within a critical/Marxist approach to systems theory. This definition took into consideration that, in a capitalist mode of production and economic policy, the functional-system economy’s demands are at the centre of the discourse of hegemonic ideologies, finalizing in an agreement upon a single state ideology implemented by the institutions of the state.

Second, I argued that shifts in state ideology must be differentiated into transitional and transformational phases.\textsuperscript{175} Solely in revolutions, a sudden transformation can take place.\textsuperscript{176} Thus, with respect to my study, I argued that the shift in state ideology in Turkey did not occur suddenly but rather was a historical development that must have started with a transitional phase decades before a transformation could take place. The reason for this was outlined via my analysis of education’s task and mode of work: preparing the future in the present, i.e., conveying future shifts in state ideology to today’s children.

Third, my contribution to critical systems theory retains the specified analysis of education as a functional system and its state ideological role in society. The functionality of the system education however, is limited to functioning as infrastructural institution for the transfer of state ideology.

All three arguments will be underlined and proven by the empirical analysis in Chapter 5.

Before I delve into a change of state ideology, however, an understanding of the baseline state ideology must be apprehended. Thus, before analysing a shift,

\textsuperscript{175} In Chapter 5 we will see that adding to these two phases, end of transition, or beginning of transformational phases will be added. However, these are details for now and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 and 6. Generally speaking two phases of a shift in state ideology will suffice for now.

\textsuperscript{176} Though this argument can be discussed as well, as ideologically parts of society will have to have had ideological beliefs in support of the sudden transformative ideology. However, the shift in state ideology as part of a revolution is not my topic in this study. Thus, a more detailed discussion on this issue can be made, yet will not be part of this study.
Kemalism must be defined in its core understanding as Turkey’s state ideology after the founding of the republic.
4. The principles of Kemalist ideology

The analysis of Kemalism differs from author to author. However, instead of depicting varying interpretations of Kemalism, its ideological principles can be explained with reference to the so-called ‘Six Arrows’ of Kemalism. They are of great importance to understanding what Kemalism really is, as they are the main theoretic grounds on which the whole ideology builds. The Kemalist idea as explained here will primarily be taken from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous collection of speeches, Nutuk, which in total accounted for 36.5 hours of speech time in 1927 but was later published as a political guide for the republic. This and other remarks by Atatürk will be considered when describing and clarifying the meaning of the Six Arrows. Secondary sources will be used with caution, as, again, ideas regarding what Kemalism is are very diverse in Turkey. It is more or less a fight over the right interpretation, which mostly all political streams claim for themselves. Furthermore, the principles and the theoretical basis of Kemalism laid out in the following does not reflect on the praxis of Kemalism or what occurred in the Kemalist era of Turkey. I am aware of the Genocides and Massacres in the name of Kemalism, while Atatürk lived and stemming from nationalist ideology in conjunction with Kemalism. However, this chapter will not delve into the praxis of Kemalism as it would blur the line of what actually is Kemalism and what is not as well, as including authors claiming for the “right” Kemalist interpretation. Theory and praxis do also not conform if Marxism and the Soviet experience are compared for instance. If any academic work would include the practice that occurred in the name of Marxism to evaluate what Marxism theoretically is, that work could not be deemed academic. Thus, I will not delve into the praxis of Kemalism, but rather outline its theoretical foundations.

The Six Arrows of Kemalism/the republic were first published in 1931 in the programme of the ruling and only party of that time, which was founded and led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). The CHP described its main characteristics as republican, nationalist, populist, statist, laicist/secularist and reformist. As the young republic implemented a single-party system, the main aims

and characteristics the CHP published in the lifetime of Atatürk were also the main goals of the republic. Furthermore, the Six Arrows can be seen as a result of the experience of eight years in power of the young republic; hence, they are intended to be a lasting result and guideline for the future governance of the republic in a Kemalist light.

The Six Arrows become more important if one takes into account that Mustafa Kemal, in his collection of speeches, *Nutuk*, and in any other statements, never signalled that he favoured a multi-party system, while, at the same time, the party’s political and ideological standpoint substantially favoured a strong leader. Consequently, the founder of the republic somewhat exemplified through and with his party what he sought to be the best way of governance.

Not only did the CHP view itself as the party amalgamating every aspect of society—which can simply be proven by the fact that there was a one-party system until 1945—but it also viewed itself as the party which had to ensure the well-being and stability of the republic. Therefore, the introductory part of the party manifesto finishes with the sentence, ‘The outline of our projections are not intended for only a couple of years, but also for the future (And) all of the(se) principles are the principles of Kemalism.’

Hence, as Kemalism was seen as the everlasting ideology which would ensure the republic’s ‘health’, it is not surprising that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was announced as the party’s leader for all time. Culminated with the persona of Atatürk as strong leader, it has to become clear that declarations of and by the party, programmes and descriptions of parts of the programme by officials have to be assumed as Atatürk’s views too. In other words, in the environment of that time, the positions of the party cannot be thought to differ from the views of Mustafa Kemal himself. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out, that although the constitution of 1924 arranged the political structure as parliamentary democracy and the presidency did not mean to intervene in the executive branch, i.e. the government with a Prime Minister, de facto, while alive, Atatürk was still the party leader of the CHP, an elected member of parliament and

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180 Party programme 1931, p.3
basically the main source for policy and law-making, rather than the ministers or the prime minister.\footnote{Cemil Koçak, ‘Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şeflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef / Milli Şef’, in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce. Vol. 2. Kemalizm, ed by İnsel, Ahmet (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 119-137.} Though this system might not have been part of the constitution or might not have had any legal grounding, it was quite accepted and welcomed in the time Atatürk was alive. This approach however, changed drastically after his death and the succession of İsmet İnönü as president. Though he took over the role of the ‘Milli Şef’ (National Boss), inner-party opposition and power struggles in general within the party can be seen as factors which changed the system itself, i.e., the introduction of the multi-party system, and the CHP’s approach towards political leadership in the government and thus in the republic. Yet it has to be acknowledged that Atatürk had both a large role as charismatic leader and father figure in the newly found republic and actively engaged in the republic’s politics. Hence, it must not be forgotten that decisions of and by the CHP, laws and legal frameworks of the young republic and other actions of the republic influencing the public have to be seen in the light of Kemalism and promoted by Atatürk himself. One should not think of a democratic system with a division of branches and powers but rather of a centralised political system, which appeared to be democratic in its structure yet was consolidated around a single person and what was meant to be ideas in his name: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the ideology in his name, Kemalism.

Of course, it has to be taken into account that when I talk about the CHP, one should not think of today’s CHP. Many changes have been made, such as to the everlasting party-leader article, which was actually changed right after his death. It therefore became obsolete, as it was changed from expressing the original idea of Atatürk, the founder of the party and the republic, to expressing the idea of Atatürk, the party’s leader forever. But the Six Arrows are still the most important institution of the CHP, as the Six Arrows still decorate the logo of the party itself and can still be found in the first article of the party’s programme.\footnote{See: CHP, Çağdaş Türkiye İçin Değişim. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı (2008) <https://chp.azureedge.net/1d48b01630ef43d9b2edf45d55842cae.pdf> [accessed: 19.11.2015]}

As will be discussed later in detail, Kemalism itself was not only an ideology at that time but was even raised to religious heights in the years between the Nutuk speech of 1927 even in present day, though as Kadir Dede argues, having shifted from a
religious to an esoteric approach to Atatürk’s speech.\textsuperscript{183} Nutuk can in this sense be seen as the ‘holy book’ and the Six Arrows as the ‘pillars’ of the belief system. Especially in his lifetime, his charismatic persona added to his speeches, and his writings brought him the status of not only the founder and liberator of the country and the people but even established a view of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as messiah or prophet.\textsuperscript{184} However, this role of Atatürk diminished in the years after his death, and he became more of a mystical figure whose statues and busts, quotes from speeches and thoughts can be seen everywhere in the country, though their instances are gradually declining. In school books and official institutions and even in most workspaces in the country, at least a portrait of him hangs somewhere visible. It is almost a fixture of businesses, though less and less so. However, the status of a prophet would not be accepted anymore, nor would the Nutuk be considered a holy book. Thus, the Atatürk portrait has become more of a cultural occurrence rather than a meaningful relation of the public with its founder. Therefore, I can again conclude that the ‘true’ Kemalist view and idea must be considered the one formulated and applied in the era of his life-time, from the founding of the republic (1923) to the power struggles within the party (until 1927) and finally to his death (1938). The Kemalism or Atatürkism after his death has to be considered to have been tampered with by every political group, all of whom have tried to ‘prove the ‘correctness’ of their political struggle by showing that they are the ‘real’ Kemalists. Hence, they have all claimed the hegemonic truth of their political movement. In this light, the struggle over the ‘correct’ definition shows similarities with religious sects which are completely confident of their correct reading of a holy book.

Hence, two important points have to be mentioned. First, Kemalism had reached a religious level in Turkey especially in Atatürk’s life-time, as was intended, yet it gradually declined to a cultural good, embodied by a social habitus. Second, as is with religions as well, attempting to formulate “The” correct interpretation of Kemalism is impracticable. Thus, I will only engage in the discussion of what the core principles of Kemalism are. This analysis will prove enough to depict Kemalism, especially in the

light of education. Only the core facts ought to be thought to be able to prove whether something can be considered Kemalist or not, not the details and questions, which go too much into detail. In other words, and to stick to the example of religions, I do not intend to rewrite existing understandings. But if a holy book clearly says that man should not kill, it means that actions conflicting with this law would be judged as not religious from my understanding and analysis in this chapter. Thus, I shall depict Atatürk’s understanding of Kemalism solely through with his own words or indirectly through his party.

In the following, all Six Arrows are briefly depicted. Nationalism is the last principle analysed as the melting point of all arrows. The emphasis will be on Turkish nationalism, as it plays a crucial role from the early educational system of the republic to the present—thus, for state ideological content. Finally, I will delve into the relevance and meaning of the arrows for education and point out three main principles of Kemalism considering Kemalist education.

**Republicanism**

The party claims in its program that republicanism is the best way to ensure the sovereignty of the people and, with that, to fight any endangering situation which could appear against the people and the fatherland. On the 30th of October, 1933, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk held a speech, which reflects his views on the republican idea. There he emphasizes the great character and diligence of the Turkish people, bearing their love for arts and science, who fought against all odds to build a unified nation, to develop as people and to come closer to Western civilization. Atatürk describes these characteristics as the main factor of building a nation, but they are at the same time qualities distancing the republic and making a clear cut to the Ottoman Empire. For Atatürk, republicanism is the political system which exemplifies Western civilization and at the same time is chosen to symbolize the break with the Ottoman past. Not only is it a break with the Ottoman past and a step towards the civilized West, but it is also a natural and necessary step for the Turks to show and re-employ their

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185 Party programme 1931, p. 31.
greatness.\textsuperscript{188} Hence, for Atatürk, republicanism is not only a political system which was adopted to break with the past, but it has a higher national and global task. By enriching the idea of republicanism with the moral, ethical and national tasks of the Turks, he stops a discussion about the political system before it even starts, as a differing idea would mean that one is against Atatürk and ultimately against the Turkish people, and furthermore against their historical development.

\textbf{Populism}

This point of the programme is divided into two parts. In the first part, the party claims that power is in the hands of the people and that this results in a mutual mission of the people to the state and vice versa.\textsuperscript{189} On the other hand, it emphasizes that every person must understand and accept other people to be the same in front of the law, regardless of their class, religion and family ties / ancestry.\textsuperscript{190} The explicit inclusion of religion and family ties emphasize the systematic/legal results of a republican system versus the Ottoman past. The CHP is making a statement for the future, and the populist arrow needs to be seen in interconnection with the republican claim described before. The democratic system needs to be sustained, while the people have the power, rights and obligations towards that republic. On the other hand, the emphasis on equality is aimed at the prevention of inner conflicts based on origin and class, as the close Soviet Union and socialism itself seem to have feared the CHP.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{Statism}

The statist arrow fully describes the purpose of the party, which is to improve the living standards and the high goals of the Turkish people by economic means. Hence, the party is supporting a state-controlled economy.\textsuperscript{192} However, economic development is not simply state-controlled and aiming towards and following the highest outcomes of

\textsuperscript{188} Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, \textit{Onuncu Yıl Söylevi}.
\textsuperscript{189} Party programme 1931, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. p. 31.
\textsuperscript{192} Party programme 1931, p.31.
business. As Atatürk said in a speech from 1923, trade has to be freed from the hands of the foreigners.\(^{193}\) Inasmuch as he says in the party's convention in 1931 that art was first taught to the world by the Turkish people, now there should be no doubt that the Turkish people will develop economically as is legitimate for them.\(^{194}\) These two examples shall show that the statist arrow is not solely focusing on a state-controlled economy in general, but moreover on one which is also held by those considered Turks. Historical incidents, especially the deportations that took place in the trade-centres Istanbul and İzmir (which were mainly held by Armenian, Greek and Orthodox and Jewish merchants) are in this context not only a political coincidence but moreover state-planned policy to build the national economy freed from Imperialist Forces as the United Kingdom and France and what was considered by Atatürk as foreigners, i.e. non-Turkish and non-Muslim parts of society.

**Laicism/Secularism**

The party programme clearly outlines in Laicism that the state, with all its governing institutions and laws, has to be in line with the rules of the civilized world; hence, state and religion have to be separated, as religion is a matter of conscience.\(^{195}\) Here again, one can say that a clear change from the Ottoman Empire to a democratic republic was intended. However, Atatürk does not promote atheism. On the contrary, he argues that Islam is the religion of the Turkish people and that the state would promote this fact by supporting it via the state.\(^{196}\) This seems to be a contradiction, as the secular idea, and the matter of conscience, as the CHP itself described it, would let one believe that the state should generally and totally leave this space to the people. Yet, the fear of religious sects and their definition of Islam, which was seen by Atatürk as a malformation, led Atatürk and the CHP to control the teachings of Islam within a state institution for religious affairs, which was founded in 1924. This institution was an effort to compensate the cancellation of the caliphate in the same year and the closing of

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\(^{193}\) Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, *Konya Esnaf ve Tüccarlarıyla Konuşma*, 26.03.1923
\(^{194}\) Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, *İzmir de Parti Kongresinde Konuşma*, 29 & 30.01.1931
\(^{195}\) Party programme 1931, p. 31.
various religious sects’ schools. The unification of Islamic belief was an aim of the early republic, which correlates with the idea of populism stated above. The unification of the people as the populist idea should also be reached in religious questions, which at the same time enabled the definition of Islam and therefore the consolidation of the republican idea, as critical approaches towards a democratic system defined by more radical Islamic teachings would be nipped in the bud before they could arise.

Reformism

The party declares that it would stay true to and continue to develop “the principles won by the greatest sacrifices of the people.” This short sentence does not seem to be very conclusive. It generally underlines the founding of the republic as a large reformist move by the people, which shall continue. As Atatürk outlines, the long-lasting system of the Ottoman Empire was overthrown by the revolution of the Turkish people, who sought to change the Ottoman approach to imperial unity via religion and people in general by replacing it with Turkish reformism.

This process will not stop for Atatürk but will keep on going, orienting itself towards the West, as he clearly warns that the backwardness of the Turkish and Islamic world has historically led to great losses. Hence, Atatürk and his party see the reformist idea as a development of the Turks, which should not and eventually cannot be stopped but moreover should be supported.

Nationalism

Closing with the last arrow nationalism, one already can trace nationalistic ideas in all of the five arrows examined before. Hence, all the arrows are claims which finalize in a historical development, having led to the founding of the republic.

197 Party programme 1931, p. 31.
This process is seen as a natural outcome of the steady development of the Turks towards higher goals, as we shall see within the examination following. The party’s view of its nationalism arrow does not clarify much of what it really understands from nationalism. It generally states that the unique character of the Turkish people shall be protected, whilst at the same time saying that contact with all other people shall be developed more.

The democratic republic was, as mentioned before, intended to make a clear cut with the political institutions of the Ottoman Empire. However, geographically, Anatolia never was a homogeneous area. Thus, not only with the Ottoman influence and expansion around today’s Turkey but also by history itself, Turkey seems to be only the latest political structure within thousands of years that this geography has experienced. As a result, the arrow nationalism within the Kemalist ideology cannot be mistaken for the racist idea of the Germans or the Arians; hence, the blood-line determining nationality, which was quite common for the early 20th century and is even legally still in power until 2000, for example, in Germany. Thus, Kemalist nationalism could not be demanding for genealogical Turks in contrast to German nationalism. This heterogeneity of Turkey could not be overcome with genealogical explanations but had to be replaced by a different approach. This approach, however, was very crucial to the making of a newly built nation and was consequently of large importance in the curricula at schools. Furthermore, it can even be argued that many minority issues could be traced to the formulation of Turkish nationalism.

Two main features of the understanding of Turkish nationalism must be clarified: *vatan* (nation) and *millet* (people). Turkish nationalism emphasizes the soil, the land, and the borders quite early and in contradiction to the state of the politics and

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200 Party programme 1931, p. 31.
201 Changes to the citizenship laws in Germany were made after 2000, empowering the idea of citizenship as central focus of being a German, rather than the blood line as it was before. However, traces of the former formula can still be found in §116 of the Grundgesetz, which still clearly outlines the dispossessed in and after Worl War II as being German in addition to present German citizens. With the changes in the citizenship law a child born in Germany does not acquire the German citizenship via birth but, if the parents are non-German citizens, only when one parent has had the right of residence in Germany for at least eight years. Therefore, Germany has moved from its blood line centred idea of citizenship, yet not totally to one which can guarantee citizenship via birth. For the German constitution: *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 23.05.1949 [https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/GG.pdf] [accessed: 05.01.2015] and the citizenship-law: *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* [https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stag/StAG.pdf] [accessed: 05.01.2015]
202 The word millet as described above is correctly translated. However, in German it would be translated into Volk, instead of Bürger for instance. Therefore, it is leaning more towards the German idea of wording and its historical meaning.
understanding of its founding times. All people within the border are seen as millet, as they are within the borders of the Turkish country.

At the same time, they are the foundation of the Turkish *millet*, hence, of the nation itself. Different from the time in the early 1920s, of course, is the idea of the borders themselves being the defining moment of a human being to be accepted and seen as a part of the community making the people. At the same time, we can see a more racist approach in Europe which emphasizes blood-ancestry as the defining characteristic of a human being who would be part of the people of a country. This diverging idea goes back to the concept of *vatan*, which was best described and most influentially theorized for the Turkish Republic by Ziya Gökalp. He describes the *vatan* as a sacred piece of land for whose sake people shed their blood.\(^{203}\) At the same time, he distinguishes between a religious and a national fatherland. This distinction seems to be necessary considering that Ziya Gökalp was writing at the end of the Ottoman Empire, i.e., as the Nation of Islam was very quickly falling into pieces. The argument he puts forward is that Arabs and Turks are not divided but are rather one in the Islamic *ümmet*, which for him is the unity of Muslims.\(^{204}\) But on the other hand, there has to be the *vatan* of the *millet*, i.e., the fatherland of the nation/the people.\(^{205}\) Yet, if asked what *millet* is, he also argues that the bond within the nation has certain premises, such as language and the bond a person feels to that nation and its culture.\(^{206}\) Herein lies the difference to other, especially European nationalistic ideas of the 20\(^{th}\) century. The nation and what it consists of, therefore the people, do not consist only of Turanic descendants. Ziya Gökalp himself thinks that Greek and Bulgarian Muslims, for example, when they have learnt the Turkish language, will join the Turkish *millet*, as they have already bonded with the cultural aspect via Islam.\(^{207}\) Therefore, I may return to the description at the beginning and add the religious, cultural and language factors to the question of how Turkish nationalism was defining itself. Though Turkish nationalism does not demand a Turkish blood-line going back to the Middle Asian Eras of settlement of the Turks, it still asks for a pre-set of attributes from its people, as defined by a construed idea of what Turks are. It is construed because, for example, Turks were not Muslims


\(^{204}\) Ibid., p. 77f.

\(^{205}\) Ibid., p. 78.

\(^{206}\) Ibid., p. 82.

\(^{207}\) Ibid., p. 78.
but are originally of shamanic belief. Yet, the description of Ziya Gökalp clearly indicates that the Islamic pre-set must be present in order for a person to be accepted as a Turk and consequently in the nation. Hence, a construed idea of the Turk is the defining fact, while German nationalism, for instance, makes claims of historical links to tribes and folks, yet focuses mainly on the blood-line. Therefore, it can be said that Turkish nationalism was more driven by the love for the land and the idea of what is thought to be Turks, rather than genealogical theories. The history of the Turks itself plays a large role in Turkish nationalism, but should be considered as a nationalism-inherent concept of history glorification. Being aware of the fact that a clean or clear blood-line is hardly to be found in the geography of Little Asia/Anatolia, the glorified Turks in history can be reduced to moral and ethical behavioural examples of what a Turk stands for. Therefore, it needs to be concluded that Turkish nationalism cannot be compared to German nationalism, for example, but still carries a very large claim and demand with it: the acceptance of primarily the Turkish identity, hence, the denial of anything differing from that. While other nationalisms may focus primarily on genes and blood, Turkish nationalism promotes an idea, a theory of what Turks are: i.e., Muslims in unwavering love for their nation and people aiming to build a strong fatherland. Şerif Mardin states that there was indeed not a nationalist concept of the Turk until serious research was made in the early republican era to find historical evidence of Turks before the Ottoman Empire and to theoretically approach that history with the nationalism promoted in Kemalism.208

The history of the fighting and conquering Turks is in constant support of this idea, while the goal is to reach these levels again. Consequently, it is totally a cultural idea which has tried to be accepted. Not rooting to the ancestors, it is strongly based on whether a person buys into this idea or not. However, not accepting or differing from the idea of how to be a Turk leads to exclusion and therefore to not being part of that community; it may even lead to one’s criminalization as a traitor.209 This also means that non-Muslims in Turkey are considered non-Turks in this concept and are not

208 Şerif Mardin, Türkiye’de din ve siyaset (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), p. 65ff.
209 Examples of this can be found throughout the history of Turkey. The most obvious one of course is the freedom struggle of the Kurdish people. But it starts quite early in school and children books, where he other is seen as the traitor, jealous of and constantly trying to destroy the Turkish people. These approaches in children’s education can be found in: Güven Gürkan Öztan, Türkiye’de Çocukluğum Politik İnşası (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınılari, 2011) 218- 222. In connection with a more general education and specifically aiming the Kurdish identity see: Ercan Çağlayan, Cumhuriyet’in Diyarbakır’da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), pp. 175-224.
given the same rights, are depicted as inferior\textsuperscript{210} or even fall victim to genocides and massacres.\textsuperscript{211} Thus, I am not arguing that Kemalist nationalism can not and is not violent. But rather that there is a distinct difference between German genelogic nationalism and Kemalist nationalism. However, the main difference in both nationalisms is the fact that an Armenian or Greek Orthodox, as well as an Alevi can hide their identity and are not recognisable from the outset as not compatible with Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, even in the ultra-nationalist MHP (Milli\c{c}t\c{c}i Hareket Partisi / Nationalist Movement Party) Kurds can become members and even rise to highest ranks in the party, such as Oktay Vural who became deputy chairman of the party's group in parliament. However, in Germany a non-German, say a person whose ancestors are from Turkey, could not even join the ultra-nationalist NPD (Nationalistische Partei Deutschlands). Thus, Turkish nationalism is not exclusive from its outset, as German nationalism is, as those minorities which are excluded from being “Turkish” can actually, if they abandon and deny their ancestoral history, become Turks, which is in no way possible with German nationalism. Thus, Turkish nationalism from its outset as historical invention of what it deems to be a Turk, i.e. a Muslim in unwavering love for their nation and people, is aiming towards assimilation towards that idea rather than being exclusive.

In line with the remarks of Ziya Gökalp, Atatürk himself argues that the characteristics forming a nation are the shared bond to specific institutions/the state and the unity in language and morals. Very important factors to attain this are the shared glorious history and the strong intention to live together.\textsuperscript{212} Yet, in some regards, he shows a more racist point of view, which does not seem to be in line with the mere cultural aspects Turkish nationalism is trying to promote. In his famous speech to the youth (commonly known as \textit{Gençliğe Hitabe}), he speaks about the youth's tasks to uphold the republic against enemies from outside and within and closes with the statement that the strength you will need for this is in your blood, flowing in your veins.\textsuperscript{213} Another example is when he talks about the beauty of the Turkish race, which became clear for

\textsuperscript{210} Baskın Oran, \textit{Türkiye’de Azınlıklar. Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama} (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004)


\textsuperscript{212} Parla, Taha (1995), p. 188.

\textsuperscript{213} Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, \textit{Türk gençliğine bıraktığım emanet}, 20.10.1927
him when Keriman Halis won a world beauty contest, and just shows that the Turkish race is a chosen one, which now needs to show the world its high culture too.\textsuperscript{214}

It almost seems as if the intention of a cultural assimilation to the artificially formulated idea of the Turks, which is embedded in Turkish nationalism, also made Atatürk go beyond what was defined and defended. This in itself involves the risk that, if the assimilation of minorities to the cultural idea of Turkism is failing, racial arguments can come into the assumption rather than the idealistic approach of the nation being united only by the virtue of the fatherland and the shared history. Furthermore, the efforts in the educational system, especially in the field of Turkish nationalism, were extraordinary and somewhat unify the Six Arrows. All other five arrows touch and support, even need, this Turkish nationalism to exist or develop. Hence, Turkish nationalism is a major factor in the analysis of a) Kemalism, b) the republic as it was introduced and tried to maintain for the future by the founding fathers and c) as a nation.

Lastly, I shall depict specifics of Kemalism as stated so far in this chapter and what implications they have for education. Thus, I return to the question this dissertation poses: How and when did Turkey’s state ideology change? The focus of the analysis is on education because Kemalism was Turkey’s state ideology after the founding of 1923. Hence, I shall briefly analyse how the Six Arrows and principles of Kemalism as depicted in this chapter influence the three school subjects I will be analysing in Chapter 4. Thus, I shall briefly point out some ideological paradigms of Kemalism relating to civic, history and religious education at both, primary and secondary education levels.

As Şerif Mardin points out, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set out to fight against ‘neighborhood pressure’, as Islamic rules, imams and conservative views dominated the daily-life of people within those neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{215} The way to do this was by emphasizing and teaching about a higher good: i.e., society.\textsuperscript{216} Thus, understanding and conscientiousness towards the new republican society had to be taught to the

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\textsuperscript{215} Mardin (1995), p. 73f.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., p. 74.
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people, which had to transpire through public education. Hence, the education of children within the realm of Kemalism had to abandon the views, morals and norms of the micro-social systems of the neighbourhood, which were defined predominantly by Islamic interpretations of morals, norms and rules. These had to be replaced with the ‘greater good’ of society. Thus, the republican citizen according to Kemalist ideology had to be a Turkish nationalist and secular. The educational system of the early Turkish Republic played a major role in the re-evaluation of the intended ideological and normative formation of the next generations of Turkish society. However, as İlíker Çayla points out, the lack of a bourgeoisie in that era, such as the French and English, led to a Turkish implementation of Kemalist nationalism comparable to the Prussian experience of early nationalization: from top to bottom.\(^{217}\) As depicted in Chapter 3.2, after 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his government tried to implement national economic policies which aimed at creating the then-lacking bourgeoisie. Thus, the creation of a bourgeoisie in Turkey is intertwined with the Kemalist project of the founding years, while both sides, the economic functional system and the state, were in a joint effort to establish a status quo in their respective fields. Of course, as argued earlier as well, inherent to state ideology is the aim of the function and reproduction of society and its most important functional systems, such as the economy. Hence, the joint effort of the newly founded republic’s political and economic leaders under the state ideological roof of Kemalism is no surprise.

Thus, Kemalist state ideology would have to be the central ideological influence in children’s education for the founding years. More precisely, Kemalist nationalism would have to play a major role in children’s history and citizenship education at schools. In an opening speech at the first education conference held in Ankara, Atatürk argues that the reason for the underdevelopment of the country was due to the educational policies of the Ottoman Empire, which, however, should be newly construed, freed from old superstitions and influences of both East and West. That is, they should be based upon a national culture rooted in national characteristics and history.\(^{218}\) Thus, in light of Kemalist nationalism, history and citizenship education in particular would have to implement the newly and artificially formulated idea of nationalism and what a ‘Turk’


is. It would have to stress the importance of Turkish society as a community and the individual's duties as a citizen to that society in accordance with how citizenship was construed in that period. Thus, so far as history and citizenship education are concerned, a Kemalist nationalist approach, while emphasizing the societal community duties of the individual, should be the focus. Yet, these exact results give us already a hint about what to expect from religious education from a Kemalist perspective. Firstly, as Kemalist ideology stresses secularism/laicism, any state-facilitated religious education either had to be non-existent or truly secular in terms of reserving an equal distance from all religions. However, if Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s views on religious influence on society are taken into consideration, education in light of Kemalism should be religion free. Hence, any religious education at schools would undermine the nationalist Kemalist idea and, further, what I have previously argued as the building of a nation by creating a society with an invented history of the Turks.

