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Partisan citizenship and its discontents: precarious possession and political agency on Harare City’s expanding margins

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On the margins of Zimbabwe’s expanding capital Harare, the ruling ZANU-PF party promotes a view of access to urban land, housing and security as ‘gift’, conditional on demonstrations of party loyalty. This article discusses contestation over this form of partisan citizenship, making the following broader arguments. First it argues that the notion of partisan citizenship draws attention to the role of party political affiliation as a source of differential entitlements in illiberal democracies, countering a tendency to emphasise ethno-regional, racialized or religious communal identities as the primary sources of graduated citizenship in Africa. Second, it casts clientalist subjection as a contextual and contentious domain of ideas and action, rather than presenting it as cultural persistence or reducing it solely to material bargaining. Third, the article uses the Zimbabwean case to caution against a tendency within debates over southern urbanism to celebrate land occupations and informal construction as political resistance and route to full citizenship. In these ways, the article offers partisan citizenship as a means of taking forward debates over re-configurations of citizenship in Africa’s illiberal democracies and the politics of precarious peripheries in the urbanising global South more broadly.

Keywords: citizenship, informal settlements, urban peripheries, Africa, tenure security, property, Zimbabwe

Introduction

‘Everything is partisan here’ – Resident, Hopley, Harare, 13 September 2017

‘Fine to go there talking about water and sanitation, but don’t go there talking about rights and the accountability of a councillor’, Director, Harare Residents Trust, 12 April 2017

In large informal settlements encircling Zimbabwe’s capital city Harare, the ruling ZANU-PF party casts access to land and security as ‘gift’ contingent on displays of political loyalty. Local party

1 This research was funded through the Royal Geographical Society Research Programme ‘Migrants on the Margins’, and two Research council grants, ESRC ES/N004140/1 and AHRC ES/P005128/1. The Zimbabwe field research was conducted by the Development Governance Institute (DEGI) in collaboration with Dialogue on Shelter (DoS) and The Federation of Homeless People, Zimbabwe. Governance interviews and focus groups were conducted by the two authors; oral history interviews with residents of the settlements and the survey questionnaires were conducted by a team from DEGI and DoS. The authors would like to extend very grateful thanks to all those who participated, and to the Ministry of Local Government, National Works and Public Housing for permission to conduct the research.
committees act as de facto territorial authorities and police the public sphere, proscribing rights talk and working with MPs to win votes through threats of eviction and promises of land, development and tenure security. This article discusses this mode of manipulating political support and residents’ navigations thereof, shedding light on the politics and lived experiences of citizenship in these spaces. It uses the specific case to take forward debates over citizenship in Africa and illiberal democracies in the global South more broadly (Dorman 2014, 2016; Martins 216, Bezabeh 2011; Oosterom 2016, Manby 2009; Mamdani 1996; Chung 2014; Von Lieres and Piper 2014). It also speaks to debates over the role of political parties in shaping city spaces and the politics of informal settlements, where struggles over land and property can been seen as being about the substantive content of citizenship (Holston 2008, 2009; Holston and Caldeira 2008; Caldeira 2016; Chatterjee 2004; on African cities Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011; Benit-Gbaffou 2012; Gastrow 2016; Hammar 2017).

The article develops the notion of ‘partisan citizenship’ as a means of taking forward these debates over everyday citizenship and the politics of informal urban spaces. We define partisan citizenship as both a disputed idea - elaborated in the moral domain that party support should confer privileges - and also as a set of political practices that render access to entitlements contingent on expressions of party political loyalty. The concept has a broader potential application beyond Zimbabwe to other contexts where political affiliation can confer differentiated access to resources and protection, and where political parties attempt to moralise political loyalty as grounds for privileged treatment. It may have a particular relevance in post liberation states in Southern and Eastern Africa, where party and state are closely enmeshed. But it can also provide a new lens for thinking about the dependencies mobilised in informal spaces, as comparative studies of protest in Africa show that informal settlements tend to support incumbent regimes (Fox and Bell 2016). Our attention to political parties and affiliations provides a counterpoint to the literature on citizenship in Africa, which is focussed overwhelmingly on the role of communal societal belonging as the primary source of differential entitlements. Citizenship is, of course, always conditional, including in classic liberal formulations. But the broader literature on everyday citizenship, which has moved away from a narrow focus on legal rights to explore citizenship practices in cultural, symbolic and economic domains has had surprisingly little to say about political parties and loyalties per se (Isin and Wood 1999; Isin 2002; Chung 2014). Analyses of hierarchies of substantive citizenship and the politics of belonging in Africa - and the global South more broadly - emphasise communal ethno-national, religious or racialized divisions rather than party political affiliation in itself as source of differentiation (Chung 2014; Holston 2008, Geschiere 2009; Dorman 2014, 2016). Osaghae sees
ethnicity as ‘arguably the most potent challenge to universal citizenship in Africa’ (2016), while Dorman et al’s discussion of the postcolonial production of ‘strangers’, concentrates on the exclusionary reworking of national belonging to exclude migrants, settlers and particular ethnicities (2007). We argue that there should be closer scrutiny of specific party political traditions of thinking about citizenship, and their influence on strategies for engaging the state and access to substantive entitlements.

Any tendency to de-emphasise party politics matters because political affiliations do not always map neatly onto ethnic, regional or other socio-cultural identities. It cannot be assumed across contexts that ethnicity or autochthony are the prime challenges to citizenship – exclusions from ‘the nation’ take a variety of forms (Dorman et al 2007). Moreover, as Dorman points out, the ways African governments moralise citizenship ‘not as a right, but as a privilege, to be earned’ tends not to depend directly on ascribed communal identities (2014: 17). Rather, she argues it can also hinge on continuities in colonial ideas of ‘improvement’, ‘work’ and ‘rate-paying’, or in postliberation states, on military service or defence of the state (2014: 17). But in many contexts – not only the one we consider here - earning such privileges hinges implicitly or explicitly on displaying political support for incumbent regimes, by voting for them and other performances of party loyalty. In riposte to Dorman, Martins argues that in Angola ‘the good citizen is not the former revolutionary, the liberation guerrilla fighter, the aggrandized rural farmer or the autochthone, but the individual who contributes to the maintenance of the present political status quo…This clientalism is key in pursuing inclusion’ (Martins 2017: 101; cf Bezabeh 2011). Patronage operates through and hinges on allegiance to the ruling MPLA party’s big men, he argues, to the point of making ‘second class citizens’ out of UNITA supporters. Prior to elections, politicians appeal to citizens’ expectations and mobilise votes through ‘co-optation and redistribution’ in a manner that briefly provides access to – or at least makes promises to what citizenship should entail (Martins 2017). This is apt for how the ruling party in Zimbabwe preferentially rewards its own supporters.

