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The Affective Economy of Internationalisation: Migrant Academics in and out of Japanese Higher Education

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Abstract

Internationalisation is a polyvalent policy discourse, saturated in conceptual and ideological ambiguity. It is an assemblage of commodification, exploitation and opportunity and is a container for multiple aspirations, anxieties, and affordances. It combines modernisation, detraditionalisation, and expansiveness, with knowledge capitalism, linguistic imperialism, and market dominance. There are notable policy shadows and silences, especially relating to the emerging subjectivities, motivations and narratives of internationalised subjects, and experiences that expose the gendered, racialised, epistemic and affective inequalities constituting academic mobility. This paper explores the affective economy and policyscape of internationalisation drawing upon interview data gathered in one private and one national university in Japan with 13 migrant academics. What emerged from our study is that internationalisation policies, processes and practices generate multiple affective engagements. Internationalising oneself can be repressive and generative, with migrant academics finding themselves both vulnerable and animated by their diverse and frequently embodied experiences.
Internationalisation in the Economic Imaginary: Policy Shadows and Silences

Internationalisation is a policy paradigm with performative effects. It is a post-national, convergent trend governed by an economic imaginary aiming to enhance countries’ international competitiveness. It does so by activating diverse knowledge industries and economies, international academic and student markets, global benchmarks, standards and practices (Jessop 2016; Larner 2015; Shahjahan 2016). Internationalisation disrupts the notion of borders and boundaries and is discursively associated with freedom and fluidity (Grant 2013). Multilateralism, mobility and alliance strategies are thought to widen reach, extend brands and enhance innovation and employability (de Wit et al. 2015). However, there are notable policy shadows and silences, especially regarding the emerging subjectivities, motivations and narratives of migrant academics (Morley et al. 2018; Richardson and Zikic 2007). The ideal international academic identity is that of global, cosmopolitan, entrepreneurial citizen, with the capacity to create, transfer and exchange knowledge capital across national, linguistic and cultural boundaries. However, non-rational analyses often form academic mobile subjects. Drawing on theories of affect (Ahmed 2010, 2012, 2017; Berlant 2006; 2011; Butler, 1995, 1997), our paper aims to embody internationalisation by engaging with migrant academics coming in and out of Japan. Internationalisation is enabling and disruptive. It combines connection and attachment to the global economy and networks but can be accompanied by disconnection and detachment from nation states, communities, and personal support networks. Internationalisation is performed and experienced in multiple ways, but is often presented as an ideologically neutral, coherent, knowledge-driven policy intervention (Morley et al. 2018). While international mobility is conceptualised as a form of desirable capital for
institutions and individuals, Robertson (2010, 646) suggests that ‘the romance of movement and mobility ought to be the first clue that this is something we ought to be particularly curious about.’ We are curious about the affective economy of internationalisation in relation to migrant academics.

**Methodology: Making Meaning with Migrant Academics**

We conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews in a national university and a private university in Japan, with five women and eight men currently working as academics and senior administrators in Japan. Seven were incoming from Germany, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Korea, and the USA, and six were Japanese who had worked or studied as postgraduates, or postdoctoral scholars in Canada, Germany, the UK, and the USA. Seven were late-career e.g. directors and professors; four worked in internationalisation e.g. the Director of International Planning. Three were mid-career i.e. associate and assistant professors, and three were early-career lecturers. Disciplines included Anthropology, Biology, Education, English, Geography, Life Sciences, and Linguistics. Some participants had migrated to Japan as a second or third sequential destination. Others had been settled there for many years. Some had internationalised themselves for doctoral or post-doctoral study, some for English language learning/teaching and others for academic and administrative posts. Some had moved for personal reasons, including having partners from the host country, or simply appreciating the culture and language. Participants were asked what was driving the internationalisation policy agenda in Japan, how it was being implemented in their organisations and about their personal, professional and academic experiences as migrant academics. The interviews were conducted in English and were transcribed and
analysed drawing on the methodology of thematic analysis (Nowell et al. 2017). The participants have all been given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity in what is quite a small community.

As a research team, we represent diverse mobilities and identifications, with experiences of socio-material, cultural and professional practices from our Chilean, Japanese and UK nationalities, and also from working and studying on five continents. Hence, our starting point was not one pure, stable and knowable location, or subjectivity, but a theoretical, experiential and discursive bricolage. We are aware that the very notion of fixed, stable and cognitively processed ‘lived experience’ could be interpreted as theoretically naïve (de Freitas 2018). MacLure (2013, 660) questions how data are often treated as an ‘inert and indifferent mass waiting to be in/formed and calibrated by our analytic acumen or our coding systems’. We are interested in making the silences and absences in policy discourse speak (St. Pierre 2000). Our choice of qualitative methods does not suggest that we believe in an authentic subject buried beneath the overload of quantification that will surface given the ‘right’ questions, probes and cues (Manning 2016; Springgay and Truman 2018). The multiple and situated readings of our thirteen participants are by no means the ‘truth’ about academic mobility. However, they could be said to offer readings based on Galloway and Thacker’s (2007) call for a new ‘climatology’ of the social.