However, if I take both arguments of building a nation based upon the newly developed idea of Turks and the secularist/laicist principle into consideration, another aspect of Kemal education appears to be of importance: women. Both the nationalist and secularist/laicist approach aim from a societal aspect against the daily-life hegemony of Islamic rule among the people. A strict Islamic rule would not allow women to vote, act, dress and express themselves freely in society and would impede or even prevent women’s education. By passing the ‘law on unification of education’ (tevhid-i tedrisat kanunu) in 1924, education was centralized in the hand of the state and thus taken away from the control and influence of Islamic groups and elites. The transition to coeducation occurred in 1927 in primary educational levels and in 1928 at the high-school level. Thus, for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and within his ideology, women and men had to be equal, which is also underlined by the implementation of civil law in 1926, giving women equal rights. For Atatürk, the role of women in society was crucial, as their participation and work in society in conjunction with the effort of men would make the revolution possible. Thus, only if women were equal to men in society and by law would his vision of the nationalist and secular/laicist Turkey be successful. Hence, the role of women in the implementation of Kemalist ideology—specifically in

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the fight against religious elites, and especially in society—was crucial. Therefore, within Kemalist ideology, female education is emphasized alongside the two other aspects I have already mentioned.

Lastly, as a culmination of all three topics of Kemalist ideology, the so-called village institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) must be very briefly addressed. Though instituted in 1940, thus, after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, their task and operational area fully comply with the Kemalist ideology. These institutes were established in areas of Anatolia where the usual state educational institutions were not built or were out of reach. According to Fakir Baykurt, there are four main reasons for the founding of these institutes: to eliminate ignorance among the rural population by teaching necessary crafts for the village in addition to the general curriculum, to renew the old Ottoman pedagogic guard with a new republic and finally to educate the rural population so it could participate in the political and social matters of the country.\textsuperscript{222} Thus, the village institutes can be seen as the culmination of the three principles mentioned, as they enabled an ideological reach via education to all children, male and female, according to the nationalist and secularist/laicist principles, while detaching them from the religious influence I have already analysed. I will not delve further into the village institutes, but I had to mention them as part of the argument regarding Kemalist education's efforts along the three principles: nationalism, secularism/laicism and female inclusion. The programme of the village institutes was ended in 1954, however.

To conclude, by pointing out the central ideological characteristics of Kemalism, this chapter helped both to understand what is meant by Kemalism and to understand what to expect from early republican education in Turkey. Both Turkish nationalism and strong secularism are central ideological issues Kemalism promotes as state ideology. My next chapter focuses on an empirical study of Turkish education from 1923 to the present. It is to be expected that, after the founding of the republic until the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a strong Kemalist state ideological approach in education can be depicted. Thus, as was the case in this chapter, the Kemalist ideology implemented in education programmes in the years from 1923 to 1938 will constitute the comparative value for a possible shift in state ideology. Hence, my analysis will, based

on this chapter’s findings, focus on the Turkish nationalist and strictly secularist approach of Kemalism and its educational implementation.
5. Changes of the Turkish Educational system

In this chapter, I take a thorough look at the educational system of Turkey from its beginnings in 1923 to today’s implementations of educational policies. Furthermore, a general analysis is not made here, as my focus was and is on the analysis of state ideological changes in Turkey away from Kemalism. Again, in using the term state ideology, my own definition of state ideology is meant: the compromised accumulation of hegemonic ideologies which, through the results of differentiation processes distinguish core functional premises in need of reproduction. The state must be defined as a generic term for the concentrated junction of functional systems. In this chapter, we shall see how shifts in education manifest in the functional system of education in Turkey, as discussed before in the theoretical discussion throughout Chapter 3. Thus, to present a complete analysis which does not exceed the limits of this dissertation, it will not be enough merely to analyze a single school subject. Instead, the aim of this chapter is to present a thorough analysis of the two main subjects I discussed in Chapter 4 concerning Kemalism. There I argued that laicism/secularism and Kemalist nationalism are the two main pillars of Kemalist ideology. Hence, my analysis of Turkish education focuses on both topics and tries to determine whether, how and when shifts concerning laicism and Kemalist nationalism appear in Turkish education. However, to limit the scope of the contents does not limit the empirical material that could be taken into consideration. Hence, I must in this chapter study crucial educational content that centres the two main pillars of Kemalism. For that matter, in Chapter 5.1, I delve into statistical indications of Turkey’s educational development in both fields. Yet, though laicist and nationalist attitudes of the public can be surveyed, a comparative analysis from 1923 to today is not possible in this field. Thus, I shall instead try to statistically determine whether indicators exist depicting laicism and nationalism in practice. In other words, Kemalist nationalism and laicism are concepts I delved into in Chapter 4 and, for that matter, are consequential for societal normative and behavioural acts as they influence such fields such as equality among sexes in the labour market and education. To reiterate, Kemalist laicism and nationalism both promoted equality among the sexes against conservative Islamic attitudes, as discussed in Chapter 4. Hence, statistics showing the development of women in labour, education and literacy depict public attitudes in conjunction with Kemalist ideology. Furthermore, I will analyse the quality of education and trends and developments
concerning Islamic vocational schools. The latter is of special importance concerning Kemalist laicism, of course.

These statistical indicators will indicate how and when the two major pillars of Kemalism changed in Turkey. Thus, I will be able to analyse whether the timeline of shifts in state ideology away from Kemalism, as identified in Chapter 3, are empirically sustained or not. I shall briefly reiterate the phases of state ideological shifts and what I argued specifically in Turkey. It was argued that Turkey was ideologically Kemalist with the founding of the republic state. Because Mustafa Kemal lived until 1938, I assume that, from 1923 until 1938, Turkey’s state ideology must have been Kemalist and, for my analysis, this span of time forms the baseline of Kemalist state ideological education. After his death, however, and with the end of World War II, Turkey entered international organisations—such as IMF in 1947, NATO in 1952. It also received structural help from the Marshall Plan in 1948, which was argued to be non-Kemalist, as it contradicted Atatürk’s national economic policies. Thus, I have argued that a shift in state ideology, if it is indeed linked to the functional system of economy as the theoretical discussion concluded, must have appeared after 1945. I argued that, between 1945 and 1980, a transitional phase away from Kemalist state ideology appeared, as economic indicators show a constant development away from Kemalist economic policies. However, with the coup d’État of 1980, neoliberal economic policies were implemented, which—with dependence on foreign investment, decreased national production and a rapidly diminishing farming sector—is an indicator of the beginning of a transformation of state ideology. This means that the transitional phase ended and the transformation to differing consolidated hegemonic ideologies away from Kemalism started. Furthermore, I argued that, after 2000, I cannot argue anymore for a phase between transition and transformation but that, with the AKP government, a full transformation had begun and is continuing. Indicators include economic and constitutional changes in 2010 and 2017 which dismantled the deep republican state structure.

223 Cf. Chapter 3.2.

Thus, statistically I will try to prove my statements about transitioning and transforming state ideology away from Kemalism from 1923 to today. However, it would not be sufficiently academic to depend on statistics alone. Therefore, chapters 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 analyse changes to educational policies. In the theoretical chapters, I have been able to establish that content taught in school education is influenced by state ideology. Hence, if I am again able to establish a base-line of Kemalist approaches to education and compare them throughout the history of the republic until now, a shift in state ideology should be visible. To do so, I must again limit the school subjects that will be examined. For that matter, I shall return to the main pillars of Kemalism: i.e., laicism/secularism and nationalism. The school subjects which cover these topics best are civic, religion and history. Hence, my field of research should be these three school subjects, as they will offer indications of changes in content which are consistent with state ideology. However, I again need to limit the vast amount of material that might be taken into consideration. Educational directions from the state include curricula and teaching programmes. During my field research in the archives of the Ministry of Education of Turkey, I was able to gather all available programmes for primary, junior-high and high schools from 1930 until 1998. After 2000, the programmes were released online on the website of the ministry; thus, printed versions of the programmes were not available in the archives. However, the programmes and curricula from before 2000 are not available online; hence, the documents I was able to obtain are unique, as only an in-person visit and permission to research and scanning of the material in the archives is necessary. I scanned every page of the programs and sorted them. Thus, for my analysis, I have a unique source on which I will mainly rely. In Chapter 2, I discussed the existing research on Turkey’s education. There I argued that research is missing in the specific field of analysis conducted in this dissertation. Yet, in the relevant chapters, I briefly address the issue of the state of research on the specific topics: i.e., civic, religious and history education. Thus, for now it is of importance to emphasize the uniqueness of the sources in conjunction with my approach. In other words, both my approach to changes in education in Turkey and the primary sources I have comprise the main analytical approach in chapters 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. Secondary sources, such as contemporary academic research in the fields of civic, religious and history education, are taken into consideration as necessary and if they are viable, yet my primary sources provide us with an unimpeded perspective on the issue I am researching, which is sadly not the case with secondary sources. Due to
the focus on the primary sources from the archives, I would like to apologize to the reader for repetitive footnotes. However, I cannot emphasize enough how unique the sources are, especially in conjunction with an analysis of shifting state ideology away from Kemalism, while the theoretical foundation of this issue is a critical Marxist approach to Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. Thus, secondary sources are consulted only if they are applicable to my very specific field of analysis.

Another issue that might arise while reading the chapters on the empirical analysis is the non-existing literature on citizenship, religion and nationalism as concepts. It is not my intention to discuss the various academic approaches and discussions to nationalism, religion and citizenship here in this chapter, as it would distract from the main task this dissertation has: to prove and outline the periods of state ideological changes in Turkey, via unique, original sources. If I solely researched on this topic via the issue of a change in approaches to nationalism in Turkey, a thorough analysis of nationalism would be advisable and necessary. The same must be said for citizenship and religion. However, the differences in state ideological implementations that will be depicted in this chapter shall remain descriptive and solely analysed via the theoretical framework I laid out in chapter 3, i.e. form a critical systems theory perspective. With that an objective approach (solely focusing and relying on primary sources) will succeed in describing how and when a change in state ideology occurred, as well as what these changes comprised of. Thus, I do not want to distract from the original issue at hand, that aims to prove a state ideological transformation in Turkey, based on the theoretical discussion in chapter 3. Systems theory is inherently observant and descriptive, thus objective. It does not touch upon ideological issues, but rather is descriptive of societies’ systematic structures. Supplementing it with a critical approach however adds causality to the circumstances described by systems theory. Thus, to rely on critical systems theory solely at the expense of existing academic literature on religion, nationalism and citizenship does help analysing and describing state ideological changes more sufficiently.

For that matter, after the statistical analysis of Turkey’s education in Chapter 5.1, I delve into the diverging proclamations of education by the Ministry of Education from 1930 to today. This will depict the general directions the state wanted education to follow throughout the years in question. The following chapters 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 delve into the school subjects civic, religion and history. I will analyse the school subjects on
every available school level, i.e., primary, junior-high and high-school. Thus, if the subjects are taught on all educational levels, I will analyse them.

In Chapter 5.3, I will delve into the school subject of civic education. There I should be able to depict how the state defined the ‘good’ citizen and how that definition changed from the Kemalist times between 1923 and 1945, between 1950 to 1980, from 1980 to 2000 and finally in the present. In Chapter 5.4, I will analyse the subject of religion at schools, while again the eras just mentioned will be the focal point of comparison. If changes appeared in religious education, are they in conjunction with the changes in civic teachings? Both chapters 5.3 and 5.4 will be of relevance especially for the laicist/secular Kemalist state ideological approach. Thus, in these two chapters, I determine whether and how one of the major pillars of Kemalism changed, how it developed and what it has become today. Chapter 5.5 delves into the school subject history. However, this chapter does not focus on laicism/secularism per se but mainly analyses a possible shift in the second major Kemalist pillar: nationalism. By doing so, I will determine whether the main ideological cornerstones of Kemalism have shifted, or if possibly one of them is still taught at schools with regards to content. Thus, if I was to determine that one of the pillars of Kemalism is still part of state ideology in Turkey, I might have to reassess my initial thesis—that a transformation of state ideology occurred after 1980—in favour of a continuing transition. Hence, this analysis of the three school subjects in conjunction with the statistical and proclamation analyses will provide us with the academic proof regarding whether, how, when and to what extent Kemalist state ideology has shifted in Turkey.

5.1 Turkish education in numbers – Statistics, numbers and development of major issues of education in Turkey

Statistical analysis is one, but surely not the only, perspective whereby developments in education can at least be depicted and in some respects even explained. Having dealt with theoretical discussions, with Kemalism as an ideology and with educational standards in a Kemalist educational system, an analysis of the educational system in Turkey can help us to obtain a clearer perspective and point of view before I examine specific shifts and changes to school books in the next chapter.

The analysis in this chapter should not be seen as separate from and closed with respect to the other examinations. Statistics, graphs and numbers only make sense if
put into context. Hence, this chapter will try to depict issues and striking numbers in Turkish education, but always with the opening question in mind: Was there a shift in Turkish Education connected to a shift in state ideology away from Kemalism? If so, can I depict it?

Thus, statistical analysis will focus on relevant numbers proving to be evidence for an examination of a shift in state ideology. The Kemalist educational principle of Turkish nationalism cannot uncontestably be analysed via statistics, as this would rely on personal statements and could thus be flawed. Hence, my field of analysis in this chapter must focus on the other two Kemalist principles: i.e., female participation in education and secularism/laicism. Therefore, to depict the quality of education I will analyze the school enrolment ratios of male and female students on all school levels, the development of literacy, chances in the labour market in general public, differences among the sexes and infrastructural indicators. Thus, three main issues are delved into in this chapter: first, female participation in education and, with it, the Kemalist principle of equality between men and women in society; second, infrastructural and qualitative success of education; and third, the development of Turkish education in the area of Islamic vocal schools.

Of course, statistics and information gathering, hence, metadata, can be discussed and criticized, especially if we look at numbers from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Such information gathering and the statistics made from it always serves some purpose, which is set by those who are conducting the study. However, I will not discuss this aspect in detail, as it would lead to a lengthy and unnecessary discussion about the validity/invalidity of statistics, which also can be subject to its own ends.

The following charts are made by me, but the metadata used for it is mainly taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute, which is the official state statistics organization. Furthermore, some statistics are used from OECD reports. All sources are indicated in their respective contexts.

To start with, I should analyse numbers which indicate the general public’s educational level. One of the most applicable statistics, which can be used on a global scale, is the literacy rate. It is useful, as it can be compared to that of other nations at a similar economic level. Furthermore, one can see the development of literacy over time and
so make estimations about education reforms and government spending on the educational system.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General literacy in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>18.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Illiteracy Men</th>
<th>Illiteracy Women</th>
<th>Illiteracy general</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen quite clearly from Table 1, Turkey’s literacy rate and the level of basic education was very low even a decade after its founding in 1923. Within the 60-year span from 1950 to 2010, the median decrease level of illiteracy was at 10.08, thereby indicating that Turkey’s efforts to educate its population was to some extent been successful. I say to some extent, as Table 2 gives us a more differentiated perspective on that matter. Women’s illiteracy has historically been high in Turkey. Though female illiteracy has decreased drastically since 1935, the numbers also show that, still in modern Turkey, women are far more subject to illiteracy and receive less basic education than their male counterparts, if any. In 2010, the illiteracy rate of women was still higher than male illiteracy in 1990. This clearly shows that the general female population was 20 years behind the male population in Turkey with respect to basic standards such as reading and writing. However, according to official statistics, female illiteracy decreased in 2015 to single digits within five years. This is a remarkable improvement, given the short amount of time.

As discussed and argued throughout Chapter 3, state education requires its populace to be prepared for work. Hence, it might be useful to analyse labour force ratios in public and to again differentiate these numbers between the sexes, which will also shed light on the correlation of improved literacy rates of women and their probability in the labour market.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General public in labour</th>
<th>Percentage of men in labour</th>
<th>Percentage of women in labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: TÜİK (2014). p. 29
The lowest percentage of women not in labour dates to 1955, when it was 28 percent. However, this number is still higher than the highest unemployed ratio of men in 2000, which was 24.1. Thus, women are not only 20 years behind men in literacy, but they are in a far worse situation concerning employment. Coming to 2008, employment numbers worsened for both men and women. Yet, men’s employment rate never drops below 60%, while female employment dropped in the period between 2008 to 2015 below the unemployment rate of women in 1955, thus completely reversing unemployment and employment statistics entirely for the 60-year period depicted in Table 3.

There are two reasons for the discrepancy between male and female employment rates that I would like to briefly address. First, one could argue that women are generally less well-educated than men, which causes a higher rate in unemployment. As we will see later with the graphs on male and female schooling percentages, this might have been the case in the past, but it does not reflect the reality of the present. Yet, it must be acknowledged that a much higher illiteracy rate plays a role in the employment numbers of women, especially for the reason of female empowerment and independence from male counterparts. However, as shown in Table 2, illiteracy among women drastically declined in the same years (after 2000) that female unemployment mounted to record heights. Furthermore, 11.9% illiteracy among women in 2010 cannot explain 76% unemployment rates for women.

Thus, a possible second reason must be employed. A closer analysis of the percentages makes clear that a steady decline of female employment occurred over the 60-year span depicted in Table 3. At the same time, employment numbers generally declined. However, male employment was almost twice as high between 1970 and 2000 and almost three times as high after 2008. Hence, generally low employment rates cannot explain high female unemployment, as the discrepancies between male and female employment are too obvious to be irrelevant. Thus, I would argue that so-called ‘cultural’ aspects—i.e., in its core, a deeply patriarchal societal common sense—must be seen as the reason for this. As discussed in Chapter 4, Kemalism demands equality between the sexes and. actively engaged with this task, by removing Islamic conservative influences and laws in society. Exemplary with regards to this effort are the right for women to vote and be elected introduced in 1934 and the Village Institutes and their educational task specifically against archaic
structures in rural areas. Thus, the employment rates of women do not reflect Atatürk’s own views. He further expressed in a speech in 1923 that women, from a Turkish and Islamic perspective, have been equal to men, independently working side-by-side with men, conducting trades and providing for their families. In this specific speech he points out that women were held back by conservative and false rule and, thus, shall be free again in the republic.\footnote{http://atam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/%C3%96YLEV-ORJ%4%BONAL.pdf, p. 287, accessed: 15.05.2018.} Hence, Atatürk’s view, policy and political action aimed towards equality between men and women in all fields, including labour. Thus, from a Kemalist perspective, ensuring equal female employment opportunities must be a task of the state. However, I must conclude that the decreasing female employment rates depicted in Table 3 are due not to Kemalist principles but to conservative Islamic social norms and pressures existent and persistent in society, together with inactivity or even support concerning this issue by the state. Furthermore, the Kemalist practice concerning women’s role in and for society, especially in the founding years, has been to raise a new republican family.\footnote{Cf. et al. Serpil Sancar, \textit{Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti/ Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar} (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012). Ayşe Gül Altınav (ed.), \textit{Vatan Millet Kadınlar} (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016)} I will delve into the teaching programmes in the following three chapters, however, what can be pointed out already is the focus of Kemalist education on listing what a good citizen ought to be and to do. Within this Kemalist nationalist concept, roles of women and men were clearly outlined as women raising and taking care of a republican family, which does not appear to be different from the Islamic conservative approach. However, as argued here, the Kemalist approach to women in society is less limited concerning their rights, social and work life in comparison to the Islamic conservative approach, as exemplified by the statistical evidence so far, and more in detail in the following chapters. Thus again, the numbers depicting a decreased employment rate of women does not mean that Kemalism was abandoned, but rather Islamic conservatism in society being persistent.

If the situation for women in Turkey’s labour market is as stated, then I need to analyse youth employment rates, and for two reasons. The first is to differentiate the numbers in Table 3 and to gain a specified picture for my field of research. As discussed throughout Chapter 3, education is the preparation of youth for the labour market. Thus, I need to depict their success in finding a job. Second, within the analysis of those numbers, I will again depict female labour market numbers to put the high
unemployment rate of the women of Table 3 into a differentiated perspective. Both reasons are, of course, crucial from a Kemalist principle standpoint.

Table 4

Table 4 shows Turkey's youth aged between 15 and 19 who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) as compared to their peers in other OECD countries. Spain and Greece are highlighted. Two main findings stand out. First, since 2000, the percentage of 15-19-year-old NEETs in Turkey has constantly been significantly higher than their peers in any other OECD country. Second, even after the European debt crisis, which hit countries such as Spain and Greece very harshly after 2010, the peak of NEETs aged between 15 and 19 in those countries has never exceeded 15%, while their peers in Turkey never dropped below 20%. More drastically, it can even be seen that, percentage wise, Turkish NEET in 2000 triples the percentages of Greek and
Spanish youth. Thus, even European countries in a state of deep financial and economic crisis do not reach the heights of Turkish 15-to-19 year NEET percentages. Almost the same can be said for the age group between 20-24, thus for young adults, who just have finished school education or even university.

Table 5


Though the percentages are closer to each other come 2014, thus after the 2010 crisis, Turkey’s percentage of 20- to 24-year olds who are not NEET was constantly far over 40% until just recently, i.e., in 2014, when it dropped to just above 35%. Yet, if I was to compare the percentages to the same age group in countries such as Italy, Greece or Spain, we could clearly see that the percentages in Italy and Greece were already at 25% in 2000 and rose 10% until 2014, with a clear break and pick up after the 2010 European debt crisis. Spain showed a constant rise throughout the years after 2000. However, the percentages are again not even comparable to those for Turkey’s youth until 2014, though this is not because Turkey’s numbers drastically declined but because of Greece, Spain and Italy consolidating at a high rate of 30 to 35%.
However, the same percentages for women only further deepen the youth unemployment problematic.

**Table 6**

Tables 6 and 7 indicate a clear division between women in Turkey and other OECD countries. If I specifically compare the percentages of Turkey, Italy, Spain and Greece, we can both clearly see the higher percentage of the total number of women in Turkey NEET and see that that the gap for women in Turkey NEET is wider than the general numbers from tables 4 and 5. To be precise, until 2005, the percentage of Turkish females between 15 to 19 NEET was 46% and 47% in 2000 and 2005, respectively, while at the same time the percentage never went above 15% and almost consolidated at 10% for all three of Greece, Spain and Italy by 2014. Between 2005 and 2014, the percentage declined for the same age group of female NEET in Turkey from 47% in 2005 to 33% in 2010 and 27% in 2014; thus, a major improvement has been made in Turkey. However, this improvement is still 15 percent point behind economic-crisis-shaken countries like Greece and Spain. Yet, it could be argued that the percentages
in Turkey have fallen and are improving, as the schooling rates of female students have risen; hence, the 15- to 19-year-old age group is more often at school thanks to education programs and controls by the state. Thus, the statistics for the 20- to 24-year-old women in Turkey might be more of an indicator of the effectiveness of education, especially for female citizens, as this age group has finished high school or even university by the age of 24. Again, comparing recession and economic-crisis-struck countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, women in Turkey were NEET in 2014 at a percentage of 51%, while women from the other three countries were at a percentage of 30% to 35%. Spain especially shows a rapidly growing percentage of women NEET since the crisis, as under 20% of women in Spain were NEET in 2000, and this indicator increased to almost 30% in 2014. In Greece and Italy, the percentages are stable around the 30% mark and do not show signs of significant jumps of 10% or more. However, the gap between Turkish women and the other three countries’ females between 20 and 24 has always been very wide and, though the gap seems to decline, the difference is still at over 10%. But beside the difference between Turkey, Italy, Spain and Greece, the sheer fact that 50% of women between 20 and 24 living in Turkey have no job, are not in education or are not in training and are thus practically left to motherhood, household and wifehood alone is drastic and alarming.

Culminating the downwards trend with the fact that, in 2015, 72.5% of the general female population was unemployed while over 50% of women aged between 20 and 24 were NEET in 2014, indicators do not show prospects for increased employment rates for women in Turkey. They rather suggest a continuation of the downwards trend of female employment of the past 60 years. Thus, Kemalist ideals, if truly applied and with consideration of Kemalist practices also somewhat contradicting the ideals, throughout the 60 years analysed so far, were not fulfilled. Equality between men and women in the labour market was and is not close to be established even in the long run. Hence, if in both fields of Kemalist principles (women and youth) Turkey’s present is failing, then either the Kemalist principles were put aside or non-Kemalist approaches were implemented. Explanations for such drastic numbers in female, young female and youth unemployment might be manifold, especially if micro-economic analyses are made. Yet, no such reasoning could convincingly explain how 70+% women in Turkey are unemployed. Furthermore, the depicted statistics already show that the quality of education in Turkey does not meet employability standards of the labour market. On the other hand, it could be argued that the labour market has no
capabilities to employ the educated youth in Turkey, as the sectors are not prepared or specified for them. Whichever argument one considers true, the statistics show a dysfunction and disconnect between the labour market and the youth. Furthermore, the high rate of female unemployment cannot be due to employability or the disparity of education and labour market. The numbers instead show that women are significantly less often employed than their male counterparts, which must be owed to social injustice and inequality. Religiously influenced social structures and norms should be identified as a main factor in the low participation of women in the labour market. Their role is defined and reproduced in society, families, politics, media and education. They are primarily to be mothers and housewives, while men are depicted as breadwinners and protectors of the family. This narrative, however, is not solely reproduced in a single generation, but as the statistics show that it must have been emulated and reinforced intergenerationally, which would in turn cause a further departure from Kemalist ideology generationally. Furthermore, this would also mean that although Kemalist ideology theoretically tried to evolve from Islamic conservative norms in society, they apparently sustained. While again, I argued above that via Kemalist practice one could make the argument that the female role in society was also to be the caring republican mother rather than the equal worker. However, increased unemployment especially of young women in present day Turkey strongly suggests that even the Kemalist theoretical approach is not applicable to Turkey at all. Rather Islamic conservatism / Islamism is the dominant ideological and normative foundation of Turkey today. Only this conclusion can explain the disparity of the drastically high rate of female unemployment.

To punctuate the claim of having departed from Kemalist ideology in education especially, I shall briefly depict Turkey’s quality of education. The latest UNESCO report, *Building the Future: Children and the Sustainable Development Goals in Rich Countries*, gives Turkey a dismal assessment. The report lays out nine indices to measure the needs of children in 41 countries of the EU and OECD. Not to go too much into detail about the different types of measured results, I focus on the issue ‘quality education’. Concerning Turkey’s educational performance, the study looks at two factors: baseline learning proficiency with 15 years of age, which would be the PISA results, and participation rates at preschool level, i.e., ages three to six.  

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Turkey’s performance results are the lowest among all and 15 points behind the next country, Romania. If analysed via baseline competency in reading, mathematics and science alone, Turkey not only is again at the bottom of the table among 41 countries but also worsened in these areas compared to 2012 by 10%; that is, it went from 50+% to 40.7% in 2015, while the country average among all 41 nations is 68.6%.\textsuperscript{228} Thus, the performance of Turkish children aged 15 in these three major fields of knowledge is 28% behind the average among all OECD and EU countries. At the same time, these children are reportedly the second most food insecure, with one in three children in Turkey living in a state of food insecurity, which is ‘topped’ only by Mexico.\textsuperscript{229} ‘Though the general availability of food is not a problem in any of these countries, too many families struggle to satisfy their children’s nutritional needs’, as the report states, which, however, also means that the government/educational system also does not provide children with sufficient nutrition.\textsuperscript{230} Hence, statistically, Turkey’s results in comparison to other OECD countries are among the worst in gender equality, quality of education and food security. An un-Kemalist approach must be attested to Turkey, not only concerning equality of women in society but also with regards to educational quality and performance.

Furthermore, the disparity of literacy numbers and unemployment of women in Turkey, and the increasingly widening gap between the sexes plus the fact that the quality of education is significantly worse than any other country in the OECD leads the discussion to two main questions: First, how did the participation of women in education develop from 1930 to the present? Thus, what does the trend show us, and what assumptions can be made concerning the disparity of literacy and employment? Second, can I depict the rising patriarchal, conservative public mindset, which I declared to be the reason for the comparably low female unemployment, via educational statistics? If so, what do such indices show us concerning Turkish education and its influence on the public?

To answer the first question, I shall now delve into what the numbers regarding school enrolment are and again compare male-to-female ratios. Sadly, there are no official statistics showing the percentages of females and males enrolling in schools, especially not dating back to the founding of the republic until today. Of course, one

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., p. 17.
could use statistics beginning with the 2000s which do show these percentages. Yet, they will not make any sense if I cannot compare them to past percentages.

Thus, to overcome this minor problem, a simple equation was made to reveal differences in schooling. The ratio was calculated for the male and female population in the age span of five to nine, which are the ages of children who go to primary school. In contrast to it the ratio of female and male pupils at primary schools was identified. For the same year of analysis, there should not be an appreciable difference in the ratios of males to females in public compared to males to females at school. Hence, if the ratio male to female in public is lower than the same ratio at school, we can understand that fewer girls were enrolled in schools than there are in public. Only when and if the ratio shows a gap which is near to null can I claim that girls are as enrolled as boys.