The second argument about the utility of the notion of partisan citizenship relates directly to the above. We argue that it can help to bridge the gap between the vast literature on patronage politics in Africa, and the still relatively small volume of work on citizenship at national and city levels. Influential strands of writing on citizenship in Africa stress the ‘failures of democratization to transform subjects into citizens’, with influential arguments hinging on legacies of authoritarian colonial governance and subjechthood, particularly in rural areas where unaccountable chiefly powers were institutionalised through indirect rule (Mamdani 1996; Bratton and Logan 2013).
Interpretations of the prevalence of patron-clientalism in postcolonial contexts can thus imply direct institutional and cultural continuities in ideas of subjecthood, reinforced through arguments hinging on the persistence of cultures of deference and insufficient grasp of liberal ideas of citizenship and state accountability (Bratton and Logan 2013). This can turn ‘citizen’ on the one hand and ‘subject’ or ‘client’ on the other into mutually opposing or discrete categories, drawing attention away from messy mixes in illiberal democracies, where the predominance of clientalism can be a context-dependent political tactic rather than evidence of cultural persistence. Strands of writing on southern urbanism also promote dichotomous understandings of citizen and client: Chaterjee’s (2004) distinction between ‘civil society’ (seen as the preserve of the middle classes and elites) versus ‘political society’ (understood as informal claim-making and the preserve of the urban poor), for example also risks reinforcing the idea of mutually exclusive political worlds. Yet neither of these bodies of work focus directly on political parties.

We build here on scholars of politics ‘from below’ who cast citizenship and clientalism as distinct yet also imbricated in practice. Aiden Russell, for instance, casts the distinction between citizen and subject/client as ‘simultaneously informative and misleading’ (Russell 2016; Hunter 2016). Urban researchers stresses the multiplicity of tactics, repertoires and subject positions adopted by the urban poor in making claims, who can act the loyal client in one context, while adopting the language and tactics of the protesting citizen in another (Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011; Metsola 2018, Von Lieres and Piper 2014). Efforts to secure land and property can have their own ‘transversal’ and ambiguous logic, to invoke Caldeira’s (2017) terms. By this, she means, that clientalist strategies to win recognition for property claims can be animated not by agreement with patron-clientalism as a form of rule, but by the prospect of owning property, which promises not only socio-economic gain and enhanced status, but also a legal and material basis for civic rights and political freedoms, as it undermines dependency. Clientalism can thus be tactic to acquire citizenship.

Unlike accounts of patron-clientalism that elevate cultural explanations for dependency and corruption, or focus primarily on material bargaining, the concept of partisan citizenship invites examination of political ideas – both hegemonic legitimizing arguments and occluded views. It invites discussion of arguments that relate specifically to political parties’ historical repertoires and practices. Clarke et al see citizenship as ‘essentially contested’ – at the level of ideas as well as practice (Clarke et al 2014). Yet it derives its power as a mobilizing imaginary not because of its disputed character, mutability and complexity, but rather as a result of its idealism (Clarke et al
2014; Cooper 2016). The classic ideals of ‘horizontal’ rights among equal citizens and ‘vertical’ rights in relation to accountable state institutions have a longevity of articulation and expression in African politics, in controversies over colonial citizenship as well as in trajectories of anti-colonial nationalist, and post-colonial politics (Hunter 2016). Liberal constitutionalism and rights-based ideas can be entangled with populist revolutionary practices, the legacies of socialism, and various traditions of authoritarian developmental statecraft. In urban contexts in Africa – especially perhaps in capital cities - classic ideas of citizenship can be relatively well embedded, beyond simply elites and the middle classes. In the Zimbabwean context we detail here, their reach extends into grassroots politics within informal settlements (cf Chigudu 2019). This can be the case even in settlements with a reputation for clientalist pro-regime loyalty, where insecurity and a restrictive public sphere have forced dissenting ideas underground rather than suppressed them completely.

Thirdly, the article’s discussion of partisan citizenship in peri-urban informal settlements provides a counterpoint to urban studies scholars’ tendency to celebrate urban land occupations on informal city peripheries as popular resistance (Benjamin 2008; Miraftab 2006, 2009, for criticism see Benit-Gbaffou 2011, 2011; Metsola 2018). Interpreting popular politics within informal settlements as resistance is problematic given the importance for residents of working pragmatically within extant power structures to try to win recognition and services (cf Roy 2009, 2011; Ranganathan 2014; Metsola 2018). Critiques stress more fractured political landscapes, marked by a variety of actors mediating claims on the states, and emphasise how the urban poor pursue a multiplicity of context-dependent tactics to pursue their interests (Benif-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011; Metsola 2018; Von Lieres and Piper 2014). In Harare’s informal settlements, however, the ruling party predominates. The prevalent pragmatic performance of support for the ruling party in this context jars with interpretations of urban theorists who see urban peripheral informality as creating the material basis for a shift towards liberal ideas of citizenship and democratic practice, as in Holston’s account of Sao Paolo, where ‘the lived experience of the periphery became both the context and substance of an urban citizenship that generated significant democratic innovation in law, government and practice’ (2008: 12). Harare’s settlements have not become ‘models of social mobility’, as Caldeira’s (2017) overview of informal peripheral urbanisation in the global South would suggest. In Harare, trajectories towards property owning within these settlements are incomplete, rights-based movements do not have access to them, and the settlements themselves continue to be symbols of poverty, thwarted development and political control. Importantly, the broader literature is grounded in Latin American and South Asian contexts where rapid urbanization occurred in
conjunction with industrial growth and expanding employment, unlike many African cities. In Harare, urbanization has occurred in conjunction with de-industrialisation and economic decline.

Partisan citizenship as promoted by ZANU-PF in new informal settlements is highly controversial as it is radically opposed to, and has deliberately sought to undermine, the rights-based understandings of citizenship that have animated urban-based social movements over the last two decades (see Kamete 2010; Dorman 2016). The expansion of informal settlements has reversed the postcolonial trajectory towards inclusive urban citizenship, marked in 1996 by the widening of political rights beyond ratepayers to include all residents (Dorman 2016). The forms of dependent, informal urban growth fostered through ruling party patronage also contradict and unravel ZANU-PF’s own past tradition of inclusive developmentalism and modernist urban planning. There is no direct continuity with colonial or early postcolonial practice in the partisan formulations of citizenship promoted in these settlements from 2000. The logic of consent on the part of residents within the informal settlements we discuss is above all pragmatic, tactical and opportunistic, motivated by ‘survival’, and tangential use of structures of power to the end of securing propertyed citizenship.

Before discussing partisan citizenship as experienced, performed and disputed within the capital’s new settlements, it is necessary to provide some context for its emergence - not as a postcolonial continuity or cultural persistence, but as a disjuncture in trajectories of urban postcolonial statecraft.

The emergence of partisan citizenship and growth of informal settlements

The existence of substantial settlements controlled directly by the ruling party, rather than by state institutions is something that needs explanation in a country notorious for the strength of its modernist urban planning tradition and well institutionalised bureaucracies (Rakodi 1995; Chatiza 2010; Mbiba 2017a; Potts 2011). Their scale is very significant, as they easily comprise 500,000 people in a city with an official population of 2.1 million in 2012 (McGregor and Chatiza 2019; Mbiba 2017a). The fact that the ruling party controls all these new geographically dispersed settlements on the city edge renders existing frameworks focussed on ‘twilight’ authorities unhelpful in this context, because they hinge on state absence, localised influences and a fragmented landscape of chiefs, gangs or individual ‘big men’ (Lund 2006; Buur 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Similarly, much of the literature on urban claim-making rooted in less repressive contexts emphasises the variety of mediators and multiplicity of avenues for claim-making (Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2012; Metsola 2018). What we seek to explain in the Zimbabwean context is not the variety of actors mediating
citizenship in informal spaces, but rather the ruling party’s dominance (on mediated citizenship, see Lieres and Piper 2014).

