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THE RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
THE BLACK SEA REGION: A CASE STUDY OF ENERGY

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THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

APRIL 2017
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature: ..................................
The Russian-Turkish Relationship Within the Context of the Black Sea Region: A Case Study of Energy

Summary

In addressing the question ‘How do energy relations affect the Black Sea Region (BSR) and, in particular, the Russian-Turkish relationship?’, this thesis argues that while energy relations have been a securitising factor in the BSR as a whole, they have played a desecuritising role in the Russian-Turkish relationship. Inspired by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), I adapt elements of their theoretical approach, establishing a framework which draws up on the concept of (de)securitisation and structuring my analysis on the basis of four different levels: domestic, bilateral, regional and interregional/global.

My original contribution to the existing literature comprises an analysis of Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, with a primary focus on energy, on the basis of a critical engagement with the concept of (de)securitisation. In particular, I have sought to apply a more nuanced account of the concept of the (de)securitisation. Regarding solving these issues, I expand the analysis to pipeline projects and use the categorisation of Lene Hansen (2012) on desecuritisation. Using this conceptual framework as the basis for my empirical analysis, I first argue that the relationship between Russia and Turkey has been transformed from one where they were historical enemies to a multidimensional partnership, in which energy is one of the most important factors. The desecuritisation of energy is basically related to economic concerns and political developments, and as a result, Turkey is defined as a new energy partner/route for Russia while Russia is a reliable supplier for Turkey. However, as a second argument, since politics is dynamic, the stability of this new relationship might be in question. In particular, relations with regional and global actors, particularly on energy, might form the basis of a new threat to bilateral relations. Despite these problems, nevertheless, two sides make an effort to mitigate bilateral tensions and minimise factors that might fuel conflict between them.
Aileme ve Karadeniz'e...
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My deepest thanks go to my family who showered me with love, kindness and care and I am very lucky to have been blessed with the family I have.
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGRI</td>
<td>Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector</td>
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<tr>
<td>bcm</td>
<td>billion cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKSEAFOR</td>
<td>Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTAŞ</td>
<td>Petroleum Pipeline Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>British Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BSF</td>
<td>Black Sea Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Black Sea Synergy</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSR</td>
<td>Black Sea Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTE</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community of Democratic Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>US Energy Information Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova: the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INOGATE</td>
<td>Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mtoe</td>
<td>million tonnes of oil equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>South Caucasus Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCAR</td>
<td>State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANAP</td>
<td>Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Trans Adriatic Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPAO</td>
<td>Turkish Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESEV</td>
<td>Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCIOM</td>
<td>Russian Public Opinion Research Center</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The title of this thesis is *The Russian-Turkish Relationship Within the Context of the Black Sea Region: A Case Study of Energy*. It focuses on Russian-Turkish relations, with a particular interest in energy, in the Black Sea Region (BSR), where the two countries have converging and diverging (energy) interests. It takes its inspiration from the theoretical assumptions of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), paying particular attention to the concept of (de)securitisation and the theory’s four levels of analysis, in order to reveal the puzzling trajectory of Russian-Turkish bilateral (energy) relations in the BSR since the early 2000s.

Relations between Russia and Turkey are complex due to their converging and diverging interests, particularly in the BSR. As the two significant powers in the region, Russia and Turkey have divergent point of view with regard to such regional matters as, for example, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; while Turkey supports Azerbaijan, Russia supports Armenia. By contrast, the two countries are united in opposing the involvement of non-regional actors in regional matters. Such fluctuations, as argued here, create a pattern of conflict and cooperation in bilateral relations.

For both countries, energy is of great importance to their national security, particularly in regards to their national sovereignty, stability and economic prosperity; however, their policy ambitions are different from each other. While for Turkey becoming an energy hub constitutes a great ambition, for Russia, the central aim is to maintain its energy security as a supplier. The two countries have been in an increasing dialogue in the energy sector, in order to diversify their options.

Security plays a crucial role in the determination of this pattern. Energy security, in particular, is the fundamental focus of this thesis. However, classical IR theories tend to emphasis the military aspect of security. In the face of a narrow, military-dominated definition of security, a proposed alternative, ‘wider’ concept of security has come from scholars from different theoretical camps attempting to broaden the security agenda since the early 1980s (Buzan, 1983; Ullman, 1983). The most important initiatives emerged after the end of the Cold War (Baldwin, 1997). In their approaches these authors express the requirement of broadening the concept of security, not only linking it to military but also to non-military issues (Buzan, 1983; Ullman, 1983). This meant a
redefinition of the understanding of security. Classical realist interpretations were too narrow to explain new threats, due to excessive dependence on the military perspective, which prevented theorisations of issues other than military affairs (Nyman, 2014). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are two of the most important thinkers aiming to find common ground for new threats and to explain the connection between the state and the public. The concept of (de)securitisation emerged as a new theoretical framework. Buzan et al. (1998:26) define securitisation as meaning that “the security act is negotiated between securitiser and audience”. Securitisation occurs when an issue transforms into a securitising threat. Securitisation is a political process in which the securitising actor defines an issue as an existential threat requiring exceptional measures, and their target audience has to accept this. According to Buzan et al. (1998), this can happen in five sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Contrary to realist thinking, the authors argue that neither security in general nor threats to national security specifically are objective phenomena. Rather, security is a socially constructed concept that can differ from one context to another.

The other end of the spectrum is desecuritisation, meaning when an issue is transferred from being a securitising threat to a normal political issue. However, there is not as much research into this concept as has been conducted on securitisation. Hansen (2012), putting great effort into making the concept clear, draws upon examples of the concept in the literature and categorises them into four groups (change through stabilisation, replacement, rearticulation and silencing). Drawing upon these, this thesis argues that Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR are examples of rearticulation and replacement.

In addition, the concept of the region drew attention as a topic for analysis after the end of the Cold War. Buzan and Wæver (2003), in their book *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, stress the importance of regions in an understanding of security, because international relations (IR) theories do not focus enough on regions. As is evident from the title, they also stress the importance of powers in this structure. The authors aim to formulate theories of regional security and to explain the structure of the international system after the end of the Cold War. Their theory states that a specific region tends to establish a complex when securitisation or desecuritisation processes are so interlinked that it is difficult for them to be analysed or resolved separately from one another (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). This process requires scholars to broaden the
analysis into four levels, meaning apart from the domestic, bilateral and global levels, the regional level is also added to the analysis.

My overall approach therefore is to make use of elements of the RSCT approach, notably the levels of analysis and the concept of (de)securitisation, in order to understand the dynamics of the relationship between Russia and Turkey in the BSR. These concepts inform the empirical analysis undertaken in the thesis. That analysis does not constitute an attempt to apply RSCT as a theory to the case of the Russian-Turkish relationship.

Currently, in the literature, it can be seen that cooperation and strategic partnership are the main concepts utilised in defining contemporary Russian-Turkish relations (Warhola and Bezci, 2013; Trenin, 2013). This new discourse illustrates a fundamental transformation in bilateral relations, with the removal of conflict from a discourse in which it had been dominant up to the 1990s. In order to understand how this has happened, one needs to analyse the process by which relations transformed from conflict to cooperation. This thesis, therefore, is particularly interested in analysis of this process as a conceptual framework. The concept of (de)securitisation provides a powerful analytical tool to explore why, and through which processes, issues (the energy sector in this case) become security issues in some contexts but not in others.

This thesis argues that Russian-Turkish relations are not fixed, but that fluctuations of both conflict and cooperation tend to establish a pattern. In examining these fluctuations, it is clear that in practice there are elements of both conflict and cooperation in the relationship throughout the period examined (2000-2014) but that the overall balance of the relationship shifts from being more conflictual than cooperative to becoming more cooperative than conflictual. In order to discuss this, it analyses bilateral (energy) relations between Russia and Turkey in the BSR, with using some concepts from RSCT and particular reference to the (de)securitisation framework. This introduction sets out the background to the study, focusing on the significance of Russian-Turkish relations, the BSR as a research area and the role of energy as a case study. It then outlines the research question and key arguments. The main question is: “how do energy relations affect the Black Sea Region and, in particular the Russian-Turkish relationship?” The answer to this question is that energy has a desecuritising effect on bilateral relations, but has been a securitising factor in the BSR as a whole. In other words, energy is a
mitigating factor in Russian-Turkish relations while aggravating security concerns in the region more widely. The introduction then discusses the methodology used to answer this question. The thesis applies qualitative methods such as interviews, and primary and secondary sources, analysing the discourse of protagonists in terms of who is talking, in what context and from where. In this sense, as a critique of the main aspect of securitisation, rather than focusing on securitising actors’ speeches, it analyses specific actions and practices, specifically energy pipeline projects. The introduction concludes with an outline of the structure of the thesis.

**Background of the study**

**The Russian-Turkish relationship**

Historically, Russia and Turkey have had an uneasy relationship (Çetinsaya, 2007). During the last four centuries, Russia and Turkey have fought each other 13 times (Kınıkhoğlu and Morkva, 2007). Bilateral relations have been characterised by complexity and often by conflict, and this is reflected in the discourse on the two countries. While for Turkey (previously the Ottoman Empire), Russia’s one aim was to diminish the country, for Russia (previously Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union), Turkey was an obstacle to its ambition for a warm sea port. Although relations between the two countries became closer after the end of the First World War, this rapprochement ended following the Second World War. During the Cold War, Russia and Turkey were in different camps and bilateral relations were at their lowest level. Perceiving a threat from Soviet expansionism, Turkey decided to ally itself with the United States of America (USA) and, consequently, became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Soviet Union – with the Russian republic at the centre – on the other side, was in the process of forming the Warsaw Pact, and it perceived a threat from Turkey, and indirectly from the West via Turkey. Over the last two decades, however, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the two countries have been drawing closer as the discourse around the idea that each country was the most important and immediate national security threat for the other started to decrease (Özbay, 2011). The diminution of the threat paved the way for the possibility of

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1 Although officially the two countries are called the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey, this study prefers to use Russia and Turkey.
increasing Russian-Turkish cooperation. The pace of this rapprochement increased from the mid-2000s, with economic and energy cooperation, as well as social interaction. Accepting the fact that bilateral relations are not problem-free, the two countries continue to add new values in their mutual perceptions. The new discourse is now based around partnership, ranging across the political, economic and energy sectors (Aras, 2009; Aktürk, 2014).

These changes are reflected in the literature on Russian-Turkish relations. Early on, although authors writing on the two countries have seen economic dialogue as paving the way for cooperation, they have nevertheless preserved their suspicions on geopolitical issues, particularly in the post-Soviet space. For instance, Markushin (1997) and Trenin (1997) summarise the context of bilateral relations, stating that although times have changed, the style and the method of bilateral relations cannot change its essence, while on the other side they put emphasis on economic developments that could pave the way for positive interaction. Bazoğlu Sezer (2000) describes bilateral relations as a virtual rapprochement, stating that although relations appear to display a positive atmosphere, as often stated by political elites, historical mistrust and fear still remain in both countries.

After Putin came to power in Russia in 1999 and Erdoğan in Turkey in 2002, it is asserted that the relationship took on a positive aspect, the result of increasing dialogue. The terms often used in the literature are strategic and multidimensional, and it is argued that each country has become sine qua non for each other. Kara (2009) asserts that the booming trade relations between the two countries emerged as a decisive factor, transforming what Trenin (1997) called a ‘schizophrenic’ relationship. Yanık (2007) scrutinises the nature of renewed Russian-Turkish cooperation and underlines the rising trust in security matters and the booming trade. The author argues that the improvement in the nature of ties is a ‘dual normalisation’, and that this has occurred due to diminishing threat perceptions and the politics of economics. Hill and Taşpınar (2006) on the other hand emphasise the rapprochement due to the frustration both countries have felt from US policies in the Middle East, as well as personal chemistry between the leaders of the two countries. Ulchenko (2003) gives more emphasis on energy and analyses the effects of energy issues in bilateral relations, stressing the energy dimension of the strategic security and foreign policies of both countries. In accordance with such perspectives, which strongly emphasise the dependence on energy resources
both as suppliers and as customers for economic growth and political stability, the author reasons that the rapprochement is due to this dependency. In other words, since the two countries depend on each other, they do not want to risk their relations. The author also stresses that the energy cooperation between the two countries is economic rather than strategic or political.

As can be seen in the above developments, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, historical negative perceptions turned into partnership. The replacement of military issues, as a fundamental aspect of bilateral relations, with societal and economic issues, has broadened the concerns of analysis. While the current literature is inclined to explain the reasons behind this shift on the basis of realism and liberalism, a more comprehensive approach is needed, including a rethinking of security to understand how a matter can be moved from being a security issue or can become a security issue.

Furthermore, these developments lead to the claim that bilateral relations are developing, and that they are characterised by a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Although in the past mutual threat perceptions constituted the main driver of the relationship, increasing political, economic and energy dialogues have led the two countries to cooperate more regularly. However, there are still concerns that the relationship is not completely cooperative and that differences persist (Terterov et al., 2010; Weitz, 2010).

**The Black Sea Region**

One of the factors that Demiryol (2015) identifies in the pattern of conflict and cooperation in bilateral relations is the converging and diverging of the (security) interests of Moscow and Ankara in Eurasia. Due to the regional concern of this thesis, this is here narrowed down to the BSR. Before starting to analyse the BSR in Russian-Turkish relations, the ambiguity of the region in terms of its geographical area and definition need clarification. A variety of definitions and classifications have emerged to characterise the region. In the literature, the term ‘Wider Black Sea Region’ is used, particularly by US-based think tank publications (Cornell et al., 2006; Hamilton and Westphal, 2008), while the term ‘Wider Black Sea Area’ is used in particular by the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC; Triantaphyllou, 2009). ‘Black Sea Region’ is used by the European Union (EU); according to the European Commission (2007a:1),
[it] includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Russia in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south. Though Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional actors.

In the ‘Wider Black Sea Area’, Albania and Serbia are also included. The ‘Greater Black Sea Region’ encompasses, in addition to the littoral countries, “the countries situated in the corridor that links Asia to Europe as well as those situated in the transportation zone of the Caspian energy resources to the West” (Bozkurt, 2013:1). The final usage is the ‘Wider Black Sea Basin’, which “covers almost 2 million square kilometres and includes parts of 19 countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Serbia and Montenegro” (Aydin, 2005:279). This thesis uses the EU version, the Black Sea Region (BSR).

In terms of the geopolitics and economics of the region, Russia and Turkey are the status quo powers with the BSR occupying an important position in the security, political, economic and cultural perspectives of each country. For Russia, the Black Sea is the main arena for the security of its southern border, as demonstrated by the presence of its naval fleet in Crimea. Moreover, it has concerns over threats coming from its southern border, due to countries in that area aiming to have their security protected by non-Russian initiatives (NATO and the EU), which Russia opposes. For Turkey, the Black Sea is important for its security as well, and the region’s emerging security problems could affect its national security. Turkey has particular concerns on maritime security, which mainly link to the preservation of the status quo in the maritime domain and also the institutionalisation/regionalisation of the BSR (Tanrısever, 2012).

The converging points of bilateral relations can be linked to the role of non-regional actors in the BSR. Both countries share a distrust of intervention by external actors. The region is often perceived as their sphere of interest by both Russia and Turkey, that is, an area where they should retain their power without any non-regional involvement or support. This, therefore, leads them to converge, particularly on issues related to the protection of the region and the prevention of non-regional actors’ involvement.

The presence of close cultural, historical and ethnic ties with other countries in the region is also important, and potentially a source of conflict between Russia and Turkey.
Thus, it becomes apparent that gaining and retaining influence in the BSR has emerged as a priority for both countries. Thus, as stated above, they display diverging positions and take different sides in conflicts within regional countries. Moreover, while Russia supports secessionist movements in the post-Soviet space, Turkey supports the territorial integrity of new independent countries (Aybak, 2010).

The role of energy

The other factor that Demiryol (2015) identifies in the pattern of conflict and cooperation in bilateral relations is the growth of economic interdependence between Russia and Turkey, particularly based on energy. Indeed, Kardaş (2011-12:82) claims that “the transformation of Turkish-Russian relations from adversity to managed competition and the current phase of multidimensional partnership owes a great deal to the economic interdependence imparted most crucially by energy cooperation”. Thus, energy is one of the most significant factors affecting the potential for Russian-Turkish cooperation. Due to its growing economy, Turkey’s dependence on energy resources is increasing year by year, and Russia is Turkey’s main energy supplier. It imports 98% of its gas, buying more than 60% from Russia. And for Russia, Turkey is a major hydrocarbon market and its second major gas recipient after Germany.

Turkey first started to import gas from Russia towards the end of the Cold War. This can be accepted as the first significant step at the beginning of energy relations. Following a 1984 agreement, the first gas deliveries started in 1987 (Kardaş, 2011-12). The Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project, which tunnels under the Black Sea and thus circumvents the ecologically risky Turkish Straits, has contributed to a new level in bilateral energy relations (Kimkhoğlu and Morkva, 2007). It follows the north-south oil pipeline from Samsun in northern Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Furthermore, Turkey gave permission for Russia to implement South Stream in its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, which excludes the Ukrainian exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. After this project was abandoned, Turkish Stream was announced as a new project. The two countries have also agreed on the building of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu in Turkey.
Turkey is not only a major buyer of Russian hydrocarbons and an investment destination for Russia but also a critical transit corridor to European markets for Caspian natural gas. The role of alternative energy suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, is a potential challenge to the Russian-Turkish relationship, as are the activities of other non-regional powers such as the EU and the USA. While Russia aims to retain control of all pipeline routes in the region and prevent non-Russian energy activities, Turkey is becoming a salient energy corridor connecting the Caspian Sea’s energy resources to Western markets. This also serves to materialise its aim of becoming an energy hub in the region. Moreover, Turkey needs to diversify its own resources in order to establish its own security. In light of this, while Turkey has largely positioned itself against Russia by participating in non-Russian energy projects, such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan (BTC), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), the East-West Energy Corridor, and, most recently, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), Russia does not want to see Turkey enhancing its relations with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members (Winrow, 2009; Kardaş, 2011-12).

Overall, as Demiryol (2015) points out, Russian-Turkish relations have for centuries been marked by cycles of cooperation and conflict. I argue that two significant elements affect changes in this cycle. The first is the geopolitical developments in the BSR and the second is energy-related economic developments. While bilateral relations illustrate an example of cooperation, the involvement of other regional and non-regional actors leads the two countries into conflict with each other. In this complex structure, a study of energy is needed as a case study in order to explain the overall picture. A study of energy requires looking at the broad picture, including regional and global actors and dimensions, as well as domestic and bilateral ones.

**Research questions**

In light of this background, it is possible to state that Russian-Turkish relations are not fixed, that they fluctuate between conflict and cooperation, and that this clearly appears in regards to the BSR and energy politics. In this situation, it is important to analyse the dynamics behind these fluctuations and changes in the process of transformation. A particular consideration of the role of energy will enrich analytical and normative
conceptions, and help look beyond military-technical and market-based approaches. The BSR, as consisting of both energy suppliers and customers as well as having a significant place in energy transportation, offers strong material for a broader analysis of this topic.

This thesis therefore aims to find answers to the following main question:

- How do energy relations affect the Black Sea Region and, in particular, the Russian-Turkish relationship?

This question addresses the role that has been played by energy in the BSR and Russian-Turkish relations. This thesis will further explore several sub-questions. The main question intends to explore the pattern of conflict and cooperation on the basis of energy as a case study. To answer this main question the thesis utilises the assumptions of the concept of (de)securitisation to investigate the transformation of Russian-Turkish energy relations in the BSR. Regarding the concept of (de)securitisation, the key sub-question is

- To what extent has energy been securitised or desecuritised by Russia and Turkey in their relationship, as well as in the BSR as a whole?

With this sub-question my aim is to link the conceptual framework to the empirical analysis. Finally, although this thesis has a particular regional concern, as the main research question indicates, the role of the fourth level of analysis also needs to be included. Therefore the final sub-question is

- What is the role of extra-regional actors (the EU and the USA) in regards to regional relationships as well as Russian-Turkish relationships, particularly regarding the role of energy?

The aim of this thesis is to analyse patterns of conflict and cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the field of energy and in the context of the BSR, with a particular focus on the factors/dynamics that explain those patterns. There is therefore an important distinction in the analysis which has been conducted in the thesis. In the first instance, the thesis provides a primarily descriptive account by revealing the patterns of conflict and cooperation which have characterised the Russian-Turkish relationship. On the basis of this, and informed by concepts from RSCT, the thesis offers an explanation of
the changing relationship. These two different but complementary dimensions make the analysis more robust. This is because, while the first aspect focuses more on outcomes, the second offers an analysis of process leading to those outcomes. In addressing the research questions, therefore, this thesis seeks to explore factors that help to explain those patterns of conflict and cooperation. Thus, it is going to argue that energy and regional dynamics have shaped the Russian-Turkish relationship. These dynamics include the involvement of non-regional actors in the region seeking alternative routes and projects, and Russia and Turkey’s shared threat perceptions as well as the (energy) attitude of countries in the region.

Core arguments and contributions

This thesis will investigate post-Cold War Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR by focusing on energy. It aims to evaluate and fill the gap in the existing literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. Building on this gap, it aims to explore the concept of (de)securitisation in Russian-Turkish energy relations in the BSR through empirical analysis. Finally, it aims to evaluate this empirical analysis, giving an original account framed in four levels of analysis.

This thesis presents a number of arguments. The first is that contemporary political and economic relations between Russia and Turkey appear to be characterised more by desecuritisation than securitisation. Although it used to be a referent object for securitisation in bilateral relations, energy no longer appears as a security issue and has been desecuritised by the two sides. In order to illustrate the alteration from securitisation to desecuritisation, this thesis draws upon the arguments of Oelsněl (2005) and Coşkun (2008:395), the latter stating that:

an issue can transcend security language in two ways: either it loses its threatening image because agent and audience perceive positive change in the nature of the threat or they perceive a qualitative change in the relationship between them and the securitised threat. Thus, they gradually begin to trust the fact that it no longer poses an existential threat. The first mechanism is a rather passive one. It seems to involve almost no effort on the part of agent and audience; the threat seems to just lose its power or capabilities. On the other hand, the second mechanism requires a more active qualitative transformation, because the relationship itself has been reassessed.
Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in this case are an example of the second option. Developing political, economic and energy dialogues and (inter)dependency as outcomes have led them to rearticulate bilateral relations, and the discourse turned from historical threat to the present partnership.

The second argument is that energy is vital for both countries as well as other countries in the BSR. It is associated with national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the stability of the political system, economic development and prosperity, and the economic welfare of each country. These concerns are used as referent objects; thus energy (security) can be linked to both political and economic sectors.

However, as a third argument, one needs to bear in mind that politics is dynamic and so the nature of cooperation between Russia and Turkey might change. One can see this in examples of other BSR countries’ activities, who when they aim to securitise energy and diversify their suppliers and resources, cause a shift in patterns in the Russian-Turkish relationship. This is because for these countries Russia is the main threat, while Turkey is a partner. The involvement of the BSR countries and their energy policies in the energy game, which are clashing with Russian (energy) interests in the region, while overlapping with the Turkish desire of becoming an energy hub, emerge as new threats in Russian-Turkish bilateral relations. In other words, since the two countries used to consider the political and security problems of the region as a threat to bilateral relations due to supporting different sides, finding solutions to these problems eliminated most of the issues feeding mutual threat perceptions; however, with the emergence of rival projects, one might consider energy as a new threat to the relationship.

Furthermore, geopolitical factors in the BSR make the region crucial from the perspective of non-regional protagonists as well, due to their concerns regarding security of energy supply and the stability of energy prices. Thus the interregional and global levels are as important as the regional and domestic levels. This has a complex impact on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations. This is because while external actors securitise Russian energy resources and aim to decrease their dependence on Russia, they use Turkey as a route for energy transportation from alternative suppliers. Therefore, their involvements become a new threat to Russian-Turkish energy relations. However, external actors’ involvement in regional matters has also led the two countries to rearticulate their relationship with each other, and has led to a level of convergence.
The existence of new threats leads one to expect that securitisation would have (re)emerged in bilateral discourse. However, following the categorisation of Hansen (2012), it has actually led to desecuritisation. Due to the diversification of energy options and growing (inter)dependency, as well as geopolitical developments, the two countries continue to articulate their relationship as a partnership. For instance, it might be expected that the two countries would decrease the level of mutual dialogue, since they have alternative options, but as seen in Russia’s investment in a nuclear power plant in Turkey and the recent Turkish Stream pipeline, they are continuing to improve and diversify relations. In short, although bilateral relations are not problem-free, both states make efforts to mitigate bilateral tensions and minimise causes that might fuel conflict between them.

Overall, I argue that, from the 2000s, national practices have tended towards the desecuritisation of energy between Russia and Turkey. This became tightly intertwined with the Russian and Turkish authorities’ wider attempts to publicise their national successes in re-evaluating bilateral relations and entering a multidimensional partnership. Developments in energy were no longer considered ‘threatening’, but were rather presented as being essential drivers of mutual rapprochement. Improvements on the ground were frequently noted in official meetings between the two countries’ leaders. A growing number of initiatives and alternative projects began to appear in official sources, highlighting the increased depth and diversification of energy relations, from pipeline projects to a nuclear power plant.

Energy has thus had an important effect on both bilateral and regional relations. It is one of the significant drivers behind a shift in discourse from historical negative perceptions, which used to trigger more security-oriented policy dimensions, to the current positive relations and multidimensional policy approaches in Russian-Turkish relations. In the region as a whole, energy has a powerful political influence, and is used as a referent object for security. Due to there being a number of new independent states, energy has strong links with security and is associated with such countries’ survival as states.

In order to justify these arguments, this thesis draws upon the ideas of Buzan and Waever, who claim that (de)securitisation is a process (Buzan et al., 1998). The changes in and causes of patterns of conflict and cooperation will be analysed on the basis of this concept, and it is claimed here that bilateral (energy) relations in the BSR, in general,
are an example of desecuritisation. However, they have a special form, to borrow Hansen’s (2012) terms: rearticulation and replacement. Regarding articulating the terms conflict/cooperation and securitisation/desecuritisation, one needs to bear in mind that they are not easily substituted for one another; on the contrary, the concept of (de)securitisation explains the process of transformation in the nature of a relationship, while conflict and cooperation are understood as a result of (de)securitisation practices/processes.

Taking into account the above-indicated arguments and the literature review and the conceptual framework discussed in chapter one, this thesis aims to make some original contributions to the research field. The first and perhaps the most important is to make contributions to the existing literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, it needs to be mentioned that the general attitude of scholars towards the discourse of bilateral relations is often structured around conventional IR theories such as that of Aktürk (2006), who focuses on realism, and Demiryol (2015), who concentrates on neorealism and neoliberalism. However, in order to understand the dynamics of shifts in patterns one needs to draw upon a different theoretical insight; in particular a concentration on the ‘process’. This is because the outcome of transformation can only be seen in the course of events (Oelsnel, 2005; Coşkun, 2008). Considering the process (Buzan et al., 1998) as one of the significant elements in Russian-Turkish (energy) relations through the concept of (de)securitisation is the original contribution of this research. This concept has never been analysed in relation to this topic before.

However, the concept has some limitations that need to be stated, and evaluating these limitations is the second original contribution of this thesis. In this regard, the first limitation is that this approach does not consider energy within its five security sectors: political, economic, societal, environmental and military (Natorski and Surrallés, 2008). Hence, there is a lack of research on the securitisation of energy. Chapter 1 of this thesis gives special attention to the application of (de)securitisation to energy, and the findings of this analysis will be applied in subsequent chapters. Second, as the main analytical tool of the concept, the speech act was found to be inefficient in the analysis of this research. This is because, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the concept only considers an issue as a security threat when it is expressed as such by the securitising actor. However, I argue that actions/practices (Bigo, 2000; Balzacq, 2008) are also
articulated as securitisation. In this regard, this thesis will consider pipeline projects as demonstrations of (de)securitisation. Finally, it is noticed that there is an ongoing debate on the definition of the desecuritisation (Aradau, 2004; Roe, 2004), with the claim being made that it is under-theorised. Drawing upon the categorisation of Hansen (2012) in the empirical chapters (3 to 5), Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR are given as an example of the concept. This thesis, therefore, also contributes to the existing literature on the concept of (de)securitisation.

Furthermore, situating the research area in a region – the BSR – rather than focussing exclusively on Russia and Turkey contributes to the presentation of a clearer picture, which is the third contribution of this study. Only analysing bilateral relations would have produced a narrow conceptualisation; looking at their relationship in the area as a whole broadens understanding. Moreover, it is argued that bilateral relations cannot be separated from regional dimensions, since they have been shared for centuries.

Finally, as will be discussed in detail in the methodology section below, this thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge via original data obtained through empirical research and the extensive use of primary resources. One of the key requirements of the concept of (de)securitisation is acceptance by the target audience. In order to demonstrate the voice of the audience this thesis will use surveys, interviews and secondary sources. Accepting the fact that the number of interviewees is not sufficient, they nevertheless make a great contribution to an understanding of the beliefs of the audience. Referencing particularly Russian and Turkish authors, as well as regional countries’ authors, produce original findings and conclusions.

Methodology

The method employed in answering these research questions and core arguments is largely structured around the conceptual principles of Buzan et al.’s (1998) concept of (de)securitisation. This thesis assesses this concept within Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) four levels of analysis in order to provide a wide area of concern, from the domestic to the global, as a structure for the thesis. In order to analyse energy in regards to Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, I have constructed a methodology for investigating the actions/practices of (de)securitisation.
The above-indicated conceptual framework is complemented by semi-structured interviews and primary and secondary sources. First, interviews were conducted with people involved in the political, economic, energy and academic areas of relevant countries. I conducted interviews with twelve people. Three of them are IR scholars specialising in the BSR, while two of them are IR scholars specialising in energy in Turkey. One of them is an expert in a Turkish think-tank specialising in Russia. Two of them are high-ranking officials in BOTAS and the Ministry of Energy in Turkey. One is a Russian economist specialising in energy. Another is an Azerbaijani energy expert in a state-owned think-tank specialising in the geopolitics of energy. Another is an officer from the European Commission Energy Unit. The last interviewee is an expert on energy and the BSR from the UK (see Appendix 1).

As the basis for the interviews, I prepared a list of questions concentrating on the perceptions of elites and scholars regarding bilateral relations, and their impact on the region and energy, and vice versa. Questions also explored the conceptualisation of energy in these countries, in the region and on the part of non-regional actors, in terms of whether it is a security, political or economic issue. The interviewee could choose questions and the interview continued through their answers. However, in email interviews the interviewee answered the questions from the list, choosing which ones he/she wanted to answer. They were selective in choosing questions relevant to their research and political concerns. I also posed several open-ended questions to the interviewees to draw out their views and opinions pertaining to the research topic.

Conducting interviews in countries like Russia and Turkey, whose political elites are quite reluctant to give interviews, is difficult, and indeed it was unfortunately not ultimately possible to find any officials in Russia, or indeed a sufficient number in Turkey, despite the fact that this had appeared possible at the very beginning of the research (2013-14). These difficulties were undoubtedly connected to the dramatic changes in the political atmosphere within and between each country. Ironically, and unintentionally, interviews were conducted in two time frames, the first after the announcement of Turkish Stream (February-April 2015), with Turkish scholars and policymakers, and the second (with a Russian economist, scholars from different countries and an EU official) after parliamentary elections in Turkey and the incident in which a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 was shot down by Turkish warplanes (November 2015-March 2016). Thus, this study was able to observe different opinions for comparison;
this also gave an opportunity to get a deeper understanding of problems, but overall data collection was limited because most of those contacted refused to take part. Nonetheless, the content of interviews did add depth and detail to the overall assessments of the research.

Apart from the interviews, documents were also used as both primary and secondary sources. Starting points for the discourse analysis included: official discourse, such as official speeches by leaders and relevant actors such as ministers of foreign affairs, energy, trade and defence, and CEOs of energy companies; US reports; EU energy policy strategy documents, particularly Green Papers; trade statistics; economic indicators of each country including their import and export rates and GDP; indicators of net energy imports and exports; national energy, national security and foreign policy documents of each country; and documents from regional institutions (BSEC summits). However, this was not a proper application of the concept; in these texts, who is talking, in what context and from where (Schmidt, 2008) are important elements that this study bears in mind, and this context is utilised in the understanding of perceptions and whether an issue is a security issue or not. Which discourse is used in understanding energy; which discourse is used for the Russian-Turkish relationship; and what discourse do regional and non-regional actors use, are all significant steps in the analysis. The selection of texts was derived from what Hansen (2006:73-74) suggests first came from the period under investigation; and second the body of texts included “key texts that are frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate, as well as larger body of general material”. On the basis of these texts and documents, the behaviour or attitude of the speakers/securitising elites can be understood.

Finally, since primary sources, particularly speeches, to some extent do not provide a clear overview of the actual foundation of states’ policies, secondary sources were selected from a wide range of works, including academic sources, surveys, and works produced by the media and think-tank institutions, in order to conceptualise the audience in the (de)securitisation process. This is because securitising actors’ process of negotiation with their audience is the most important aspect of securitisation, and this can easily be seen in secondary sources, as well as in the interviews. Selecting works from Russia and Turkey and the BSR was the priority in order to understand their
perception of issues in the region. This also helps to provide a more balanced overview of the problem.

However, in some cases language was a problem, particularly in Russian sources. In order to compensate for this shortfall, I resorted extensively to Russian primary and secondary sources written in English and Turkish. The websites of the Russian Presidency, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also the Russian Ministry of Energy were helpful as they included English versions of speeches, statements, statistics, news conferences, ratifications, official meetings, international visits, as well as basic documents on relevant Russian policy. The webpage of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey was also useful as it provided valuable information about the political agreements between the two countries, including details of meetings, visits, consultations, and contents of the telephone conversations that took place between high-level officials in Turkey and Russia. I also made use of books and articles in academic journals written by Russian academics, field specialists and journalists as secondary sources, in order to provide a comprehensive, accurate and insightful account of the Russian side.

Regarding media sources, I used databases such as Nexis, including both Russian and Turkish as well as other regional countries’ newspapers, and sites with English versions of Russian newspapers such as Russia Beyond the Headlines, which often covers headlines of other Russian newspapers. Regarding Turkish media sources, I used the Anadolu Agency, which is the state-run news agency of Turkey, and Hürriyet Daily News, one of the leading newspapers in Turkey.

Moreover, the well-known problem of freedom of the media in regional countries led me to use Western media sources, particularly the BBC, The New York Times, The Economist, Der Spiegel, The Financial Times, The Guardian and CNN, due to their having large resources, and setting the framework in which everyone else operates. Moreover, having well-respected translation facilities, Western media sources provided a great opportunity to reach regional resources and discourses. Accepting the fact that the research concerns include a wide area, in order to narrow it down, since the pipeline projects constitute the main framework of the thesis, names of projects were searched for on relevant media sites. Within these sites, the relevant news was used for analysing the reaction and the discourse of the securitising elite/decision makers. They are also
useful for providing basic background information on the research concern (Lamont, 2015). All these media materials provided a steady stream of data.

Apart from media sources, think-tank institutions and newsletters from both the global and regional scales made a strong contribution to this study. They were a source of statements by securitising actors or their audiences on particular empirical events. They also helped to justify my argument, providing more examples on the research topic. I utilised the Valdai Discussion Club, Russia Direct and Global Affairs Russia from Russia, and Turkish Policy Quarterly and USAK from Turkey. Comments and articles on these institutions by scholars from the two countries give great insight into how relevant audiences think about the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Natural Gas World, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and ERI RAS were sources for analysis of energy issues; the International Centre for Black Sea Studies, articles published in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies and EurasiaNet, and the Eurasia Daily Monitor were chosen for the BSR. Carnegie Moscow, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, the German Marshall Fund, Brookings Institution and the Jamestown Foundation were also used.

Finally for the surveys, WCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) from Russia, which conduct surveys on an issue-basis, and in Turkey, Kadir Has University and TESEV’s (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) annually conducted surveys on Public and Political Trends, were drawn upon to strengthen the main argument of the study.

**Time-limitation of the thesis**

This study focuses on developments up to the end of 2014, when Turkish Stream was announced. Thus, although the period after the demise of the Soviet Union is the starting point of this study, the main time framework is between 2000 and 2014. The reason for this is the aim of focusing in detail on the politics of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and how Russia and Turkey have changed/developed in their relations during this period.

Moreover, regional developments, both in the political and energy respects, were quite effective in terms of bilateral relations within this period. Regarding political
developments, the different political attitudes of regional countries can be seen more clearly in events such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and Russia’s reaction to these initiatives, as well as the violent events in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Regarding energy, competing pipeline projects between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic bloc allying with Azerbaijan were planned during this period. These dimensions have a strong influence on the nature of the bilateral relations of Russia and Turkey. Post-2014 developments, however, have rather emerged in regards to matters outside the BSR, such as in Syria, and so it was decided not to consider this period due to it being outside the research concern.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 presents the conceptual framework of the topic, via a literature review. RSCT is chosen as the basis for such a framework, especially for its four levels of analysis, and for its focus on the concept of (de)securitisation. The reason behind choosing (de)securitisation is to identify when, where and how key issues moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to becoming a threat to security and beyond the scope of normal politics – and vice versa (Buzan et al., 1998). The chapter begins with a review of the literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. Indicating the gap in the literature, the subsequent sections give specific attention to the conceptual framework of the thesis. It continues with an analysis of the concepts of regionalism and RSCT, before focusing on the debate around the concept of (de)securitisation. After critically engaging with the limitations of the concept, the concept of (de)securitisation will be applied to the concept of energy security.

In accordance with the conceptual framework, research questions and methodology, four levels of analysis are used to structure the subsequent empirical chapters. This structure will be similar to what Godzimirski (2008) called a matryoshka-like structure. Instead of progressing from the bigger to the smaller picture, however, this study starts from the smaller picture and extends to the bigger, similar to the method used by Buzan and Wæver (2003). This structure helps to avoid repetition, ensures consistency and retains flexibility. Hence the structure of the empirical chapters will centre on the domestic, bilateral, regional, and the interregional and global levels.
The second chapter of this thesis, therefore, focuses on the domestic level, scrutinising the domestic dynamics of energy in Russia and Turkey and other regional countries and how these can cause change; as well as how each country perceives energy, as a political, economic or security issue, and how this changes their political approaches. This chapter also gives an overall picture of the domestic (energy) situation in each country. I argue that energy has a strong impact on the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries (political and military sectors); the integrity and stability of their political systems (political sector); and the economic development and prosperity of both countries (economic sector).

Chapter 3 outlines bilateral relations among regional countries as well as Russian-Turkish (energy) relations. In this regard, rather than classify bilateral relations among all regional countries, it focuses on the relationship, indicating examples of securitisation, normal political relations and desecuritisation. In this sense, while Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian relations are examples of securitisation, the relationships between Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey are given as examples of normal relations. Regarding desecuritisation, Russian-Turkish relations are given as an example. After analysing the developing nature of bilateral relations in the social, economic and political sectors, in order to conceptualise desecuritisation, bilateral energy projects such as Blue Stream, South Stream, the Akkuyu Nuclear Plant and Turkish Stream are analysed. Desecuritisation of energy has led to a change in perceptions, reflecting on the articulation of the relationship between the two countries. For Russia, Turkey has become a partner, replacing Ukraine and Georgia’s role as a transit route, and Russia has become a reliable partner for Turkey.

Chapter 4 focuses on the dynamics of energy in the BSR. In this sense, the problems/potential of regionalisation of the BSR and the role of energy in this context are elaborated. Regarding Russian-Turkish relations, it is argued that the involvement of regional actors in the energy game has revealed the possibility of energy becoming a risk to Russian-Turkish convergence. In other words, bilateral relations affect and is affected by energy developments in the BSR. The Azerbaijan-backed TANAP pipeline project is analysed here.

Chapter 5 is about the role of the EU and the USA’s energy policies in bilateral relations. The EU is considered an interregional actor, and the USA is a global actor.
The impact of non-regional actors on bilateral relations is analysed. It is argued that securitisation is seen more clearly in these levels. BTC, BTE, Blue Stream, Nabucco, South Stream, Turkish Stream and TAP are analysed here.

In the concluding chapter, the argument of the thesis is briefly summarised on the basis of the research aim and research questions. It is concluded that energy has a strong effect on Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, and that it paves the way for patterns of conflict and cooperation. The originality of the thesis is restated here. Although all levels of analysis are closely connected to each other, as per the above-indicated structure of the thesis, they are analysed separately; this concluding chapter brings them together, by revisiting the pipeline projects chronologically. It concludes with issues that it was not possible to sufficiently consider within the thesis, which are suggested as topics of future research.
CHAPTER 1

1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

It has been argued that, while Russian-Turkish relations have evolved in remarkable ways, there has been relatively little attempt by scholars to explain the changing nature of this relationship. In order to fill this gap in the literature and to effectively evaluate research in the area, a conceptual framework is needed. This chapter aims to provide such a framework, as well as to consider the theoretical underpinnings of the concepts that inform that framework, and to review the strengths and weaknesses of the current literature. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the aim of this thesis is not a strict application of the theory to an empirical study, nor is it a test of the theory. Instead, the thesis draws inspiration from theoretical work to establish a conceptual framework for understanding Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR.

The emergence of new threats to security cannot be addressed by the traditional narrow interpretation of security which focuses on the state and its defence from external military attacks, and therefore a wider approach is required in terms of political, economic and security changes. This has led to the adoption and evaluation of a variety of theoretical approaches in the field. Some of them have come up with new theoretical insights, while others (re)evaluate current ones. The Copenhagen School, in this regard, is one of the most important approaches, having developed a substantial body of concepts which allow us to rethink security. The School concentrates on the way that security is studied. In this regard, it focuses on a wider range of sectors in defining security, embracing the political, economic, environmental and social as well as the military aspect. It also broadened the research agenda by highlighting the importance of regions, and claiming that the regional level is as important as the state and global levels in analysis, via conceptual tools that have provided new frameworks for analysis.

Since the aim of this thesis is to understand bilateral patterns, specifically in a regional context, it is appropriate first to review the literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR, focusing on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations, their bilateral relations in the BSR, the region itself and the role of energy in the region. After
illustrating the requirement for a conceptual framework, this chapter continues with a
discussion of the IR debate on regionalism, focusing on the insights of Regional
Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The chapter then examines the potential and
limitations of the concept of (de)securitisation and considers its usefulness in relation to
energy security. On this basis, the chapter concludes by outlining the conceptual
framework which structures the rest of the thesis.

1.2 Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR

Since they have been interacting with each other for centuries, the literature on Russian-
Turkish relations can be divided into four parts: the Imperial period, the interregnum
period, the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period. In the first three periods, the
literature tells of mistrust and the often competitive and conflictual nature of the
relationship. The arguments are predominantly historical (Kelkitli, 2017). For Turkish
scholars, Russia’s imperialist and expansionist policies in the BSR, and their demands
for joint control of the Turkish Straits and the incorporation of several Turkish cities –
Kars and Ardahan – to its territory were significant security concerns (Inalcık, 1999;
Ortaylı, 1999); while Russian scholars accused Turkey of being an ally to the USA and
so blamed Ankara for deteriorating relations (Gasratyan, 1965; Ignatyev, 1999).

However, the end of the Cold War started to transform not only the relationship
between the countries but also the perceptions of scholars regarding this relationship.
Non-history-oriented literature found itself an audience, analysing the nature of the
relationship. There is now a limited amount of academic literature on contemporary
issues in Russian-Turkish relations, with attempts at analysis from an IR perspective.
While (neo)realist approaches still focus on the legacy of a conflictual history, threat
perceptions and geopolitical rivalry, the liberal approach, rather than using competitive
or conflictual phrases in describing bilateral relations, puts more emphasis on the
advantages of convergence and policy areas which lead to dramatic decrease in the
threat perceptions of both sides (Demiryol, 2015). In terms of constructivism, they
highlight mutual mistrust and the (re)identification of states themselves in accordance
with their historical background. This might be associated with the use of the phrase
‘greatness’ in foreign policy attitudes (Sakwa, 2010).
The mainstream argument proposes that bilateral relations are traditionally conflictual and that there has been a mutual lack of trust in relations, and scholars of this category argue from the perspective of the historical and security dimensions of relations (Trenin, 1997; Bazoğlu Sezer, 2000; Ediger and Bağdadi, 2010). The security and military aspects of relations are taken much more seriously in studies conducted during the Cold War, while post-Cold War literature explores the tensions between Russia and Turkey from a broader perspective, emphasising that the improvement of economic linkages has played a pioneering role in developing relations (Yanık, 2007). The common argument on post-Cold War bilateral relations is that cooperation and competition are often both apparent at the same time. Both Aktürk (2006) and Baran (2008) note that relations are a combination of cooperation and competition. Cooperation manifests itself in economic relations, while competition is more visible in geopolitical matters, such as in regard to Eurasia.

This complexity has caused doubts among scholars about the nature and future of the relationship. One group emphasises that current relations are at the level of ‘strategic partnership’ or are moving ‘towards strategic partnership’, whereas the second group points out that the nature of relations in progress are pragmatic and tactical, without any strategic depth. The first group consists mostly of politicians, experts and journalists from both countries and, according to them, Russian-Turkish relations are based on economic dynamics, a (re)identification of the other side and a desire to find a common ground that could enhance bilateral relations (Warhola and Mitchell, 2006; Hill and Taşpınar, 2006; Warhola and Bezci, 2013). According to Ivan (2012), Russia and Turkey appear to be willing to restart their relations and put the past behind them. Trenin (2013) argues that mutual relations are close to a security community, which means they are no longer influenced by historical hatreds, and rapprochement is on the solid basis of a mutual respect. Glebov (2009) and Özbay (2011) observe that Russia and Turkey develop beneficial mutual relations. They identify this approach as a strategy and claim that it plays a significant role in bilateral relations.

By contrast, the second group consists of scholars who perceive the idea of a strategic partnership with caution and thus do not view the ongoing cooperation as strategic. In their view, this is due to significant limiting factors, which they argue have been largely ignored or considered unimportant by the first group. Weitz (2010), for instance, maintains that when comparing the benefits to both sides, Russia has the advantage in
terms of economic relations, and this makes Turkey’s dependence on Russia considerably more important. Terterov et al. (2010) describe bilateral relations as being far more fluid than static. These can change from situation to situation and thus could possibly change from cooperation to rivalry, because both sides take different political stances towards crises in the world. For instance, while they agree on the protection of the Black Sea as their sphere of interest, they are competitive with respect to current conflicts. In addition, Torbakov (2007:3) clearly observes that even though both sides have close relations, it remains “a pretty precarious relation”, and notes that the relationship came under additional strain after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 (Torbakov, 2008). Aktürk (2014) argues for the impossibility of considering a Russian-Turkish axis, and Öniş and Yılmaz (2016) think the concept of a strategic partnership is an overstatement because of their divergent views in regional and global developments.

With regard to energy, there is no clear consensus in the academic literature as to how convergent or divergent Russian-Turkish interests are. Perspectives on the nature of energy relations between Russia and Turkey are divided into three different approaches. Scholars who think that energy relations are determined by competition (Aktürk, 2006; Kardaş, 2011-12) focus on the dual dynamics of both sides. They largely argue for divergent perspectives of Russia and Turkey. Roberts (2004, cited in Kardaş, 2011-12:91) points out that “with regard to Russia, Turkey is mainly, as far as transit is concerned, a competitor rather than conduit”. Bacıık (2006) maintains that even though Turkey has energy relations with Russia, it still perceives Russia as a threat. Energy here is seen as one of main drivers of a clash of interests between the two countries. This view sees the energy policies and attitudes of the countries as more security-oriented. These sorts of approaches concentrate on the mistrustful character of the two states, which has been shaped by their historical background.

Others focus on the fact that although Russia and Turkey have mistrusted each other, the relationship is now characterised as one of “overt friendship, subtle partnership” (Weitz, 2010:65). This makes the dynamics of bilateral relations highly complex in regards to economic concerns, and accommodates both the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship. Sidar and Winrow (2011:52-53) highlight the dual character of mutual relations, as for these authors energy relations “mirror on the one hand the strengthening of economic and political ties but on the other, reflect concerns that Ankara may lose its freedom of manoeuvre in its foreign policy because of
increasing dependence on Russia”. In this group energy is rather seen as a political-oriented issue. They find historical problems irrelevant in determining energy relations.

Scholars who have a more optimistic approach accentuate the degree of cooperation between Russia and Turkey. They totally ignore regional and bilateral problems and are positive about the relationship. According to Bourgeot (2013), Russia is keen to secure Turkey’s backing for its flagship South Stream pipeline, which could mitigate Turkey’s dependence on Russia in its negotiations. The role of energy in this context increases the positive atmosphere of bilateral relations due to the states’ interdependency and their pragmatism, helping the relationship to move from competition to cooperation. Energy here is seen as more economy-oriented.

