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Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress
In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll’s Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism.
Funding
Expressivism Generalised: the scope of non-descriptive thought and talk; G1453; SWEDISH RESEARCH COUNCIL (VETENSKAPSRADET)
The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity; G2568; RIKSBANKENS JUBILEUMSFOND; P17-0487:1
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
PhilosophyISSN
0031-8191Publisher
Cambridge University PressExternal DOI
Volume
86Page range
35-62Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2019-09-13First Open Access (FOA) Date
2019-09-13First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2019-09-13Usage metrics
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