The growth of informal settlements in Harare is directly linked to ZANU-PF’s shift into patronage politics. ZANU-PF state power and practices of urban governance in Zimbabwe transformed dramatically from the late 1990s following the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and cities’ transformation into MDC strongholds. Before this juncture, austerity had provoked a shift away from early independence direct state provision of urban housing, towards ‘enabling’ approaches in a context of increasing overcrowding and growing housing waiting lists (Rakodi 1995; Potts 2006; 2011). But from 2000, state institutions and housing provision were politicized, in a broader context of repression, dramatic economic contraction and informalisation, collapsing services and mass impoverishment (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2010; Alexander and McGregor 2013; Muchadenyia and Williams 2017; Muchadenyika 2015; Kamete 2013). The country’s urban planning bureaucracies were securitized and officials within them subject to intense surveillance (McGregor 2013; Kamete 2007, 2012). Local government was re-centralised, and strategies of subversion used to undermine the new MDC-controlled municipalities (McGregor and Chatiza 2019).

A landmark event in the informalisation of the urban periphery took the form of the mass demolitions of ‘Operation Clean the Filth’ in 2005, which destroyed the homes and/or livelihoods of 700,000 informal urbanites and tried to forcibly remove them to the rural areas. Scholars sought explanations for what they saw as the state’s intolerance of informality. Kamete (2012) argued that the Operation was motivated by the excesses of modernist planning and ‘punishment’ for urban opposition voters, while others stressed continuities in cultural attitudes among officials and the middle classes that urban citizenship should be contingent on being ‘earned’ through work, property and rate-paying (Dorman 2016; Fontein 2009). But thereafter state policy and practice shifted towards accommodating rather than expelling the urban poor, through resettlement schemes, land reform and peri-urban occupations, as well as distribution to cooperatives charged with building and servicing (McGregor and Chatiza 2019; Mpofu 2011; Chirisa et al 2011; Muchadenyika 2015; Muchadenyika and Williams 2017).

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2 The MDC split in 2005, with the biggest grouping MDC-T taking the initial of party leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Following Tsvangirai’s death, there was further fragmentation with the largest grouping for the 2018 elections being the MDC-Alliance, MDC-A.
State allocations of urban land and housing to the urban poor ceased to be made on the basis of need via housing ‘waiting lists’. Rather, party political interests came to predominate in processes of distribution that worked both through state institutions, and outside them, via the party structures directly. State institutions themselves were securitized and subject to political capture (McGregor 2013; McGregor and Chatiza 2019). ZANU-PF rewarded supporters at all levels: at the top, Ministers, military figures, war veterans and MPs were the most prominent ‘land barons’, but at the bottom within informal settlements, local party committees, cooperative leaders and youth were also beneficiaries. MDC politicians, who had initially opposed the land invasions, tried to emulate this means of rewarding grassroots voters by leading their own occupations, particularly during the period of the power-sharing agreement 2008-2013. But they lacked the capacity to do so on anything but a very small scale, as they controlled neither land nor state security institutions (McGregor 2013; Muchadenyika 2015). ZANU-PF’s control over access to urban land and housing in newly urbanizing spaces undermined the MDC opposition and interlinked rights-based civics and residents organizations, as well as side-lining housing movements that had worked less agonistically with the state, such as Dialogue on Shelter and the Federation of Homeless People.3

Urban policy and practice increasingly emphasised regularization, ie formalizing land rights in situ and bringing informal settlements back under control of state institutions, particularly after ZANU-PF regained sole control over the state in the 2013 elections. There was political capital to be made from regularization, which the ruling party sought to monopolize, by giving responsibility for formalising informal settlements to a state company, the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP), which answered directly to the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) and not to municipalities. ‘Bottom up’ efforts at regularization, assisted by NGOs, have also been recognised where these have been controlled by the ruling party. ZANU-PF rhetoric and state policy thus offered stigmatised informal residents and urban land occupiers the prospect of becoming propertied urban citizens.

The expansion of informal settlements on the edge of the city under ruling party control is thus explicable in a narrative of ZANU-PF’s changing statecraft, and shift into patronage politics. But it is also clear that residents themselves have been far from passive in this process. To understand from the bottom up, how urban residents have claimed land and property, how they have debated and

3 Interview, Mfundo Mlilo, CEO, Combined Harare Residents Association [CHRA] 13/4/2017, interview Dialogue on Shelter 14/4/2017. These policies were interpreted as allowing ZANUPF to increase its share of councillors in Harare City from 1 to 7 (out of 46) between 2008 and 2013. The impact of the settlements on urban votes is, however, greatly reduced because political boundaries are fixed until 2023, such that some informal settlements are in rural constituencies.
tried to influence everyday life and authority in newly urbanizing spaces, we draw on two years research in three of the city’s largest new informal settlements – Epworth Ward 7, Hopley and Hatcliffe Extension. The research, in 2016-17, involved focus groups, 50 oral histories and a survey. The oral histories were conducted outside the settlements themselves, as people told us they were not free to talk openly where they lived. The survey’s 500 participants were from across the three settlements (Hopley: 159; Hatcliffe Extension: 148; Epworth ward 7: 193). Enumerators used several different geographical starting points within each settlement, to try to cover sections with varied histories, and respondents were anyone encountered who agreed to participate. Not all sections of the settlements were accessible, however, and in one section of one settlement local ZANU-PF authorities prevented the survey taking place. Many of our participants raised sensitive matters, and the oral histories and some other interviews are anonymised.

**ZANU-PF authorities at local level: legacies of violence and fear**

To shed further light on partisan citizenship and contention thereover within these precarious urban spaces, it is important to begin with an account of ZANU-PF authorities at local level. Local party committees acting as territorial authorities in these settlements were residents themselves and had personal histories of eviction and/or had been backyard dwellers and squatters. They have been described as ‘petty sovereigns’ (Kamete 2018), as they had licence from the party’s central organs, MPs and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to take on aspects of the role of sovereign (Kamete 2018; on sovereign roles, Hansen and Stepputat 2005). They could determine membership of the political community (through evictions), enforce rules, police the public sphere, decide on punishments for those who did not comply, and control access to land. Kamete casts the settlements as securitized ‘enclaves’, where people are ‘warehoused’ and stripped of their rights, reduced to ‘bare life’ (2007, 2018). For the Combined Harare Residents’ Association, the lack of state protection rendered residents ‘captive citizens’, ‘disconnected’ from local authorities and central state institutions in terms of services, protection and justice.\(^4\) In the words of the Harare Residents’ Trust, life within these informal settlements was shaped by:

> ... political victimization, lack of freedoms to express their concerns around services delivery, and the fact that it’s a no go area for the opposition. If they [local ZANU(PF) authorities] want to take over a stand, so you are just accused of belonging to the opposition or not attending [ZANU(PF)] meetings, so you become a target...the expectation is that you must go to meetings, must belong to ZANU(PF). It’s not a secret, it’s the language they know. ...Even

\(^4\) Mfundo Mlilo, CEO CHRA, interview 13/4/2017.
if someone can identify human rights violations, where will they take them if they want to stay there, have family there, children? 5

Our interpretation differs from advocacy accounts of residents as pure victims, because we examine the agency of local party committees and that of residents more broadly, and stress residents’ differentiation. Casting residents as captive victims can mislead by conveying local authorities as only punitive, stressing their excesses, ignoring both the constraints on widespread overt violence since 2008, and how individuals have sought to manoeuver within the party structures to make life more bearable, leverage communal benefits and push for collective recognition. Residents have also continued to try to leverage benefits via other routes and to protest, though the risks of visibly working outside or opposing the party are hugely constraining. Our account of partisan citizenship and its discontents aspires to convey this complexity. It is, however, important to begin with the constraints on political expression, through a discussion of how ZANU-PF authority is built on fear – particularly of evictions - and the legacies of political violence. Indeed broader literatures on postconflict contexts similarly stress how fear can provoke tactics of non-confrontation as well as profoundly altering the ‘sense and practice of citizenship’ (Oosterom 2016, Uvin 2009, Pearce et al 2011).