Finally, apart from bilateral political and energy relations, it is necessary to review the literature on Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR. When compared with the above-indicated literature, the literature on bilateral relations in the region is not sufficient. Aybak (2010) emphasises a convergence of Russian-Turkish relations and the impact of this on the new geopolitical order in the BSR. Tanrısever (2012) concentrates on the impact of the relationship on the BSR, revealing the relationship’s converging and diverging points.

*The literature on the BSR*

The BSR, in fact, was not really analysed as a region until the end of the Cold War. The current literature on the BSR focuses, on the one hand, on specific challenging issues of the region, such as organised crime, illegal migration or frozen conflicts (Antonenko, 2009), democracy (Sherr, 2011), and trust (Saari, 2011), and on the other hand on particular actors’, such as the USA and the EU, policies towards the region (Hamilton and Mangott, 2008; Bozkurt, 2011).

Furthermore, a considerable number of scholars debate whether it is a region or not. Analysts have attempted to explain the BSR using a variety of concepts and definitions, but, as Tsantoulis (2012) argues, these definitions are rather ambivalent and somewhat catchy epithets, and tend to be Western-oriented, particularly the US-based ones, which are closely related to perceptions of the geopolitical position of the BSR. These vary from “frontiers of freedom” (Asmus and Jackson, 2004), “barrier and bridge” (Simon,
2006; Lesser, 2007), “buffer zone” (Maior and Matei, 2005), “hub” (Cornell et al., 2006), “major crossroads” (Rumer and Simon, 2010), an area that lies at the centre of a heartland (Mackinder cited in Aydın, 2004), and the frontier between the heartland and Spykman-type Rimlands (the Eurasian landmass; cited in Ciută, 2008).

The most common view is that the BSR is one of the most heterogeneous and complex areas in Eurasia due to its countries’ differences from each other in terms of their size, “level of political and economic development, military potential and geopolitical interest as well as in cultural, social, and religious traditions […] and in institutional affiliation with Europe and the Euro-Atlantic integrated structure” (Pavliuk, 2004:7). Thus, critiques of accepting the BSR as a region insist that it “is ‘a passive geographical area’, ‘an intellectually constructed region’, ‘a black hole’, ‘a side effect of European integration’” and that it is characterised as having a weak regional identity (Aydın, 2009; Ivan, 2012:3). The only agreement is about the complexity of the issues entailed in accepting the BSR as a region.

The role of energy in the BSR is also researched by scholars, albeit indirectly, insofar as the underlying concern in such literature is dominated by the energy security of non-regional actors. In the context of this issue the main argument is that the security of the region is the primary aim of European energy customers (Bahgat, 2006; Youngs, 2009). Hence, in the current literature, there is a tendency to associate European energy security with a secure BSR (Roberts, 2006). Indeed, Gültekin-Punsmann (2008) defines the region as a potential contributor to European energy security. There is also the USA’s interest in the region (Larrabee, 2009).

There are some sources which discuss the particular concerns of countries in the region regarding energy, Maltby (2015) studies Bulgaria in terms of its dependency on Russia, focusing on interdependency and amity and enmity. Chifu et al. (2010) analyse the energy strategies of BSR countries in detail. Flikke et al. (2011) in their edited report critically analyses the shifting geopolitics of the BSR, taking into account the main actors, drivers and potential problems. However, although the overall security concerns of regional countries need to be taken into account as well, but the literature does not focus on this aspect in any depth.
Limitations of the literature

After giving a general overview of the literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR and the region itself, the following paragraphs concentrate on the gap in the literature and the way that this thesis fills it.

As can be seen from the literature regarding Russian-Turkish (energy) relations, realist and liberal aspects certainly clarify changes in the patterns of conflict and cooperation, and the driving forces behind changes in the nature of bilateral relations. However, the existing literature lacks an underlying conceptual framework to make sense of the BSR and Russian-Turkish relations within it. This is because scholars tend to use more descriptive and interpretative methods, and these, problematically, put the analysis in a broader context; it can be, on the one hand, about cultural or social interaction, or on the other about security perspectives towards each other. However, the articulation of such issues is deficient in structure. Scholars have often interpreted contemporary issues by providing historical narratives, such as referring to an enemy or a threat, or indulging in generalisations that lack a strategic overview. For instance, Ediger and Bağdadi (2010) analyse bilateral energy relations and claim that it is the same old story, comparing the modern relationship with the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. However, it can be claimed that the current conjuncture is different from the past and although these kinds of generalisations might pave the way for a new area of study, they fail to address the dynamics shaping the current relationship. Thus, new approaches need to be taken.

However, the literature on Russian-Turkish relations fails to offer different approaches. For instance, there are studies on Russia and Turkey which adopt securitisation as a framework, while no study on relations between them applies the concept. Applications of (de)securitisation to Russia concentrate on secessionist activities in the post-Cold War period, for example in the studies by Snetkov (2012; 2015; 2017). The author concentrates on the (de)securitisation process of Russia’s insurgent threats since 2000, with particular focus on Chechnya at the local level, the North Caucasus at the sub-federal level and Russia at the national level. The author chronologically illustrates the transformation of Russian discourse on issues in related areas. Åtland (2008), giving an example of the desecuritisation process in the Arctic during the Gorbachev era, explores
the dynamics of how an issue can turn from a security issue to non-security issue. Sjostedt (2008) links Russian identity building with the securitisation of HIV/AIDS.

Regarding Turkey, the literature on the application of securitisation concentrates on domestic political thought in the country, regarding issues such as secularism and the rise of Islam (Oğuzlu, 2007; Bilgin, 2008). Scholars have illustrated the revival of Islam as an existential threat to Kemalist secularism, and how it has been securitised by political elites. A considerable amount of research has been conducted on Turkish-Syrian relations using securitisation theory (Aras and Polat, 2008; Çakmak, 2016). In their works these authors successfully demonstrate the change in discourse between the two countries. Turkish-EU relations are also often studied by scholars, with a particular concentration on Turkey’s accession process and democratisation (Macmillan, 2013). The literature has a particular concern with nationalism and how the related sides securitise each other due to their differences. Finally, the Kurdish issue has an important place in securitisation studies in Turkey (Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2013; Weiss, 2016). The literature often sees Kurds as a minority and particularly focuses on the societal sector of the concept of (de)securitisation, e.g. issues such as identity.

Regarding the BSR, the literature fails to give a clear picture of whether it is a region or not. In accordance with observations above, it can be seen that even though most scholars have some reservations about accepting the BSR as a regional entity, they are open to the possibility of the area as a region, but that this regionalism is not a classical type of regional notion, and is rather a sui generis type of regionalism (Aydın, 2009; Manoli, 2012).

The existing literature of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations both in general and in the context of the BSR in particular has made a number of contributions regarding our understanding of the current nature of the bilateral relationship. Their fundamental contribution, has been to examine different aspects of the relationship on the basis of conventional IR theories, realism and liberalism in particular. The insights from this literature has helped me to identify issues, actors, and potential sources in my own research.

As can be seen in the review of the literature, these different theoretical approaches inform two perspective on the nature of the bilateral relations: liberal accounts see the relationship as cooperative whereas realists regard it as conflictual. However, there is a
risk in the existing literature of oversimplifying the nature of bilateral (energy) relations in the BSR by failing to analyse the process that has brought two countries to their existing relationship.

Given the limitations of the existing literature, it can be stated that, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changing trajectory of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR, it is necessary to analyse the process that lead historically conflictual countries to current partnership. Without such understanding, the analysis of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR would be inaccurate and simplified. Moreover, one needs to take into consideration the interaction between all sides rather than analysing them separately. Thus, the research questions in this thesis address not only bilateral relations but also other regional and non-regional actors and dimensions which affect and are affected by the relationship. With this in mind, my main question takes into account not only the specifics of the bilateral energy relationship but also the role of other countries of the region (the last subquestion takes into account non-regional actors).

Furthermore, the review of the literature indicates that in order to analyse the process leading the two countries to the current nature of the relationship, it is necessary to take a broader approach embracing political, economic and security dimensions, informed by concepts drawn from particular IR theories. Thus, my subquestion regarding the securitisation of energy in the relationship provides a new perspective on the analysis by drawing upon the concept of (de)securitisation and offering multilevel framework for analysis.

**Filling the gap in the literature**

Taking into account the review of the literature above, a gap in current research on bilateral relations is evident, in particular the absence of a conceptual framework. Such a framework would need to take into account the process that leads countries into either conflict or cooperation. The research concern of this thesis is the transformation from conflict to cooperation. In this regard, it is necessary to conceptualise the way that an issue transforms from being a security threat to a normal political issue.
In terms of constructing such a framework, since this research is concerned with a specific area, it is necessary to understand the concept of regionalism. On the basis of this broader debate the chapter then focuses on an approach that concentrates on security dynamics: Regional Security Complex Theory.

The conceptualisation of security, however, has its own problems. This is because the requirement of scrutinising non-military issues as security threats has increased. This leads to the necessity of analysing the concept of (de)securitisation in order to broaden its definition of security. The concept helps me understand how and when a specific matter becomes (de)securitised. In addition, its concern with analysing the process helps me to comprehend whether a threat is ‘real’ or not, or whether an issue is a security issue or not. Finally, as there is a lack of empirical research, energy is used as a case study. On the basis of this framework, and in line with the research questions introduced in the previous chapter, this thesis aims to analyse the influence of energy in shaping actors’ political attitudes towards each other. In particular it examines states’s perception of energy whether as a security issue or a normal political case and explores the factors/reasons shaping those perceptions.

This thesis, therefore, utilises some concepts from RSCT, in particular, the concept of (de)securitisation. This conceptual framework is used to help analysis. The RSCT, overall, is invoked as a heuristic device – which is an abstract concept or model useful for thinking about social phenomena/the problem – to help interpret empirical materials. The concept of (de)securitisation is used both to present the process of changing relations and to understand the reasons for such changes. It takes into account actions/practices of countries which shape their attitude towards each other. It also draws upon a variety of resources ranging from primary to secondary materials such as policy documents, speeches, news and interviews. Thus it has both descriptive and explanatory value: for instance, while descriptive use of (de)securitisation makes use of speeches and pipeline projects in understanding the pattern of conflict and cooperation, the explanatory use of the concept provides understanding the reasons for changes in the relationship. Owing to these, this concept helps examine issues in particular ways. Thus, it is necessary to reiterate that the use of concepts from RSCT is primarily designed to inform my account of the changing relationship between Russia and Turkey in the BSR rather than to provide a theoretically-driven analysis.
1.3 The concept of regionalism

In conventional IR theories such as realism and globalism, regions are often ignored, and so before constructing a conceptual framework, one needs to understand what regionalism means. Since the end of the Second World War, there has been considerable interest in studying regionalism, regional cooperation and their connection with security in international politics.

There have been many attempts to contextualise the concept of regionalism, and these in turn have prompted further debate. Although the literature on regionalism has often attempted to define the term ‘region’, no agreed definition has been arrived at. One of the main characteristics of regionalism, as Soderbaum (2016) outlines, is that it is understood differently by different people in different contexts and time periods. In this regard, the current literature can be divided into two groups, with one group interested in geographical and common identity as the main determinants of regions, with these scholars often exhibiting a tendency to use descriptive methods that reflect the observers’ view of the world (Ciută, 2008). Others, on the other hand, rather understand regions by focusing on non-geographical and non-identity options. This is because, after the end of the Cold War, the international system changed to become more multipolar, and this change has served to enhance the importance of research into regional concerns (Ciută, 2008). The two sides of this divide have been labelled old regionalism and new regionalism: old regionalism was formed in the bipolar context of the Cold War, while new regionalism was formed in the subsequent multipolar world order and in a context of globalisation; old regionalism was created ‘from above’, while new regionalism was a more voluntary process emerging ‘from within’ regions; furthermore, the old was specific with regard to its objectives, while the new has resulted in a more comprehensive and multidimensional societal process; and whereas the old was interested in groups of neighbouring states, the new encompasses both state and non-state actors (see Hettne, 2003:23-24).

This diversification is easily seen in examples from the literature. Nye (1968, cited in Hajizada and Marziacq, 2013) defines a region as a group of countries located in the same geographically specific area that are linked by a degree of mutual interdependence as well as their geographical relationship. According to Deutsch (1957, cited in Maior and Matei, 2005:33-34) this brings with it “common history, shared strategic assets,
common concerns and challenges, and [...] a sense of community”. These ideas are related to the old regionalism conceptualisation. In new regionalism, however, as discussed by Hatto and Tomescu (2008), a region is seen as being not only based on geography but also as being related to politics, economics and culture. King (2008:5) supports Deutsch’s argument and argues that “regions involve a set of essential connections and interests that bind together peoples and polities”, but, contrary to old regionalism, King suggests that a common identity is not the *sine qua non* component of regions. Apart from these distinctions, the new concept of regionalism/regions is studied differently. Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) analyse the concept of the region by concentrating on regional organisations and regional economic frameworks, while Adler and Barnett (1998) focus on security communities, building on Deutsch’s work. The authors, in this manner, argue that “the community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition” (Adler and Barnett, 1998:3). Waltz (1987, cited in Maior and Matei, 2005:34) emphasises the reasons why states have a tendency to build a region, declaring that it has the “function of rising or declining hegemonies or as a localism-oriented gathering against the pressure of globalisation”. Finally, as stated below, regionalism is studied via the lens of security.

In accordance with these arguments, it can be claimed that new regionalism is not primarily about states, but has focused more on types of intra-regional relations, such as economics, the environment, technology or communication (Hurrell, 2005; Makarychev, 2008; Ivan, 2012). This new concept has encouraged a range of interdisciplinary research, stretching from an interest in classical sharing of common territory or identity space, to economic cooperation and security interactions (Manoli, 2012). This framework justifies the definition of regionalism as a blanket term, as Hurrell (2005) notes, since it includes a wide range of research areas.

The review of the literature on the concept of regionalism illustrates the potential of considering the Black Sea as a region by identifying a number of characteristics which allows us to designate the area as a region. However, the absence of existing research taking such an approach reveals a significant gap in the literature which my thesis helps to fill.
How does this concept inform my analysis of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR? Although not explicitly addressed in the research questions, the extent to which the BSR can be considered a region is an important contextual element of the analysis and central to the RSCT approach. Therefore in assessing whether the BSR constitutes a region insights from the new regionalism debate to make this assessment. In this respect the concept is used primarily to help structure and focus the argument of the thesis though to some extent the concept also helps to explain the extent to which the BSR can be considered a region drawing on some of the criteria presented in the literature.

As one of salient elements in the analysis, developments in the BSR – such as some states’ perception of threat would have come from Russia while choosing Turkey as an alternative to Russia – are one of factors shaping the changing pattern of conflict and cooperation between Russia and Turkey. Thus, the use of insights from the literature on the concept of regionalism, and applying them to the BSR, highlights the role of the region in shaping and developing pattern of conflict and cooperation in bilateral relations.

1.4 The concept of a regional security complex

The growth of interest in regionalism has been driven in part by the changing security context in international politics (Kelly, 2007). In this manner the end of the Cold War not only diminished the bipolar international system but also, as most scholars argue, led to the necessity of deepening and broadening the security studies agenda (Baldwin, 1997). Apart from military-based security issues, with this new agenda, non-military issues such as women’s studies, environmental issues and economic instabilities have become research areas for scholars. Analysing these broad security issues brought the requirement of considering a wide geographic area (Kelly, 2007). It is thus possible to claim that emerging security issues in the post-Cold War era support the study of regions in a political context.

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) developed by Buzan and Wæver serves the aim of linking security with a regional context, inspiring many subsequent studies of regions. Barry Buzan is one of the most important names focusing on regions, and his approach differs from his counterparts by specifically concentrating on security,
coining the concept of “regional security complexes” as a research area. In collaboration with Ole Wæver, Buzan reshaped the theoretical understanding of security to allow it to deal analytically with the new geopolitical realities after the end of the Cold War. Wæver and Buzan stated that they were motivated to study regions because the international system was taking on a more regionalised character, due to the collapse of the bipolar system which removed the principal organising force of the global level (Buzan et al., 1998). From this perspective, they aimed to facilitate comparative studies across regions to fill the academic gaps in the understanding of regions. Buzan’s (2012:22) definition of a region is:

a geographically clustered subsystem of states that is sufficiently distinctive in terms of its internal structure and process to be meaningfully differentiated from a wider international system or society of which it is part. Region is a level of analysis located between the international system (global) level, and the unit (state) level.

In accordance with this understanding, Buzan argues that regions are as important as global actors and states.

RSCT uses a blend of materialist and constructivist approaches, making the theory more applicable to developments in the post-Cold War era (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:4). In terms of its materialist approach, it develops the neorealist ideas of bounded territory and distribution of power. RSCT, indeed, is complementary to the neorealist perspective on system structure. The main difference from neorealism is that instead of putting the emphasis on the global and pure state levels, its main area of concern is the regional level. On the constructivist side, the theory builds on securitisation, which focuses on the political processes by which security issues are constituted, and also patterns of amity and enmity. Due to these constructivist aspects, the theory adds more variables and value to the understanding of neorealism. From a constructivist perspective, meanwhile, the authors intend to keep the concept of security more coherent. Through new security sectors – economic, environmental and societal – in addition to the military and political sectors, RSCT allows for a deeper analysis.

RSCT was first proposed by Buzan in 1983 in the first edition of his book *People, States and Fear*. The original definition of a security complex was “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1983:106). This formulation related to “the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead
to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity” (Buzan et al., 1998:11-12). Following this classic definition, Buzan and Wæver later reformulated it as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:44). Adamides and Christou (2015:179) note that in this new definition “states were substituted with ‘units’ [...] and the focus shifted to the interdependence of securitisation processes rather than security interests”.

The essential structure of the theory embodies four variables for analysis in empirical studies:

- **boundary**, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours;
- **anarchic structure**, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units;
- **polarity**, which covers the distribution of power among the units;
- **social construction**, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:53)

They also stress that a major shift in any of these essential structural components would normally require a redefinition of the complex (Buzan et al., 1998).

The concept of security in regional analysis has become a significant research concern for other scholars as well. Lake and Morgan (1997), for instance, are amongst those who derive their theoretical insight from Buzan (1983) and apply it to regions. Lake and Morgan (1997), however, study patterns of security orders instead of security management. According to these authors, regions have become salient features of world politics after the end of the Cold War and this has opened new possibilities for competition, though mostly for cooperation. Lake and Morgan’s (1997) problem is to mix levels in one unit frame, making it impossible to draw analytical distinctions between regional and non-regional actors. In this context, the original contribution of Buzan and Wæver to the field is to divide the main concerns of regional security issues, analysing them over different levels.

Buzan and Wæver (2003) use a multilevel analysis in their research, which emphasises the domestic and regional levels, in addition to the interregional and global levels. By these levels, the authors mean objects for analysis that are defined by a range of spatial scales from small to large (Buzan et al., 1998). In their descriptive application, the four levels are:
Domestically, in the states of the region, particularly their domestically generated vulnerabilities (is the state strong or weak due to stability of the domestic order and correspondence between state and nation). The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has (and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if they have no hostile intention); state-to-state relations (which generate the region as such); the region’s interaction with neighbouring regions [...]; and the role of global power in the region (the interplay between the global and regional security structures). (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:51)

These four levels constitute the security constellations, which refers to groups of countries that share the same concerns. By incorporating the interregional and global levels, the theory is able to grasp complex contexts involving multiple actors. In order to understand the overall picture, Buzan (2003) clarifies that one needs to understand the levels independently, as well as the interaction between them.

Defining the level of analysis became a significant IR topic particularly after Waltz’s *Man, the State and War* (1959). In this text, the author posits three ‘images’ as independent variables to explain state behaviour as the dependent variable – in his case the decision of a state to go to war – which are individual, state-itself and international systems (Waltz, 1959 cited in Temby, 2015:723). Since this publication, there has been much discussion of levels of analysis, concentrating on how the structure brings overlapping and mutually constitutive phenomena and arbitrary separation into specific levels or into the actors/systems that the term includes (Singer, 1961; Hollis and Smith, 1990; Wendt, 1999). Hollis and Smith (1990) conceptualise levels of analysis as “hierarchical groups of aggression whose behaviour are independent variables for the level below, and dependent variables for the level above” (cited in Temby, 2015:726). In this manner they posit two levels – unit actors and their system of interaction. Yurdusev (1993) makes distinctions between level of analysis and unit of analysis. In this context, while studying framework and context leads one to levels of analysis, studying entities and actors leads to units of analysis. Buzan et al. (1993 cited in Onuf, 1995) identify two tiers – deep structure and distributional structure – in both the structural level of analysis and the unit level of analysis. The authors then insert the interaction level of analysis between the two levels (units + interaction + structural). Wendt (1999) bases his conceptualisation on what he terms micro and macro-levels of structure, and according to the author every structure has these levels. Micro-levels are called the ‘interaction’ levels and macro-levels are called the ‘systemic’ levels.

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2 However, in 1979, Waltz re-entered the debate and decreased the terms to two levels, unit and system.
As can clearly be seen from the above, there are a variety of definitions and concepts which aim to clarify the same concept. In the current understanding, because of the complexity of world politics, however, any analysis needs to consider more than two levels. This is because more levels help to clearly conceptualise and to provide a holistic approach and finally to identify causal factors in international politics. Therefore, only focusing on two levels, as Singer (1961) suggests, would certainly limit conceptualisations. For instance, at the state level, every state puts itself at the centre of the analysis, while the global level, in any holistic sense, is far from reality because it can be applied specifically only to superpowers. Since levels/dynamics, as Buzan and Wæver (2003) put forward, are relational, four levels of analysis provides both methodological and structural opportunities. The regional level provides a bridge between units and the global level. It will be considered as a place where extremes of unit/national and global dynamics interplay. The concept also points to a deepening of security along the axis of referent objects.

The RSCT approach offers considerable insights by focusing on regions and arguing that they are as important as states and global actors and by doing so from a security perspective.

How does this concept inform my analysis of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR? Overall, RSCT provides some of the concepts, such as the multilevel of analysis, and the concept of (de)securitisation, which provide the analytical framework for this thesis. By conceptualising security as a multilevel issue, it offers a way of presenting the contexts within which the Russian-Turkish (energy) relationship has developed. It takes as its focus the (de)securitisation process rather than security interest. On this basis, the concept helps to explain the reasons leading countries to cooperate or conflict rather than describe their interests. The analysis of the (de)securitisation process helps to answer the question of the effect of energy in the bilateral relations as well as the region as a whole. This is because in order to see the results of the effect of energy, one needs to bear in mind that it is a long process and that an examination of it requires detailed analysis. This is particularly the case when addressing whether energy is perceived as a security threat or a commercial transaction. Moreover, the multilevel aspect of RSCT has been adapted to organise the analysis of the different dimensions of the Russian-Turkish (energy) relationship and the interaction between them. With this
structure, the role of other actors in the establishment of pattern of conflict and cooperation in bilateral relations can be identified.

1.5 The concept of (de)securitisation

The concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation, as stated in the main definition of RSCT, constitute one of the main elements of the theory, and are central to the work of the Copenhagen School itself. With the concept of securitisation, Buzan et al. (1998) aimed to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies which questions the idea of the primacy of the military element and the state understanding of security. In doing so, the authors compare the costs and benefits of security and provide a classification of issues that might be accepted as security issues or not; finally, they put the security issue into its relevant context. This is because, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the traditional understanding of security, referring to military and nuclear obsessions, has increasingly come to share importance with non-military elements such as terrorism, illegal activities, environmental and societal problems, and economic instability. Academia, therefore, has sought to widen its conceptualisation of security threats (Ullman, 1983; Buzan, 1983; Baldwin, 1997). In the context of this development, Buzan et al. (1998) aimed to find common ground for both wideners and traditionalists through their methods. In this regard, they wanted to build a more radical view of security studies “by exploring threats to referent objects, and the securitisation of those threats, that are non-military as well as military” (Buzan et al., 1998:4). The main argument behind these concepts is that security is not given but is instead constructed, and also that it is about survival (Buzan et al., 1998; Anthony et al., 2006).

The authors apply their analysis to five sectors, political, economic, military, environmental and societal. The security-survival logic is maintained as well as extended beyond military security to other sectors (Emmers, 2010). These sectors are for identification of specific types of interaction. In this view,

3 Since it applies RSCT, this thesis will use four levels of analysis and securitisation as inspiration for research; accepting the fact that the concept of (de)securitisation was proposed before RSCT, I prefer to structure this chapter in this way, as following the definition of RSCT.

4 It founded in 1985 at Copenhagen University under the name of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Since that time, the School has conducted much research, but is specifically known for securitisation, societal security and RSCT (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Bill McSweeney (1999) is generally credited with coining the label ‘Copenhagen School’.
the military sector is about the relationship of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. (Buzan et al., 1998:7)

Buzan et al. (see 1998:8) exemplify issues in each sector that might cause a security threat. In this regard it is possible to claim that every issue has the potential to become a security issue, but the authors argue that this has to be done via utterances by a securitising actor. If an issue is not expressed as a threat, it is not recognised as a threat needing to be securitised (Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2011).

Securitisation refers to

the discursive process through which an *intersubjective* understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:491, emphasis added)

The concept of intersubjectivity is central to securitisation theory. The main element of this approach is to seek to understand how security works in global politics, and it has done this by focusing on the above-mentioned five sectors. The concept also seeks to find an answer to the question ‘security for whom?’, and its reply is based on the concept of securitising actors who securitise issues by declaring referent objects, which are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survive, in order to persuade their audience, particularly the public (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). As can clearly be seen, the actor’s defined notion of threat is at the centre of the theory. In this manner, the authors attempt to define the boundaries of security. Security concerns only occur when political elites think there is an existential threat which necessitates the taking of exceptional measures. Moreover, the acceptance of the audience legitimises the elite’s act. Thus the audience is the *sine qua non* element of the theory. This is because “the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998:25). Thus, its difference from similar theories or concepts is to put more value on the audience.

The process of securitisation is called a “speech act” by Wæver:

What then *is* security? With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done […]. By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific
Here Wæver derives his theoretical approach from Austin (1962), who “proposes that many utterances are equivalent to actions; when we say certain words or phrases we also perform a particular action” (cited in Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:77, emphasis in original). Buzan et al. (1998), in this case, claim that the securitising actor rather prefers not to use the term security, but instead to utter threats to survival and exceptional measures. In order to do that states need to identify an enemy and a referent object to securitise. Regarding the context of the speech act in securitisation theory, it is rather inspired by the approaches of Arendt in the political context, who insists that “politics is productive, irreducible and happens among people as an unpredictable chain of action”, and Schmitt in a security context, who defines security in terms of exception, emergency and a decision (Wæver, 2011:470, emphasis in original).

While the process of threat construction is called securitisation, the other end of the process is called desecuritisation, which refers to

a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat. (Buzan and Wæver 2003:489)

Since it is in the opposite direction to securitisation, the same components of securitisation – securitising actor, speech act, audience, facilitating conditions – are also valid for the desecuritisation process (Coşkun, 2008). There are three possible illustrations of how to desecuritise an issue: the first simply refers to not talking about issues in terms of security; second, even though an issue was adopted as a security threat, “to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals”; and the last is to move security issues back to normal politics (Wæver, 2000 cited in Roe, 2004:284; Coşkun, 2008). Hansen (2012) argues that this facilitates a less violent and more political form of engagement.

Because security has a close relationship with politics, according to Buzan et al. (1998) securitisation is the extreme version of politicisation:

Security ‘frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ and a spectrum can therefore be defined ranging public issues from the non-politicised (the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision), through politicised (the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of
communal governance) to securitisation (in which case an issue is no longer debated as a political question, but dealt with at an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules). (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:214 emphasis in original)

The spectrum would be:

Non-politicised  Politicised  Securitised  Desecuritised

This categorisation depends on how the state perceives the threat or labels a case as a threat. This claim means that “security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 1998:24). Thus, these approaches on the one hand enrich the concept while on the other hand put it into the theoretical discussion.

1.6 Limitations of the concept of (de)securitisation

Williams (2003:511) points out that the theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School “provides one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies”. Although the author only specifies securitisation, this comment can be extended to other theoretical contributions of the Copenhagen School as well. Taking into account this point, a critical engagement with certain aspects of securitisation is needed, in order to draw a conceptual framework. This study aims to contribute to the understanding of speech acts and desecuritisation, and aims to make the concept more systematic and clearer.

Ciută (2009:302-3)\(^5\) notes that problems emerge in the concept of (de)securitisation in three ways: conceptual (structural issues particularly related to speech acts); epistemological (how securitisation reads empirical contexts); and normative (related to the shift from practices of theorising securitisation into practices of securitisation).

\(^5\) In light of these critiques, Snetkov (2017:261) summarises how a second-generation research agenda emerged among contextual securitisation scholars, concerned with combining the formal aspects of securitisation’s emphasis on examining the interrelationship between security politics and operating contexts. The aim of this agenda is to construct a more comprehensive understanding of underlying processes by concentrating on the socio-linguistic and/or socio-political micro-dynamics of threats (e.g. Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008).
Taking into account these criticisms, I argue that, first, there is a problem in making a distinction between terms. Most of the terms have a vague context and so it is difficult to produce clear definitions. For instance, as a criticism of the above-indicated spectrum, Emmers (2010) points out that because there are no clear distinctions between the security and political realms, the model does not sufficiently dissociate an act of securitisation from a case of politicisation. Therefore, the specific situation in which countries securitise or politicise issues can cause confusion. In this situation readers have to rely on their own judgements (Lemke, 2005). I argue that in order to define an issue as politicisation, it should be a part of states’ ordinary activities or normal relations, that Williams (2003) describes as the day-to-day workings of politics, while desecuritisation is the shift toward politicisation from a condition of securitisation.

The second problem is the inability to identify what Hansen (2000) calls ‘the silent security dilemma’, which occurs when the potential subject of (in)security has no, or limited possibility of speaking out about its security problems. Methodologically, “there is a certain ambiguity in securitisation theory, as it argues that the utterance of the word ‘security’ is not the decisive criterion and that a securitisation might consist of ‘only a metaphorical security reference’” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:216). However, there are serious concerns on this issue and the concept of securitisation itself cannot solve this problem. This is because, in order to identify an issue as a security threat, it needs to be expressed as such, but in some cases the real victims cannot explicitly express that an issue is a threat. Hansen (2000) uses the example of Muslim women who are victims of rape. In these cases, although an obvious security problem exists, because it is not expressed by the political elite, the issue is not accepted as a referent object.

This criticism is associated with the theory’s strong emphasis on speech acts, which is another element of the concept that is usually criticised. For instance, McDonald (2008) notices some limits to the conceptual framework of securitisation by arguing its definition of securitisation is narrowly conceived. The author particularly focuses on three senses:

first, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors. Second, the context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats. (McDonald, 2008:563 emphasis in original)
As can be seen from this quotation, researchers have criticised the Copenhagen School for not elaborating in any detail how securitisation relates to speech acts. Balzacq (2005) points out that the speech act view of security fails to examine security practices in real cases, and so the author argues that securitisation can be understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice. Stritzel (2007) claims this terminology is too vague and under-theorised.

It is important not to reduce the concept of a speech act to simply a linguistic act. Only depending on saying the word (Buzan et al., 1998:26) or focusing on speech acts in an understanding of securitisation or desecuritisation is flawed, because in some cases elites might prefer to securitise an issue as an existential threat on the basis of actions/practices rather than uttering it. Thus, apart from utterance, following Bigo (2000) who focuses on practices and Balzacq (2008) who focuses on empirical referents of policy (meaning policy tools or instruments rather than speeches), for an analysis of the concept of (de)securitisation, actions/practices are here taken into account. Actions/practices in this context represent policies, projects or behaviours of states. It does not need to be explicitly uttered but through actions one can understand that a specific issue is a referent object.

The third significant criticism is of the concept of desecuritisation. Critics base their opinions on the requirement for examples of the concept and the need for more attention to be paid to it. Since great attention has been paid to the concept of securitisation, desecuritisation within this condition appears, as Aradau (2004) discusses, under-theorised. The concept is simply defined as a move back to normal politics and ceasing to express an issue as an existential threat, but Roe (2004:285) points out that this situation can be described as non-securitisation, “where there is simply no security to begin with”. Thus, as Coşkun (2008) argues, this triggers a different interpretation of the concept. The consensus that scholars have reached is that desecuritising moves have come to be considered as the product of a wider management process, rather than a singular speech act or debate (Roe, 2004; Jutila, 2006).

This discussion leads one to comment that the concept needs empirical examples, via which one can investigate the nature and the evolution of desecuritisation discourses and processes. Hansen (2012), in this manner, scrutinises the meaning of desecuritising an issue and examines the possible picture of a desecuritised issue. The author’s aim is
to observe how formerly securitised issues can be moved to the public sphere of everyday politics (Akgül-Açıkmese, 2013). The author, in this regard, focuses particularly on an empirical orientation and outlines four main readings of what constitutes a desecuritisation, from previous research, which are as follows:

*Change through stabilisation* is when an issue is cast in terms other than security, but where the larger conflict still looms; *replacement* is when an issue is removed from the securitised, while another securitisation takes its place; *rearticulation* is when an issue is moved from the securitised to the politicised due to a resolution of the threats and dangers, that underpinned the original securitisation; and *silencing* is when desecuritisation takes the form of a depoliticisation, which marginalises potentially insecure subjects. (Hansen, 2012:529 emphasis in original).

An examples of the first reading is Wæver (2000); the second Roe (2004) and Aras and Polat (2008); the third Åtland (2008); and the last MacKenzie (2009); or a study can be an example of more than one of these categories, as in Akgül-Açıkmese (2013) and Snetkov (2017). Agreeing with Snetkov (2017), I focus on rearticulation and replacement in my focus on desecuritisation in Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. I will argue that even though bilateral relations alternate between these two aspects, rearticulation steps to the fore in bilateral relations.

The literature review of the concept of (de)securitisation indicates that it is still a work in progress. Its particular strengths in focusing on the process of transformation and analysing the factors behind the choice of an issue as a security or a normal political issue are applied in this thesis. Given that the concept has not been deployed in research on the Russian-Turkish relationship, my use of the concept in the thesis provides a contribution to the literature both securitisation and relations between two countries.

The fundamental objective of this study is to understand the process of the transformation of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. Thus, how this concept inform my analysis? The concept of (de)securitisation, as part of RSCT framework, is central to understanding how and why an issue becomes (or ceases to be) a security threat. The concept is used to inform the empirical analysis to provide both an account and an explanation of relations between Russia and Turkey on the one hand and between them and other countries in the region. As an account, it is applied to both the overall relationships and to the specifics of energy relations at all levels of analysis. As an explanation, it informs the analysis of why, perhaps surprisingly, relations between Russia and Turkey have developed along a desecuritising trajectory. As such it informs...
the thesis’ response to both the main and the subsidiary research questions, not least given its focus on energy.

It would be wrong to suggest that the concept is without problems. For instance, the operationalisation of the concept of (de)securitisation might be regarded as verging upon the tautologous (i.e. because an issue is perceived as a threat, it is securitised). While there is some validity to this argument if statements of securitisation are taken in isolation, it is important to remember that securitisation does not only embody the perception of threat but also the move towards addressing that threat whether through “extraordinary” actions or by attempts to limit the threat by normalising conditions.

1.7 The concept of the (de)securitisation of energy

As stated above, the concept of (de)securitisation has some limits, which are potentially improvable by combination with different aspects. According to Anthony et al. (2006) and Emmers (2010), the concept can be improved via empirical studies and refined in the light of their findings. This is because the Copenhagen School primarily focused on framing a theoretical approach to security studies, with insufficient use of empirical research. In the current study, energy is chosen as a case study. This is because states heavily depend on energy, not only in the economic sense but also in the societal sense, and they have a tendency to consider their energy supply and demand as having extreme importance. Hence, they want to ensure their supply and demand is secure. This is because the absence of resources causes an existential threat for the survival of the state. For instance, an unexpected incident in energy transportation or a refusal to supply a resource can seriously affect a state’s production and consumption, or cause a transformation in the relationship between supplier and customer. Energy is also extremely important for economic development. Thus, there is a high possibility that it will be taken out of the agenda of normal politics. Due to these features, energy can give a clear picture both about the concept of (de)securitisation and about Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR. Hence, one of the main contributions of this study is to conceptualise securitisation in such a manner that it can take into account the role of energy and energy policy and (re)evaluate it.
Before starting this section, there is one issue which needs clarification. Fundamentally, there are three different types of states in the global energy structure: energy resource producers, transit countries and customers/consumers, each with different political considerations and attitudes. As Umbach (2011:25) explains:

[while] consumer countries are primarily interested in security of supply, producer countries are more concentrated on security of demand from foreign markets. Transit countries are often equally interested in their own national security of supply and security of demand from neighbouring markets in order to benefit from stable and ever higher transit fees.

Security of energy supply and demand, and their role in national and foreign markets play important roles in terms of explaining states’ priorities. “Energy resources” in this case refer to oil and natural gas.

Furthermore, it is necessary to understand how the concept of energy has been studied. In the literature on energy a considerable amount of research has been dedicated to a wide range of issues, from politics to the economy and security, which makes energy a multidisciplinary field. For instance, the focus of current research is on market regulation, infrastructure construction, legal provisions, physical limits of energy production and alternatives to fossil fuels, which constitute the context of energy policy, while earlier research focused on dynamics triggered by the 1970s oil shock and developments thereafter (Ikenberry, 1986; Yergin, 2008). This illustrates that the scope of energy-based research has significantly changed. Moreover, energy policy covers a broad area of concern. Sovacool (2011) briefly concentrates on other energy systems, ranging from natural gas or nuclear energy and other types of vulnerabilities stemming from political, economic, technical and natural factors, while Bohi and Toman (2011) focus on the economic aspects of energy and Cherp et al. (2012) on resources and technologies. Dyer and Trombetta (2013) concentrate on energy in different aspects, such as human and environmental security, energy poverty and efficiency.

While energy policy is about more than energy security, the latter has been a predominant concern, particularly in the IR literature. Thus, it is necessary to clarify it. Essentially, the concept of energy security is often discussed in the context of security of supply, security of demand or environmental issues. Some works discuss geopolitical challenges and the economic cost of existing and future pipeline routes (Pamir, 2007;

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6 It needs to be borne in mind that these are stylised categories and that many countries are both producers and consumers albeit to varying degrees.
Tekin and Williams, 2011); others attempt to theorise relations between producers and customers (Kaveshnikov, 2010; Kirchner and Berk, 2010). These aspects derive their theoretical framework from two significant IR theories: Stoddard (2013) notices that some analyse causes of and solutions to energy (in)security issues from a realist/strategic perspective, while others do so via a liberal market-based approach.

The strategic/realist approach to energy security sees the international struggle for energy security as a zero-sum game (Raphael and Stokes, 2010), emphasising competition, national security, state survival and conflict (Klare, 2008). According to this approach, energy security is geopolitical, and scarce resources and increasing demand lead to competition. Furthermore, there is no possibility for cooperation in this approach. The market-based approach, however, emphasises integration, interdependence and the liberalisation of the global energy market (Raphael and Stokes, 2010), where energy security is not a zero-sum effort. However, this debate is too narrow to provide an analytical basis for understanding energy security. Indeed, Nyman (2014) argues that these approaches provide a state-centric perception of security, associating it with self-sufficiency. They cannot, therefore, be objectively identifiable; on the contrary they are contingent, and thus open to change.

The idea of energy security has not been clearly defined, due to these problems. As Luft and Korin (2009) and Chester (2010) argue, it is a multifaceted issue, and has different meanings for different countries, strongly affected by their geographical location, geological endowment, political system, global circumstances and economic situation. Energy security can be characterised according to “the sources of risk, the scope of impact and severity filters in the form of the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts” (Winzer, 2012:36; see also Sovacool, 2011). The Westminster Energy Forum (2006, cited in Ciută, 2010) defines energy security as an ‘umbrella term’, consisting of concerns linking energy, political power and economic growth. The most common definition of energy security is observed by Yergin (2006, cited in Heinrich, 2008:1539): “the objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardise major national values and objectives”. For the International Energy Agency (IEA), more narrowly, it means “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy” (2007:160, cited in Bradshaw, 2014:24). In light of these definitions, Radoman (2007:36-37) briefly summarises it to mean “access to sufficient energy supplies at reasonable prices
from a stable source as well as the actual, physical security of oil and gas pipelines”. All these definitions put an emphasis on three significant and strong adjectives – affordable, reliable and adequate – for defining the character of energy supply. The common feature of these phrases, according to Ciută (2010), is that energy is a vital element for states, societies and economies even though it receives little conceptual attention. The security perspectives of energy suppliers and customers are important elements of this case. Kirchner and Berk (2010:864) portray the security perceptions of energy suppliers and customers, saying that:

[energy customers consider energy security as] the availability of energy in various forms, in sufficient quantity and at affordable prices, delivered in an environmentally friendly, sustainable manner which is also free from serious risks of major disruption of service; [whereas for the energy suppliers, energy security] denotes a quest for a market for their energy exports which correlates to increased (government) revenues.

As can easily be seen from these definitions of energy security, these phrases pave the way for securitisation (Cherp et al., 2012) since they explicitly express that not protecting energy can cause a security issue. They provide evidence that energy has become a part of high politics. However, realism and liberalism explain energy relations between countries more simply. While realism focuses on competition, liberalism focuses on cooperation. It is argued by these approaches that states are acting naturally in order to ensure their survival, but they fail to explain the reasons behind states’ domestic and international activities.

Furthermore, energy security itself as a research topic is not sufficient to explain some issues, such as security for whom, security for which values and security from what threats (Baldwin, 1997; Cherp and Jewell, 2014). In other words, the attitudes of states when they determine their policies or in the way that they value energy, to some extent, are the missing link in the classical security concept of IR (Casier, 2011). A securitisation or desecuritisation approach can “show how a commercial acquisition bid moved from a non-politicised market based issue to an (inter)national security crisis”, or the other way around (Nyman, 2014:60). It shows how the threat is constructed. It can also demonstrate the possibility of broadening a security approach, taking into account different sectors (political, economic, military, societal and environmental), different levels (domestic, bilateral, (inter)regional and global) and different actors (states, companies, international institutions).
Even though it is not specifically researched by the Copenhagen School, particularly in regards to securitisation, the concept of energy can be scrutinised under different sectors. This is because, as Waever (2011) contends, securitisation can refer not only to who enacts securitisation and how or when it happens, but also what securitisation does. In other words, an analysis of securitising practices can reveal causal mechanisms and provide hypotheses as to why specific issues were securitised and what changes securitisation brought. As energy has become an important security issue for states, analysing the issue as a whole can provide a clear understanding for the reader. Regarding this, any attempt is valuable and there have been some salient attempts to analyse the concept via the theory. However, when looking at the current literature, the focus is largely on the EU (Belyi, 2003; Radoman, 2007; Natorski and Surrallés, 2008). There are some analyses of China-US energy relations (Nyman, 2014), and the Middle East and North Africa (Christou and Adamides, 2013). In this research securitisation is used in political analyses of energy security.

Securitisation potentially broadens the perception of the context of energy. Buzan et al. (1998:98), however, place securitisation of energy in the economic sector, explaining:

The possibility that economic dependencies within the global market (particularly oil) will be exploited for political ends or, more broadly, questions of the security of supply when states abandoned the inefficient security of self-reliance for the efficient insecurity of dependence on outside sources of supply.

Christou and Adamides (2013) rightly position energy more broadly, including five securitisation sectors within it. Natorski and Surrallés (2008:74) also state that energy is “an elusive policy domain” and that it has close relations with the five sectors of securitisation and can be analysed under these sectors. Belyi (2003) suggests that, in terms of the political sector, energy can be an example of states’ self-sufficiency; in terms of the military, energy availability can have close relations with self-defence; in terms of the economy, it can refer to the financial possibility of projects and the unpredictability of the energy market; in terms of the environment, it has a connection with environment-friendly formations and natural resource protection; and in terms of the societal sector, it sees energy as a social necessity for the social welfare.

Taking into account these possibilities, it is necessary to construct energy as an issue prone to securitising. Buzan (2003:148) states that issues become securitised when leaders begin to talk about them “in terms of existential threat against some valued
referent object”. Based on this view it is possible to argue that energy has always been an issue of securitisation. Energy insecurity is a picture often stated by states’ elites to their audience as a referent object, referring to interruption of supply, import dependency, insufficient capacity, high energy intensity, and sudden price fluctuations due to global and regional security developments (Cherp et al., 2012; Adamides and Christou, 2015). In terms of expanding this, Ciută (2010) analyses the effects of the securitisation of energy on energy policies, in other words the way that an issue turns into a national security concern or existential threat. States, according to the author, first might develop a logic of war framework, using the words weapon, battle, attack or fear in their explanation of energy security. This inherently changes the political rationality.

Second, states might develop a rhetoric of logic of subsistence (Ciută, 2010). A key element of this notion is that everyone needs energy. Thus it includes energy resources, activities (infrastructure, transportation) and actors (policy-makers, securitisation actors). Including this kind of variety has led the logic of subsistence to be perceived differently by different actors. In this logic states utilise threats and challenges as reference words.

Third, in the logic of totality, everything is energy (Ciută, 2010).

Illustrating these developments as existential threats, elites claim that their state’s survival is under threat, and so they need to take emergency measures in order to protect it (Leung et al., 2014). In this manner, states attempt to diversify either their suppliers or resources in order to decrease their over-reliance on them. This study argues that the diversification attempts of energy suppliers and resources and (inter)dependency are essential factors in deciding the level of securitisation of the energy sector. These can easily be analysed via projects and political initiatives, and provide a wide insight into how energy actually affects states and regions.

Regarding the categorisation of the securitisation of energy, the spectrum ranges from non-politicised to securitisation, where non-politicised refers to the circumstance where energy is not perceived as a security threat in a state’s affairs and so energy agreements can act as a reinforcing mechanism for positive relations and it can be subject to commercial norms (Christou and Adamides, 2013). The energy relationship between the EU and Norway might be given as an example (Kirchner and Berk, 2010). The politicisation of energy, meanwhile, is where it contributes to “two levels (economic and political), using both economic and political arguments and with divergent interpretations of the concept of energy security” (Radoman, 2007:40). The
securitisation of energy, on the other hand, is the extreme state of politicisation, with Radoman (2007) asserting that energy can not only become an issue that takes public attention but can also be a matter of survival. The EU’s energy relations with Russia might be given as an example, particularly after the 2006 and 2009 crises between Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Belarus (Khrushcheva, 2012; Sharples, 2012).

Regarding the desecuritisation of energy, according to Nyman (2014) desecuritising energy leads countries to cooperate with each other and perceptions (us vs them) start to lose importance in relations. Moreover, most importantly, it moves energy out of the security sphere and traditional energy security discourses. States begin to discuss alternative policy options. China-US relations on shale gas can be given as example (Nyman, 2014).

Each spectrum illustrates the importance of discourse. When the discourse is securitised, cooperation becomes difficult and in this context securitisation has a clear impact on policy choices. For instance, any energy-based activities can be demonstrated as an existential threat. However, if the discourse is not securitised, cooperation becomes possible and energy-based activities are illustrated for instance as trade activities. The securitising actor chooses the path that the state follows. One can understand these differences through the nature and atmosphere of states’ mutual (energy) relations.

Geographical proximity is one of the crucial elements in determining whether an issue ought to be securitised or not with the other side. There is “more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas [which is] potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:45). This security conceptualisation ensures a kind of global web of security interdependence. In the energy sector, since threats come more from short distances than long ones, states’ heavy dependence on a neighbouring supplier determines their threat perceptions towards the supplier, because they might not have any other options to diversify their resources. For instance, the EU’s heavy dependence on Russia and its feeling of a threat go hand-in-hand with geographical proximity (Sharples, 2012). This is very much related to how the EU perceives Russia. The only exemption I argue is that states and regions bind each other with long pipelines, and even shipping of resources can be an issue when it comes to transportation, and so the geographical area can be wider than expected. Hence, non-
regional actors may become a threat for a region’s energy security as well. For instance, the possibility of LNG shipping to Europe is a threat to Russian security of demand.

Regarding the method that states draw upon, it can be claimed that one can see whether energy is securitised or not in where energy security is placed in national security strategies, and discourse around the significance and sources of energy threats, the timing of concerns, and exceptional measures.