Here is the ratio of male and female students in public compared to the same school ratio at primary schools.

Table 8

Table 8 has two main straight-line segments: The male-to-female ratio between the ages 5 to 9 in public and the male-to-female ratio at primary schools. The male to female segment in public, shows a ratio close to 1 at all times. To be precise, the median male to female rate aged between 5 and 9 throughout the years is 1.068, while the peak shows in 1940 with 1.12 and the lowest rate is indicated in the years between 1970 until 1990 at 1.05. Yet, as can be seen in the chart, the ratio of male to female enrolled in primary schools is higher in comparison to the general public ratio. Its peaks were in the years between 1923 and 1926 with a rate of 4.338 in 1923. After the
founding years and a true constitution of general education laws in line with the republican ideas implemented in 1927, it appears that the number of girls enrolling at primary schools is rising, as the ratio is declining and stabilizes on an average level at 2.039 between the years of 1927 and 1943. If I look at the general ratios after that date, I can clearly say that the ratio is dropping more and more towards 1. However, I am talking about 60 years of development and a slow closing gap between the two lines of public ratio and schooling ratio. Though not fully closed, after the 2000s one can say that the gap is almost closed. The data of this graph and these indicators should be compared to data from junior-high schools and high schools to make an analysis of the outcomes and reasons for the gap.

Table 9

![Graph showing ratios of male and female aged 10-14 in comparison](image)

Data Source: TÜİK (2014)

Table 9 depicts the ratio for ages 10 to 14 in public to be close to 1 again. Yet, the gap between the public and the enrolling ratio appears to be wider in Table 9 (i.e., on junior high-school level) than it is in Table 8, the primary-school level.²³¹

A more precise look shows that, while the ratio declined constantly from 1927 until 1947 and had a median of 2.62, it increased again afterward, reaching a peak in 1961 at 3.138 and never going below 2.5 until 1974. This basically means that, for every female pupil at junior-high schools, there were always at least 2.5 male pupils, though

²³¹ The straight line segment shows a gap between 1996 and 2012 as an education reform made education compulsory until 15, hence, extending the primary school years and officially not teaching in junior-high schools anymore. However, in practice this only meant that after primary school students had to continue attending junior-high school. Yet, because of the law change no official numbers were archived about the numbers of students attending junior-high schools, as by law there was no junior-high school anymore.
in public this rate never went above 1.2 throughout the history of Turkey. This indicates
that policies before 1947 were tackling the issue of girls continuing their education,
while after that date, state-supported help and reforms were apparently not in place to
help female pupils, as the numbers are quite stable at a rate of 2.5. After 1974 yet
again, a constant decline of the rate appears, which in numbers means that the ratio
fell from 2.407 in 1974 to 1.578 in 1996. After a new reform of education which
reintroduced junior-high schools again and made them compulsory, the ratio of
enrolled male to female students at junior-high school declined even below the public
ratio to 1.02 in 2012 and 1.01 in 2013 compared to a ratio of 1.05 in both years in
public. Thus, inequality between the sexes is found especially until 1975, after which
the numbers show a drastic improvement for junior high-schools.

Table 10

Table 10 depicts the ratios for males to females in public aged 15 to 19 and their high-
school enrolment numbers. Again, the male-to-female ratio in public is at around 1,
though I cannot argue for the same gradual development until 1962. After 1931, the
ratio of male to female students enrolling in high schools rises from 3.17 to 3.64 in
1935, yet it falls from that date to 3.15 in 1940. Though one should expect a further
decline of the ratio, it rises again and reaches its peak in 1945 at 3.99, with a median
of 3.70 for the period between 1940 and 1952, thus adding almost one point to the
ratio compared to junior-high schools. Hence, for every female student at least three
male students came throughout the years between 1935 and 1955. However, in the
years between 1953 and 1969, the average ratio is 2.898 which, on the one hand, is
still very high if I consider that at the same time the ratio in public is at around 1.15; yet
this should not surprise us as, the median enrolment at junior-high schools for the same years (as we have seen in Table 9) was at around 2.5. Hence, there is only a slight difference between the junior-high school and high-school ratio. At 1970, the ratio is under the 2.5 mark for the first time since 1925 and almost gradually declines to a record low of 1.04 in 2013, where it stabilizes. Hence, it took 45 years to reach a male-to-female ratio of below 2.5 at high schools and to further normalize to public averages until after 2011. However, I would argue that this improvement in educational equality is not rooted in a shift of state ideology but is rather due to infrastructural causes.

But first, from these numbers it would be fair to argue that female children were disadvantaged compared to their male counterparts in Turkey throughout the history of the republic. Only in the years after 2000 can I talk about a fair share in education at all levels (primary, junior high-and high-school). Not only are the parents of these girls responsible for this situation, but also state policies. Hence, again, Kemalist principles in education promoting equality were not met for more than 70 years. On the other hand, state promoted and supported education of girls does not appear to have dealt effectively with this inequality to a degree that I would argue wilful intent to not fight inequalities among sexes must be attested, rather than incompetence, contingency or feasibility. Thus, it must be said that the state acted in accord with an un-Kemalist educational policy.

Second, the graphs show us that, for the most part, girls were enrolled in primary schools, though there is also a gap with respect to their male counterparts, but continuation of education in public schools at the junior high-and high-school level were not primary aims of either families or the state. Yet again, this gap was consolidated in the years after 2000. Thus, women were gradually better educated and more literate but were gradually less employed. This discrepancy of better education but less employment, however, cannot be explained with an appeal to labour-market needs or general employability for specific fields of work only; instead, it points again towards the gradually increasing Islamic conservatism in society, social norms and families. Whereas women were simply not enrolled in schools in the past—and were thus somewhat forced to marriage, low-income jobs and motherhood—because of a lower educational level compared to their male counterparts, especially after 2000, education
on all school levels is promoted and compulsory for the most part\textsuperscript{232}. Yet cultural codes endure, and a higher educational level does not ensure gender equality. Hence, I would have to point out the cultural pre-set of a woman as mother and housewife, which forced women into unemployment and dependency on men in decision-making and livelihood. This dependency is far reaching: It touches economy, appearances in public, behaviour and social participation. A recent study of all OECD and EU countries further supports this claim, as Turkey’s respondents were the highest among all 41 participating nations in agreeing that ‘university education is more important for a boy than a for a girl’, with 34.4\% male and 29.6\% female respondents agreeing with this statement, both highest among all nations.\textsuperscript{233}

Furthermore, another reason for the improved enrolling ratio of women throughout the years is migration from villages to cities. Though in 1927, 24.2\% of the population lived in provinces and district centres and 75.8\% percent in towns and villages, this percentage gradually shifted to 77.3\% percent of the total Turkish population living in larger cities while 22.7 stayed in villages in 2012.\textsuperscript{234} I shall not go into detail about the development, yet in 1980, still more than half, 56.1\% percent, lived in villages.\textsuperscript{235} Thus, within the last 30 years, from 1980 to today, migration from villages to larger cities has increased rapidly. Considering the education ratios analysed before, urbanisation might have caused the increased enrolment of female students especially to secondary educational institutions. Especially if taking into consideration core numbers of the moving population. While in 1980 the total population of Turkey was 44.736 million it increased to 76.667 million in 2013.\textsuperscript{236} For the same years 19.639 million people lived in larger cities and 25.097 million in villages and rural areas in 1980, the near balance shifted to 58.459 million living in cities in 2012 and only 17.167 million in villages.\textsuperscript{237} The effect of urbanisation must be accounted as factor of higher enrolment numbers of females, as increased access to education was granted in larger cities. At the same time, even if educational facilities exist in villages, the imperative need to attend

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} In 2012 an education law was passed making 12 years of education compulsory. Cf., .C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü, \textit{12 Yıllık Zorunlu Eğitime Yönelik Uygulamalar, Genelge 2012/20} (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 09.05.2012) <http://www.meb.gov.tr/haberler/2012/12YillikZorunluEgitimeYonelikGenelge.pdf> [accessed: 15.05.2018]
\item \textsuperscript{233} UNICEF Office of Research (2017), p. 32, Figure 5.2.
\item \textsuperscript{234} TÜİK (2014), p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid., p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p.7.
\end{itemize}
secondary education is not given, as facility in farm labour does not require a high-
school degree. Hence, the fact that women became gradually better educated and less
illiterate while their employment numbers decreased at the same time might also be
partially explained by the urbanisation of the populace in Turkey.

Thus, state ideological shifts cannot explain the higher participation in educational
programs of female students. They are due to urbanisation and, after 2000, to
membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Yet, even though female
enrolment at secondary educational levels increased, societal norms kept women from
free participation in the labour market. Another factor of higher female participation in
education, however, could be increasing enrolment in Islamic vocational schools
(İmam Hatip Liseleri/Ortaokulları).

This trend has implications in two different respects. First, it touches upon the
increasing Islamic conservatism in society which I have identified in all other indicators
before. And second, it might show indications concerning state ideological changes.
To be more precise, Atatürk tried to counter and eliminate the religious influence on
social life via education, as noted in Chapter 4. Religious vocational schools do not
contradict this approach per se, as these schools can control the religious narrative
with a more liberal and egalitarian interpretation of religious texts. However, in light of
disastrous mathematics and science results, an increasing number of religious
vocational schools would contradict Atatürk’s statement about the importance of
science and technology.

These schools were originally founded to answer the need for state-educated religious
personnel to be employed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. However, the notion
of these vocational schools solely ‘producing’ imams and other religious staff is not
completely correct. Or, could the numbers (e.g., 11% of all junior-high and 9% of all
high-school students in 1979, i.e., 1.180.233 junior-high and 531.760 high-school
students at religious vocational schools) mean that Turkey was in severe need of
imams, that ten percent of its young population needed to go to these schools? The
answer lies somewhere else, which I shall delve into. Before 1970 and until 1975, the
ratio of students attending these junior-high schools to general junior-high schools
ranged from 1% to 5%.238 Thus, for every vocational student came 100 general junior

238 Ruşen Cakir, İrfan Bozan and Balkan Talu, İmam Hatip Liseleri. Efsaneler ve Gerçekler (İstanbul: Tesev
Yayınıları, 2004), p. 64, Table 1.4.1 & TÜİK (2014).
high-school students, and it peaked at around 5 to 100. However, this ratio increased to a range of 9/100 to 11.9/100 in the years between 1977 and 1993.\textsuperscript{239} For the same time span, the ratio of vocational junior-high schools/general junior-high schools between 1977 and 1993 peaked in 1977 at 10% and was steady at 7 and 8% between 1979 to 1988, after which it constantly declined to 5.26% in 1993. Hence, while the student number ratio was almost constantly at around 10%, the school numbers dropped to 5%. After 1993, the school ratios almost remained the same, while the student number gradually rose to 14/100 in 1996, which marked the end of all junior-high schools until 2012.

At the same time, the ratios for high-schools depict the opposite: A relatively higher student-body ratio to school ratio can be found. In 1970, the ratio of vocational high-schools was 7/100 to general high-schools, while at the end of that decade, the ratio grew to 22.4/100 in 1979. At the same time, the student ratio of vocational to general high-schools in 1970 was 2%. This increased and stabilized at 6 and 7% between 1973 and 1978, to increase to 9% in 1979. Yet, after 1980, both the school ratios and the student ratios increased dramatically. Already in 1981, the vocational high school/general high school ratio was at 29 /100. It then reached an all-time high until today of 30.7% in 1984. After 1984, the ratio gradually declined, increasing solely between 1995 and 1997, to 20.6% in 1991 and to 17.3 /100 in 2001 to reach its lowest ratio since 1971 of 11.3 in 2008. However, the student ratios were almost stable, ranging between 12 and 16% until 1998. After 1998, the ratio dramatically declined from 9.5/100 to 3.1/100 in 2002, yet it gradually rose to 8.8% in 2010. After 2011, the ratios increased very rapidly. Though the school ratio increased from 12.8% in 2011 to 25.7% in 2014—hence, almost doubled within three years—the student ratio more than doubled from 10% in 2011 to 23% in 2014. As can be seen from these ratios, vocational schools in Turkey are not only popular among students and parents in Turkey but are also over-represented in comparison to general schools, as they initially solely served to educate religious staff. Thus, it is doubtful whether Turkey suddenly is in urgent need of so many \textit{imams} to build one religious vocational high-school for every general high-school. If the need for religious staff is not plausible then, again, the attitude of parents might be the cause for the increasing attendance, as discussed earlier with respect to female employment rates. Çakır/Bozan/Talu have analysed the phenomena of

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.
vocational schools in their 2004 study *İmam Hatip Liseleri: Efsaneler ve Gerçekler*, and I shall depict some of their findings regarding reasons parents send their children to these schools, as they might be of state ideological importance. Among many reasons, the authors explain the multitude of students attending Islamic vocational schools with a public in support of such schools, as the clear majority of them were privately funded, which meant that the kind of school to be opened was left to the financier, rather than the state. Thus, conservative financiers were using a loophole that allowed them to open Islamic vocational schools without regard for the actual educational needs of the state but rather in-line with their agenda, political attitude and/or ideology. Furthermore, these schools were the only education institutions children could attend in rural areas, which must also be linked to the financiers and their efforts. Hence, instead of opening general junior-high and high-schools in areas where there was a need, the decision to open religious vocational schools as the only option to continue the second half of primary and secondary education must be considered an attempt to intergenerationally influence, uphold, support and/or deepen religious conservatism. The authors also point out that urbanisation may have created a need for boarding schools and school grants, as the clear majority of people moving from villages to cities are in low-income circumstances, which would usually not allow them to send their children to junior-high schools or even high schools. These Islamic vocational schools opened an opportunity for children of families with low incomes to finish their educations. At the same time, the authors indicate that the high attendance of these schools by female students is striking, which is interconnected to the complex of inner-migration, low-income, low-education and conservative views. As the authors point out, families of female students explicitly wanted them to attend Islamic vocational schools, as they see their values better represented in these institutions, which isolate male and female students completely and predominantly teach Islamic curricula. The authors also state that the educational level of these families is mainly very low. Hence, the reasons pointed out by the authors include reinforcement of the families’ values paired with an apparent trepidation regarding daughters’ possible educational success, which would shake their normative attitude regarding the role of women in society. Thus, economic, religious and cultural reasons are also supporting factors for the high attendance at

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241 Ibid., p. 72f.
242 Ibid., p. 75ff, 121f.
these schools. Hence, higher participation of female students after 1990 and foremost after 2000, especially with respect to secondary education, must then be a result of urbanisation (accessibility), changes in the law (making 12 years education compulsory) and an increasing enrolment in Islamic vocational schools. Thus, a shift from Kemalist state ideology must have occurred after 1940, as otherwise I cannot explain the intergenerational influence in enrolment numbers to Islamic vocational schools and declining unemployment rates of women for the same period. Furthermore, Atatürk died in 1938; thus, a shift from Kemalist state ideology in his lifetime is implausible. And though urbanisation resulted in higher enrolment numbers for the female population, especially after 2000, the missing infrastructural investments in quality of education by the state yet again indicate an un-Kemalist approach to education.

Statistically the shift in state ideology away from Kemalism can be substantiated. I shall further and deepen these findings with an analysis of teaching programmes and curricula from 1923 to the present in the next chapters.

5.2. Changes in proclamations of educational goals

This chapter focuses on changes that occurred from 1923 to the present concerning Turkey’s educational goals as manifested in its educational programmes. These programmes are extended guidelines to curricula issued by the state which describe, define and explain in detail how teaching staff should approach every subject, which topics to teach, how to teach them, which topics to emphasize and how much time to spend on the different issues of the subjects. Also included in these programmes are introductory guidelines for teachers concerning the state’s educational goals and tasks of education. Thus, these general guidelines can be viewed as a public manifest of what the goals of education according to the state are.

These programs changed over time in many respects. First, the length and size of the programs dramatically increased. While these programs were printed in A5 booklet format until 1938 and were around 80 pages long, this changed after 1945 to the typical book format we know today, while the page numbers rose to 200. This
trend of increasing page numbers incrementally continued yet did not exceed 300 pages. However, after 1980, in the 1988 programme for junior-high schools, the page number jumped to 400 and almost reached 500 pages with the 1995 programme when the book format was abandoned in 1995 in favour of catalogue-sized programmes. All the page numbers refer to junior-high school programmes. Both high-school and primary-school levels also saw comparable incremental rises in page numbers and format changes.

Here alone we already have signs of what I will be able to depict in the forthcoming: These programs became more and more detailed over time and should no longer be seen as general guidelines; they rather give the teaching staff very specific and detailed information regarding what should be taught in the classroom and how. Though centralized within a single piece of work, the sheer size of these documents already shows signs of the increasing influence of the state in pedagogical spheres of action, as discussed in Chapter 3.3 concerning the classroom situation. There I argued that, though education as a functional system has created an organised sub-system of pedagogues, the result was not more differentiation, hence, more autonomy against the environment in decision-making, but rather an increased influence of the state and the economy in pedagogical issues. Thus, in this chapter, I depict the result to which this ‘de-differentiation’ of the system of education in Turkey led with respect to state ideological changes.

To analyse state ideological changes, a closer analysis of clear and open statements within the programs is necessary. These statements can be found in the entry declarations of these programs. They are entitled, ‘The purpose of national education’ and ‘The Principles of Education and Teaching’ (Milli Eğitimin Amaçları and Eğitim ve Öğretim İlkeleri). In the programs analysed here, these declarations can be found at the beginning of the programs and are a compass to what follows in the detailed descriptions of the different subjects within the program. Thus, not only can a person try to read the intentions of the state via its history curriculum, but a closer look at and comparison of the opening statements shows the direction of the state’s ideological position.

In the years of definitive Kemalist education from 1923 to 1939, such principles or purposes of education were non-existent. The first time such declarations appear is in 1949, with a length of 32 pages. After this date, all programs entail such
statements. What stands out in the 1949 program’s declarations is the focus on two aspects of educational goals: the formation of a person with national identity and pride in and submission to the state and its leaders. The latter is openly stated under the heading ‘what students have to/will learn from school-affiliated administrative and public works with the following words: ‘If necessary, [the student] needs to follow the path a leader shows him’\textsuperscript{243}. This is not a stand-alone sentence concerning merely a student’s openness in group work environments; it must be put in perspective with the entirety of the educational objectives mentioned in the preliminary text. The very beginning of the section entailing the mentioned sentence’s headline is ‘The School is a true community’. It states that,

\begin{quote}
\textit{As the children must be brought up in a national community and as such should be productive and successful individuals, the educational system has to provide the students a place in which they have to actively take part in the school community.}\textsuperscript{244}
\end{quote}

Thus, the educational principles are, as I mentioned in the theoretical part as well, to educate children to be part of a society with its own guidelines, rules and punishments. However, here one can almost get the impression of quite a positive approach which aims towards development rather than toward the implementation and teaching of a restrictive rule. This is highlighted under the point of how to teach morality to students at school, in which the program states that ethics and morals cannot be taught with force ‘like a dictator’ but should rather be objectively described and made understandable by the teacher, while the student will eventually learn common ethical rules with the help of the teacher.\textsuperscript{245} These statements do not change throughout the years and remained the same until the very last issued programme in 1995.\textsuperscript{246} Hence, in my analysis, I might conclude that, without a change of principles, the educational system was not involved in a state ideological shift. However, this phenomenon does not have to collide with one of the major controlling tools the Turkish Republic has deployed since its founding: the construction of a national identity around the created idea of the historicity of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[244] Ibid., p.11.
\item[245] Ibid., p. 22.
\item[246] After 1995 the programme structure changed, and the Ministry of national education of Turkey decided to issue school subject based curricula.
\end{footnotes}
‘Turk’, as mentioned in Chapter 4 when analysing Kemalism. Quite to the contrary, any shift in state ideology, whether a transition or transformation, would necessarily be dependent on a core belief in society of membership, as this ensures that the different facets of society to follow the change of state ideology. Thus, the second aspect of educational goals should be analysed in connection with the submission to the state—that is the formation of a person with national identity and pride—as this is the limiting factor to the students’ behaviour and action in society.

In the programme of 1949 the ‘Goals of national education’ (Milli Egitimin Amaclari) are listed, as are the aims the educational system tries to reach with the children, which is subdivided into four categories: from a societal, personal, interactive and finally economic standpoint. While these subdivisions exist, they all are based around the premise of national identity and pride. As for the goal a child should reach via education from a societal perspective, the very first sentence is very much in line with the analysis done before about citizenship not being a balanced relationship between a citizen and the state of rights and duties but rather one overly burdened with duties of a person towards the state.

‘[The child ought to] understand the responsibility and feel the pride of being a child of the Turkish people’ and ‘[The child ought to] protect the values of the proud Turkish history, be bound to the principles of the Turkish revolution’. These are the very first two principles of education as the Turkish Republic understood it in 1949, and they constitute a very strong sign for my claim regarding the formation of national identity and pride within children via the educational system.247 And though one of the arrows of Kemalism was reformism, thus the will to constant improvement and change in society, the fifth principle of the goals of Turkey’s national education demands that the child ought to respect differences in ideas in society, so long as they do not ‘shatter the principles of National Unity.’248 Whereas one could argue that a state seeks stability and naturally would not support ideas aimed to destroy its cores, the exact definition of what idea could endanger principles of national unity is left unclear. Furthermore, whereas the six arrows of Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal’s speeches demand a youth who seeks the continuation of reform, revolution and development—which would include consideration of radical ideas that probably

247 Ibid., p. 5.
248 Ibid., p. 5.
collide with the national unity ideas of a specific time—the educational system of Turkey demands that the child follow the opposite path of nationalist obedience. To put it into perspective, Atatürk himself, like every revolutionary, shattered the principles of unity of the Ottoman Empire. Without going too much into detail, the rest of the articles are based around this core principle of obedience, national identity and pride and do not delve into general principles such as the student being able to read and write.

The programmes of 1962 and 1970 did not change the core principles of national education; only the wording was adapted to a more modern Turkish language. The 1995 programme totally abandoned the original form and version of the principles of national education by naming it as it stands but inserting the aforementioned principles for primary education. However, in the programme of 1988, the goals and principles of national education were completely rewritten. Though as mentioned before, the principles of primary education were left unchanged. Within the programme of 1988, Atatürk is mentioned for the first time in the general goals of national education. In the programmes prior to 1988, the ‘Turkish Revolution’ is mentioned without an explicit mention of the founder of the republic. However, the general goals of national education start by stating that,

*General goals of the Turkish National Education is to raise all members of the Turkish People bound to the reforms and principles of Atatürk as well as Atatürk’s Nationalism (...); adopted, protective and advancing of the national, moral, humanitarian, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish People; loving of their families, their nation, their people and always striving towards aggrandizing these.*

Yet again, the opening statement of the goals of Turkey’s national education demand the formation of the aforementioned national identity and pride. In lieu of educational goals for students—which are that future citizens are well educated, free minded and capable of thinking critically—the programmes set rather nationalistic goals for the

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252 Ibid., p. 13.
formation of a uniform societal body. This continues in the statements about the principles of education. While past programmes solely included the goals of education, 1988 introduced principles which are very much in line with the opening statement of the goals. Though topics such as ‘education of democracy’, which is set out as an eighth principle, appear to be honourable principles by virtue of stating that democratic standards, principles and values need to be learned to be lived and upheld and thus should be taught to students via national education, the section finishes by stating that ‘in no circumstance will there be room for political and ideologic expressions of thoughts, political activities and discussions contrary to Atatürk’s Nationalism’.253 Thus, the aforementioned democratic values and standards are not only limited, as they would be in democracies, to the opposition of fascism or racism; they rather restrict and force teachers, students and parents into conformity in particular political views. The principle itself basically states that every differing views of Atatürk’s nationalism are to be treated outside of a democratic protection of freedom of speech and belief. Furthermore, if the wording of the goals mentioned before is considered here as well, it could well be argued that any oppositional stance towards the state, government or simply common belief about what Kemalism is cannot be part of the ‘national values’ as it opposes the ‘reforms and principles of Atatürk’ and is thus alien, radical or even destructive of the state and the unity of the people. However, at the same time, secularism is one of the principles of education laid out in the programme, as was discussed before in the context of a discussion of the Six Arrows of Kemalism. Though the programme accepts that national education is based on laicism, the very next sentence directs that religion is a compulsory subject in all stages of primary and secondary education. This oxymoron is consolidated even more by the numerous mentions of Atatürk for the first time in a school programme’s goals while at the same time introducing something fundamentally contrary to Kemalism, as discussed in Chapter 4.254 However, frequent references to Atatürk or Kemalism made while implementing non-Kemalist policies is consistent with the approach of the 1980 junta regime. While in the 1961 constitution Atatürk is mentioned only once, the 1982 constitution uses his name

253 Ibid., p. 18.
254 Compulsory religious teaching was introduced by the junta constitution of 1982 for the first time. The programme of 1988 was written in the light of the junta regimes policies.
eighteen times. Yet again, the same constitution pledges to Kemalism, while compulsory religious education is introduced for the first time in a constitution of Turkey. Thus, after the coup d'état in 1980, a proclaimed Kemalism without one of its core principles, laicism/secularism, is introduced both in the constitution and in education.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the expressed principles of Atatürk should not be taken literally but rather in the light of national identity and pride together with the submission aspect. To be more precise, the collision of set goals (Kemalism) and the implementations (non-Kemalist) cannot be questioned, as this is seen as 'non-national' or destructive; thus, conformity with and submission to a prescribed form of national pride and identity are of upmost importance if the system is to prevail, no matter how absurdly apart theory and reality are. Furthermore, this issue of a more strict, regulated and judging programme—e.g., guidelines for teachers in their classroom interaction with students—depicts a de-differentiated system of education in Turkey. With these programmes, teachers are limited in their space of action and communication. This, however, is what I described in Chapter 3.3 as the very core of state ideological influence in the classroom situation, which ought to be the interactive space of teacher and students. Thus, for Turkish education, I must say that the interpenetration of the state into the sub-system of the classroom developed since 1949, increased its influence considerably after 1980 and reaches its heights in the present. The set of rules described in this chapter are what I have described as the normative rules within a classroom concerning thought and action, thereby creating a space of discipline and punishment within the classroom. Hence, again, the theoretical discussion has found its practical implementation in Turkish education, with which I will be able to further discuss Turkish education and the state’s ideological shift away from Kemalism.

From this conclusion, I have now both theoretically described the influence of the state in the classroom situation, as in Chapter 3.3, and have described this very

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256 As this article remained unchanged in its meaning since 1982, the amended present version of the constitution is used as source. Section 24 is the article concerning the compulsory religious education. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2018.pdf> [accessed: 20.07.2018]
phenomenon of the increased interpenetration of the state into the sub-systems of the classroom for my field of research, i.e., Turkish education.

5.3. Civic education at junior-high schools

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, relevant school subjects are to be analysed to determine whether and how a shift or transformation of state ideology appeared. Relevant in this context are subjects such as history, religion and civic education.

As for civic education, there have been numerous analyses of the subject matter. However, they either, a) focus solely on changes that have appeared within the last twenty years or are an inventory of the subject\textsuperscript{257}, b) focus on the perception of curricula by pedagogues\textsuperscript{258} or c) focus on the learning success for students of changed curricula\textsuperscript{259}. As for the first, these analyses are limited by the view on short periods, which might be meaningful in a pedagogical analysis of subjects but is not, however, relevant to this dissertation. Second, the perception of pedagogues with respect to changed curricula might yield relevance for the classroom and school situation as per an ‘idea’ of what topics might be useful or not, yet it cannot be of relevance to this dissertation. And lastly, the learning success of students is, again, not of importance within this dissertation. The subjects I am analysing are selected as per their ideological influence on the students \textit{per se} rather than per their ‘real’ influence. Thus, any measure to account for success or lack of learning is irrelevant.

For the purpose of this dissertation and its success, a) the timespan must be from the beginning of the republican education to the present, b) rather than a pedagogical perspective, I shall let the changes in programmes and curricula be proof, c) the

Tuba Çengelci and Şefik Yaşar, ‘Sosyal Bilgiler Dersinde değerler eğitimine ilişkin bir durum çalışması’, \textit{Uluslararası Avrasya Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi}, 3.9 (2012), 1-23


learning success of students is not of importance within the framework of this dissertation.

Finally, none of the mentioned analyses focus on shifts in state ideology, thus, cannot specifically examine the crucial points I want to delve into. Thus, the dissection on civic education relies fully on my own, unique examination made using primary sources: the programmes of varying years.

Civic education changed its name throughout the years from 1949 to the present, which already bears hints regarding the direction which the subject took over the years. While the subject concerned with civic education was named ‘fatherland/country knowledge’ (Yurt Bilgisi) until 1949, it changed to ‘civic knowledge’ (YurttAŞlık Bilgisi) in the programmes of 1951, 1962 and 1970. In the programmes of 1988 and 1995, it is named ‘citizenship knowledge’ (VatandaŞlık Bilgisi). After 1998, the subject was renamed to ‘Citizenship and Human Rights’ (Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları) as a result of reforms to human-rights standards in Turkey as part of the process of membership to the EU.260 All in all, the gradual change of the subject’s name is already an indication of what will follow in the analysis of the curriculum.