ZANU-PF’s control took the form of a hierarchical structure of party committees that extended spatially throughout the settlements (repeating modes of territorial organization used during the liberation war, as well as in rural land occupations from the late 1990s (on the latter, Cliffe et al 2011; Chamunogwa 2019). The party’s District Coordinating Committees (DCCs) were key. They were connected upwards to ZANU-PF’s Harare Provincial structures, the Central Committee and Politburo, and downwards through party branches to cells. ZANU-PF councillors, MPs and youth groups were part of this hierarchy. The District offices conveyed ZANU-PF’s territorial powers and were marked by national flags mounted from small cement buildings, where meeting rooms were bedecked with photographs of the (then) President Mugabe and liberation war heroes. Some also had rooms that acted as holding cells, the presence of which acted as a potent material reminder of the local executive’s licence to punish. As our research team experienced when called into one party office, the executive’s powers were conveyed by paraphernalia for beating and holding suspects in the small windowless cell or ‘proto chamber’, the door to which was left open for visitors to see. Mostly, however, authorities could win consent simply by threats – particularly of eviction.

5 Precious Shumba, Director, HRT, interview 12/4/2017
To the extent that ZANU-PF office-holders within the settlements sought to legitimate the local party’s threats of punitive action against residents not willing to perform party loyalty, they did so indirectly, invoking ZANU-PF’s official rhetoric of the situation being one of ‘war’ that called for ‘discipline’. Most, however, simply described the reality of ZANU-PF powers that could not be challenged directly. Local party officials stressed their own personal need for ‘protection’ and ‘survival’, casting the settlements as ‘uninhabitable’ without active performances of consent. Some stressed their own quest to make the localities more habitable by using the powers conferred through their office to contain violence and sideline individuals renowned for violence. One district chair, for example, recalled her desire to prevent a repeat of 2008, when there were ‘a lot of deaths and people demolished each other’s homes….Now that I’m the vice chairwoman, if people plan to start violence, I will make sure that I stop them…..’⁶ Others described how their motivation for office holding was simply self-protection: one ZANU official had a prior history of MDC activism and took on a district position only after returning from South Africa in 2011 (where he had fled for his life in 2008, when these settlements were literally party political battlefields). He described ZANU-PF as a ‘law unto themselves’ and said he had assumed office ‘for survival reasons... I cannot help it’.⁷

Indeed, most ordinary residents stressed fear – particularly of losing their homes - as the prime motivation for their compliance:

They [ZANU-PF] have to give approval for everything – they see and control local people...Everyone says they are ZANU-PF, which is not true...If you do not say so, the place becomes uninhabitable... Even some who are [district] chairpersons deep down they are not ZANU-PF...It is not that we love them, but we are protecting what we have. Here we cannot say anything because of fear...All these areas experienced this state-led destruction of formal livelihoods replaced by informality and chasing houses and that is how the people ended up in these informal areas. As such it is not that it is a genuine ZANU-PF stronghold...⁸

The survey showed that 41% of respondents had been evicted once or more, mostly dating back to the mass demolitions of 2005.⁹ But some people had been evicted up to 6 times and many older residents had been circulating the informal settlements and ‘holding camps’ of the Harare periphery since the early 1990s. Levels of direct experience of violence within the settlements were high: 24% said they had personally been victims of violence and 52% had witnessed violence there; 83% said

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⁶ Interview 2, Epworth, 12/10/2017
⁷ Interview 6, Hopley, 19/10/2017.
⁸ Interview 12, Hopley, 10/11/2017
⁹ Differences across the settlements were insignificant.
they felt unsafe, and 65% said they would like to live elsewhere, with lack of money being the overarching explanation for why they could not. The sole attractive feature of the settlements was affordability and low rents compared to other parts of town.

The power of threats of eviction to produce consent can be appreciated further by understanding how and why the memory of the demolitions lives on so powerfully. As a broader literature attests, demolitions can be experienced as a destruction of personhood, not just as the loss of homes and property. Gastrow argues that demolitions are an ‘unmaking of belonging’ (2016), while Harms casts them as ‘a set of visceral engagements with time’ (Harms 2013: 346). Our oral histories echoed this sense of ‘going backwards’ and assault on bodily integrity, to which we would add a sense of altered embodied relationship to space, articulated through feelings of entrapment (cf Kamete 2018). One district ZANU-PF official narrated the demolition of his home as the withdrawal of life support: ‘I do not know the right terminology to describe the experience...the things I lived on were being attacked, imagine the tree you are resting on is being attacked....It was a sign of massive force by government. It showed this is government and you cannot challenge it’.10 The aftermath of the demolitions was cast as ‘a time of ‘hopelessness’, expressed through metaphors of enclosure (‘kupererwa’, from kuperera, ie trapped/encased like a snake in a hole), of being ingested and ‘swallowed’, or ‘stuck/accreted’ (‘kuomerwa’ – from kuomera, ie stuck/dried onto something).11

Some residents recalled how ‘living in plastic’ was a source of shame that destroyed their sense of themselves:

I was ashamed to stay in such a house; I just felt I didn’t deserve to be in that place.... I could spend the whole day inside my plastic shack reading books because I was ashamed to be seen coming out...12

Residents’ account of the legacy of the demolitions was often discussed explicitly in terms of an assault on citizenship and national belonging. There was frequent explicit resort to a language of ‘rights denied’ (cf Kamete’s 2018). One resident recalled: ‘I felt like an outcast in my own country. I was being violated and supressed in my own country’.13 The makeshift dwellings themselves could reinforce this feeling of citizenship denied and being cast out. The sense of being a rights-bearing

10 Interview 9, Hopley 31/10/2017
11 Interview 9, Hopley, 31/10/2017
12 Interview 11, Hopley, 10/11/2017; see also interview 6, Hatcliffe Extension, 26/10/2017
13 Interview 6, Hatcliffe Extension 26/10/2017.
subject and of demolitions as an assault on what one deserved as citizens built on historically moulded expectations of the state.\textsuperscript{14}