There are some issues that one needs to bear in mind here because they limit the operationalisation of the concept of (de)securitisation in energy. First, expressing that an issue is an existential threat needs to be reconsidered. Regarding the evaluation of the above-mentioned criticism of speech acts, apart from only focusing on the speeches of the securitising elite or policy documents in the understanding of security threats, I argue that pipeline projects can also be drawn upon. In these cases, the main aim is to understand how actions/practices construct securitisation. This is because in some cases states do not explicitly securitise suppliers or transit routes, but they materialise their security concerns via pipeline projects. Such projects, in this case, are used as exceptional measures. In other cases, pipeline projects might pave the way for convergence, where states desecuritise their energy relations. In the context of this issue, my aim is to lead the analysis beyond speech acts.

Second, expressing that energy is a security threat and a matter of survival in some cases might relate to states’ formulation of energy as a political tool, even though they do not feel the threat to be so extreme that they have to take extraordinary measures. In this kind of situation, the fundamental aspect is that energy is perceived as a key strategic good (Stoddard, 2013). In this sense the notion of security is rather politicised, meaning there is neither an existential threat nor exceptional measures (McGowan, 2011). Thus, even though in theory it is securitisation due to the expression of energy as a threat or growing attention to energy in high politics, in practice McGowan (2011) and Casier (2011) call this the politicisation of energy.

According to Casier (2011), politicisation emerges when states, at some point, do not have the courage or interest to securitise energy due to high dependency. This is because not every country has energy resources; as stated above, customers depend on a supplier for energy, as the foundation of their economic and military capabilities, while suppliers depend on customers for their national security and economic well-being. This
increases the possibility of dependence, referring to “a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces” (Keohane and Nye, 2012:7). Mutual dependence brings interdependency when there are reciprocal costly effects of transactions (Keohane and Nye, 2012). In order to clarify the role of power in interdependency, Keohane and Nye (2012) distinguish between two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity “involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly affects?” (Keohane and Nye, 2012:10). The vulnerability dimension relies on “the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors faces” (Keohane and Nye, 2012:11). In other words, a country will “only be vulnerable if it has no escape route, no alternatives on offer” (Casier, 2011:541). Proedrou (2007) prioritises sensitivity and vulnerability in analysis of conflict and cooperation. Thus, (inter)dependency has an important influence on the way that states build their policy approaches.

As can be seen, there is a close connection between the concept of (de)securitisation and (inter)dependency. The perception of energy as a security threat or economic commodity is affected by future supply, infrastructure, and the price of oil and gas. In the securitisation process energy is no longer understood in commercial or economic terms, but in geopolitical terms. The relationship has rather become conflictual and both sides intend to lower their dependency (Krickovic, 2015). The desecuritisation process emerges, on the other hand, when statements of energy relations have moved away from stressing issues of dependence and security to a purely economic approach. Economic transactions, in this context, are a form of cooperation. (Inter)dependency leads to more cooperative relations where security concerns have been alleviated.

As the review of the literature shows, energy is an important focal point for the debates on security in general and particularly the BSR. With that in mind, the thesis seeks to build on the existing literature and take energy as an example of Russian-Turkish relationship. The centrality of energy to the thesis is reflected in all three research questions. In addressing different dimensions of energy security across the region as a whole and in the Russian-Turkish relationship, this research aims to fill in some of the gaps in existing analyses. It does so by using the concept of (de)securitisation to inform both its account and its analysis of energy relations in the region. In particular the analysis focuses on pipeline projects as examples of (de)securitising actions and
practices. Analysing energy also contributes by bringing a range of different actors into the research in order to reveal the factors shaping the nature of the Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR.

1.8 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to present key concepts, which will present throughout the thesis. On the basis of my readings, I argue that previous research on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR has a weak conceptual framework and is not well-equipped to make sense of the changes that have occurred over time. This conclusion draws on the different strands of literature examined in this chapter to set out a more robust conceptual framework, one which is deployed in the rest of the thesis.

It was stated in the review of the literature that in terms of quantity and quality, the literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR in particular and the BSR as a whole have some strengths, particularly in their understanding and assessments of the issues regarding the region and the sector. These will utilised in my analysis of the effect of energy in the Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR in terms of providing relevant materials and informing the description and analysis of developments. However, in terms of engagement with the topic, in particular the use of new concepts to inform the analysis, there are gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature. In order to understand the dynamics/factors affecting the bilateral (energy) relations in the BSR, one needs to take into account the influence of energy in bilateral relations and in the perception of regional and non-regional actors as well as Russia and Turkey. In this regard, this thesis aims to build on the existing literature to explain the role of energy at the bilateral, regional and global levels, analysing it through the concept of (de)securitisation.

In order to understand the dynamics/effects of energy in Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, this thesis is inspired by RSCT, as outlined by the Copenhagen School, but modifies it substantially, with particular concern for the concept of (de)securitisation. The concept has played an important role in broadening the conception of security, not only in including new referent objects of security other than the state, but also in providing a framework to define security and determine how and when a specific matter
becomes securitised or desecuritised (Anthony et al., 2006). The main aspect that this thesis will use in following empirical chapters is the analysis of the process which reveals the dynamics of the changing nature of the Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR.

However, the concept of (de)securitisation has some deficiencies that make it difficult to clearly conceptualise the research topic. Only depending on speeches, for instance, and a lack of desecuritisation research are significant problems that this thesis aims to overcome, and thus make an original contribution to the field. Apart from speeches, I concentrate on pipeline projects as securitising actions/practices and give an example of desecuritisation via focusing on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations.

All above-indicated concepts informed the analysis of the energy relationship. This chapter specifically distinguished the terms considering energy as a security threat and an economic commodity. It was argued that while security concerns bring securitisation, economic concerns pave the way for desecuritisation. Deriving its understanding from this arguments, in empirical chapters it will argued that the perception of suppliers and customers towards each other leading countries either diversify their suppliers/resources or improve their relationship, and the degree of (inter)dependence are salient factors determine the notion of energy either as a security issue or an economic one.

Furthermore, the application of the concept of (de)securitisation is address across four levels of analysis: domestic, bilateral, regional and interregional/global. This allows for an examination of the security and political dynamics at each level with particular reference to the nature of Russian-Turkish (energy) relations.

Overall, this thesis has developed a conceptual framework which draws upon aspects of RSCT, particularly the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation and a multilevel analytical approach. It accepts the political, security and economic problems of energy as referent objects and argues that current energy relations between Russia and Turkey are based on desecuritisation, preserving the fact that energy has the potential to become a security issue because countries seeking alternative routes and ambitions. This puts desecuritisation into Hansen’s (2012) rearticulation and replacement categories. This conceptual framework adds analytical insight into complex bilateral relations in the BSR. Analysing these through energy adds a new aspect.
After clarifying the conceptual framework, it is necessary to move on to the empirical research. In regards to providing a background to Russian and Turkish energy policies as well as other regional countries, which determines patterns of conflict and cooperation, it is necessary to begin with the domestic level. The following chapter will examine energy in each country.
CHAPTER 2

2. THE DOMESTIC LEVEL IN RUSSIA AND TURKEY AND
THE BLACK SEA REGION

2.1 Introduction

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their book *Regions and Powers* (2003) structure their analysis into four levels, of which the domestic level is the first. The authors, in this level, focus on the domestic character of region states, examining how their security vulnerabilities and strengths impinge on regional relations (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Moreover, they research the stability of the domestic order, defining states as weak or strong, and the state’s perception of the other states in the region. This structure gives the reader a comprehensive picture about the state, which makes the domestic level a *sine qua non* factor of analysis.

Buzan (1983) claims that analysing the domestic level is important because domestic security problems frequently spill over into the international domain. Hence it is possible to argue that discussing domestic developments as a factor provides information on a number of levels. States, according to Buzan (1983), should be the conceptual focus of a security analysis, because they have to cope with all aspects of the problem. Taking into account this statement, this chapter aims to introduce some factors which indicate the way in which states perceive energy and which will be followed up in the subsequent empirical chapters.

With the region host to some of the world’s most significant energy producers and consumers, as well as a number of important energy transportation routes, BSR countries are important actors regionally and globally. It is therefore important to understand the domestic context, particularly in terms of the development of their energy policies. The principle aim of this chapter is to analyse the national energy context in the countries of the region. In particular it focuses on the specifics of the Russian and Turkish energy conditions and policy frameworks, since they are main focus of the research.

I argue that energy for all BSR countries means national sovereignty and territorial integrity, stability of political system, economic prosperity and development, and
economic welfare. It is the possibility of energy conditions being disrupted that constitutes a threat to these factors. However, the way that energy impacts on each regional country's domestic level and the way that they each securitise energy is different. In order to reveal these differences this chapter addresses energy and national security concerns in three parts. The first part consists of the smaller regional countries. The role of energy at their domestic level is argued to be more related to their survival as a state and solving their economic and political problems, which can be regarded as more security-oriented. Priorities are to decrease dependence on a single supplier who they feel threatened by, and to gain financial and political benefits due to their geographical location. In Russia, however, one can strongly see the usage of energy as a security object, which is more about the threats to its capacity to supply other countries than the ‘usual’ security problem faced by energy importing countries. In Turkey, energy lies between securitisation and desecuritisation. By this I mean that although energy is an important security object for Turkey due to its heavy dependence on external suppliers, Ankara often uses it as a foreign policy tool, such as in developing relations with energy suppliers, as well as a tool for its economic wellbeing.

Overall I argue that energy is securitised by all countries in the BSR. However, the degree to which they do so varies from one country to another. While energy is prone to securitisation for small countries and Russia (albeit for different reasons related to their relative positions as net importers and exporters). In particular it is linked it to their survival/soverignty as a state (smaller countries in the region) or regaining and maintaining its power (Russia). By contrast, for Turkey energy is perceived more in terms of desecuritisation and is linked to the country’s attempts to gain the advantage of economic growth and political cooperation with foreign actors. Thus, in terms of the first and second research questions, energy has a direct impact on relations between countries in the BSR to the extent that it has become a focus for securitisation and in some cases desecuritisation.

The context of securitisation and its interpretation by the actors is of key importance for understanding the securitisation process. This chapter, therefore, will focus on contexts of securitisation in BSR countries and in which senses energy has become a high political issue.
The chapter focuses on BSR countries, particularly on Russian and Turkish national energy perspectives, and the way that governments have (de)securitised energy. As Proedrou (2007) argues, the energy sector is a part of national security for most countries due to its influence on economic development and political stability, and thus it strongly affects their policy approaches. Accordingly, in order to understand the other dimensions of the Regional Security Complex, discussed in subsequent chapters, one needs to understand the situation and motivation within each country. In this regard, the following sections, after giving a general overview of the BSR, discuss energy first in other BSR countries, followed by the two key countries, taking into account the role of energy at their national level.

2.2 The domestic level of BSR countries

The analysis of the domestic level of BSR countries entails a conceptualisation of their approach to national security, focusing on the impact of domestic vulnerabilities and strengths on their stability and security. The term national security is used to explain a state’s mission in meeting possible external and internal threats. A state’s mission involves protecting its territorial integrity and state border, providing security for its population, and preserving political and economic stability.

In addressing this issue, Buzan and Wæver (2003:22) have introduced “a concept that offers some way forward on how to deal with the interplay between types of states and types of security dynamics: the spectrum of weak and strong states as a way of thinking about national security”. This spectrum “is about the degree of socio-political cohesion between civil society and the institutions of government” meaning the level of ‘stateness’ that a state possesses (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:22). A strong state refers to one that is internally cohesive, with most threats coming from outside its borders; whereas a weak state has a “low level of socio-political cohesion and generally high levels of internal political violence” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:492).

According to this distinction, as Buzan and Wæver (2003) observe, the typical region contains a mixture of state types, and when looking at countries in the BSR, it is possible to argue that the BSR indeed consists of both strong and weak states, making it a heterogeneous region. Apart from administrative capabilities, weakness and strength in this context signify a lack of military or economic capabilities, as well as a lack of
liberal political capacities affecting a country’s statehood (Volten and Tashev, 2007; Oskanian, 2013). Taking into account these assessments, it needs to be acknowledged that even though both Russia and Turkey face challenges, they are strong states because they have relatively strong military, political and economic capabilities, and their military and administrative government is able to contain such challenges. New independent states in the BSR, however, have a tendency to be weak states (Oskanian, 2013). Their internal weaknesses, as King (2008a) points out, represent the chief threat to peace and stability, in other words the security structure of the region. This is because one of the indicators of a weak state that Buzan and Wæver (2003:22) point out is that “they are more likely to be forums in which a variety of sub-state actors compete for their own security, and/or to capture the state”, and therefore they are vulnerable to internal/external threats.

2.2.1 Smaller states in the BSR

After the demise of the Soviet Union, newly-independent BSR states had to manage the tasks of building a nation (see Blum, 2013) and a state. They focussed on improving their economic systems, promoting democracy and providing an enhanced dialogue with the rest of the world, at least in theory (see King, 2008a:12). However, it can be claimed that such states are characterised by a weak tradition of statehood and by a combination of internal and external threats.

The end of the Cold War also unleashed ethnic, national and territorial conflicts (Çelikpala, 2010). Hence, in the very first years after the demise of the Soviet Union the region witnessed armed conflicts and an increase in political tensions such as border disputes. Several BSR countries have had to deal with internal conflicts which are categorised in the literature as frozen conflicts: for instance, Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Moldova with Transnistria; and Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, in the very first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, these conflicts raised worries regarding whether or not the host countries would become failed states (Nodia, 2005). Weak states have the potential to cause disputes and tensions within a region, strongly affecting regional security. They can also potentially become global hot spots for threats such as terrorism and other illegal activities, and so
these states have the potential to affect the security of countries around the region (Triantaphyllou, 2009).

As Glebov (2009) rightly claims, therefore, insecurity is the dominant feature of the region, and its security must be judged from this point of view. Other domestic security matters of smaller BSR states are late development and lack of democratic experience due to power struggles, and the challenges deriving from the communist past (Kamrava, 2001; King, 2004a; Altmann et al., 2010). In this respect there are three main ongoing factors affecting the security of BSR states: economic developments, political developments and conflicts.

In regards to economic concerns, BSR countries’ economies differ in performance: on the one hand, there are developed economies such as Russia and Turkey, and on the other hand, (under)developed economies ranging from Moldova and Armenia. King (2008a) notes that poverty is deep and endemic here, and the reason for this is the structural and long-term features of local economies. There is high inflation and high unemployment, and the gap between rich and poor is high as well.

Furthermore, some countries, such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, due to political tensions with a particular neighbour, do not trade with their neighbours (Astrov and Havlik, 2008; Appendix 2). Azerbaijan and Armenia, for instance, do not have trade relations. Georgia, after the war in 2008, has opted to reduce its economic dependence on Russia. These economic/political decisions strongly affect their economies.

In terms of political concerns, the weak states of the BSR have to deal with issues regarding democracy, human rights and corruption (Altmann et al., 2010; Kuzio, 2012). Chronic political problems of the region, particularly in weak states, such as the fact that the democratisation process is slow and civil society remains underdeveloped, are still quite serious, and unfortunately this prevents effective power sharing, creates discrimination and enables aggressive rhetoric from local elites.

In accordance with the above assessments, it might be claimed that the domestic level of the region, particularly smaller states, is characterised by weak state cohesion. This combination is strengthened by economic disruption and political instability. There have been several interstate and intra-state conflicts which have profoundly affected the security of the region. Hence, BSR states tend to push their normal politics in the
direction of security, meaning they see national security problems as an existential threat.

2.2.1.1 Energy in the smaller states in the BSR

These are some of the internal difficulties that the countries of the BSR face, and in order to solve these problems, it can be claimed that energy has become one of the important potential solutions. This is because energy, as one of the instruments contributing to how countries of the region build their state, has two significant roles: economic and political. Regarding economic development, all states depend on energy resources in terms of both supply and demand, and in addition it helps countries to improve their industrialisation, by virtue of the production of goods and services. Regarding politics, energy can help in the production of a state identity, either as a supplier or a customer or a transit route. Thus, it helps shape states’ international recognition. It can also ensure relative stability on the state level.

As Table 2.1 shows the countries of the region have very different energy profiles. In some cases, such as Russia and Azerbaijan, they are significant energy producers and rely on exports for economic development and government revenue. In others they are largely energy importers whose economic fortunes and domestic security is dependent on reliable supplies at reasonable prices. The vulnerability of the latter group is to some extent moderated by their role as transit countries (notably Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine). These conditions may reinforce – or may be reinforced by – their domestic state capacity. Domestic weaknesses are a deep influence on states’ conceptualisation of energy as a security issue, because interstate security issues might risk their new positions as transit countries and their involvement in international pipeline infrastructure. This makes the domestic level the basis of all other levels. Hence energy has become a major national and regional security concern and it is effectively moved from normal politics to high politics.
Table 2.1 Share of total primary energy supply and net import in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Natural Gas</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Net Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-307.4*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>-84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Negative value indicates net exports as a share of total energy supply

Source: IEA statistics (2017)

Energy resources are the basis of national security, because they are essential to the proper functioning of states. Owning sufficient amounts of energy resources increase states’ internal stability as well as their power. In the opposite situation, in which such resources are not available, states need to adopt an active foreign policy to ensure energy security. Given that most of the BSR countries are heavily dependent on energy imports for their economic growth they need to prioritise secure and reliable energy supply. They aspire to decrease dependence on only one supplier or only one resource. Thus, diversification of energy resources is the priority. In other words, energy is fundamental to national security and so is intrinsically prone to being securitised.

The national energy statements of countries in the region demonstrate that energy policy works in coordination with their foreign policy preferences, and reflects their perceptions of their neighbour (the supplier is fundamental in this issue), and their degree of dependence (Chifu, 2010). Indeed, it is clear that historical mistrust and internal conflicts shape states’ attitude to energy. They are surrounded by countries with whom they often do not have a good relationship. For instance, they may depend on one supplier with whom the bilateral relationship is not good, and so even though the supply is at a reasonable price, they aspire to diversify their suppliers. Russian-Bulgarian energy relations might be given as an example. As Maltby (2015) points out, although Russia is the main energy supplier for Bulgaria and during the Soviet era two countries had close relations, increasing concerns about high import dependence on Russia, particularly after the 2009 gas crisis led Bulgaria to reconsider its energy relations with

7 It needs to be acknowledged that resources do not always equal stability and growth. The resource curse shows that many exporters have economic and political problems.
Russia. In this context, it reoriented its energy policies, for instance it acted slowly in the construction of South Stream and also expressed its willingness to diversify its suppliers.

Regarding internal conflict, the existence of secessionist movements within a country strongly influences its position on energy diplomacy. As one can see in Georgia, for example, the existence of secessionists movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and particularly Russia’s support for these de facto regions has problematised the reliability of Russia in Georgian energy demand, and so it intends to diversify its suppliers and become involved in non-Russian projects (Jervalidze, 2006; Kubicek, 2013).

In this multidimensional and complex nature, concerns regarding the energy security of BSR states, as stated in their national security strategy statements, arise from their dependence on external suppliers, as is the case in Armenia; or the need for a diversification of energy resources and a strengthening of the transit role, as in Georgia; or the need to ensure secure supply as in Azerbaijan; or a desire to integrate with European energy strategies as in Romania and Bulgaria (Armenia National Security Strategy, 2007; Azerbaijan National Security Concept, 2007; Romania National Security Strategy, 2007; Bulgaria National Security Strategy, 2011; National Security Concept of Georgia, 2015). Although in terms of policy they appear to have different priorities, in practice these concerns are closely related to each other. These explicitly-stated concerns highlight the importance of energy security for states’ domestic politics and indicate why and how they consider energy as a national priority. This indicates that if any developments threatens their energy supplies, states are likely to shift from normal to extraordinary political action.

Georgia and Ukraine are two of the key transit countries within the BSR. Georgia is one of the shortest routes for Azerbaijani oil to reach world markets, meaning that it is an important transit route for Caspian energy resources to travel to the West. Moreover, it is located between Armenia and Russia. Armenia depends heavily on Russian resources, making it an important market for Russia, which at the same time is a problem for Russia and Georgia because of mutual political tension (Chifu, 2010). Some of the priorities of the Georgian national interest include ensuring energy security and strengthening its transit role in order to solve its political and security problems (National Security Concept of Georgia, 2015). This is because in the National Security
Concept of Georgia (2015), it was emphasised that the further strengthening of Georgia’s energy capacity would positively affect state security, economic development and the welfare of citizens. This, therefore, leads it to play an active role in energy diplomacy. It has the advantage of close relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the EU and the USA. Hence any non-Russian pipeline project participation can ensure its aim of the diversification of its energy resources and suppliers.

Ukraine, on the other hand, has limited oil and gas reserves, is a net oil and gas importer, and is highly dependent on Russia for its oil and gas (Pamir, 2007). Its role in the energy configuration is strategic in two senses. First, Ukraine is a major transit country for gas to the European market: Russian exports to the EU pass through the Ukrainian gas transportation system. Second, Ukraine’s role as a littoral state of the BSR makes it a stakeholder in existing and potential transport routes for hydrocarbons across the BSR (Flikke, 2011:25). However, Chifu (2010) argues that its high dependence on energy put it at an obvious risk, making it sensitive to energy security challenges. Thus, according to Chifu (2010:27), “the biggest challenge to Ukraine’s energy security is losing its control on its pipelines to Russia’s Gazprom or losing the quantity of gas transiting the system to Europe” by the construction of alternative pipelines aiming to bypass the country and the divert the transit away from its pipelines. Retaining its importance as an energy actor is the priority of the country and so it strongly links energy with its political and economic developments.

Azerbaijan is an important energy exporter. It might be claimed that its growing importance for the Euro-Atlantic bloc as an alternative to Russia gives it more independence than other post-Soviet countries in the region. It can now act relatively freely from Russian hegemony, but Ismayilov (2014) argues that it nonetheless follows a balanced policy with regards to the West and Russia. For the Azerbaijani political elite (Ipek, 2009) energy plays a great role in the country’s political strategy, with regards to its defence and independence. Gulmira Rzayeva, a Senior Research Fellow at the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) (Interview, 2015), pointed out that energy is a commercial project affecting the well-being of the country.

However, while Azerbaijan is one of the most active players in energy in the BSR, along with Russia, its land-locked geographical location causes great concerns on energy transport. This certainly increases concerns regarding dependence on transit
routes as well. Hence, choosing reliable partners as well as ensuring the national security of each partner are priorities for country.

Bulgaria and Romania are other important energy transit countries and net oil importers that depend heavily on Russia (Pamir, 2007; Winrow, 2007a). However, the dependence of Bulgaria on energy is more than that of Romania, and so it has more security concerns (Chifu, 2010). Indeed, in the Bulgarian National Security Strategy (2011:35), it was stated that “heavy dependence on energy resources creates economic and political vulnerabilities”. Both countries prefer to follow the same political approach as their NATO and EU counterparts, and so their energy policies aim to decrease their dependence on Russia, on the basis of diversifying their suppliers. For instance, they were both part of the West-backed Nabucco pipeline project, which can be given an example of their diverging energy policy approaches.

In accordance with these examples, it can be claimed that since most of the regional countries were part of Soviet Union (or its sphere of influence), they tend to have a higher dependency on Russia both in terms of supply and transit. This is because most of the Soviet energy infrastructure went through Russian territory. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and, as will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5, the increasing importance of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea as alternative energy suppliers, have made a great contribution to the ability of post-Soviet republics to isolate themselves from Russian hegemony. Thus, it can be claimed that while during the period of the Soviet Union energy was perceived in low politics, with its increasing importance and the requirement of solving political and economic problems, energy has become a high politics issue. The risks linked to energy dependence on Russia are expressed as an existential threat and the need to ensure energy supply diversity as an exceptional measure. Problems, such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, and Russia’s support of secessionists activities in various countries and use energy of as a weapon to intervene in domestic politics, have increased the concerns and threat perceptions of some countries in the region. Thus, they are reluctant to improve their energy dialogue with the country and, on the contrary, aim to diversify their supply options.

Finally, regional countries have close energy interactions with each other, whether defined by tension or cooperation. They worry about threats coming from their neighbours. Therefore, even though they depend on a geographically close supplier who
could easily meet their energy demands, they tend to seek alternatives. These concerns lead them to move the conceptualisation of energy from low politics to high.

2.3 Russia

Russia is certainly a power in the BSR, and a country that has a strong influence on its neighbourhood as well as on global politics. During the first years after the demise of the Soviet Union – during the presidency of Yeltsin – Russia experienced problems of political instability, nation-state building, economic struggles and democratisation similar to those faced by other post-Soviet countries at the same time (Lo, 2003; Govella and Aggarwal, 2012). However, it solved all these problems quicker than them. Mankoff (2009:3) briefly summarises the transformation from that problematic atmosphere to the current situation, emphasising that “Russia’s internal transformation [was] based on booming revenue from the sale of its energy resources and the political stability” provided by the rule of Putin. Perovic (2009) supports this and indeed maintains that this particular situation led to a massive financial return and also had a large impact on Russia’s domestic development. These features, particularly increasing oil and gas prices, allowed Russia, as an important exporter, to “begin the process of reversing the precipitous decline of its military forces, freeing itself from dependence on foreign creditors, and exerting pressure on customers of its oil and gas” (Mankoff, 2009:3).

Taking into account these assessments it can be claimed that developments in the energy sector have paved the way for Russia to be accepted as a strong state. This is because it has solved political and economic problems more easily relative to other regional countries. It is possible to argue that energy resources are an important security issue for the Russian state, and thus political elites aim to ensure they are stable and sustainable. Anything that risks upsetting the stability and sustainability of energy or decreasing the country’s importance as a supplier – in other words risking its status as a strong state – is perceived as a threat, not only pertaining to the sector itself but also a threat to Russia’s survival as a state. Thus, the energy sector is strongly conceptualised as a security object. Exceptional measures in regards to this security concern are about consolidating the power of the political elite. In other words, the survival of the state is
uttered as an existential threat, while establishing control over the sector is introduced as an exceptional measure.

Table 2.2 (summarising data in Appendix 2) shows that Russia’s GDP has increased substantially since 2000 (except in 2009, due to the 2008 financial crisis). Indeed, the Russian economy had a 4.9% average annual real growth rate in GDP between 2000 and 2014. It can be stated that the energy sector is essential for Russia in the economic sense. This certainly stems from its rich energy resources. As a non-OPEC energy producer, exporter, importer and consumer, and as a transit state, Russia is one of the richest and most important energy suppliers and corridor states in the world (Appendix 3). According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, in 2015 Russia became the biggest exporter of oil in the world, overtaking Saudi Arabia, and the largest exporter of natural gas (BP, 2016).

Table 2.2 Russian economic and energy trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP ($)</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>13,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports ($)</td>
<td>99,868,397</td>
<td>497,833,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which energy</td>
<td>51,860,985</td>
<td>346,119,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports ($)</td>
<td>41,865,362</td>
<td>286,648,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production (mtoe)</td>
<td>506,826</td>
<td>781,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exports (mtoe)</td>
<td>-218,477</td>
<td>-340,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas production (TJ-on a gross calorific value basis)</td>
<td>21,806,667</td>
<td>24,717,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas exports (TJ-on a gross calorific value basis)</td>
<td>-6,796,667</td>
<td>-7,247,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016); International Trade Centre (ITC) (2017); IEA statistics (2017)

Since energy is important for political and economic aspects, the role of energy at the national level is so important that energy security is stated as one of the most important components of national security:

*Energy security is the country’s security*, that of its citizens, society, state and economy from the threats to reliable supply of fuel and energy. These threats are determined by external (geopolitical, macroeconomic, market) factors, as well as by the condition and operation of the country’s energy sector. (Russian Energy Strategy to 2030, 2010:28, emphasis added)

It can be easily seen that energy security is part of national security. When considering that national security refers to the survival of the state, which is associated with the military sector, with this remark energy is put in the same place.
This is because oil and gas, as single sectors, dominate the Russian economy, and so they, naturally, are the most important value-creating industries. In 2013, exports of oil products, natural gas and crude oil constituted 68% of total Russian export revenues at 21%, 14% and 33%, respectively, based on data from the Russian Federal Customs Service (EIA, 2014a). In addition, oil and gas activities constituted a large portion of its state budget. According to the Ministry of Finance, half of Russian federal budget revenue in 2013 came from mineral extraction taxes and export customs duties on oil and natural gas (EIA, 2014b). The accumulation of wealth from energy sales has had a large impact on Russia’s domestic development. Thus Gaddy and Ickes (2009) posit that the energy sector is a blessing for Russia.

Russian Energy Strategy to 2020 (2003) focuses on the importance of energy to economic growth and improvement of quality of life. This gives a clue about the priorities of the current securitising actors and the way that they perceive energy, which is that it is vital for state-building. Russian Energy Strategy to 2030 expands this view and states that

> The objective of the energy policy of Russia is to maximize the effective use of natural energy resources and the potential of the energy sector to sustain economic growth, improve the quality of life of the population and promote strengthening of foreign economic positions of the country. (2010:10, emphasis added)

Energy, therefore, has a growing importance and close relations with the security, economic and political sectors, as well as the resurgence of Russia in international politics, and so supporting the sector has become a key strategic asset and a vital one for the current political environment (Baev, 2007; Coşkun and Carlson, 2010). In this manner, it can be claimed that energy has strong economic and political meanings for Russia, particularly related to the stability of the country. In other words, the Russian political elites see the energy industry as a guarantor of economic growth, which automatically brings political stability. There are also indications that the elite highlight to its audience that all these energy-based initiatives are for Russian citizens’ benefit. In other words, the state justifies its initiatives by drawing upon the concept of ‘improving the quality of Russians’ life’.

Varol (2013) claims that with these strategy documents Russia aim to use energy policy for security purposes. The author continues that this idea connects to the general aspect of security to extend Russia’s influence abroad, and to secure its independence.
Bradshaw (2012) argues that these documents are aimed at securing Russia’s economic wellbeing. Dellecker and Gomart (2011) read them as suggesting the urgency of the state involvement in the energy sector in order to protect the country from both internal and external threats. Taking into account these divergent approaches, it can be claimed that for the Russian government, energy is more than just a tradeable commodity; it is central to both economic development and to the restoration of ‘great power’ status in the international system (Kropatcheva, 2011; Khrushcheva and Maltby, 2016).

Providing secure energy has become important since it has close links with all sectors. According to Bradshaw (2012:217), the energy security concern of Russia is placed in two different areas. While at the national level it refers to resource nationalism, and sustainability of oil and gas production and export; at the external level, i.e. the regional and global levels, it refers to security of demand and security of transit. Sharples (2013) narrows this aspect and claims that since it is rich in energy resources, energy security entails security of export, including the economic, political and social aspects of energy.

In this regard, it can be claimed that energy security covers a broad area, ranging from production, export and social dimensions.

2.3.1 Resource nationalism

Resource nationalism refers to a wide range of strategies that domestic elites employ so as to increase their control of natural resources (Domjan and Stone, 2010). It can be argued that Russia is an important example of this phenomenon. In the context of this issue, Pleines (2009) contends that since fossil fuel is vital to the functioning of current economies, countries attempt to establish control over the energy sector in order to secure vital financial flow. Godzimirski (2013) supports this argument and points out that the energy sector plays a crucial role in Russian politics, and its energy resources allow for relative stability on the domestic level by granting legitimacy to the government. Perovic (2009) contends that energy has provided the Russian state with the means to pay pensions and fund infrastructure and social development projects. Thus, any action risking this is perceived as a threat and so, for state elites, energy increases the requirement of the retention of direct control over these features, or at least of having a strong influence over them.
It can be contended that this approach has enjoyed strong official support during the rule of Putin. This is because Putin’s aims, as stated in his first National Security Strategy document (2000), are rebuilding a strong Russia, which was the main priority, with the aim of establishing an efficient economy, national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Smetkov, 2015). This is because Russia is a large country containing many different identities, with the potential for secessionist activities, as in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, and so territorial integrity and national sovereignty have been under threat (Taylor, 2011; Smetkov, 2012, 2015). Thus, the survival of the state (Wæver, 1995), referring back to the political instability during the 1990s, has become Russia’s main security issue.

In this manner, energy has become key method of recovery of the socio-economic situation in the country, as it could guarantee political security, meaning relatively stable institutionalisation of authority (Khrushcheva, 2011). In an article in 1999, Putin overtly revealed what the state itself needs to do, saying that:

Regardless of whose property the natural resources and in particular the mineral resources might be, the state has the right to regulate the process of their development and use. (Putin, 1999 cited in Balzer, 2005:218, emphasis added)

A state-oriented energy structure refers to the controlling of energy resources and even companies by the government, which makes its own political and strategic policies for those resources and companies. Therefore, the success of the structure is related to the degree of influence by the government. For Putin and other state authorities, Russia’s natural resources were built-in reserves for surviving crises, hence Hill and Gaddy (2013) outline the importance of establishing control not just over the actual resources, but also over the business networks and physical infrastructure needed to purchase, transport and sell them. This means a heavy political dominance in the energy sector, covering every single aspect of it.

Balzer (2005:217) stresses the rationale behind Putin’s thesis as follows:

If used effectively, mineral resources can provide the basis for Russia’s entry into the world economy. This means the raw materials sector is crucial to all aspects of the state, supporting industry and providing 50% of GDP and 70% of export revenues. It represents the basis for modernising Russia’s military-industrial complex. It promotes social stability and can raise the well-being of the population.
According to Bochkarev (2006), Putin has set his energy policy on four main pillars: the first pillar is the national energy sector, which is rapidly becoming Russia’s geopolitical lever and a source of ‘comparative advantage’ in global politics. The second pillar is the new legal environment surrounding the sector and Russia’s rigid control over the energy policy-making and decision-making processes. The third pillar is a tendency towards more concerted state control over the country’s main energy assets and major energy companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft. The fourth is government control over oil exports and the gas export pipeline infrastructure (Bochkarev, 2006).

In the context of these statements, it can be claimed that energy has become a potential issue for securitisation because it is vital for the state (Heinrich, 2008; Paltsev, 2014). As stated by Putin (BBC website, 2005), the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. This is because the state has suffered from political, economic and security problems. The greatest among these is the liberalisation attempts in the energy sector. In the very first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian energy sector saw some attempts at liberalisation. In these cases, most of the country’s oil industry was sold at cheap prices to private investors. They used capital from private banks, with close relations with the Russian government of the time (Hill and Fee, 2002). They then engaged in a process of asset stripping in which they were able to privatise much of the country’s wealth (Orttung, 2009). During this time it can be implied that energy was placed in normal politics. However, with the realisation of the accruing revenues to the state, it became more centralised. During this process energy was placed in high politics. The first signal of this was in 2000 when Putin made a speech at the nationwide conference on the Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector, stating that:

> I would like to indicate the Government’s position with regard to natural monopolies. We understand that these companies contribute a lot to supplying the nation with energy. So we will do all we can to help them. But it is equally important to control their work. I am sure that structural changes should not take place unless the consequences of such a step for the country as a whole are clearly understood. We will proceed with care on these issues. (Kremlin, 2000 emphasis added)

Moreover, in 2004 in his address to the Federation Assembly (cited in Lomagin, 2015:137), Putin stresses that:

> We must grow faster than the rest of the world if we want to take the lead within today’s complex rules of global competition […] This is the question of our economic
survival. It is a question of ensuring that Russia takes its deserved place in these changing economic conditions.

With this statement, in fact, Putin emphasises that establishing state control over companies is not just for national sustainable development but for global acceptance. One of the significant developments of providing evidence of the transition from normal politics to high was seen in the clash between private energy companies and the state. Energy companies during the Yeltsin presidency were controlled by oligarchs – what Hill and Fee (2002) call oilgarchs – but after Putin’s presidency they have systematically come under state control, with the re-nationalisation of energy companies, and are led by appointed people close to the Kremlin – the siloviki8 (see Goldman, 2008; Perovic, 2009; Pirani, 2010). They also undid some of the key privatisations of the Yeltsin era, and revised some of the concessions made to foreign energy companies in Russia (Orttung, 2009). With these attacks, Orttung (2009) argues that Putin and his allies intend to strengthen the capacities of the state that they inherited from Yeltsin and attempt to make it an effective actor. Khrushcheva (2012) observes it as the consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control.

Within this process there is an overt clash of interests between oligarchs/the private sector and the state/siloviki that Khrushcheva (2012) notices; they threaten each other. Buzan et al. (1998:44) note that “if securitising actor ‘a’ on behalf of community ‘A’ claims A is threatened by B, he/she will present B as an actor, as responsible for the threat, as an agent who had a choice”. The political clash between two actors is an example of this statement. Oligarchs, due to their having both political and economic power, could potentially become an obstacle for Putin, his authority and his regime’s survival (Hanson, 2009). For the oligarchs, because they have interests that clash with Putin’s, he could be a possible obstacle to their benefits. In this sense, one of most well-

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8 This initiative formed the backbone of Putin’s administration after Yeltsin’s oligarchs left the political stage, chosen from the KGB, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, and politically and personally linked to the Kremlin (Rivera and Rivera, 2006; Pirani, 2010). Coming from a security background, Putin and his siloviki demonstrated the fundamental idea behind his approach: the militarisation of Russian politics, meaning that the state has potentially become more security-oriented, paving the way for the securitisation of domestic developments (Lo, 2003; Rivera and Rivera, 2006).
known examples of these threat perceptions is the Yukos case,\(^9\) which could be seen as an outcome of securitisation.

There are different readings of the Yukos case, which also illustrates the complexity of the relationship/clash between the state and private companies. Some authors assert that it was the reassertion of state power by Putin (Perovic, 2009; Orttung, 2009). According to Khrushcheva (2012), Putin’s movement on drawing a negative image of oligarchs can be explained by the justification of Russian actions. Hanson (2009) sees the Yukos case as the first attempt at state intervention, particularly in the oil sector, while Bacon et al. (2006) perceive it as the securitisation of economic policy.

Gazprom\(^{10}\) and Rosneft,\(^{11}\) in this and subsequent cases, expanded their shares and activities. In this sense, rather than taking direct control, political elites preferred to act through state-owned companies (Pleines, 2009), and in the case of Yukos, the state-owned Rosneft acquired shares in the company. The role of private companies in this case can be explained as a tool for the political elite to consolidate their control over the sector. Increasing taxes and controlling exports were used as tools to break the resistance of the energy oligarchs who emerged during Yeltsin’s presidency, and one by one their companies came under the control of Gazprom or other state-owned energy companies.

The outcome of consolidating the energy sector under government control is a more state-oriented energy sector in Russia. A state-oriented energy structure is significant because controlling energy resources and nationalising energy companies to some extent enables the Kremlin to make its own political and strategic policies. Moreover, it protects the interests of society by ensuring economic security (Khrushcheva, 2012).

\(^9\) In this case, the government demanded that Yukos should pay back taxes owed, imposed fines for these not having been paid in the 1990s and froze the company’s assets. Once it became apparent that it would not be able to pay back these taxes and fines, the government auctioned off one of Yukos’ units, Yuganskneftegaz, and it was bought out by state-owned Rosneft (see Pirani, 2010).

\(^{10}\) Gazprom, one of the biggest energy companies in the world in terms of export and infrastructure capacity, dominates the Russian gas business (Heinrich, 2008; Aslund, 2010). With a 50.23% stake owned by the government, Gazprom is the key Russian gas producer and the dominant player in energy issues. It holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, oversees 13% of global gas production, and is one of the leaders among the world’s oil producers, with Gazprom Neft and other gas companies (Gazprom website, 2014). Moreover, it is the leading exporter to the European gas markets and the biggest gas exporter in the world.

\(^{11}\) The main company shareholder is JSC Rosneftegaz, a 100% state-owned company, which owns 69.50%. BP owns another 19.75%, and the remaining shares are traded publicly. It accounts for more than 40% of Russian oil production and is the third largest gas producer in Russia (Rosneft website, 2014).
For instance, as one of the leading natural gas companies, Gazprom accounts for about 8% of Russia’s GDP, one-fifth of its exports and one-fifth of its market capitalisation, and so having control over it means that the profit stays inside the country is spent for the state’s benefit (Aslund, 2010). The state-controlled energy companies are thus perceived as strategic resources by Russian political elites, and seen as having an important role to play in increasing the power, influence and geopolitical advantages of the country (Monaghan, 2007; Perovic, 2009). Moreover, Heinrich (2008) and Herd (2010) assert that they can help ensure Moscow competes successfully in a globalised world. Thus, in order to ensure the Federation’s control over the energy sector, referring to “the control exerted by the Russian federal state through its shareholders in companies” in the sector (Heinrich, 2008:1539), the state should have more than a half or even a 100% stake in energy companies. In accordance with this policy, the state has a 50.23% share in Gazprom, 69.50% in Rosneft and federal ownership of 100% in Transneft, which owns crude oil pipelines. Apart from state-owned companies, private companies have to be closely linked to the state as well. If companies object to state policies, this is interpreted as a threat to state survival and a direct threat to national security, as was clearly seen in the Yukos case (Balzer, 2005; Baev, 2007).

During the nationalisation process, it was illustrated that there was an existential threat to the Russian nation, the Russian state and the Russian economy (Lo, 2003). It was stated to the public that the Russian economy was a victim of past liberalisation of the energy sector, which was supposed to be the driving force of the state’s social wellbeing and stability. It was for this reason that the public were spending more money on energy bills. Thus, returning to state control of the energy sector was the main political target of the government and the concept was illustrated as the only solution to Russia’s problems (Khrushcheva, 2012). This is because it was committed to having people pay less for energy. The developing discourse of this process was that the government was protecting the interests of the Russian population and attempting to restore Russian superpower status, lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Saivetz, 2007). In an economic sense, the owners who had acquired their wealth in the 1990s had done so illegitimately (Orttung, 2009). The image that the state elite portrayed to the public was that these billionaires were threats to the country that aimed to put their own benefit over that of the state. Hanson (2005), based on an informal speech of the deputy head of the Russian Presidential Administration, points out that oligarchs used methods such as
registering their companies and keeping some or most of their financial benefits offshore. Furthermore, as they worked with enemies outside the country, they were not patriotic (Hanson, 2005). All these discourses aimed at the preservation of Russian sovereignty. Within these initiatives, they justified their actions. This process of securitisation, as Khrushcheva (2012) and Rutland (2014) stress, was a successful one due to its acceptance by the target audience. For instance, in a survey conducted by the All-Russian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion in October-November 2004, 45% of respondents answered the question of how Russia’s oil and gas sector should be developed by saying that it should be ‘completely nationalised’, while 30% said it should be left in private hands but that state control should increase, and 5% said more foreign companies should be allowed to participate in Russia’s energy market (Gurin, 2004).

2.3.2 Energy and foreign policy

Taking into account the above-indicated assessments, it can be stated that managing the energy sector is the most important issue for Russian economic growth and political stability, and so in particular ensuring control over the sector is presented as an exceptional measure. Apart from those, one needs to add the role of energy in Russian foreign policy. This is because, as Monaghan (2007) argues, energy is the basis for rebuilding Russia’s internal capabilities and also its international status. Since transport of energy resources through transit countries and supplying the global market ensure great economic as well as political benefits, any actions risking this situation are perceived as a threat towards their survival as a state and securitised as existential threats. Thus there has been a concerted effort to link the energy sector and foreign policy, which is framed as foreign energy policy in the current literature (Dellecker and Gomart, 2011; Orttung and Overland, 2011).

In the document outlining energy strategy up to 2030, there is a subtitle relating to foreign energy policy (2010:55) which states that:

> The strategic objective of the foreign energy policy is the maximum efficient use of Russian energy potential for full-scale integration into the world energy market, enhancement of positions thereon and gaining the highest possible profit for the national economy.
Taking into account this article it can be claimed that, as Khrushcheva (2012) points out, the target of Russian foreign energy policy is the domestic level, and within this context Russia can enhance its position in global affairs, and the author sees that only the energy sector can do this. This is because both geographically and in terms of resource potential, Russia is among the richest energy suppliers in the world and its current wealth is mostly derived from energy sales. Khrushcheva (2011) and Blank and Kim (2016) indeed assert that Russia’s energy assets are crucial to the enhancement of its global power, influence and standing, and the government overtly recognises those assets’ role as a major tool of its foreign policy.

In this regard, it can be stated that Russia’s energy potential has a strong connection with its security concerns in global sense. Priorities of Russian foreign energy policy are:

- maintaining stable high-paying markets for its natural gas; reducing dependence on the transit of energy exports through neighbouring states; sustaining dominance as the main natural gas supplier to the European Union; gaining control of neighbouring states’ transport and distribution systems both for economic gain and to increase political leverage over former Soviet republics; and expanding oil production and Russia’s share of the world market. (Shaffer, 2009:123)

Regarding more specific concerns, it can be enumerated that stability of demand and security of transit are crucial issues. Thus, maintaining exports and control over transit routes are salient security concerns that are mostly securitised by Russian securitising actors. This can be seen in the cases of Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Georgia, as will be analysed in detail in chapters 3 and 5. In these examples Russia’s policy of securitisation can be summarised as being concerned not to lose its power over such countries. Thus it explicitly expresses its objections to improvements in relations between post-Soviet countries and the Euro-Atlantic bloc. It has done this by threatening these newly independent states which have sought to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. Moreover, its attempts to diversify pipeline routes, as in the case of Turkish Stream, can be seen as examples of the way that Moscow securitises export routes.

Thus, Russian securitising actors have been pursuing active foreign energy policy covering a broad area. The main ambitions of the state are to retain its supplier status in customer countries, and so it is concerned with providing secure and reliable supply, as it does in European countries (Monaghan, 2007; Closson, 2012); to diversify energy customers and decrease dependence on European imports, and ensure economic development in East Siberia and the Far Eastern regions (Lomagin, 2015; Yun, 2015);
and to retain its control over pipelines and gas supplies as it does in Eurasia (Nygren, 2008a; Nanay, 2012). Therefore, it has been argued that Russia has not hesitated to use energy resources as a tool or a weapon (Newnham, 2011), while Russian elites claim their actions are driven purely by business interests, seeking to secure the highest possible returns for their energy sales (Perovic, 2009).

One of the important instruments of the Russian state is vertically-integrated energy companies. Pleines (2009) indicates that state-owned companies accounted for over 85% of worldwide oil and gas production and over 95% of global reserves in 2008. As being a natural gas export monopoly, Gazprom is accepted as one of the most significant companies in this respect. Regarding the importance of Gazprom for the Russian state, Putin’s speech on Gazprom’s 10th anniversary might be given as an example:

Gazprom is a key element in the system of the country’s energy security and its export potential. Equally important, it is a powerful lever of Russia’s economic and political influence in the world. All this prompts us to closely follow the state of affairs in the company. It is not by chance that government representatives hold the majority of seats on the Board Directors. That is one more proof of the strategic significance of the company and need for government control over its status. (Kremlin, 2003)

The roles of Gazprom in Russian foreign energy policy are to provide great power on energy infrastructure in the European market and to use a ‘carrot and stick’ approach in pricing gas. The export politics of Gazprom can be linked to the Russian desire to decrease its dependence on routing exports through transit countries. It rather chooses to construct direct pipelines, despite them being less cost-efficient, bypassing the power of transit countries. It moreover takes steps including

subsidising energy exports to neighbouring states in order to attain control over their transit infrastructure, and halting energy supplies as a punitive measure to states that obstruct transit and as means to obtain control over energy infrastructure in neighbouring states. (Shaffer, 2009:124)

For an understanding of Russian foreign energy policy, one needs to bear in mind that since its economy heavily depends on energy exports, this automatically leads to some extent to desecuritisation when it comes to regulating its relations with customers. This means that even though in politics Russia has problems with customers, in terms of energy export and transportation, it rather uses soft power instruments, and energy in these cases is considered part of normal politics. This, however, does not change the fact that in some cases Russia uses its energy resources as a political weapon, as will be
detailed in Chapter 3 (Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian energy relations). Energy in foreign policy depends on context, meaning on the one hand Russia considers non-Russian energy initiatives as a threat, as will be explored in chapters 4 and 5, while on the other hand it is ready to put political problems aside, as will be explored in Chapter 3 (Russian-Turkish energy relations).

Overall, Perovic (2009) contends that Russia’s ruling elites consider energy to be the locomotive of economic growth and the basis for the country’s claim to great power status in global affairs, retaining its power as an energy supplier. Thus, Larsson (2006) points out that Russian leadership has securitised energy issues, legitimising the use of exceptional measures to tackle perceived problems and threat. The author continues that

The use of exceptional means (coercive policy, nationalisation, central planning, politicised policies etc.) is made possible as power over the energy sector is continuously being concentrated to the Kremlin and its loyal appointees in the corporate sector and within state structures. (Larsson, 2006:6)

2.4 Turkey

Turkey’s economy recovered rapidly after the 2001 financial crisis, leading to an increase in its energy needs. The growing energy demand was one of the most important factors affecting the country’s economic and political policies. With this in mind, Turkey’s domestic energy policy is directed towards meeting the deficit between domestic energy production and demand (Mazlum, 2007).