The difference between knowledge about the country or fatherland and knowledge concerning fellow countrymen is obvious, as the first concerns the country itself and knowledge about it while the latter is directed towards persons living in that country itself. However, the change of name from ‘yurttAŞlık’ to ‘vatandaşlık’ needs to be explained. In its meaning, there seems to be no difference when translated into English language. However, the connotations of yurt and vatan are different in the Turkish language and can be best translated as homeland and nation, respectively. Thus, the rebranding of the subject after the 1980 coup plays into the curriculum again, as I mentioned before. However, the details of the curriculum regarding the subject itself are more intriguing, as they appear to reveal the opposite of the notion the titles carry. Thus, though the name change would suggest a more nationalistic, more controlling and less democratic take on the subject, Füsun Üstel analysed this specific issue in her 2004 work, ‘Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde’. There she concludes that, especially during the early years of the republic yet also during the later years, the state was more controlling in its approach towards the education of their citizens.

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in schools, while this stance of the state changed after the 1980s.\textsuperscript{261} However, my concern in this study is neither with whether democracy is taught to the students sufficiently nor with whether this subject is of importance and how it should be taught. I focus solely on shifts in content, meaning and emphasis bearing evidence for state ideological shifts, as I have defined them in Chapter 3.1.

In 1930, this subject was taught to junior-high students in their second and last/third year for one hour per week, and it was compulsory. The description of the subject is short and covers a basic understanding of what the rights and duties of citizens are with a focus on the republican institutions and their importance to basic human rights, rhetorically asking the question, ‘Why is the republic the best form of governance?’\textsuperscript{262} Interestingly, one phrase sums up the notion of the subject to be taught amidst the more explanatory sentences: ‘The fulfilment of the civic duties is necessary to grant the civic rights’\textsuperscript{263} Though this short presentation of the 1930 programme does not seem to be very conclusive in its overall purpose, it already points in its notion to what follows in the 1938 programme, thus, in the years when the founder of the republic was alive and in power. In the programme for the junior-high school in 1938, the hours to be devoted to the subject of fatherland knowledge were increased from one to two. Consequently, the subjects to be examined in the classroom were augmented as well. Spending seven of the 7.25 pages on the description of the second junior-high school year on the depiction of the different estates of a state, the programme finishes with an account of what a family consists of and, interestingly, addresses ‘Marriage to more than one woman’.\textsuperscript{264} Though polygamy had been forbidden by law since 1926, the subject programme still saw the need to mention this at school. The finishing unit of the second year of junior-high school is reserved for a description of the army. Unlike the second year, the third year of junior-high school focuses on citizen-specific topics rather than on core descriptions of the structure of the state. The highlighted issues are, a) Turkish nationalism and its importance, b) how the republic is different from the sultanate, and c) the rights and liberties of citizens but more importantly the duties of these.

\textsuperscript{261} Füsun Üstel, „Makbul Vatandaş” in Peşinde. II. Meşrutiyet’ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2004)
\textsuperscript{262} T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, Ortamektep Müfredat Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930b), p. 20.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{264} T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Ortaokul Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi,1938), p.62.
For the first and second issue, it should be noted that the republic, though 15 years after the founding, is still very young and, as I have discussed numerous times throughout this study and especially in Chapter 4, is trying to build a unified nation with an historically made-up history of the Turks: i.e., Kemalist nationalism. Thus, the ties between Turkish nationalism and its importance with the system of a republic and its superiority to a sultanate was a main focus of educational policy, not only in schools but for the general public as well. Yusuf Akçura, one of the major theoretical figures, especially after the founding of the republic for the CHP, criticised the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire and its lack of understanding of emerging European theories, such as nationalism, populism and socialism and states. He said that it is ‘unforgivable that the elites, the intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire have not heard, learnt and tried to find out the causes for their existence [the emerging theories].’ Inherent in his critique of the Ottoman Empire are already-mentioned Kemalist principles, such as nationalism and populism. Thus, the superiority of the republic over the Ottoman Empire for Akçura is its modern approach to society, state and politics, the lack of which leads to the Ottoman Empire’s demise. Furthermore, Hasan Ali Yücel, the minister of education from 1938 to 1946, wrote in 1938 in a book about secondary education that, ‘the main characteristic of republican education has without a doubt been national’. He then quoted a speech by İsmet İnönü, the second President of the Turkish Republic, in which İnönü makes clear that national manners ought to be taught at schools, which oppose international and—significant for my argument, as it pertains to the Ottoman Empire—religious manners. Thus, both theoretical and political leaders of the young republic were insisting on the superiority of the republic over the Ottoman Empire and creating a contrast between republic vs. empire, democracy vs. sultanate.

However, rather more detailed is the display of the duties and rights of the citizens in this programme. Though the part concerning citizenship starts with the rights given by the constitution and protected by the state a thorough and lengthy explanation of the different types of taxes is implemented in the programme. This is surprising, as the students to be taught are teenagers, and the curriculum is designed mostly to

265 Akçura, Yusuf, Türkçülük (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 2006), p. 16.
present tax law and all variants of taxes that existed in that period.\textsuperscript{268} The description of the subject of fatherland knowledge finishes with an account of military duty, which again is part of the duties of a citizen, though solely on the male side. However, for both the taxes and military service, the programme clearly identifies harsh punishments if the responsibilities are not fulfilled. Hence, the programme discusses the duties of citizens with much more emphasis than the rights while amplifying the emphasis by threatening students with punishment. At the same time, the programme does not provide sufficient arguments for the guarantee of citizens’ rights, other than to say that ‘the state protects the rights’ of its citizens.\textsuperscript{269} To finalize the 1938 programme’s direction, I can say that students were mainly taught what their civic duties towards the state are and how to fulfil them even as they were taught the harsh consequences for disobedience.

While the 1938 version emphasized a simple description of the duties and the consequences of disobedience, the 1949 programme furthered this notion by bundling Turkish nationalism, Atatürkism and the security of the state (i.e., obedience of the people for the sake of the state). One hour per week for all three stages of junior-high school is scheduled with this programme. For the first-time objectives and explanations of the objectives, chapters are included to the subject curriculum. All objectives are based around the education of patriotic, republican and useful parts of society. It is not based around the education of individuals with a free spirit, but rather around students becoming a working piece of society. They shall be ‘bound to the values of the revolution’ who ‘abide the authority of the state’ yet respect different ideas so long as these do not ‘interfere with the principles of national unity among the citizens’.\textsuperscript{270} In addition to this behavioural ruling of the programme, it is stated that joblessness harms society; thus, being employed is of the upmost importance, making it another duty of a citizen.\textsuperscript{271} In the descriptions of the objectives, one can see characters of what was discussed in theory: the school as institution and social system as a preparatory tool for the state to ensure economic goals to be met (Chapter 3.2) and the status quo implemented via the structure of the state to not be endangered by its citizens (Chapter 3.3) The mentioned section states that, ‘in order

\textsuperscript{268} Cf., Ibid., p. 65-68.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{270} T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (1949), p. 113.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., p. 114.
for the students to love school, the rules need to thoroughly taught to them, [...] if these rules are not abided by the order of the school would be destroyed'. The programme identifies a parallel between school, society, family and the state and says that all of these can live in harmony within themselves and in synergy only if order prevails. However, not only should the child obey and protect law and order but ‘it should be indoctrinated to the child by the teacher, that living for the nation, dying for the nation, sacrificing its whole existence to the nation and to fulfil national goals as they are more important than any other goal are the task and cause of every Turkish child.’ This tenor is continued in the detailed curriculum, in which the child is being taught obedience and active engagement, however, without self-determination. Again, the rights of the citizens are very briefly explained, while their duties are more detailed and can again be distilled to paying taxes, voting and military duty. The programme goes so far as to tell the student how to act in society, thus branding differing behaviour as disruptive. As mentioned before, joblessness is seen as an act against the whole society, so how does the programme deal with job finding? It mentions factors such as talent and desire; however, the ‘situation of the family and surrounding’ is mentioned as well. Though state support for education is mentioned in the programme, the very next point is concerns ‘our debt after receiving state support’: ‘[E]very person needs to earn their living on their own [...] and not be a burden to others, thus should have a job’. This makes the whole argument for breaking out of one’s family’s socio-economic situation and class obsolete. Thus, one can clearly see that this teaching regarding ‘civic knowledge’ is not much involved in teachings of democratic rights but rather concerns the formation of a singular society. Or, as discussed earlier, the reproduction of the means of production via Althusser together with Foucault’s disciplining in the classroom, appears in full bloom with this programme.

The 1962 programme curriculum, which remained untouched in the 1970 programme, did not change the objectives and explanations of 1949. However, the curriculum was enhanced with respect to various topics. Traffic rules are a yearly topic in the curriculum which had never been discussed before. Furthermore, tourism

272 Ibid., p. 114.
273 Ibid., p. 114.
274 Ibid., p. 115.
275 Ibid., p. 123.
276 Ibid., p. 124.
plays a large role, such that the behavioural rules in public were enhanced by this specific issue. However, the main reason tourism played a major role in teaching regarding the behaviour of students was not to make the students beware of strangers in their country but to contain possible difficulties the citizens could cause to tourists coming into the country, as the ‘currency earned by the tourist’ is of economic importance.

Another topic introduced in this programme and extant in the 1970 programme as well is the 1960 coup, described as the ‘27th of May 1960 Revolution’. This coup is not merely explained but is rather deepened in its importance by thorough teachings regarding the new constitution and reasons for the coup. The 1962 programme tries to implement a strong belief in the support and understanding of the junta’s mindset. Continuous references to the Demokrat Parti government they overthrew are underlined by newly added statements to the programme’s democracy explanation such as, ‘[t]hose in government shall not misuse their power for their own advantages. Negative consequences contrary situations will produce.’ This statement is followed by a point which explains the Turkish Republic as an example of democracy. However, there the programme’s plan is to ‘briefly look at the history of the republic’ to then mainly discuss the ‘27th of May Revolution’. While the programme seeks constantly to explain the reasons for the coup, it also threatens the students, thus future voters, regarding the consequences of ‘wrong’ governmental acts. This is deepened by a point made regarding the duties of the citizens under elections: Students should be taught the ‘responsibility of their vote. Seeking the qualities of competence and the benefit of the nation in the candidates, we vote.’

This statement refers directly to the Demokrat Parti government and tells the students that ‘wrong’ decisions at the ballot cause coups; thus, their votes should consider the powers in the state. Tim Jacoby argues that this very notion was very much constituted with the 1960 coup, while the military would argue in all three coups (1960, 1971, 1980) that it balances the true demands of the people and the well-being of the state.

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278 Ibid., p. 145.
279 Ibid., p. 144.
280 Ibid., p. 144.
281 Ibid., p. 144.
Further, the main theme of the curriculum for civic knowledge in 1962 must be devotion. Numerous direct and indirect mentions of the leitmotif, ‘Valuing the nation’s interests higher than the own interests’, can be found.\textsuperscript{283} The mentioned topics—traffic, tourism and the coup—are also dealt with from a devotional perspective and follow the leitmotif. Thus, the intertwined notions of nationalism and obedience were deepened after 1960 in the curriculum of civic knowledge by adding devotion. Though obedience and devotion might seem to describe the same thing, what is meant here is not solely a blind obedience demanded by the people from the programmes before but rather the call for devotion to actively change patterns of behaviour and thought. Thus, while nationalistic standards demand fulfilment of the duties of a citizen towards a state—i.e., voting, military service and paying taxes as per the programme of 1949, which are personally active (nationalism) and societally passive (the duties) behaviours—the addition of devotion asks for a socially active role to meet the demands of the state and nation. However, the active role cannot be mistaken with a true democratic engagement, where differing ideas have their right to exist. Contrariwise, as was stated earlier, political views and ideologies outside of the realm of the perceived Kemalism and nationalism of that time were branded ‘non-national’, thus non-acceptable. Consequently, the programme consists of a shift in the education of society’s youngest. While the purely Kemalist educational system tried to form a national unity via education, after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death, an obedient nationalist citizen was demanded, resulting in a nationalist, obedient and devoted formation after 1960. The increasingly personality- and freedom-limiting aspect must be noticed.

The teaching programme of the civic knowledge subject in 1988 and 1995 (both being the exact same, content wise) was changed almost entirely in the goals-and-explanations department compared to the programmes of 1962 and 1970. The hours the subject was to be taught changed from one hour per week for all three stages of junior-high school in 1962 and 1970 to two hours per week solely in the last year of junior-high school in 1988 and to three hours per week again in the last year in 1995. What stands out in these texts is the focus on state authority and the respect for it, which should not be taught ‘deprived of excitement […], [but] the teacher needs to be convincing and impressive.’\textsuperscript{284} In the statements of the goals and explanations of

\textsuperscript{283} T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (1962), p. 142.
these, the teacher’s role is emphasized, while topics similar to prior programmes such as nationalism, love for the nation and dedication to it are mentioned yet are not emphasized. Moreover, the main tenor of the programme is respect for the state’s authority, for ‘personalities who are/have been working tasked in various fields for the prosperity and peace of society’ and the personal fulfilling of the duties of citizenship learned at school. A detailed analysis of the curriculum depicts a newly organized, thorough education regarding citizen’s rights. This detailed teaching of all civic rights never occurred in the previously analysed programmes of 1930, 1938, 1949 and 1962. Duties are mentioned again; however, these mentions are not as lengthy and thorough and are limited to the topics of voting, army service and paying taxes. Also, newly added are sections in which the curriculum deals with ‘threats to our regime and our existence.’ Furthermore, religion and religious rules find their debut in the curriculum as part of common rules in society. All in all, the curriculum, bundled with the goals and explanations, reveals a picture of citizens who are a little less nationalistic but are still obedient and respecting of the state instead of devoted. The focus on democracy and the consequent rights to citizens was never so thorough in previous programmes. However, this curriculum almost asks its citizens to learn about their rights yet not to devote themselves to the nation, but rather to mind their business, respect the status quo and not be too involved with political matters. While the 1962 curriculum asked for an active engagement of its students to devote themselves to the nation and give up their self-interests, the 1988 and 1995 curricula demand the opposite, almost saying, improve your own life, get a good job, know your rights and let the state and political elites deal with the nation’s issues. In Turkey’s political history, the 1960s until the coup of 1980 were very vibrant times. An active civil society with very active student and worker’s groups marked these times. It went so far that the coup of 1980 was grounded on the fact that neoliberal changes such as the one from the 24th of January 1980, could not be implemented because of political instability and strong socialist opposition groups outside of parliament. Considering this abridgment of Turkey’s political situation in the 1960s and 1970s, it

285 Ibid., p. 207f.
286 Cf., T.C. Maarif Vekaleti (1930b) & T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı (1938) & T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (1949) & T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (1962)
appears understandable that, after the *junta* in 1980, strong societal involvement was not to be demanded in the curricula for the civic knowledge subject.

A look into the programmes of the years after 2005 shows many inconsistencies regarding the teaching of this subject. Though the subject was excluded from the curricula completely in 2005, it was reintroduced in 2006, yet not as a stand-alone subject but rather as part of the subject ‘social science’. In 2010, it was reinstated as a subject of its own to be taught in the eighth grade (final year of junior-high school)\(^{288}\). Only two years later, in 2012, it was to be taught to fourth graders (final year of primary school).\(^{289}\) From the inconsistencies of the curricula after 2005 until 2012, the emphasis on conforming future grown-up citizens to a normative and behavioural standard via civic education, as eluded to in this chapter, already raises questions about how the AKP approached this subject. It was furthered with the exclusion, fusion and teaching of civic education to primary-school aged children, which has never occurred. This implies, among other things, that the formation of the future citizen was shifted to other subjects, rather than being manifested in one. Furthermore, one can see the rise of weekly school hours for students from 30 in total in 1995 to 35 in 2012, while the hours of electives was increased from 2 to 6 hours.\(^{290}\) However, the compulsory hours per week were increased as well, from 28 in 1995 to 29 in 2012. Thus, time constraints cannot have been the reason for the abolishment of a stand-alone civic subject. Nor can an increase of weekly hours in mathematics and foreign languages and the introduction of new subjects (such as technology and design, IT and career planning) explain the exclusion of the civic subject in junior-high schools, as geography and history classes are not part of the curriculum in 2012, thus, would combine for a surplus of 4 hours weekly of the first two years of junior-high school. Hence, I must conclude that the trend of the programmes after 1980 until 2012 toward relatively minimized hours of civic classes was furthered towards their complete annihilation.\(^{291}\) How did this translate to the curricula? To get a complete picture of explicit and implicit civic teaching at the junior-


high-school level, the subject itself and social-science teachings need to be analysed.

The subject’s programme of 2015 introduces a new perspective to the teaching of this class. While the students of previous years’ programmes were around 15 years old, this curriculum is addressed to 10- to 11-year-old children. Thus, demands for an active citizenship, as mentioned in the programme, are somewhat unrealistic; they amount to an expression of good intent. Yet, the programme does not emphasize this matter. It rather focuses on human rights as a natural cause of being a human. Throughout the programme and the detailed explanations for all units of the curriculum, ‘rights’ in their different variations constitute an ever-occurring topic. From the right of self-determination to religious rights and freedom of expression, rights are the centrepiece of this programme. The only limitation is brought to the student’s attention at the end of the curriculum, which mentions the necessity of order in society, adherence to written and unwritten laws and obedience to the state. Though the programme prescribes the weight of each of the six topics in the curriculum in percentages while appointing only 30% to ‘rules’- and 70% to ‘rights’-related themes, the rules and negative outcomes of not following them are intriguingly kept for the finishing chapters of the subject. The curriculum is not very detailed or aimed towards earning key knowledge as in previous years. It is rather laid out for little children to know that they have rights as result of being a human and for the students to ‘essentially protect and not harm themselves, protect and not harm others, protect and not damage what is ours’. Thus, this programme’s civic education, per the target group it is addressing, is very indefinite in its approach and goals. If one studies civic education topics in the ‘social science’ subject, taught from primary school’s last year and throughout the first three years of junior-high school—thus, for four straight years for three hours per week—the mentioned approach to personality building is deepened and fed with more knowledge about democracy and the state. Embedded within the ‘social science’ subject are various topics which formerly were part of the civic knowledge curricula, such as the teachings of the

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293 Ibid., p. 12f.
294 Ibid., p. 3.
Furthermore, under the chapter entitled ‘One Nation, One Flag’, these state institutions are not only mentioned but are mentioned in connection with civil society and existing laws and the importance of the cooperation of these for the sake of the state. A great emphasis is also put on economy as part of the civic duties. This not only includes paying taxes as seen in previous years but, with this programme, it includes a more macro-economic approach. Topics such as ‘Investment and marketing project suggestions, especially considering Turkey’s geographic characteristics’ or for the student to be able to be able to ‘evaluate Turkey’s resources and needs from the perspective of its economic relations with other countries’ are introduced. All in all, it can be said that ‘social science’ is not a dedicated class for the acquisition of civic knowledge. On the contrary, with the programmes and curricula after 2005, Turkey’s education on civic knowledge negates the attempts of the 70 years I have analysed so far and eviscerates the subject as a whole. The foundation of any civic teachings at junior-high schools that is left is based on personality building and rights and institutional teachings. The trend of the 1988 and 1995 programmes, in which more emphasis was placed on an individualistic account of citizens, was continued and deepened.

One must conclude that Turkey’s early (1930 to 1949) education relied strongly on nation-building and the acknowledgement of one’s membership in the unified, new society. Briefly after 1949, this was brought to more strict lines and the call for obedience. In addition, the call for nationalism became louder and clearer, such that devotion was added to the couple of nationalism and obedience in the 1960s and 1970s. When analysed, these three periods depict what was described before in Chapter 3.1 as the process of transition of state ideology. While until 1949 the programme was kept simple in its dimensions and clear and simplistic in its demands—i.e., obedience to the founding fathers and the formation of national pride for a unified body within the newly formed republic—the transition process of

Turkey’s state ideology began after that date. Emphasizing the obedience character of the teaching more than before did not visibly change a lot concerning the formation of the citizen. On the contrary, a more unitary approach to Kemalism would favour this approach. However, this change implied two things. First, the programmes from 1949 until 1960 were more detailed, descriptive of chapters of the curricula and were thus more controlling of the room the teaching-body had in its educational execution. This is a characteristic of the de-differentiation process in education, as argued in the previous chapter. Thus, the influence of the state on the system of education’s inner-workings did not concern merely the general guidelines for teachers in light of the aims of education, as discussed in Chapter 5.2; instead, this decision-making power by the state over the classroom-situational behaviour of students and teachers was carried over to the subject of civic education as well. Hence, again, the theoretical discussion of Luhmann’s differentiation process of the system of education and its dependent independency, as discussed in both chapters 3.1 and 3.2, has de facto increasingly become dependent to a degree, as the state and the functional-system economy have taken decision-making roles even at the micro level.

Second, Kemalist education focused more on both nationality building and devotion to the Six Arrows of Kemalism, thereby leaving room for the children to develop revolutionary and progressive personalities—though of course within the lines of the republican ideas. By emphasizing obedience to such an extent that it was equally important to nationalism—even merged into a reciprocally dependant construct—progression even within the lines of Kemalism was halted. For the period between 1960 until 1980, the transition of state ideology, which began with 1949, was amplified. Again, the differentiation process by which micro-managed class-room scenarios were controlled was widened, while at the same time yet another characteristic of the ‘Turkish citizen’ was introduced: devotion. Not only the citizens listen to and follow what the state commanded, they should even devote their lives towards that goal. The active participation of the citizens was demanded for the very clearly set goals the state defined. Thus, the transition away from Kemalist education was furthered and, stated ideologically, the shift can be more clearly seen. However, it was not until the military coup of 1980 that the shift from transition to transformation started. As my analysis of the programmes and curricula of the civic knowledge subject has shown, thematically totally different curricula emerged. These were less controlling of human behaviour and offered fewer prescriptions for how a good citizen
acts, and they did not demand devotion anymore. A more individualistic, self-centred approach was taken while remaining nationalistic-obedient. It even went so far as to fully abandon the subject and make it part of generalized social teachings. Thus, the citizens should focus on their own lives and not get involved too much with state issues while remaining nationalistic and obedient. The question of affiliation after citizenship was raised, making room for religious, cultural and derivative memberships for the children to think of instead of insisting on the 1930s Kemalist unitary collective of ‘the Turks’. Hence, the timeline of state ideological shifts in Turkey set out in Chapter 3.1 is supported by the changes in the teaching of the subject of civic knowledge.

However, by unhinging the Kemalist unitary idea of society and further differentiating it with affiliations besides citizenship even to the point of teaching individualism, a vacuum of identification within society was produced via the educational system. Or, as Kemal İnal states, ‘pragmatic individualistic individuals’ were produced. Füsun Üstel argues that this shift was from the ‘state of emergency citizen’ to the ‘human rights citizen’. Supporting my claim, she argues that, instead of the controlling state, the approach to human rights and citizenship included and added characteristics for the citizen to abide to, thus leaving room for the individual to explore themselves how they would want to identify themselves. However, Üstel argues that the main characteristic filling that void is the symbiosis of Islam and Turkism. Furthermore, in my timeline, I have argued in Chapter 3.2 that economic changes in Turkey would have had state ideological implications while the 1980 shift to a neo-liberal economy in Turkey would be a mark the beginning of the transition of state ideology. Mustafa Peköz’s study of the growth of economic power in conservative Islamic circles in neo-liberal Turkey depicts how Islamism is consistent with the economic, political and social beneficiary of neoliberalism in Turkey. Selda Polat names this symbiosis of Islamism and neo-liberalism ‘neoliberal conservative ideology’ and goes on to say that, ‘while education produces the entrepreneur, competitive workforce that the market needs, it also must have the

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300 Ibid.
301 Mustafa Peköz, İslami Cumhuriyete Doğru. Türkiye’de Siyasal İslamın Dünü, Bugünü ve Yarını (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2009), p. 343-373.
ideological/pedagogical content to raise moderate, obedient, conservative workforce.\textsuperscript{302} Thus, the authors presented here argue that Islamism fills the vacuum that occurred with the shift in state ideology away from Kemalism. Hence, it must be argued that, though the curricula appeared to have put more emphasis on human rights and liberal thought, the controlling mechanisms of the state appear in the form of changed approaches. This would mean that a subliminal identificatory approach must be taken and implemented in school subjects so that the student would decide on identificatory characteristics on their own and thus not feel pressured but rather come to the ‘conscious’ conclusion that their self-description is made freely and rationally. This characteristic would be even more precious, as it was ‘chosen’ by them. However, the underlying fact would remain that it would have to be taught and emphasized in education, hence, be state ideologically relevant. As the authors above have already pointed out, Islamism is this characteristic. Thus, the next chapter focuses on religious teachings in the educational system of Turkey from 1923 to the present to again determine whether and since when changes to that specific subject were made.

5.4. From Kemalist statist, nationalist teachings to nationalist, religious individualism

Atatürk’s idea of the Turkish Republic was profoundly rooted in the secular/laicist conception of democracy. As discussed earlier, one of the Six Arrows of Kemalism deals with this issue; thus, the implementation of religious symbols, ethics or even teachings can and should be considered non-Kemalist. Though the analysis of the programmes and curricula has so far been focused on junior-high schools, to analyse religious teachings at schools I must also depict primary-school programmes and curricula, as the programmes for primary high and high schools do not include religious teachings until after 1980.

The first to introduce a kind of religious teaching is the 1930 primary-school programme. However, it is solely for fifth grade students whose parents explicitly demand it and it appears in the form of a weekly half-hour seminar, which is extracurricular. The content of the subject, as described by the curriculum, is based on republican ideas, fears and views regarding Islam at that time. Thus, it is said that, in Islam, 'hypocrisy is the greatest immorality. Hypocrites are not Muslims.' This is directed towards the manifold interpretations and practices of Islam in Anatolia at that time, which were viewed as faulty and non-Islamic by the founders of the republic and especially by Atatürk, as discussed in Chapter 4, which can be depicted by the following sentence to that section as well, which states that, 'in Islam reason stands above everything.' As Quranic schools were closed by the republic, the demand for religious teaching had to be met, yet still within the lines of secular education. Hence, this is the solution was adopted, which was found in 1930. However, there is no religious teaching to be found in any of the school stages until the 1956 programme. Before 1956, religious teaching within the programme, even if extracurricular, does not find its place. Yet, the programme of 1956 dedicates a whole chapter to the subject of religion. There it is declared that religion is to be taught to students whose parents consent in the fourth and fifth grade of primary school. Intriguingly, it is not extracurricular anymore; the programme even assigns one of the weekly six hours in the fourth and fifth grade of Turkish language teaching to religion classes. The curriculum is divided into two school years. In its first year of teaching, students focus on the prophet Muhammad and, in connection with him, on Islamic morals, as the prophet is depicted as the highest ground of humanly possible morality. The second year of the teaching is focused on faith. That part of the curriculum covers the basics of Islam, such as faith in God’s books, the five pillars of Islam and judgement day. Thus, it is a basic introduction to Islam, which is not spectacular in itself but is already a step away from the Kemalist approach, which stressed the importance of reason, which cannot be found in this more descriptive approach of 1956. Furthermore, the step away from Kemalist education is the

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303 T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, İlkmektep Müfredat Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930a), p. 229.
304 Ibid., p. 230.
305 Ibid., p. 230.
306 T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, İlk Okul Programı (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1956), p. 299.
308 Ibid., p. 299f.
309 Ibid., p. 300ff.
assignment of one hour of Turkish classes, making the subject *de facto* part of the curriculum though still dependant on the consent of the students’ parents. It thus remained extracurricular in theory.

In 1969, the curriculum and programme for religious teaching changes minimally but significantly once again. The hours for Turkish classes are generally cut down to four hours, thus remaining the same whether one takes religion classes or not. Again, it is bound to written consent by the students’ parents and taught one hour per week. For the first time, the programme includes a goals-and-explanations section, as we have seen in my previous analysis as well. There it becomes clear that the educational goals of the 1960s were also part of religious education; i.e., a heavily behaviour-based formation was to be taught via the subject. Two topics in particular crystallize as foci for religious teachings in that time: first, behavioural formation, as mentioned above. A lot of emphasis is given to the teaching of Islamic values and morality, while these are connected to a functional society.\(^{310}\) Hence, for the authors of the programme not only are the known Islamic rules, such as praying five times a day, of importance, but it should be laid emphasize on other Islamic rules which are concerned with ‘the person’s health, rules that are helpful to promote the cooperation and solidarity within society, actions and behaviour that makes the person more virtues.’\(^{311}\) The second important emphasis is the ‘correction of wrong knowledge and teaching the student brought from outside the school.’\(^{312}\) Here again, the programme suggests control over personal matters, as seen in citizenship education. The issue of ‘wrong’ religious knowledge, however, as we have seen with the programme of 1930, has been a topic since the founding of the republic of Turkey. A state-governed understanding of Islam was promoted in the early years of the republic; however, this was not deepened, as the state was bound to the idea of secularism. Most notably, the state-governed-and-interpreted understanding of Islam was the founding of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924, which is one year after the founding of the republic. Furthermore, Atatürk’s approach to Islam was directed by rationalism. While talking to the public in Izmir in 1923 he stated that, ‘our religion [Islam] is the most reasonable and natural religion. This is why it is the last religion. For a religion to be

\(^{311}\) Ibid., p. 108.  
\(^{312}\) Ibid., p. 108.
natural it has to concur with reason, science, knowledge and rationality.\textsuperscript{313} Hence, not only was the state centrally institutionalizing Islam via its directorate, but, as Mustafa Kemal himself argued, it was focusing on science and the rational rather than on religion.