Although ZANU-PF ruled in the settlements generally, some small sections were overtly MDC, some individuals had managed to carve out a reputation as ‘non-aligned’, and intra-ZANU-PF factionalism also left its mark in the form of a growing disillusion.\textsuperscript{15} MDC activists had established and won tolerance for a public presence in some places largely by retaliatory violence. They told of ‘fighting back’, recounting how, ‘they [ZANU-PF] saw we were brave so they let us stay to avoid conflict’.\textsuperscript{16} But local opposition leaders encouraged members dispersed through the settlements to act covertly - to buy ZANU-PF party cards for personal protection and to get land, while ‘knowing how you will vote’.\textsuperscript{17} It was extremely difficult to be overtly ‘unaligned’, due to threats from local ZANU-PF maintaining that ‘fence sitting’ was the same as selling out.\textsuperscript{18} Yet the fractures and hollowness of ruling party support were very evident in contexts where people felt free to talk. Some local ZANU-PF office-holders spoke of the disposability of those at district level and below in the eyes of their party. Many spoke of their caution in how to articulate support for ZANU-PF, given the party’s factionalised elite politics at the time of the research. They talked of resorting to expressions of the vaguest possible support for, and gratitude to the ‘government in power’, the ‘incumbent president’, distancing themselves from being part of the elite in-fighting, trying not to associate themselves too closely with individual MPs aligned to specific factions and privileging their fight for ‘development’ and other matters that concerned them directly, such as tenure security.\textsuperscript{19}

In short, fear and the local party’s invocation of its licence to evict and engage in punitive violence remained important underpinnings of ZANU-PF authority, forcing dissent largely underground. Away from the constrained public sphere of the settlements themselves, where people spoke more freely,

\textsuperscript{14} On expectations in South Africa, see Benit-Gbaffou (2012), Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield (2011), compared to Angolan slum residents’ low expectations of the state and lacked a comparable sense of themselves as possessing rights (Gastrow 2017: 235).
\textsuperscript{15} Factionalism was about the party’s internal succession and in the period leading to the military ‘coup’ of November 2017 when President Mugabe was replaced with Emerson Mnangagwa. The informal settlements of the Harare periphery had been controlled by patrons from unsuccessful factions of ZANUPF that were successively expelled from the party, with knock on effects for their activist clients inside the settlements. Initially MPs acting as patrons of the Harare periphery were aligned to the faction within ZANUPF led by Joyce Mujuru. In 2013, when the Mujuru faction was expelled from the party, there was retaliation against local clients of this faction, particularly leaders of the youth militia known as Chipangano. Thereafter, MPs on the Harare periphery were aligned to the ZANUPF faction known as G40, which was loyal to Mugabe. But in 2018, G40 politicians were expelled from ZANUPF following the ‘coup’, and some were absorbed into the MDC alliance.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview, district MDC chairman, youth chair and transport secretary, [X location], 23/11/2016
\textsuperscript{17} MDC structure members, [X location], 23/11/2016
\textsuperscript{18} Interview 11, 10/11/2017
\textsuperscript{19} Conversations during fieldwork 2017.
the interviews showed the extent of criticism of the way power was exercised, including by ZANU-PF office-holders themselves. Some of this criticism was articulated explicitly in the language of rights, accountability and the idealism of what citizenship should entail – ideas that the ruling party sought to suppress. Indeed there are echoes of other post-conflict contexts where fear and securitised local authorities led to self-censorship in public domains (Oosterom 2016, Uvin 2009, Pearce et al 2011). But ZANU-PF authority in these settlements was not only about violence and fear, as partisan citizenship also promised resources and advancement for supporters, and appealed directly to residents’ interests in land, property and services. In relation to these issues, residents were untiringly active and engaged in a variety of ways. A better understanding of political ideas and action in relation to land, tenure security and development can provide further insight into partisan citizenship and its discontents on the city edge.

Navigating access to land, tenure security and development

In contrast to punitive dimensions to ZANU-PF powers, the local party committees’ authority to allocate land and efforts to gain tenure security and services were populist strategies. Land occupations and the quest for recognition in Zimbabwe are not usefully understood through the lens of ‘resistance’ or ‘insurgency’, given the key role of the ruling party, but they do give important insight into residents’ political ideas and disputes over the meaning and substance of citizenship. In offering access to land as a conditional ‘gift’, the ruling party attempted to tie recipients into a relationship of dependency into the future, through a moral and political duty to continue demonstrating gratitude as loyal party supporters. This was a strategy to influence political ideas and not simply an appeal to material reward. Residents’ use of ZANU-PF to secure land and services should not necessarily be seen as agreement with the party’s view of partisan conditionality. Most made pragmatic calculations. But the moralisation of partisan privilege itself, hinging on the generosity of the giver and onus on the recipient to demonstrate loyalty, was also disputed. Some residents articulated alternate conceptualisations of urban citizenship, based on ideas of equal rights as citizens. But there were also ways of articulating dissent to partisan citizenship within the framework of ZANU-PF discourse and historic repertoires. We emphasise two such arguments in particular: first the idea that development was an inclusive arena of state and therefore not legitimately partisan, and second, the view that rate-paying earned rights. The account below provides insight not only into consent to ZANU-PF’s partisan formulations of citizenship, but also tangential and dissenting ideas and actions.
Popular aspirations of land-owning and tenure security hinged centrally on state recognition and on state documentation (leases, title deeds) and the material signs of conformity with planning regimes – pegs and surveyed plots, official house numbers (on rural claim-making, see Chaumba et al 2003). This partly reflected the strength of Zimbabwe’s historic planning regime (for a contrast, see Gastrow’s 2017 account of building in cement as grounds for recognition in Angola). Across Zimbabwe’s informal settlements, the party was route to land, but it was not cast as able to confer tenure security. Although some residents had benefitted from illegal sales, subdivisions and occupations more than others, there were nonetheless shared collective interests in recognition and paths to legality for the settlements as a whole. In all the informal settlements, ZANU-PF had set up ‘development committees’ leading pressure for regularization and services, which articulated the morality of non-partisanship (though in practice the criteria for office-holding were histories of district-level ZANU-PF office-bearing). This locally articulated inclusive developmentalism drew strength from ZANU-PF’s own past practice and claims to legitimacy. Many ordinary residents and party office-holders alike expressed strong desire for ‘proper planning to make this place decent’. Indeed planning was upheld as countering ‘people using political muscle to do whatever they want, anything that results in their getting money’.20

After a decade or more of expansion, the city-edge informal settlements were no longer small ‘enclaves’. Rather, they were populous, extensive settlements scheduled for, and to varied extents already involved in regularization. Residents were differentiated in terms of whether they possessed state, local authority and party documents or not, and how many stands they claimed, or whether they were landlords or ‘caretakers’ for others’ plots or simply tenants, lodgers and dependents. Some of this variation can be illustrated through brief accounts of the histories of the 3 settlements themselves.

Two settlements in the study – Hatcliffe Extension and Hopley – originated in the central state’s military-led ‘Operation Live Well’ housing programme, undertaken in 2007, which was supposed to cater for those rendered homeless through demolitions, but had informalised subsequently. The settlements had differing levels of security at the time of the research because Hatcliffe Extension had been regularized by UDCORP, while Hopley was still waiting for the state corporation to arrive. In Hatcliffe, UDCORP’s planners had resurveyed and reallocated landrights in an untransparent process that included known MDC activists as well as ZANU-PF supporters. The 28,000 registered plotholders had new leases, people had moved into re-surveyed stands and were being billed by the

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20 Interview 2 Hopley 13/09/2018
21 Interview 2, Hopley, 13/09/2018
MLGPWNH and City of Harare for monthly lease and rates payments.\textsuperscript{22} This conferred a degree of recognition, but residents still felt insecure, as we explain below.