Table 2.3 (summarising data in Appendix 2) indicates that Turkey’s GDP has been growing steadily for between 2001 and 2014 (except in 2009). The Turkish economy had a 4.6% average annual real growth rate in GDP over this period.

Table 2.3 Turkish economic and energy trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP ($)</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>10,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports ($)</td>
<td>31,333,944</td>
<td>157,610,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports ($)</td>
<td>41,399,079</td>
<td>242,177,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which energy</td>
<td>8,339,366</td>
<td>54,889,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil consumption (mtoe)</td>
<td>50,979</td>
<td>76,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil imports (mtoe)</td>
<td>28,764</td>
<td>36,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas consumption (TJ-on a gross calorific value basis)</td>
<td>622,057</td>
<td>1,870,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas imports (TJ-on a gross calorific value basis)</td>
<td>614,878</td>
<td>1,886,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016); International Trade Centre (ITC) (2017); IEA statistics (2017)
The table shows that Turkey is the largest consumer and importer of energy in the region. Almost all of its oil and gas needs are provided from imports. Turkey therefore is highly dependent on external energy resources since the country only has solid fuel and hydropower resources which are limited, yet oil and natural gas account for over 70% of its total energy demand (Tekin and Williams, 2011; Güney, 2015). In Appendix 4, it is indicated that in terms of crude oil supply, Turkey depends on Iraq and Iran; while in terms of natural gas, Russia is Turkey’s largest supplier.

At the same time, Turkey has a significant geopolitical location linking energy suppliers and customers (see below). Apart from planned and existing pipeline projects going through Turkish territory or the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits – Bosporus and the Dardanelles – are an often-used route, particularly by Russia: the Straits account for half of its oil exports to Western markets (Demiryol, 2015). However, this certainly has great environmental and security risks. Krauer-Pacheco (2011) states that for Turkish authorities as well as the public this passage is very risky and dangerous because of the large amount of tanker traffic, the materials being transported and their proximity to populated areas where major industries are located. Thus, avoiding environmental and humanitarian catastrophe, bypassing passage from the Straits and supporting the diversification of transport routes are some of the main policy initiatives aiming to reduce security concerns.

Energy is certainly important for the Turkish government. Environmental and security concerns and growing dependence on energy imports are some factors which impact upon the country’s economic development and political stability. This is because any problems could risk its status as a strong state. Energy could help build its security and stability. Such considerations are reflected in Turkish energy strategy documents, which provide evidence that energy has become a high politics issue. In a 2009 strategy document for 2010-2014 (2009:9), threats were stated as:

The high rate of import dependence in terms of primary energy resources. The sharp fluctuations in the price of energy resources. The political instabilities in our region. Foreign influences in the use of trans-boundary resources. The contradiction between the energy policies of other countries with the target of our country for becoming an energy hub.

Balat (2010:2002) summarises security concerns and there are four problems that are shown as threats to energy security, which are high dependency on imported fossil fuel,
reliability of energy suppliers, high energy intensity and the investment needs of the Turkish energy sector. Thus, Babalı (2009) asserts that Turkey’s energy strategy relies on three pillars: to ensure diversified, reliable, and cost-effective supplies for domestic consumption, to liberalise its energy market, and to become a key transit country and energy hub. These priorities serve as the driving force of development and social progress. Bilgin (2015) summarises that Turkish energy strategy has both political and market-led sides. On the politics side, economic concerns and trade opportunities have leading roles; on the market side, growing domestic energy demand leads to initiatives aimed at diversifying resources and suppliers.

Turkey’s energy strategies, formulated by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, stem from domestic market characteristics. In its strategies, the issue of energy security is synchronised with geopolitical features and foreign policy priorities (Bilgin, 2015). In the 2010-2014 (2009:10) energy strategy, the mission is stated as follows:

Our mission is evaluating the energy and mining resources effectively, efficiently, securely, timely and environmentally friendly and therefore reducing import dependence and bringing the highest contribution to national prosperity.

This accords with the vision of making the country the leader of its region in energy and natural resources. In the 2015-2019 (2014:17) energy strategy, the mission was stated as:

Providing the highest contribution to national welfare by utilising energy and natural resources in the most efficient and environmentally-conscious manner.

This document aims at a reliable future for energy and natural resources. Regarding achieving these missions, the two documents initially emphasise the requirement of developing Turkey’s own indigenous resources. In the 2010-2014 (2009:12) energy strategy document it was stated that:

The energy supply security, [...], is [...] significant for our country. Within the context of the energy supply security of our country, in recent years, the legal and technical studies have been intensified for the purpose of restructuring our energy market with a market understanding that is based on competition and transparent, detecting and using our domestic and renewable resources potential, integrating the nuclear energy into the electricity production, and utilizing the new energy technologies.

Despite its efforts to build its energy base with renewable and nuclear energy, the Turkish economy still heavily depends on fossil fuels (Güney, 2015). Thus, paying
attention to energy diversification, it is connected with wealth and they are seen as an inseparable whole. As an example, in the 2015-2019 strategy document (2014:32), it is stated that:

Diversification of primary energy resources and utilization of the country’s resources rationally are the key components for both of sustainability and low-cost energy supply. Resource diversity involves diversity both in resource type and in the import country. Within this context, reducing the risks arising from import dependency and bringing forward indigenous energy resources are of utmost significance in terms of the national economy.

Thus, putting special emphasis on political stability and economic wealth, it can be argued that energy has become a high politics issue. Taking into account these two strategy documents, it can be stated that the image demonstrated to the public is that energy is vital for the public’s economic wealth and for national prosperity. Balat (2010) asserts that high dependency on imported fossil fuels might make Turkey at risk of energy supply disruptions and volatility in energy prices. Expressing problems of the energy sector to the public, the aims of becoming an energy hub and the need for a reliable future, as exceptional measures, are justified. It is expressed that Turkey needs to pursue active energy diplomacy, using its geostrategic position effectively and ensuring regional cooperation.

In Appendix 5, it is indicated that Turkey’s consumption of natural gas has grown dramatically over the last few years: between 2003 and 2013 alone it doubled from 20.9bcm to 45.6bcm (Güney, 2015). This growth in consumption has led Turkey to be the eighth largest natural gas importer in the world and this automatically makes it an important client.

Imported oil and natural gas are the main drivers of the Turkish economy. The share of energy sector imports in the country’s imports in 2014 was 22.67% (ITC website, 2015). Spending nearly one quarter of its import budget on one sector greatly affects the economic balance of the country. Hence Bilgin (2011) points out that growing energy demand is a significant challenge both in economic and political terms and so Turkey’s energy security has been shaped at its domestic level. Energy security, therefore, in Turkish energy strategy documents, refers to maintenance of a secure and reasonably-priced energy supply for its growing economy (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources website, 2015).
Coşkun and Carlson (2010) argue that Turkey’s energy strategy shows how the government is attempting to use energy for political purposes. This is because it is believed that energy can help provide national political stability. Thus it invites and cooperates with initiatives within and outside the country. Investments in the energy sector as well as other economic sectors have become an important priority. Economic development in particular, during the tenure of Erdoğan and his party (the Justice and Development Party) has been achieved via increasing foreign investment in Turkey. Traditionally, energy investments in Turkey relied on the state, but with some privatisation attempts, such as the privatisation of National Petroleum Refineries, the new government has pursued a liberal approach. Bacık (2006) describes these as rather materialistic, considering benefit-cost analysis, and pragmatic.

Furthermore, Turkish political elites intend to adapt the country’s energy systems to the most accepted energy system, the European one. In this context, it is an observer in the Energy Community (Bilgin, 2015). The aim of Turkey is to demonstrate itself as a reliable partner for the EU, in particular in regards to energy transport, and since the energy sector is quite important, it wants to protect itself from potential risks by being part of the European grid. Turkey also carries out many reforms so as to harmonise itself with the political, technical and legal conditions of the energy market (Bacık, 2006).

Although the Turkish authorities are open to the idea of the privatisation of the oil sector, they are quite conservative about the natural gas sector due to its importance to economic development and growth. Since most of the electricity generation in the country is provided from natural gas, which is expected to grow up to 45bcm by 2030, the resource is crucial for Ankara. Apart from electricity generation and the industrial sector, natural gas is also used in the household sector due to environmental concerns (Rzayeva, 2014). Thus it has been under government control for decades, and natural gas policies are important.

The above analysis highlights the importance of the energy sector for Turkey. It, to some extent, securitises energy in particular circumstances related to its heavy dependence on energy imports, and its economic sensitivity to increasing energy prices. However, the exceptional measures that it used have been different from those pursued by other countries in the same situation. Turkey has pursued a multidimensional and
balanced foreign policy which has aimed to desecuritise energy by improving its relations with energy suppliers both in economic and political terms.

2.4.1 Energy and foreign policy

Although Turkey is itself poor in energy resources, it is located near some of the world’s richest energy producing regions, which constitute approximately 75% of the world’s proven hydrocarbon reserves. This allows it to become a bridge between oil and gas producers in the Caspian Sea and the Middle East on the one hand and European customers on the other. This gives energy policy its most pertinent political dimension. Turkey intends to project an image of itself as a reliable country for these suppliers.

The difference between Turkey and Russia is that a lack of energy resources but a convenient geopolitical location has led Turkey to organise its energy policies more globally. In the 2010-2014 (2009:29) energy strategy, it is stated that:

Our ministry has been applying the policies and strategies, based on the provision of national supply security and the contribution to supply stability in the region and the world, by taking the leading role in the significant regional oil and natural gas projects and sustaining its resolve in the area. Moreover, for contributing to electricity energy supply security and for the supply of adequate energy without any interruption and at high quality, we are also giving importance to the interconnections with the neighbouring countries bilaterally and as multi-parties (regional).

As can be seen from this quotation, energy not only refers to national security but also to regional/global security. Turkey, in this complex environment, has found itself a new identity or political image, which is as an energy hub, or at least a significant and secure energy transit route. This has led it be more active in energy diplomacy in order to fulfil its aim of becoming an essential regional actor. This, in the 2010-2014 (2009:29) strategy, is also stated as follows:

Turkey is aiming at playing a significant role in the axis of developments in the global energy sector and within the framework of the advantages brought by its private geostrategic condition, in the provision of the diversification of supplier countries for its

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12 This ironically causes popular wisdom among Turkish people in the expression that if Turkey is located next to energy abundant countries, why does it lack its own resources? The answer to this question often links to global powers not wanting Turkey to become rich and so they prevent it from drilling its resources. Indeed, the Turkish Petroleum Cooperation published a report titled ‘Energy Legends’ (2009 cited in Pamir, 2015) aiming to clarify the energy picture of the country for the public.
own energy security, as well as playing a significant role in the transfer of rich hydrocarbon resources to growing markets and especially the EU market.

Bilgin (2015) claims that the Turkish authorities’ aims are to link national energy security with international recognition and the building of regional and global relations.

At the end of the Cold War, parallel to changes in the international security climate, the foreign policy and security conceptualisations that Turkey went through in the 1990s and early 2000s led to a change in the foreign policy discourse at the domestic level. While during the Cold War Turkish foreign policy determined its priorities principally in accordance with the security threat coming from the Soviet Union (and so it became a member of NATO, making it its main security provider, and also aimed to become an EU member), after the collapse of the Soviet Union non-security aspects such as cultural vicinity, and economic benefits like foreign direct investments and bilateral trade, have become stronger determinants of new foreign policy approaches (Tür and Han, 2011). In other words, instead of securitising neighbours, Turkey now desecuritises them, and even though it feels threatened by some of those countries, it rather prefers to establish a convergence of interests (Barrinha, 2013). In this respect, for instance, Turkey enhanced its relations with Russia and Syria, and attempted to do the same with Armenia (Aras and Polat, 2008; Babalı, 2009). This strongly influences its energy policies as well.

Its location gives Turkey a chance to diversify its suppliers, even among those whom it used to feel threatened by. Its main aim now is to desecuritise energy relations with potential suppliers. This is because it has to build pipelines in order to fulfil its needs. Even though it feels threatened in terms of energy supply, therefore, the degree of benefits gained, both financially and politically, is, to some extent, more dominant than security concerns, and so the energy sector for Turkey has political and economic dimensions. This reflects on its foreign policy thought as well. It participates in both Russian-backed and non-Russian projects, and intends to ensure close relations with all energy suppliers. In this sense the recent increased dialogue with Israel and the Kurdish region in Iraq can be given as examples. Although Turkey and Israel had a crisis due to

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13 Syria is a special case because, particularly historically, it had often supported Kurdish terrorist leaders and terrorist groups in its territory, and both countries have other problems originating in the usage of the water of the Euphrates and Tigris. The two countries initially converged after Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad came to power, but this closeness ended when Turkey supported anti-Assad rebels in Syria.
the Mavi Marmara fleet incident, and Turkey and the Kurdish region were in conflict due to the terrorist groups in the latter region, Turkey has pursued close interests in energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Iraqi Kurdish region, on the basis of the transportation of these both to its domestic market and to the European market.

These divergent energy diplomacy dimensions have close relations with Turkey’s aim of becoming an energy hub, which stresses Turkey’s extensive influence on a web of oil and gas pipelines as well as LNG trade, not only in terms of its ability to influence transit terms and conditions, but also in re-exporting some of the hydrocarbons passing through this system. (Bilgin, 2010:114)

Turkey, therefore, has increased its efforts to build new oil and natural gas pipelines to transform its energy perspective from a local level to that of a global energy hub (Bacik, 2006; Bilgin, 2011). Its domestic energy investments and enhanced relations with energy suppliers and corridor/transit countries, including Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries, in addition to all its neighbours, coincide with each other; Bilgin (2011) claims that these indicate the possibility of Turkey becoming an emerging hub. According to political elites, this requires strong state control over the sector. The energy sector is therefore one of Turkey’s most strategic industrial sectors and has been under government/state control for decades. Even though in relevant energy strategies privatisation and liberal reforms are often mentioned, the main energy companies – BOTAŞ14 and the Turkish Petroleum Cooperation15 – are still state-driven (Bacik, 2006; Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources website, 2015).

Taking into account the domestic and foreign politics dimensions, overall it can be stated that Turkey’s energy policies have various dimensions ranging from national to global. It attempts to increase its share in international projects and its role in

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14 The state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Company (Boru Hatları ile Petrol Taşıma A.Ş., BOTAŞ) is the most significant company in the natural gas sector in Turkey. It operates in crude oil transportation, as well as transportation, distribution, import, storage, marketing, trade and export of natural gas (BOTAŞ website, 2015). In addition to ensuring adequate supply for the domestic market, a key part of this mandate has been participation in international pipeline projects.

15 The Turkish Petroleum (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, TPAO) is the main exploration, drilling, well completion and production entity in Turkey. It is a state-owned firm aiming to meet Turkey’s hydrocarbon demands in the near future. Its mission is to fulfil Turkey’s oil and natural gas potential, providing for the needs of the Turkish economy, supplying new sources of income via international activities and playing an effective role in the energy sector by also actively participating in Turkey’s project of being an energy corridor (TPAO website, 2014). TPAO alone accounts for the majority of the country’s oil output.
international energy routes while at the same time supplying its domestic needs. Also, the integration of the Turkish system into neighbouring ones, namely the European energy system, has been the main target of Turkish energy politics. These, according to Bacık (2006), are relevant to each other and influence Ankara’s standing in energy politics. They forced Turkey to create a functional and complex energy system so as to realise what is needed for maximising its national interests (Bacık, 2006). Moreover, Babalı (2009) claims that since energy is an important device for foreign policy, Ankara is more careful in conducting its politics, between its own interests and its desire not to antagonise any of its neighbours or allies. Its political behaviour of retaining balance between clashing sides in energy diplomacy, as analysed in detail in subsequent chapters, can be illustrated as an example that this is the priority of Turkish foreign energy policy, which means the Turkish energy policy approach is located between securitisation and desecuritisation but close to the latter one.

Regarding analysing the attitude of the public, it is possible to claim that the (de)securitisation of energy in Turkey has been successful. In particular, the discourse during the supply cuts, particularly from Iran, in winter, and busy tanker traffic in the Straits paved the way for the Turkish public to be aware of the importance of sustainable and secure energy supply. Within this sense they support and find successful their government’s diversification of energy supply policies. Indeed, in surveys conducted by Eurobarometer during 2007 and 2014, the question of ‘what do you think the most important issues facing your country at the moment?’ was asked, and Turkish citizens’ perception of energy as a security issue was around 1%, while unemployment and terrorism constituted the top two issues (Eurobarometer website, 2014).

2.5 Conclusion

The BSR consists of weak and strong states, and they have various national security problems: while some states are exposed to economic and political instability and interstate and intrastate conflicts, others are exposed to their neighbours’ political ambitions and instability. Hanson (2007) specifies that states are exposed to pervasive corruption, personalistic rule, legal arbitrariness and internal conflicts. In this atmosphere, states need to solve their problems. Energy has become a priority for each
country, since states of the BSR are either rich energy suppliers or heavily dependent on energy imports. King (2008a:17) addresses that:

The politics of oil and gas have not only strategic-level implications for the entire region but also domestic political and security dimensions in the countries that currently benefit most directly from the region’s hydrocarbon wealth.

Energy is seen as a tool for economic growth and political stability, and so it becomes important, even to the extent of becoming a focus for securitisation. The way of expressing energy as a case of securitisation is apparent in states’ reference to energy as a matter of survival/sovereignty. In particular, their emphasis on the issues of heavy dependence on external energy resources and on single suppliers illustrates how they securitise energy. In these problematic circumstances states’ securitising elites often stress the need for the diversification of suppliers and resources in their policy documents.

Furthermore, this chapter indicated that for Russia and Turkey issues related to economy, political and security strongly are some of the most salient factors that influence the patterns of conflict and cooperation between the two countries. Thus, it is necessary not only to focus on the patterns of the relationship but also to bear in mind the factors shaping them.

The aim of this chapter has been to understand the dynamics shaping Russian and Turkish national energy security discourses. Russian political elites consider the energy sector to be central to political and economic stability, leading them to increase their control over the sector. In order to justify their initiatives, the Russian political elite utilise the idea that there is a threat to Russian national stability and security. Turkish political elites, however, consider the energy sector as more economy-oriented. Since its dependence on energy is high and its economic development depends on energy imports, in theory it is expected that the Turkish view would be more security-oriented. However, using the advantages of its geographical location, energy is rather used as a tool to gain political recognition in the international arena as an energy hub.

For both countries, energy and foreign policies are interrelated. They have a tendency to desecuritise energy in their relations with other states. While Russia tends to desecuritise its relations with energy customers, Turkey has done this with energy suppliers. However, desecuritisation is more visible in the Turkish case since it has
more foreign connections. Russia uses energy as a weapon in order to retain control over customers and routes, which are often former Soviet republics.

The oil and natural gas sectors of each country illustrate similarities. While for both countries the oil sector is more flexible, natural gas on the other hand is considered a vital industry that the state has to retain its control over. The dependence on natural gas is stronger than dependence on crude oil for both countries.

Finally, it is possible to claim that the (de)securitisation of energy at the domestic level has been successful. In the Russian case the public believed that oligarchs aimed to maximise their financial and political benefits over the state, and so they supported strong state control over energy companies. In the Turkish case the public believe that the potential of supply cuts in winter, and busy tanker traffic in the Straits, are threats, and so they support state policies aimed at the diversification of suppliers and resources.

In accordance with these differences and similarities, it is necessary to analyse the role of energy in bilateral relations in order to grasp the effect of the above-indicated referent objects. Furthermore, since securitisation is a process, it is important to perceive how energy is seen as a threat, or whether it is indeed a threat.
CHAPTER 3

3. THE BILATERAL LEVEL OF THE BLACK SEA REGION AND RUSSIAN-TURKISH (ENERGY) RELATIONS

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter was specifically concerned with the domestic level, analysing it through the lens of the (de)securitisation of energy in countries of the BSR. It argued that for many countries in the region energy has a strong connection with political stability, economic growth and territorial integrity, and so these are used as referent objects in order to persuade the public that there is a threat to their survival. It was also pointed out that dynamics in the region are quite varied. Some of smaller countries in the region have a tendency to securitise energy on the basis of their vulnerability. Others, particularly Russia, have securitised energy because of the importance of their resource endowment, whereas the final group, particularly Turkey, have sought to desecuritise and conduct policy on a more ‘politicised’ basis. The current chapter explores the evidence for these divergent processes in bilateral relations and evaluates why and how formerly securitised issues have begun to be perceived as normal political issues, or the other way around.

The reason behind following the domestic level with the bilateral level is to claim that the domestic level strongly influences the determination of the nature of the mutual relationship. In other words, domestic dimensions strongly shape the dynamics behind the bilateral level. In this sense, it can be stated that bilateral relations in the BSR are an example of complicated relations. When taking into account bilateral (energy) relations between Russia and some countries of the region, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, the relationship is often closer to securitisation. Here the pattern of conflict is predominant. Whereas bilateral (energy) relations between smaller countries of the region and Turkey are closer to desecuritisation, even normal politics. The pattern of cooperation is predominant. Overall, this chapter argues that each state’s perception of the other, as a factor, has shaped the pattern of conflict and cooperation between them.

Leaving aside Russia and Turkey, the (energy) relationships between regional countries have been affected by their perceptions of each other. In other words, historically close relations have led countries to maintain their cooperation in varied areas, as has
happened between Georgia and Azerbaijan. In conflictual relationships, which emerge due to frozen interstate conflicts, the relationship is very limited, as has happened between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Furthermore, it is argued here that bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey have been undergoing a process of desecuritisation. I argue that although energy used to be a potential source of security threat between the countries, it has become one of the salient elements leading the countries to cooperate. In this context, it can be claimed that the discourse is rearticulated from historical enmity or threat to a multidimensional partnership with energy at its hearth. Desecuritisation can be understood in bilateral relations as the broadening of the boundaries of normal politics. The current bilateral relations are manifested in tourism, the economy, bilateral trade and regional security.

Roe (2004) argues that desecuritisation could be achieved either by the management of threats or their transformation. Taking into account this claim and drawing on Hansen’s insight (2012:529), the main argument is that Russian-Turkish bilateral relations are an example of rearticulation happening “when an issue is moved from the securitised to the politicised due to a resolution of the threats and dangers, that underpinned the original securitisation”. In other words, previously securitised dimensions start to be rearticulated towards normal politics. In this regard, the nature of bilateral relations in general as well as those related to energy used to be perceived as a security threat by the two countries. However, with the increase in dialogue and trade in the economic sector as well as with regards to energy, which are solutions to existing problems, both countries define the nature of their relationship as multidimensional or as a strategic partnership. In the outcome of the process of desecuritisation, the discourse has changed dramatically. For instance, Turkey is articulated as a new energy partner/route for Russia, while Russia is perceived as a reliable supplier for Turkey.

My emphasis on processes of desecuritisation is in contrast to the approach adopted in much of the current literature on Russian-Turkish energy relations. While much of it focuses on the outcomes of bilateral relations, particularly the emergence of a multidimensional partnership (Sidar and Winrow, 2011; Kardaş, 2011-12), it does so without reference to securitisation and desecuritisation. The approach adopted in this thesis thus provides a better understanding of the nature of the changing relationship between the countries.
After scrutinising bilateral relations in the BSR in general, the chapter discusses historical development of bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey, highlighting the transformation from conflict to cooperation, and outlining the reasons for this transformation. This chapter argues that developing and diversifying bilateral economic relations, taking into account investment, tourism and trade, has led the two countries to carry their relationship into a multidimensional level. As energy is one of the most significant elements of cooperation in bilateral relations, this chapter focuses on the development of bilateral energy relations, taking into account four significant empirical examples: Blue Stream, South Stream, the Akkuyu Nuclear Plant project and Turkish Stream. Drawing on surveys, media reports and the author’s interviews, the chapter assesses how far the Russian-Turkish (energy) relationship can been seen as a successful example of desecuritisation. This chapter aims to explain the role of energy in shaping bilateral relations whether as a security threat/risk or a commercial transaction. On this basis, it aims to explore whether and how energy is securitised or desecuritised at the bilateral level.

3.2 General assessment of bilateral relations of BSR states

An issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2011, vol. 3), specifically focused on ‘managing distrust in the BSR’, emphasises the bilateral problems preventing countries of the region from building trust. Saari (2011), for example, points to the lack of trust among countries. Having shared borders for centuries, countries in the BSR have complex relations. For instance, historically the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) was perceived as a threat to countries in the region, while Russia was perceived as the most important country with which they could cooperate (see King, 2004b; 2008b). However, developments in the political and economic situation led to a great transformation of perceptions in bilateral relations among countries and thus the roles of each country changed dramatically.

Conflict and cooperation are still important in the BSR, and this greatly influences states’ bilateral political, economic and also energy relations. When close relations are the main determinant of bilateral relations, states tend to establish cooperation in varied areas, whereas in conflict they rather prefer to limit mutual interaction to a low degree or even to have no relationship at all. The conflict automatically brings military-political
concerns to the highest level and, as Christou and Adamides (2013) assert, the survival of the state becomes the main driving force of regional countries, leading them to pursue the maximisation of their political concerns; in cooperation, these concerns are at the lowest level.

Russia’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine can be given as a significant example of conflict. Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian relations have a long history. Feeling threatened by Ottoman and Persian influence led Georgia and Ukraine to turn to Russia to protect them, but this ended up with Russian domination of both countries until 1991 (King, 2004b, 2008b; German, 2012a). As both countries were part of the USSR before 1991, the relationship with ‘Russia’ only emerged as a consequence of the Soviet collapse. The relationship between Russia and these countries were relatively positive in particular during in the early years of independence: rule under Kuchma in Ukraine and Shevardnadze in Georgia. Even so, when the two countries sought to develop their relations with the West, Russia continued to meddle in their affairs. The failure of those leaders to solve economic problems and internal disputes paved the way for further tensions in the relationships as post-Soviet republics asserted their unwilling to align with Russia in their domestic and international policy choices (Nalbandov, 2016).

Relations between these countries and Russia have become more difficult since the turn of the century. Serious tensions arose with the anti-Russian Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. Since these revolutions, bilateral relations have been in perpetual political conflict over Georgia’s and Ukraine’s geopolitical orientations (Antonenko, 2009). In both relationships each side describes the other in extremely negative terms and securitisises the other (see in particular Russian support for secessionist activities in these countries). Indeed, as seen in Georgia in 2008 with the five-day war, and in 2014 in Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea, relations have descended into violent conflict.

From the Russian perspective, Ukraine and Georgia need to be retained under Russian control or at least have a pro-Russian government structure. This is because, among other issues, from the Russian point of view, Georgia and Ukraine are its southern flank and are strategic gateways to the Black Sea, and so they are important for its security. They are buffer zones between Russia and the EU as well as NATO. When it cannot retain its control, its attempts to keep them unstable have become Russia’s priority, and
using its resources as a tool has been a major way of achieving this. Apart from specifically targeting the leaders of the colour revolutions – Saakashvili and Yushchenko – Russia adopted a punitive approach. In the Georgian case it imposed sanctions on Georgian exports (particularly wine and mineral water) and gave Russian passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians. Moreover, in both countries Russia has supported secessionist movements: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Russian minority in eastern and southern Ukraine. Through such policies, according to Nalbandov (2016), Russia intends to destabilise these countries’ domestic political structure by jeopardising their territorial integrity. Buzan and Wæver (2003) explain this pattern of relations as one of the characteristic forms of conflict involving a package of interconnecting securitisation in bilateral relations, forming the triangle minority/state/Russia, such as Abkhazia/Georgia/Russia.

On the Ukrainian and Georgian sides, the most common discourse is that there is a threat to their territorial integrity, and their efforts to protect democracy and basic freedoms. Moreover, the discourse presents the Russian state as aiming to undermine their countries, turning them into failed states and forcibly returning them to the Russian political orbit (see MFA Georgia website, 2015). Moreover, they also have concerns about Russia’s military presence in Crimea and occupied territories in Georgia, which block their territorial integration and invite possible provocations and aggressions. Through such actions, according to them, Russia aims to hinder the realisation of their European and Euro-Atlantic ambition.

Looking at these tensions, it can be argued that, as RSCT clarifies, there is more security interaction among neighbours in the BSR than among states located in different areas; as Buzan and Wæver (2003) assert, threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. Moreover, because mutual perceptions tend to have negative connotations, in the case of the BSR, these divisions influence states’ political agendas, reinforcing security concerns. As a result, states tend to securitise each other, establishing a sort of interdependency between states.

Accepting the fact that Russia has close relations with some countries due to common Soviet legacies, Turkey’s relations with countries of the region can be an example of cooperation. Particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey became more involved in the region, with attempts at founding organisations (detailed in Chapter 4)
and attempts at economic improvement (Winrow, 2007b). In order to do so it has
desecuritised bilateral relations with the post-Soviet space. The country’s energy
relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia (detailed below), the economic relations
with all regional countries (Appendix 2) and the political relations with Bulgaria (Hale,
2013) might be given as examples.

Taking into account conflicting and cooperating dynamics, it can be claimed that states
are inclined to choose partners and allies that help ensure a balance of power in the
region and so, as Buzan and Wæver (2003) articulate, they establish their own security
constellations depending on common concerns.

### 3.3 The role of energy in bilateral relations in the BSR

Energy is potentially an important threat to countries’ national security (Khrushcheva,
2012). This is because not every country has energy resources; customers depend on a
supplier for energy, while suppliers depend on a customer for income. This increases
the possibility of dependence, as defined by Keohane and Nye (2012) and as discussed
in Chapter 1. The BSR is vulnerable if regional countries cannot find any alternative
supplies or routes from countries other than Russia, and this automatically raises
security and political concerns. However, due to its geopolitical location, the region’s
countries have other options, which reduce the possibility of vulnerability, but this
depends on planning pipeline projects. Thus, the policy of energy diversification aims to
reduce vulnerability, but sensitivity still exists (Casier, 2011).

The dependency becomes more intense between states or regions geographically close
to each other and will influenced by how a state perceives its neighbour. Maltby
(2015:811) claims that “dependence on a single energy source can shift between a
perception of a mutually beneficial interdependency and negative, unequal and even
threatening dependency”. Thus, according to Maltby (2015), conflict and cooperation
are factors explaining the reasons behind the desecuritisation and/or securitisation of
energy.

There is growing energy interdependency between the states of the BSR; just as energy
customer countries of the region depend on supplier countries of the region – for
example Armenia heavily depends on Russia – suppliers depend on customers or
corridors as well – for example, Azerbaijan needs Turkey as a corridor for its energy transportation because it is a landlocked country, as well as Turkey as a market. Hence it is necessary to explore the impact of these issues on political and security concerns. Despite accepting strong interdependency in the energy sector, in some cases states, particularly customer states, could use energy as a referent object, meaning that dependence on a single supplier becomes potentially an existential threat to bilateral relations.

While some countries, who have a difficult relationship with a supplier on whom they depend, securitise energy, and so aim to diversify their suppliers, others, due to close bilateral relations, do not even consider energy a security issue, and so energy has become a normal political issue. For some countries, who used to have conflicted relations, developing relationships pave the way for abandoning perceptions of threats, and beginning a new dialogue, engaging in a process of desecuritisation. While political and security concerns are strong in the securitisation of energy, economic benefits are strong in the desecuritisation of energy.

Regarding the above-stated political features of bilateral relations, I argue that, while positive perceptions among states strongly enhance energy partnerships, negative perceptions seriously affect mutual energy security. Among BSR countries there is clear securitisation between Russian-Ukrainian (2006 and 2009 crises) and Russian-Georgian energy relations; while energy is seen as a normal political issue between Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian energy relations (Turkey-Azerbaijan, Turkey-Georgia, Azerbaijan-Georgia); and desecuritisation is seen in Russian-Turkish energy relations.

### 3.3.1 Securitisation of energy in bilateral relations

Energy relations with Russia are an important case of securitisation for some countries in the region. Russia’s energy relations with its near neighbours, in essence, are rooted in the Soviet era, when all the Soviet republics were tied together by a network of gas pipelines fed by Russia (Newnham, 2015). This historical fact is still strong for many post-Soviet republics and this makes them – both energy suppliers and customers – heavily dependent on Russia. This provides Russia with a market and with the political power to influence its near neighbours. Russia has managed this legacy to control the market and pipelines, as well as other energy facilities, and maintain its position as the
main energy actor in neighbouring countries, and thereby exercise political leverage. Where it cannot control them, it aims to bypass them or works hard to ensure that these countries cannot find alternative routes (Nygren, 2008b; Newnham, 2011).

The perception of Russia towards these countries, therefore, plays a salient role in its policies. According to this notion, if the customer or transit country is a friend (such as Armenia), Russia considers energy a normal political issue, and so tends to sell resources at relatively cheap prices, and contributes to these countries’ energy infrastructure with subsidies that Newnham (2011:140) defines as ‘petro-carrots’. If the relation is one of animosity, however, Russia tends to use “measures such as punitive price increases and demands for debt payment”, and if it is a country that it depends on for energy transportation, like Ukraine, it seeks to diversify its routes and cut off the resources of the transit country; approaches that Newnham (2011) calls ‘petro-sticks’, as seen in the cases of Georgia and Moldova. This, however, has led to its reliability as a supplier being questioned more widely (Monaghan, 2007; Feklyunina, 2012). These examples illustrate that Russian energy power over its neighbours either consolidates cooperation in bilateral relations or deepens conflict where energy has become a threat. Securitisation of energy is an inevitable outcome of this latter approach.

Furthermore, security of energy is another important issue for Russia in terms of the secure transportation of resources to markets. From a Russian perspective, as stated in the previous chapter, energy security refers to ensuring secure routes to its customers, and ‘security of demand’, and therefore it feels threatened by nearby countries, which are the areas it needs to control in order to control those routes (Kirchner and Berk, 2010). This is because, in terms of its geographical location, although Russia borders on two of the world’s major energy importers, the EU and China, in some cases it needs transit countries. However, in the EU case, the present transit countries have unfriendly relations with Russia, and thus this risks its supply. As a result, it has taken steps to secure dominance over the pipeline infrastructure in the BSR and the Caspian Sea region in order to prevent the West’s dominance over these regions.

For other countries in the region, being faced with energy disruption and Russia’s usage of energy as a political weapon has led countries to consider dependence on energy

16 Currently 33% of Russian natural gas transits via Ukraine to the EU, which is a fall from 80% (Valdai website, 2015).
from Russia as a security issue (Baev, 2008; Smith Stegen, 2011). From the perspective of securitisation theory, in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is perceived as an existential threat to their energy requirements, as they believe that Russia intends to use its resources as a tool to punish them due to their non-Russian political stance (Goldman, 2008; Newnham, 2013). The perception that energy supply is insecure to the extent that Russia is involved leads to political action. In these two countries’ cases, such actions include the diversification of suppliers and the use of their geopolitical importance in energy transportation as a tool for getting political support from their Russia-dependent EU counterparts.

In the case of Russian-Ukrainian energy relations, the relationship between the two sides was relatively stable until the Orange Revolution. Russian-Ukrainian political relations were at their closest and energy was one of the main driving forces of bilateral relations. For years Russia kept gas prices quite low (at about $50 per thousand cubic meters), and also let Ukraine buy even cheaper natural gas from Turkmenistan through the Russian pipeline system (Newnham, 2013). Moreover, the first Russian Ambassador in Ukraine under Putin was the former Prime Minister and head of Gazprom, Chernomyrdin (Nygren, 2008b). Russian energy supply to Europe travels mostly through Ukrainian territory, making the country one of the most important energy corridor countries in the world, because at one point more than 80% of Russian gas was transported via Ukrainian territory.

Following the Orange Revolution, the energy relationship deteriorated as part of the general worsening of relations between the two countries. The 2006 and the 2009 energy crises happened, when bilateral political relations were at their lowest and mutual mistrust at one of its highest points. In 2006 the Russian energy giant Gazprom announced price increases for Ukraine from $50 to $230, and Ukraine refused to pay this price (Bahgat, 2006; see Pirani et al., 2009). This amount was out of Ukraine’s price range and so energy became a security issue. One of the aspects of energy security, as stated in the literature review chapter, is to ensure resources at reasonable prices, because when a supplier dramatically increases energy prices, this leaves countries politically and economically in a difficult position; substantial bilateral tensions deepen. Although on the Russian side it was often stated that there were economic reasons behind this activity (Percival, 2008), the most widely accepted explanation is its intention to punish Ukraine due to its non-Russian policy activities (Smith Stegen, 2011;
Newnham, 2011). According to this understanding, the above-indicated change in the political atmosphere in Ukraine and its anti-Russian attitude led Russia to play the energy card and use economic sanctions (Goldman, 2008; Newnham, 2013). Balmaceda (2012) mixes these assessments and claims that Russia’s position is politics through economic means. In this sense, Russia curtailed the natural gas supply to Ukraine for three days, while still planning to transit gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory. Kiev’s reaction was to divert these gas volumes for its own consumption (Kropatcheva, 2011). Until the two sides found a solution for this crisis, some European countries had to face disruption in gas supply, which called to question the reliability of Russia as a supplier and prompted them to find alternatives (Percival, 2008) (detailed in Chapter 5). The 2009 gas crisis occurred when the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine was completely halted for two weeks (Pirani et al., 2009; Tagliapietra, 2014). As a result of these two crises it can be argued that the disruption of energy supply has serious political and economic consequences, as well as implications for security.

As can be clearly seen, changing the nature of the bilateral relationship had a profound impact. The two crises, with regards to Ukraine, illustrate its overt dependence on Russia. This is because even though it was technically possible for Ukraine to obtain gas from Turkmenistan, there is no direct pipeline system and all imports pass through Russia and the effective control of Gazprom (Chifu, 2010). Ukraine had to pay 10% more than other customer countries, such as Germany, and this seriously affected its economic development and public peace (Newnham, 2013). Moreover, Newnham (2011) states that Ukraine has realised its mistake in believing that Russia depends on it more than it depend on Russia. This is because Russia has questioned the reliability of Ukraine as a transit country, and the new target of the Russian political elite was to decrease their dependence on Ukraine by means of alternatives such as the Nord Stream through the Baltic Sea and the proposed South Stream through the Black Sea. The broad influence of the two crises demonstrates that “the immediacy and severity of the impact of energy-related threats quickly spills over from the economic sector and into the political, given that lack of energy is an existential threat for the state as a whole and not just the economy” (Christou and Adamides, 2013:515).

The Russia-Georgia bilateral energy relationship is another case of securitisation. Before the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia was one of Russia’s most significant energy transit countries and electricity buyers. After the Revolution, however, Russia’s
attitude towards Georgia changed dramatically. Apart from supporting breakaway regions inside the country, Russia disrupted economic ties with the country, including with regards to energy. Gazprom increased gas prices; from 2004 to 2006 the price demanded by Gazprom increased from $50 to $235, and this made Georgia the first country to pay full ‘Western’ prices before Ukraine (see Jervalidze, 2006; Newnham, 2015). This was followed by a temporary cutting off of gas to Georgia (Pirani, 2010). Moreover, at about the same time, in January 2006 (when the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis happened), the gas pipeline from Russia passing through North Ossetia to Georgia exploded, and also there were some disruptions in the flow of electricity from Russia (Goldman, 2008).

Georgia is a significant energy corridor country that Russia does not want to risk losing. When thinking of the dependency of Armenia on Russia, their close relations, and Armenia’s problematic relations with its neighbours, Georgia is the only country through which Russia can transport its resources to Armenia. However, given its problematic relations with Georgia, Russia has put its supply of resources to Armenia at risk.

Georgia’s close energy cooperation with Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic bloc is also a source of concern for Russia. This is because it is one of countries that could change its energy dependence on Russia to Azerbaijan, and within this context could “secure itself against Gazprom’s notorious price manipulations” (Chifu, 2010:30). Indeed, it is believed that one of the reasons behind the war in 2008 was to punish Georgia for hosting alternative routes, while indicating to European states the insecure character of Georgia (Allison, 2008; Glebov, 2009). German (2009) describes the situation as so-called Russian petro-politics, whereby Russia intends to balance its political benefits and supply concerns.

After their respective crises with Russia, Georgia and Ukraine both faced political instability and economic problems. In 2007 there were demonstrations against Saakashvili, calling for his resignation, such that he was forced to declare a temporary state of emergency, which risked his position in the following election. In Ukraine the two natural gas crises led the public to question the Orange Revolution (Goldman, 2008; Newnham, 2011, 2013). Indeed, in this context, Russia’s success was overtly seen in the election of Yanukovich as President in the 2010 election.
Buzan et al. (1998:95) place energy in the economic sector, suggesting that securitisation of the economy “is exceedingly controversial and politicised”. They claim that energy is a tradeable good in the global market which is subject to market forces. Thus any issue related to the subject does not pose an existential threat beyond the economic sector (Christou and Adamides, 2013). The Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian cases, however, illustrate that energy is rather securitised in the political sector, even though it could have consequences in the economic sector and so it is difficult for conflicted sides to converge; energy in this sense is not an element to bring sides together. Therefore, this situation impedes the emergence of energy collaborations and possible desecuritisation processes in both the economic and political sectors (Christou and Adamides, 2013).

3.3.2 Energy as a normal political issue

The demise of the Soviet Union reinforced the importance of Azerbaijan as an alternative energy supplier, but its landlocked geographical location prevents it from supplying directly to the European market and so it has to enhance relations with potential corridor countries. Due to close historical and ethnic ties, Turkey is an inevitable and reliable option, so much so that authorities even describe bilateral relations as ‘one nation, two countries’. Georgia, another option where Baku could possibly normalise energy, has completes the energy transportation options for Azerbaijani exports to the European market. Energy, therefore, has a strong role in defining relations among these three countries. In the current literature, indeed, bilateral relations among these three countries are often correlated with energy. Kardaş (2011) and Aras (2014) describe energy as the main driving force of the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship; while Shaffer (2009) does the same for Georgia-Azerbaijan; and Balcı (2014) and Aktürk (2014) do likewise for Turkey-Georgia.

Not feeling threatened by each other, and their mutual positive (inter)dependency, are some of the important factors reinforcing the current circumstances in which energy is a normal political issue in bilateral relations among these three countries. They have shared the same geography for centuries, and during this time they did not have any serious problems with each other (King, 2004b, 2008b; Oskanian, 2013). After the demise of the Soviet Union their increasing energy demands, and their aim of
diversifying suppliers as well as transit routes, have intensified the (inter)dependency (Kardaş, 2011). Georgia needs Azerbaijan and Turkey in order to ensure balance against Russia, Azerbaijan needs them as supporters regarding its regional problems and as markets to supply, and Turkey needs them in order to attain its goal of becoming an energy hub. As seen in this example, high levels of interdependence tend to favour normalised relationships in the energy sector, even frequently leading to the development of strong alliances (Christou and Adamides, 2013). Each side, in this context, has made significant efforts to ensure the stability and vitality of the other, and they have undertaken significant policy steps in this regard. For instance, during negotiations over a transit agreement for the BTC project, even though World Bank experts insisted Azerbaijan increase the price for Georgia, Azerbaijan strongly resisted the proposal and kept the price as low as possible in order to ensure Georgia’s economic viability, which thus increased its stability (Shaffer, 2009; Newnham, 2015).

Since the three countries have reached an understanding on various energy issues, they have entered a new phase in energy cooperation, involving deeper partnership. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP\textsuperscript{17}), an Azerbaijan-proposed project, is an important example of normal politics. It is an Azerbaijan-based pipeline project, which makes it both supplier and constructor and distinguishes it from other projects (Ericson, 2012). Moreover, it is not an extension of already existing projects; on the contrary, it will operate as a standalone pipeline (Kardaş, 2014). TANAP is a new project, initiated in November 2011 and formally inaugurated in March 2014. It aims to provide 10bcm of gas from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe, with 6bcm for Turkish consumption, by 2018, and it is scheduled to be followed by its European portion, the TAP (Rzayeva, 2014).

TANAP is the locomotive of Azerbaijan’s political dream. Mitat Çelikpala, IR scholar at Istanbul-based Kadir Has University (Interview, 2015), sees TANAP as an asset, like a railway line. As the main supplier and constructor of the project, and defining the project as a major strategic investment (Socor, 2012a), Azerbaijan’s aim is to guarantee the project’s feasibility. This is because in these kinds of projects no country wants to risk its project by investing in or choosing a partner country that it already has tension

\textsuperscript{17}Its shareholders are SOCAR with 58\%, BOTAS with 30\% and BP with 12\%. The project run from the Turkish border with Georgia connecting to SCP system, go through Turkish-Greek border and further connecting to TAP.
with. Hence, it wants a country or countries that it has close relations with politically and trusts the most. As Herranz-Surrallés (2016) points out, the selection of supply routes via pipelines is an important political issue, because this infrastructure can tie producer, customer and transit countries into a relation of (inter)dependency. Choosing Turkey as the main partner of this project, where the pipeline build will be the longest, as well as Georgia, illustrates the positive dynamic behind trilateral relations. Moreover, Turkey holds a 30% share in the project, moving it beyond its customer and transit roles, to being significant in upstream and midstream (Kardaş, 2014). In this climate it is possible to claim that there is a strong connection between TANAP and normalisation.

This does not mean that relations are problem-free. There is a great price dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Financial issues, such as asking high supply and transit fees, have constituted the main problems (Kardaş, 2011). Indeed, Rzayeva (Interview, 2015) asserts that bilateral negotiations are stuck because Turkey’s main concern is price, while Volkan Özdemir, Research Director at Ankara-based EPPEN (Institute for Energy Markets and Policies) (Interview, 2015) points out the disadvantages of TANAP for Turkish energy demands, and focuses on low transit fees. Nevertheless, taking into account these problems, the argument might be made that the great interdependence between the two countries, and their close historical and ethnic ties, pave the way for new opportunities, allowing them to ignore these possible problems.

3.4 **Russian-Turkish bilateral relations**

3.4.1 **Historical assessment of Russian-Turkish bilateral relations from conflict to cooperation**

As Markushin (1997) explains, Russia and Turkey have been eternal neighbours, but this has not always led to partnership or convergence; on the contrary, for much of their history the two countries have perceived each other as a threat and as rivals (Özdal et al., 2013). For Russia, Turkey (previously the Ottoman Empire) was the gate preventing its access to warm seas, while for Turkey, Russia (previously Tsarist Russia) had shown great ambitions to destroy the country. This, indeed, led to thirteen wars in just four centuries (Kınıkoğlu and Morkva, 2007), until the cataclysm of the First World War caused the collapse of both empires and led to the new Soviet and Turkish Republics, who had close relations until the end of the Second World War. The reasons behind this
rapprochement were, as Çetinsaya (2007) and Hale (2013) assert, the perceived common threat from the West, which led both countries to see themselves as being in a common fight against the shared enemy of ‘Imperialism’, which was threatening their survival.

This mutual rapprochement could not go on for long because of the Soviet Union’s expansionist acts towards Turkey’s neighbourhood and its claim of rights over the Turkish Straits. Thus after the Second World War, Russia and Turkey joined different camps. During this period, while the Soviet Union belonged to one of the blocs in the bipolar international system, Turkey developed close relations with the other bloc. During the Cold War, due to ideological separation, mutual relations had to be cut completely and perceptions of a threat from the other side increased dramatically, leading to NATO becoming Turkey’s most important security provider. This is because, as Çetinsaya (2007:12) reveals, Turkey faced twenty divisions of Soviet land forces close to the common border, which stretched for more than 500km in the Transcaucasus region of northern Turkey, and heavily populated areas were within range of Soviet fighter aircraft and bombers. Soviet naval vessels and submarines were also well positioned to take control of the Black Sea.

Surrounded by Soviet Union countries as well as Warsaw Pact members in its north and east, the Soviet Union was strongly securitised in Turkish national security discourse. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey no longer shared a common border. In the very first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, mutual mistrust remained. Özbay (2011) rightfully defines this period as the ‘lost years’, due to mutual accusations that the other was the source of their national security problems. Russia worried about a strengthening of Pan-Turkism – with Turkey aiming to enhance relations with the ethnically Turkish nations of Central Asia due to its increasing influence over the region (Yanık, 2007; Donaldson et al., 2014). Russia also criticised Turkish support for Chechen separatists whose aim was to separate from Russia (Bazoğlu Sezer, 2000). Turkey criticised Russia’s support for Kurdish rebels and Greek Cypriots (Weitz, 2010).