**Why/ How is Japan Internationalising?**

The Kokusaika, or internationalization of Japan’s higher education is a policy priority (Agawa 2011; Goodman 2007). Internationalisation is both a desired and feared force, incorporating an awareness of symbolic goods such as recognition, distinction and competitive
stratification in the prestige economy. The pressure of status competition for publishing, funding and ranking success, and the power of vertical differentiation are structuring strategic rationalities. Contemporary internationalisation discursive practices relate to the desire for competitive participation in the global knowledge economy, and the creation of new geopolitical sites for world-class universities. Rankings are used to inform strategic decisions, set targets, priorities and resource allocation; identify research areas; review recruitment, promotional or student entry criteria; create, close or merge departments or programmes; and/or merge with other institutions or research institutes (Hazelkorn 2011).

Depending on the index, Japan had 3 (ARWU), 2 (THES), 5 (QS) universities in the top 100 league tables in 2017. Internationalisation plays a major part in aspirational leadership imaginaries to join the upper ranks of the global league tables.

There are aspects of Japanese higher education that interact with internationalisation. Japan has one of the largest higher education systems in the world comprising 777 universities, 341 junior colleges and 57 colleges of technology, and has a challenge of over-supply. It has a large private sector -approximately 77.2 per cent (MEXT 2017), and three higher education sectors with different legal status (national, private and local public) (Kitagawa and Oba 2010). Japan’s national universities enrol 20 per cent of students but receive 80 per cent of the national higher education budget. There is intense stratification and research concentration, with 15 universities receiving 50 per cent governmental research grants. Like many higher education systems, it is characterised by male dominance. Only 2.3 per cent of university leaders are women- the lowest female academic staff participation rates in the OECD. In terms of socio-economic status, there is a correlation between students’ social class background and choice of university (Kariya 2009).
Japan has a history of internationalisation dating back to the nineteenth century (Rivers 2010), but Jessop (2016, 11) suggests that the 1997 Asian crisis fostered neoliberal political economy strategies that promoted a financialised, knowledge-based economy that drove internationalisation efforts of Japan and other East Asian countries. This material-discursive event was both read as a threat and an opportunity to boost the economy. This strategy, argues Hada (2014), is reflected explicitly in internationalisation policy initiatives such as the *Global 30 Project* (2009) aiming to configure a cluster of elite universities suitable for international students by, for instance, delivering courses in English, exchange programmes, and international cooperation. Another was the *300,000 International Students Plan* (2008) aiming to increase the number of international students in order to ‘to make Japan more open-minded’ (MEXT 2012: np); and the *Top Global University Project* (2014) which seeks to prioritise government support to universities carrying out more comprehensive internationalisation reform (MEXT 2017). Huang (2018a) argues that these policies have furthered the acceptance and growth of international academics, especially those with English language, from 1.1% to 4.1%.

There are related internal and regional drivers of internationalisation. Internally, Japanese higher education has an oversupply of both public and private university places, and an ageing population (Hada 2014). New international student markets are sought to fill these places to counterbalance the shrinking national market (Yonezawa 2009, 200–201). This involves attracting a global market including the provision of courses in English and the attraction of international faculty. Alongside this, the constitution of a regional competitive economy, featured by the development of technology, sciences, industrial and service economies in Japan’s neighbouring countries, is affectively mobilised in discourse as a threat
that Japan will lose its position in the global prestige and enterprise economy as well as risk becoming isolated from regional and global spaces because of the aggressiveness of competition (Yonezawa 2009, 201). One of the main policy drivers for the internationalisation of academic staff is the attraction of international students to improve Japan’s global competitiveness, but also to lead the national culture towards a more global society by promoting the English language and making the Japanese language and culture more globally attractive (MEXT 2012). A further internationalising strategy is the encouragement of more academics and full-time scholars with degrees from foreign universities (MEXT 2012). This internationalisation modality mobilises an affective economy of multiple and contradictory fears. It is a response to the government’s fear of failure of producing subjects able to cope with a globalisation saturated with English grammar. This is accompanied by the anxiety of losing Japanese distinctiveness.