In contrast, Hopley was an ultra-insecure mosaic of differentiated tenure and property claims and was home to an estimated 80,000 people awaiting UDCORP’s arrival.\textsuperscript{23} Some occupants had Ministry leases (to two bedrooomed houses or plots, allocated via Operation Live Well). Others had documents from the City (which had allocated plots to cooperatives of its own workers when run by a Ministry-appointed Commission). Many more had no documents or only party documents: one section of the settlement originated in an encampment of people left out of the original allocations, while substantial wetland areas and other vacant spaces had been occupied by ZANU-PF-led invasions, and there was one small MDC-occupied area. The settlement’s 6 sections mapped onto ZANU-PF Districts, whose officials were small scale ‘barons’ who had profited from land sales and were landlords. The settlement had become dense through illegal subdivisions and letting: people said it was common for the initial small plots to have 6 families living on them, the overcrowding reflected in the terminology of lodgers living in ‘chicken runs’ and ‘bathrooms’.\textsuperscript{24} Despite being unserviced, both Ministry and City were billing residents for leases and services.

The third settlement - Epworth Ward 7 – originated as a party-led occupation. Located on the edge of the city’s oldest informal settlement in what had been grazing land of ‘original’ Epworth residents, Ward 7 grew from the late 1990s as tenants and squatters claimed land rights themselves through ZANU-PF, mobilising around war veterans and through party structures, establishing their own territorial authorities who sold and allocated land to others. These occupiers had successfully resisted attempted eviction by the Epworth ‘originals’, by using the ZANU-PF MP to secure Presidential intervention in support of their land claims, and the ward’s loyalty to the ruling party had led it to be spared demolition in 2005. Indeed, it grew rapidly as homeless people from other parts of the city moved in, buying land from the local party structures. The population was 80,000 people at the time of the research.\textsuperscript{25} Ward 7 residents had pushed for regularization through a ZANU-PF-aligned development committee, and the process was midway (surveyors had re-planned the settlement, but people who needed to move into new plots had mostly not done so). The development committee was itself resolving disputes caused by multiple claims to plots. Regularization was inclusive in that it recognised ‘facts on the ground’, but was also un-transparent:

\textsuperscript{22} Interviews, MLGNWPH, 6 and 7/4/2017
\textsuperscript{23} Interviews, MLGNWPH, 4 and 7/04/2017
\textsuperscript{24} Focus group, Hopley, 18/11/2016
there were allegations of the Development Committee incorporating people for money, giving multiple plots to some, and of partisan favouritism. A rival association – the Epworth Residents Development Association, whose leadership did not live in the settlement – claimed the process had led to politicized evictions and decried partisan ‘tyranny’.26

The envisaged trajectory out of informality through regularization was a prime plank of local ZANU-PF authorities’ claims to legitimacy in all settlements. Local officials expressed pride in how they had delivered development in accounts of power that were otherwise frank in presenting politics as an exercise in oppression and material self-interest. A (ZANU-PF) development committee official recounted:

...Of course there is some oppression of some...when a war is fought some will die, but generally, we are proud of the development we have achieved... There is no benefit in politics - it’s just that at times you get an opportunity to oppress others. When commodities come, we get those commodities first before anyone else. We don’t want to leave politics because it has led us to where we are today.27

Some narrated their on-going support for ZANU-PF in the language promoted by the party itself: the party’s provision of access to land was a matter for ‘gratitude’ for a ‘gift’ that required political loyalty. Any funds exchanged for this gift did not free the aspirant land-owner from future obligation, but was rather a gesture towards an on-going relationship that demanded ‘labour’ and ‘sacrifice’. One ZANU-PF officer, for example recalled how he himself: ‘got the stand through the party... I can’t say I bought the stand. I promised them a token of appreciation for giving me somewhere to stay. I promised them that we will work together...’28 Those heading the ZANU-PF invasions sometimes cast all land as belonging to the party and President, deliberately obfuscating legal-institutional responsibilities: an occupier on newly occupied land recounted how:

they always tell us the land belongs to the President. We are always afraid and we don’t comment on anything. They steal from people under cover of politics; if you don’t have the money to pay they send youth to toyi-toyi to instill fear and you end up paying. We pay USD $30 per month for development and $50 per month for membership in the coop. I

26 ERDA, interview, 11 April 2017; interview, MDC officers, Epworth ward 7, 2/11/2016.
27 Interview 11, Epworth ward 7, 10/11/2017
28 Interview 2, Epworth ward 7, 10/10/2017.
29 Interview 5, former Hopley resident and occupier, Churu Farm, 17/10/2017.
understand the land is state land but those from the party say the money is going to council. We are therefore confused.\textsuperscript{30}

In Epworth ward 7 the local ZANU-PF officials narrated their lasting gratitude to President Mugabe himself, for intervening to protect them against evictions when they had been mere squatters. While land occupiers in peri-urban contexts were in theory protected through the same legislation that had legalised rural occupations, in practice people who had participated in invasions were aware of the precarity of their claims.

These local invocations of ZANU-PF’s partisan citizenship were, however, compatible with a strong assertion of the morality of inclusive development, which could mitigate the excesses of party political exclusion. Although the party was cast as potential route to land, tenure security was viewed as an arena of state. Development and tenure security were rarely cast as legitimate domains of partisan privilege, as a local ZANU-PF official narrated (while also making his personal loyalties clear):

We only split for politics, not development...we are focusing on security of tenure - we want to let everyone receive official papers... moving from a phase where people were given cards for houses which were related to politics... If you struggle to develop a place and with time you finally succeed, you will not just let go. I struggled for this place and some of the things we did along the way cannot be said... There used to be shacks in our area, but now people are building quality houses.\textsuperscript{31}

Newly pegged plots were upheld by local ZANU PF leaders as evidence of their achievements in the domain of development. Another ZANU-PF official in Epworth described politics as ‘dirty’, dangerous and contemptuous of those at the grassroots, but narrated how it could be used pragmatically to achieve properly planned development which was a moral good in itself:

So the stand I am occupying, I didn’t buy it I don’t want to lie to you. I was given by the party... Now that we are inside stands, we can start doing proper house plans. Before this we were just settled as the party youths. Now the place is serviced and pegged... I try to avoid high level politics – the only thing that you can be involved in is something that points directly to you....otherwise you can be getting yourself into a situation where you can get killed.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} Interview 5, Churu Farm, 17/10/2017
\textsuperscript{31} Interview 1, Epworth 12/10/2017
\textsuperscript{32} Interview 3, Epworth, 10/10/2017
This view that politics could confer access to land but not tenure security, and had no proper place in ‘development’ was frequently articulated. Many local ZANU-PF officials were themselves suspicious that their party’s interests in development were far from genuine. One such recounted:

Our development association was named after Mugabe, we did that aimed at the government to recognise us and have sympathy with our plight...Politics did its job by getting us a place to live, now it is time for everyone to deal with their own things without political interference. In cases where you get caught up in the road and you are asked to attend a meeting, you just go and listen, we don’t resist... We are still not sure on tenure ....