According to Aktürk (2014) domestic secessionist threats in both countries paved the way for a major reorientation of threat perceptions away from external threats to internal threats, which also helped to desecuritise bilateral relations. Each country’s leaders’ expressions of respect to territorial integrity and their assertions that they would
not support any anti-Russian or anti-Turkish secessionism, taking neutral positions, paved the way for restoration of good relations. Since 1998 in particular, with the realisation of the failure of Pan-Turkism in its post-Soviet space, and its own struggles with domestic economic problems, Russia has softened its approach towards Turkey (Weitz, 2010). For instance, Moscow refused to give asylum to the Kurdish rebel Öcalan and redirected S-300 air defence missile systems planned for the Greek Cypriot government (Bazoğlu Sezer, 2000). These initiatives had some positive impact on relations, weakening Turkey’s perception of the threat from Russia.

Increasing bilateral interaction since the millennium due to domestic, global and regional incidents has brought the two countries together. During this period, the mutual threat perception of ‘enemy’ was replaced with a perception of ‘partnership’. Mankoff (2016) asserts that Russia has become less of a threat for Turkey, and that Turkey has become a useful partner for Russia. Özbay (2011) identifies this as a ‘maturation’ period in bilateral relations. Putin and Erdoğan have played an important role in deepening the relationship (Kuchins and Petersen, 2009). In this context, in 2004, in his first visit to Ankara, which was also the first to Turkey by a high-ranking Russian leader, President Putin argued that bilateral relations were based more on economic relations rather than political ones, which makes Turkey an exception for Russia. Moreover, the year 2005 in particular was in every sense, according to Özbay (2011), an *annus mirabilis* (incredible year). Within this year, the two leaders came together four times to sign important agreements (Özbay, 2011; Tanrısever, 2012).

This mutual convergence was interrupted by the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. Although Russia and Turkey did not clash with each other and Turkey played a more passive role than expected, this war damaged regional cooperation and the BSR’s status quo. Nonetheless, due to their common interests regarding the BSR, mutual relations were not damaged irreparably. During this period multidimensional cooperation helped the countries to overcome regional problems (Sakwa, 2011). In 2009 the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations between Russia and Turkey and Continued Development of Friendship and Multifaceted Partnership. The declaration serves as the political foundation for cooperation on foreign policy matters, in trade and economic relations, and in the humanitarian sphere. This mutual convergence continued in subsequent years, culminating in Medvedev’s three-day official visit to Turkey in 2010, and the signing of 17 agreements between
Russia and Turkey, including on visa exemptions between the two countries, and the construction of a nuclear power plant in Turkey (Özbay, 2011). The two sides also signed an agreement on the Joint Declaration on Creation of the High-Level Cooperation Council which would act as the guiding body in setting the strategy and main directions for developing bilateral relations. They also decided to hold a Public Forum in order to bring the two countries together (Kelkitli, 2017). This in fact could be an important initiative regarding ensuring dialogue among people in order to change perceptions.

Bilateral relations were (re)tested in the BSR with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, however. Annexing Crimea and deploying its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol certainly strengthened the Russian presence in the Black Sea (Van Herpen, 2015). This means that there is no balance between Russia and Turkey in the sea, which the two countries perceive as their own lake. However, like the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, bilateral relations were not strongly affected by this annexation, since subsequent to it Russia and Turkey agreed on constructing a new pipeline project called Turkish Stream. Moreover, Turkey did not take part in imposing sanctions against Russia, and even though a NATO ally, Turkey did not accept NATO or USA naval forces helping Ukraine; although, at the same time, it did not recognise the Russian annexation of Crimea.

3.4.2 Resolution of the threats: Economic relations

In the case of the bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey, it might be claimed that there is a historical legacy of threat perception that persists, but the above-indicated moves, particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, were made towards desecuritisation through closer economic and energy ties. The multidimensionality in bilateral relations transforms the traditional threat perceptions of each country in a unique way (Bozkurt, 2011).

Regarding desecuritisation and the way that countries deal with their problems, the economic, energy and social dimensions certainly have great influence. The economy, trade, tourism and investment between the two countries have constituted the main elements in bilateral relations (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016). Since 2006 Russia has been Turkey’s biggest trade partner, although in 2015 it fell to third place following China...
and Germany (see Appendix 6). Bilateral economic relations, however, continue to grow year by year. Hence Bacık (2016:2) rightly calls the model of bilateral relations an “economy-first paradigm”.

Bilateral economic relations improved after the establishment of the Russian-Turkish Business Council in 1991, and the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Cooperation Commission in 1992. The first institution was formed under the umbrella of the bilateral economic relations board and it was composed of companies that had already undertaken business relations or planned to develop such relations in each country (Kelkitli, 2017). The aim of the second institution was to review the existing commercial-economic relations between the two countries and regulate disputes to the benefit of both sides. With the establishment of these institutions bilateral relations started to improve. Kelkitli (2017) indicates that in just five years’ time – between 1992 and 1997 – Turkish exports to Russia increased 369% and imports 109%; on the other side Russia came second in Turkey’s total exports and sixth in total imports. Moreover, the suitcase trade of the time, in which Russian citizens came to Turkey with big and empty suitcases, and bought mostly textile, leather and household goods from small shops in Istanbul and Trabzon and resold them back in Russia, has become a significant socially and economically constructive element of bilateral relations.

By 2000, after Putin came to power, this perception of Turkey gained more credit. In his speech by October 2000, the leader declared Turkey to be a “traditional and important partner” and expressed the desire to “upgrade the relations between Russia and Turkey to the level of a strategic partnership” (cited from Aktürk, 2006:344). Economic relations were seen as the priority and the basis on which political instabilities could be eliminated.

There has been a great increase in trade between the countries since 2000. In Appendix 7, it is indicated that all components (import, export, volume of trade) increased in the period from 2004 to 2012. Trade volume between the two countries increased from $4.5 billion in 2000 to $33.4 billion in 2012 (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016). Turkey sells motorised vehicles, fruit, textile and electrical machines to Russia, and purchases energy and industrial products in return. However, the trade is in favour of Russia and Turkey’s trade deficit has significantly increased because of the energy deals between the two countries (Appendix, 7). Öniş and Yılmaz (2016) notice that although asymmetric
interdependence is problematic, Turkey believes that the maintenance of engagement and deepening of ties with Russia is very important and beneficial for itself. In this sense, Ankara encourages Moscow to sustain bilateral relations, particularly in regards to energy.

In terms of investment, the two countries’ companies have huge investments in each country. Turkish construction companies are among the biggest construction companies constructing on behalf of Russian investors/the Russian state, and even took an active role in building the Sochi Winter Olympics complex, as well as building airports and other buildings. Moreover, Turkey’s “leading durable consumption product companies, Beko and Vestel, have captured 10% of the durable consumption sector in Russia” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016:78). In addition, seven Turkish banks have opened new branches in Russia. Russians, on the other hand, invest in the Turkish energy sector: Lukoil is in the Turkish market and Yandexinvests in the Turkish telecommunication sector (Özdal et al., 2013). Moreover, Russia’s largest state-owned financial institution, Sberbank, has acquired Turkey’s Denizbank (Trenin, 2013).

Tourism is the other significant factor that has a positive and transformative impact on bilateral economic relations (Özdal et al, 2013). Turkey is the most popular destination for Russian tourists before Greece and Spain, and in 2013 four million Russian tourists visited Turkey (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016).

Finally, the social dimension is the most interesting in terms of bilateral relations, and this is enhanced by cultural interactions and intermarriage (see Özdal et al., 2013). For this reason in particular, visa exemptions were an important example of the changing perspectives of the two countries. This is because Russia used to perceive a threat from Turkey and believed that it supported Chechen separatist groups in its country, but with the visa exemption Moscow also illustrated that it trusted Ankara and did not see it as a threat. As Özbay (2011) clarifies, with this move, Russia was able to overcome its psychological barrier against Turkey. The above-indicated dimensions have led to a change in the conflictual nature of the relationship, turning it into cooperation. Although there is still imbalance between the countries, which to some extent has triggered

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18 After Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian war jet on the Syria-Turkey border in November 2015, due to the deterioration of bilateral relations, Russia abolished the visa exemption.
asymmetric interdependency, the elites of each country attempt to diversify and maintain their relations.

3.4.3 Desecuritisation of energy: Russian-Turkish energy relations

The central component of economic links between the countries has been the growth in energy trade. This has improved the rearticulation of the relationship, as Hansen (2012) suggests. It means that the previous conflictual nature, which was also triggered by energy due to Turkey’s involvement in non-Russian pipeline projects, started to improve and move towards a strategic partnership. Instead of tension or mistrust ruling discourse, positive and peace-oriented discourses become the norm.

Bilateral energy relations occurred during the Cold War while the countries were on opposite sides. This might be explained by the perception of energy as being vital for their political survival as well as economic development; it should not be surprising that the convergence of interests between the two countries started with an energy agreement in 1984, which facilitated the current rapprochement (Ediger and Bağdadi, 2010; Özbay, 2011). The agreement included a 25-year trade agreement between Gazexport and BOTAS, which was signed in 1986, and the natural gas flow, which started in 1987 through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, the ‘Western Line’ (Özbay, 2011).

The two countries have had complex energy relations since then, however. These problems have affected the way they perceive each other and the way in which energy intrudes into the relationship, whether as a security issue or otherwise. For instance, throughout the early 1990s, Russia and Turkey had clashing energy interests, principally through competition over the transit routes for Caspian resources to the European market (Demiryol, 2015) (detailed in Chapter 5). This is because Turkey, with BTE and BTC, chose Western countries and alternative energy suppliers as energy partners, rather than Russia. It took an active role in these projects, aiming to bypass the role of Russia in energy transportation of Caspian and Central Asian resources and to supply European market (Kardaş, 2011-12). Russia responded to these activities by raising new projects that bypassed Turkey. For example, the Russian desire to bypass the Turkish Straits for the transport of oil, led to the development of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis link connecting the Bulgarian Black Sea coast with the Greek Aegean (Torbakov, 2007).
Although Turkey remained committed to projects backed by Western powers and Russia responded immediately, Turkey also increasingly developed a more cooperative relationship with Russia in order to meet its energy needs. They attempted to increase their bilateral energy dialogue and so agreed to the construction of the Blue Stream project in 1997. In parallel with their political ties, the current situation can be defined as multidimensional, ranging from exportation, transport, pipeline infrastructure and recently nuclear energy.

In 2014, in his visit to Turkey when Turkish Stream was declared, Putin expressed the final version of bilateral energy relations, stating that “we consider energy an important area in our bilateral cooperation. Our relations in this sector have reached a truly strategic level” (Kremlin, 2014, emphasis added). Erdoğan (cited in Özbay, 2011:74) stated that “it is significant and meaningful that we make our first investment in energy with the Russian Federation”. As can be seen from these two speeches, energy has a positive influence on bilateral relations. Energy has turned from an economically significant issue to a strategically significant issue.

In the Russian-Turkish case, because Turkey’s dependency on Russia is heavier than Russia’s dependence on Turkey, Russia has the advantage. Russian natural gas exports to Turkey illustrated an increased trend particularly until 2008. Although between 2009 and 2011 it was decreasing, after 2012 it was back to an increasing trend again (Appendix 8). At the same time Turkey has an increasing natural gas export trend with other suppliers too, but none of them reach Russia’s level (Appendix 8). Moreover, more than half of Turkey’s energy demand is supplied by Russia, and this is used in half of Turkish electricity production. On the other hand, this reliance on Russian supplies makes Turkey the second largest energy market for Moscow. Thus one view might think that energy is perceived as a security threat for Turkey, while another might see interdependence.

The dominant side of the debate is based on the inequality of energy interdependence between Russia and Turkey, which worries some scholars (Winrow, 2009, 2013; Hale, 2013; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016), who argue that this potentially shifts the balance of power to favour Russia, which they associate with the concept of asymmetrical interdependence, which basically refers to “a situation in which A needs B more than B needs A, making B the more powerful party” (Touval, 2002:157; Keohane and Nye,
This often happens in cases when a country only depends on one energy supplier. In the case of Russian-Turkish energy relations, this, according to scholars, is a source of conflict, because sectors like energy which are vital for countries can damage the security of the dependent state (Demiryol, 2015). This is because the less vulnerable state (Russia) might apply a supply disruption or use energy supply as a political tool against the dependent party (Turkey), leading to much greater costs on the more dependent party than on the stronger party (Esakova, 2012).

Some scholars, on the other hand, argue that asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of cooperation, focusing on mutual vulnerabilities (Kardaş, 2011-12). In this case they emphasise the possibility of their dependence on each other. In other words, according to this notion, while Turkey needs Russia for sourcing its domestic energy demand, Russia depends on Turkey for selling its resources (Aktürk, 2014). According to these scholars, this could grant some bargaining power to Turkey.

In these assessments, regarding (inter)dependence, it can be claimed that Russia and Turkey are each deeply aware of the importance of the other in energy relations, and so dependency does not have a negative connotation. Rather it makes a supportive contribution to the relationship. Thus the concept of (inter)dependence strengthens the concept of desecuritisation and reduces perception of energy as a potential source of security threat. In the context of this issue, concerns and advantages in dependency often appear at the same time, but even if states have concerns about each other, these tend not to pose a problem in their overall bilateral relationship.

Furthermore, one might rightly think that the two countries are not sine qua non partners for each other, meaning they do not depend on each other strongly because geographically they have many options. This is because Russia and Turkey are both close to other energy suppliers and customers and thus could easily decrease their dependence on each other. For instance, in the case of a possible supply disruption, Turkey could substitute its demand from Azerbaijan, Iran or Iraq, while in the event of an abrogation of the agreement Russia could substitute its supply to European or Asian countries. As occurred in the nuclear power plant example, however, Turkey is increasing its dependence on Russia, even though it has many options.

This act might explain the positive nature of mutual perceptions. The two countries have inherited mutual mistrust and antagonism from their ancestors, and so constructing
an energy partnership is expected to be quite a difficult case. Surprisingly, energy is actually one of the main elements that has changed these historical perceptions (Winrow, 2007a, 2007b; Sidar and Winrow, 2011; Makovsky, 2015). Starting a dialogue with each other, and particularly also Russia’s changing perception towards its own transit countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, has allowed Turkey to undertake new roles in Russian energy politics. According to Gvosdev and Marsh (2014:303), Turkish partnership in the energy sector “is seen as a way to enhance Russia’s energy links with core European markets by bypassing transit states in Eastern Europe, so it does not threaten Russia’s interests in closer ties with Europe”. This approach transforms Turkey from a formidable rival for influence in Russia’s near abroad into a partner, while Russia has become less of a threat for Turkey (Mankoff, 2016).

This gives Turkey a confidence and assertiveness in its regional and global relations. It also ensures that Turkey perceives Russia differently, which often means a partner who, nevertheless, has to retain balance with. In the context of this issue, although Turkey heavily depends on Russia, in order to protect its own energy security, it has not promoted defensive energy policies with the aim of a decrease in its dependence on Russia, as Poland or the Baltic States have done (Khrushcheva, 2012). On the contrary, as in the case of the nuclear power plant and the Turkish Stream, it has increased its dependency.

This is because Russia is a reliable energy supplier for Turkey. Apart from Russia, Turkey also depends on Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq. Regarding Iran and Iraq, energy transport problems with Iran especially in winter due to Iran’s cutting supply to Turkish market in order to meet its domestic energy needs, and terrorist attacks to pipelines in Iraq, led to important demand concerns for Turkey. In this sense, Russia’s constant support and availability to supply the Turkish market, especially in winter, has paved the way for Turkish elites’ willingness to cooperate with Russia. Indeed, Erdoğan in his meeting with Putin in 2012 stated that

During hard times, the Russian Federation always assisted when we had difficulties with natural gas supplies, provided us with support and helped us overcome the crisis situation, supplying additional gas. (Kremlin, 2012a)

In light of these assessments and the cases mentioned below (Blue Stream, South Stream and Turkish Stream), the energy relationship between Russia and Turkey has a non-conflictual structure, because although there is the potential for a security threat
(such as Turkey’s participation in non-Russian projects), their own ambitions overcome threat perceptions and make the perception of energy a desecuritised rather than securitised issue. Energy, in this case, provides the basis for a rapprochement between two historical enemies and thus it supports the process of desecuritisation in bilateral relations. The development of improved and multidimensional energy relations indicate the desecuritisation of energy in bilateral relations.

3.4.3.1 Blue Stream

The first important Russian-Turkish energy interaction after the 1984 energy agreement was the announcement of Blue Stream. On December 1997 the Blue Stream\textsuperscript{19} natural gas project was signed between Russia and Turkey. On October 2002, the pipeline was completed and since 2003 Russian natural gas has been transmitted via this line. It is an important project given the fact that it was built under the Black Sea. The pipeline came in amidst a lot of criticism. Baran (2008), regarding this, claims that Russia benefited from Turkey’s ambition to meet its own energy needs and also Ankara’s negatively developing relations with the EU and the USA. According to Ediger and Bağdadi (2010), the US and EU-backed East-West energy corridor was sacrificed for the Blue Stream.

Even in Turkey, Blue Stream caused some domestic political debate. The project was very much criticised in the Turkish parliament as well as in the media. The main objection was based on doubts about the associated high energy dependence on Russian resources (Bacik, 2001). Moreover, high energy prices and ‘take-or-pay’\textsuperscript{20} obligations caused serious public debates. Corruption was the other issue that affected the project

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19}Beginning at Russia’s Novorossiysk port, and reaching the Turkish port of Samsun through pipelines embedded in the Black Sea, Blue Stream led to an initial transfer of 1.2bcm of natural gas in 2003, with this amount increasing to 9.9bcm. On February 18, 1998, an agreement was signed between Turusgaz and Russia which envisaged a deal to last 23 years with a preliminary purchase of 538mcm (million cubic meters) which has been increased to 6-7bcm since 2001 (Ediger and Bagdadi, 2010:230).
\item \textsuperscript{20}‘Take-or-pay’ binding contracts with Russia were major obstacles to Turkey’s economic benefit because they did not allow for the re-export of gas to third parties under any circumstances (Winrow, 2004). Turkey has to pay the amount specified in the contract and, due to a lack of storage facilities, if that contracted gas is not used (which happens particularly in summer months) the full amount still has to be paid. Furthermore, Turkey has to pay compensation to the exporter if it fails to import a certain percentage of the volume of gas contracted to be received in a given year (Sidar and Winrow, 2011). This, certainly, is not profitable for Turkey; on the contrary, as Bilgin (2011) points out, it is an extravagant energy burden.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
negatively. It was mostly believed that the responsible elites were corrupted by Russian officials. In the so-called ‘white energy’ scandal, many energy bureaucrats and even the Minister of Energy were “accused of having taken large-scale bribes in a deal widely recognised as contrary to Turkey’s national interest”, but the Turkish parliament voted not to open an inquiry into the conduct of the Minister of Energy (Cornell et al., 2006:82).

What is interesting in regards to Blue Stream is that even though the government attempted to illustrate the project as an important step in Russian-Turkish rapprochement, the public overtly criticised it. This illustrates that in the very first stages, the public did not accept the desecuritisation attempts in the energy sector. The reason for this might be that it was the very first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, and nationalist dimensions, particularly the aim of enhancing relations with post-Soviet Turkish republics, were the primary concern of the public. Relations with Turkic countries and behaving as a big brother could have led Turkey to have a voice in the transportation of energy resources from these countries to European markets, as well as making great contributions to their economic development.

The choice of Blue Stream, however, had some rational justifications. Giving priority to supply security and the need to meet its domestic demand led Turkey to urgently negotiate with Russia. This is because compared to other energy suppliers such as Iran or Central Asian countries, Russia already has technology and a reputation as a reliable energy supplier. With improving energy relations with reliable Russia, Turkey lowered the possibility of unexpected energy interruptions. Moreover, the pipeline directly links to Turkey, bypassing other states, meaning the possibility of any dispute over supplier and transit countries would not affect it. Thus, as Belyi (2003) comments, Blue Stream eventually came to represent a new opportunity for Russia and Turkey to develop their bilateral energy cooperation.

The project emerged when Russia felt isolated due to strong involvement of non-regional actors in the region. The construction of BTC and BTE could have decreased the importance of the country in the eyes of its customers, meaning that they could decrease their dependence on it. Thus, choosing Turkey as a partner in this vital issue, possibly claimed as a threat to its survival as a state, is quite an important indicator that bilateral relations had gone through a great transformation in a positive sense. The
acceptance of Turkey was also a strong indicator of its great ambition of meeting its energy needs and becoming an energy hub. Being a part of two rival projects, the position of Turkey in this project illustrates that when it comes to maximising its benefits, Turkey can stand against its partners.

Moreover, the way that the project was implemented, which was under the sea, required a great technological effort. Providing this ensured state confidence and public support for future projects. Russia, particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, had struggled with significant political and economic problems, and the achievement of this technologically difficult project brought the country to world politics again and provided state confidence. Although it was only targeting the Turkish market, the Blue Stream pipeline project has realised the above bilateral achievements.

3.4.3.2 South Stream

The second important initiative was Turkey’s participation in South Stream.\(^\text{21}\) At the very beginning of the project, Turkey was not seen as a project partner and instead the project was an attempt to decrease the importance of Turkey as an energy transit route and to prevent Turkish activities in energy projects in the region (Torbakov, 2007). Due to global political developments (detailed in Chapter 5), however, Russia was forced to accept Turkey’s involvement in the project (Bourgeot, 2013). From the Turkish side, its participation in the project occurred when it faced some problems in a non-Russian project, Nabucco, and so it can be claimed that Turkey used the Russian project as a tool with regards to its European partners.

As stated above, Turkey was also part of the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline project, which makes the role of Turkey complicated. The idea behind the Turkish political elite’s decision might be explained as the reinforcement of its status as an essential player. On the other side, the fundamental aim of this project was to bypass Ukraine for Russia, and so this led Moscow to find alternative while at the same time reliable transit

\(^{21}\) It starts from Beregovaya in parallel with Blue Stream, and travels across the Black Sea to Bulgaria, where it forks into a south-western branch moving gas to Greece and then undersea to Italy, and a northern line taking gas via Serbia, Hungary and either Austria or Slovenia, to Italy (Tekin and Williams, 2011). It is a joint venture between Russian Gazprom and Italian-owned ENI, and the other energy companies involved are state-owned Srbijagas from Serbia; MFB from Hungary; DESFA from Greece; Bulgarian Energy Holding from Bulgaria; OMV from Austria; and EDF from France (South Stream website, n.d.).
routes. Choosing Turkey as a transit route not only serves the Turkish desire of becoming an energy hub but also demonstrates that Russia’s perception of Turkey has changed, as has the nature of the relationship.

This project uses only the Turkish exclusive economic zone but bypasses its territory, meaning it would not supply gas to the Turkish market. Accepting such a project, which does not provide any direct benefits, indicates that the nature of the relationship is more trust-oriented and even that sides can ignore their own benefits but consider those of others. This example, also, leads to claims that although bilateral energy relations are not problem free, as can be seen in the ‘take-or-pay’ obligations of the time, the elites of the two countries, rather than cutting relations completely, prefer to negotiate and find a solution to satisfy each of them. Thus, the preference on maintaining energy trade brings cooperation.

3.4.3.3 Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant

The third important initiative was Russian involvement in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Turkey. In 2011, Turkey gave permission to Russian state-owned atomic power company ROSATOM to build a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin. In this project, 100% of shares will initially be owned by ROSATOM, which also finances and operates the construction, and then it will subsequently sell a 49% share (ROSATOM website, 2010; Bourgeot, 2013). The important feature of the project, as Conant (2012:2) notes, is that:

[T]he reactors built under the programme reside in a foreign country – in this case, Turkey – but will still be owned by Russia. The [build-own-operate] model has been used in other industries worldwide, such as water treatment and communication, but the Russian-Turkish Akkuyu deal is the first time the model has been used for a nuclear power plant.

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22 Turkey and Russia often have clashing politics over take-or-pay obligations. In 2002, although Turkey, according to a take-or-pay contract has to pay for 16bcm, it imported 11.6bcm. However, in this case it even paid for the unused amount of natural gas. Regarding putting pressure on Russia to lower its prices, in 2003 Turkey suspended its gas imports from Russia for three weeks. After negotiations, Russia agreed to reduce the price of natural gas and eased take-or-pay obligations (Winrow, 2004). The problem flared up in 2009, when as well as price reductions Turkey sought re-export rights for gas delivered to its market. Due to failure of negotiations, Turkey decided not to renew supply contracts in 2011 (Kardaş, 2011-12). Even though Russia is always eager to maintain the take-or-pay obligations, this attempt forced Moscow to make some amendments in the contract at the end of 2011.

23 From the Turkish side, however, this is presented as a Turkish initiative. In relevant advertisements, the nuclear power plant, ironically, is presented as a project will reduce Turkey’s dependence on foreign resources.
Aktürk (2014) argues that the agreement on the plant reveals that the two countries have developed economic interdependence with strategic significance. Delegating the construction of the project to Russia illustrates the positive nature of their relationship.

Apart from financial and environmental risks, as clearly seen in this case, dependence, a risky site – since Akkuyu is located on a fault line – and untested technology are important problems, especially for Turkey to deal with (Tanrısever, 2012; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2016). These problems have not yet been widely discussed in Turkey, however. The actors’ satisfaction is an important element in this case. Russia is definitely on the winning side because it will gain great benefits, while Turkey transfers/risks all its energy rights. This is because apart from heavy dependence on natural gas exports, Russia has become a main nuclear power exporter to Turkey. Although one can think that the construction of the nuclear power plant could enhance partnership, Levent Ö zgül, an official at BOTAŞ (Interview, 2016), believes that Turkey will only become a customer for ROSATOM. Hence, there are quite important concerns about the project due to Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russia. As stated above, ironically, with this project, rather than diversifying its energy resources, Turkey has strengthened Russia’s energy power over itself. This can be explained by altering bilateral perceptions. In other words, due to Russia and Turkey having positive relations; they tend to maintain this positive atmosphere in other sectors as well.

3.4.3.4 Turkish Stream

Turkish Stream24 is the latest initiative illustrating the role of energy in bilateral relations. This was the Russian reaction to the sanctions imposed by Western countries due to its annexation of Crimea. With the implementation of sanctions Russia went through a difficult time in the political and economic senses. Even the name provides evidence that bilateral relations are seen as peaceful, and that Russia is perceived by Turkey as a partner and able to undertake a new project with the country.

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24 The project was conceived to deliver Russian gas through Turkey, bypassing Ukraine and building a hub on the Turkey-Greece border. The project is intended to end in the Ipsala district of Turkey (close to the Greek border) where TANAP is planned to end and connect with TAP.
On 1 December 2014, following a meeting between the Russian and Turkish presidents, Putin and Gazprom CEO Miller announced\textsuperscript{25} the scrapping of South Stream because of “the combined failure of the Bulgarian government to provide assurances that the pipelines could be laid and the EC would provide assurances that gas would be allowed to flow through them” (Stern et al., 2015:5). Putin declared this decision in a press conference, saying that:

Taking account of the fact that we have not received permission from Bulgaria, we believe that in the current conditions Russia cannot continue with the realisation of this project [South Stream]. (BBC website, 2014)

This is the visible reason for the cancellation, but because of economic problems stemming from sanctions and falling oil prices,\textsuperscript{26} South Stream could no longer be afforded by Russia, whose economy heavily depends on the exportation of its energy resources (Stern et al., 2015). Prior to the announcement of the cancellation, however, Gazprom had already finished the important parts of the programme, and spent $4.7 billion on the offshore and European sections (Stern et al., 2015). Turkey, therefore, could play a significant role in changing the direction of the project so that, instead of Bulgaria, the final destination would be the Turkish-Greek border. Turkey’s location and increasing energy demands\textsuperscript{27} served to increase Russia’s competitiveness compared to other supplier countries.

The announcement of Turkish Stream, however, revitalised concerns about Turkish dependency on Russian natural gas. According to Karagöl and Kızılkaya (2015) this should be seen as a security issue because Turkey’s dependence on Russia would increase dramatically, and Russia would gain an important benefit and power in this case. Çelikpala (Interview, 2015) questions the constructor and the financial sponsor of the project, while Mert Bilgin, IR scholar and energy expert at Istanbul-based Medipol University ( Interview, 2015), criticises the contents of Turkey’s gas agreement with

\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, Gazprom and its Turkish counterparts agreed on expanding volumes transferred through the underwater Blue Stream pipeline from 16 bcm per annum to 19 bcm, and Turkey gets a 6% discount on buying gas.

\textsuperscript{26} Even though from 2010 until mid-2014 world oil prices had been fairly stable, at around $110 a barrel, since June 2014 prices have more than halved. In January 2015 Brent crude oil dipped below $50 a barrel, and in October 2015 it traded at around $44 a barrel (BBC website, 2015; New York Times website, 2015).

\textsuperscript{27} Turkey is the second largest European regional export market for Gazprom and imported 26.7 bcm in 2013; “by comparison the whole of South East Europe imported less than 10 bcm of Russian gas in that year, and even by adding Hungary and Austria the total was only 21 bcm” (Stern et al., 2015:7).
Russia and the customers of the project. Russian scholars also have some concerns on the project. Ulchenko (2015), citing Russian experts, warns that the main Turkish concern in energy relations with Russia is the price of the gas. Thus, the author believes that this approach strongly affects the future of Turkish Stream.

However, it is clear that political dimensions have outweighed security and dependency aspects in driving the project. It can be claimed that the multidimensionality of the relationship diminishes threat perceptions and focuses bilateral relations upon desecuritisation. Thus, rather than taking emergency measures as per securitisation, both countries were free to choose how to decide and act, as per desecuritisation. They have not allowed the complex dynamics in their relationship to become an existential threat for their own survival but instead have encouraged each other to diversify energy options. Energy is here presented as one of essential drivers of mutual rapprochement by political elites, rather than a threat.

Overall, when analysing the above-indicated energy developments and bilateral projects, relations between Russia and Turkey have been transformed. Initially, following the demise of the Soviet Union and Turkey’s strategy of developing energy partnerships which bypassed Russia, energy became a source of tension between the countries and arguably close to securitisation. This is because, for Russia, these projects were perceived as threatening to limit its presence in both European and former Soviet markets. However, with the increase in dialogue between the two countries and in the light of other regional and global developments, energy shifted from being a security threat to an opportunity to develop the relationship. Thus, this process indicates that there is a transformation from perceiving energy as a security issue to a normal political issue – desecuritisation.

3.5 Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR: A successful desecuritisation?

In order to determine whether the concept of (de)securitisation is successful or not, Buzan et al. (1998) state that it needs to be accepted by the target audience. Although there many different tools can reveal the success or the failure of the process, this thesis takes into account interviews, media sources and surveys.
In political elites’ discourse, the relationship between Russia and Turkey tends to be expressed as a strategic partnership or some sort of partnership close to a strategic one. Interviews conducted by the author with policy makers and scholars in various countries, however, illustrate that this expression is not supported as strongly by them. In these interviews, it was indicated that there are still doubts surrounding bilateral relations, seeing it not as a strategic partnership but as some sort of special relationship, which focuses on specific areas. For instance, Emre Erşen, an IR scholar focusing on Russia and the BSR at Istanbul-based Marmara University (Interview, 2015), refers to bilateral relations as flexible cooperation. Çelikpala (Interview, 2015) portrays the character of the relationship as more competitive but close to cooperation. Tatiana Mitrova, Head of the Oil and Gas Department in the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ERI RAS) (Interview, 2015), contends that bilateral relations depend on pragmatism.

These interviews were conducted in two different time periods, the first after the announcement of the Turkish Stream, the second after the Russian-Turkish SU-24 fighter jet crisis. Overall, scholars and policy-makers had a tendency to describe bilateral relations as pragmatic and emphasised the importance of the economy and energy in the relationship. The first round of interviewees were Turkish scholars and energy experts as well as Turkish officials in the energy sector, and they tended to reveal their worries about the potential for increasing Turkish dependency on Russia on the basis of the natural gas pipeline project and the nuclear power plant. Scholars also criticised the present Turkish foreign and energy policies, arguing that they were quite different from what one might expect from a Western ally and NATO member country. Thus, for instance, Bilgin (Interview, 2015) questioned the meaningfulness of these projects.

During the second round of interviews, the political consequences of the SU-24 incident in bilateral relations were very much in focus and the interviewees often expressed the impossibility of convergence in the foreseeable future. Gareth Winrow, an energy expert and scholar at Oxford University (Interview, 2016), asserts that Russia and Turkey had never been strategic partners and that the SU-24 incident provoked significant doubts about the relationship. Mitrova (Interview, 2015) noted that energy projects were frozen by Russia but stated that the projects had been going well before the incident.
The other important point is the perception of the public in the two countries. As Warhola and Bezci (2013) assert, while one might think that public surveys do not illustrate firm and definitive conclusions on bilateral relations, they can provide a measure of evidence about how the public see the relationship. In Russia-conducted surveys, particularly by the Levada Center between 2006 and 2015, Turkey was not considered an enemy. In 2004, before Putin’s visit to Turkey, which was the first time that a high-ranking Russian politician had visited the country, in a survey conducted by WCIOM (2004) on the subject of ‘Turkey and Russia: Friend or Rival?’, 51% saw Turkey as an economic and trade partner, 16% said friend and 4% strategic partner, while 4% said a rival and 3% an enemy.

In Turkey-conducted surveys, particularly by Kadir Has University between 2011 and 2015, Russia was not seen as a major external threat to Turkey (Kadir Has University website, 2015, 2016). In 2013, although 10.6% said that Russia is a threat, 10% said Turkey should be in cooperation with the country and 6.8% that the two countries should act together (Kadir Has University website, 2013). According to a survey by TESEV (2011), 70% support cooperation with Russia and 76% support economic cooperation.

The media also has a great influence on the determination of public opinion as well as growing bilateral relations. The quality and content of news coverage on Russia and Turkey in each country has changed considerably in recent years. It can be claimed that Russian and Turkish journalists play a key role in the rectification of each country’s traditionally negative images of each other. News coverage in Turkey has a tendency to identify Putin as Kemalist, after the founder of the Turkish republic, or emphasise the close friendship of Putin and Erdoğan (see Kimiklioğlu and Morkva, 2007:545-546). On the Russian side, they value the upward trend in bilateral relations. News coverage in Turkey in fact focuses fundamentally on non-political issues such as tourism, food supply and energy relations. In this news coverage, the reliability of Turkey in these sectors is valued by Russia (Lossan, 2016).

Considering all these arguments and surveys, it is possible to claim that diminishing the perception of being an external threat in terms of state security and the complexity of bilateral relations have been reflected in both scholarly debate and public opinion. In light of these elements, it is possible to conclude that bilateral relations have undergone
a process of great transformation in a positive way and that geopolitical developments
definitely play an important role in this. Thus, the desecuritisation between the two
countries can be accepted as successful.

3.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to claim that energy and the nature of the wider
bilateral relationships between the countries in the BSR are strongly affected by each
other. It was argued that countries of the region prioritise energy very much for their
political stability and economic growth, and this is reflected in the formulation of
mutual energy relations. States either tend to enhance relations with countries with
whom they have had close relations, or, where there are concerns about perceived
threats from suppliers, have sought alternative sources of supply in order to decrease
their dependence. While in the first case energy is rather seen as a normal political issue,
in the latter it is a high politics issue and possibly a securitising case. Thus, the chapter
has shown that changes in each country’s perception of the other have both shaped and
reflected changes in the pattern of conflict and cooperation, which have characterised
the Russian-Turkish relationship.

To illustrate these situations, the cases of Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian
relations have been given as examples of securitisation both in the political sector and in
regards to energy. The conflicted nature of the relationship has led them to move energy
into high politics. By contrast, Azerbaijan-Turkish and Georgian-Turkish relations were
given as examples where energy is perceived as a normal political issue, thanks to the
dialogue between them. The mutual trust and intention of diversifying engagement has
led to a normalisation of their relationships with each other.

Being the main actors in the region, Russia and Turkey in their bilateral relations with
other countries are different from each other. In bilateral relations with some regional
countries Russia has been more assertive and ready to use hard power, making itself
both referent object and a securitising actor. Thus it is on the securitisation side of the
spectrum. Turkey, on the other hand, attempting to ensure balance between relevant
actors and using soft power, is perceived as a partner, and thus it is on the
desecuritisation side of the spectrum. In other words, energy has been securitised in
determining relations between Russia and some countries; while desecuritised or even
normalised between Turkey and some countries in the region. The securitisation of
energy indicates itself in attempts to reduce the dependence on Russian resources while
desecuritisation is manifest in efforts to diversify energy options.

Regarding Russian-Turkish relations, it was claimed that bilateral relations have gone
through a great transformation. The two countries used to perceive each other as a threat
until the demise of the Soviet Union and this caused them to lower their relations.
However, reinforced with economic and social interaction, particularly in the energy
sector, bilateral relations, as political elites of each country have expressed, have altered
from their being historical enemies to the current multidimensional partnership. Putin in
his visit to Turkey in 2012 emphasised this, saying that:

> We have gone through all manner of events in our history, but this is all part of the past
now, and we must look toward the future. It makes me very happy to see that our
Turkish friends share this view and that this is what we do. (Kremlin, 2012b)

In official discourse energy was removed from being expressed as a security or a threat
issue to be rearticulated as a dimension of increasing relations and a facilitating factor
for strategic partnership. This has led to a reassessment of the relationship. States seek
to find alternative areas in which they can increase their relations. This process has been
given as an example of desecuritisation.

One last issue discussed in this chapter was the acceptance of the audience. It was
contended that even though scholars have some doubts about the nature of the
relationship, they nevertheless support the convergence between the two countries. Thus,
it was stated that desecuritisation between Russia and Turkey has been successful.

This positive state of affairs raises new questions regarding its impact on the BSR as a
whole. The next chapter examines the implications of the convergence of Russia and
Turkey, the two significant regional actors, on political and energy issues for the region.
CHAPTER 4

4. THE REGIONAL LEVEL OF RUSSIAN-TURKISH (ENERGY) RELATIONS: THE BLACK SEA REGION

4.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have highlighted some characteristic features of the BSR, ranging from perception of threats and the nature of bilateral relations, as well as the relationship between these issues and the energy policies of states in the region. In light of these, it is possible to claim that the domestic and bilateral levels of the BSR are complex. The relationships between some countries are highly problematic, while those between other countries are more stable. These complexities highlight intense interactions between states in the region which cannot be understood in terms of the domestic and bilateral levels alone. On the one hand, these interactions provide common ground for cooperation among states who feel the same threats or common interests; on the other hand, they pave the way for conflict (Vorotnyuk, 2013). The BSR manifests both characteristics: while it has the potential for the building of common ground due to sharing common threat perceptions as well as interests, there are also dramatic divisions amongst states in the region.

These features are particularly apparent in the conduct of the two main protagonists in the region, Russia and Turkey. The previous chapters illustrated that, particularly during the main research timeframe, Russia’s relations with some of most significant regional energy transit countries, Ukraine and Georgia, have deteriorated, whereas relations with Turkey have improved, with the latter an important energy partner. Turkey, on the other side, has enhanced its relations with both energy suppliers and transit countries. This chapter analyses the impact of the relationship between Russia (which is perceived as an existential threat by some countries in the region) and Turkey (which is perceived as an alternative to Russia by countries in the region) on shaping the development of the Black Sea as a region. Moreover, this chapter analyses how Russian-Turkish energy relations affect and are affected by the energy security perceptions of BSR countries. In particular, it aims to inform the extent to which energy has been (de)securitised in the BSR as well as in bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey. It is argued that energy has a complex effect on the BSR, alternating between securitisation and desecuritisation.
Buzan and Wæver (2003) claim that the main prize in the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space, but particularly of Central Asia and the Caucasus, is control of the transportation of oil and gas and other resources. As discussed before, there are important links between these regions and the BSR in terms of energy supplies and transportation links. While the region has become an important figure in energy politics and security, as Celac (2011:37) notices, there has been less research on developments in the BSR energy market itself. On the contrary, in the current literature, there is a great amount of research on the role of pipeline projects passing through the region, and on European energy security. Since the countries in the region have complex domestic and bilateral natures and since the region is important for non-regional actors, it is necessary to examine the security of energy in the region itself.

In this chapter I argue that increasing energy requirements in theory ease regional tensions and desecuritise energy (amongst other) relations. However, regional frameworks are quite weak and so cannot desecuritise completely. Instead, energy relations reflect broader characteristics in the region. In some cases, relations are securitised but in others a process of desecuritisation has been achieved. However, both are despite rather than because of regional frameworks. It has been difficult to build communality among regional countries. Although Russia and Turkey have put great effort into this, they have not been able to finalise it as desired.

In this complex atmosphere, countries have a tendency to choose partners between Russia and Turkey, and in energy particularly Turkey is the more preferable. Thus, the attitude of countries in the region as well as Russian and Turkish attitudes towards regional developments/countries have shaped the pattern of conflict and cooperation in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The influence of attitudes across the region highlights the influence of developments in the BSR as a whole on that relationship. Due to its aim of becoming an energy hub, alternative projects are often welcomed by Ankara. This has a potential to constitute a new threat to its (energy) relations with Russia. This can be examined when taking into account the form of ‘replacement’ derived from Hansen (2012:541), who argues that it is a process that involves “the combination of one issue moving out of security while another is simultaneously securitised”. In other words, one set of threats or risks are replaced by another. Taking into account this statement as the fundamental approach of my argument in this chapter, I argue that Russia and Turkey have diverging and converging relations in the BSR. They used to problematise frozen
conflicts in the region in bilateral relations, however, due to increasing dialogue between the two countries, two countries get more involved in regional matters together. This positive development impacts on the regionalisation of the Black Sea with the construction of organisations aiming to establish regional coherence with the collaboration of Russia and Turkey. However, the involvement of other regional countries in the energy game has led to new threats in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, it is necessary to state that due to interdependency and common interests, the two countries form a unique mechanism, meaning they do not totally securitise each other or risk their relationship, but attempt to mitigate risks in bilateral relations.

The plan of the following sections is as follows: first the chapter scrutinises the role of Russian-Turkish convergence in the evolution of BSR regionalism; second, it analyses the role of energy in BSR regionalism through organisational structures; finally, it discusses how energy security aspects of regional countries affect and are affected by the Russian-Turkish relationship.

### 4.2 The role of Russia and Turkey in BSR regionalism

During the Cold War, the Black Sea was perceived as a region of direct contact between two opposing military-political groups: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, the two salient actors in the region, Russia and Turkey, as members of these opposing camps, perceived each other as threats. This began to change following the demise of the Soviet Union.

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the expected scenario was the continuation of Russian-Turkish tension over the BSR, because Turkey had become the second power of the region, leading to a bipolar regional structure (Glebov, 2009). Such expectations were understandable, given that Russia and Turkey both considered the BSR their own lake and aimed to increase their influence over the region on the basis of different foreign policy priorities.

Turkey’s involvement in the post-Soviet BSR, in terms of its plans for increasing economic, political and military cooperation, was not appreciated by Russia. This was particularly the case with regard to its relations with its neighbours, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Turkey was the first country to recognise the independence of these states in
1991. The emergence of new states, particularly in the BSR, was a great opportunity for Ankara to diversify its foreign policy options as well as an opportunity to enhance its relations with Western countries. With increasing involvement, Turkey intended to strengthen and expand its influence in the region (Kelkitli, 2017). Allying itself with Western countries, Turkey proposed a ‘Turkish Model’, meaning parliamentary democracy, a market economy, a secular stance and close relations with the West that could help post-Soviet countries with their political and economic restructuring as well as with integration into the international system (Tanrısever, 2012).

Russia, on the other hand, wanted to maintain and retain its key power position in the region, and it has done this by firstly building an organisational structure covering all former Soviet Republics – its Near Abroad Policy. Secondly, it intended to form a forum for fighting and suppressing fundamentalism, separatism and terrorism; thirdly, ensuring energy security and preventing non-Russian projects; fourthly, preventing NATO membership among countries in the region; and finally preventing the emergence of divisive military coalitions (Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2008; Çelikpala, 2010).

These contrasting priorities created political divergences, particularly over the region’s frozen conflicts. The two countries supported different sides, such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where Turkey supported Azerbaijan and Russia supported Armenia. In addition, Turkey supported the territorial integrity of each country. In particular in regards to Georgia, while Turkey stressed the territorial integrity of the country and the inviolability of its borders, Russia encouraged the separatist aspirations of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Kelkitli, 2017). Kardaş (2011-12) observes that bilateral relations in the post-Soviet space but particularly in the BSR evolved in zero-sum terms, due to their competing visions of regional order.

However, these divergences were to some extent overcome and replaced by a more cooperative approach to the region. Increasing economic and political dialogues and the requirement of finding solutions for frozen conflicts in the region lowered the degree of securitisation between the two countries. The BSR became a priority area for

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28 This includes all non-Russian former Soviet republics in the region where Russia intends to sustain its own political influence and to maintain shared economic and commercial interests (Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011). The area might be specified as the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova, where Russian military installations are mostly located (Özdamar, 2010).
cooperative ties between Russia and Turkey. This is because, as Druzhinin (2015) argues, the region is the most geographically and historically proximate area where Russian and Turkish geostrategic interests overlap. Believing themselves to be the main actors in the region, therefore, they attempt to build organisational structures to bring countries in the region together, and in which they can solve their problems as well as enhance their relationship. This could also help to prevent the intervention of non-regional actors in regional matters which could break the balance of power in the region. In this regard, it can be stated that Russian-Turkish cooperation in the region paves the way for region-building.

“Region-building” is a term coined by Neumann (1994) to refer to a process analogous to that of nation-building. He defined it as an ideational process of constructing a shared sense of belonging and identification (Neumann, 1999; Simão, 2013). Regions, in this context, are considered as “institutional structures and processes that are perpetually ‘becoming’ instead of just ‘being!’” (Paasi, 2009:133). Neumann (1994) asks whose regions are in fact being constructed when one is analysing a territory in a regional context. In this articulation, region-builders take a salient role in building an area as a region, which in most cases are political, economic and social actors, and their political acts play an important role in this (Neumann, 1994; Tassinari, 2011). A region emerges in two ways, either inside-out, meaning an imagined community and political project borne by regional political actors, or from an outside-in perspective, shaped by external influences (Neumann, 1994; Delcour, 2015:318). While the inside-out approach focuses on the role of internal actors and factors such as cultural, religious and linguistic similarities, an outside-in approach emphasises systemic and geopolitical explanations and the influence of great powers (Neumann, 1999; Jurkynas, 2004).

However, the method of region-building in the BSR is different from that put forward by Neumann. In other words, rather than through the ideational processes that Neumann argues for, Russia and Turkey foster a region for shared economic and diplomatic reasons. Thus it can be stated that the region-building/regionalism process in the BSR is sui generis (Aydın, 2009). Since they have been sharing the same area for centuries with neighbouring countries, there are some economic ties and common historical experiences. Thus, in fact, they can understand the requirements of the other countries in the region more than non-regional actors. Erdoğan (cited in Özbay, 2011:82), for instance, has emphasised the role of Russia and Turkey in the BSR, saying that “Turkey
and Russia are the two main countries determining the success of regional cooperation policies especially on the BSR”. Aybak (2010:116) argues that the two countries have “the potential to repeat the historical function France and Germany fulfilled in European integration and promote and advance regional integration and stability in the BSR”.

Given the different relationships which Russia and Turkey had developed with their regional neighbours, bringing them together into a set of institutional arrangements was significant for the future of regional security, and also for the establishment of closer cooperation within the region. The most widely accepted attempts at regionalism were formed by Turkey, which was supported by Russia, and to some extent were targeted at establishing security in the region, and these potentially protect the West’s own security as well. Western-formed regional initiatives are often relevant to guaranteeing their own security and so they have a lack of understanding of the requirements of the region. For instance, the programmes or institutions offered either comprise a broad area – as in the case of ENP – or do not find ultimate solutions to the region’s problems. The EU’s involvement in the region causes misunderstandings for post-Soviet countries, and a perceived security threat for Russia. On the EU’s side, however, it aims for *de facto* European integration, not just European cooperation, which means integration rather than membership (Smith, 2005). It needs to bear in mind that among the three types of union, cooperation, integration and membership, the EU’s preferences go beyond the first but fall short of the third. This makes its specific relationship with the region rather unsatisfactory (Carr and Flenley, 2007; Glebov, 2009). Indeed, Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou (2014:279) assert that the EU “is not seen as a consistent actor with clear and credible objectives from the introverted lenses of the regional actors”. Thus, although their aim is integration with the region, as a result of these deficiencies, the EU cannot meet regional expectations.