*Amid ongoing globalization, in order to develop an educational environment where Japanese people can acquire the necessary English skills and also international students can feel at ease to study in Japan, it is very important for Japanese universities to conduct lessons in English for a certain extent, or to develop courses where students can obtain academic degrees by taking lessons conducted entirely in English. Of course, such universities still also provide substantial Japanese-language education courses’ (MEXT 2012, np).*

There is here an affective recognition of internationalisation strategy as both a nudging policy towards national citizens as competitive multicultural resources to participate in the global economy and education market, and as policies embedded in neo-colonial governmentalities that position national capacities and citizens in deficit (Le Ha and Barnawi 2015,
In 2008, Hada forecast that the future of the developments of the Japanese higher education could be grouped under three broad headings (Hada 2008, 157-175): changes in population, changes in the economy and the labour force, changes in structures and policies. And now higher education institutions in Japan have stratified. The gap between individual universities is continuing to expand and competition is increasing. Furthermore, the distribution of university resources and project funding are becoming more unequal as government sources of research funding are increasingly divided on the basis of research output (Hada 2005, 219-241). The arrival of the international cavalry represents a type of immediate institutional upgrade.

**Transnational Mobility as a Happiness Formula?**

In the political economy of neoliberalism, a complex coagulation of opportunity for cosmopolitanism and economic wellbeing, and capitalist circuits of exploitation of knowledge, groups and individuals co-exists. Yet, internationalisation promises happiness (Ahmed 2010). Mobile academics are constituted as carriers of transferable knowledge, norms, values and practices to establish competitive advantage and add value to national systems (Kim 2017). While mobility implies dislocation and disposability in a profit-motivated knowledge economy, many studies report the social, intellectual, material and professional benefits and gains of academic mobility. Huang (2017) reminds us that the OECD (2001) identified potential increases in earnings as the most important migration motivation. Other drivers include the production of new knowledge, international transfer of existing knowledge, mobilisation of innovative resources for research and teaching, a regular exchange of students and academics, and the establishment of long-term research collaborations (Ackers 2005; Jöns 2007; Kim 2010; Musselin 2004; OECD 2004, 2012). This
exemplifies a dominant depiction forming the policyscape of transnational academic mobility. Policyscapes can be understood as interconnected phenomena making global policy patterns and orientations across national and regional contexts through chains of visions, values, modes of organisation, and learning processes coming from hegemonic worldviews that are shaping and shaped by local specific education landscapes (Carney 2009, 67–69). Policyscapes, as heuristic tools, go beyond embedded national hermeneutics connecting local enactments with internationalising processes.

Mobility can imply the instrumental use, or commodification of academics as human capital to attract more international students, thus as marketing enhancers, or to do the job that locals cannot or are not willing to do (Kim 2017). The glamorous view of transnational mobility as virtuous flows of exchange and production of new knowledge prevails, however. This has some basis in fact. Latour (1987) explains that repetitive circulatory movements have helped to accumulate new and disparate resources in venues such as the university, the archive and the museum. Inside these ‘centres of calculation’, the gathered resources have been systemised, classified, transformed and combined in order to create new knowledge claims about distant phenomena (Jöns 2015). Expressed in Bourdieu’s (1986, 42) terms, travelling researchers have the possibility to exchange and accumulate different forms of capital that are ‘determining the chances of success for practices’ and provide access to further capital, including prestige (symbolic capital), education and knowledge (embodied cultural capital), books and research infrastructure (objectified cultural capital), academic credentials and qualifications (institutionalised cultural capital), a network of relationships (social capital), and economic capital that is directly convertible into money. Nonetheless, academic mobility discourse can over-emphasise its capacity to trigger univocal
positive social change and overlooks power relationships embedded in gender, class, and
post-colonial trajectories. Thinking with Berlant (2006, 20–23), we argue that hegemonic
internationalisation policy discourses are a pleasurable formation because they comprise a
cluster of promises -openness, multiculturalism, competitiveness, prestige, 
cosmopolitanism, global orientation- that resonate with struggles and fantasies of global
inclusion and recognition while encompassing fears that animate the very same
internationalisation strategies.

**Learning the Lingo**

In our study, internationalisation processes were often signalled via the promotion of the
English language. This included the delivery of some programmes, providing support for
publication and conference presentations and participation in partnerships and exchanges.
Language was a source of socio-material tension and difference, provoking complex affective
assemblages. Non-Japanese speakers expressed anxiety and pride about learning and
functioning in Japanese, while Japanese colleagues expressed hesitancy about their English,
or exasperation with their colleagues who would not learn and speak English. Language
surfaced feelings about identity, commitment, inclusion, connection, protection and honour.
In 2015, Japan’s average total score on the TOEFL was 71, the second lowest in Asia
(Education Testing Service 2016). Japan’s mono-lingualism is often interpreted as being
wilfully attached to difference and to cutting off from a real or imagined global community.
There are knowledge and governmental discourses stressing the urgency and benefits of
gaining English Language proficiency in academia (Bradford and Brown 2018; Morita 2017a;
MEXT 2012; 2017). Nonetheless, there are also tensions and limits. Whitsed and Wright
(2011) believe that English is viewed as a means of gaining access to globalised knowledge,
rather than as a means for facilitating dialogue. Yonezawa (2009, 205) suggests that
Japanese students’ and academics’ lack of English as an indication of internationalisation
deficit is particularly emphasised by English- speaking countries suggesting a geopolitics of
knowledge adumbrating neo-colonial relations of power at the base of internationalisation.
Le Ha (2013, 171-172) identifies the internationalisation of Japanese higher education as a
force of unequal international relations of knowledge condemned to reproduce an inferior
anxiety status, misrecognition, dependency, and homogenisation. Kim (2017) suggested that
Japan can sometimes be reluctant to accommodate difference, and that it sustains a:

*strong ethnonational cultural ‘exclusivity’ and ‘resilience’ in the process of
globalisation of academic capitalism, and beneath the state-enforced
internationalisation policies.* (p.16)

Language featured prominently in our study. Dr Cruz, an English teacher from the
Philippines, described some of his Japanese colleagues’ resistance:

*Because Japanese are generally happy with their comfort zone. ... I have a few
people telling me why do I have to take your class in English? I am Japanese, I don’t
need English. Japan is the best country in the world... I had one student...it was an
English class and he just stood up and said, well, I don’t like English and all the
classmates just looked at him, I really don’t like to learn English.*

This affective response and rationality of avoidance could be interpreted as a demonstration
of a subjectivity that is immune to internationalisation technologies. It could also be seen as
boundary-setting and passionate attachment to the local, rather than the imagined and
coercively promoted global (Mouer 2015). Dr Asai, a bilingual Japanese administrator
responsible for internationalising his university’s research activities reflects on the tension between the government’s desire to ‘promote our research activities internationally’, the related investment in writing courses including one-to-one support for English publications and conference presentations, on the one hand, and the poor take-up of these services by academics in his university. Dr Asai’s observations resonate with research findings by Hashimoto (2009), Poole (2005), and Whitsed and Wright (2011) that suggest that communicative English-language programmes delivered by peripheralised adjunct teachers are not taken seriously by students, Japanese academics, and administrators of higher education.

The refusal to participate in Anglophone academic culture is open to multiple interpretations. Not learning English has been theorised in terms of a political power struggle between the Japanese and English languages, and between Anglophone capitalism and Japanese capitalism. Tsuda (2000) claimed that English is a threat to the Japanese language and culture, and that it is not simply a value-neutral means of communication but, rather it is an instrument of linguistic and cultural imperialism. Dr Cruz believed that reluctance to speak English was rooted in perfectionism and dignity, rather than in ideological resistance:

This has a very strong cultural root because in Japan I believe people here, since they were little, are trained to do things perfectly.... I talk to teachers or people or students, and they say, ‘oh, I don’t really speak English’, and I said ‘you are speaking English. Why can’t you?’ And later on, I found out that what they really meant is that ‘I don’t speak perfect English’.
Speaking a foreign language implies visibility and vulnerability, coming into view, or a magnification that is at odds with the orientalist perception that humility and self-effacement are promoted in Japanese culture. Like internationalisation, it represents a type of messy, entrepreneurial excess in opposition to the clean lines of minimalism. Dr Nnamani, a Nigerian lecturer, suggested that reluctance to speak English is part of a culture that eschews self-promotion:

_They are very shy people... they are worried about international settings like social gatherings and stuff like that, so we actually organise events for them and probably talk with them one on-one... to help them lose that shyness._

For many, it was associated with recasting their identities as entrepreneurs in academic capitalism. Dr Asai connected English with positional advantage in the global leagues tables:

_But still because of the pressure from the senior executives or the government ...for improving their university ranking. That is very important. In order to improve the ranking ... you need to produce papers. In English, not in Japanese._

Professor Nobu, a Director of International Planning, suggested that internationalisation drivers originated from industry, and that knowledge of the English language was obligatory in his university:

_This expectation came from the private companies, they need ... ‘globalised manpower’, whoever can be useful for the Japanese companies, so that they can ...improve the competitiveness...Our university president changed the policy or the system over hiring all faculties...One of the requirements, no matter what, the new professor has to be able to teach something in English._
English classes are taught in most universities for most undergraduate students (Poole 2005; Whitsed and Wright 2011). However, Dr Park, a South Korean lecturer, believed that many Japanese colleagues opt to make themselves inaudible in English:

*Even most of academics and students can speak English, but they tend to use more, prefer to use Japanese than English.*

This tendency was elaborated by Dr Fuji, a Japanese associate professor who had worked in Canada. She believed that imperfect English would undermine her academic authority:

*And also, language skills, especially like discussion skills and negotiation skills probably in large groups. ...you have to, you know, look intelligent in the academic environment.*

Language was used as a signifier of new imaginaries, power, influence and peripheralisation – not just from institutional administrative systems, but also from the research economy, as Professor Ross, from the USA, explained how difference is deemed disruptive in Japanese systems, and that the screening out of difference has socio-material, as well as affective consequences:

*As an academic if you want to get funding for your research and you don’t have the Japanese language as your first language and you’ve not managed to speak in Japanese it would be difficult to understand how the things work or to reach to informal networks, right?*

Dr Park illustrated how she was excluded from information networks:
Still many official things are just in Japanese. So, there is some portal system on the website for the faculty members, but only in Japanese. So, for me it is really hard to search some information.