However, with the 1969 programme, the state tries to be more influential in its role over the interpretation of Islam than the previous programmes would suggest. The content of the curriculum remains mainly the same to its predecessor. Some additions were made which feed into the conclusion drawn already. The teaching includes ‘The services of the Turks to Islam.’\textsuperscript{314}

This programme does not change until after the 1980 coup. However, for the analysis of the curricula and programmes after 1980, junior high and high schools are added for the first time, as, for the first time in the educational history of the Turkish Republic, religion was introduced to these school stages as well. The constitution of 1982 introduced religious teaching on a constitutional level for the first time in the republic’s history. Article 24/4 states that, ‘Religious culture and morals education is a compulsory subject to be taught at primary and secondary educational levels. Any other religious educations and teachings outside of that are bound to the will of the persons themselves and to the will of the legal guardian of the little ones’\textsuperscript{315}

By introducing this article in the constitution, religious teaching, i.e., the education of Islam, was legally placed on the same level as human rights. Furthermore, the article states that the subject is compulsory; thus, after 1980 the educational system of Turkey breaks with the tradition of voluntary religious education.

The taught hours of the subject are as follows: two hours per week in the 4th and 5th grades of primary school, another two hours per week throughout junior-high school (three years), and one hour per week throughout high school (three years).\textsuperscript{316} This translates to religious teachings at schools for eight of a maximum eleven years. In

\textsuperscript{313} Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I-III (Divan Yayıncılık, 2006) <http://atam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/5%C3%96YLEV-ORJ%C4%B0NAL.pdf> [accessed: 15.05.2018], p. 93.

\textsuperscript{314} T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (1969), p. 111.


comparison, we have seen only one hour per week for a maximum of two years until 1980. This approach does not change throughout the 1980s and 1990s; thus, the education of religion remained at the highest level of hours per week and the most levels of school in the history of the republic. In all the programs for primary, junior-high and high-schools after 1980 until 2000, the goals are introduced by the statement that the subject of religious teachings are in line with Atatürk’s laicism principle and ought to help educate students: ‘Atatürkism, national unity, the consolidation of love for each other from a religious and morality point and to educate these students to ethical and virtuous human beings.’\textsuperscript{317} The program acknowledges other religions in Turkey as well and claims that it is prepared with care and with regard to Christianity and Judaism to widen the students perspectives about other religions as well. However, it follows by stating that 99 per cent of the population are Muslim; thus, the focus will be on Islam to reinforce the cultural, moral and national standards of society to all students.\textsuperscript{318} The establishment of uniform citizens, as we have seen in previous programmes and under the education of citizenship, finds its place in religious education. Almost all the goals name qualities which were mentioned especially in the programmes of citizenship education in the 1960s until 1980. It is noteworthy that the goals of religious education in the programme for primary schools of 1989 shifts the development of the personality of the student and its qualities from a republican nationalist perspective on education to a religious nationalist educational tool according to which ‘national unity and solidarity’ should be built and ‘the education of good citizens’ established, while showing that Islam is against ‘injustice, dishonesty, hypocrisy, fraud, selfishness, laziness and behaviour like that’.\textsuperscript{319}

The primary-school programmes for religious education of the 1980s and 1990s are almost entirely comparable to the programmes of the 1960s and 1970s regarding the state practical and moral duties of Muslims; they thus cover Islamic basics. Topics such as ‘Atatürk’s views on our religion and laicism’, ‘Moral duties’, ‘Cleanliness and honesty’ and ‘Love of the Nation’ were added.\textsuperscript{320} Interestingly, these last four topics contain the most direct statements concerning the relationship between Islam and

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., p. 625.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., p. 626.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., p. 632f.
citizenship. Atatürk introduces the section on religious education, while the next two units are concerned with behavioural issues such as cleanliness. The last part intriguingly mixes love for the nation, as depicted before in civic education programmes, and martyrdom from a religious perspective. It entangles the personal sacrifice a person ought to make for the nation with nationalism as a religious duty.\(^{321}\)

Thus, though religious education was extended to all stages of education, the programme consists of more topics than before and is, as mentioned before, an hour longer per week. Hence, the teachings at junior-high and high schools include additional information compared to the years from 1960 to 1980. The goals of the junior-high school religious teachings are almost the same to those of the primary schools. Again, the intention of that subject is stated to be teaching religious knowledge entangled with nationalism and civic education. However, at this stage of school, Turks and their contribution to Islam and ‘national defence and national issues’ ought to be taught in the light of Islam.\(^{322}\)

As it was the case with the programme for primary schools, the focus of religious teachings is to give the student the necessary general and basic knowledge about Islam. However, within that purpose, contextual connections to public issues that were to be found in civic education before are identified as part of the religious belief system. For instance, under the header ‘faith and worship in Islam and their obligations’, general Islamic rules are presented. This section concludes with reference to ‘behaviour that is bad for one-self and society’.\(^{323}\)

The programmes of 1988 and 1995, which are almost fully the same despite some little corrections, are comprised of such ending chapters to main Islamic-rule topics. Thus, while the student learns the general rules of Islam in this programme again and in depth, they are shown as intertwined with societal common sense, rules and purposes. Beside the issues of Islamic rules and behaviours are the numerous statements about the nation, flag and the national community. Here again, Islamic rules relate to nationalist ideas such as ‘behaviour harming the nation and the people’, ‘the love and respect for the flag’, or, as a whole chapter is headlined, ‘Love for the Nation and the People’.\(^{324}\) This tenor is topped with one of the last chapters of religious teaching on junior-high schools: ‘The Turks

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\(^{321}\) Ibid., p. 632.


\(^{323}\) Ibid., p. 243.

\(^{324}\) Ibid., p. 243ff.
After having learned Islamic rules and behaviour, always with respect to Turkish nationalism and society, the student finishes junior-high school learning that Turks and Muslims are ‘human kind’s most excellent.’ Thus, religious education at junior-high schools in the 1980s and 1990s was primarily focused on the continuation of the formation of the citizen within the subject of religion, while it openly adds nationalism to it. Thus, as was the case with civic education, the student is presented with an Islamic conservative nationalism as the normative standard in society. Furthermore, being presented with this sentiment of nationalism and conservative Islam, the student cannot diverge by accepting slightly alternative sets of ethics, norms or rules, as both the religious and the nationalistic sentiments are intertwined and built upon dualisms of good/bad, right/wrong, God/Devil, patriotic/terrorist. To put it in an exemplary way, a student cannot be an atheist and nationalist or Muslim and not nationalistic. Thus, the student is solely presented with a single ‘right way’ to live, think and behave: the Islamic conservative nationalistic way. Finally, this approach to the state’s detailed prescription of normativity and religion leaves no room for the teacher to teach with a diverging approach. Again, I must argue that a de-differentiation process linked to the increasing influence of the state in the classroom situation has occurred in the programmes of the 1980s and 1990s.

Though the 1980s introduced religious teachings to the curricula of all school levels, the topics do not differ from junior-high schools to high schools. Again, Islamic behaviour and rules are stressed and connected with societal and national standards. However, the focus in the programmes of high schools is more on morals as the common sense of society and their rooting in Islam, as in the third topic of the curriculum, ‘Religion and moral’. Again, to the end of the religious teachings, the curricula are planned towards portraying ‘Turkish-Islamic Culture and civilization’. The programmes of 1987 and 1998 are almost similar, with the only difference that the topics ‘happiness’ and ‘Religions in the world and Islam’ were deleted from the curricula in 1988.

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325 Ibid., p. 251.
326 Ibid., p. 251.
Thus, I can conclude that, for the period from 1980 to the 2000s, a more in-depth knowledge about Islamic philosophers or Islam in itself was not given at that time, though the hours dedicated to teaching Islam were raised significantly. The subject was mainly focused on repetitive teachings of Islamic basics and their connection with Turkishness/nationalism. Hence, apart from the curricula prior to 1980, religion was not a subject the students could choose but was rather used as a substitute to the civic educational goals for the formation of the student. In this regard, not only the behavioural set of rules laid out in the programmes as Islamic is a replacement for a new civic description, but so is the intertwined relationship between Turks/nationalism and Islam depicted in this new definition, as discussed earlier and analysed here. While the ‘good’ citizen ought to follow republican nationalist rules in the years from 1923 until 1980, as analysed in 5.3, I argued that that the definition of citizenship in Turkey saw a change in the curricula of civic education after 1980. Following my assessment here, a harsh shift in state ideology further away from Kemalism after 1980 must be attested concerning this subject as well.

The approach to the programmes of religious education changes in the 2000s. Instead of generally covering topics, the programme of 2010 stipulates six topics to be covered: i.e., belief, worship, the prophet Mohammad, the Quran, morals and religion and culture. The introduction and the goals of the subject are described in the programme as ‘taking the religions core information sources into account and with the framework of Islam’s core morals, the [subject’s] understanding is non-denominational and [considering various] religions.’ However, as one can see from the six core subject to be taught, non-denominationalism does not appear to be of core interest. The focus, as laid out by the goals in the programme, are again to teach religious rituals and knowledge. But more than before, the emphasis is on morals and ethics and the unity they provide in society as a function of common sense, common morals and common ethics. Furthermore, the programme describes fields in which the subject shall influence the student. As could be seen previously in the citizenship education subject, emphasis is placed on personal development. Both the societal and personal aims are intertwined in this matter.

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330 Ibid., p. 2.
331 Ibid., p. 8.
personal quest of the student and the teachings at school shed some light on the path the student should morally go, which, on the one hand, makes them ‘good’ people and, on the other hand, provides for and ensures the ‘stability and unity’ of society.\footnote{Ibid., p. 12f.} The hours per week were left untouched for all levels of schools. However, students must select electives for a total of six hours per week in junior-high schools and much choose five (9\textsuperscript{th} grade), four (10\textsuperscript{th} grade), 18 (11\textsuperscript{th} grade) and 20 (12\textsuperscript{th} grade) at the high-school level. They are offered additional religious teachings in these electives. At the junior-high and high-school levels, they are enabled to elect another six hours per week of religious teaching. Thus, the opportunity of religious teachings was generally widened while the compulsory subject was overhauled so as to be made more focused.

If we analyse the topics of the subject more closely, they mainly cover the basics of Islam, as was the case in previous years. However, the topic of Mohammad constrains what can be said regarding later school levels as well: The topics chosen and dealt with are tailored for the age group of the student so as to improve the learning and internalizing of the intended message. They are consequently chosen to improve the level of the state ideological formation of the student. In the fourth grade of primary school, the students are introduced to the prophet Mohammad via his childhood. The aim of this topic is to teach the basics of Mohammad’s early life, but also for the children to ‘correlate his holiness Mohammad’s behaviour of his childhood and youth to their own.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 38.} A year later, the Prophet’s marriage and his family life are dealt with. Furthermore, the topics ‘worshipping’, ‘morals’ and ‘religion and culture’ are interstratified with formational subjects and messages. While cleanliness is the only topic for fourth graders when dealing with worship, fifth graders learn that national and religious memorial days and holidays are part of national identity and of supporting national unity, while the students’ duty to the nation is focused on the flag, the nation and martyrdom.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 37, 47f.} At the junior-high-school level, the topics are based more on basic Islamic knowledge; however, the focus is still on intertwining this with personal-formation messages. Worship is explained in its details via the Islamic prayers in the sixth grade/first year of junior-high school; however, the student shall not only be taught the basics but must also ‘appreciate the
contributions of the namaz [Islamic prayer] to the individual and the public’. At the same time, the student shall be able to explain the positive effects Islamic prayer had regarding their emotions, behaviour, consciousness of cleanliness and good time management.\textsuperscript{335} The same could be said for other topics, such as heaven and hell in the seventh grade, or the detailed explanations of ‘bad behaviour’ in the eighth grade. However, this short analysis should be enough already to see the formational factors of state ideology in religious teachings. This programme intertwines the personal development and belief system of the student with its own formational demands. As we have seen in civic education for the same period after 2010, a more personal approach is chosen. The students shall ask questions about themselves while the state offers the answers to those questions posed via its educational programme and curricula. And though the programme was introduced to be non-denominational, Anatolian Alevis are mentioned when dealing with different interpretations of the Quran in the seventh grade, as are ‘other religions’, under the topic ‘religion and culture’ concerning the relationship between other religions and Islam in the eighth grade.\textsuperscript{336}

At high schools, this trend continues. Instead of six main topics, the high-school religious teachings consist of seven. Belief, worship and His Highness Mohammad remain the same. Values were added to the topic of morals, while civilization was added to religion and culture. The Quran as topic was not removed but was modified to ‘revelation and reason’, while the added topic compared to primary and junior-high schools is ‘religion and laicism’.\textsuperscript{337} While explanations for the primary- and junior-high-school program’s topic ‘belief’ consist of vague statements that the student shall learn and internalize the general knowledge of religion, implicitly Islam\textsuperscript{338}, the programme for high schools is more explicit about the aim of the topic:

\begin{quote}
With this topic the students will (...), be aware that by being a free and believing human being they differ from others, understand the place and importance of religion in a human’s life, have the belief by knowledge, be able to ground the belief in one God, have a healthy communication with Allah, be
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\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{335} Ibid., p. 50.
\bibitem{336} Ibid., pp. 58, 66.
\end{thebibliography}
able to make sense of their lives, be conducting their everyday lives with the knowledge that every good and evil they do will definitely have consequences (...). Furthermore, a believing person is better equipped to be a humanist (...).\textsuperscript{339}

As can be seen from this quotation, the aims are more specified and show a direction the subject shall fulfil. One must consider that high schools are dealing with students who are 15 and above and who have thus already had religious teachings for five years. Thus, the programme depicts the tailoring of a student with gradually increasing knowledge of religious matters and a more in-depth personal engagement with Islam. Another such example is the Quranic topic in primary and junior-high schools. What was a topic covering religious basics becomes almost a theological-discussions topic. In the second year of high school (10\textsuperscript{th} grade), the student shall be able to ‘analyse the interpretation and translation of a verse in the Quran’, while in the eleventh and twelfth grades the student is taught the different schools of philosophy, thought and law of Islam.\textsuperscript{340} Thus, Islamic basics are covered and repeated in the following years, as we have seen in the programmes from 1980 until 2000. Furthermore, religious education has become more complex and in depth. In this regard, the student is not able to simply internalize the basics to earn a mark but rather has to engage in religious thinking to be successful. This personal engagement goes further and more into the student’s internality when dealing with the topic of ‘belief’. The programme states that the aim of the belief topic in the ninth grade is to show the student that, throughout history, mankind was always seeking religion and belief, while the student shall ‘understand the manifestations in social life of non-revelation religions.’\textsuperscript{341} In the tenth and eleventh grades, the focus is on deepening the belief in Allah. The twelfth grade finishes the topic of ‘belief’ by reflecting on death and the purpose in life. Thus, non-believing or believing in something other than the Sunni Hanefi Islam proposed by the state via education would, per the programme, not be rational, would be non-logical, would be out of human nature and, most importantly, would be punished in the afterlife. With this, the students are not solely taught the basics of Islam but must engage in a more

\textsuperscript{339} T T.C. Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Din Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü (2010b), p. 15.
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., pp. 42, 49, 56.
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., p. 32.
personal reflection on their belief-system. At the same time, knowledge about Islam is more specified and deepened.

In the previous chapter found civic education, what counts as ‘good behaviour’ in and for the public and human rights in the programmes. However, the programme for religious education at high schools touches directly upon these issues with two topics: morals and values, and religion and laicism. As mentioned earlier, morals, as dealt with in the programmes for primary and junior-high schools, included formational matters for the students. However, at high schools, this notion is deepened. In the first year of high school, religion and laicism are laid out to show that laicism ensures the personal religious freedoms of a person and is thus on par with the notion of the personal religious development of a student. In the continuing years, this topic is based around Atatürk and his laicism view, at the same time laying emphasis on ‘correct’ religious education: i.e., religious education by the state. Throughout religious education at high schools, the student learns why and how Atatürk wanted laicism to prevail, why and how he supported religious education by the state and why and how he fought wrong interpretations of Islam from a republican perspective. Thus, the student shall learn that the religious teachings of the state are the most correct ones, which reinforces the rules and formational aspects mentioned for other topics. Furthermore, divergent religious beliefs are to be accepted. However, they are accepted by the well-behaved who learn correct Islam by the state. Thus, not believing in the state-sponsored Islamic view is not only contrary to common sense, as mentioned above, but is also confronting the founder of the state, Atatürk. Parallel to this, the topic ‘morals and values’ states that societal and personal morals, ethics, norms and values in society are rooted in religion and that the student shall learn to uphold these values. Islam is further portrayed as a religion of fundamental human rights and a protector of human beings from evil, though every person must fulfil his or her duty, as this is Islamic. Consequently, the formational aspects are deepened at high schools, as mentioned at the beginning by drawing a parallel between Atatürk and Islamic rules, thinking, acts, standards and morals. While these rules were set out to be republican ideological duties of citizens,
the programme of 2010 proposes Islam as a ruling system to ensure the fulfilment and upholding of these duties and morals/ethics.

At the end of Chapter 5.3, I stated that civic education after 2000 left the student without a personal characteristic to follow or abide by compared to the programmes before. Some authors were presented who suggested that Islam was promoted by the state as the unifying characteristic of society. In this chapter, we have seen how religious teachings changed from descriptive teachings for just two years solely for those students interested and willing to attend the classes. After 1980, the subject became compulsory, while in 2010 we have seen a shift towards more specified, deepened knowledge about Islam and personal engagement of the student, as could be seen in civic education after 1980 as well. The parallel between Islam and Turkey’s society, standards, morals and ethics is very much emphasized in religious teachings, contrary to the early years of the republic in which the republican idea and Atatürk were at the forefront of defining what morals and ethics in Turkey are.

A study by the Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV) from 2006—hence, from a time in which the 2010 changes to the programmes had not yet been made and with persons influenced by the teachings of the years before 2000—showed how the 1,500 people interviewed from all regions of Turkey based their attitudes towards equality in society around Sunni Islam. The study showed that the interviewees centred their identity around being Sunni Muslims and did not demand equal rights for other religious or ethnic minorities concerning comparable limitations by the state. Thus, already before the new programmes for religious education after 2010 were implemented, the self-description of society was mostly around Islam. This notion, however, will be deepened by the more personalized rather than forced experiences students will have after 2010, as depicted in this chapter.

Chapter 3.3 briefly mentioned Luhmann’s account of moralization regarding double contingency and referenced this chapter as an analysis of the very same issue. To reiterate what Luhmann argued concerning the moralization of norms, he states that it is a ‘symbolic generalization, which diminishes the full/vast reflexive complexity of

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345 Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2006), p. 27ff.
346 Ibid., p. 27.
double contingency’ to solely a ‘(1) scope for conditioning and (2) the possibility of reconstruction of complexity through the binary schematism of regard/disregard.’

Thus, the development I have analysed so far from normativity via Kemalist nationalism to a moralization of norms via Islamic conservatism must lead to the dualism I depicted in this chapter. This also explains the results reported by TESEV and my prediction for generations after 2010, in which the reflexive process of thinking is limited to a dualism between good/bad. As the authors of the study state, there appears to be a ‘from us syndrome’, which is worrisome for Turkish democracy.’

Hence, in accordance with Luhmann, this would mean that the us/them dualism presented in civic and religious education undermines possibilities for any differing identities in Turkish society. While Kemalist nationalism was not extraordinarily inclusive, as the history of the Turks also limited society to a strict definition, I will again argue, as I did in Chapter 4, that no one in Turkey would have matched the Kemalist description if taken literally. Thus, it must be viewed as what Immanuel Wallerstein described as ‘the construction of Peoplehood’: i.e., in Turkey’s case, as a glorification of history in an attempt to unify the diverse society of the newly found republic under the label of being a Turk. Hence, contrary to Kemalist nationalism, Islamic conservative nationalism limits the being and consequently its actions, beliefs and norms to the ‘binary schematism of regard/disregard’ of who is a member of society of Turkey and who is not.

Thus, this means that one of the two main Kemalist pillars has been abolished starting from the 1950s: laicism/secularism. The other pillar I highlighted in Chapter 4 was the unifying idea of a history of the Turks. Hence, even if the state and Turkish society has abandoned the notion of secularism, it still could hold on to the Kemalist nationalist notion of Turkism within the new Islamist nationalism. Then I would be able to argue that a shift in state ideology in Turkey appeared; yet the transformation argument of the abandonment of Kemalism accentuated so far would not be able to be upheld. Thus, for us to argue that Turkey’s state ideology shifted and then fully transformed, I shall finally delve into the school subject history from 1923 until today.

348 Çarkoğlu and Toprak, p. 28.
5.5. The rewriting of history. Or how Turks became primarily Muslims

In the previous analysis of citizenship and religious education at the different levels of schools, we have seen a transition and transformation of the focus from the communal citizen to an individualist religiousness. As such, every country teaches its official history from their own perspective. Turkey is of course not different concerning historicity; thus, Turkey has a centrist view on history. Hence, this focus will not be a field of critique. However, what we see in the following is the parallel development in historical teachings to more and more religious education in Turkey’s educational system. Furthermore, my analysis of Kemalism and its nationalist arrow is at the centre of my interest, as I said before (in Chapter 4) that Kemalist nationalism bases its history and view of ‘the Turks’ in the time of the republic on the academically construed history of the Turks from Middle Asia and their path to Anatolia, which no person could fulfil because of the long history of the Ottoman Empire; thus the cultural amalgamation of various ethnicities. Furthermore, I established in Chapter 4 that Kemalist nationalism is a central ideological pillar of Kemalism, as it tried to unify society under an idea of the Turks. Hence, in this chapter, we shall discover whether Kemalist nationalism is still taught despite the changes to the laicist/secularist principles of Kemalism. To differentiate between Kemalist nationalism through historical teachings, I shall again compare the programmes and curricula from the definitive Kemalist era (1923-1938) to those released after his death.

Before I start to delve into this topic, however, I must again stress the uniqueness of the analysis, especially as encountered in Etienne Copeaux’s doctoral dissertation of 1997 (the release in Turkish was in 1998): *Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda (1931-1993). Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslâm Sentezine* appears to examine the same topic I am after in this chapter. This book is a very intriguing, very well-written and well-investigated case study of the changing contents of history school books from 1931 to 1993. However, to stay within the concept of analysis, I will examine the programmes and curricula of Turkey from the founding to today. Thus, to switch to history books would seem odd, as the programmes and curricula have proven to be an abundant source in connection with my field of analysis. However, Copeaux’s results generally coincide with my results so far yet differ in the conceptual approach to the changes of taught history. Though Copeaux agrees that taught history at schools bears
extraordinary ideological weight, it is rather a societal ideological issue.\textsuperscript{350} Furthermore, it is assumed that ideological changes within the political and societal spheres are influential insofar as to change the state's view and consequent teachings on history.\textsuperscript{351} However, my theoretical approach in Chapter 3 found that these dominantly visible and widely supported political dispositions in the general public are in-line with state ideology rather than with the coincidental rational expressions of a political spirit of many. Thus, changes in history books are, according to my theory, not shifts of predominant hegemonic ideology in society but rather changes implemented by the state addressing future shifts in state ideology. Hence, visible and growing ideological changes in the political and public sphere are the result of an already existing shift in ideology that started earlier than its visible appearance.

To start this analysis, I shall look at the hours of taught history classes throughout the stages of education. From the 1930s to 1961, the programme for elementary-school history classes was taught in the fourth and fifth grade, hence, in the last two levels of elementary education, for two hours per week. With the programme of 1969, history classes are fully cancelled from elementary-school levels. At the same time, while the hours of taught history classes at junior-high schools in 1930 totalled eight hours while the distribution of hours was three hours of history classes per week in the first, two in the second and three in the third year of junior-high school, the hours declined to a total of six with the distribution of two hours per week per junior-high school year. This remained until the 1980s, when the hours of history classes at junior-high schools was distributed as two hours for the first and second year but none in the last year. Instead, a new subject was introduced after the coup of 1980: namely, ‘The Revolution History of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism’ (T.C. \textit{Inkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük)} (TRHTRA). At high schools, the trend of declining hours of history classes continues. While the programmes of 1934 and 1938 stipulate history classes at high schools of two hours per week for the first and second years, three hours are stipulated for the third year. However, it must be mentioned that students with a focus on sciences were only taught two hours while students with a focus on literature were taught three. This separation of science and literature students continues in the

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., p. 23.
future year programmes as well. I do not focus on this detail but rather take the literature students’ hours into account, as these students are in the majority of high school education in Turkey. The hours of history classes per week were lowered in the 1950s to a total of six hours over the three years and raised between 1960 and 1980 to seven hours in total. In the 1987 programme for high schools, we see the hours decline to a total of six hours in total, while in 1998, they were further lowered to four. In addition, as mentioned for the junior-high-school level, TRHTRA classes were introduced at the high-school level as well. While in the programme of 1987, students were taught one hour per week in the first and second years of this subject and students in their last/third years were taught two hours per week, the programme of 1998 limits this subject solely to two hours per week in the last year of high school.

All these hours per week mean that, assuming the student attended all levels of primary and secondary education, a student in 1930 took a total of 19 hours of history classes throughout the school career while this number declined to 16 between 1948 and 1960 and increased slightly to 17 in the 1960s and 1970s. After the coup of 1980, the student was solely able to attend a total of ten hours of history classes and six hours of TRHTRA, while the hours declined to eight hours of history classes in total and four hours of TRHTRA in 1998. Thus, it must be concluded that the hours of history classes taught diminished drastically over the decades. This trend continues after 2000. There the hours of history classes have been cut further to six hours in total, and these are taught two hours per week in the first three years of high school. Meanwhile, TRHTRA is taught in the last year of junior-high school and the last year of high school for two hours per week, totalling four hours throughout the educational career.

The declining hours of history classes is a problem for my analysis. The issue is how to compare history classes from 1930 to the present if the taught hours are less such that the probability of incrementally condensed material throughout the decades is very high. Furthermore, if I was to compare on the basis of the different school stages, inconsistencies may arise, as contents might be taught but the approach to history teaching might only have changed. Thus, instead of focusing on primary or secondary education alone, the entirety of history education in Turkey from the founding to today should be in focus. Only then will we be able to fully grasp what the state sought as ‘historically crucial’.
However, not only is the depiction of historically crucial elements in the teaching programmes of importance, but again, so are possible differences between Kemalist-nationalist history teachings and the already depicted eras of state ideological shifts concerning citizenship and self-characterization. Thus, the question is this: Can we see shifts of history teachings along the dates I argued were transitional (1945-1980), transitioning to transformational (1980-2000) and transformational (after 2000). If we can, we shall then see if and how the Kemalist-nationalist history telling of the Turks and the nationalibus corpore transitioned and transformed.