By contrast, Turkish-formed regional initiatives are more in line with regional expectations. This is because, through establishing regional cooperation, which “covers interstate activities designed to meet commonly experienced economic, political and social problems and challenges”, particularly with regards to naval and economic issues, Turkey aims to build mutual trust among regional countries (Jurkynas, 2004:3; Çelikpala, 2010; Milevschi, 2012). Although Russia does not hold specific institutional power over the BSR as a whole, it has not had any objection to Turkey’s initiatives either. On the contrary, Russia has expressed its belief in the importance of these
initiatives for regional security and as a significant diplomatic source of dialogue, and it supports their maintenance (Freire, 2014). This, to some extent, has increased the success of Turkish initiatives as well as the regionalism of the BSR.

Russia and Turkey’s commitment to building the BSR as a region, by enhancing cooperation within the region and improving regional dialogue has encouraged countries in the region not only to participate in those frameworks but also to find a platform to enhance their relationship. By virtue of gaining this experience, these initiatives are also paving the way for the formation of new initiatives. Countries such as Greece, Romania and Ukraine have each promoted regional frameworks for cooperation which have contributed to the evolution of the BSR’s organisational framework.

The Turkish initiative the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC) was the first example of regional cooperation and has become the symbol for formal post-Cold War cooperation in the BSR (Hajizada, 2014). It was established in 1992 by eleven countries – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine – with Serbia acceding in 2004.

Manoli (2010) reveals that the economy has been historically the unifying factor in the area. Thus it is not surprising that the first regional initiative centred on economic coherence. As a result of this, conflicting states could ease the tension between each other and enhance their relationships. One can see this in Russian-Turkish relations, as seen in Chapter 3. In this regard, I argue that the increasing economic dialogue between Russia and Turkey might be linked to the foundation of BSEC. This is because

29 Greece has increasingly advocated the central role of BSEC in the design and implementation of multilateral policies in the BSR (Manoli, 2012). It has also pursued “a policy of stressing the economic and ‘practical’ nature of BSEC cooperation, [hosting a Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki] and supporting activities directed at non-political issues” (Manoli, 2012:113). The GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova – with Turkey having observer status) Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, was initiated by Ukraine, with the aim of counterbalancing Russia’s dominant position in the region (Tsantoulis, 2009). The CDC was established in 2005 in Kiev by nine Eastern European states – Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine – aiming to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region between the three seas (the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas) (Grotzky and Isic, 2008; Tsantoulis, 2009). The Romanian-sponsored BSF for Dialogue and Partnership, meanwhile, was established in 2006 by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine (Manoli, 2012). It aims to build on a common mindset and create a vision for the BSR and wants to act at the non-governmental level, attempting to enhance the contribution of civil society to the building of regional security (Tsantoulis, 2009).
economic relations improved their bilateral relations, and it might be estimated that this improved relations among other regional countries as well.

The multilateral political and economic initiatives championed by the organisation aim to foster freedom, stability and prosperity in the region through economic cooperation (Grotzky and Isic, 2008; BSEC website, n.d.(a)). BSEC\(^{30}\) represents a multidimensional scheme of cooperation covering a broad spectrum of activities: trade and investment, agriculture, transport and communications, education, combating organized crime, energy, tourism, the environment, transport, small-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), culture, and other non-conventional threats, “dealing with emergency situations, institutional renewal and improved governance” (Celac and Manoli, 2006:195; BSEC Charter, Art. 4, n.d.(b)).

It is an important initiative since newly independent states of the Soviet Union joined the organisation as sovereign equals with Russia. Moreover, the organisation consisted of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries who used to have a lack of relations, and with the establishment of BSEC the aim was to establish post-Cold War partnerships. As Aybak (2010:109) observes, for the first time, “a regional cooperation process had been put on track with the aim of dismantling and managing the Cold War divisions in the BSR and integrating the region into the European and world economies”. Aydin (2012:52-53) also states that

> With its heterogeneous composition of member states, the BSEC has been an interesting regional organisation. [...] There were ongoing border disputes (e.g. between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and historic grievances (as between Turkey and Greece, Greece and Albania, Moldova and Russia, Turkey and Armenia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) between the members during the establishment of the organisation. Nevertheless, it was an attempt at cooperation in a region divided by power struggles for centuries and separated by one of the main fault lines of the Cold War.

\(^{30}\) BSEC consists of a wide variety of institutions, which are the Permanent International Secretariat; Project Development Fund; Project Management Unit; the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which is the parliamentary component in the BSEC process; the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation Business Council, which is an international, non-governmental and non-profit organisation with the aim of lobbying and acting for the continuous improvement of the business environment throughout the BSR; the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, which supports economic development and regional cooperation by providing trade and project financing, and guarantees and equity for development projects, supporting both public and private enterprises in member states; the International Center for Black Sea Studies, which serves as a think-tank; and the BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information, which aims to collect, coordinate and disseminate statistics and economic information for member states (BSEC, 2015).
Increasing dialogue between Russia and Turkey in the post-Soviet space but particularly in the BSR improved cooperation in the region. A milestone in terms of the deepening regional cooperation between Russia and Turkey was the ‘Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey: From Bilateral Cooperation towards Multi-dimensional Partnership’ in 2001. This document underlined the fact that both countries were determined to carry their existing good political and economic relations to the level of enhanced constructive partnership in Eurasia. In this regard, they intended to bring peaceful and lasting solutions to the disputes in the region, reinforce stability, and create conditions for sustainable development in the Eurasia area, including the BSR (Russian Embassy in Turkey website, 2001). The two sides decided to establish a Joint Working Group for improvement of relations on a bilateral basis and in the Eurasian platform. It also referred to cooperation in the terrorism, security, trade and energy sectors. According to Erşen (2011) the inclusion of these sectors and issues, some of which used to spark serious tensions between the two countries during the 1990s, pointed to an emerging common understanding on regional issues. Agreeing on work in common in the BSR, according to Demiryol (2015), provides evidence that the two countries recognise each other as the major Eurasian powers.

Furthermore, Russian-Turkish rapprochement and its influence on the regionalism in the BSR continued in the attempts to develop naval cooperation with BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony. The aim of Turkey when it launched these initiatives was to ensure security and peace among littoral states and to prevent non-regional actors’ involvement in regional issues, as well as to prevent discussions about the Montreux Convention. It can clearly be seen from these initiatives that littoral states who have

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31 For the purposes of enhancing peace and stability in the Black Sea area, by increasing regional cooperation, and improving good relationships, the idea of establishing a multinational naval on-call peace task force, “The Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group: BLACKSEAFOR”, was initiated by Turkey in 1998. The official agreement was signed in 2001 by littoral states: Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine (BLACKSEAFOR website, 2014). It is an instrument available to be used effectively for preventing and eliminating the threat of terrorism and other risks and challenges in the Black Sea (MFA Turkey website, n.d.(a)). It is used to conduct search and rescue operations, for humanitarian assistance and environmental protection, and also for carrying out operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE (Hale, 2013).

32 Operation Black Sea Harmony was initiated by Turkey in March 2004. It is closely affiliated with NATO and complements NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, is recognised as a major security provider in the BSR’s maritime domain, and focuses on operational maritime security. It aims to secure sea lanes in the Black Sea in line with UN Security Council resolutions, to provide support, to deter, disrupt and prevent the threat of terrorism and illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials (OSCE website, 2007).
threat concerns and are involved in cooperation initiatives are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one another. These Turkey-led initiatives, despite their inefficiencies, have served to illustrate, to some extent, a sense of trust and confidence among littoral states, and have been an alternative venue for security discussions among member states. In terms of Russian-Turkish relations these maritime security organisations indicate that bilateral relations have seen a diversification of policy areas. Moreover, in their five hundred years of diplomatic relations which mostly involved conflicted relations, these initiatives were the first military cooperation between the two countries.

**Limitations of regionalism in the BSR**

Although establishing regional organisations certainly has had a positive influence on the BSR, the reality of regionalism falls short of the aspirations articulated in agreements such as BSEC. There are a number of obstacles to achieving greater cooperation, as Manoli (2010:337) enumerates:

- the persistence of unresolved conflicts,
- the need to generate trust and political commitment among leaders,
- a lack of financial and institutional resources,
- the need to engage the private sector and civil society,
- and the currently fragmented nature of regional organisations.

Coppieters (2001) maintains that the securitisation of political relations between national communities both on the domestic and on the bilateral level is another major reason for the lack of progress in regional integration. Finally, the political atmosphere in the region has the potential to change dramatically, and so this could completely change the future of each organisation.

Except for BSEC and other Turkish initiatives, regional organisations have not been embraced by Russia, and are often in fact perceived as anti-Russian (for instance GUAM). Moreover, some organisations have not found active support from Turkey and Greece as well such as GUAM and CDC. Overall, political elites in each country are reluctant to be more active and pursue the political targets of these initiatives. Moreover, they only remain government-based, and do not include civil society or the private sector, and so the public could not be involved in them as much as desired (Manoli, 2011). A final reason might be suggested that, because the main priority of most
Manoli (2013) claims that early post-Cold War period regional states attempted to desecuritise relations within the group. In this regard, it might be right to claim that region-building was successful during this period. BSEC can be given as an example in this case. During this period, regional tensions were rather frozen and economic cooperation improved greatly. These provided a certain status quo in regional security. However, unfortunately, it could not meet the expectation of a peaceful and fully regionalised BSR. This is because, after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, there has been more potential for conflict in the region, and this peaked with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, it might be right to claim that the institutional attempts in the BSR illustrate the process of desecuritisation in Russian-Turkish relations. Issues which were once securitised by each country, such as the perception of the Black Sea as their lake and of the other’s actions as a threat to their potential hegemony over the region, have lost some of their importance. Instead, the two countries have come to share the view that the security of the BSR and their respective interests in the region can only be provided via collaboration.

Regionalism in the BSR has seen some achievements as well as failures. While the problems faced by these regional organisations are multiple, falling easily into the category of divided, declaratory and overlapping regional cooperation patterns (Csernationi, 2014), they nonetheless demonstrate the development of a regional identity and awareness and, to some extent, a willingness on the part of political elites to subscribe to this identity (Aydın, 2005; Ciută, 2008). Hajizada (2014) rightly notices that region-building is a long-term project, a gradual and lengthy mission. In this context, actors’ political and security concerns and willingness are important factors, if the BSR is to remain as a region in the long term. Hence, Weaver (2013) concludes that, despite the problems, the BSR is becoming more recognised as a region, partly through the efforts of international institutions such as NATO and the EU, and regional ones such as BSEC. It is possible to claim that interaction among regional countries and organisational structure in the BSR are not weak, but they are complex, and this complexity is closely related to the security and political problems of the region.
4.3 The role of energy in the BSR

As we have seen, Russian-Turkish cooperation in the BSR has led to some successful outcomes, though they have so far been limited in building an institutionalised regional framework. This section examines how this cooperation affects and is affected by the energy politics and security concerns of BSR countries. In this regard, it is argued that the conflicting interests between Russia and other regional countries cause new concerns/risks in Russian-Turkish energy relations.

4.3.1 Overview of energy in the BSR

The BSR, as stated in the last two chapters, includes both countries who are economically and politically weak and which could easily become failed states on the one hand (Oskanian, 2013), and strong states on the other. This imbalance greatly affects the security of the region, leaving open the potential for tensions between countries. Moreover, historical suspicions and threat perceptions are dominant features of intraregional relations (Antonenko, 2009; Tassinari, 2011). Given these conditions it is unsurprising that regional relations are often securitised rather than desecuritised by countries in the region, and “the worst outcome [is] represented by the possibility of open conflict” (Tassinari, 2011:229). Although for these countries securitising their relations with each other is the most preferable option, other countries have close relations and have a tendency to diversify their cooperation in different areas in which issues are rather perceived as low politics. In this complex atmosphere, energy is perceived as both a political tool and a stabilising factor for regional countries.

The BSR consists of major energy producers (Russia and Azerbaijan), transit countries (Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Romania), and customer countries (Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria). Moreover, as a natural corridor for energy, the BSR is geographically located between other well-resourced energy suppliers and energy customers. The BSR is one of the major junctions of supply routes to Europe from Russia, the Caspian Basin and other producing countries in the East. Thus, O’Hara (2004) claims that energy is one of the salient determinants of the BSR’s importance. This has also led regional countries to find opportunities to interact with each other due to interdependency, as well as with non-regional actors due to transporting and supplying energy resources.
Given the diversity of conditions in the countries of the region, energy security has different meanings for countries in the BSR, ranging from concerns on increasing dependence on energy, strengthening its transit role, supply security and integration with European energy strategies. However, what is common is that these countries prioritise energy in their policies, and this is most commonly seen in the pressures of producers and transit countries. These converging and diverging interests make such interaction quite a complicated issue. Hence Dubien and Fanés (2010) and Manoli (2011) claim energy has become one of the most complicated factors of regional cooperation.

Energy has become an important security issue for the region. This is because regional states place a high priority on energy security for their survival due to the dependence on energy supply and demand. As clearly seen in Appendix 2, each country’s import of energy resources, including oil and natural gas or any other items related to them, constitute a significant share in their total imports. Russia is one of countries dominating the trade in the BSR due to its energy export. Currently, Russia exports its resources to BSR countries through three existing infrastructure elements: along the western Black Sea shore across Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria to Greece and Turkey, across the Caucasian mountains into Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and via the Blue Stream pipeline. However, as can be seen from the energy import table in 4.1 (summarising data in Appendix 2) BSR countries have made constant efforts to decrease their energy imports (with mixed results). Moreover, even when they have not achieved decreasing energy imports, they pay more attention to new pipeline projects in order to diversify their suppliers or transits.

Table 4.1 Net Energy Import Shares (%)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>-330.6</td>
<td>-340.4</td>
<td>-441.1</td>
<td>-465.4</td>
<td>-377.3</td>
<td>-328.9</td>
<td>-327.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-84.2</td>
<td>-82.1</td>
<td>-84.0</td>
<td>-85.5</td>
<td>-79.7</td>
<td>-77.6</td>
<td>-83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank (2017a)
These policies can also be characterised as examples of the significance of the securitisation of the energy sector in the BSR. Political developments such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009, and Russia’s other assertive initiatives, such as the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, have greatly increased concerns among regional countries that there is a threat to their national security and energy imports, leading them to question the reliability of Russia (see Chifu et al., 2010; Feklyunina, 2012). In particular, these countries focus on the distribution of supply. For instance, the Minister of Energy in Bulgaria in 2011 (cited in Maltby, 2015:819) implied that Russia was no longer a reliable partner: “we need to […] buy only from reliable partners. […] Energy security is not a factor in economic prosperity, but also a key part of national security”. This is because Russia has existing influence over the former countries within the Soviet sphere’s energy trade, as a route and a supplier, and so dependence on Russia is higher than on any other countries.

Thus, the politically-driven energy policies of each country situate securitisation in a regional energy security context. In this regard they are often concerned that Russia may utilise their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to make foreign policy concessions. They also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries, Russia may manipulate the internal political situation (Baev, 2007). States, as a result, aim to diversify their suppliers and resources, particularly in terms of not using Russian ones. Bulgaria and Romania can be given as examples. Aiming to decrease its dependence on Russia led Bulgaria to enhance relations with another regional energy supplier, Azerbaijan. In a presidential meeting in September 2016, Bulgaria and Azerbaijan expressed their willingness to enhance energy cooperation with the TAP section of the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline project (Azernews website, 2016a). The planned supply will start in 2020 via an interconnector on the border between Bulgaria and Greece.

Romania also has close energy relations with Azerbaijan, particularly through the AGRI LNG project, an interconnector intending to deliver Azerbaijani gas through Georgia to Romania. This project is important in the sense that Azerbaijan will not depend on one corridor and thus can diversify its routes, ensuring security of supply. So far, as stated in the previous chapter, Turkey is the main route for Azerbaijani gas, but with this project the Black Sea itself has become a route for Baku as well.
These diversification initiatives, as the examples of Bulgaria and Romania indicate, on the one hand enhance trilateral relations between Azerbaijan-Romania-Bulgaria, while on the other hand put Russian-Azerbaijani relations at risk, as well as Bulgarian-Russian and Romanian-Russian relations. This constellation in fact is quite common within the region, since most energy customers aim to decrease their dependence on Russia. Although this on the one hand means each country acting individually thereby undermining regional coherence, at the same time it paves the way for building energy constellations.

The BSR has two suppliers, supported by Russian and non-Russian groups. While Russia is the main supplier and supporter of Russian pipeline projects, Azerbaijan’s projects are supported by predominantly non-regional actors as well as regional ones. In their planning projects, they offer to build pipelines on the same territory, targeting the same markets and even providing the same amount of resources and so, in theory, they could be partners, and share the same territory, and regional cooperation opportunities could contribute to this. Indeed, Papava (2010) suggests that if they were to have close relations, the region could have cooperated and thus they could create pipeline harmonisation instead of pipeline diversification. However, the distinction between the two countries is quite strong, and even Russia and Azerbaijan see each other as alternatives, and so they have not taken any initiatives to get involved in common projects as yet. Pipeline projects are seen as competing rather than complementary (Manoli, 2011).

The rivalry between the two energy suppliers and their mutual mistrust impacts on cooperation in energy projects, impeding the creation of a unitary and cohesive region around the Black Sea, and also preventing them from gathering under the same roof of regional initiatives. Hence, Hajizada (2014:114) claims that

[one of the] fundamental problems hindering regional integration [in the BSR] is that governments have not yet bridged their differences on energy projects and they do not seem even to be creating conditions under which their race could be based on competitive grounds. The energy policies of BSEC states have never been aimed at being regionalised, as it has been a matter of bilateral relations and has never been integrated to the pluralist BSEC format.

A possible argument that can be given in this context is that present regional institutions are in general organised around political and economic frames, but the region itself is predominantly characterised by security problems, making the energy relationship
among regional states more security-oriented. In other words, because regional organisations in general have problems in forming common interests among region states due to mutual negative perceptions, this is likely to happen in energy as well, and the above-mentioned organisations’ energy commissions are highly likely to fail to form common regional energy grounds.

For instance, BSEC, under its organisational body, established a permanent working group on energy, involving cooperation on oil and gas transportation, energy efficiency, and renewable energy promotion (BSEC website, n.d.(c)). In its working group meeting in 2004 in Istanbul, BSEC put forward its main energy goal as “to pursue convergence and cooperation of the national energy markets (including all kinds of energy resources – oil, natural gas and electricity) at the regional level in order to establish mutual advantages” (Roberts, 2007:35). To achieve this, it works on “develop[ing] common-interest energy interaction” and creating “a network in charge of monitoring the development of projects on the improvement and construction of trans-border gas and oil pipelines among BSEC member countries and their connection to the domestic gas and oil networks” (Roberts, 2007:36). Moreover, annual declarations of cooperation are often rather ambitious, proposing such things as an integrated BSR energy market or green energy development task force proposals (BSEC website, n.d.(c)). They also constantly stress the need to enhance security of energy supplies. In some issues, such as providing political and technical support in the Black Sea Electricity Ring project, BSEC, according to Roberts (2007), has been successful.

Celac (2011) notices that the statistics of sectoral BSEC meetings at ministerial and working group levels illustrate that the largest number of meetings were devoted to energy issues. This illustrates the value they place on energy development. Moreover, energy certainly has financial value, and these are quite important for an organisation like BSEC which is predominantly concerned with these aspects, and so it is expected to at least attempt to start an energy union initiative or energy cooperation aiming to put regional countries together. As being the first organisation and having a broad area of concern, BSEC has the potential to be successful, but as Belyi and Makarychev (2015:72) point out, despite being ambitious and often holding meetings, “energy cooperation did not evolve into a key element of the region”.
Although many issues can explain the reason behind these failures (of BSEC), the most agreed-upon explanations are clashing with energy interests, the non-binding nature of commission proposals and lack of will (Celac, 2011). Regarding the first explanation, Russia’s rejection of the EU-supported INOGATE agreement on pipeline interconnections can be given as an example (Belyi and Makarychev, 2015). Certainly, in Russia’s objection, political calculations play a salient role. Russia aims to retain its control over energy in the region, as well as political control, and so any non-Russian initiatives are perceived as a threat that must be removed. Regarding the second case, the BSEC energy working group has met several times since the formulation of the organisation, and has published documents indicating the targets of the group, but when looked at closely, the documents’ recommendations are not obligatory but rather advisory, and even word choices are relatively weak, leading to the conclusion that they are not significant or binding. Regarding the last case, because states feel strongly threatened by their neighbours, and yet they heavily depend on each other, they are not inclined to take a more active role in energy. As Celac (2011) asserts, there is no political will to implement ambitious projects. Therefore, one might claim that no energy-based regional organisation has been formed yet.

One might nevertheless claim that, unlike the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the BSR has several cooperation projects, such as BTC, BTE and Blue Stream. Hajizada (2014) for instance claims that these projects provide peace and stability in the region, and have possibly contributed to regionalisation in the wider neighbourhood. However, when analysing them in depth, although in terms of number of projects and partner countries it needs to be accepted that the region is successful, Belyi and Makarychev (2015:72) point out that they do not reflect the overall success of regional cooperation, but are rather guided by the unilateral and bilateral interests of states. In this context, states tend to develop their own unilateral policies and so the pattern of regional institutionalisation is rather a weak.

Overall, energy is one of the sectors that could easily enhance regional relations, taking into account the fact that regionally and globally states depend on energy, but ineffective organisations and political problems among regional states have deepened the fault lines in the region, while other countries have been able to achieve a success of cooperation in what Triantaphyllou (2009) correctly articulates is the paradox of the
region. Patterns of conflict and cooperation are still strong in the region, and so this causes countries to alternate between securitisation and desecuritisation.

### 4.3.2 Energy: A new threat in Russian-Turkish relations?

Given our discussion of the regional dimension of energy in the BSR, it is important to return to our analysis of Russia and Turkey's regional role and to consider the contribution of Russia and Turkey in the present energy politics of the BSR. It can be argued that since regional energy policies include complexities, these strongly influence and are influenced by Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. According to Tanrısever (2012), although Russia and Turkey have close energy relations, their energy strategies are very competitive and rival each other. While the two countries have rival energy strategies, raising the possibility that energy could become a new concern/risk in bilateral relations, both Russia and Turkey are attempting to mitigate the tension between them on the basis of their interdependence and converging interests. This positive initiative increases the potential of building regional coherence in energy politics. In order to analyse this, one needs to take into account regional energy projects, but particularly non-Russian initiatives. Since one of the contributions of this thesis is to analyse securitisation apart from speech acts, choosing pipeline projects as an example serves this aim. Moreover, when analysing the problem via projects, one can see the delicate and complex balance between the two countries.

The Turkish-Azerbaijan energy relationship and Russian opposition to it provide an example of the complexity of Russian-Turkish energy relations in the region. It needs to be determined whether this situation is a challenge to regional cooperation or not, and also whether it is a threat for Russian-Turkish relations or not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s attempt to develop a larger regional role was driven partly by its growing energy needs and partly by the emergence of the Caspian Sea region as potentially one of the largest suppliers of energy in the world. This required Turkey to be more proactive not only in supporting regional initiatives but also in promoting the construction of pipelines from the region to the wider markets, with the country becoming a key link in an East-West energy corridor. Consequently it has sought closer political and diplomatic ties with the energy-abundant Caspian Sea states,

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33 BTC, BTE, Nabucco and TAP are discussed in Chapter 5.
particularly with Azerbaijan. It was easier for the two countries to enhance their relations since they have close ethnic, cultural, historical ties. Although bilateral relations among the two countries deteriorated in 2008 and 2009 due to the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process (see Kardaş, 2011), in general bilateral relations have been cooperative (Kardaş, 2014; Aras, 2014).

The increasing importance of Azerbaijan in the energy game of the region as well as for Europe has strongly affected both the country itself and Turkey, bringing benefits to both countries. Apart from consolidating bilateral energy cooperation, Azerbaijan started to be considered an alternative supplier, while Turkey found a new opportunity for fulfilling its energy demand, diversifying its natural gas imports away from Russia and Iran.

In Appendix 8, it is indicated that since 2007 (except in 2011 and 2012) bilateral natural gas trade has been increasing year by year, growing five times since 2007. Kardaş (2014) asserts that Azerbaijan plays three significant roles in Turkish energy policies: supplier for domestic markets, contributor to energy projects and investor. The BTC paved the way for increasing energy dialogue between the two countries and has been reinforced by State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)’s investments in the Turkish energy sector, making it the largest foreign investor in Turkey (see Ibrahimov, 2015:87). Energy cooperation between the two countries is developing successfully, and this success is the impetus for the further deepening of relations not only in the energy sector, but in all others.

From the Russian point of view, however, Azerbaijan is one of the countries that circumvent Russian territory via newly constructed pipeline projects and in this regard could help European countries reduce their reliance on Moscow (Perovic, 2009). Thus, a central objective of Russian energy strategy towards Azerbaijan has been to establish control over Baku’s energy sector (Ismailzade, 2006; Nanay, 2009). With this in mind, in 2008, Gazprom approached Baku offering to sell any Azeri gas that it sells to European market at European prices (Baev, 2011). However, Azerbaijan only committed 1bcm of its gas to Gazprom (Kardaş, 2014).

Russia also used other tactics to maintain its dominance in regional energy supply and to weaken Azerbaijan’s ability to export. As in other cases, it exploited frozen conflicts and secessionists activities to disrupt Azeri energy initiatives. Its involvement in the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was partly driven by this objective: Nygren (2008a) argues that Moscow sought to use the conflict to demonstrate the insecure nature of the country to potential European customers.

In addition, Russia has also taken advantage of the uncertain legal status of the Caspian Sea to weaken Azeri energy development. There are border disputes and conflicting legal claims to offshore oilfields of the littoral nations of Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The discussion is on whether those resources are owned in common or should be apportioned among the five littoral states, and if they should be apportioned, on what basis (Öğütçü, 2003). The exploitation of mineral resources in the sea and their transportation through pipelines constitute other problems. The legal status of the Caspian Sea has not yet been clarified and this is a serious obstacle to the full development of Caspian resources under normal circumstances, and makes the Caspian Sea region inefficient in energy diplomacy in regards to what was expected.

The diverging preferences of Russia and Turkey in the regional context can be illustrated by the case of TANAP. As noted in the previous chapter, TANAP is an important project with regards to Azerbaijan-Turkish cooperation in the energy sector. It not only makes Turkey an energy customer but also a shareholder of up to 30%. For Turkey, TANAP has an important place in its aim of becoming an energy hub. Apart from being a transit country, by becoming an important shareholder, it can diversify its energy-based political ambitions. This is because the success of the project could provide Turkey with the chance to diversify its options in the energy sector, establishing itself as a major energy transit state and further as an energy hub (Winrow, 2013). Moreover, Kardaş (2014) and Kim and Blank (2016) note that Turkey will benefit from the project by receiving Azeri gas at favourable prices. As a consequence of this, it can provide leverage with other exporter countries when negotiating the terms of its future imports.

While TANAP presents many opportunities for Turkey, for Russia it could undermine its importance as a supplier. TANAP is an alternative to Russian-backed pipeline projects in south-eastern Europe. Although the current agreement guarantees 10bcm supply to the European market, Azerbaijan, intends to use TANAP to increase its supply to the European market in the future – 31bcm by 2026. With this aim Baku could become a challenge for Gazprom, who will lose significant revenue in sales both to
Turkey and the Balkans. TANAP is thus one of the major contributors to European and Eurasian energy security. It is also an example of a non-Russian pipeline project that could bring Caspian energy to Europe.

TANAP is currently the only pipeline under construction bringing non-Russian gas to Europe from a former Soviet Union country (Kim and Blank, 2016) and its importance has been increased following the cancellation of South Stream. As discussed in Chapter 2, Russia’s securitising is more about to threats to its capacity to supply countries and control pipelines. Russian political elites, therefore, have sought to undermine any alternatives, as demonstrated by their response to TANAP. Initially Russian tactics sought to obstruct the project using Gazprom’s shareholdings in European distribution networks, notably Greece, to block Azerbaijan’s/SOCAR efforts to buy a 66% stake in a Greek gas grid operator. This would limit SOCAR’s activities in the TANAP/TAP routes, through the Balkans to Italy or Austria and Germany (Kim and Blank, 2016).

Moreover, Russia has sought to influence other energy suppliers in Central Asia to prevent them from cooperating both with each other (particularly on non-Russian projects), and with global customers. This can clearly be seen in Azerbaijan’s attempt to cooperate with Turkmenistan on TANAP. In order to supply the European market with more than 10bcm, Azerbaijan needs additional resources. While these could be supplied from Turkmenistan, the latter’s close relationship with Russia makes this unlikely. Özdemir (Interview, 2015) argues that it appears impossible, since the Turkmen need Russian consent for a pipeline running under the Caspian Sea.

Furthermore, the discourse that Russian political elite utter in criticising TANAP is based on the environmental, technical and financial difficulties of constructing pipelines running under the Caspian Sea. In this manner, the Russian political elite has expressed doubts about the TANAP project, with its envoy to the EU Chizhov saying it was “extremely challenging from a technical point of view” and “exorbitantly expensive” (Financial Times website, 2015).

Apart from Azerbaijan, Russia has developed a discourse warning Turkey about its participation to the project. Nanay and Stegen (2012:352), in this regard, point out that the TANAP project has engendered stiff criticism from Gazprom: in response to the agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan over TANAP, Gazprom warned Ankara, its second-largest gas customer, that if TANAP is completed as planned in 2018, Turkey
could [then] apply to Baku for help if it needed emergency supplies of gas. (emphasis added)

The authors indicate that with this statement Moscow implied that it would not be willing to help Turkey in a crisis (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). This statement can be considered an example of Russia reminding Turkey of its importance as a partner and supplier and highlighting Turkish vulnerability. One of Turkey’s security concerns is the lack of energy supply in an emergency situation.

The case of TANAP highlights the different priorities of Russia and Turkey towards ongoing pipeline projects, and the energy game more generally, within the BSR. While Russia considers non-Russian projects a threat to its monopoly and so opposes all projects aiming to develop resource diversity, Turkey cooperates with all countries, aiming to become an energy hub. This, therefore, risks the previously mentioned convergence of energy interests between the two countries, and reveals the possibility of energy becoming a new risk/threat in bilateral relations.

However, when considering moves taken by Russia, it appears that the country’s policy is to take a strong offensive position towards Azerbaijan rather than Turkey. In each situation, however, rather than uttering Azerbaijani activities as a threat to its survival, Russian political elites demonstrate it through their activities. Thus, it has dealt with Azerbaijan by trying to limit the country’s potential importance in energy diplomacy.

Regarding Turkey, Russia ceased issuing warnings to the country of the sort noted above. This change of approach can be explained as an indication that Russia does not want to risk its wider relations with Turkey. This is because Turkey is still an important market for Russian exports, and presently will be an important route for its resource transportation (hence its agreement with Turkey to develop the Turkish Stream project).

The complexity of relationships within the BSR is one of the main constraints on regional cooperation. This is because, rather than constructing political grounds that all parties can participate in and work on in common, countries have a tendency to take individual and rival initiatives on the basis of a small group of countries. However, in order to create a secure and trusted region, particularly in regards to energy transportation, there should be no disagreement among countries. The current atmosphere, due to this lack of coherence, seriously affects this opportunity.
Realising the importance of not only energy but also other political issues in regional cooperation, and recognising that these could risk their security and interdependence, Russia and Turkey have taken a number of initiatives to limit the risk. The Russian initiative to develop Turkish Stream has reinforced cooperation between the countries. Ankara in particular has embarked on a series of salient projects with the aim of continuing the desecuritisation of its energy relations in the region.

This has led Turkey to engage in efforts to mitigate the tension between Russia and Azerbaijan. It can be claimed that Turkey can bring two countries together since it has close political, economic and energy relations with both sides. In this regard, on every occasion Turkey declares that TANAP and Turkish Stream are not in competition with each other since they are both designed to guarantee gas supply with long term contracts. Moreover, taking diplomatic initiatives, Ankara has sought to bring the two sides together to cooperate with each other, since they aim at the same market through the same route (Azernews, 2016b). For instance, the Turkish Foreign Minister has offered to connect Turkish Stream and TANAP, since Turkey will buy 15.75bcm of Russian gas via Turkish Stream and the remaining volume can be exported via TANAP (Azernews website, 2016b). With these initiatives, Ankara’s target is to ensure balance between the two regional suppliers. Although no concrete steps have yet been taken, in terms of providing energy security among related countries and the BSR, the initiative of Turkey is important. Moreover, because Turkey and Russia aim to maintain a constructive political and economic dialogue between each other, initiatives paving the way for a positive relationship reinforce this bilateral relationship.

Taking into account all these complexities in the BSR, both related to energy and other issues, it can be stated that Russian-Turkish relations affect and are affected by the BSR. Moreover, risks still exist between Russia and Turkey but the current geopolitical environment is pushing the two sides to work with – instead of against – each other. This puts the idea of regional coherence in a delicate balance.

4.4 Conclusion

According to Antonenko (2009:260-262) the BSR is a new region, but this new political construct has been taking root slowly in terms of politics, the economy and security. Historical legacies have shaped the nature and pace of such developments. Second,
states in the conflicted regional structure fundamentally focus on their survival and, rather than creating opportunities to solve problems, they have a tendency to retain distance and mistrust between themselves and other countries, and so this has restricted the formation of a cooperative common mindset. Moreover, the imbalance between regional countries prevents them from reaching a consensus and so common ground. These issues strongly influence the development of the Black Sea as a region.

These problems have also been made manifest in the regional approach to energy supply and demand. The conceptualisation of energy as an existential threat often brings with it the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation. Countries tend to seek platforms for increasing cooperation with those countries with whom they have close relations, and this on the one hand paves the way for forming energy security constellations, while on the other hand it deepens separation. Hence, it was stated that the region demonstrates complexities within itself.

Russian-Turkish relations both affect and are affected by this complicated atmosphere. Their growing convergence has led them to launch regional initiatives in the BSR establishing, as well as partnering with regional organisations. This, in fact, to some extent, has been successful. With these desecuritising attempts, although frozen conflicts have so far not been resolved, regional economic activities have started to develop among countries in the region via bilateral trade. Such initiatives may serve to consolidate the concept of the Black Sea as a region.

However, Russia and Turkey are strongly affected by the energy opportunities of the region. Since it includes alternative suppliers in itself, their existence has triggered new concerns in bilateral relations. Russian politics towards these suppliers illustrates that in order to securitise an issue or a country it is not necessary to utter it as a threat, but through activities/practices states can easily demonstrate whether they perceive an issue as a threat or not. Influencing suppliers and using the problematic nature of states as a tool, Russia demonstrates how it prioritises energy in its foreign politics and security conceptualisation. Turkey, on the other hand, by seeking ways to bring energy suppliers together and establishing dialogues among them, intends to provide desecuritisation in the region as well as the maintenance of regional cooperation. In particular, due to interdependency, the two countries attempt to mitigate problems in their relationship. Turkey’s energy moves increase the possibility of regional energy coherence via
attempts to bring Azerbaijan and Russia together. Taking these into consideration, this chapter has argued that the pattern of conflict and cooperation in Russian-Turkish (energy) relations is powerfully affected both by their attitudes towards the development of energy links within the BSR and by the political stance of other countries in the region.

Since these practices have not yet been finalised, Alexandrova-Arbatova (2015) argues that the BSR remains plagued by insecurities and unpredictable conflicts. This has led some countries in the region to seek new security providers from outside. It is also a developing region, however, and this has drawn Western attention to the region, due to its geopolitical situation. For Russia and Turkey this is an unacceptable threat. The next chapter, therefore, concentrates on how these non-regional (energy) initiatives in the BSR affect Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the region.
CHAPTER 5

5. INTERREGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS OF RUSSIAN-TURKISH (ENERGY) RELATIONS IN THE BSR

5.1 Introduction

In the previous three chapters, this thesis, inspired by the concept of (de)securitisation in Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, has used energy as a case study for the domestic, bilateral and regional levels. I have highlighted how Russian-Turkish relations have a complex nature, with a pattern of cooperation and conflict. However, it is clear that Russian-Turkish relations cannot be fully understood in terms of domestic, bilateral and regional aspects. It is also necessary to consider how they are affected by global and interregional conditions. Thus, it is necessary to take into account the role of external actors, since they also exert influence on the BSR’s dynamics, shaping relations between protagonists within the region (Konoplyov and Delanoë, 2014). In terms of external actors, moreover, it is necessary to take into account those actors operating at the interregional as well as the global level. In this regard the EU is chosen as an interregional actor while the USA is a global actor.

The end of the Cold War transformed the BSR from a competitive but stable regional situation into an active and globally central one, wherein it has gradually become “a strategic amphitheatre of clashing interest and aspirations” (Tsantoulis, 2009:245; Çelikpala, 2010). With the independence of a number of new republics, there have been multiple channels of interactions between countries in the region and the international arena, ranging across the political, security, economic and social areas. The BSR’s own security problems and geographical closeness to other problematic regions are some of the important reasons behind external actors’ growing interest in the region.

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34 The interaction among the two sides can be seen in institutional platforms. The countries of the BSR have various ties to European and Euro-Atlantic structures. They are all members of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Two littoral states (Romania and Bulgaria) and Greece are members of the EU. Four are members of NATO (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey), and a number of countries in the region aspire to membership of both organisations. All non-EU countries in the region participate in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) except Russia, which has its own bilateral relationship with the EU. Turkey is currently in a negotiation process with the EU. All non-NATO countries in the region are members of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Ukraine and Russia each have additional bilateral links to NATO (Hamilton, 2008). After Russia’s annexation of Crimea cooperation has been suspended between NATO and Russia.
Russian-Turkish relations, in fact, used to be strongly affected by the involvement of non-regional actors, particularly during the Cold War period. Being members of two opposing camps, they used to believe that the significant threat to their national security was from the other side of the Black Sea. Turkey chose to ally itself with non-regional actors, and as such become a NATO member state. The growing effectiveness of non-regional actors in the region, as mentioned in the previous chapter, however, currently worries both Russia and Turkey, since they believe it to be their sphere of influence. This circumstance is securitised by Russia as an existential threat. This is because it is thought by Russia that external actors want to decrease Russia’s power in its near abroad. Turkey has sought to limit outside influence through joint actions with Russia on several regional issues, particularly control over the Black Sea via the Montreux Convention. Hence, I argue that while Russia’s relations with external actors are placed at the securitisation of the spectrum, Turkey’s relations with them alternate between desecuritisation and securitisation. Turkey is not as assertive as Russia because it is both a NATO member and in a negotiation process with the EU. However, it can be argued the relationship has become more securitised following recent domestic political developments and changes in the nature of the interaction between Ankara and the Euro-Atlantic bloc from positive to relatively negative. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to become fully securitised due to Turkey’s connections with the Euro-Atlantic bloc and its pragmatic political, economic and energy relations with them. Russia, by contrast, without having any membership ambitions vis a vis the Euro-Atlantic bloc, has been more assertive in the relationship with the bloc. The current picture indicates that deteriorating relations with the West have led Russia and Turkey to converge and consolidate their desecuritisation between each other. Thus, it is argued that in addition to other countries in the region, global actors have, as a result of their growing (energy) interests in the region, considerable influence on the changing patterns of conflict and cooperation in Russian-Turkish relations.

Energy is an important illustration of the impact of external actors on bilateral relations. Currently while there is a rivalry/sense of threat between Russia and the West, relations between Turkey and the West in the region are more cooperative. Their constructing roles in regional energy diplomacy have complicated bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey. In this sense, it can be claimed that external actors’ political stance dominates bilateral relations. In some cases, perceptions among/of actors increase the
possibility of deterioration in energy relations, as well as securitisation of the energy sector. Russia, in this case, is the most negatively affected, because its customers intend to decrease their dependence on the country. In this case energy has become an issue of high politics. In other cases, perceptions among actors increase the possibility of cooperation where energy has become an issue of low politics. Turkey, in this case, is the most positively affected, since the aim of decreasing dependence on Russia has led European customers to choose Turkey as a partner. These developments raise the possibility that energy could become a new threat to bilateral relations. This is because while Turkey is a part of non-Russian projects, Russia intends to retain its hegemony over the energy network. However, it is argued that the political discourse of external actors and geopolitical developments within the region as a whole have led Russia and Turkey to ignore potential tensions with each other and pursue cooperation in the energy sector as illustrated by Turkey’s involvement in Russian-backed projects.

The concept of (de)securitisation, according to the original theory, relates to circumstances where issues become securitised through speech acts, meaning when the securitising elite expresses an issue as a threat and their audience accepts it. However, one of the original contributions of this thesis is that in some cases, rather than expressing an issue as a threat, states articulate it through their activities and practices. In this regard, as has been done throughout the thesis, this chapter focuses on pipeline projects, both Russian-backed and non-Russian-backed projects, in order to indicate the process of (de)securitisation among countries.

The first section of this chapter highlights the involvement of the interregional and global levels in the BSR, focusing on the policies and perceptions of the EU and the USA/NATO towards the BSR; second, how the regional powers – Russia and Turkey – have reacted to this global attention; and finally the role of energy in this context, on the basis of analysing planned and existing pipeline projects. In this regard, this chapter discusses how the EU and the USA have impacted upon Russian-Turkish energy relations.

5.2 The involvement of non-regional actors in the BSR

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 created a power vacuum and marked the beginning of the redrawing of the geopolitical landscape in the BSR, as well
as in other parts of the world (Bahgat, 2003; King, 2008a). Tsantoulis (2009:243) claims that the BSR “emerged as one of the key areas in a new spiral of geopolitical competition characterised by intensifying antagonism among great powers”.

The BSR has become important for external actors for several reasons. In a geopolitical sense, the BSR is located at the centre of a geopolitical heartland, and is a bridge to a wider strategic space on the southern and eastern periphery of Europe and Asia Minor (Aydın, 2004; Lesser, 2007; Popa, 2010). Moreover, it is in close proximity to the ‘hot zone’ of the Middle East, the southern border of Russia and the northern limit of the southern flank of NATO (Popa, 2010).

Furthermore, the BSR is also a new and a substantial market economy in which external actors can enhance economic relations (COM, 2007a). During the Cold War, most countries in the region had a centrally-planned system, but with the demise of the Soviet Union, as discussed in Chapter 2, there was a transition to a market economy. In this new situation, they strongly depend on exports, because they have not been able to structurally advance their economies. The involvement of external actors in the economic sector contributes to the economic development of countries in the region, since they aim to reach European standards of market economy (Papava, 2010) and offers new markets for external actors’ exports.

In energy terms, as will be discussed in the final section of this chapter, the BSR occupies a pivotal position between significant oil and gas suppliers and customers: to the east the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, to the north Russia, to the south the Middle East and North Africa, and to the west major energy importers in the European market (Asmus, 2006; COM, 2007a). The share of total world production of oil in these regions is 57%, while proven reserves of oil are 63.6% (BP, 2015). The share of total world production of natural gas in these regions is 45%, while proven reserves of gas are 79.5% (BP, 2015). It is this concentration of energy resources which renders the BSR geopolitically important (Tsantoulis, 2009), giving meaning to O’Hara’s claim, paraphrasing Mackinder’s Heartland theory into energy, that “who controls the export routes, controls the oil and gas; who controls the oil and gas, controls the Heartland” (2004:148-151).

Regarding security, after the integration of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU and to NATO’s security umbrella, and the pacification of South-Eastern Europe,
the BSR has gained more strategic significance for the overall security and stability of Europe and Asia (Larrabee, 2006; Lesser, 2007; Çelikpala, 2010). This is because the BSR is located at the crossroads between potential conflict zones within the region, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and because security problems such as illegal migration, organised crime and drug trafficking have started to be articulated as threats in Euro-Atlantic security discourse (Lesser, 2007; German, 2009; Popa, 2010). In particular, since 9/11 – before that, although they had concerns over the region, they were not actively engaged (Maior and Matei, 2005) – the BSR has gradually been evolving into a “natural geopolitical hub” and a new “geopolitical axis” (Tsantoulis, 2009:245), which has begun to be seen as a back door and a zone of “connective tissue” (Bryza, 2006:37) between Europe – NATO/USA indirectly – and the problematic “broader Middle East and North Africa region” (Aydın, 2012:48).

Given its proximity to the region, the security problems within the BSR have led the EU to be more concerned about the region (Ciută, 2008). This is because security threats in the region have the potential to spread, to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Thus, the EU has worked to desecuritise conditions in the BSR in order to decrease security risks.

The EU’s neighbourhood policies and programmes aiming to transporting energy resources securely might be given as examples of desecuritisation (Tassinari, 2011). These initiatives were designed to foster closer integration within the region and with the EU. In this context, Europe aims to enhance relations through institutions, which depend on establishing good neighbourhood relations, as well as ensuring regional countries get close to its own standards. Thus, it can be stated that the EU is one of the significant actors who have been responsible for building the Black Sea as a region (see Ciută, 2008). Taking into account the discussion in the previous chapter, when asking whose region the BSR is, as Neumann (2003) does, the answer might be based on a plural endeavour involving the EU, Russia and Turkey.

Leaving aside the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and the presence of Greece since 1980, the EU has a number of programmes which engage with the BSR. These are: the pre-accession process of Turkey; a strategic partnership with Russia; and the integration programmes – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)\textsuperscript{35}, Black Sea

\textsuperscript{35} The ENP is designed to offer neighbour countries an opportunity to “participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation” (COM, 2004:3) without an accession perspective (Whitman and Wolff, 2010). The philosophy is to create a “ring of friends” among
Synergy (BSS\textsuperscript{36}), the Eastern Partnership (EaP\textsuperscript{37}), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy – which basically cover Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Hatto and Tomescu, 2008).

While the USA does not engage with the BSR on the basis of being a neighbouring power, as is the case for the EU, its engagement is also informed by security concerns, with a particular priority being given to the political protection of these areas or to increasing influence over them. The USA has a close interest in countries which it thinks have terrorist potential, troubling its national security, and the BSR is close to these areas (US Department of State website, 2008). Security is only one aspect of its engagement in the region; it has a multidimensional relationship with the BSR, consisting of promoting democracy and market reform and encouraging investments and trade opportunities, particularly in relation to energy (Bryza 2006; Larrabee 2009). In addition to these motives, Larrabee (2009) adds rivalry between Russia and the West as a factor motivating US involvement. In these ways, the USA aims to reinforce its position in a region where its role was limited during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, US officials have paid growing attention to the region, and have worked to construct a more coherent and comprehensive strategy (Larrabee, 2009). In most cases, therefore, the US’s geographical perspective on the region is ‘wider’, consisting both of the littoral countries of the Black Sea, the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea (Asmus, 2006; Hamilton and Mangott, 2008).

\textsuperscript{36} In May 2007 the Council adopted the Black Sea Synergy, a new regional cooperation initiative which was initiated by Germany during its presidency. It is a cooperation framework including six littoral countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, and also Greece, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Its aims are to support regional cooperation within the BSR and the EU and with regional organisations such as BSEC. In particular, it attempts to solve ongoing problems in the region such as energy, the environment, transport, mobility and security (COM, 2007a).

\textsuperscript{37} The EaP is a joint initiative involving the EU and six Eastern European countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EaP is “based on mutual commitments to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights [...] and protection of minorities, and the principles of the market economy and sustainable development” (COM, 2008; Grant, 2011:4). In order to achieve these objectives the EaP bases its policies on a “bilateral and multilateral track. The bilateral track aims to create a closer relationship between the EU and partner countries” in terms of the EU’s mutual interests, which means fostering partner countries’ stability and prosperity (COM, 2008; Grant, 2011:4). The multilateral track ensures a new framework for four policies, “these are democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and adaptation to EU policies; energy security and contacts between people” (COM, 2008; Grant, 2011:4).
As Lesser (2007) rightly notes, these geopolitical and strategic developments mean that both the USA and the EU now want to become regional actors, and this has changed the whole dynamic of the region. While Turkey and Greece were the only Euro-Atlantic members of the BSR during the Cold War, currently Russia has been left in relative isolation, because the other littoral countries are either members of Western institutions or have declared their intention of seeking membership of these institutions. This inherently changes the balance of power in the region, meaning that its geopolitics is now more complicated than ever before, and that the conflict/competition is sharper.

5.3 The approaches of Russia and Turkey towards the involvement of the USA and the EU in the BSR

With the above-indicated political initiatives, the EU and the USA as external actors demonstrate their growing concerns over the region. They have become salient actors in the region, pursuing their own strategic interests and preferences with the different strategies and instruments at their disposal (Lesser, 2007). It may be that the EU and US intend to pursue peace and stability in the region. However, they could have done so by cooperating with regional powers like Russia and Turkey, who have their own initiatives targeting the same problems. Instead, they preferred to pursue their own policies, which often clashed and competed with Russian and Turkish regional approaches.

