Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress

Besson, Corine (2019) Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress. Philosophy, 86. pp. 35-62. ISSN 0031-8191

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In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll’s Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Moral and Logical Expressivism; Carroll’s Regress; Motivational Internalism; Moral and Logical non-cognitivism; Moral and Logical Cognitivism
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Corine Besson
Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2019 11:27
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2021 15:15
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/86169

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Project NameSussex Project NumberFunderFunder Ref
Expressivism Generalised: the scope of non-descriptive thought and talkG1453SWEDISH RESEARCH COUNCIL (VETENSKAPSRADET)Unset
The Foundations of Epistemic NormativityG2568RIKSBANKENS JUBILEUMSFONDP17-0487:1