The programme of 1930 for primary schools include the Roman Empire and the Greeks, while dividing the topics into two parts with teachings from prehistoric times to the founding of the Ottoman Empire in 1299 (in the fourth grade) and from the Middle Ages to the founding of the republic of Turkey in 1923 (in the fifth grade). Thus, primary school children are being taught the elementary periods of history, including the history of the ‘Turks’ from Middle Asia to Anatolia. At the junior-high level, the taught history is more explicit about these periods. Hence, while again teaching the same periods of history, topics are examined in more dept, inasmuch as the first year of history education at the junior high-school level is dedicated to ‘the elder times’, including a detailed analysis of the ‘old Turks’, the Greeks and Macedonians, Romans, East Rome and Iran and the beginnings of the Middle Ages in the West. The second grade of junior-high is almost fully dedicated to the Turks in Middle Asia, their travel to Anatolia and the founding of the Ottoman Empire, thus to the history of the Turks, while also briefly including the history of the Arabs and the Middle Ages in Europe. In the third grade, the programme examines the times from the 16th century to the founding of the republic of Turkey in 1923, while also delving into European and Ottoman history throughout the centuries. At the high-school level, the in-depth analysis of already-examined periods of history between the stages of schools was continued. Again, the three years of history classes are sectioned to the prehistoric and the antique periods, the Middle Ages and the new and newest history. What is meant by in-depth can be determined by an examination spanning from the China of the third to the sixteenth centuries, to India's history from

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354 Ibid., p. 24-27.
355 Ibid., p. 27-30.
1500 B.C. and the Assyrian Empire of 2000 B.C., or ancient Egypt and the Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{356} The same approach to more intensified, in-depth history teaching can be depicted for the second and third grades of high-school, while again, the second grade was mostly dedicated to the Turks in History without leaving out Byzantium or the fifth century European migration period.\textsuperscript{357} However, interestingly, the focal point of the analysis of the Turks in Middle Asia is non-Islamised Turks, such as the Tukyu, Türkeş and Uygur states. And the third grade again examines the history of the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with Europe’s history from the sixteenth century until the founding of the republic.\textsuperscript{358}

In the primary-school programme of 1960, contrary to that of the 1930s, the Roman Empire, for instance, is not on the schedule in the fourth grade. Instead, students consider the Stone Age and then fast-forward to the ‘Turks’, ending with the ‘birth of Islam’ and the Middle Asian Turks converting to Islam.\textsuperscript{359} Consistent with the geographical focus on the Middle East, Anatolia and the Turks as people, the fifth-grade programme examines almost solely the Ottoman Empire from all aspects: i.e., its rise, stagnation and fall, and its civilization and culture up until the Turkish Revolution and the founding of the republic.\textsuperscript{360} The only non-Turkish/non-Anatolian topics analysed are the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in Europe with their consequences in technology, culture and economy.\textsuperscript{361} Thus, at the primary-school level, we can already see a distinct difference from the previous programme in the 1930s and a shift from a more general historical education with a focus on the history of the Turks and Anatolia to almost solely the view on the latter two topics. This trend continues at the junior high-school level for the 1960s as well. While the programme of 1930 listed only one main focus on the Turks concerning the ‘elder times’, the 1962 programme for junior-high schools’ first topics are ‘the homeland of the Turks and their migration’, ‘the Turks who stayed in the homeland after the migration’ and ‘the history of Near Asia’. Only then is prehistoric Anatolia covered along with a ‘general view’ of prehistoric Mediterranean civilizations, Rome and ‘the Aegean Area’.\textsuperscript{362} Remarkably, the programme does not put the Greeks in the title, yet
it talks solely about Ancient Greece and refers to it as ‘the Aegean Area’. However, in
the second grade of junior high-school, students are almost faced with the same
programme as in the 1930s. The only difference is a more distinguished and
differentiated view of the Turks in the 1930s compared to the 1960s. The 1962
programme analyses the Turks before their Islamisation and the founding of the
Ottoman Empire; however, the focus is more on the times after the Islamisation, the
Seljuk and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{363} This trend continues in the third grade of junior
high-school as well, as the topics are focused on the Ottoman Empire’s rise,
stagnation, civilization and fall and the founding of the republic—as we have seen at
primary-school level for the 1960s as well. Though these topics are dealt with in more
detail, and though one of the topics to be taught for the final year of junior high-
school is ‘Europe and America in 17th and 18th century’, it already becomes clear
that the programme of the 1930s was more balanced concerning the students with
Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the same historical period at the same time. This
trend of a more geographically focused analysis of history can be traced at the high-
school level. While the programme of 1930 for high schools analysed China, for
example, the 1960 programme focuses solely on ‘Near Asia’, i.e., on civilizations
around Anatolia, Egypt and, again, on the ‘Aegean Area’ rather than on the Greeks
and finally Rome.\textsuperscript{364} In the second year of high school, this trend does not change,
and the student solely examines a general view of ‘Europe between the eighth and
the thirteenth century’ and ‘Europe in the fourteenth century’ rather than the more
differentiated topics concerning Europe, as we have seen in the programme of
1930.\textsuperscript{365} Instead, the main focal point is the depiction of the great empires of the
Turks after their Islamization: the Karahan, Gazne, Oğuz and Seljuk states. In
contrast to this, the 1930 programme focused more on the pre-Islamised empires of
the Turks: i.e., the Tukyu, Türkeş and Uygur states. The third-grade programme for
high schools in the 1960s examines, again, as was the case in the 1930 programme,
Europe’s and the Ottoman Empire’s history from the fifteenth to the twentieth
centuries while including the founding of the Turkish Republic and its war of
independence.\textsuperscript{366}

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., pp. 113-115.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., p. 33-36.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., p. 36-43.
In depicting the programmes of the 1980s, one can see a drastic change to the approach to history. As mentioned earlier, the hours of taught history classes throughout the levels of schools were reduced dramatically, and history was not taught at all at the primary-school level. Taking this into account, the first history classes a student was able to attend was at junior high-school level, and it started with a ‘brief summary’ of the civilizations in Anatolia in prehistoric times. After that short introduction, the programme’s focus is on the Turks of Middle Asia and their migration. However, what stands out in the programme is the long and in-depth analysis of the history of Islamic and the Islamised Turks’, which comprises the clear majority of the first-year junior high-school students’ taught history. As for the second year of taught history, the programme considers the founding, the rise, the stagnation and the fall of the Ottoman Empire while considering Europe’s history very briefly with the topics ‘geographical explorations’, ‘the Renaissance’ and ‘reformist movements’. Thus, at the junior high-school level, the programme of 1988 does not consider Europe’s prehistoric and ancient history to be part of the programme, but rather focuses solely on a) the Turks after Islamisation and b) the Ottoman Empire. As for the high-school level, the programme of 1987 is analysing the ‘first civilizations in Asia and Egypt’, and the ‘Aegean and Rome civilizations’; however, the focus shifts to the states of the Turks before their Islamisation, their culture and civilization and finally offers an in-depth analysis of the history of Islam. Note both the short examination of non-Turkish history and the wording of what was formerly identified as ‘empires’, now as ‘civilizations’, as the only empire the student will have been taught about is the Ottoman Empire, which would make the Ottomans the sole Imperial force in history, according to this history teaching. Hence, Turks only formed states until the Ottoman Empire, while non-Turks formed civilizations without reaching the status of imperial strength. This trend continues, as in the second year of high-school, the students is being taught about the Turks after Islamisation, the Turks after their migration to Anatolia, which again is primarily their already post-Islamisation period and the founding of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the 15th century. Almost as a side-note, thus, very briefly, the programme stipulates the

368 Cf., Ibid., pp. 187-190.
369 Ibid., p. 191.
370 Ibid., pp. 88-90.
371 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
topics Middle Age Europe and ‘other states founded in Middle Asia and the Near East’. At the third grade of high-school, the programme of 1987 examines the Ottoman Empire until the 17th century, Europe’s 15th and 16th centuries, and from there the parallel history of the Ottoman Empire and Europe from the 17th century until the end of the First World War. The Second World War is only very briefly touched upon at the end of the year of education for third-grade students. What stands out in the third-grade education, however, are the lengthy examinations of the ‘culture and civilization’ of the different phases throughout the Ottoman Empire’s history, which shed light on its technology, social and economic life, arts, and the state structure and military. Thus, it can be concluded that the student, who already examined the Ottoman Empire in its details in the history classes attended throughout their junior-and high-school career, receives an in-depth analysis of the Ottoman Empire’s manifold structures of social-science importance.

The drastic shifts in history teachings after the coup of 1980 are in-line with what was argued earlier. An increased Islamisation of content appears. Furthermore, this shift from Turanic Turkism to Islamic Turkism was not only implemented by the generals leading the coup d’état. Within the nationalist movement in Turkey, this shift is visibly a fight between the old and the new generation of nationalists. As Tanıl Bora explains, the founder of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Alparslan Türkeş, faced the opposition of the nationalist movement’s regional organisations, as they shifted towards an Islamist nationalism against the laicist Turanic approach of their leader and founder. I already mentioned in the previous chapter how the junta introduced Islamic contents into education even by manifesting them in the constitution. Ismail Kaplan argues that it was the intent of the generals to ‘protect the students and youth from all harmful ideologies and thoughts ranging from any shade of socialism to cultural liberalism. The students and youth were to be brought up as Muslim-Turk children and to be antagonistic to any other ideology.’ Thus, the subtle differentiation of other empires as ‘civilizations’ while only the Ottoman Empire would appear to be imperial plus the teaching of in-depth knowledge about Islamised

\[372\] Ibid., p. 91f.
\[373\] Ibid., p. 94f.
\[374\] Ibid., p. 96.
Turks rather than about shamanic Turks is indeed according to the constitutional and civic-and-religious education subjects’ direction, as analysed previously.

Coming to the mid-1990s again, history as a subject was not taught at the primary-school level. I will discuss a 1998 change to the approach and teaching of history at the primary-school level at the end of the analysis, as it connects to one of the main problems encountered when comparing the periods from the 1930s to the 1990s and future history education on all levels of schooling. Thus, I will here solely depict the subject ‘history’ to later examine the birth of different types of education of history.

With the 1995 junior-high-school programme, the sole significant change is that any mention of prehistoric empires in Anatolia was deleted. The programme rather intensifies the examination of what was already the focus of its 1988 equivalent for junior-high schools: the history of Islam and the history of the Turks after Islamisation. As for the second year at junior-high schools, the programme primarily analyses the founding of the Ottoman Empire, its rise, stagnation, reform and fall. Yet again, Europe is mentioned solely for its geographic discoveries, renaissance and reform movements, while the Second World War is very briefly covered at the end of the term, with a general explanation of what occurred. Apparently, the founding of some republics of the ‘Turks’—such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan after the Second World War—was more important to the authors, as these topics are specifically to be covered via the programme. As for the high-school programme, the eradication of topics other than the Turks continues. At the freshman high-school level, the student is to learn only about ancient Turks, Middle Asian Turks, the Turks after Islamisation, the Turk states between the 13th and 19th centuries and the history of the Turks in Anatolia. The only ‘non-Turkish’ topic examined in the first year of high-school is the history and civilization of Islam, which again is in-line with previous programmes evaluated here. Thus, until the tenth grade of schooling, which translates to an age of 16/17, a young person in Turkish schools would not have heard about Europe, its

378 Ibid., pp. 167-169.
379 Ibid., pp. 170-173.
380 Ibid., p. 171 & 173.
381 Ibid., p. 173.
383 Ibid., pp. 86-90
history or influence on or around the geography of Turkey. However, this changes with the second year of high-school, as, the programme briefly describes the Ottoman and European history in parallel from the 13th century until the end of the First World War.\textsuperscript{384} Contrary to the programme of 1988, however, the 1998 equivalent allocates in-depth analysis and half of its content to what was one of many topics in the ninth grade of 1988: The political structure, society, economy, culture and art, and education of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{385} Consequently, the student is not only faced almost solely with the history of the ‘Turks’ through history but must even focus on Islamised Turks and especially the Ottoman Empire. The context in which the Ottoman Empire or, for that matter, other states of the ‘Turks’ were historically present, is almost of no interest, as the student solely examines the facetted cores of the Turks without being able to connect that knowledge to other geographical areas of the world. Hence, the student is left with a Turk-centric history telling, yet, judging from the topics not contextualized, the Ottoman Empire is what is apparently organized.

As argued concerning the programme after the coup of 1980, Islamised Turks are at the centre of education between 1980 and 2000. My dissertation regarding a transition to the transformation of state ideology will be fulfilled if, in the years after 2000, history classes dramatically shift again in their subjects. This does not mean that Turkey’s history books treat Brazil’s history after 2000. Instead, this means that the transformational phase of state ideology has started, according to my theory, and that a shift in the teaching of history classes must be visible from a state ideological perspective. I have also argued that the description of the citizen via the state was not laicist anymore but was shaped by Islam. This shift of emphasis regarding non-Muslim Turks to solely Islamised Turks has been depicted so far. But if my theory of state ideological transformation is correct, then the years after 2000 must deepen the sentiment of Islamist nationalism. I would argue that this process is achievable by a) focusing on Islam itself and, as a secondary topic, on the Islamised Turks; b) further decreasing the hours of history classes, so that the second pillar of Kemalism (Turkish nationalism) is just removed by lack of knowledge and the singular ideological ‘glue’ of society is what is taught in civic and religious education (Islamist

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., pp. 103-141
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., pp. 123-141.
nationalism; or c) both of the above. An in-depth analysis of the programmes of history education after 2000 shall give us the answer.

Frequent changes to programmes and the school system as a whole make it almost impossible to exactly analyse weekly hours of education of history classes. However, a common weekly hour for history classes is the formula of two hours per week from the first until the third year at high-school while in the fourth and last year of high-school history classes are not existent. In addition, there are no history classes, labelled as such, at the primary and junior-high levels. These history classes were rather bundled with the aforementioned ‘social studies’ subject. A very brief examination of the years 2009 and 2017 will suffice, as these programmes do not include many history-related topics. Thus, the analysis of the AKP years will focus on the 2007/2011 high-school programmes for history classes and compare them with the newly released 2017 programmes. Thus, for each year of high-school there will be a comparative analysis of what has changed within the mentioned years and what has changed compared to the 1990 programme.

According to Yusuf Keskin, the bundling of history, citizenship and geography classes in social studies was a constructivist approach to taught history, as could be seen in other Western countries, especially the USA, which centred the student and activities in its approach. This also means that the subject itself is solely a tool for the activities and the thought process of the student, rather than a subject in need to be taught and/or complete depiction of history. Solely in the systematic approach on education, the separation of the label ‘history’ to taught contents is visible. Furthermore, if this ‘constructivist approach’ was implemented, it would logically be for an ostensibly better understanding of history and foremost for a superior acquisition of topics the programme wants the student to understand. However, the examination of social studies for the years 2009 and 2017 do not support this claim. The 2009 programme contains history-related topics only in the second and third year of junior-high school, thus undermining the claims regarding taught history throughout the subject of social studies. Furthermore, the topics examined in the programme involve brief analyses of the first civilizations in Anatolia and Mesopotamia, Middle Asian Turks, the birth of Islam, the Turks after Islamisation and

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386 Yusuf Keskin, ‘Evaluating the History Course Subjects Involved in the Programs of Primary Schools, Secondary Schools and Elementary Schools Published from 1970’s Until Today According to the Education Terms’, *International Online Journal of Education Sciences*, 4.2 (2012), 442-461 (p. 456)
the Silk Road, all with respect to political, social, economic and foremost cultural influences on their respective geographical area of existence. Strikingly, the chapter in which these historical topics are examined is entitled ‘culture and heritage’. As for the seventh grade, i.e., the third year of junior-high school, the historical topics examined are the Seljuks in Anatolia; the birth of the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman conquests; the importance of tolerance in the Ottoman Empire; the continuity and change of Turkish culture; influences of the Ottoman-European relations on culture, arts and aesthetics and changes in society and economics after reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Though the topics appear to cover the main issues previous history classes were discussing as well, it must be kept in mind that these topics only form a seventh of the social-studies programme, a weekly two hour subject. With the latest programme of 2017, students at the primary-school level, more precisely in its last year, are introduced to history via monuments and museums in their surroundings and biographies of important personages of the national struggle leading up to the republican revolution of 1923. However, the historical monuments to be visited are mostly religious, such as the mosque, shrine and madrasa, which raises the question of how much religious rather than historical relevance this examination has for the students. In the first year of junior-high school, the programme stipulates the analysis of Anatolian and Mesopotamian civilizations and cultural monuments from history while discussing differences between them. In the second year of junior-high school, historical examination within the social-studies subject focuses briefly on the Turks in Middle Asia; it then proceeds to the birth of Islam, the Islamisation of the Turks and the Turks in Anatolia, to finish with the Seljuks, while focusing on the Seljuks’ cultural heritage, which is made visible by the Islamisation and Turkisation of Anatolia. The last historical topic is stipulated in the third year of junior-high school with the Ottoman Empire’s rise and prospering and European incidents in history that influenced the Ottoman Empire, such as the Renaissance, Enlightenment, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution and slavery.

388 T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (2017b), 7. Sınıf Programı
390 Ibid., p. 20.
391 Ibid., p. 23.
All of these topics are covered within the chapter entitled ‘culture and heritage’, as we see in the programme of 2009 as well. And again, this chapter is only one out of seven chapters per school year; thus, they are but briefly addressed with little to no in-depth or previous knowledge about the issues dealt with. Thus, it is doubtful whether this seemingly constructivist approach contributes much to students’ historical awareness. At the same time, the sole historical knowledge taught concerns Islamised Turks from the Seljuks to the Ottoman Empire. Nowhere to be found is a historical trace of the founding of the republic or the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It rather glorifies the Islamised Turks and intertwines the present’s common Turkish culture with them, almost as if the republic is not part of that Turkish history but is rather an outcome alien to the past of the Turks.

As for the topics examined in history classes, the first year of high-school in 2007 can be compared almost completely to the programme of 1998. However, a major change can be depicted in the approach towards civilizations and dynasties other than Turkish ones. More precisely, after the first topic, which is again an introduction to history as science, the second chapter examines the first civilizations, including China and India, which were excluded in 1998, as geographically that programme focused solely on Anatolia and its surroundings. Furthermore, the reference to Greeks of antiquity under the heading, the ‘Aegean Area’, was also removed, and instead was in 2007 named ‘Aegean and Old Greek civilization’. But other than these changes, the programme of 2007 again examines the first states of the Turks in Middle Asia, the birth of Islam and its history, the Islamisation of the Turks and, finally, the Islamised Turks in Anatolia, i.e., after their migration from Middle Asia. Hence, the only changes to history teachings in 2007 compared to 1998 in the first class of high-school is to be found in the reference to non-Turkish history with mention of the Greeks. In the new programme of 2017, the first year of high-school sees a change of approach to history teaching, specifically regarding non-Turkish history. Instead of the depiction of prehistoric and ancient civilizations, the programme analyses the economy, sociology, military, law, state formations and religious and organizational structures in society from prehistoric times to the Middle

394 Ibid., p. 22.
395 Ibid., p. 23ff.
Ages.\textsuperscript{396} Thus, the examination includes Asian and Mediterranean civilizations and also European ones. Hence, the analysis shifts from a geographical depiction from prehistoric to antique times to a broader perspective, putting important human historical formations until the Middle Ages in the centre of the examination. However, the rest of the programme for the first year of high-school is almost identical with the programme of 2007, depicting the Turks in Middle Asia, the birth and history of Islam, the Islamisation of the Turks and finally their migration to Anatolia.\textsuperscript{397}

In contrast to the programme of 1998, the programme of 2011 does not stipulate a parallel view of Ottoman and European history from the 14th until the end of the 19th centuries but rather focuses on the specifics in the founding of the Ottoman Empire, looking at the years between 1300 to 1453 to then rather deeply analyse the ‘Global Power: Ottoman Empire’ between 1453 to 1600.\textsuperscript{398} Though the second half of the tenth grade appears to be more balanced concerning the inclusion of European history as well, the detailed explanations of the units to be taught shows that topics such as the Enlightenment are rather a side note, a necessity to be taught, rather than a topic to be delved into.\textsuperscript{399} This can be confirmed by references to other important historical events, such as the founding of the USA or the French Revolution. Instead, the focus in this programme for second-year high-school students is more the Ottoman Empire in its entirety and European events that affected the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the history-teaching programme of 2011 gradually walks the student through the different historical periods, with the second half starting in the seventeenth century entitled ‘The Seeking Years’, the eighteenth century and ‘The Longest Century’ translating to 1800 to 1922.\textsuperscript{400} Remarkably, the writers of the programme were talking about ‘Global Power’ and ‘The Longest Century’ concerning the Ottoman Empire’s military, economy and its expansion for the first, while the latter relates to the defeated, dissolved Empire and is the title of İlber Ortaylı’s 1983 book.\textsuperscript{401} While the programme of 2011 already involved a profound change of topics to be taught to second-year high-school students


\textsuperscript{397} Ibid., pp. 32-34.


\textsuperscript{399} Cf., Ibid., p. 27.

\textsuperscript{400} Ibid., pp. 24-34.

\textsuperscript{401} İlber Ortaylı, \textit{İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı} (İstanbul: Tim aş Yayınları, 2016)

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compared with the programme of 1995, the 2017 programme furthers this distinct characteristic of the history programme by offering almost solely Ottoman history rather than general history. It starts with the topic of the settling and state formation of the Seljuks in Anatolia to then teach the pre-formation of the Ottoman Empire, as we have seen in the 2011 programme, concerning the years between 1300 and 1453. The programme focuses so much on the Ottoman Empire that it reserves a unit for the topic, ‘Fighters and Soldiers in the state formation process’, which analyses the differences in approach of military power and how the Ottoman Empire was able to centralize a military force with fighters from outside the state system, together with the regular soldiers, so as to finally become a military force unmatched at that period of time. However, the glorification of the Ottoman Empire does not end there but rather continues in the next unit with a depiction of the civilization in the process of the founding of the Ottoman Empire, which is limited to the examination of religious (Islamic) leaders and groups and their positive influences on the founding of the Ottoman Empire. The next unit is again, as it was the case in 2011, the ‘Global Power the Ottoman Empire (1453-1600)’. However, it must be remarked that, according to the schedule of the programme, the teaching hours of both this unit and the aforementioned unit regarding the clerical influence on the path of greatness of the empire make up 30% of the whole years’ worth history classes. The last two topics to be taught in that year are insights of the sultan and his royal household on the one hand and Ottoman society in the Classic Age. Thus, to conclude the tenth grade, a drastic change to the 2011 programme can be examined, as history stops at 1600 for that year and a more in-depth analysis from 1300 to 1600 is stipulated which focuses on clerical influences in the ages in which the Ottoman Empire grew to a global power.

Unlike the programme of 1998, both the programmes of 2011 and 2017 allocate history classes to third-year high-school students. Thus, a comparative analysis of the 1998 and the 2000s programmes is not applicable; however, I will try to analyse the topics examined in the programme to depict a change in content between the

403 Ibid., p. 37.
404 Ibid., p. 37f.
405 Ibid., pp. 38-40.
407 Ibid., p. 40f.
programmes. For the third year or third-grade high-school student, the 2011 solely stipulates topics on Turks, all of which are quite evenly distributed. It covers the following topics: ‘The state system of the Turks’, ‘The social structures of the Turks’, ‘The legal system of the Turks’, ‘The economy of the Turks’, ‘The educational system of the Turks’ and finally ‘Arts/Culture of the Turks’. What stands out is the historical progression of the programme from Middle Asian Turks until the founding of the republic. Furthermore, the majority of the in-depth analysis is reserved for Islamised Turks and the Ottoman Empire while all the mentioned units’ republican analyses are associated with the ‘national struggle’ until 1938 (the date of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death). Thus, these units only emphasize a ‘national’ motif rather than a diversified examination of the founding of the republic, which, in conclusion, emerges as an Islamic-nationalist view on ‘the Turks’.

This changes in 2017 with a more diversified, global view, though, as noted before, the second year of high-school is, with respect to content, rather similar to the third year of high-school in 2011, with the exception that the 2017 programme focuses on Islamised Turks and the Ottoman Empire’s apex period and excludes the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the republic. Thus, the approach to history telling changes in 2017, as I have already noted, by being concerned more with global issues while nevertheless overwhelmingly analysing the Ottoman Empire. The tenor of the programme of 2017 does not change for the third grade of high-school. Though the programme mentions and examines European developments after 1600 until 1919, such as the Enlightenment, the birth of Mercantilism or the Peace of Westphalia, the programme constantly connects these events with influences on the Ottoman Empire. Thus, an in-depth analysis of European history is missing. Instead, these events are solely mentioned to then analyse topics, such as the following: ‘Ottoman politics in the face of changing global balances’, ‘Crisis and reform of the socio-economic state of the Ottoman Empire’ or ‘the Ottoman school of thought in the era of Enlightenment’. However, the titles ‘Capital and labour’, and ‘The changes of daily life in the modern world’ seem to surprise the reader at first as critical analyses of capitalism, which in turn would, for today’s Turkey, mean self-criticism. However, the content is limited to the effects of rising capitalism and

imperialism on a weakened and technologically and economically lagging Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{410} Thus, a potentially critical assessment of the history of capitalism is reduced to an examination of furthering factors of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution. Hence, the third-grade high-school programme for history focuses mainly on external factors for a declining ‘Global Power’ as it was depicted a year before at second grade, while at the same time pointing out belated actions in technology, economy and society, yet with an underlying message of the ‘influence from outside’ on a great empire.

In conclusion, there are four major shifts in taught history in schools from 1930 to today. These are not stand-alone shifts but rather depict my conclusion of whether the second major pillar of Kemalism (Kemalist Nationalism) has indeed been abandoned by the state and thus whether state ideology has shifted away from Kemalism.

The first distinctive shift occurs in the teachings from prehistoric to the antiques. As we have seen in my examination, in the early years of the republic, history classes focused far more on prehistoric and antique history than did the programmes after 1980.

The second distinctive shift occurs in the teachings about the Ottoman Empire. This topic covers a relative majority of the history taught throughout the school levels. At the same time, topics such as ancient and prehistoric times were cut or totally discarded from the programmes, thus leaving the Ottoman Empire to be taught to a wider extent. At the same time, we can also observe a glorification and in-depth analysis of the Ottoman Empire which covers topics such as culture, sociology, economy and others after 1980 and especially in the 2000s. Thus, history classes at schools in Turkey overwhelmingly show in-depth analyses and repetitive elements concerning the Ottoman Empire throughout while non-Ottoman historical events are either non-existent or are presented as side-notes of history.

The third distinctive shift occurs with respect to teachings about the Turks. While the founding years until the 1960s focused more on the Turks before Islamisation, programmes after that date, and especially after 1980, are more concerned with the Turks after their transition to Islam. Thus, the founders of the republic of Turkey were

\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., p. 47f.
more concerned with the depiction of the Turks as reaching further back than Islam’s birth, while after 1980, and especially again after 2000 until today, the importance of the Turks as mostly Muslims appears to be in the centre.

The fourth distinctive shift occurs in the teachings of the founding of the republic. As we saw above, it appears that history as a term does not apply to the founding of the republic. Relevant history starts with the Turks after Islamisation, overwhelmingly continues with the Ottoman Empire and ends there, while the founding of the republic is almost seen as a non-historic exception in need of a separate subject at the end of junior high-school and high-school. By separating the battles for independence and the founding of the republic from history classes, a symbolic separation is being made of ‘our’ history, i.e., the history of the Muslims, and the history of the laicist/secular republic. Thus, the student learns from history classes that the Turks have been Muslims and were the sole imperial force, while TRHTRA teaches them in few hours of the collapse of the caliphate, holding the Ottoman Empire up as an imperial force by the founding of the laicist Turkish Republic. An imbalance concerning the emphasis of historically important topics is certain, but in my opinion is further deepened in favour of Islam against secularism.

This leads us via the accumulation of all four shifts to one conclusion. History classes between 1930 and 1960 almost followed one single plan: a depiction of the Turks, supplementing the Kemalist Nationalist view of its own people as a mystic folk, that, though far gone, is still exemplary for Turkish society as a personal aim to be reached. These depictions were mostly based on non-Islamic, Middle Asian states of the Turks. Contrary to this perspective are the Islamised Turks, especially the Ottomans, which were a focal point of history classes after 1980. In connection with no other empires than the Ottoman examined in the teaching programme, and the overwhelming depiction of the history of Islam and the ‘great achievements’ of the Islamised Turks, the perspective shift from apparently ‘pure Turks’ of elder times, to the Islamised, sophisticated and powerful Turks conquering Europe becomes obvious. When at the same time the founding of the republic of Turkey, and the teaching of history at the primary and junior high-school level, is reduced to a minimum or bundled with other subjects, as we have seen with the creation of the subject of social studies, the limited knowledge about history as such becomes the Ottoman history rather than a broader understanding of the regional history. Included
in this regional history must be the founding of the republic of Turkey as well, as it is not seen as part of history.

Returning to the question this chapter posed, did the second major pillar of Kemalism dissolve in education? Thus, was Kemalist Turkist nationalism replaced? Etienne Copeaux argues that, ‘the educational history discourse is not laicist anymore. But it is also not a religious discourse. The narrative of the history of the Turkish nation is not Islamic dogmatism, but history.’\(^{411}\) Though Copeaux might be correct in his own right, the analysis he presents is until 1993. And as my research has shown, the trend of Islamisation of history at schools in the 1980s and 1990s was furthered after 2000. Because I am able to analyse a longer period, the shifts that appeared before 2000 can be put in context with present-day developments against which Islamic dogmatism becomes clear. Furthermore, selective historical decisions by the state do not constitute history. Of course, denying the Islamisation of the Turks is impossible. If however, only Islamised Turks are presented as Turks, the history depicted is no longer history but history in the light of Islamic dogmatism. Hence, my answer to the question posed is yes: Kemalist Turkist nationalism was indeed replaced by Islamist nationalism. Thus, the second major pillar of Kemalism was replaced. The history-telling of the Turks and even the founding of the republic is not considered history enough but rather was replaced with in-depth analyses of every possible aspect of Ottoman life and politics, while the glorification of the Middle Asian Turks from the Kemalist era of education was replaced with a consideration Islamised Turks.

5.6 Conclusion

Now that I have analysed statistics related to Turkish education and the programmes and curricula of primary, junior-high and high schools concerning their changes from 1930 to today, the conclusions appear to be manifold.