Lacking language can mean non-attunement to the environment. Dr Asai identified the additional work that is required when one does not inhabit the norms of an institution:

At this moment, the administrative system ...is very domestic, so heavily Japanese language oriented, so many foreign faculty members have found it very difficult ...I think we should kind of transform this system. I mean at least bilingual.

Resistance to English might also relate to mis/trust. There is an element of ‘stranger danger’ in which the ‘other’ becomes an object of fear, accumulating affective value (Ahmed 2000). Based on the results of the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6, Vogt (2017) found that 36.3 per cent of the Japanese respondents indicated that they would rather not have immigrants or foreign workers live in their neighbourhood. This is the third highest proportion among the OECD countries that included in the survey. When asked how much they trusted people of another nationality, 13.6 per cent of Japanese respondents responded in the affirmative, which is the lowest proportion among the OECD countries (Vogt 2017). A concern is that these values undermine internationalisation processes. Dr Jameson, a lecturer from the USA, discussed how Japan’s traditional practice was to separate foreigners from the local community:
They tend to Dejima\textsuperscript{1} the foreigners and put them on a little island and I find it very counter-productive because if they want to internationalise they should be embedding us within the rest of the faculty instead of collecting us all in one place ...I have heard of situations where larger universities ...create a new faculty and they'll put most of their foreigners there and then, especially at private universities where they're more nimble, things don't work out so well, university runs into financial troubles, well, we can cut a whole faculty now. We don't fire person by person and we can't be charged with discrimination, but we can cut a whole faculty and then it's just no, no we're not firing each individual foreigner, we're firing a whole faculty because it's the one that's not helping us out.

Internationalisation work was attempting to reconfigure these relationships that are evocative of the contagion fears of leper colonies and other control technologies of quarantining, and isolation. Foreigners have to be rehabilitated from objects of fear and suspicion to partners, allies and value enhancers in the global knowledge economy in order to counter what has been described as academic apartheid (Hall 1998). Dr Cruz identified the materiality of affective resistance to transformation and reported witnessing xenophobia and Islamophobia in his national university:

\footnote{\textit{Dejima} was a small artificial island built in the bay of Nagasaki in 1634 by local merchants, notable for being the single place of direct trade and exchange between Japan and the outside world.}
I would imagine there is a little bit of xenophobia, yes...I have students who refuse to go abroad and I thought, you know, why not? Oh, no, it’s very dangerous, you know, it’s... Japan is the best country in the world...And I think it’s just a general feeling of indifference towards foreigners... we have a strong recruitment programme for students from the Middle East. We have a lot of students from Egypt, from Afghanistan, a lot, a lot, a lot. And I’m starting to worry because I said, oh, you know, I hope the students and the faculty and the university is ready to be exposed to such a new cultural group...I know one professor, two professors, they’re just blatantly Islamophobic... And I’ve witnessed some antagonistic relationships.

Dr Nnamani reported how he organised courses to challenge these prejudices by encouraging Japanese academics to become more attuned to difference and inclusiveness in their classrooms:

The course is about actually helping them to improve, to change their mindsets, to view things differently because the rate at which Japan is going, no matter what you do you can’t stop... students from other countries coming to your classroom. So, you have to get ready for it now, to have an international mind-set, so that when you go to classroom if you see a Chinese person and somebody probably from Turkey or somebody from Nigeria...you won’t have a different mindset...put them separately.

Ahmed (2012) noted that diversity work is the work we do when we aim to transform an institution often by trying to open them up to those who have been previously excluded. Providing courses can be evidence of institutional internationalisation
interventions and affordances, but a question remains as to whether they succeed in their declared intentions? Ahmed (2012) uses the concept of ‘non-performativity’ to describe the process when naming something does not bring something into effect, or when something is named in order not to bring something into effect. The institutional ‘noise’ around language and diversity could, perversely, be a way of silencing difference. On the other hand, to see struggles over language as ‘noise’ can gloss over international power relations and abject and deficit constructions of non-western countries. Internationalisation policy promotes the mastering of hegemonic ways of representing the world through English as one of its main technologies. Nonetheless, as an exercise of power it creates an affective economy characterised by lines of opposition and rejection, threats and risk of vulnerability for national cultures. Exclusionary linguistic practices can make migrant academics feel marginalised from the daily operations of universities, the global research economy, hospitality rituals, and citizenship. On the other hand, this way of implementing internationalisation policy rather than creating globalising sharing economies of diverse knowledges, produces forces that oppose the oversight of cultural nuances and other valuable subjectivities existing and defended in Japanese higher education.