The ways in which land, development and security were conceptualized in relation to citizenship did not, however, only produce consent with the view of land as contingent ‘gift’ necessitating reciprocal gestures of appreciation and on-going loyalty. We have already seen from the above that pragmatic ‘transversal’ calculations prevailed and there was a universal interest in security through state recognition, in a trajectory out of dependency, and a suspicion of the motives of higher echelons of the party. Some residents aspired to state recognition explicitly because it offered future freedom from partisan ties. We witnessed celebrations in Epworth after it had been surveyed, as residents were jubilant over their newly-allocated house numbers and leases – potentially ending their status as ‘migrants on the margins’ and recognition as ‘landowners on the margins’. In both Hatcliffe Extension and Epworth people had paid the substantial surveyors fees, penalty fees for regularization, as well as service charges hoping for a legalising trajectory that would allow them to invest in their homes. In Epworth, ‘political interference’ in relation to regularization had worked to residents’ collective benefit because the intervention of the MP combined with grassroots protests organized by the party had pressured the local authority into negotiating lower surveyors’ fees.

Leases were a welcome step in the direction of property and full citizenship, but there was a widespread view that they were also inadequate and only title deeds could remove insecurity. The fact that Ministry of Local Government leases had not conferred protection against eviction in 2005 was widely known. In Hatcliffe, a resident who had built a large house narrated:

We decided to support the ruling party to safeguard our own interests...previously I didn’t build as I was waiting for authority from Cleveland house (the City of Harare). Now I have built a 9 roomed house. But I am not yet settled mentally because of the lease. I wish we

33 Interview 1, Hatcliffe Extension, 12/1/2017
34 Interview 4, Epworth Ward 7, 17/10/2017
35 Focus group, Epworth, 17/11/2016
had title deeds for the house that we built. We are still not certain whether the houses are ours or not.  

Leases were also seen as inadequate because their stringent conditions meant that most people were in breach of their terms. These included rules against subdivisions and lodgers; necessitated regular monthly payments to the MLGNWPH (for leases) and the Council (for services, even if these were not being provided). They required residents to build according to (purchased) council-approved building designs. Many residents had received notices threatening eviction for histories of non-payment. Moreover leases terminated. And of course, they could not in themselves protect against politically-motivated eviction. Some felt that the lease conditions were deliberately unmanageable for poor people.

Another described feeling secure enough to build a 10 bedroom house, not because he had a lease, but because he had political protection from a war medal belonging to a prominent relative: ....they were forcing people to support ZANU-PF. I was telling them I only supported the president and the government in power, I didn’t have any particular party I was supporting, up to now that’s what I do. After fetching a medal from my relative - Minister X - they left me alone....My brothers look down on me, say the area is filthy and we will be evicted, but I am supporting the family [with rental income]....

Many interviewees described not feeling secure enough to build, even with a lease and council approved building plans: ....I am not satisfied because we do not have title deeds... Sometimes I think we were used to clear the land for other people. There is a lot of uncertainty. The Ministry and City officials don’t come to meetings together...they blame each other [for lack of services]... We cannot do any development on the land as we are afraid that we are going to be evicted at some point...we bought plans from the city for 120USD – we are not sure whether they will expire or not. We have had them for quite a while now and what is stopping us from building is the fear of having our houses demolished...

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36 Interview 11, Hatcliffe Extension, 26/10/2017
37 Interview 1, Hopley, 13/09/2017
38 Interview 13, Hopley, 8/11/2017
39 Interview 6, Hopley, 19/10/2017
Residents’ quest for security thus rendered them active within the party structures in a manner that was far from uncritical. But some also took action outside party channels, notwithstanding the risks. Many felt ZANU-PF was deliberately blocking development and recognition as ‘punishment’ for histories of opposition support, and to manipulate their votes. Residents had tried to engage the state directly and had also tried militant protest strategies, motivated by their sense of rights bearing citizenship as well as making demands based on their lease and rates payments. Yet acts of citizenship outside ruling party structures had met with scant success and many had been punished. In Hopley for example, residents had tried to challenge the City’s closure of communal water pipes to the settlement by various means: they approached the press and human rights lawyers to act on their behalf, pushing to the fore lease-owners among them who were being billed by the City for water. When these actions did not bear fruit, they broke the locks that stopped the water supply, risking punishment. One resident narrated:

When they tried to block the water using locks, I broke those locks knowing I will get arrested... It was better than people suffering. I ... was taken to Waterfalls police station. I told them that this issue should go to the courts because I knew we are the rightful owners of the water....\(^{40}\)

This act of self-sacrificial public service, undertaken through a sense of civic rights did not deliver a resumption of water supply, although the narrator was not charged with an offence. The settlement continued to depend on wells and communal boreholes drilled by international agencies.

Other attempts to assert collective rights as urban citizens and to leverage the state outside the party structures were similarly unsuccessful. In Hatcliffe Extension, residents recalled organizing a delegation to the City and Ministry of Education, for which they had been arrested. They were led by residents with leases who paid rates, and had a well-developed grasp of City and line Ministries’ responsibilities:

We approached the City and told them you have really not done anything for us. We do not have sewer. Why are you then billing us? We want to pay for something we can see. We do not have any school, clinic. We held a meeting and told them that you are abusing us. We don’t even have a cent which comes back to us. We are aware that 10% must be ploughed back for ward development. …We asked the Engineer that we want to know what property tax is. They explained that property tax fixes challenges in the settlement such as fixing potholes, collecting bins. We ask them why they are not doing that....all the refuse

\(^{40}\) Interview 2, Hopley, 13/09/2017
bills were then scrapped….We then went to Ministry of Education... but we were then arrested. 41

Some MDC supporters had tried to use their own party to lobby for services, but recognised its lack of capacity or control over the settlements. Although known MDC activists lived in small MDC enclaves originating in MDC-led invasions, and regularizations had included MDC members, opposition supporters nonetheless feared being left out. One local MDC leader with a personal history of militancy described having claims to four stands ‘two from allocations and two from grabbing’. 42 But people living in enclaves originating as MDC invasions that had yet to be regularised were preparing themselves for eviction. One such described how: ‘I can say they [ZANU-PF] are there and they rule. I was afraid recently….MDC helped me to get my plot...but our leaders not effective. We are just standing on one leg...ready to go43

The widespread view among residents that development of these settlements was deliberately being delayed and precarious tenure and lack of services were intentionally perpetuated for political ends was also articulated by local ZANU-PF officers themselves:

Politicians say if you want to control people they have to remain poor, struggling and don’t give them an opportunity to establish themselves. .. In terms of politics it is about the battle for controlling people’s minds, thinking...Some politicians think that we should not remove people from the slums [or improve them] as their [political] bases will be destroyed. These people you can call them for meetings at 1 am, ungodly hours and they will come in their numbers and you can manipulate. We tell them we know where they are and promise to address the situation. At times we call people from outside, get them to wear City dust coasts labelled HM (Harare Municipality) promising residents that they (the officials) will come back to peg stands.... It is not like the hierarchy is not aware of the challenges, they are fully aware of the situation. They want to exploit the situation for their advantage... 44

The hegemony of ZANU-PF’s partisan citizenship was thus hollow, as performances of consent were combined with widespread criticism of coercion and enforced dependency.