I argue that conflicting political interests play a significant role in this choice. This is particularly the case for actors, such as Russia and the USA, who do not share a border but who have a history of rivalry. The two countries have had conflicting foreign policy interests in many areas, but the post-Soviet space is where they have particularly different expectations and perceptions, and one can analyse the BSR in this respect (Lukyanov, 2010). Indeed, the common view among scholars of the US’s activities in the region is that it aims to decrease the influence of Russia (Glebov, 2009; Harris, 2010). The USA has been accused by Russia as directly or indirectly supporting anti-Russian activities in the region, such as the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (Kanet, 2010a; Nalbandov, 2016). These are salient political problems for Russia since it considers these areas its sphere of interest. In addition, the USA seeks platforms for dialogue with regional countries in the guise of formulating economic structures. Russia,
as a result of these initiatives, feels threatened by the USA more strongly than it feels threatened by Europe. This is because Europe depends on Russia in terms of energy, but the USA has no such dependency on Russia. Hence Mankoff (2009) and Freire (2014) claim that while the EU is still an issue for Moscow, Russia does not perceive the EU as a game changer and a threat as much as it does the USA (Nalbandov, 2016).

Another significant example of Russia’s sense of threat from the USA is the NATO enlargement in the BSR (Cross, 2015). The importance of the BSR was specifically mentioned by NATO for the first time at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, stating that

> We note the importance of the Black Sea Region for Euro-Atlantic security. Littoral countries, Allies and Partners are working together to contribute to further strengthening security and stability in the area. Our Alliance is prepared to explore means to complement these efforts, building upon existing forms of regional cooperation. (NATO, 2004)

Originally, NATO enlargement around the BSR was viewed as a generalised strategic priority, part of the long-term consolidation of the post-communist security order in Europe. From the Russian perspective, however, the extension of NATO to include its southern neighbours is aimed at creating a reverse buffer zone to isolate the country from the European continent (Shlykov, 2008; Kanet and Larive, 2012), and an act that increases insecurity between itself and its neighbours (Sakwa, 2013). With NATO, Russia might claim that the West wants to build a European security complex without including itself, with Russia perceived as a threat. Alexandrova-Arbatova (2015) points out that ‘without Russia’ is always perceived as ‘against Russia’ by Russians. According to the Russian view, alternative institutions such as the OSCE could serve as substitute forums including all European countries. However, such an option has not been taken up by the Euro-Atlantic bloc. This is because the Euro-Atlantic bloc needs to identify a threat to their audience in order to maintain NATO as a security organisation and justify their policies, and Russia could play that role. This demonstrates the strength of the West’s mistrust of Russia and Russia’s perception of that mistrust (Tsangankov, 2013). Putin, in the Munich Conference on Security Policy, stated that

> I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? (Kremlin website, 2007)
In parallel, Russia securitises NATO as an existential threat to its national security. In accordance with this rhetoric, the image that Russian elites project is that the West prefers a weak Russia (Hansen, 2016). Moreover, in its military doctrine of 2010, Russia defined NATO as its main external military danger (Cross, 2015). Russia is also concerned by NATO’s military presence in Romania and Bulgaria, and argues that it is not designed to fight against terrorism but to keep troops closer to Russia. Given these circumstances, Shlykov (2008) claims that Russia has a right to fear NATO. Russia feels the fear of encirclement by enemies, and is concerned that a more substantial and coherent approach from the USA might undermine its political and economic influence, particularly when the US attempts to get involved in the former Soviet space. The Russian narrative of US provocation in the Rose and Orange revolutions and the proposed NATO expansion in Georgia and Ukraine, which border the Russian Black Sea coast, provoked these fears (Hill and Taşpinar, 2006). This is because, from Russia’s point of view, Georgian membership of NATO would have put the USA in the heart of the Caucasus with direct access to the oil and gas pipelines of the Caspian Sea. Ukrainian membership would have been catastrophic for Russia, because of the historical ties between the two countries, the large Russian population in eastern Ukraine and the location of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Donaldson et al., 2014). Russia perceived these actions as attempts to decrease its influence in this area, and therefore it upgraded its foreign policy initiatives, militarising its southern border and attempting to increase its influence in the former Soviet space as exceptional measures (Sakwa, 2013).

From the Turkish side, Turkey remains committed to NATO as a foundation of its national security strategy and as a forum for its full participation in Euro-Atlantic security policy deliberations. Moreover, its security has been supported by NATO (Nalbandov, 2016). Turkey’s relationship with NATO is not problem-free, however. Turkey has hesitated over expanded NATO operations in the BSR. Like Russia, Turkey argues that operations are unnecessary and will only feed Turkish fears about encirclement, with damaging consequences to its regional interests (Flanagan and Brannen, 2009). Hence, Turkey prefers not to be part of any operations and aims to prevent NATO’s military presence in the BSR (Hill and Taşpinar, 2006; Winrow, 2007a).
Furthermore, Turkey does not want its legal privileges to be threatened and has restricted the number, type and length of stay of warships of non-BSR states in the BSR as established under the 1936 Montreux Convention (Winrow, 2007a; Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2008; Aydın, 2012). Any breaches of Convention are perceived as a threat to its security and the unity of the state, which Tür and Han (2011) call Sevres Syndrome, referring to external actors’ aim of dividing Turkey into small regions, as the 1920 Treaty of Sevres proposed in the wake of the First World War. Turkey, therefore, is frequently suspicious about external actors’ intervention in its sphere of interest. While being regarded as a European country has always been at priority for Turkish foreign policy and membership of the Euro-Atlantic bloc has been perceived as essential for security, Turkey has criticised the bloc for a lack of understanding, a lack of respect and a lack of friendship in their relationship with Turkey (Yılmaz, 2012).

For instance, relations with the EU were originally characterised as a source of desecuritisation in various fields such as democratisation, human rights and minority rights in Turkish domestic politics (Öner, 2013; Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2013). These issues were considered as part of the security agenda, but with the EU accession process they were redefined as part of political agenda. However, due to the ambiguity of the membership negotiations and political issues such as the Cyprus and Kurdish issues, Turkey’s relations with the EU have deteriorated. Turkey perceives EU’s activities in its domestic politics as examples of encirclement (Oğuzlu, 2007; Tür and Han, 2011).

**Russian-Turkish convergence**

External actors have a strong influence on Russian-Turkish convergence, in particular regarding the BSR. Indeed, Hill and Taşpınar (2006:4) argue that the main motivation behind Russian-Turkish convergence seems to be a shared sense of frustration with the West. Especially since 2003, shared disillusionment with the United States and Europe, and an increasing common desire to head off US and European activity in their joint border area in the Caucasus [...] have drawn Russia and Turkey together.

Regarding the EU, Russian-Turkish converging interests in the BSR depend on refusing to “accept the role of the EU as an equal regional stakeholder while preferring the status quo” (Triantaphyllou, 2014:292). In this regard, for instance, the two countries but
particularly Russia are reluctant to accept the EU’s activities in BSEC (Freire, 2014). Moreover, the EU’s criticism of Russian and Turkish domestic political conditions, such as the growing authoritarian regime in both countries, and abuses of human rights and freedom of speech, plays a key role in the two countries’ problematic relations with the EU, while further leading the two countries to converge with each other. Hill and Taşpınar (2006:9) point out that the EU’s polices towards Russia and Turkey cause them to “feel increasingly rejected or snubbed by [Europe/the EU], with their concerns not fully taken into account”.

Regarding the USA, the starting point of its effect on Russian-Turkish convergence can be dated back to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Turkey feared that the invasion would lead to the disintegration of Iraq, paving the way for an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and the destabilisation of the Middle East (Aktürk, 2014; Demiryol, 2015). Thus, Öner (2013) argues that this incident changed Turkish security perceptions, in which security issues moved to high politics. The invasion fuelled a phenomenal rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, while on the other hand it changed the perception of Turkey in Russia. After the rejection of the deployment of American troops in Turkey for a possible attack on Iraq by the Turkish parliament on March 1st 2003, in his responses to Russian journalists before his first official visit to Turkey, Putin (2004) stated that

we are impressed by Turkey’s independent foreign policy. To be honest, I was thinking of how the situation with Iraq developed. Turkey’s independent stand on this issue came as a surprise for me personally, for the entire Russian leadership, and I think for many of my colleagues in the world. Turkey’s stand was dictated above all by its national interests and shares a lot in common with Russia’s own position.

In this context, Russia started to perceive Turkey as an independent actor in foreign policy with whom it could develop close relations.

In light of Russian and Turkish concerns over Euro-Atlantic involvement in the region, it is possible to claim that even though the two countries perceive security problems in the BSR as a risk to their national security, the way that they consider external powers as a risk is stronger than their consideration of regional ones. This is because, since other countries in the region have an intention to be a part of Western security and political structures, external actors can easily build their influence over the region, and this, inherently, decreases Russian and Turkish influence in the region. For Russia, the
biggest risk is to be encircled by NATO, while for Turkey it is to be divided into smaller entities by external actors. Thus, instead of joining NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, which is a “naval deployment to prevent the movement of terrorists and trade in components of weapons of mass destruction from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea”, the Turkish and Russian authorities have lobbied for BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony to be more active rather than Western security initiatives (Winrow, 2007a:224; Karadeniz, 2007). Moreover, they opposed the US application to BSEC for observer status until 2006 (Kara, 2009). Erşen (2011) points out that this was interesting not only in terms of revealing the extent of the frustration felt in Ankara about a long-time ally, but also illustrating the dedication of Russia and Turkey to tackling regional matters in consultation with each other, rather than with outside powers.

Furthermore, on all such occasions Russia and Turkey acted in common, particularly in regards to the BSR. For instance, Turkey at first did not allow NATO ships to enter the Turkish Straits to help Georgia in 2008, and then only accepted those bringing humanitarian aid. It pursued the same policy in the Ukraine crisis in 2014. In addition, it did not join Western sanctions against Russia as a matter of principle. In fact, being a NATO partner, what Turkey has done in these cases is quite unusual. Its actions have been greatly criticised by allies as well. This political movement might be explained by a change of Turkish foreign policy priorities and a new questioning attitude towards NATO and the EU. On the Russian side, it regularly stresses its support of the Montreux Convention (Larrabee, 2010).

From these examples it is possible to argue that dissatisfaction with non-regional actors’ policies towards themselves and to the BSR, and deteriorating relations with the West, have facilitated the improvement of Russian-Turkish relations. Having belonged to two rival political blocs in the BSR during the Cold War, developing relations between Russia and Turkey is an important example of the process of desecuritisation leading them to rearticulate their relationship.

5.4 The role of energy at the interregional and global levels in Russian-Turkish relations

On the global level, it has been warned that global energy demand is increasing (COM, 2006; IEA, 2016). As a result, concerns over energy security have intensified with all
states and regions aiming to reduce the risks associated with resource dependence. As stated in Chapter 1, obtaining sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future are at priority for most countries, and ensuring such access to energy resources is a central component of their external affairs (Hadfield, 2008). States aim to trade with reliable suppliers and to transport resources via secure routes. However, current suppliers are in rather problematic regions, dealing with domestic conflicts as well as state-to-state tensions. When states have to import energy resources from such troubled regions, they tend to perceive energy insecurity as an existential threat and to securitise it. This is because security problems in energy supply would strongly affect political stability and economic wealth, in other words a state’s survival as a state. Customer countries/global actors start to be concerned with suppliers’ as well as transit countries’ domestic and regional security policies in order to keep their supplies secure.

Such concerns have led global actors to seek alternative suppliers and routes. In the context of this issue, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the emergence of the energy-abundant Caspian Sea countries (Table 5.1) as independent states was a significant development for the global market, serving to internationalise the region and provoking a major reconfiguration of power and influence (Jonson, 2001).

**Table: 5.1 Energy Profile of the Caspian Sea Region**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: BP Statistical review (2015)*

Despite its rich energy resources, however, transportation of resources to the Western market has been quite challenging for both customers and suppliers due to the landlocked location of the Caspian Sea (Mangott and Westphal, 2008). Moreover, there has been no direct pipeline system which could handle the volumes of oil that could potentially be exported from the region. The BSR’s geographical proximity to the Caspian Sea, therefore, adds a new dimension to its geopolitical importance as a transit region. In addition to enhancing cooperation with countries in the Caspian Sea and the
BSR, therefore, building new oil and natural gas pipelines via transit countries has been a priority particularly for European customers in these areas.

In order to develop the Caspian Sea’s export capacity, policies under consideration by the countries planning to export have focused on three main projects. The first involved the expansion of Russian routes to the north of the region through existing pipelines and railroads; the second option was Iran to the south through the construction of new pipelines; and the final option, supported by the US for its allies, entailed multiple pipelines so as to prevent any individual actor establishing a monopoly over the export of the region’s energy resources (Cornell et al., 2005; Guillet, 2011).

Until 2014, when an agreement on lifting sanctions was achieved, the Iranian option was a challenge because of political tensions with the USA. Expanding the Russian oil export capacity was also problematic due to the bottleneck of the Turkish Straits in terms of tanker traffic. Russia already makes heavy use of the Turkish Straits, which handle around half of Russian oil exports to Western markets and almost 4% of world oil consumption (Demiryol, 2015). Planning for new pipelines was needed to circumvent the potential log-jams at the Turkish Straits. These considerations of Western actors have tended to enhance the attractiveness of building overland pipelines, allowing oil to be transported through Georgia and Turkey directly to a deep-water port in the Mediterranean, thus avoiding the major chokepoints in transportation, such as the Straits (Cornell et al., 2005).

When external actors aim to differentiate their routes and suppliers, planning new routes greatly depends on the way that they perceive the related actors. In other words, when it comes to deciding a partner with whom to launch a new project, external actors/customers prefer to choose those with whom they have close relations or at least whom they have a positive perception of. Thus, supplier and customer can meet on common ground. As can be seen from these three options, even though Russian and Iranian options were commercially more suitable and economical (Kim and Eom, 2008), due to being perceived as a threat for the USA and the EU, they were not even taken into consideration. By contrast, relatively close relations with Turkey facilitated its potential as an energy route.
Concerns and actions of the USA and the EU towards Russia and the Russian response

It needs to be stated that the USA does not directly engage in the energy market as a customer; its interest is more geopolitical and strategic. In this regard, Klare (2008) argues that the USA does not want Russia to once again assert its hegemony in the energy-abundant post-Soviet space, and it therefore works to prevent and disrupt Russian energy influence in the region. Moreover, the USA’s energy securitisation in the BSR is relevant to securitising European countries’ energy demand; in other words, according to the US concern, Europe should decrease its dependence on one supplier and diversify its resources and suppliers; and thus “minimise European vulnerability to Russian energy manipulation” (Nanay and Smith Stegen, 2012:343). The USA has, therefore, actively promoted alternative projects which envisage non-Russian elements in transportation, and has worked to use energy cooperation as a strategic tool to shape the political transformation of the post-Soviet nations (Konoplyov and Delanoë, 2014).

As for the EU, since its enlargement, it has come closer to the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves (Russia and the Caspian basin, the Middle East and North Africa). At the same time, however, enlargements have increased sensitivity towards, and overdependence on Russian energy resources. The EU, alongside Russia and the USA, is the most prominent in securitising energy as an existential threat (Kirchner and Berk, 2010). Stoddard (2012) suggests that, as a policy initiator, the EU Commission has a notable position as a securitising actor in the EU, and so their policy documents give one a clear idea about how the EU securitis energy. In its energy strategies, the EU/EC focuses its attention on the importance of secure and stable suppliers, as well as routes, at reasonable prices, and so the main aim is to decrease dependence on one supplier and instead diversify suppliers as well as resources (COM, 1995; COM, 2000). These concerns increased their importance after the energy crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, when some EU member states faced disruptions to energy supplies (COM, 2006; COM, 2007b; COM 2014). After these crises, Casier (2011) argues that an economy-oriented energy policy has become more politics-oriented with an increasing emphasis on energy security.

Table 5.2 highlights the decline of the EU’s oil and gas production and the consequent increasing reliance on energy import (detailed in Appendix, 9). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2014), the EU is the largest energy importer in the
world, importing 53% of the energy it consumes, which is expected to increase to 55% in 2030. It imports 88% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas (IEA, 2014).

Table 5.2 Development of the Production of Primary Energy EU-28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tones of oil equivalent</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat website, 2017

As shown in Appendix 10, Russia has maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil (31.9%) and natural gas (32.4%) to the EU (Eurostat, 2017). However, the share of energy imports, particularly from Russia, is distributed unevenly across the member states; the dependence of EU member states on Russia can be divided into three groups: the first group consists of countries with low dependence, such as Denmark, France, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland; the second group have a medium dependence, including the Netherlands, Italy and Germany; while the last group have high dependence, including Austria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia (Youngs, 2009; Appendix, 11). So far, Russia has delivered its resources to the European market via the Nord Stream natural gas, the Druzhba (Friendship) oil, the Yamal-Europe natural gas and the Soyuz natural gas pipelines, passing through Ukraine and Belarus and it plans to do so through further pipelines in South Eastern Europe (EIA, 2015a).

The high levels of energy trade and networks of pipeline linkages highlight the interdependency between the two sides (Proedrou, 2007; Güney and Korkmaz, 2014), creating a security dilemma for them (Krickovic, 2015). Moreover, the nature of that interdependence is contested: Casier (2011) calls it asymmetrical interdependence, favouring Russia, while Kropatcheva (2011) claims it favours the EU. The EU Commission (2013:3) calls it a symmetrical relationship, saying that

Over the past half century, Russia has been a vital supplier of energy to the EU. But if Russia is important to the EU, the EU as a neighbour with half a billion energy consumers in a unified internal market is just as important to Russia.

In symmetrical dependence, states play down the fear that the other side will use the threat of breaking or manipulating the relationship, and instead focus on the benefits of the relationship. In an asymmetrical relationship the situation is the opposite, with the
weaker side focused on the costs and risks of the relationship and concerned that the other will exploit their advantage (Krickovic, 2015). Hence, in order to understand the nature of the EU-Russian interdependence, one needs to consider the perceptions of each side. Moscow’s growing and threatening influence over the post-Soviet space – particularly with regards to the EU’s energy transit route, Ukraine – and its willingness to use its oil and gas resources as a political tool, have intensified the EU’s efforts to diversify its energy suppliers. They have changed their perception of Russia as a reliable supplier, to a view where it is regarded as an unreliable partner (Feklyunina, 2008, 2012). Thus, naturally, the desire to maintain good energy relations with Russia is now increasingly counterbalanced by the desire to find new suppliers in order to decrease the EU’s energy dependence on Russia, which undermines the perception of symmetrical (inter)dependency. These circumstances highlight the importance of building alternative pipelines to the European market from energy abundant suppliers, where the BSR has become more important.

The energy disputes between Russia and energy transit countries for Europe, Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, and Belarus in 2009, as well as the political disputes with Georgia in 2008, triggered this political shift. This is because it can be argued that in particular Ukraine and Georgia are important energy transit routes for the European market, so that any threat their national security could have an impact on European energy security. Recent developments have arguably confirmed this change in perception, notably the 2013/14 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, which resulted in sanctions against the Russian energy sector, specifically curtailing its accession to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil production and exploration, as well as in the political and economic sectors (Stulberg, 2015; Appendix 12).

Furthermore, as an outcome of its policy approach, in order to limit Russian dominance over European energy supply, the EU aspires to improve energy network connections with its partners, aiming at ensuring strong mutual interests, increased energy cooperation, and building on existing bilateral and regional initiatives in respect to the BSR by introducing related programmes. Lussac (2008) notes that although the EU

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38 The TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme aims to promote the transition to a market economy; to reinforce democracy and the rule of law; to assist in constituting social policies; to enhance the infrastructure networks; to protect the environment; and to
used to believe that the BSR is Russia’s backyard and thus that it should not get involved, growing energy needs have led it to enhance relations with the region. The region offers strategically important potential for energy supply diversification. Thus the EU has changed its political perception of the region: for the EU, the BSR is a new strategic energy partner, and their concerns interlink with each other. This, therefore, leads the EU to enhance its relations with the region with the objective of strengthening cooperation.

Azerbaijan is an important option for meeting European energy needs for a number of reasons. It is a new supplier to the European market with rich energy resources and it is located in a suitable position, offering transportation routes which are relatively secure for the European market. Moreover, it is a country which is not perceived as a threat by European countries: indeed it might be argued that the European market and Azerbaijan enjoy a symmetrically interdependent relationship. While Europe wants to diversify its sources of supply in order to decrease its dependence on Russia, Azerbaijan needs a stable and secure market for its resources.

Nevertheless, one needs to bear in mind that even though it had to face some resource disruptions, the EU has played a more pragmatic role compared to the USA (Harris, 2010; Kardaş, 2011-12). Although it shares similar geopolitical concerns to the USA, the EU has displayed a multi-vectoral policy approach, cooperating with the USA in its support for pipeline projects but recognising that its dependence on Russian resources makes it difficult for it to ignore Russia in reality (Nanay and Smith Stegen, 2012). Indeed, Kaveshnikov (2010) asserts that the EU’s energy framework relies on maintaining peaceful and balanced relations with Russia. In this regard, for instance, although founder EU member states such as Germany, France and Italy have the
intention to maintain energy relations with Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011), new post-Soviet members such as Poland and Lithuania want to diversify suppliers (Casier, 2011). Thus, a lack of unity and solidarity among member states sometimes leads to them being more passive in energy politics.

Russian-EU energy relations, overall, since the two sides depend on each other, have a special form. While on the one hand the EU attempts to diversify its suppliers in order to decrease dependence on Russia, which has revealed rivalry between the two sides on the other hand, as seen in South Stream and Nord Stream pipeline projects, some member states seek to maintain their energy links with Russia. Interdependency and geopolitics play key roles in determination of the relationship. It can be stated that the EU and Russia exist in a complex and an uncertain relationship and energy is at the heart of current tensions and the attempts to develop a strategic partnership (Judge et al., 2016). Thus energy is not simply a commercial phenomenon but a security issue for political actors.

Russia, meanwhile, interprets these goals of the USA and those of the EU as aiming to restrict Russian influence in what it sees as its own sphere of influence, as well as reducing its importance in the European energy market, and so it securitises non-Russian energy activities in the region. Kanet (2010a) posits that Russians perceive Western activities as a continuation of a policy of containment. It feels threatened by new pipeline projects and so it has responded with counter-projects (Crandall, 2011). In this regard, apart from signing contracts with energy suppliers in the Caspian Sea region, as stated in Chapter 4, Russia has signed agreements with major European countries, operating outside any common EU policy, to construct new pipelines that will avoid the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland and, thus, any ability of these countries to use Russia’s dependence on them for delivery to Europe of petroleum and gas for political purposes (Kanet, 2010b:91).

Overall, as Kanet (2010a:218) points out, “Russia has positioned itself effectively to control the production and distribution of energy across almost the entirety of former Soviet space and, thus, to Europe as well”. Moreover, it has worked to diversify its
customers, in particular by enhancing its energy relations with China \(^{39}\) and the East Asian market (O’Sullivan, 2014).

**The USA and the EU’s energy relations with Turkey**

Given Western concerns about Russia, Turkey is the most convenient option for non-Russian transportation. According to Raphael and Stokes (2014), strategic calculations play an important role in the US choice of Turkey; while the EU considers Turkey as critical to its security of supply (Tekin and Williams, 2011). This is because Turkey has close ethnic and historical ties with alternative energy suppliers – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – and also compared to other transit routes it is seen as a reliable route for the European market due to its close relations with the West, as a NATO ally, and its negotiations for membership with the EU (Tekin and Williams, 2011). Thus, in this context, both its European partners and Azerbaijan can trust it, and this makes transportation more secure and possible. Although Turkey and the USA and the EU have some political disputes, Turkey’s role in energy is still important for them (Morningstar, 2007; Freire, 2014). Indeed, the USA Energy Information Agency (EIA 2015b:1), states that “Turkey is an increasingly important transit hub for oil and natural gas supplies as they move from Central Asia, Russia and the Middle East to Europe and other Atlantic markets” (emphasis added). Also, for the EU, Carl Bildt and Massimo D’Alema, foreign ministers of Sweden and Italy, respectively, wrote in a joint article stating the importance of Turkey, as

> Turkey is a key actor in the realm of energy security. Given the uncertain state of energy markets, and the stakes involved, it is our shared interest to incorporate Turkey in a functioning integrated system. (cited in Tekin and Williams, 2011:170)

In order to become an energy hub, Turkey believes it is necessary for it to be a part of significant projects. In this regard, in official discourse it has often expressed the necessity of the many projects providing resource transport to the European market. Thus it supports all projects without considering whether they are Russian or non-Russian. In official discourse, it emphasises that pipeline projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Ankara, in this context,

\(^{39}\) In a May 2014 gas agreement, Moscow and Beijing agreed on “terms to deliver 38bcm of natural gas a year from Russia’s as-yet-undeveloped gas fields in eastern Siberia to the heavily populated eastern corridor of China” (O’Sullivan, 2014:n.p.).
aims to retain balance among all sides as well as to maximise its opportunities. In this context, for instance, at the signing ceremony of South Stream, Erdoğan stated that

In my opinion it would be more correct to describe Nabucco and South Stream as parallel rather than alternatives to each other. (Cited on Euronews website, 2009)

[Furthermore], Europe cannot be satisfied with either Nabucco or South Stream, but both projects can meet the demand of Europe and fill a very big gap. (Anadolu Agency website, 2009a)

Moreover, former Minister of Energy in Turkey, Taner Yıldız, has stated that

Although in the short term they might look like rival projects, in the mid and long term, they are not. As Europe needs more natural gas, there will be a need for three or four projects [TANAP, Nabucco West and ITGI] like that. This is why we have a positive approach to South Stream. (Cited on Hurriyet Daily News website, 2012)

Karagöl and Kızılkaya (2015) assert that when considering the significance of energy in the global market, the position of Turkey in all pipeline projects, with its aim of becoming an energy hub, has played a key role in its transformation into a global energy player. In this regard, Turkey has sought to pursue a balanced policy between the West and Russia.

The above assessments illustrate that external actors have different energy-based approaches towards Russia and Turkey. The fundamental aspect shaping their point of view is their perception of these two countries. In this context, while Russia is perceived rather as a risk/threat to energy dependence, Turkey on the other side represents an option that they can chose as a partner. In other circumstances, external actors, particularly the EU, could have developed their energy relations with the already-existing energy supplier, Russia, due to their (inter)dependency. However, the EU has chosen to diversify its sources of supply. This can be explained as when customers feel threatened by their main supplier, they tend to securitise them as an existential threat, aiming to diversify their resources. Securitisation of energy is the case for external actors in the BSR and so they are quite active in regional energy projects. In this situation, they have a tendency to choose a partner that they can develop dialogue with without facing any risks.

However, their choice of Turkey as a partner in developing non-Russian energy projects and pipelines could render energy as a threat to Russian-Turkish relations. The choices of non-regional actors have led Russia and Turkey to be parts of different constellations.
This certainly has a great influence on bilateral relations as well as their energy policies since, as stated before, Russia aims to retain its power and control over its customers and routes, while Turkey aims to become an energy hub. The approaches of external actors have complicated bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey.

While external actors’ energy policies towards the BSR have influenced and could possibly undermine Russian-Turkish relations, so far they have not done so. This stems from the politics of external actors and their misperception of Russia and Turkey, particularly over pipeline projects. As the following cases show, the two countries have increased their cooperation on such ventures to reinforce their relations and reduce tensions. Each subsections compares the development of two projects, one Russian and one non-Russian, which might be seen as rivals and considers how they reflected the changing relationship between Russia and Turkey on energy projects in the BSR

5.4.1 BTC and Blue Stream

BTC and Blue Stream are important projects indicating the different and potentially conflicting conduct of actors in the BSR. As stated before, Russia was the primary energy actor in the Soviet Union, both as a supplier and a transit route. As the first non-Russian pipeline project aiming to transport former Soviet Union countries’ resources to the European market, bypassing Russia, the BTC started the process of competition between Russia and the West. Blue Stream, on the other hand, can be seen as an attempt by Russia to offset the loss of control over Azerbaijan’s oil supplies by seeking to commit the Turkish market to growing volumes of Russian gas supplies (Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2008).

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey have been in competition for the use and transportation of the Caspian’s hydrocarbon resources. By circumventing Russia and Iran, Turkey aimed to earn a distinct advantage in its regional rivalry with these countries (Kelkitli, 2017). Thus, Turkey – allying with the USA – played a key role in BTC. By contrast, Russia, facing the threat of being bypassed, backed at ‘northern’ pipeline route to Novorossiysk (Torbakov, 2002), a move that highlighted the Russian government’s goal of retaining control over energy export routes to Europe.

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BTC, Blue Stream, Nabuco, South Stream, TAP and Turkish Stream are chosen as pipeline projects because they run from either Azerbaijan and Russia across the Black Sea itself or the BSR countries.
and thereby keep outsiders like Turkey from intervening in what it considered its natural sphere of influence.

The 1,768km long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) \(^{41}\) transports oil from the Sangachal Terminal serving the offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oilfield in the Caspian via Georgia to Ceyhan, the Mediterranean port of Turkey. Its construction began in 2002 and it became operational in 2006, even though there were some doubts among scholars about the likelihood of its construction (indeed Rondeaux (2005) called it a “pipe dream”). As it has turned out, the project has been successful in transporting oil from not just Azerbaijan but other former Soviet producers: since 2008, Kazakh and Turkmen crude oil has also been shipped via the BTC. \(^{42}\)

The roles of the EU and, particularly, the USA were notable in regard to this pipeline, since the BTC prevented a Russian energy supply and transit monopoly in the region, and also it avoided the need for major pipelines crossing Iran (Morningstar, 2007). Hence, BTC might be seen as a response to the securitisation of energy in the region. Moreover, it demonstrates the degree to which the USA securitises Russian influence over the post-Soviet space and the EU. The project is also significant in being the first project involving collaboration between the USA, the EU, Turkey and post-Soviet republics (Azerbaijan and Georgia). Tekin and Williams (2011:14) demonstrate the benefits of the pipeline for partner states, saying that the project served as a strategic step to connect landlocked Azerbaijan to the Western market through Georgia, boosting the economic and political confidence of these countries and showing the determination of Turkey to become an East-West energy corridor.

\(^{41}\) In spring 1992 Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel proposed a new pipeline running through Turkey to Central Asian countries, including Azerbaijan. The pipeline route decided was Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the parties signed an agreement in the spring of 1993 in Ankara. The project gained momentum following the Ankara Declaration, adopted on 29 October 1998, Turkish Republic Day, by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, the President of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, and was witnessed by the US Secretary of Energy Bill Richards. Finally, the intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed by three constructing parties in November 1999, during a meeting of the OSCE in Istanbul (Baran, 2005). It was commissioned in May 2006, incorporating joint venture companies made up of 11 shareholders and managed by BP, the largest shareholder (Krauer-Pacheco, 2011).

\(^{42}\) The main shareholders of BTC Co. are BP with 30.1%, AzBTC with 25%, Chevron with 8.9%, Statoil with 8.71, TP with 6.53%, ENI and Total with 5%, ITOCHU with 3.4%, INPEX and ConocoPhilips with 2.5%, and ONGC VIDESH with 2.36%.
This project also encouraged the development of other projects such as the South Caucasus Project, connecting Baku to Erzurum in Turkey via Georgia and delivering 6bcm of gas to Turkey per year. This “BTE” gas pipeline is important given the dominance of Russia over regional gas production and transport hitherto. The establishment of such a pipeline threatened the interests of Russia and, to a limited degree, reduced its importance as a natural gas supplier. It also shifted the direction of pipeline routes from Russian territory, to the south (through the Black Sea), a route that Russia would also choose to use in the future with South Stream and Turkish Stream.

The Russian view of the BTC was very negative: Russian critics questioned the economic viability of the BTC and criticised it as an attempt by the US to divide Iran and Russia (see Kim and Eom, 2008:102). Some Russian political analysts argued that the pipeline might also carry a revolutionary “virus” that could trigger further political change in a volatile region (Torbakov, 2005).

Turkey’s main objective as partner in BTC was to connect Caspian resources to Europe, creating an alternative and secure energy supply, and securing its role as an energy partner. However, it also wanted to pursue a multifaceted energy policy which did not bypass Russia totally. Hence, it agreed with Russia to develop the Blue Stream gas pipeline project even though it might be seen as a threat to planned Western-backed projects in the region (Ediger and Bağdadi, 2010). Turkey’s decision to collaborate on the project was part of a multidimensional political approach informed by a mix of environment, energy security, economic and political concerns (Bacik, 2001).

Due to a long tradition of mutual threat perceptions and their conflicting views of the BSR, compromise on the construction of a pipeline was quite a challenge for the two countries, a salient indicator of the changing nature of the relationship. However, the project became an expression of the changing nature of the relationship: in accepting the development of Blue Stream (even in the face strong opposition from the Turkish public), Turkey sought to mitigate its problems with Russia. In addition, the project changed the nature of energy relations between the two countries: Torbakov (2002)

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43 It is a natural gas pipeline from the Sangachal terminal in Baku to Georgia and, since 2007, to Turkey, which runs parallel with the BTC pipeline. After commencement of the construction of the pipeline in 2004, it has been operating since 2006. The 692km long pipeline that is “running parallel to the BTC pipeline has been constructed by the South Caucasus Pipeline company [and its shareholders are] a consortium of BP (technical operator – 25.5%); Statoil (commercial operator – 25.5%); Azerbaijan SCP Ltd (10%); Lukoil (10%); Total (10%); and TPAO (9%)” (Krauer-Pacheco, 2011:32).
points out that with this step, Russia began to see Turkey as a transit country for its resources rather than simply an export market.

Baran (2005) and Ediger and Bağdadi (2010) each contend that the US-backed BTC and Russia-backed Blue Stream (Appendix 13) are rivals. This is open to debate, because although both pipelines demonstrate some rival features, they are also clearly not rivals in other aspects. For instance, while the BTC carries crude oil from the Caspian region, Blue Stream carries gas from Russia. Therefore, Blue Stream could more accurately be seen as a rival to the Euro-Atlantic-supported natural gas projects like the Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe natural gas pipeline, referred to as the East-West Energy Corridor (Ediger and Bağdadi, 2010). The extent of rivalry between the two projects may also be questioned given that Blue Stream was intended to meet Turkey’s domestic energy demand while BTC was oriented towards exports (Tekin and Williams, 2011). Nonetheless the two projects can be seen as initiatives that paved the way for future rivalry between Russia and the West.

5.4.2 Nabucco versus South Stream

During the 2000s the competition between Russia and the West was more overt than in the 1990s and focused more on the EU that the USA as the competitor to Russia. During the 2000s the EU, became more assertive in its own energy policy, seeking decrease its members’ heavy dependence on Russia while searching for alternative suppliers (COM, 2006; COM, 2007b). As part of its attempts to improve energy security, the EU supported programmes in the BSR aiming to develop the infrastructure in energy abundant regions, creating alternative transit routes to transport Caspian basin and Middle Eastern reserves to its market.

The pipeline projects Nabucco (referring to the Southern Transit Gas Corridor) and South Stream (Appendix 14) can be seen as examples of the competition between Russia and the EU in natural gas pipeline projects. Nabucco,\textsuperscript{44} which was a flagship pipeline project of the Southern Corridor, was supposed to stretch from Erzurum in Turkey – the terminal point of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline – to Baumgarten in

\textsuperscript{44} It travels 2,000km in Turkey, 400km in Bulgaria, 460km in Romania, 390km in Hungary and 46km in Austria. The pipeline was designed to have a total capacity of 31bcm. The shareholders are OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), BOTAŞ (Turkey) and RWE (Germany). Each holds a 16.6% stake in the Project (Tekin and Williams, 2011).
Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (Baev and Øverland, 2010). It became significant for the EU after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006: Kaveshnikov (2010) claims that Russia was the main reason for the EU wanting to diversify its suppliers and to find alternate supply routes. The aim of Nabucco was coherent with the construction of an EU energy security framework, decreasing the dominance of Russia in the energy sector by enhancing relations with non-Russian suppliers and transporting their resources via secure and reliable corridors to deliver cost-effective gas sources (Nabucco, 2010, cited in Tekin and Williams, 2011).

The Russian response to Nabucco was to launch the South Stream pipeline project. Although the Russian political elite claimed that the project was not in competition with Nabucco, there was no other rationale presented for proposing the project at that time. Instead it appeared that was driven by Russian strategic interests, as a reactive project (Baran, 2008) or a ‘bluff’ to prevent the EU’s alternative project (Stern et al., 2015). Such views were premised on the timing the project, 2009, and the speed with which Russia began negotiations with consumer European states, most of whom were also Nabucco partners (Baev and Øverland, 2010; Barysch, 2010).

The Nabucco and South Stream projects were effectively equivalent in terms of targeting the same market – Europe – using almost the same route and intending to carry similar volumes of gas – approximately 30bcm. However, while Nabucco was designed to reduce dependence on Russian gas, South Stream had other objectives. As Barysch (2010) argues, Russia’s objectives for South Stream were twofold: first to decrease the importance of Ukraine as a transit country, and second to prevent Nabucco. In order to achieve these purposes, Russia first locked up the markets to keep out potential competition, and, second, ensured long-term contracts and large gas commitments with other energy supplier countries in the Caspian Sea (Baran, 2008).

Turkey’s role in the two projects reveals the changing dynamics of energy politics in the BSR. During the very first stages of Nabucco, Russian-Turkish relations were tense particular as Turkey was a part of the project. Although Turkey suggested Russia join the project (Erşen, 2011), Russia instead offered Blue Stream II, which would carry Russian gas into Europe through Turkey via a pipeline to be built in parallel with Blue Stream in order to get Turkey on its side (Kardaş, 2011-12). However, Turkey was reluctant to participate in the Russian proposal and instead decided to continue with
Nabucco. Erşen (2011) claims that increasing worries over the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis and heavy dependence on Russia led Turkey to adhere to Nabucco.

While Turkey chose the EU side, risking its relations with Russia, the EU was not able to reciprocate in developing greater energy cooperation with Turkey. Tekin and Williams (2011) observe that the EU’s parochial interests and the prejudices of its individual members derailed EU-Turkish relations as well as the project. Turkey’s support for Nabucco did not deliver wider benefits, particularly regarding EU membership. Turkish political elites saw its participation in pipeline projects as a contribution to European energy security and expected that this should facilitate its membership of the EU (Müftüler-Bac and Başkan, 2011). Indeed, Erdoğan (cited in the Anadolu Agency website, 2009b) stated that

I would also like to remind that we have made great progress in adjusting our energy market with the domestic market rules of the EU during our negotiation process […] even the energy project clearly showed that Turkey should become an EU member.

However, Turkey’s commitments on Nabucco and energy legislation were not reciprocated by the EU. Not even the energy chapter was opened for negotiations due to the veto by Cyprus (Erşen, 2011). Moreover, the EU, during the negotiation process of Nabucco, ignored Turkey and excluded it from the negotiations. Turkey, for the EU, as Bilgin (2009) claims, was only a transit or corridor country that could facilitate energy transportation, rather than a partner country that EU had to negotiate with, even though it was one of the shareholders of the project. These treatments cause Turkey to reconsider the nature of its cooperation with the EU. As a result the official Turkish position become difficult to gauge and at times unpredictable (Tekin and Williams, 2011).

As a part of this shift, Turkish political elites started to lean towards South Stream. The project, according to Demiryol (2015), is a testament to Ankara’s ability to use its role as a transit country as a bargaining chip. In 2009, during Putin’s visit to Ankara, Turkey gave the green light for conducting geological research for the South Stream pipeline in Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea, which ironically was signed a month after the final agreement of Nabucco. Turkey was not a shareholder of the project but allowed the project to use its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. This attempt, according to Socor (2012b), undermined Nabucco and other non-Russian projects. Tekin and Williams (2011) argue that Turkey’s involvement in South Stream was a
function of its energy dependence on Russia and the associated political leverage. However, another interpretation would see Turkey’s involvement as a manifestation of interdependence. Although Turkey depended on Russia for energy supplies, Russia’s inability to find an alternative route for transporting its resources to Europe meant that it was dependent on Turkey as a transit route. Indeed, Putin described Turkey’s participation in South Stream as a wonderful Christmas gift to Russia (Socor, 2012b), effectively reviving the project. For its part, Turkey secured energy price discounts from Russia.

In light of these developments, it might be claimed that both Russian and Turkish energy policy priorities have developed considerably since the 1990s. As stated in Chapter 3, apart from these pipeline projects, between 2008 and 2012, Russia and Turkey agreed on diversifying their energy cooperation, notably in the area nuclear energy. Although Turkey’s position during BTC and Blue Stream was more political and economy oriented, its involvement in South Stream was more a response to changes in the positions of its external partners. In other words, the political attitudes of the EU and, to some extent, the USA, disappointed Turkey, leading it to be a part of a rival project. Moreover, Russia had become a significant energy power in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, and so it became more assertive in its diplomacy, seeking to avoid the mistakes as it made in the past. These developments strengthened Russian-Turkish energy interdependence on the one hand, while risking Turkish-EU energy cooperation on the other. Although energy has become a security issue between Russia and the EU, where one can see overt securitisation, between Russia and Turkey it is now rather a political and economic issue.

5.4.3 TAP versus Turkish Stream

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)\(^\text{45}\) and Turkish Stream are new developments in the rivalry between Russia and the EU (and indirectly the USA) regarding BSR energy transportation (Appendix 15). The diversification of energy suppliers and routes have

\(^{45}\text{TAP was announced in 2003 by the Swiss energy company EGL Group. A feasibility study was concluded in 2006 and it will transport Azeri gas onward from the Turkish-Greek border to Greece, Albania and across the Adriatic Sea to Italy (Rzayeva, 2014). Its initial capacity will be about 10bcm of gas per year, but in the future, it can be doubled as additional energy supplies come on-stream. The shareholders are BP, SOCAR, Statoil (20% each), Fluxys with 16%, Total with 10%, E.ON with 9% and Axpo with 5% (Rzayeva, 2014: TAP website, 2014).}
been priorities for the EU and it has encouraged the development of new projects in order to achieve those goals, including TAP, ITGI,\(^{46}\) AGRI, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline and the South-Eastern European Pipeline (SEEP).\(^{47}\) While these projects were under consideration for a number of years, their prospects were limited once Nabucco was proposed, as this became the EU’s priority (Barysch, 2010). When Nabucco was cancelled in June 2013, the EU offered its backing for the Shah Deniz Consortium’s decision to continue with TAP. According to an official from the European Commission Energy Unit (Discussion, 2016) TAP (along with TANAP) has become the means by which the EU intends to decrease its energy dependence on Russia.

TAP forms the westernmost segment of the planned Southern Corridor to Europe for Caspian Sea. Ryzaeva (2014) argues that the decision of continue with TAP can be explained as the EU aims to connect to as many additional markets as possible but particularly the Western Balkans, which heavily depend on Russian gas. At the Turkey-Greece border, TAP will connect with TANAP and thus it could link European markets with TANAP, while at the same time strengthen Turkey’s aim of becoming an energy hub (Tagliapietra, 2014). TAP/TANAP is, therefore, considered to constitute the realisation of the Southern Gas Corridor.

In addition to supporting TAP and other projects, the EU also addressed the issue of Russia’s energy dominance by other means, deploying its considerable legal powers against the main player in the Russian energy sector – Gazprom. In 2011, the European Commission launched a systematic anti-trust investigation of Gazprom’s operations in EU countries suspected of breaching EU competition law in collusion with the company (Socor, 2011). It also finalised legislation (the so called Third Energy Package) which required the reorganisation (or “unbundling”) of different elements of gas production and transmission. The legislation required the breaking-up of companies which integrated the different functions of energy production, transmission and storage (Socor, 2011).

\(^{46}\) This was led by the Italian Edison, the Greek DEPA and Turkish BOTAŞ, as an extension beneath the Adriatic Sea from Greece to Italy by the Interconnector Turkey-Greece (ITGI). The ITGI has already been receiving gas from the Shah Deniz 1 field via the BTE since 2007. It is supposed to be part of the ‘fourth gas corridor’ promoted by the EU. The first phase of the project connects Turkey and Greece and the second phase Greece and Italy (Tekin and Williams, 2011).

\(^{47}\) The BP-proposed pipeline project was envisaged to follow the same route as Nabucco, but only from western Turkey to Baumgarten in Austria, and reduced the total length of the pipeline to be built from 3,900km to 1,300km.
The provision was mainly seen as aimed at Russian companies, fearing that they would get too much of a grip on the EU market (Casier, 2011). Attempting to decrease the power of the Gazprom on the EU market, it might be argued that the EU sought to pave the way for non-Russian companies and projects to become more active in the European market. This initiative has been strongly criticised by Russian political elites, who sought exceptions or derogations from the Package. This is because the Package creates serious obstacles to ensuring a stable supply of Russian gas to the EU. Moreover, perhaps the most influential instrument affecting Russia was the programme of sanctions imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This hampered Gazprom’s ability to finance South Stream, effectively forcing Russia to cancel the project and reorient its gas export strategy.

One of Russia’s responses to these initiatives was Turkish Stream (detailed in chapter 3), which was designed to counterbalance the EU’s cooperation with Azerbaijan. This project would “not only allow Russia to diversify its energy transit, but it would also permit Russia to circumvent the legal and regulatory barriers posed by the EU’s Third Energy Package” (Leal-Arcas et al., 2015:314). Putin declared this decision in a press conference in Turkey, saying that

> We see that obstacles are being set up to prevent [South Stream's] fulfilment […]. If Europe does not want to carry it out, then it will not be carried out […]. We will re-concentrate our energy resources on other regions of the world […]. We will work with other markets and Europe will not receive this gas, at least not from Russia. (Guardian website, 2014)

It can be stated that Russia used the energy card to retaliate against their European customers. This, at the same time, illustrates the deepening deterioration of Russia’s relations with the USA and the EU.

Turkish Stream is generally perceived as a rival to the TAP/TANAP projects with many arguing that the projects are designed to undermine each others’ viability (Makovsky, 2015; Gurbanov, 2015). For instance, after the announcement of Turkish Stream, the USA and the EU constantly declared their concerns about the project. The most significant concerns, from the EU Vice-President for Energy Union Maros Sefovic and the US officials’ meetings in Ankara and Athens, were based around the view that the project is not essential, and they emphasised the importance of their own projects (Cutler, 2015; New York Times website, 2015; US Department of State website, 2015).
With these objections, it is possible to argue that securitisation of energy gained more importance in the Euro-Atlantic energy discourse, which is prompted by assertive Russian involvement in its neighbourhood. Energy has become a high political issue for European countries, more than an economic issue.

On the Russian-Turkish relations side, Russia’s ambition of retaining its control over its customers and Turkey’s ambition of becoming an energy hub ironically have led the two countries to converge in the energy sector, and Turkish Stream has added a new dimension to bilateral relations. Although there is an asymmetrical dependency between the two countries favouring Russia, nevertheless interdependence is the dominant aspect of the maintenance of bilateral energy relations through projects such as Turkish Stream.

The three groups of projects discussed above highlight both the increasing securitisation of energy in Russian-Western relations and the complex nature of Russian-Turkish energy relations, embodying both conflict and cooperation. In terms of the latter dynamic, Turkey has mitigating the tensions within the region as a whole pursuing a balanced policy, while Russia is more assertive. For most countries in the region, as well as non-regional ones, Russia is a threat for their energy security and Turkey is a partner that they can cooperate with. However, this divergence is not a strong influence on bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey; on the contrary, cooperation is the dominant definition. Feeling threats coming from the West led Russia to choose partners that it can cooperate with in the energy sector; the choice of Turkey as a partner can be seen as an example of the nature of overall bilateral relationship and of the interdependence between the two countries. Turkey as a customer does not have strong willingness to decrease its dependence on Russia; on the contrary it attempts to include Moscow in European projects. This can be explained by its aim of becoming an energy hub. Hence, the two countries cooperate with each other and during this process their bilateral energy relations can be described as desecuritisation.

5.5 Conclusion

Global and interregional actors (notably the EU and the USA) have played a key role in influencing Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR, both in general and in relation to energy. It has been argued that the countries have become closer in response to deteriorating relations with such external actors and their involvement in the BSR. In
particular, worries over the possibility of external actors encircling them or reducing their influence in the region have contributed to their rapprochement. This rapprochement is based on a rejection of external actors’ involvement in regional problems, and the pursuit of mutually beneficial policies. However, there are differences in the response of the two countries towards such external involvement. Russia is the most assertive in rejecting the involvement of the Euro-Atlantic bloc, whereas Turkey is rather less so, due to the fact that it is still a member of NATO and has ongoing relations with the EU.