Melancholic Migrants: Precarity, Peripheralisation, Friction and Fragilities

While cosmopolitanism seems attractive, migrant academics can suffer hidden injuries such as the insecurity of short-term contracts or second-class citizenship (Bonisch-Brednich 2010, 2016; Hoffman 2009). The social impact of re-location can be a form of dis-location and displacement, requiring active engagement with otherness (Kim 2010; Morley et al. 2018). Poole (2005, 254) observed in a case study of a Japanese university that there ‘is a very
striking and important distinction between “core” and “periphery” faculty. Arudou’s (2007) University Black List documents discriminatory practices and labour law violations in a significant number of Japanese universities. Precarity and peripheralisation were noted by participants, in what were often melancholic narratives of mistreatment. Melancholy is the unfinished process of grieving a loss (Butler, 1995), and melancholic loss discourses featured in many narratives. For example, Dr Jameson reported vulnerabilities and friction as a US citizen working in Japan:

"Things can go from seemingly safe to precarious pretty fast. ... there are a lot of Japanese academics, younger academics who also feel things are precarious for them... it tends to be a little more heavy-handed on the foreigners... Everything seemed to be going well ... then suddenly my boss walks into my office and says, ‘Oh, I have news. We’re going to upgrade your post from contract status to tenure track status’, which is great, if I get it, which I didn’t. I think tenure is only as good as the university that gives it to you and when you talk about precariousness, who do you trust and to what extent do you trust them?"

In this analysis, professional relationships, as well as the contracts themselves were fragile and unstable, easily undone and denied- a point that is rarely noted in international policy discourses. In Berlant’s (2011) terms, current cruelties were rationalised in relation to future promises of security and inclusion. Hashimoto (2009) argued that, just as English is viewed as a utility, foreign teachers of English are likewise instrumentalised. Contractual precarity was reported by Dr Lee, a Korean/US English teacher working in a Japanese national university:

"Right now, our university's dealing with some budget cuts ... I'm dealing with..."
maybe less favourable contract renewal conditions... There seem to be ... many things out of my control ... So, I don’t quite know how to handle this... I don’t know if it’s a Japanese thing or it’s my situation... Like for example, you don’t know when you’re renewed or not.

The uncertainty is evocative of Berlant’s (2011) concept of cruel optimism – when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing as you are unlikely to achieve it and the wanting makes you more governmentable. Dr Lee explained how precarity is reinforced by foreignness, unfamiliarity and fear:

The university here doesn’t provide English translation of contracts ... You can’t just have us sign things in Japanese, and some of the Japanese even is quite vague. So, that’s one of the things I think that the union is trying to really nail down... There is support there but it’s really kept hidden and people ... who don’t agree to certain impositions or requests are ... awkward about sort of asserting their rights... Do you know where the union office is? It’s like near this, you know garbage chute, garbage disposal area. There’s no signage.

Precarity is not unique to Japan (Carrozza et al. 2017), but is rarely mentioned in formal international policy discourse. Dr Fuji reported a breach of employment rights when working as a researcher in a major Canadian university:

But the second year, my boss decided to cut my salary into half...... He said, according to him there is another new graduate. There is another person who just got a PhD but she is looking for a job. So, he said I should work with her, and she
will take care of the English parts and I can take care of the rest. So, that's the reason, that half of the salary should go to her, and I can get the half the salary.

Dr Fuji did not dare to make trouble, for fear of losing the opportunities that were open to her by becoming trouble. Her passionate disciplinary attachment enabled a space of subjectification and potential exploitation (Butler 1997). Power relations were maintained by her vulnerability as a migrant academic and the high costs of challenging power abuses. Butler described how ‘when someone says “no” to power, they are saying “no” to a particular way of being formed by power’ (Butler 2009 np). Dr Fuji did not believe that she had the right to say ‘no’, as a hierarchy was invoked i.e. she had to cede her post to a first language English speaker in order to maximise the unit’s output of publications that are valued in the global knowledge economy. Rather than dismantling the discriminatory structures, she made personally stressful adjustments to fit in with the enforced arrangement e.g. moved in with an inappropriate partner in order to reduce her living costs. In so doing, she felt that she had accepted the unacceptable and eventually decided to return to Japan - reverse mobility as her form of resistance to oppressive power relations in her Canadian university. In the end, after much personal and professional injury, she said ‘no’.

There was a potent affective economy of gratitude underpinned by fragility. It was preferable to sacrifice one’s own happiness than risk breaking bonds and alienating powerful employers when the stakes were high e.g. professional and personal well-being, housing, children’s education, partners’ employment and immigration/ visa status. This meant that non-attunement or non-participation were sometimes survival strategies. Professor Ross commented on how migrant academics were excluded from institutional decision-making:
I mean discrimination... In some situations, you’re not put on committees. So, this is a double-edged sword. You don’t want to be on committees and so I think a lot of international academics in Japan are thankful for that but what that means is you’re not part of the power centre of the university, you’re peripheralised and so you have very little say in the management of faculties or even, and a larger scale the managing of the university.

