The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems

Barrett, Adam B and Mediano, Pedro A M (2019) The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26 (1-2). pp. 11-20. ISSN 1355-8250

[img] PDF - Accepted Version
Restricted to SRO admin only until 1 January 2021.

Download (239kB)

Abstract

According to the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT), consciousness is a fundamental observer-independent property of physical systems, and the measure Φ (Phi) of integrated information is identical to the quantity or level of consciousness. For this to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Φ consistent with the axioms of IIT, and there should not be cases of Φ being ill-defined. This article presents three ways in which Φ, in its current formulation, fails to meet these standards, and discusses how this problem might be addressed.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences > Physics and Astronomy
Research Centres and Groups: Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF0311 Consciousness. Cognition
Depositing User: Marianne Cole
Date Deposited: 07 Feb 2019 10:08
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2019 15:30
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/81803

View download statistics for this item

📧 Request an update