First, the statistics have pointed towards a patriarchal, Islamic-conservative sociology while the performance results of Turkish education on the OECD scale were among the worst. At the same time, the popularity of Islamic vocational schools was and is relatively high if we consider that these schools’ initial task was to produce clerics. Yet, instead of educating future clerics, they appear to have been attended in large numbers out of economic compulsion or due to the conservative attitudes of parents. Though these indicators were at hand, I did not focus on the curricula of Islamic vocational schools. The reason is that my focus is on the shift of state ideology rather than on a limited view of specific schools, which meant that general schools programmes and curricula had to be analysed. Thus, Turkey’s educational statistics have pointed us to two possible results, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 5.1. One is that Kemalist state ideology was not successful to begin with and failed to manifest in public, which would have meant that state ideology does not have the importance I have discussed throughout this dissertation. Furthermore, it would imply that changes made in the educational system were totally random, not interconnected and aimlessly implemented by the state or government. However, I have found that the changes in the curricula and programmes were aimed towards a shifting state ideology and cannot be academically nullified. These changes, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, were not irrational, populist changes, as can be observed in politics at times, but rather point towards a planned, long-term commitment to the shift of state ideology in Turkey.

The other results from the statistics is that a shift in state ideology was already in progress. For both questions, I have analysed the programmes and curricula of all stages of schools, especially focusing on the three subjects of civic, religion and history. This more profound analysis has answered the two possible issues posed and reiterated here again: It is not Kemalist state ideology failing to manifest itself in society but rather the shift of state ideology itself, which fed already existing patriarchal, Islamic conservative attitudes in society. As depicted in the analysis of the three programmes and curricula, stages can be discerned in the shifting state ideology.

This shifting state ideology, however, appeared in the different stages I identified in my theoretical chapter, especially in conjunction with the functional system of the economy. Thus, with my analysis of the subjects taught at schools in Turkey from
1930 to today and with the help of the theory already discussed, I can finally answer the question of when the transitional phase in Turkey started, when the intersection of transition to transformational phase began and when it ended to be replaced by the transformational phase.

As the analysis of Turkish education has shown, the transitional phase away from Kemalist state ideology started very clearly after 1960. Though we have seen signs of change in the programmes and curricula after 1950, especially in religious teachings at schools—hence, as start of the transitioning state ideology—the changes in civic education started to mark a parallelism towards the shift away from Kemalism. Consequently, I would argue that the transition away from Kemalist state ideology began after 1950 and was more visible in the programmes of the 1960s.

The programmes of the 1970s concerning the subject of history have been shown to join this path, while at the same time my statistical approach has shown us that, to the end of 1970, the popularity of Islamic vocational schools increased. Thus, for the period from 1923 to 1940, I assumed Kemalist state ideology to be implemented, as Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic and Kemalist ideology economically, politically and governmentally, was alive until 1938. The period between 1940 and 1980 can be marked as a transitional phase away from Kemalist state ideology. However, my analysis has shown us that a transition period to the transitional phase away from Kemalism was also depicted. Thus, transitioning from state ideology in my theory must be amended by an initiating period. However, instead of discussing in this conclusion the details of the additions which need to be made to the thesis put forward by me in the theoretical chapter, I shall postpone this discussion to the final conclusion of this dissertation in Chapter 6.

All in all, however, the programmes of the years from 1950 to 1980, together with the statistics, show clear signs and prove to belong to the transitional phase away from Kemalist state ideology while also showing indications of what it will be replaced with: a more conservative, Islam centred perspective, which however, still emphasizes Turks, thus subsumed as an Islamic-Turkish perspective.

With the coup of 1980, changes in the programmes and curricula were more drastic, and in the three subjects examined, the shift away from Kemalist state ideology became more obvious. Added to the conservative Islamic nationalist perspective was an individualism, which conflicts with the Kemalist idea of unity, thus the non-
individualist approach. In other words, I have discussed the nation-centred description of citizenship of Kemalism, which sought unification of the nation by centring the task, duties and obligations of the citizen. However, this state-centred Kemalist approach was abandoned for an individualist approach, while tasks remained, yet were not the unifying discourse. Hence, with their young citizens left without a role in society as part of their civic duty, the students were presented with alternative identities. First, such identity is being an Ottoman Turk. I conclude this from the teachings in history, which are mostly Ottoman-Empire based rather than the Turks as an ethnic group in Middle Asia, as can be seen from the teachings from 1930 to late 1960. However, with this geographical shift of focus in history education another identity shift appears as well: from shaman/non-Muslim to Islamised Turks.

Hence, secondly and most importantly, the programmes after 1980, but more specifically between 1980 and late 1990 stressed the Islamic identity to such an extent that, with the lack of identity portrayed in Kemalist education, these students were presented with their most important self-reflection. Through history teachings - in which the students are presented with their past as vastly Muslim and as actually rising to global power after having converted to Islam - , civic education - in which their role in society is almost nullified, while they are solely mandated to self-reflection and to avoid oppositional ideas- and finally to religious teachings - which as we have seen were drastically increased in the amount of hours taught, and the spread to all levels of school, while at the same time not solely an academic approach to Islam as religion or other religions is stipulated, but rather a teaching which makes Islam inevitable as consequences of not being Muslim are appalling to little children at primary school level - the student is overwhelmed with Islamic content as identificatory element. Thus, from 1980 to the late 1990s, we can clearly identify the interphase between the transition and transformational phases. After 2000, and especially with the AKP as sole governmental power since 2002, the interphase ended and merged into the transformational phase. The immensely increasing numbers of Islamic vocational schools and attendees already reflected this phenomenon. This occurrence was further supported by increased weekly hours of religious teachings, the omittance of citizenship as stand-alone subject and the focus on culture and society in the Ottoman Empire in history teachings. Altogether, these findings validate that a transformation away from Kemalist state ideological education has started after 2002. Furthermore, Turkey’s educational system has been
diminished under the AKP government consistent with the transformational process of state ideology. Within the fifteen years of government since 2002, the ratio between general and Islamic vocational school students has risen dramatically, as depicted earlier. Within the same time span, six education ministers have held the post, while changes to the centralized entrance examinations for each school level have changed as frequently. Thus, a proper preparation for students is almost impossible, as changes were made every year, while the form itself changed in 2004, 2008, 2009, 2012 and finally was removed by demand of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2017. Thus, constant requirements were hardly to be found in the examinations deciding the students’ future. Furthermore, with the reintroduction of the junior-high school level in 2012, the path for Islamic vocational junior-high schools was opened, while the law restructuring the school system also included a change in the entry examinations to universities, with which Islamic vocational high school students were enabled to study whichever field of study they desire at university level, whereas before they were factually limited to studies at faculties of theology, via specific scoring structures.\textsuperscript{412} Though general junior-high and high schools remained, these are undergoing a dramatic change as well. In my analysis, I focused solely on the programmes and curricula of these schools and the findings which pointed towards a shift in state ideology. However, these schools are also undergoing a structural Islamisation process which undermines the very core of Kemalist education: secularism. With a decree issued by the Ministry of Education in 2017, new schools to be opened must have prayer rooms in their premises, while the size of these prayer rooms is not specified in the decree and can, if intended, expand to a mosque within the campus of the school.\textsuperscript{413} This decree was amended in 2018 by a very important point, cancelling the necessity of coeducation at vocational high schools.\textsuperscript{414} To clarify, at Islamic vocational schools, coeducation was not a necessity; however, the cancelation of the necessity for any other vocational high school opens the possibility of completely abandoning coeducation. Furthermore, the prayer-rooms


initiative of the ministry was followed by an endorsement on the part of the Ministry of National Education of a project which actively funded and constructed prayer rooms and mosques at schools.\textsuperscript{415}

To finalise the structural perspective carried out by the AKP within the transformational phase of state ideology, the latest report on investments (in 2017 by the Ministry of Education) to improve the ‘attendance and completion of the education of disadvantaged groups’ indicates that, out of the total budget of 694,123,475 Turkish Liras, 500,000,000 Turkish Liras will be invested in Islamic vocational boarding high schools for women.\textsuperscript{416} Thus, though the Ministry of Education is obliged to make education accessible to everyone, it chooses to make one-sided investments to increase the female rate of high-school graduates with an Islamic vocational school background, which a) completely contradicts Kemalist education and b) forces these women to stay within the patriarchal conservative Islamic system of society. Thus, these investments impede the enlightened educational mandate of Kemalist education.

Thus, my empirical analysis, which mainly focuses on primary sources I collected from archives of the Department of Education, shows first a difference between the contents taught at all school levels between my baseline Kemalist education until 1945 and the periods from 1950 to 1980, 1980 to 2000 and 2000 to present-day education. Second, these changes must not be approached as modernisations or adjustments to improve education. OECD studies presented in Chapter 5.1 identify Turkey as a country with one of the worst education performances among all OECD countries.

Finally, the conclusion to be drawn from my empirical study of Turkish education must be that, according to the set periods, Kemalist state ideology was abandoned in favour of Islamist nationalism. However, this does not influence only children with respect to their education content, but, as I argued in my theoretical discussion in Chapter 3, is influencing societal structures, norms and rules. Furthermore, I have

argued that education has an outlook role for future grownups in both the curriculum vitae and the state ideological aspect. Hence, the decreasing female participation on the labour market and the increasing Islamisation of Turkish society must be linked to this shift in state ideology.

However, a more detailed conclusion, the validity of my theoretical findings proven by this empirical analysis and the interrelations between some of my findings and the theory is the task of the next, concluding chapter of this dissertation.
6. Conclusion

In introducing this study, I drew upon my personal experience with Turkey and what my impression of the country was in the mid-1990s and how I experienced a changed Turkey in and after 2008. My personal story of Turkey has led me to write this dissertation. I researched it and tried most objectively to come to a conclusion about what happened in Turkey. While researching the question ‘is Turkey really a Kemalist country?’, I understood that personal preferences, political views and experiences were not of importance to really draw a conclusion about what happened to a country within the 95 years of its existence. I had to set aside political debates and numerous ideologically driven books on the issue of Kemalism, changes in education and political Islam in Turkey. For instance, authors on the left were and still are overly dedicated to the description of the Turkish state being driven by Kemalist ideology. Ismail Beşikçi for instance, argued in an essay published in 2007 that the ‘official ideology is predicated on Turkish nationalism. Religion is used as a buttress of the official ideology.’ As his whole argument throughout his essay is based on the ‘official ideology’ implemented with the founding of the republic, I assume he means what I have argued to be Kemalism. In a recently published article for the journal Birikim, Taner Akçam, a formerly high-ranking member of the Marxist Devrimci Yol organisation and present Professor of History at Clark University compared both Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s republics, arguing that the ‘enlightenment’ and the ‘conservative’ movements have been fighting a ‘Kulturkampf’ for more than 150 years. However, more interestingly, he states that all three coups (1960, 1971 and 1980), and additionally the 1997 warning of a coup by the military, were results of the Kemalist military tutelage trying to bring back order to politics and society. I used only two examples to depict a general consensus in the Turkish left assuming a Kemalist status quo in bureaucracy and the military, which forms the country based on Kemalist ideology. Thus, the Turkish left’s critique of Kemalism is

419 Ibid.
part of the opposition of any oppression of the state. I will not delve into examples of Kemalists and political Islamists and their critiques of each other, as they appear to me to be obsolete by virtue of the nature of the dichotomy of both ideological perspectives. Hence, issues such as what exactly Kemalism is or political debates about ideological underpinnings of the state in Turkey had to be set aside, and primary sources only were chosen.

For that matter, my sources on Turkish education are the primary sources I gathered in the archives of the Ministry of Education. Gladly, these sources were treasures, as they offered an unfiltered perspective on the state’s approach to how all three topics—history, civic and religious education as school subjects—should be taught and consequently what the state wanted ideologically to implement. Thus, I think the use of the sources concerning Turkish education is unique, as they are hardly used in any academic research, especially considering the time span from 1923 to present. Access to these sources was not achieved easily, as is described in detail in the literature review in Chapter 2. To reiterate briefly, none of the programmes from 1923 until 2000 are accessible digitally. All hard copies are held in the library of the head council of education and morality in Ankara. Though access to the library is free, visiting the library on a daily basis, accessing the facility of the council and independently seeking information and archived documents is not done without difficulty. Reoccurring questioning by the staff about the study and its aims and an oversight the researcher made, not to mention the daily filing of the filled-out form with all personal details gave me the impression of an attempt to limit my access to the archives. And to remind the reader again, all of these actions appeared even after I presented the security at the gate of the facilities, the staff and the head of the library of the council a document stating that I was a special advisor to a member of parliament. Consequently, I would argue that, given the limitations mentioned, fully independent and free research is currently not without difficulty. Coupling these issues of apprehending the archived programmes with researching the entire educational history of the republic, i.e., from 1923 to present, is what made this study interesting, challenging and unique at the same time. Furthermore, the focus on the subjects of history, civic and religious education at the centre of my empirical analysis is unique to the literature on education in Turkey.
These unique sources were able to depict what I set out as the centre of my research: state ideological shifts in Turkey away from Kemalism. As the analysis of the curricula and teaching programmes has shown us, the system of education was and is influenced by state ideology and its shifts. Not only did the ideological shift change the content of said subjects, but it also changed the structure, the hours to be taught and the focus on specific issues. The increase of hours in religious teachings, coupled with the strongly Ottoman historical focus and finally the change of approach to the definition of the citizen in the teaching programmes must all contribute to a shift in state ideology and were all clearly depictable. Thus, without these sources, a thorough study of state ideology in Turkey away from Kemalism would not have been feasible.

This chapter should not be merely a summary of what has already been mentioned and analysed; it should rather constitute a conclusion drawn from my findings. Thus, as the very unique sources gave us insight into the practical approach of what I defined as state ideology, I should revisit the theoretical findings and try to determine whether my theoretical discussion can be considered to have completely covered every aspect of state ideology and education or if amendments to my theoretical findings or even the theories of the authors used, especially that of Niklas Luhmann, must be made. I would argue that, if I discuss the two definitions I put forward, i.e., state ideology and changes to state ideology, and if I critically assess the validity of my definitions in light of my findings, the usefulness of these definitions especially in the field of critical systems theory must be outlined.

**Theoretical findings and their validity**

Hence, my definition of state ideology in accordance with the theory of Niklas Luhmann’s System Theory, revisited from a Marxist perspective, was this: the compromised upon accumulation of hegemonic ideologies, which through the results of differentiation processes distinguish core functional premises in need of reproduction. Thus, my definition from Chapter 3.1 argued that there are indeed varying and numerous hegemonic ideologies which agree upon a single state ideology to reproduce core functionalities of the system. I further amended to this definition later in Chapter 3.3 to say that state ideology cannot be portrayed only as a present-day implementation of this compromise of hegemonic ideologies, but has, as is the case with education *per se*, an outreach to the future. Or, in other words, present state
ideology is a preparation for future shifts that will occur; thus, it is a preparation for what will be state ideology. I would argue that my findings have shown that the thesis regarding preparation for future state ideological shifts is valid. Especially the changes to religious education at schools in Turkey depicted in Chapter 5.4 have portrayed a gradual change away from the Kemalist laicist approach from 1923 until 1945 and to the adoption of a diminished laicisim in the period between 1950 to 1980. This was followed by a furthering of non-laicist practices after the coup of 1980 and finalised in the transformational phase after 2002, in which laicism was not only abandoned in its then-present form of state ideology but was even reversed into a state ideological implementation of political Islam. Thus, the shifts away from Kemalism in the 1950s forward were preparing the consensus of hegemonic ideologies to transform state ideology in Turkey for a complete reversal of Kemalism in the present day. Thus, I would argue that my definition of the compromise of hegemonic ideologies upon a state ideology with an outreach to future consensuses has proven to be valid. However, the communication between systems representing the varying hegemonic ideologies was not delved into within this dissertation and should be cause for future research. Hence, the question of coding in the inter-systematic communication between such hegemonic ideologies is an issue I was not able to delve into. Again, I argued that the common ground for these hegemonic ideologies to agree upon on a single state ideology, i.e., a state's ideological road map for the present and near future, was the functionality of vital systematic functioning. One of the most important vital functions I depicted was indeed in the economic field. I did not delve into this issue more deeply, but what can be assumed per the nature of the economy within the concept of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory in conjunction with society is that all hegemonic ideologies were influenced by and linked to the economy or economic developments at least, inasmuch as their hegemonic ideological power in the present and its sustainability for the future was relying on the present and future functionality of the economic system. Hence, the economy as a functional system and its sustainability was at least one commonly shared interest of all hegemonic ideologies, which is at least one reason for them to agree upon a state ideology. Thus, future research could try to evaluate how a common ground becomes what it is and how the communicative coding on this level can be mapped. Figuratively speaking, are human beings talking as representatives of hegemonic ideologies at a round table about how to proceed in society and thus define state ideology in their society? Or is there a central communicative instrument that
bundles the inputs of hegemonic ideologies and summarizes the middle grounds of all? If so, where is this instrument to be located and who controls it? Or is the process of loose communication of hegemonic ideologies to be mapped within a closed social system with an organisational structure? I think further research on specifically this issue could be very interesting and enlightening.

Furthermore, I have depicted shifts spanning decades, yet I left the issue of micro-shifts untouched. This of course might prove to be harder to outline via an empirical analysis such as mine, for which reason a study solely approaching this issue from a theoretical discussion seems to me more appropriate. Yet, for my study, this broader approach of depictable (macro-) shifts was an appropriate theoretical basis from which to apprehend educational changes in the context of state ideology in Turkey. However, can I point out state ideological shifts in countries in which micro-shifts appear as well via educational programmes? Hence, applying the method used in this study to highly developed and politically and economically stable countries such as Germany after 1949, for instance, might be interesting yet also possibly fruitless for many reasons. First, the small shifts in such countries might not visibly translate to shifts in educational programmes, while changes to such might as well be due to pedagogical findings, improvements in education, academic findings, etc. Thus, changes to educational programmes in Germany only might be caused by non-strictly ideological reasons. The second issue might be that such changes might not become as visible, which would then require a more in-depth analysis of phrases used in school books, linguistic analysis of single word changes, etc. At that point the question of a reasonable argument to be made for an ideological shift might not be given. However, I believe that education as a field of analysis for state ideological shifts has proven to be fruitful for my study and that, with tweaks to the methodology, it may also be able to depict even slight shifts in state ideology in developed, politically and economically stable countries.

Further, it would be fair to state that my discussion in theory and the three findings I outlined in the conclusion of Chapter 3 as contributions to critical systems theory have been validated. First, I outlined a definition for what should be applied as state ideology within this dissertation. The definition’s core is that state ideology is the bundling of hegemonic ideologies in a society, which agree upon a single state ideology which should be implemented by the state’s infrastructural institutions such as schools.
However, the central focus of this consensus on state ideology is the upholding of the economy’s functioning in present and the future. I would argue that this definition/thesis about state ideology has been proven valid through my empirical study. There we were able to see shifts in state ideology starting as early as 1950, thus, only 12 years after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Such change away from a Kemalist approach to a state ideology cannot be explained by political or social discourses but must instead be due to policy changes within the functional-system economy as outlined throughout this dissertation. In brief, and also underlining the second finding of the theoretical discussion, i.e., that shifts appear in phases and are not sudden, I argued that, after 1950, Turkey’s economic and political policies abandoned the independence clause of Kemalism and very rapidly entered an era of dependencies economically, strategically and politically with foreign countries in the West. The transitional phase from 1950 to 1960 saw a paralleling development between state ideological and economic shifts, through which both distanced themselves more and more away from Kemalism. After the coup of 1980, the transition to the transformational phase began and finalized in the transformational phase after 2002. Again, economic developments after 1980—i.e., the full introduction of neoliberal-capitalist economic and political policies, and, after 2002, the intensification of neoliberal economy in Turkey—were paralleled and depictable in educational programmes for both eras. Hence, my definition of state ideology was valid for this dissertation, as it can be proven to be correct in Turkey when analysing almost 100 years of republican history of education and its state ideological development paralleled with the economy, while such shifts did not and cannot appear suddenly but must rather undergo transitional phases spanning decades to finalize in a transformational phase.

Finally, I argued that my study is able to contribute to critical systems theory, as it tries to evaluate existing and through this dissertation furthered discussions in critical systems theory concerning the system of education and its role in and for society. To be more precise, my theoretical discussion in all of Chapter 3 tried to show that the system of education must be simplified to be an infrastructural institution of the state for the implementation of state ideology. Thus, though generally functional as per the definition of Luhmann, I would argue that its functionality is rooted in its societal task as an institution for the implementation of state ideology. My empirical study has proven that education as a functional system is not independent and is not focused on truly educating the children and youth of society. As pointed out through my research,
education in Turkey was primarily focused on the normative and ethical formation of students according to what was seen to be Islamic. My statistics in Chapter 5.1 have shown that skill-based education, understanding and mastering basic skills, such as reading, logical thinking, mathematical skills, and an effort to educate to prepare for labour were not the focus of education in Turkey. And the trend continues to worsen the situation of the youth. Thus, if education is not preparing the young generations to be skilled in future jobs, how will an Islamic normative education help them provide for themselves? Apparently, in Turkey, the system of education is not bothered with such issues. Thus, it would be fair to state that my empirical study has underlined what I found in the theoretical discussion. The functional system of education is limited in its functionality especially by the outside factor of the economy and as such cannot guarantee quality of education but is only guaranteed to implement state ideology in its teachings.

I believe that my contribution to critical systems theory is not limited only to these three points just made. I would argue that I also made a contribution in the theoretical discussion concerning ideology and critical systems theory and education and critical systems theory. However, these three main findings of the theoretical discussion were validated with my empirical study, which, with the material and methodology, would have to be a unique contribution in itself.

Yet, the contribution made to critical system theory, which remained unnamed but performed throughout this dissertation, is that I have proven that with a critical approach to systems theory Luhmann’s concept of modernity made his approach almost exclusively Euro-centric. I have shown through my dissertation that his statements about functional systems leaning towards globalisation becomes more relevant, if neo-liberal economy is taken into account.\textsuperscript{420} To be more precise, with neo-liberal economic standards accepted and implemented globally, the limitation of advanced differentiation processes as necessity for modernity of a society is overcome. This result however means that analyses of developing capitalist societies on the theoretical basis of systems theory is possible. I would argue that my dissertation is prove that especially with a critical systems theory approach, Luhmann’s theories can be applied not only in developed capitalist societies.

\textsuperscript{420} Luhmann (1998), p.809.
Key findings of the empirical analysis in conjunction with the theoretical discussion

Yet, I shall specify and take a closer look at my findings on state ideological shifts in Turkey. Before I outline and detail the results and what they mean for the present and future of Turkey, I want to briefly describe the historical setting in which Kemalism was implemented.

The republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 and cemented what was already pro forma the case: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This meant, among other things, two main difficulties. First, the Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic empire, not only because of its reach from the Balkans to the Arab Peninsula and North Africa but also because of the multi-ethnic composition within the borders of Turkey in 1923. Second, the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of holding the caliphate, was an Islamic empire. Thus, though non-Muslim religions existed in the empire, Islam was the official religion.

Among other principles, the two main pillars of Kemalism were laicism/secularism and nationalism. Hence, the founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, implemented a political system and state ideology in the republic completely opposite to that of the Ottoman Empire. The 600 years of Ottoman experience for society were no longer valid from a political perspective. This sentiment is most explicit with women’s rights to vote, be elected to political posts and attend schools in the same classes with their male counterparts. Thus, it would be fair to say that the republican experience for society after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was something they were not accustomed to for centuries. This change in social and political rules and norms was not easy to accept for religious groups and organisations. The law closing and forbidding Islamic monasteries, the law on clothing, the abandonment of the caliphate, laicism as centre piece of the constitution and the founding of a central religious-affairs presidency marked the new republican idea, which I have found to be central in the Kemalist state ideological approach after the founding. At the same time, I have briefly outlined in Chapter 3.2 how Atatürk tried to implement a new national bourgeoisie and an industrialization effort. If I parallel the developments concerning Kemalist state ideology and its abandonment since 1950 and the economy of Turkey, one could already argue that increasing non-Kemalist approaches leaning towards Islamic approaches and a shift in Turkey’s economy go hand in hand. Thus, the remarks I
made above concerning the central importance of the economy within the functioning of state, society, education can be depicted in Turkey as well. Again, not only has Luhmann not fully accounted for the central role of the economy in other socially indispensable systems such as education, but moreover he has linked the degree of modernity in a society to the degree and level of differentiation, thus, to the autonomy and independence of systems to their environment.421 Yet, as discussed above in Chapter 3.2, either he was correct in his analysis and my field of research Turkey and developed countries such as the United States of America have all shifted towards less differentiation, i.e., decreased modernity, or the theory of Luhmann must be amended insofar as the functional-system economy plays a more central and unique role in society, which cannot be described in conjunction with other functional systems, but rather has inter-systematic influence and powers. This would mean that the economy cannot be a simple functional system anymore but rather has evolved into a different type of system which Luhmann did not have the chance to describe before his death in 1998. Conceptually, the outcomes of my analysis of Turkey have shown that economic policy shifts have resulted in changes in approaches to education, especially in shifts in the content of subjects such as history, civic and religious classes. My closer analysis has shown that these shifts and changes were compatible with the thesis put forward to be non-Kemalist. Thus, the changes to the contents of the subjects analysed were substantial state ideological shifts for Turkey. To be more precise, I have very briefly discussed the economic development of Turkey, in which the years from 1923 until 1945 were statist approaches with an effort for industrialisation and the formation of a national bourgeoisie. After 1945 and especially 1950, the statist, national approach was abandoned in favour of an economy open to foreign trade and investments, thus undermining the Kemalist effort toward national dependence and production. This was best depicted by the mere statistic of an increasingly negative trade balance which started in 1950 and persisted to the present day. Furthermore, Gülten Kazgan states that, by demand of the World Bank, Turkey was to prioritize the farming sector over its efforts of industrialisation while abandoning its statist approach; i.e., it was not to build state-owned factories and companies anymore and must finally subsidise foreign investment.422 Yet, though Kazgan elaborates on how Turkey did not fully cooperate

422 Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat’tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), p. 82.
with the World Bank on halting its industrialisation in favour of investments in farming, she shows what I discussed earlier in Chapter 3.2 that the efforts for industrialisation did not really come to fruition. What, however, stands out is the fact that Turkey’s dependency on foreign money/loans/investments had become its economic policies after 1950. Specifically, this issue is one that is contradicting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s economic policies, which are linked to his political beliefs as well. After having fought for Turkey’s independence against imperial forces such as France and the British Empire, his economic policies were driven to not be economically dependent on the very same empires and countries. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his comrades who led the independence wars of Turkey had seen first-hand how an economically dependent country would eventually be controlled by the nations it depended on. What I am referring to is the Ottoman Public Debt Administration established in 1881, which made the Ottoman Empire into a quasi-colony of France and Britain. In order for the newly formed republic to not face a similar dependence, it must be argued again that dependency on foreign economic sources was not in the conceptual framework of Kemalism. However, as I have stated here and especially in Chapter 3.2, the dependency on foreign money and imports started with 1950 and has grown immensely ever since. I have also argued that, with the coup in 1980, another shift in the economic policies of Turkey has appeared. Neoliberal economic policies were accepted and implemented. In his book, Özal Ekonomisinde Paramız Pul Olurken Kim Kazandi Kim Kaybetti, Osman Ulugay depicts in 1987 how the failed/halted implementation of neoliberal economic policies on the 24th of January, 1980, and after lead to the coup on the 12th of September the same year. Ulugay argues that the economic decisions made in January were widely supported by Turkish industry and businessmen, the World Bank, OECD and IMF, while their implementation was politically not easy, as a minority government was in power, while Marxist organisations outside of the parliament enjoyed wide support and popularity in the streets, which led to collisions between communists and nationalistic/racist movements. Thus, while ideological battles were fought in the streets, a minority government could not truly implement its own economic policies. In addition, the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979

423 Ibid., p.84ff.
425 Osman Ulugay, Özal Ekonomisinde Paramız Pul Olurken, Kim Kazandi Kim Kaybetti (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987)
led to an elevated strategic role of Turkey within NATO, while Marxist ideology was spreading in public, which led to a state-sanctioned increase of terror from racist right-wing movements against the left and harsh law-enforcement tactics. At the same time, i.e., in the second half of the 1970s, Turkey experienced a currency crisis in 1978, while Turkey’s exports were heavily negatively influenced by the petrol crisis in 1979. Thus, a military coup to assure (enforced) political and economic stability was not a surprise, but was rather inevitable as ‘almost all the necessities for the military to ‘grab’ the country’s political power were given.’ For Ayşe Buğra, it was intriguing that the military mentioned an economic-development strategy dependent on foreign investments; hence, the national military of Turkey grabbing power in the name of their Kemalist duty presented an economic policy prescribed by the IMF. While all party leaders were held captive, the former undersecretary to the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who was the author of the 24th of January economic policies, became the state minister and deputy prime minister of Turkey under the regime of the coup d’etat. Thus, the coup sought for continuity concerning the neoliberal economic plans for Turkey. These drastic governmental and economic changes also introduced new state ideological shifts, which I argued were the end of the transition and the beginning of the transformational phase. The validity of my claim was clearly observable in the teaching programmes for all three subjects: history, civic and religious education. While the teaching programmes between 1960 until 1980 did not change at all in their content, this cannot be said for the first programme I was able to analyse after the coup. Furthermore, the result of my analysis was that, ideologically, the contents were further apart from Kemalism. The religion of Islam played a far more important and visible role in the teachings of the three school subjects delved into. Lastly, I argued that, with the AKP governments starting in 2002, the transformational phase was