Migrants were sometimes seen as temporary visitors in contrast to the long-service career tendencies of many Japanese employees (Morita 2017b). As such, their engagement was seen as fragile and easily ruptured. For Ahmed (2017) fragility is reproductive. The quality assumed to belong to something is generated by that very assumption. If you think that someone or something is fragile, the chances are that it will become so. For migrant academics, leaving their home support system can mean becoming more fragile, breaking a connection, involving living on the edge. Liminality, loss, hybridity and being between two identity worlds carried an affective load for Dr Jameson:

* A personal detriment would sort of be feeling disconnected from my home culture quite often. ... they say you're not really an American any more. You've been abroad so long you don't know what it's like and that's rough. It's rough to hear that because I am certainly not a Japanese.

Spatiality and what counts as home preoccupied some participants. Professor Yoshiro believed that fears about loss of national identity deterred young Japanese post-docs from seeking positions abroad. This combined with a comfortable research environment for them in Japan:
So, in Japan we also have similar institutes with postdoctoral issue, ... if they move out of Japan, it’s rather difficult for them to return to Japan because they lose the connection from Japanese society, so that’s why some Japanese young researchers, they don’t want to really go abroad, and at the same time in some fields, and obviously the research environment is quite good already, so they don’t really need to go abroad, so these days we avoid that, not many young researchers, they are not really seeking to go abroad, so it’s kind of difficult for us to encourage them to go abroad.

These views contradicted research by Sang et al. (2013) who found that belonging to two countries was a strength, and a resource on which their participants could draw – an argument that is often posited in internationalisation policies. In discourses of inter-cultural competencies, global citizenship is a premium. Yet loneliness, isolation and separation were occupational hazards for migrant academics. Professor Yoshiro described separation when he left Japan to work in France:

\[ I \text{ had to be away from my family ... for two years ... because at the beginning my family could come, but at the end, of course, they would rather like to be staying at home. } \]

Dr Jameson discussed how rapidly the affective climate can change, and how fragile the transnational social relations can be:

\[ Japan \text{ in general can be very isolating and you get better with dealing with isolation ... when you first arrive in Japan at your new post, there's a big 'oh, hello,} \]
welcome, nice to meet you,’ and maybe for a week or so you’re getting some attention. It’s very nice, but after that … it seems that it goes from very intense to not nearly enough in a heartbeat.

Ahmed reminds us (2016) that the word ‘precarious’ derives from ‘pray’ and means to be held through the favour of another, or dependent on the will of another, which is how ‘precarious’ acquires the sense of risky, dangerous and uncertain. She suggests that to be welcomed is to be positioned as a guest or stranger, the one who is dependent on being welcomed. A welcome leads us into precarity. If you are dependent on a door being opened, that door can rapidly be shut in your face. So, given the precarity of academic mobility, what motivates people to dislocate and relocate? These multiple affective ‘sad’ threads constituting the experiences of migrant academics disrupt the modernist, optimistic and happy formula of the internationalisation and academic mobility policyscape embedded in desired notions of subjectification such as global citizenship and multiculturalism. Through a focus on the affective economies of academic mobility we can understand the notion of policyscape (Carney 2009) as a chain of sticky concepts that link mobile subjects to broader imaginaries of desires (Butler 1997). An affective economy pays attention to how internationalisation policyscapes are also patterned by affective registers inscribed in internationalisation and knowledge-based economy imaginaries. It indicates the work on the self that these academics do to manage and navigate conflicting global policy productions of local contexts of higher education where internationalisation desires are enacted.
Motivations to Migrate and Technologies to Thrive?

Huang (2018b) found that Japan attracts migrant academics mainly from the Global North with the largest number of international faculty coming from China (45%), followed by Korea (22%), the USA (17%), the UK (8%), and Australia (3%). All these countries have well-developed higher education systems, so, why Japan? Supporting English was a major pull factor. Other motivations included interest in Japanese culture and language, personal relationships or simply *faute de mieux* (for want of better), with Japan a second choice when applications to Canada or the USA were unsuccessful. Some, like Dr Nnamani, stayed on after enjoying fully-funded studies in Japan. Others appreciated aspects of Japanese culture. For example, Dr Jager was involved in the martial art of Aikido. Motivations for Japanese faculty to leave Japan included language learning, doctoral or postdoctoral study, employment and intellectual opportunities including working in international research teams. Professor Ross migrated from the USA for personal challenge. Cantwell (2011) argued that academic mobility can be accidental, forced and negotiated. While some narratives from the Global North incorporated a privileged sense of strategy, rational calculation, purposefulness and choice, some narratives from the Global South exemplified a *faute de mieux* logic. Dr Cruz described how Japan was not his first choice:

*I think the most compelling reason was I couldn’t find any more positions...in Canada, in the Philippines...*

Dr Jameson migrated to Japan as his value was higher there than in the congested USA internationalised graduate market:
Japan’s an easier market for me, with my qualifications in the States right now... I was a high-school English teacher for three years on the JET program, yes, great program in ways, famous program, but I found that when I went back to the States people like me were sort of a dime a dozen.

