Barrett, Adam B and Mediano, Pedro A M (2019) The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26 (1-2). pp. 11-20. ISSN 1355-8250
![]() |
PDF
- Accepted Version
Download (239kB) |
Abstract
According to the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT), consciousness is a fundamental observer-independent property of physical systems, and the measure Φ (Phi) of integrated information is identical to the quantity or level of consciousness. For this to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Φ consistent with the axioms of IIT, and there should not be cases of Φ being ill-defined. This article presents three ways in which Φ, in its current formulation, fails to meet these standards, and discusses how this problem might be addressed.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Schools and Departments: | School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences > Physics and Astronomy |
Research Centres and Groups: | Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF0311 Consciousness. Cognition |
Depositing User: | Marianne Cole |
Date Deposited: | 07 Feb 2019 10:08 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jan 2021 02:00 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/81803 |
View download statistics for this item
📧 Request an update