41 Focus group, Hatcliffe Extension, 17/11/2016
42 Interview, MDC committee members, 23/11/2016.
43 Interview 11, Hopley 14/09/17
44 Interview 9, Hopley, 31/10/2017
This discussion of access to land and development aimed to convey the contours of moral debate and political practice on the part of differentiated residents. Local party office-holders and residents did not only echo ZANU-PF’s partisan citizenship, but also tried to soften its excesses with arguments acceptable within the party, hinging on the morality of an inclusive developmentalism. Many conveyed a cross-cutting desire for tenure security and state-recognised property rights, which motivated tactical manoeuvres and use of the party to these ends, as well as sacrificial acts in the collective interest conducted outside the party structures, motivated by a sense of rights as ratepayers and citizens, which had met with punishment. If for some, the acquisition of land was reason for on-going loyalty to and ‘sacrifice’ for ZANU-PF, for others it was route towards a future that includes not only land and basic services but also security from property rights and state recognition that could potentially bring freedom from political control.

Conclusion
Debates over ‘everyday’ citizenship in illiberal democracies need to include discussion of party politics and affiliation per se as source of graduated entitlements. The existing literature has paid too little attention to citizenship’s party political contingencies in repressive global South contexts. Party political divides matter in themselves in many authoritarian contexts, and may or may not map onto the ethno-regional, racialised or religious sources of hierarchy and differentiated belonging that predominate in the citizenship literature. Chung’s overview of citizenship in non-western contexts ignores party politics, arguing it ‘is characterised by the prioritization of collective regulation over individual rights, contingent membership over universal membership, and subnational and supranational hierarchies over national democratic principles’ (2014). This echoes Africanist debates over the weakness of ideas of civic rights, often attributed to the power of communal, ethnic identities, customary law and incomplete nationalisation of former colonial subjects (Mamdani 1996). The emphasis on how ‘informal and formal hierarchies of citizenship or non-citizenship’ are ‘linked to existing social hierarchies, ethnicity, residence and/or levels of political/economic development rather than democratic principles’ (Chung 2014; see also Holston 2008) overlooks residents’ status as voters and political allegiances as potential source of differentiated entitlements and protections. Politics in authoritarian democracies in Africa has tended to be discussed not through debates over citizenship but rather through the lens of patron-clientalism. Partisan citizenship we argue, provides a means of bridging these literatures and is useful for discussing contexts where party political affiliation matters for access to resource and protection. It invites investigation of traditions of political thought and practice within political parties, and the shifting contours of moral debate.
By using the lens of partisan citizenship to discuss urban residents’ political agency and ideas – including both clientalist practices and actions motivated by notions of civic rights and state accountability, the article moved away from a view of citizen and subject or client as discrete positionings or identities. Rather it showed a messy domain of action and moral-political ideas (cf Hunter 2016; Russell 2016). It illuminated residents’ tactics that upheld authorities’ practices of political patronage and discrimination along partisan lines, while at the same articulating critiques thereof. Local party authorities worked to uphold partisan constructions of citizenship in the public domain by repeating ZANU-PF rhetoric of urban land, housing and services as gifts donated by party patrons in acts of generosity to their followers, who owed loyalty to the party. Such party political ‘work’ differs from the forms of ‘earning’ citizenship that Dorman (2014, 2016) emphasises in her discussion of colonial continuities in postcolonial state practices of urban control hinging on urban/rural dichotomies and the morality of rate-paying and employment. But the local party could also subvert the excesses of partisan citizenship, by invoking ZANU-PF’s own language and history of state-led developmentalism. The longstanding idea of urban citizenship being earned by rate-paying mattered at the grassroots, as residents of informal settlements invoked their payments as grounds for deserving services and tenure security, and in critique of exclusive renderings of partisan citizenship.

Residents’ tendency to avoid confrontation with party-state authorities and to censor their own dissenting opinions had much in common with other African contexts, where fear and memories of violence underpinned calculations about how to engage with local authorities (Oosterom 2016, Uvin 2009, Pearce et al 2011). But we also emphasised the scope for argument within the repertoires of the ruling party, and the fact that rights-based ideas and actions were not completely eliminated but rather forced underground. The broader literature on southern urbanism has stressed how residents of informal spaces typically use a multiplicity of channels and claims to further their interests (Beni-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2012; Metsola 2018). Our account, however, sought to explain the predominance of the ruling party. The article revealed the manufacture of consent and a public domain that reproduced hegemonic discourses, but also showed sources of autonomy in local political discourse and tactical practices that engaged patronage structures tangentially to the end of securing propertied citizenship and development. As the broader (non-African) literature on urban citizenship in informal ‘auto-constructed’ settlements in the Global South attests, the politics of property can cut across and operate ‘transversally’ and is deeply ambiguous as to its capacity to transform or reinforce the status quo (Caldeira 2017).
The Zimbabwean case, however, currently stands as a counterpoint to optimistic framings of developmental trajectories in informal settlements and cautions against a reading of urban land invasions as political resistance or insurgency. On Harare’s expanding quasi-legal and insecure fringe, informal settlements mostly remain stigmatised emblems of poverty, victimization and political control, rather than ‘material embodiments of notions of progress’ (Caldeira 2017: 6). Rather than being the sites of innovative modes of organization (Holston 2008), they have been sites of partisan surveillance where forms of association other than those controlled by the ruling party have been banned in the public sphere. This has allowed the ruling party to win votes within opposition strongholds and has undermined opposition-controlled municipalities. Rather than spreading ‘rights talk’, the partisan manipulation of insecurity in these spaces has restricted the reach of civic organizations promoting rights and accountability. This has contributed to the demobilization of rights-based movements, has suspended and slowed trajectories of urban improvement and has perpetuated precarious tenure. But political capture is incomplete.

The ambiguity and multivalence of local politics hinging on securing land and property rights, combined with fractures within Zimbabwe’s ruling party mean that future trajectories are unclear. Will moves to regularize and service these settlements change their reputation as impoverished, allowing people to invest in quality homes? Or will the logic of perpetuating insecurity to manipulate votes prove more powerful? Will leases and partial regularization mean people continue to vote for the party out of fear, insecurity or gratitude, or will it confer confidence in political freedoms and provoke a surge in opposition votes? After the interviews cited here were conducted, there was an unprecedented temporary opening up of the settlements, as rifts within ZANU-PF led to a coup, and ZANU-PF’s 2018 election strategy did not entail intense vigilance of the capital city’s peri-urban spaces. This had the effect of reversing ZANU-PF’s 2013 electoral gains in many areas of the City, including in some of the spaces discussed here. Yet the ruling party was quick to punish the new Hopley MDC-Alliance councillor for attempting to pursue regularization outside ZANU-PF channels: he was hospitalised following a life-threatening assault by local ZANU-PF youth. Epworth ward 7, in contrast, was rewarded for its loyalty after the elections with solar-powered street lights.45 While we have elaborated the ways in which policy shifts towards regularising the periphery fell short of removing all tenure insecurity, they nonetheless opened up renewed hope for less precarious futures. The importance of developmentalism within the ruling party’s own discourse of legitimacy provided grounds for local claim-making, criticism of the party and attempts to leverage

benefits. But the aspirational qualities of liberal citizenship as a mobilizing imaginary also continue to inspire residents to acts of citizenship that criticize partisan conditionalities and kindle anger over rights denied, notwithstanding the constraints of the public sphere. The notion of partisan citizenship can be a prism for conveying not only the ways in which the ruling party has attempted to render substantive entitlements contingent on demonstrations of political loyalty, but also the substantial discontent thereover.

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