426 Cf., Et al. Feroz Ahmad, Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), p. 179ff.
Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devleti Ocak Dergâh. 12 Eylül'den 1990'larla Ülkücü Hareket (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 88ff.
427 Kazgan, p. 113ff.
430 Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), p. 206.
actively ongoing and still is in the present. Again, changes in the economy can be paralleled to the development I was able to depict in the educational shifts. I argued that an emphasis on Islamic teachings, abandonment of the republican era in history curricula, the symbiosis of the subjects civic and religious education, an increased offering of ‘elective’ courses containing religion (The Life of the Prophet Mohammad was one example I depicted in Chapter 5.4) and increased hours teaching religious subjects was current. Furthermore, the augmentation of Islamic vocational schools and students in the AKP era prove that a state ideological transformation in Turkey was ongoing. The transformation of state ideology can also be depicted in the furthering of neoliberal economic policies with the AKP governments after 2002. I already mentioned in Chapter 3.2 the increase in household debts from 13.4 billion Turkish Liras in 2003 to 541.7 billion Liras in 2017. At the same time deindustrialization and increased efforts of privatization policies can be depicted. Instead of industrializing efforts, the construction sector was heavily subsidized with low currency policies, investment incentives and low minimum wages. Hence, with an economic focus on the construction sector instead of on industrialization efforts, the AKP favoured single investment and return policies instead of mid- to long-term investments via industrialized economic growth. I have already touched upon the gender-gap issue and how it worsened in the years of the AKP. In addition, the World Economic Forum ranks Turkey at 131 of 144 countries globally concerning its general gender-gap statistics, and places it at 128 in the field of economic participation and opportunity. Thus, under the AKP governments since 2002, the implementation of neoliberal economic policies was furthered and intensified, which must be seen as the fulfilment of the economic transformational phase that started in 1980. Both Mustafa Peköz and Yıldız Atasoy lay out very well and in detail how the AKP in particular and Islamic capitalists in general have been very much integrated into the neoliberal capitalist system. Peköz depicts how in 1973 the Islamic party Millî Selamet Partisi, instead of putting forward an alternative, Islamic economic system, in its core argued with Islamic references for a capitalist economy. A theme evolves within Islamic movements of

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bending forbidden Islamic practices, such as interests for the banking sector, exploitation of the working force, to merge Islam with capitalism. This theme was continued after 1980, and especially under the political rule of the AKP in Turkey. Atasoy argues that support for neoliberal economic policies under Erdoğan has been declared from the beginning, which can be due to the historical development of the political Islamic movement aligned with capitalism. However, she argues that beyond an ideological shift internally, a ‘realignment of Turkish capital’ from ‘secularly-oriented large business interests concentrated in the Istanbul region, with strong ties to the Kemalist state’ to ‘both large and smaller-sized Muslim business interests, generally from smaller cities in Anatolia with very weak ties to the Kemalist state apparatus’. Hence, neoliberal economic policies would allow for the dismantling and consequent distribution of wealth of state-owned enterprises to their Islamic business ties. Though I cannot agree with Atasoy on her remark about a Kemalist state apparatus, I would argue that, in light of both Peköz and Atasoy, political Islamic movements have positioned themselves very early as a political guarantor of capitalist economic interests. On the one hand, this was, according to Mustafa Sönmez, to economically strengthen and grow the political Islamic movement, while on the other hand it helped to dismantle what has been viewed as the enemy: i.e., Kemalism and its elites. Thus, the dichotomy of Islamism vs. Kemalism can be depicted not only in a theoretical discussion of economic principles of both ideologies but also in the historically visible practical approaches. Gilles Kepel even goes so far to state that ‘For the regime in Riyadh, support for the emerging devout middle class in Turkey was part of a global political strategy to back this social stratum.’ He further describes how, especially after the 1980 coup, Islamic businessmen have flourished with the help of post-coup Turkish conservative/centre-right governments. Thus, arguing that, with the introduction of neoliberal economic policies in Turkey, Islamic businessmen saw a rise in their influence and growth, while not only being supported by their own governments, but rather are part of a global effort of political Islam. Finalizing this string of argument, I would argue that economic figures have already shown that, with an increasing Islamisation of Turkey, its economic policies have shifted towards an accord with capitalist demands. However, the ideological underpinnings of the aims of political

437 Sönmez, Mustafa, İslami Sermaye Nasıl Tırmanıyor?, Gazetepazar, 16.03.1997.
439 Ibid., p. 349ff.
Islam in Turkey with neo-liberal economic policies lead us to conclude that neo-liberalism and political Islam are tied to each other with respect to Turkey. Or in other words, the rise and stabilization of the political power of the AKP is closely linked with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. Furthermore, in a society in which religious norms, i.e., determinism, have replaced secular normative and ethical discourse, crude neoliberal policies resulting in an increased exploitation of the individual are easier to implement and uphold. At the end of this chapter, I will delve into the fascist characteristics of the AKP regime, yet even the promoted Islamic determinism in the educational system and in political and social spheres of society lead us to the conclusion that the state ideological transformational phase is paralleled with the neoliberal economic transformation of Turkey, i.e., merging political Islam and neoliberal economy.

Thus, as was discussed in Chapter 3.2, the economy should theoretically not be able to influence the system of education in one of its core functions: content of teaching. However, as I have argued and proven throughout this dissertation, the content of teaching is shaped by state ideology. And with my analysis of Turkey, I have shown that shifts in economic policies have directly affected the teaching programmes in their direction from a state ideological perspective. Hence, concerning the influence and interconnectivity of the economy and other systems, the economy has gained so much influence that the structural coupling between the functional-system economy and education has allowed it to gain as much decisive powers that I cannot talk about an independent system of education anymore and the differentiation process was reversed in Turkey. The other conclusion would be that Niklas Luhmann might have been theoretically sound in his assessment of the interconnection of systems, i.e., structural coupling, though his theory has flaws in its practical approach.\footnote{To remember the discussion presented on this issue, see Chapter 3.2. For the original reading of Luhmann’s approach: Luhmann (1998), p. 776-788.} I would argue that, in my specific case, Turkey, both conclusions are valid. For one thing, the transition from a heavily farming industry to an overwhelmingly service-oriented sector, starting with the 1950s and rapidly shifting after the 1980s, naturally changed the necessities in school education. With the changed demand for a person’s knowledge and abilities in the service sector, education had to adapt, which again is in line with Luhmann’s theory of education: i.e., the preparation for the job market and the
necessary curriculum vitae.\textsuperscript{441} This might lead to changes in teaching programmes and curricula, which is understandable. However, the shift I have analysed and identified was less focused on the abilities necessary for a work-force in the service sector—such as the ability to engage in conversations, listening, understanding, practical thinking and physical strength (especially in the construction sector), or language skills (foreign and native). The knowledge and skills mediated through the teaching programs were more spiritual, deterministic, focused on the individual formation as a being with Islam as the first and uppermost identification. Hence, instead of teaching the child the skills needed to work in the service sector, education in Turkey is limiting the child to obedience and deterministic thinking, which in turn, I would argue, makes that future working force more obedient and less critical.\textsuperscript{442} From this perspective alone, the child is well equipped, as it is able to obey orders. However, this also means that these individuals are more likely to be exploited, which again is very much in line with neoliberal economic modes of production. Thus, I would argue that education had to naturally change and develop with the economic challenges and changes and an increased urbanisation of the population. However, it shifted to teach children deterministic, uncritical behaviour, which might be in-line with neoliberal capitalist exploitation of the working class yet is, from an educational-policy standpoint, failing the duties of education \textit{per se}. Thus, I would argue that, for Turkey, the economy as functional system has widened its sphere of influence into education inasmuch as it is able to even determine teachings contra productive to the aims of education as Luhmann defined them and as were discussed in Chapter 3.\textsuperscript{443} On the other hand, I would argue that the theory of structural coupling has its flaws when comparing the Kemalist era of education to the transformational phase in the present. In both cases, educational policies are determined by the economic policy the state implements. To reiterate from Chapter 5.3, in the Kemalist era of the republic when he was alive, i.e., from 1923 until 1938, civic education centered around the formulated idea of the Turk and his/her characteristics. Being Turkish was the identification above all other


\textsuperscript{442} One such example of non-skill-based education is the abandonment of lessons on how to prepare and mix cocktails taught and crucial for students at hotel and tourism high schools in 2017. Before students were taught how to prepare alcoholic cocktails, yet it was abandoned from the curriculum to \textit{prevent children from direct or indirect harm alcohol could cause on them}. Source: Birgun.net, \textit{Alkolü İçki ve Kokteyl Hazırlama Dersi kaldırıldı}, Birgun.net, 18.07.2017 <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/alkollu-icki-ve-kokteyl-hazirlama-dersi-kaldirildi-170435.html> [accessed: 05.10.2018]

\textsuperscript{443} Luhmann, (2002).
characteristics a human could hold in Turkey. Hence, even if someone was a Kurd or a Greek, an Alawi or an Orthodox Christian, these identifications were all to be left in the shadows behind the ‘shining’ Turkish unity all citizens had to adhere to. I have deliberately not discussed the social and political consequences of laicist/secularist and nationalist implementations of Kemalism in every-day life. The reason for this decision is that political interpretations of Kemalism and their consequences for the public are not the issue of my dissertation. I have focused on the shift in state ideology rather than on possible positive or negative effects of Kemalism. However, there exists a vast literature on the treatment of minorities in the name of Kemalism/Kemalist nationalism in Turkey. In the same era between 1923 to 1938, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tried to form a national bourgeoisie consisting of Muslim Turks rather than of minorities, while national economic policies were aimed at industrialisation and subsidising the farming industry within the statist approach of the young republic. We have seen the same approach of the state concerning its educational policies and its accordance with economic policies, as discussed just above. Hence, since the founding of the republic, the policy-making of the state is focused on the necessities of the economy and the subsequent alignment of educational policies to these necessities.

On the other hand, we can also observe an ongoing undoing of the differentiation processes that had taken place, yet were reversed with the AKP after 2002. One such pivotal example is the dissipation of the jurisdiction. This process started with the 2010 referendum, in which the supreme court and the state council were no longer independent institutions, that could decide on their inner-institutional appointments, but were transformed to politically appointed offices, while at the same time the

444 Cf., et al. Nezahat Gündoğan and Kazım Gündoğan, Dersim’In Kayıp Kızları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016)
İzeddin Çalışlar (Publ.), Dersim Raporu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011);
Hakan Yücel, Rum Olmak, Rum Kalmak (İstanbul: İstos Yayınları, 2017)
Desmond Fernandes, Kürt ve Ermeni Soykırımları: Sansür ve Inkardan İkara (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2013)
Ahmet Yıldız, Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene. Türk Ulusal Kimliğin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007)
Zafer Toprak, Darwin’den Dersim’e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Yayıncılık, 2012)
Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar. Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004)
oversight role of the supreme court concerning passed laws and their accordance to the constitution was taken away.\textsuperscript{445}

Though the \textit{Turkey 2009 Progress Report} of the European Commission praised the efforts of Turkey to fight against rouge inner-state actors by arguing that the ‘alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed by the investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns.’\textsuperscript{446} Professor Dani Rodrik from Harvard University argued in 2011 that ‘Once the indictment and the supporting files were made fully public in July 2010, the fraudulent nature of the coup plot documents became even clearer.’\textsuperscript{447} He further continued in his article to depict how the AKP was directly involved in the case by holding a ‘prejudicial role’, which ultimately harmed Turkey’s judiciary, concluding that, ‘unless the political leadership stands for the rule of law, the rule of law cannot sustain itself.’\textsuperscript{448} The very same patterns were to be seen after the 15\textsuperscript{th} of July and the long-lasting state of emergency, through which the AKP ultimately became the only deciding factor in who should be charged, for what and for how long. According to the Journalists’ Union of Turkey, 142 journalists are now in prison.\textsuperscript{449} Though Reporters Without Borders accepts only 32 of these journalists as imprisoned, even their relatively smaller number puts Turkey on top of the global chart of imprisoned journalists.\textsuperscript{450} In 2017, the Department of Justice of Turkey felt the need to correct a newspaper which falsely reported the number of citizens charged with defamation of President Erdoğan. There the ministry very angrily replies to the newspaper \textit{Cumhuriyet} that it was wilfully reporting wrongly to create a bad impression of Erdoğan in public.\textsuperscript{451} However, what was to be corrected by the ministry with such an accusation? According to its press release, it was not true that 46,000 people were charged with defamation of the president, but

\textsuperscript{445} Oğuz Oyan, ‘Kamu Yönetiminin ve Mülkiyet İlişkilerinin Dönüştürülmesi’, \textit{Mülikiye Dergisi}, 36.3 (2012), 133-153 (p. 135)
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., p. 105 & 109.
rather 3,658, while 46,193 citizens were charged with ‘crimes committed against the state’s sovereignty and its organs’ prestige’. Thus, according to the Ministry of Justice, in a single year (2016), almost 50,000 citizens were charged with ‘crimes’ which would be considered freedom of thought in democracies. This while making a press release ‘correcting’ a newspaper about its fraudulent behaviour to mislead the public against the president Erdoğan. This press release alone depicts the state of the judiciary very well, when the executive branch of the judiciary, i.e., the ministry it is bound to, is solely concerned with protecting the president instead of with questioning the large number of citizens being charged for criticising the state: the AKP, ministers, high-ranking members of the AKP or members of parliament. At the same time, 6,081 academics were discharged and cannot work in academia anymore, while the the decrees dismissing them claim to ‘fight against terror’ with that act. In other words, these academics were discharged for being in opposition to the government. Hence, what started with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases in 2008 continued to be common practice in the Turkish judiciary of the present. To be more precise, what Dani Rodrik stated in 2011 about the rule of law not being able to sustain itself, became reality, in which the courts are not independent at all but are rather directed by Erdoğan. There is no academic research about the current fear in the judiciary of judging against the will of the president and in the name of law; however, in a legal state, in which any action against the president and his demands is considered terrorism or counteracting the state, it is not farfetched to assume that Turkey’s legal system has fully become a tool of the governing AKP and the president.

Hence, the AKP is holding power in the executive and legislative branches, but also in the judiciary. Furthermore, the military was dismantled with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, while the last opposition to the policies of the AKP in the military was successfully defeated with the failed coup of the 15th July, 2016. The media is overwhelmingly under the control of businessmen closely tied to the AKP, while critical voices are arrested in record numbers. Lastly, the judiciary as briefly

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452 Ibid.
depicted was dismantled and made docile to the AKP, especially after the referendum in 2010.

Thus, from the perspective of my research, both conclusions can be made and are true at the same time concerning structural coupling and the influence of the economy on the decision-making of educational directions in Turkey. While I can state that the educational system in Turkey, throughout the republican history, tried to meet the demands of the economic system, the influence of the economy has grown within the educational system as well. At the same time, Luhmann’s assessment of modernity in conjunction with the differentiation processes and the coupling of systems can also be endorsed for Turkey, as the AKP has dismantled the differentiation processes of various systems to centralize and increase its power and control in Turkey. Hence, this would also mean that Turkey has distanced itself further from modernity, according to Luhmann.454

**Outlook**

Building upon both theoretical and empirical conclusions on Turkey, I shall now briefly present an outlook for Turkey’s future, specifically, about the future shifts in state ideology and the development Turkish society awaits. I believe I have shown that the theoretical approach used in this dissertation is a reliable tool with which to predict future ideological shifts, as it depicts the present-day ideological shape with an outreach to future developments. In other words, I have gained knowledge about possible progressions from the empirical analysis, based on the theoretical background, and are able to specify the empirical material that needs to be analysed to make predictions about the future. Thus, what do educational policies implemented in the programs and curricula of the present tell us about Turkey’s tomorrow? Furthermore, how can we intertwine present-day societal norms and their development from the past to the present with present-day educational policies to make predictions? And what do they tell us? Before I start answering these questions, two unpredictable factors have to be taken into account: first, what I have described as revolutionary shift in state ideology in Chapter 3.1. There I argued that changes to state ideology usually do not occur abruptly. Such events are exclusive to revolutions or the overthrowing of a government by a foreign power with a differing political order in mind. One example

I used was Cuba and its revolution, and for the latter I argued that Germany before and after World War II is a good example of a sudden change in state ideology. Thus, if such an event takes place, my forecast of what might occur in Turkey in the near future might differ from what actually takes place. Second, I cannot foresee sudden changes in the modes of production. Thus, if in the near future new economic policies are accepted in Turkey, that cannot be foreseen so far, and my analysis might be wrong again. However, this would mean that a completely different type of mode of production within capitalism would be accepted in Turkey, or even an abandonment of capitalism itself. Both scenarios are, however, not probable. Hence, such an event would mean that we are seeing one scenario happening: i.e., a revolution. I have excluded a foreign power invading Turkey here, as Turkey’s ties to NATO and the EU, and the economic dependencies with the EU especially would most certainly exclude such a scenario.

With the two unpredictable scenarios mentioned, I would argue that, in Turkey’s near future, the government of the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will further its autocratic regime, while Islamism as state ideology will be more prevalent in Erdoğan’s policy making concerning every aspect of social and political life. With the last referendum, I have already found that he gained limitless and unchecked governmental power, which makes him a de facto dictator. The argument in the Turkish media and politics for him not being autocratic and a dictator is, a) that he was elected and b) that it is lawful, as his powers and position are rooted in the constitution. The reason for me to list these two arguments is that they depict quite well how political Islamist ideology has worked in Turkey so far and what its aims are. However, both arguments can very easily be rebutted. Autocrats, such as Vladimir Putin, and dictators, such as Hitler, came to power via elections. Elections themselves are no guarantor that autocratic regimes are not in place. And as for the second argument, the constitution supporters are quoting from is the new constitution, implemented after the referendum in 2017, which the International Referendum Observation Mission deemed to have taken place ‘on an unlevel playing field’, while the constitution proposal itself was heavily criticised by the renowned constitutional professor, Ibrahim Kaboğlu, among others, to give the president more rights than the Sultan of the
Ottoman Empire, binding executive, legislative and judiciary power to the president.\textsuperscript{455} Thus, both arguments are invalid and devoid of democratic standards to begin with.

In these circumstances, and with the present regime under Erdoğan, Turkey’s political system is broken. It is not only autocratic, but it even misses the smallest amount of democratic participation of its institutions. It is as of now solely based on and directed towards the decision-making of Erdoğan, while expertise regarding certain issues or the area of responsibility within the state are obsolete within his reign. From historical examples, I can already foresee further nationalistic and racist fear-mongering within this system. It was the case in Germany, Spain and Italy. Furthermore, the outspoken aim of Erdoğan and his AKP is to raise a ‘religious generation’.\textsuperscript{456} Hence, the aim of the political Islamist party in power is to raise Islamist children, while the singular use of the \textit{generation} should not be taken literally but is rather to depict that they are intending to raise conservative Islamist children. Of course, schools are, as we have seen in this dissertation, the best way to execute this demand. I have also shown that this project is already in progress, which is why I argued that the state ideological transformational phase has started with the AKP and still continues. I would argue that, in the near future, educational programmes for state schools will change to be more focused on Islamic teachings, while private schools might be more flexible in this area. However, on the one hand, this would mean that only children of rich parents might attend schools with a more balanced education, while, on the other hand, the divide between rich and poor will be further deepened. Already, the founding of the republic is in the background of history lessons. I foresee a more intensified focus on the AKP and a depiction of Erdoğan as the liberator of the people, which I can already see in some instances today. I will, however, only focus on one instance. After the failed coup on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of July, 2016, the Ministry of National Education decided to dedicate the whole first week of the reopening of the schools to a programme they named ‘15\textsuperscript{th} of

\textsuperscript{455} International Referendum Observation Mission, \textit{Republic of Turkey – Constitutional Referendum. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions}, OSCE, 16.04.2017
& Serpil İlgün, Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kaboğlu: \textit{Güçlü meclis resmi bir yalan}, Evrensel Gazetesi, 04.06.2018

\textsuperscript{456} Ensar Vakfı, \textit{Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Vakit Ensar Olma Vakti}, Ensar Vakfı, 28.02.2016
\texttt{<https://ensar.org/cumhurbaskanrecep Tayyip Erdogan-Vakit Ensar Olma Vakti_Vakitensarolmavakti_H938.html>, [accessed: 03.10.2018]>}
July victory of democracy and remembrance of the martyrs'. I will not delve too much into the details of the program itself. However, what stands out are two main elements which the ministry demands that schools adhere to: nationalism and Islam. In their programme released in 2016, the connection between religious martyrdom and the nation, repeated symbols are used, such as the example of the opening of the ceremonies by the national anthem, followed by the Fatiha for the martyrs: an Islamic prayer ritual for the souls of the dead. Furthermore, the programme prescribes the speech of the principal of schools, and theatrical scripts to be played by boys and girls, in which children are constantly reminded that martyrdom is to die for the nation, thus, intertwining both nationalism and Islamism. More importantly, the programme also equates the independence war of Turkey from 1919 until 1923 to the failed coup attempt of the 15th of July, 2016. Thus, what is attempted here is to equate the founding myth and aura of the republic in 1923 with Erdoğan’s very own founding myth to be the 15th of July, 2016. In certain ways he applied this parallel successfully, as I argued above already, via his election to the newly formed political system and his unchecked presidency.

This example shows how the AKP is trying to write its own history, forgetting that their Islamic movement were the beneficiaries of the 1980 junta. Hence, the AKP cannot have a stance against coups per se. They rather need an event to build a mythical aura around their reign, in particular around Erdoğan. He claimed time and time again that Turkey would fall into chaos if he was not in power. These elements are particularly interesting, as I have mentioned Germany in the above and how history might shed some light on the present and near future of Turkey. Such elements were used by Hitler and the Nazis as well. The myth Hitler used was the Reichstag fire in 1933, which Hitler used to extend his constitutional powers and lift himself to the role of dictator of Germany. The parallels here cannot be dismissed. With the Reichstag fire decree on

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459 Ibid., et al p. 3, 7, 8.
460 Ibid.
461 Cf., Et al Peköz (2009), p. 56-60.
the 27th of February, 1933, most of the rights of German citizens were suspended. The very same happened after the attempted coup on the 15th of July, 2016. On the 21st of July, the state of emergency was imposed, which was extended seven times until the 19th of July, 2018; thus it lasted for two years. Again, in parallel with the events in Germany in 1933, not only were ‘100,000 individuals prosecuted and 40,000 of them detained’ after the coup attempt, but also a new constitution was implemented, and Erdoğan was elected to the newly empowered Presidency briefly after.463 Thus, Erdoğan followed almost exactly the historical precedent of Hitler.

With these historical parallels in mind, and having analysed the teaching programs in detail in Chapter 5, I would argue that Turkey is heading towards becoming not only an autocratic Islamic state, which it is already, but even a fascist Islamist dictatorship. There are already academic discussions about whether fascism is prevalent in Turkey’s political system today.464 However, it will become worse. Already, oppositional voices are silenced forcefully, such as the detained opposition leaders of the pro-Kurdish HDP, Figen Yüksekdağ and Selahattin Demirtaş. However, the symbiosis of the new generations being educated by the present and near-future educational system—whereby they learn to obey and think primarily deterministically, form their personality with Islam in the centre — and having only experienced Erdoğan as leader of the nation, will in my estimation reinforce Erdoğan’s rule in Turkey, while conservative up to radical Islamic norms and ethics will solidify. Even today, previously unthinkable and unaccepted norms and views are publicly stated. I will focus solely on what was said about women by Erdoğan and high officials of the AKP; however, this could be extended to other areas as well. In 2016, Erdoğan argued that no Muslim family would use the contraceptive pill. Briefly afterward, in the same year, he followed up by stating that women who have not given birth to a child, no matter how successful they are in their careers, are ‘not complete, are half of a woman’.465 This sentiment and

desire to have control over female bodies goes so far that the then Minister of Health Recep Akdağ argued that abortion was murder and that a woman who was raped should not abort as ‘the state will look after the child’. Clearly, religious views on the role of women in society and family are the guideline for such political statements. Erdoğan very openly stated that he does not think women are equal to men. He just recently repeated this sentiment by asking if men and women could compete in a 100-metre dash, thus proving to his audience that equality was not possible between men and women. To complete this picture and role the AKP and Erdoğan stipulate for women, vice-premier minister of Turkey Bülent Arınç claimed in 2014 that it was proper for women to laugh in public, while women were seen as reason for the high unemployment rates by the minister of the state in 2009 by Mehmet Şimşek. These statements were made publicly and show clearly that Erdoğan and his highest-ranked party officials openly admit viewing the role of women to be not in public, but rather at home, caring for their children and family, while not reporting for unemployment, but focusing on their real job: being mothers and wives. Though in his recently published book, Toygar Sinan Baykan might argue that the AKP is a populist party personified in Erdoğan, I would argue that Erdoğan’s popularity in Turkey goes beyond a populist agenda and has reached a level of personality cult, or as a member of the AKP has put it: Touching Erdoğan is a form of prayer. Hence, a pseudo-Islamic discourse mixed with a personality cult around Erdoğan make his statements, views, policies and actions almost religious norms. To reiterate Adorno again, he suggests that, ‘All fascist movements officially employ traditional ideas and values but actually give them an


entirely different, antihumanistic meaning." While the use of Islam ‘as a means instead of an end’—in this case to hold on to political power in Turkey for Erdoğan and his followers—‘falls in line with the general tendency toward subordination and renunciation of one’s own judgment’, which undoubtedly must be described as fascism. Thus, by using pseudo-Islamic populist arguments, such as the equation of touching Erdoğan with prayer, which of course is utter non-sense, Erdoğan and his followers are making use of fascist means to maintain their regime. Adorno further argues that the depiction of Erdoğan as a figure of high religious importance is the psychological reawakening of an almighty prime father for the masses, which indeed was depicted with regards to Hitler and his appeal to the masses in Germany. Thus, with the normalisation of a pseudo-Islamic discourse in public, a conservative Islamisation and even radicalisation of Islamic views reaching fascistic levels is almost inevitable. Children learn already and will continue to have learnt that normative and ethical rules are, if presented as Islamic principles, to be left unquestioned and followed. Thus, the future development of Turkey will, as I argued already, lead to an empowerment of the fascist system already in place or at least in preparation. Even if Erdoğan’s reign would be limited by force of nature, i.e., death, the ideological underpinning of uncritical Islamic normative determinism is seeded in society. In accord with my theory, only a shift of present-day state ideology over decades, leading to another transformation, would make a normative and ethical and critical engagement in society possible. This, however, could take another 50 years to fully be embodied and accepted in society. To close the circle started in the introduction of this dissertation, I argued that a dichotomy between Kemalism and Islamism presented itself in state ideological realms. Both ideological paths could not be further away from each other, as one was actively implementing laicist policies by closing Quranic schools and religious sects, abandoning the Kalifate and making coeducation compulsory, which was naturally not well received by Islamist ideology. However, I would have to conclude that the political Islamist ideological approach apparently was and is more relevant to the implementation of state ideological policies for the sustaining of today’s and the near future’s functional economic needs even though (and maybe especially because?) this comes at the cost of the reversal of

472 Ibid., p. 733.
differentiation processes in society and its functional systems. Thus, I would argue that the new dichotomy prevalent in Turkey is not Kemalism vs. Islamism but rather a non-ideological battle of systems in society continuing to differentiate against Erdoğan’s centralized demand for de-differentiation. It is the battle of a democratic society vs. an Islamo-fascist society.
Appendix


Note: I used the abbreviation R.T. (Republic of Turkey) for T.C. (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) in the translation.

1923 – 1950

- T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Ortaokul Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938)
  R.T. Ministry of Culture, Junior High-School Programme (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938)
- T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, İlkmektep Müfredat Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930a)
  R.T. Ministry of Education, Primary School Curriculum Programme (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930a)
- T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, Ortamektep Müfredat Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930b)
  R.T. Ministry of Education, Junior High-School Curriculum Programme (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930b)
- T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, Lise Müfredat Programı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934)
  R.T. Ministry of Education, High-School Curriculum Programme (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934)
- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Orta Okul Programı (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949)

1950 – 1960

- T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, İlk Okul Programı (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1956)
  R.T. Ministry of Education, Primary School Programme (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1956)

1960 – 1980


- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, *İlkokul Programı* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1961)


- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, *Ortaokul Programı* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1962)


- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, *İlkokul Programı* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969)


- T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, *Ortaokul Programı* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970)

R.T. Ministry of National Education *Junior High-School Programme* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970)

1980 – 2000


- T.C. Milli Eğitim Gençlik ve Spor Bakanlığı İlköğretim Genel Müdürlüğü, *İlkokul Programı* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1989)

R.T. Ministry of National Education Directorate General of Primary Education, Primary School Programme (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1989)

**2000 – present**


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