The EU and the USA have been able to exercise influence in the BSR due to the support of countries in the region, who are hoping to become a part of Euro-Atlantic political, security and economic structures. The external powers have sought to project this influence into the energy realm, effectively securitising the issue, but with mixed results. It has been argued that securitisation is seen more overtly in the political actions of the USA and particularly the EU. As part of the process of weakening the influence of Russia over the region, energy has been a particular concern for these actors. Turkey, in this context, is seen as reliable partner, since it has relatively close relations with them. Thus, previous threat perceptions have been reinforced by the involvement of non-regional actors in the energy sector.

However, it has been argued that, due to political problems and a dissatisfaction with what it has obtained from its relationship the USA and the EU, Turkey has not only continue to cooperate with Russia but also deepened the relationship. Attempting to ensure balance between the two sides, Turkey maintains its convergence with Russia, while Russia, with its objective of retaining control over energy customers, maintains its energy dialogue with Turkey. Such strong interdependence ensures the continuation of desecuritisation in the two countries’ bilateral relations.

Overall, in addition to discussing the role of energy in bilateral relations and regional relations, it was necessary to take into consideration global actors so as to clearly understand the factors shaping the nature of the Russian-Turkish relations and the effect of energy on it. The involvement of such global actors in the region has been to prompt Russia and Turkey to develop closer energy ties, highlighting the impact of such actors’ on the changing patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Russian-Turkish relationship and the emerging desecuritisation of those relations.
CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter briefly summarises the overall argument of the thesis, linking it directly to the research aims and research questions of the thesis and outlining its principal contributions. It concludes with some unresolved puzzles and new questions that arise from the research indicating directions for future research.

Summary of the thesis

Russian-Turkish relations

Being eternal neighbours as well as the predominant powers in the BSR, Russia and Turkey have historically experienced a conflictual relationship. Each has historically perceived the other as a threat to their national security and they have often been on different sides of the global system in order to maintain the balance of power between them. The demise of the Soviet Union paved the way for the two countries to set aside historical differences and encouraged bilateral dialogue on economic, political and social issues. Energy, in this regard, emerged as one of the most significant areas for bilateral cooperation. At the same time, however, on the other hand, it also had the potential to become a new threat to the ongoing converging relationship between the two countries, due in particular to the involvement of regional and non-regional actors. In this complex situation, my overall argument is that the relationship between the two countries has improved, and that while energy has the potential to be a source of tension and rivalry, it has not done so to the extent of damaging the overall relationship.

Analytical framework

In this complex setting, the aim of this thesis has been to reveal the puzzling trajectory of Russian-Turkish relations in the BSR since the early 2000s. It has aimed to evaluate and fill the gap in the existing literature on Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR. It has done so on the basis of the concept of (de)securitisation in Russian-Turkish energy relations in the BSR. This concept has been at the heart of the thesis’s empirical
research, which has focused an analysis of pipeline projects in the region. This research has been presented on the basis of four overlapping levels of analysis. Both the concept of (de)securitisation and the analytical framework are based on Buzan and Wæver’s work on Regional Security Complex Theory.

In order to unravel the puzzle, the main research question of this thesis was:

- How do energy relations affect the Black Sea Region and, in particular, the Russian-Turkish relationship?

Key sub-questions were as follows:

- To what extent has energy been securitised or desecuritised by Russia and Turkey in their relationship, as well as in the BSR as a whole?
- What is the role of extra-regional actors (the EU and the USA) in regards to regional relationships as well as Russian-Turkish relationships, particularly regarding the role of energy?

The existing literature often presents Russian-Turkish relations from a narrow perspective, according to either realist or liberal assumptions. Moreover, much of the existing literature lacks a conceptual framework on which to base an analysis on the relationship. To understand the relationship and to answer these research questions, it is necessary to look at the problem in a more balanced way, by taking into consideration the concept of (de)securitisation. The concept provides a method for an examination of the process, leading to the conclusion that energy has had a positive impact on the relationship, encouraging greater cooperation between the countries. Even though the two countries have disagreements over each other’s involvement in other projects, their shared interests in energy have led to a greater convergence which has allowed for a desecuritisation of the relationship. This is in contrast to conditions in other parts of the BSR where, due to perceptions of a threat from Russia, energy has brought conflict, leading some countries to securitise energy.

The Copenhagen School, concentrating on the way that security is studied, has given insightful inspiration to this thesis. Given its emphasis on the role of regions in international security and its broader approach to what constitutes a threat to security, its formulations of the concept of (de)securitisation has been a major contribution to the IR literature. The concept rests on the insights that, in order to understand an issue as a
security issue, it has to be expressed as a threat by a securitising elite and accepting as such by their audience (the public). The School explains security as a speech act: an issue becomes a threat when it is presented as such.

However, the concept of (de)securitisation has some limitations. Perhaps the most important is the concept of the speech act, which cannot be reduced to a purely linguistic act but needs a broader approach. In this regard, Bigo (2000) and Balzacq (2008) point out the importance of actions and practices. This is because, in some cases, elites might prefer to securitise an issue as an existential threat based on actions/practices rather than expressing it directly. Taking into account this criticism of the concept, this thesis has conducted empirical analysis of pipeline projects as expressions of (de)securitisation. Another significant limitation is the vagueness and the lack of empirical examples of the concept of desecuritisation. Drawing on the categorisation of Hansen (2012), Russian-Turkish energy relations in the BSR were thus analysed in an attempt to address this limitation.

Another limitation of the concept is the insufficient use of empirical research. This is because, it has been argued, it only focuses on framing a theoretical approach to security studies. The case of energy offers a fruitful basis for applying the concept empirically. Energy (in)security, due to the imbalance between energy supply and demand and increasing security concerns over energy transportation, has become an important issue for states. However, there has been a lack of explanation of this issue: while realism emphasises competition, national security, state survival and conflict, liberalism emphasises integration, interdependence and the liberalisation of the global energy market. These deficiencies require us to conceptualise issues through discussions of: security for whom; security for which values; and security from what threats. Moreover, how and when does energy become securitised or desecuritised? The securitising elites have a key role, since they determine state policy. Their perception towards the other as well as their degree of (inter)dependency were taken into account in this thesis. In these circumstances, it has been contended that states diversify their suppliers or resources when they feel threatened by the other side.

It has also been argued that there is a close connection between the concept of (de)securitisation and (inter)dependence. In the securitisation process, energy is no longer understood in commercial or economic terms, but in geopolitical terms. The
relationship between an energy supplying and an energy consuming state has become conflictual and both sides intend to lower their interdependency. The desecuritisation process emerges when statements of energy relations move away from stressing issues of dependence and security to a purely economic approach.

**Empirical analysis**

As a starting point of the analysis, the thesis examined the domestic conditions which shaped the countries in the BSR’s energy policies (Chapter 2). In this regard, it has been argued that energy for all countries is associated with political stability, economic growth and territorial integrity, as strongly stated in their related policy documents. However, as countries are situated on different sides of energy diplomacy, e.g. being on one side an energy supplier and on the other an energy customer, the way that they put their policies into practice is different. In this regard, it was stated that while for Russia energy is a security object, which is more about the threats to its capacity to supply other countries rather than the ‘usual’ security problem of ensuring supply faced by energy importing countries, for Turkey it is rather more economy-oriented and a foreign policy tool, and so the country is rather more willing to cooperate at the national level as well as on other levels. For other countries in the region, energy is more related to their survival as a state, and to solving their economic and political problems, and is thus regarded as more security-oriented. These different approaches impact on their energy diplomacy, for Russia, energy is key to retaining its influence over its neighbourhood as well as transportation networks, and so it is more assertive; for Turkey becoming an energy hub is the priority, which has led it to be open to every kind of cooperation; for countries in the region, the priority is to decrease dependence on a single supplier who they feel threatened by, and to gain financial and political benefits owing to their geographical location.

Following on from this, the bilateral analysis (Chapter 3) identified three types of relationship in the region. In the first group are countries who securitise each other and whose relations are rather conflictual, as seen in Georgian-Russian and Ukrainian-Russian relations. In the second group are countries who consider each other as important partners and cooperate accordingly, where issues are rather seen in normal politics, such as seen in Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey relations.
In the last group, are countries, such as Russia and Turkey, who used to consider the other as a threat, but who have re-evaluated relations on the basis of closer economic and political relations. In theory, it might be expected that cooperation was unlikely given that the two countries have different energy policy priorities and also historically troublesome relations. However, in practice, bilateral relations have been improving to the extent that the two countries have even described each other as strategic partners.

In this thesis, the reasons behind these extraordinary circumstances are argued as being the (inter)dependence and geopolitical developments in the BSR. It has been argued that Russia and Turkey are highly dependent on each other: Russia for supplying the Turkish market and the Turkish route for transportation, and Turkey for depending on Russia for around 60% of its natural gas requirements. Although Turkey has attempted to diversify its resources and has expressed decreasing dependence on Russia as a priority, it has nevertheless attempted to diversify energy options with the country. The first signs of genuine moderation and long-lasting accommodation in Russian-Turkish relations came at the beginning of the 2000s when, as Kelkitli (2017) reveals, Russia started to see Turkey not just as a prospective rival but also as a lucrative market for its energy products. Turkey was a perfect client for Russian oil and natural gas exports due to its geographical proximity, growing economy and natural-resource bereft situation. On the Turkish side, it began to consider Russia as a reliable energy provider as well as an important supplier that could contribute to its aim of becoming an energy hub. Thus, there existed a positive correlation between the two, and ascending economic relations in particular, as well as expanding collaboration in the field of energy, preceded and facilitated political détente.

At the regional level (Chapter 4), it has been argued that the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a totally new era for the BSR. Before these systemic changes, the region constituted the crossroads and battlefield of numerous cultures, historical backgrounds, civilisations and different interests. With the independence of the new republics, the BSR has become a strategic frontier for regional and global actors, while at the same time the region has encountered new problems and concerns. Energy, as the region includes both suppliers and customers, as well as its strategic geopolitical location, is of major importance for the BSR. For other countries in the region energy has become a security issue since they equate energy with economic wealth and political stability. Furthermore, the only way that they could
decrease the hegemony of Russia over their national level was by participating in non-Russian energy projects. In this atmosphere, perceiving that Turkey could be an alternative to Russia due to its foreign policy priorities, as well as historical, ethnic and cultural ties, it has become a partner for them and an alternative to Russia which they perceive as a significant threat.

At the interregional-global level (Chapter 5), it has been argued that having an interest in energy transportation from the region has led the EU and the USA to become involved in regional issues. This engagement is driven by considerations of their own security as well as by the region’s proximity to energy-abundant regions. These dimensions have led them to become more active in the region since the demise of the Soviet Union. Their initiatives have also been strongly supported by countries in the region due to the perceived threat from Russia, a result of both its energy resources and its military potential.

In examining the domestic, bilateral, regional and global dynamics in the region, the thesis has focused on the development of pipeline projects in the region. The importance of the BSR in energy diplomacy commenced with the BTC and BTE pipeline projects. These Euro-Atlantic-backed projects were expressed as initial steps in the securitisation of energy in the BSR. Their impact on Russian-Turkish relations appeared to be one of increasing competition between the two countries since Turkey joined with the Western countries in taking prominent role in these projects. Regarding the projects to be an attempt to reduce its importance in both the European market and the post-Soviet space, Russia perceived them to be securitising attempts and considered the role of Turkey in these projects as a threat. However, Turkey’s ambitions in terms of meeting its energy needs and engaging with Russia led it to the development of agree to Blue Stream, a project which is often presented in the literature as a counter-attack on Western-oriented projects (Baran, 2008; Ediger and Bağdadi, 2010). This cooperation introduced a new era in the Russian-Turkish relationship.

The completion of the BTC and BTE projects increased confidence in the West, leading them to become more active in regional energy diplomacy by offering new projects, with Nabucco the next step in this strategy. Aiming at decreased its dependence on Russia, the EU sought to cooperate with Ankara and Baku in the infrastructure of the project. Turkey’s initial support for the project was based on its expectations that it
would help the country achieve its goal of becoming an energy hub, building on the success of the BTC and BTE. Russia’s response to this project was to offer South Stream, aimed at the same market, offering the same amount of gas and following the same route. At the beginning of the project, Moscow aimed to bypass Turkey, given the latter’s role in the rival Nabucco project. However, subsequently Turkey became a partner in the project, as a result of its increasing disillusion with the EU and Russia’s need for transit routes for its supplies.

Apart from non-regional initiatives, regional initiatives emerged as a rival to Russian energy dominance over the European market and exposed the complexities of the Russian-Turkish energy relationship. As an alternative source of energy supply for the EU, the Azerbaijan-led TANAP presented a new risk to Russian-Turkish relations. This is because Turkey was involved in this project; the close relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey were reflected in the latter becoming a significant shareholder in the project. Russia tried unsuccessfully to prevent the project from being built, but did so largely by pressurising Azerbaijan rather than Turkey. This approach arguably reflected the country’s desire to maintain its increasingly close relations with Turkey. For its part Turkey sought to improve relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, perhaps paving the way for future cooperation between the two energy suppliers.

The recent pipeline project rivalry between the EU and Russia is seen more overtly in the EU-backed TAP and Russian-backed Turkish Stream. While these are generally regarded as rival projects, they have not affected Russian-Turkish relationships. As in other cases examined in the thesis, Turkey is involved in both projects and has regularly declared its ambition to bring them together. While this ambition is not shared by Russia, it nevertheless remains committed to the energy relationship with Turkey.

My analysis of these pipeline projects has led me to conclude that the process of contemporary political and economic relations between Russia and Turkey appears to be characterised more by desecuritisation than securitisation. Although it used to be a referent object for securitisation, energy has not become a security issue as might have been expected; instead, it has been desecuritised by both sides. Developing political, economic and energy dialogues and (inter)dependence have led the countries to rearticulate bilateral relations, and the discourse has turned from historical threat to the present partnership.
It can be stated that, particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, energy interaction between Russia and Turkey commenced with BTC, and since Turkey allied with the Euro-Atlantic bloc who aimed to diversify routes, excluding Russia, this interaction was negative. However, accepting the fluctuations among bilateral relations on the basis of the above-listed pipeline projects, the present circumstances appear to be progressing in a positive way. This affects and is affected by political, economic and social interactions, as well as regional and global developments. The current situation is defined as multidimensional, ranging from exportation, transport, pipeline infrastructure and recently nuclear energy.

This positive relationship has been also shaped by the involvement of regional and non-regional actors. It has been argued that Russia and Turkey have converging relations both at the regional and global levels. At the regional level the requirement of establishing regional security has led the two countries to cooperate, particularly over the regionalisation of the BSR, which can be accepted as successful in terms of the establishment of regional coherence. At the global level the redefinition of foreign policy priorities and the perception that non-regional actors may threaten their interests in the region has led them to work in cooperation with each other, particularly over regional problems as well as maritime security. Such cooperation certainly ensured a rearticulation of their perceptions of each other.

It might have been expected that the involvement of BSR countries and non-regional actors, particularly on energy matters, could threaten Russian-Turkish bilateral (energy) relations. Turkish engagement with other countries inside and outside the region could be seen as a threat to Russian energy interests, leading one to expect that securitisation would have (re)emerged in the bilateral discourse. However, following the categorisation of Hansen (2012), it has been argued that due to the diversification of energy options and growing (inter)dependence, the two countries continue to articulate their relationship as a partnership. This in fact illustrates that energy for the two countries is largely an economic and political issue rather than a security one. In other words, as its location provides many alternatives to Russia, Turkey could easily decrease its dependence on Russia, as most Eastern and Central European countries have tended to achieve, if energy has security connotations in bilateral relations. However, as the nuclear power plant and the recent Turkish Stream project indicate, energy is more an economic commodity for Russia and Turkey.
Although Turkey is part of non-Russian projects supported by both regional and non-regional actors, it aims to retain balance between Russia and others. Turkey’s involvement in non-Russian projects was initially criticised by Russia and this led energy to become a new threat to bilateral relations. Thus, Russia proposed projects aimed at excluding Turkey. Yet, at the same time, it attempted to draw Turkey to its side by reviving previously offered projects, and offering oil and natural gas price discounts. It can be claimed that due to realising the importance of the other side, the two countries developed a unique mechanism, in an attempt not to problematise and undermine the relationship.

Finally, it has been argued that despite the emergence of certain risks, developments in energy were no longer considered ‘threatening’, but were rather presented as one of essential drivers of mutual rapprochement by political elites. Improvements on the ground were frequently noted in official meetings between the two countries’ leaders.

In such official discourse energy is used to underline the close relations between the two countries. Terms like ‘locomotive’, ‘strategic level’ and ‘boosted’ are often uttered by the elites of each country (Anadolu Agency website, 2010, 2014; Kremlin, 2014) in order to express the current nature of relations, as well as in emphasising the role of energy in this regard. During the 1990s, due to Turkey’s involvement in non-Russian projects, the discourse drawn upon by Russia often criticised the attitude of Turkey and indicated that Russia felt threatened by the country. However, owing to the latest initiatives Turkey has become a reliable partner for Russia. From the Turkish side, although the first pipeline initiative was mostly criticised by the public even among political actors, the latest phase of bilateral relations is strongly supported by the Turkish public.

Energy has thus had an important effect on bilateral relations. It is one of the significant drivers behind a shift in discourse from historical negative perceptions, which used to trigger more security-oriented policy dimensions, to the current positive relations and multidimensional policy approaches in Russian-Turkish relations. For instance, Blue Stream was accepted by Turkey despite public criticism; South Stream was accepted even though Turkey did not gain any direct benefits; the Akkuyu nuclear power plant was accepted despite heavy dependence on Russia; and finally, Turkish Stream was accepted even though there were strong criticisms from the EU and the USA. These
dimensions, as contended in this thesis, can only be explained on the basis of the above-indicated dynamics.

**The original contributions of the thesis**

The original contributions of the thesis are as follows:

- While there is a great body of academic work devoted to Russian-Turkish energy relations in the BSR, it has some deficiencies. This thesis provides a balanced overview of the subject by taking into account both Russian and Turkish as well as other regional countries’ perspectives, compared to the existing literature. Moreover, the analysis in this thesis was structured on the basis of a systematic and robust conceptual framework, in contrast to much of the current literature.

- The research was inspired by RSCT, but particularly focused on the concept of (de)securitisation. This approach has never been applied to Russian-Turkish (energy) relations in the BSR before, and it allows us to open the subject to a new angle by taking into account different levels as well as regional aspects.

- Situating the research area in a region – the BSR – rather than focusing exclusively on Russia and Turkey contributes to the presentation of a clearer picture. Analysing bilateral relations alone would have produced a narrow conceptualisation; looking at the area as a whole widens understanding.

- This thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge via drawing upon primary data, including government documents and interviews.

**Future research**

Russian-Turkish (energy) relations are developing: the conclusions made in this thesis are based on research conducted up to December 2014, and might need updating in the future as a result of new developments in the geopolitics of the region as well as in the energy sector. For instance, bilateral relations deteriorated radically when a Turkish military jet shot down a Russian SU-24 bomber for allegedly having crossed the Syrian-Turkish border on the 24th of November 2015. Moreover, the global arena has also witnessed dramatic developments, such as the election of Donald Trump as American
President in November 2016. These developments certainly add uncertainties and complexities to bilateral (energy) relations in the BSR.

There are, in any case, some other limits of this research which could be addressed in future work. The subject of energy relations in the BSR is very broad; although this thesis has presented general arguments covering all countries, it could not cover all the countries in the region with the same depth of analysis. It could only analyse Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan and their energy interactions with Russia and Turkey, due to practical limitations in regards to time and access to information. Perhaps future work could analyse the energy policies of more countries, such as Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, since they are all significant routes for planned pipeline projects and have been in interaction with Russia and Turkey. Moreover, apart from the EU and the USA, as a key energy supplier as well as an interregional actor, the role of Iran should be taken into account, since its importance in energy transportation is increasing, particularly if sanctions remain suspended.

Some of the limitations in data collection should also be acknowledged. Interviews with top officials directly involved in energy policy development in both Russia and Turkey provided valuable and original information. However, due to the sensitive nature of the topic and political developments in the region, as well as Russian-Turkish relations in general, some potential interviewees preferred not to participate in this research. Gaining more connections, the research’s focus on public opinion could be developed further via additional interviews in the future.

Finally, in the literature there is great concern over the role of Russian and Turkish political elites in bilateral relations. Their personal similarities, close relations as well as political mentality are often stated as the main elements in the current bilateral rapprochement. Future studies the roles of Putin and Erdoğan could usefully be added to the current conceptual framework.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Author’s interviews

“Interview with Mert Bilgin”, 2 March 2015, IR scholar and energy expert at Istanbul-based Medipol University

“Interview with Mitat Celikapala”, 23 February 2015, IR scholar at Istanbul-based Kadir Has University

“Interview with Emre Erşen”, 27 February 2015, IR scholar at Istanbul-based Marmara University

“Interview with Kerim Has”, 21 March 2015, Russian expert at Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK)

“Skype Interview with Tatiana Mitrova”, 18 December 2015, Economist and energy expert Head of Oil and Gas Department in the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ERI RAS)


“Email Interview with Levent Ozgul”, 21 March 2016, A Senior Consultant at Ankara-based BOTAŞ

Email Interview with Anonymous Energy Official from Ankara-based Ministry of Energy, 2 February 2016

“Skype Interview with Gulmira Rzayeva”, 30 November 2015, Senior Research Fellow at the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM)

“Interview with Erel Tellal”, 23 March 2015, IR scholar at Ankara-based Ankara University

“Email Interview with Gareth Winrow”, 3 March 2016, Energy expert and scholar at Oxford-based Oxford University

Phone Discussion with Anonymous European Commission Energy Unit, 21 December 2015
Appendix 2: Country Profiles of the Black Sea Region

Armenia

GDP (million current US$, 2015) 10,561
GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 3,696
Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015) -5.9
Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 1,366
Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015) 37.0

<table>
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<th>Rank in world trade, 2015</th>
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<th>Imports</th>
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<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
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MERCHANDISE TRADE

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<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports 0.01
Share in world total imports 0.02

Breakdown in economy's total exports
By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 7.9%
- Fuels and mining products: 23.5%
- Manufactures: 26.3%
- Other: 42.4%

Breakdown in economy's total imports
By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 0.7%
- Fuels and mining products: 54.2%
- Manufactures: 23.5%
- Other: 22.7%

Breakdown in economy's total exports
By main destination (2015)

- European Union (28): 35.1%
- Russian Federation: 9.7%
- China: 29.7%
- Iraq: 15.2%
- Other: 11.1%

Breakdown in economy's total imports
By main origin (2015)

- Russian Federation: 30.4%
- European Union (28): 30.5%
- China: 6.1%
- Iran: 23.3%
- Other: 9.7%

Agricultural Products

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<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2208 Alcohol of less than 80% volume</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0406 Cheese and curd</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>HS2401 Unmanufactured tobacco</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2008 Plants' parts otherwise preserved</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>HS1806 Chocolate and other cocoa food</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0809 Apricots, cherries, peaches</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>HS0207 Meat and edible offal of poultry</td>
<td>35</td>
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Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports

Imports

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<tr>
<th>HS1001</th>
<th>HS2402</th>
<th>HS2401</th>
<th>HS1806</th>
<th>HS0207</th>
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Exports

<table>
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<tr>
<th>HS2402</th>
<th>HS2208</th>
<th>HS0406</th>
<th>HS2008</th>
<th>HS0809</th>
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### Million US$ Value Annual percentage change

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Non-Agricultural Products

### Top exported products

| HS2603 | Copper ores and concentrates | 317 | HS2711 | Petroleum gases | 433 |
| HS7108 | Gold | 99 | HS2710 | Petroleum oils, other than crude | 217 |
| HS7607 | Aluminum foil | 83 | HS3004 | Medicaments in measured doses | 94 |
| HS2716 | Electrical energy | 77 | HS8703 | Motor cars for transport of persons | 88 |
| HS7102 | Diamonds, whether or not worked | 77 | HS7102 | Diamonds, whether or not worked | 87 |

### Top imported products

### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

### Million US$ Value Annual percentage change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<td>Imports</td>
<td>2597</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-22</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Armenia

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The percentage of Real GDP Growth of Armenia

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Armenia

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
Azerbaijan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>7 055</td>
<td>Merchandise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>2 546</td>
<td>Commercial services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value 2015</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>9 400</td>
<td>2010-2015: 7, 2014: -10, 2015: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Share in world total exports         | 0.09       | Share in world total imports | 0.06 |

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 2.4%
- Fuels and mining products: 5.3%
- Manufactures: 92.2%

By main destination (2014)

- European Union (28): 8.1%
- Indonesia: 9.3%
- Israel: 25.6%
- Thailand: 53.2%
- Other: 14.0%

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 7.8%
- Fuels and mining products: 15.7%
- Manufactures: 4.0%
- Other: 72.5%

By main origin (2014)

- European Union (28): 14.0%
- Russian Federation: 33.8%
- China: 30.3%
- Turkey: 7.6%
- Other: 76.4%

**Agricultural Products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value 2014</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1701 Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0810 Other fruit, fresh</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0802 Other nuts, fresh or dried</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>HS1701 Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1516 Animal or vegetable fats and oils</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>HS1806 Chocolate and other cocoa food</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1517 Margarine; edible mixtures oil</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>HS0102 Live bovine animals</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1701 Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0810 Other fruit, fresh</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0802 Other nuts, fresh or dried</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1516 Animal or vegetable fats and oils</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1517 Margarine; edible mixtures oil</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1701 Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1806 Chocolate and other cocoa food</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0102 Live bovine animals</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Million US$ Value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>FDI inflows</th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Non-Agricultural Products

#### Top exported products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2709 Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td>HS7108 Gold</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2711 Petroleum gases</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3901 Polymers of ethylene, primary forms</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>HS8431 Parts for machinery of 8425 to 8430</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7601 Unwrought aluminium</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>HS8414 Air or vacuum pumps</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2709 Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2711 Petroleum gases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3901 Polymers of ethylene, primary forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7601 Unwrought aluminium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

#### Million US$ Value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>20,729</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>9</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>FDI inflows</th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Azerbaijan

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Azerbaijan

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Azerbaijan

Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017a)
**Bulgaria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (million current US$, 2015)</th>
<th>48 953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>7 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>0.8 excluding intra-EU trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>4 915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>66.0 excluding intra-EU trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rank in world trade, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>25 690</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>29 298</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Share in world total exports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

*By main commodity group (2015)*

- Agricultural products: 24.4
- Fuels and mining products: 55.8
- Manufactures: 17.3
- Other: 2.6

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

*By main commodity group (2015)*

- Agricultural products: 11.1
- Fuels and mining products: 63.0
- Manufactures: 24.3
- Other: 1.5

**By main destination (2014)**

- European Union (28): 63.8
- Turkey: 23.2
- China: 8.6
- Serbia: 2.4
- Other: 2.0

**By main origin (2014)**

- European Union (28): 63.9
- Russian Federation: 14.8
- Turkey: 12.0
- China: 5.7
- Other: 3.7

**Agricultural Products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>HS0203 Swine meat, fresh, chilled, frozen</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1206 Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>HS0901 Coffee</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>HS1701 Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed or cotton oil</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>HS1806 Chocolate and other cocoa food</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>HS0207 Meat and edible offal of poultry</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1206 Sunflower seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed or cotton oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| HS0203 Swine meat, fresh, chilled, frozen |    |    |     |     |     |
| HS0901 Coffee |    |    |     |     |     |
| HS1701 Cane or beet sugar |    |    |     |     |     |
| HS1806 Chocolate and other cocoa food |    |    |     |     |     |
| HS0207 Meat and edible offal of poultry |    |    |     |     |     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>4 149</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>2 877</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
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</table>

### Non-Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>HS2709</td>
<td>2245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7403</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>HS2603</td>
<td>1338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>HS2711</td>
<td>1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7402</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2716</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>HS8703</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7402</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2716</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP per Capita of Bulgaria

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Bulgaria

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Bulgaria

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
Georgia

GDP (million current US$, 2015) 13 965
GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 4 169
Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 2 155
Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015) 51.7

Rank in world trade, 2015
Exports Import
Merchandise 129 108
Commercial services 90 117
excluding intra-EU trade 103 83
excluding intra-EU trade 63 90

MERCHANDISE TRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>2 204</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>7 724</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports 0.01
Share in world total imports 0.05

Breakdown in economy's total exports
By main commodity group (2015)

By main destination (2015)

Agricultural Products

Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS0802</td>
<td>Other nuts, fresh or dried</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2204</td>
<td>Wine of fresh grapes</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2201</td>
<td>Waters, natural or artificial</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2208</td>
<td>Alcohol of less than 80% volume</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0102</td>
<td>Live bovine animals</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>15%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1001</td>
<td>Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402</td>
<td>Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat and edible offal of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0207</td>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1701</td>
<td>Cane or beet sugar</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1806</td>
<td>Chocolate and other cocoa food</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Million US$ Value Annual percentage change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong></td>
<td>588</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imports</strong></td>
<td>1 068</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-16</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| FDI inflows | ... | FDI outflows | ...

### Non-Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2603 Copper ores and concentrates</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7202 Ferro-alloys</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>HS2711 Petroleum gases</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3102 Nitrogenous fertilisers</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>HS2603 Copper ores and concentrates</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HS2603</strong></td>
<td><img src="chart1" alt="Percentage" /></td>
<td><img src="chart2" alt="Percentage" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HS7202</strong></td>
<td><img src="chart3" alt="Percentage" /></td>
<td><img src="chart4" alt="Percentage" /></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HS8703</strong></td>
<td><img src="chart5" alt="Percentage" /></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HS3004</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HS3102</strong></td>
<td><img src="chart9" alt="Percentage" /></td>
<td><img src="chart10" alt="Percentage" /></td>
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</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.  
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

**Source:** World Trade Organisation Statistics (2015)
GDP per Capita of Georgia

![GDP per Capita of Georgia chart](image)

Source: ‘Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Georgia

![The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Georgia chart](image)

Source: ‘Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Georgia

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
Greece

GDP (million current US$, 2015) 195212
GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 20 510
Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015) -0.4
Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 6 541
Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015) 31.9

**Rank in world trade, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>28 617</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>48 417</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Share in world total exports | 0.17 |
| Share in world total imports | 0.29 |

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

**By main commodity group (2015)**

- Agricultural products: 2,0%
- Fuels and mining products: 37,0%
- Manufactures: 22,8%
- Other: 38,2%

**By main destination (2015)**

- European Union (28): 53,3%
- Turkey: 4,1%
- United States: 6,7%
- Egypt: 4,9%
- Other: 4,1%

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

**By main commodity group (2015)**

- Agricultural products: 0,4%
- Fuels and mining products: 54,9%
- Manufactures: 29,4%
- Other: 15,2%

**By main origin (2015)**

- European Union (28): 51,8%
- Russian Federation: 27,2%
- China: 6,0%
- Iraq: 7,0%
- Other: 6,0%

*Agricultural Products*

**Top exported products**

- HS1509 Olive oil and its fractions: 702
- HS2005 Other vegetables not frozen: 433
- HS0406 Cheese and curd: 414
- HS2008 Plants' parts otherwise preserved: 344
- HS5201 Cotton, not carded or combed: 327

**Top imported products**

- HS0203 Swine meat, fresh, chilled, frozen: 439
- HS0406 Cheese and curd: 431
- HS0201 Bovine meat, fresh, chilled: 405
- HS1001 Wheat and meslin: 216
- HS2106 Other food preparations: 211

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

**Exports**

- HS1509: 15%
- HS2005: 10%
- HS0406: 5%
- HS2008: 4%
- HS5201: 8%

**Imports**

- HS0203: 8%
- HS0406: 6%
- HS0201: 4%
- HS1001: 2%
- HS2106: 1%
### Million US$ Value and Annual Percentage Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,688</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>6,425</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Exports</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>FDI inflows</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>FDI outflows</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>8</td>
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</table>

### Non-Agricultural Products

#### Top Exported Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIC Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>7973</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7606</td>
<td>Aluminium plates, sheets and strip</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0302</td>
<td>Fish, fresh, chilled</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8471</td>
<td>Automatic data-processing machines</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>2015</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Top Imported Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIC Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td>8070</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>3032</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8901</td>
<td>Vessels for transport</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703</td>
<td>Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

### Share in Economy's Non-Agricultural Exports and Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIC Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7606</td>
<td>Aluminium plates, sheets and strip</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0302</td>
<td>Fish, fresh, chilled</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8471</td>
<td>Automatic data-processing machines</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td>Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004</td>
<td>Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8901</td>
<td>Vessels for transport</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703</td>
<td>Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Million US$ Value and Annual Percentage Change

<table>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,969</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>FDI inflows</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>FDI outflows</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-68</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Greece

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Greece

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Greece

Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017a)
**Moldova, Republic of**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (million current US$, 2015)</th>
<th>6 551</th>
<th>Rank in world trade, 2015</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>2 111</td>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>-6,8</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>1 150</td>
<td>Commercial services</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>54,5</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>118</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>1 967</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>3 987</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports 0,01 Share in world total imports 0,02

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

**By main commodity group (2015)**

- Agricultural products: 51,1%
- Fuels and mining products: 47,0%
- Manufactures: 1,9%

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

**By main commodity group (2015)**

- Agricultural products: 6,7%
- Fuels and mining products: 15,7%
- Manufactures: 13,4%
- Other: 64,1%

**By main destination (2015)**

- European Union (28): 61,9%
- Russian Federation: 12,2%
- Belarus: 3,3%
- Turkey: 9,3%
- Other: 15,9%

**By main origin (2015)**

- European Union (28): 49,0%
- Russian Federation: 19,0%
- Ukraine: 9,2%
- China: 4,9%
- Other: 15,9%

**Agricultural Products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1206 Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0802 Other nuts, fresh or dried</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2204 Wine of fresh grapes</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed,or cotton oil</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top imported products</strong></td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2106 Other food preparations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0809 Apricots, cherries, peaches</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1206 Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1905 Wares</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>HS1206</td>
<td>HS2402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>HS0802</td>
<td>HS2106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>HS2204</td>
<td>HS0809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>HS1512</td>
<td>HS1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>HS1001</td>
<td>HS1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Million US$</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Annual percentage change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>555</td>
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<thead>
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<th>FDI inflows</th>
<th>FDI outflows</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Agricultural Products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top exported products</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Top imported products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8544 Insulated electric conductors</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS9401 Seats and parts thereof</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS6204 Women's or girls' suits</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>HS8544 Insulated electric conductors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS6203 Men's or boys' suits</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>HS3808 Insecticides, rodenticides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>1 042</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>3 166</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2015</th>
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<th>FDI outflows</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Moldova

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Moldova

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Moldova

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
Romania

GDP (million current US$, 2015) 177954  
GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 9 524 Merchandise 43 Import 40  
Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015) -1,8 excluding intra-EU trade - -  
Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015) 3 895 Commercial services 42 58  
Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015) 40,9 excluding intra-EU trade - -

MERCHANDISE TRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>69 867</td>
<td>2 2010-2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports | 0,37 | Share in world total imports | 0,42 |

Breakdown in economy's total exports  
By main commodity group (2015)

By main destination (2015)

European Union (28) 73,7  
Turkey 3,9  
United States 1,8  
Russian Federation 1,9  
Other 18,6

Breakdown in economy's total imports  
By main commodity group (2015)

By main origin (2015)

European Union (28) 77,1  
China 3,6  
Turkey 3,2  
Russian Federation 4,6  
Other 11,5

Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>HS0203 Swine meat, fresh, chilled, frozen</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>HS2401 Unmanufactured tobacco</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1206 Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>HS1905 Bread, pastry, other bakers' wares</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1003 Barley</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>HS2304 Solid residues from soya-bean oil</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports

Imports

Exports

| HS0203 | HS1005 | HS2401 | HS1905 | HS2304 | HS1005 | HS2402 | HS1001 | HS1206 | HS1003 |
## Non-Agricultural Products *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS8708 Parts for motor vehicles 8701-8075</td>
<td>4951</td>
<td>HS8708 Parts for motor vehicles 8701-8075</td>
<td>2820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8544 Insulated electric conductors</td>
<td>3648</td>
<td>HS2709 Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td>2518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>3233</td>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>HS8544 Insulated electric conductors</td>
<td>1487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS9401 Seats and parts thereof</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>1452</td>
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### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>HS8708</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8544</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS8703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS9401</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Romania

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Romania

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Romania

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
### Russian Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP (million current US$, 2015)</th>
<th>Rank in world trade, 2015</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>1326 015</td>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>3 152</td>
<td>Commercial services</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### MERCHANDISE TRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>340 349</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>194 087</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports 2.06, Share in world total imports 1.16

#### Breakdown in economy's total exports

- **By main commodity group (2015)**
  - Agricultural products: 67.4%
  - Fuels and mining products: 22.3%
  - Manufactures: 8.0%
  - Other: 2.3%

- **By main destination (2015)**
  - European Union (28): 39.8%
  - China: 35.8%
  - Japan: 19.3%
  - Korea, Republic of: 4.4%
  - Other: 6.3%

#### Breakdown in economy's total imports

- **By main commodity group (2015)**
  - Agricultural products: 75.5%
  - Fuels and mining products: 14.2%
  - Manufactures: 3.9%
  - Other: 0.9%

- **By main origin (2015)**
  - European Union (28): 34.3%
  - China: 19.3%
  - United States: 17.6%
  - Belarus: 6.3%
  - Other: 0.3%

### Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value 2015</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>3949</td>
<td>HS0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried</td>
<td>1191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed or cotton oil</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>HS0202 Meat of bovine animals, frozen</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1003 Barley</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>HS2401 Unmanufactured tobacco</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>HS0203 Swine meat, fresh, chilled, frozen</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2402 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>HS1201 Soya beans, whether or not broken</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS0805</td>
<td>HS1001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0202</td>
<td>HS1512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2401</td>
<td>HS1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0203</td>
<td>HS1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1201</td>
<td>HS2402</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Million US$ Value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>13,395</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>25,432</td>
<td>-4</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Non-Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2709 Petroleum oils, crude</td>
<td>89576</td>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>6796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>67403</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>6490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2711 Petroleum gases</td>
<td>47518</td>
<td>HS8708 Parts for motor vehicles 8701-8075</td>
<td>5377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2701 Coal; briquettes, ovoids</td>
<td>9480</td>
<td>HS8471 Automatic data-processing machines</td>
<td>4419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7601 Unwrought aluminium</td>
<td>6076</td>
<td>HS8525 Radio-telephony transmission tools</td>
<td>3692</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2701</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7601</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Million US$ Value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>319716</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>156512</td>
<td>-3</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Russian Federation

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Russian Federation

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Russian Federation

Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017a)
Turkey

| GDP (million current US$, 2015) | 718 221 |
| GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015) | 10 069 |
| Rank in world trade, 2015 | 29,2 |
| Exports | 31 |
| Imports | 21 |
| Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015) | -6,0 |
| excluding intra-EU trade | 22 |
| Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015) | 2 943 |
| Commercial services | 26 |
| 2015 | 39 |
| Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015) | 29,2 |
| excluding intra-EU trade | 15 |
| 2015 | 26 |

**MERCHANDISE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>143 883</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>207 199</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in world total exports</td>
<td>0,87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in world total imports</td>
<td>1,24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

### By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 6,8%
- Fuels and mining products: 11,9%
- Manufactures: 6,7%
- Other: 74,5%

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

### By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 6,2%
- Fuels and mining products: 20,7%
- Manufactures: 65,4%
- Other: 7,8%

**By main destination (2015)**

- European Union (28): 41,2%
- Iraq: 3,9%
- United States: 44,5%
- Switzerland: 4,4%
- Other: 5,9%

**By main origin (2015)**

- European Union (28): 34,8%
- China: 38,0%
- Russian Federation: 9,8%
- United States: 12,0%
- Other: 5,4%

**Agricultural Products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS0802 Other nuts, fresh or dried</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>HS5201 Cotton, not carded or combed</td>
<td>1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2008 Plants’ parts otherwise preserved</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>1103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1101 Wheat or meslin flour</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed or cotton oil</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1905 Bread, pastry, other bakers' wares</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>HS1201 Soya beans, whether or not broken</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>HS2106 Other food preparations</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS5201</td>
<td>HS0802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1001</td>
<td>HS2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1101</td>
<td>HS1512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1905</td>
<td>HS1201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2106</td>
<td>HS0805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Million US$ Value Annual percentage change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>16 358</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>12 479</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-14</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>FDI outflows</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Non-Agricultural Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS7108 Gold</td>
<td>7381</td>
<td></td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>9227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td></td>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>9024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8704 Motor vehicles for goods transport</td>
<td>4249</td>
<td></td>
<td>HS8708 Parts for motor vehicles 8701-8075</td>
<td>4966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>3966</td>
<td></td>
<td>HS7204 Ferrous waste and scrap</td>
<td>4288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8708 Parts for motor vehicles 8701-8075</td>
<td>3804</td>
<td></td>
<td>HS8802 Other aircraft</td>
<td>3442</td>
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</table>

### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>2%</th>
<th>4%</th>
<th>6%</th>
<th>8%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS7108</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8703</td>
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<td>HS8704</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8708</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>2%</th>
<th>4%</th>
<th>6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS8703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8708</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS7204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8802</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Million US$ Value Annual percentage change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>12 5387</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>16 9661</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-12</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>FDI outflows</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Turkey

Source: ‘Key Indicators’ Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Turkey

Source: ‘Key Indicators’ Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Turkey

Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017a)
**Ukraine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (million current US$, 2015)</td>
<td>90,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>2,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade per capita (US$, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (% GDP, 2013-2015)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rank in world trade, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial services</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excluding intra-EU trade</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MERCANTILE TRADE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million US$</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Annual percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>37,859</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports, c.i.f.</td>
<td>36,317</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share in world total exports: 0.23

Share in world total imports: 0.22

**Breakdown in economy's total exports**

By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 48.9%
- Fuels and mining products: 40.4%
- Manufactures: 10.7%

By main destination (2015)

- European Union (28): 39.6%
- Russian Federation: 34.1%
- Turkey: 6.3%
- China: 7.3%
- Other: 12.7%

**Breakdown in economy's total imports**

By main commodity group (2015)

- Agricultural products: 56.3%
- Fuels and mining products: 33.2%
- Manufactures: 10.5%

By main origin (2015)

- European Union (28): 22.6%
- Russian Federation: 40.9%
- China: 6.5%
- Belarus: 2.0%
- Other: 10.1%

**Agricultural Products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1512 Sunflower-seed or cotton oil</td>
<td>30,240</td>
<td>HS2401 Unmanufactured tobacco</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1005 Maize (corn)</td>
<td>30,020</td>
<td>HS0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1001 Wheat and meslin</td>
<td>22,380</td>
<td>HS2106 Other food preparations</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS1201 Soya beans, whether or not broken</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>HS2309 Preparations of a kind used in anim</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2306 Solid residues from other oil</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>HS2101 Extracts, essences and concentrates</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Share in economy's agricultural exports and imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS2401</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS0805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2309</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS2101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS1512</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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### Million US$ Value

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<td>FDI outflows</td>
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**Non-Agricultural Products**

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<th>Top exported products</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Top imported products</th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>HS7207 Iron's semi-finished products</td>
<td>2496</td>
<td>HS2711 Petroleum gases</td>
<td>4723</td>
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<td>HS2601 Iron ores and concentrates</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>HS2710 Petroleum oils, other than crude</td>
<td>3809</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS7208 Hot-rolled products of iron +600</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>HS2701 Coal; briquettes, ovoids</td>
<td>1631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS8544 Insulated electric conductors</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>HS3004 Medicaments in measured doses</td>
<td>1093</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS7202 Ferro-alloys</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>HS8703 Motor cars for transport of persons</td>
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### Share in economy's non-agricultural exports and imports

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<th>Imports</th>
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### Million US$ Value

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1 As defined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. See the Technical Notes.
2 Refers to WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access products (NAMA products). See the Technical Notes.

GDP per Capita of Ukraine

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)

The Percentage of Real GDP Growth of Ukraine

Source: 'Key Indicators' Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (2016)
The Percentage of Net Energy Import of Ukraine

Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017a)
### Size of the economy of the Countries of the Black Sea Region (2015)

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Population millions</th>
<th>Surface area sq. km</th>
<th>Population density people per sq. km</th>
<th>Gross national income $ billions</th>
<th>Gross national income per capita $</th>
<th>Purchasing power parity gross national income $ billions</th>
<th>Purchasing power parity per capita $</th>
<th>Gross domestic product % growth per capita % growth</th>
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<td>66</td>
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*Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017b)*
# Energy production and use of the Countries of the Black Sea Region (2014)

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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million metric tons of oil equivalent</td>
<td>million metric tons of oil equivalent</td>
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Source: ‘World Development Indicators’ World Bank (2017c)
### Energy dependency and efficiency of the Countries of the Black Sea Region (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of energy use</th>
<th>2011 PPP $ per kilogram of oil equivalent</th>
<th>Total thousand metric tons</th>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>630.929</td>
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Source: 'World Development Indicators' World Bank (2017d)

### Appendix 3: The percentage of Russia’s total proved oil and natural gas

- **World oil total proved reserves**
- **World natural gas total proved reserves**

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016
Natural gas and Oil productions of Russia (million tonnes)

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016

Appendix 4: Turkey’s crude oil and natural gas supply

Appendix 5: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption

Source: Strategic Plan (2014), Retrieved from October 2017

Appendix 6: Imports by country and year of Turkey, share in total imports (%)

Source: Turkey Ministry of Economy website, 2016
Appendix 7: Turkey-Russia Total Foreign Trade (thousand $)

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<tr>
<td>Export</td>
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<td>2,371</td>
<td>3,238</td>
<td>4,727</td>
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<td>3,202</td>
<td>4,628</td>
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<td>Import</td>
<td>9,033</td>
<td>12,818</td>
<td>17,806</td>
<td>23,508</td>
<td>31,365</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>21,601</td>
<td>23,953</td>
<td>26,620</td>
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<td>The volume of trade</td>
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<td>15,189</td>
<td>21,044</td>
<td>28,235</td>
<td>37,847</td>
<td>22,652</td>
<td>26,229</td>
<td>29,946</td>
<td>33,303</td>
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<td>Trade deficit</td>
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<td>-10,447</td>
<td>-14,568</td>
<td>-18,781</td>
<td>-24,883</td>
<td>-16,248</td>
<td>-16,973</td>
<td>-17,960</td>
<td>-19,937</td>
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<td>The value of export (%)</td>
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<td>3,8</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>4,4</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>The value of import (%)</td>
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Sources: Turkish Embassy in Moscow Office of the Commercial Counsellor website (2013)

Appendix 8: Turkey’s Natural Gas Export (billion m³)

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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>RUSSIA</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>AZERBAIJAN</th>
<th>ALGERIA</th>
<th>NIGERIA</th>
<th>SPOT LNG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>3.722</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>1.100</td>
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<td>22.762</td>
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Source: Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Turkey, 2017
Appendix 9: Fossil fuels production of the EU

Oil products production in the European Union by country during 1990-2012

Natural gas production, 1990-2012

Source: IEA (2014), European Union
Appendix 10: Crude oil and natural gas imports of EU member states from 2005 to 2015

### CRUDE OIL

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Source: Eurostat website, 2017
Appendix 11: The share (%) of Russia in national extra-EU imports in 2016

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Source: Eurostat website, 2017

Appendix 12: Global sanctions against Russia

In terms of diplomatic measures, the EU-Russia summit was cancelled and EU member states decided not to hold regular bilateral summits. Moreover, instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4-5 June. In terms of restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, the Council imposed substantial restrictions on economic relations with these two regions including an import ban on goods from Crimea and Sevastopol; a full ban on investments along with a prohibition to supply tourism services in Crimea; and exports of further key goods for certain sectors are banned, including equipment for the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. The EU imposed economic sanctions targeting exchanges with Russia in specific economic sectors.
including limit access to EU primary and secondary capital markets; impose an export and import ban on trade arms; establish an export ban for dual-use goods for military use; andcurtail Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil production and exploration. The measures concerning economic cooperation include: the EIB was requested to suspend the signature of new financing operations with Russia; and the implementation of EU bilateral and regional cooperation programmes with Russia was re-assessed and certain programmes suspended (EEAS website, 2015).

Appendix 13: Map of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and Blue Stream pipelines

Source: EIA (2015b)
Appendix 14: Map of Nabucco and South Stream

Source: Economist (2010)

Appendix 15: Map of TAP, TANAP and Turkish Stream

Source: Cohen (2015)