Dr Park’s experiences, coming from Korea, articulated with recent research by Gerhards et al. (2018) suggesting that doctoral scholars are less likely to be accepted by prestigious universities in the Global North if their earlier degrees were from Asian universities:

> Actually, I applied in the United States. But I got PhD degree in my country so it’s really hard to move.

Once again, this illustrates how power geometries of the core and periphery operate to impede internationalisation.

Yonezawa and Ishida (2012) surveyed migrant academics from 34 Japanese universities about their incentives for internationalising their careers. One main reason related to language education and the other to the internationally competitive research environment. Research indicates disciplinary differences (Wende 2015), and STEM differences were emphasised by Professor Araki, a Japanese life scientist:

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2 The Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme or JET Programme is a Japanese government initiative that brings college graduates—mostly native speakers of English—to Japan as Assistant Language Teachers.
Science is really international, so, I was encouraged to go abroad as a postdoc and then I went to USA for three and a half years... I got the opportunity to go to UK as a lab head... I believe that scientists they don’t have to be mobile but ...it’s very important to have experience at some point in their life to live in a foreign country, that’s if you want to be a scientist or researcher.

The issues of academic capitalism, research and epistemic inclusion were raised by participants who felt that their foreignness excluded them from institutional research cultures. Dr Jameson commented:

They don’t give much help to the foreigners. They’ll send out an email. The grant system, they have put out handbooks and stuff in English now, good on them, but...

This view contrasted with Professor Hara’s experiences of working in Germany:

You know, it’s quite tough here, to work in a Japanese University, a lot to do, not only research so, many different things...I didn’t think about coming back to Japan, I was happy there, and I had a tenured position and I could do my own research and have freedom in research.

Goodman (2009) maintains that most research is conducted in non-academic and corporate locations in Japan following the 1980s’ severe budgetary cuts. Active participation in higher education and research is always a ‘positioning practice’ in which actors claim their own places and define where others belong through the usage of available social categories (Angermuller 2017). Whitsed and Wright’s (2011) study of Japanese higher education drew on Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical concepts of ‘front’ and ‘back’. This means that there is a front performance (omote) designed to manipulate the audience and a back or interior (oku)
where the private world is enacted. While this is often applied to the internationalisation process itself *i.e.* employing English teachers as a signifier of change, Dr Jameson applied it to the research culture in his national university:

> I don't know if there's actually a research culture there as much as there is an appearance of a research culture... I sort of feel that there are a lot of people here who talk of big things but actually don't know how to do a lot of high-level work, high-level research. So, if it's detrimental to be in that kind of culture day in and day out, then that's a detriment.

Performance, performativity, authenticity, complicity, and attunement are theoretically complex and confound and conflict many migrant academics in their attempts at establishment. Furthermore, the quotidian navigation of ambiguity and uncertainty can develop cultural competence. However, it is a major form of affective labour – a perpetual tribunal (Oksala 2016), meaning that migrant academics are forever being assessed and evaluated. We asked participants what advice they would offer to others. Professor Ross advised attunement, rather than friction (Cresswell 2014). Acknowledging and affirming the ‘other’ and the ability to step outside one’s own benchmarks, expectations and references were seen as crucially important:

> You have to be respectful. You have to buy in...You have to understand the organisation, you have to be willing to learn the administrative organisational structures at the university to make any change. You can’t just make assumptions that oh that’s just because they don’t know how to do it...I think you have to make the effort.

Dr Park invoked harmony over conflict as a valuable internationalised subjectivity. Differences had to be blended rather than accentuated:
Sometimes the academics in my country and academics in other countries, they have different perspectives, like different points of view, about same topics. So, how to make harmony about these kinds of things is quite important to international faculty, I think.

Professor Ross raised questions about whether particular subjectivities lend themselves more readily to transnational mobility, such as the ability and desire to network?

I think networking. ... there’s strategic decisions you can make in the way you position yourself within the academic community that I think really go a long way to increasing the chance of success. So, a lot of it is luck, it’s chance but you can still, I think, increase those chances if you’re aware of the different communities that exist and are able to network.

In this analysis, network capital and investment are key to being a successful migrant academic, attracting investors and making oneself more visible and marketable, while contradictorily occupying a space of invisibility and humility.

Exilic Thinking: Reflecting on Power, Peripheralisation and Pedagogy in Japanese Higher Education

Exilic thinking, according to Fahey and Kenway (2010), is representative of criticality itself, as it means positioning oneself as an outsider in opposition to orthodoxies (Said 1994).

Migrant academics in our study deployed their often-hybridised subjectivities to subject the Japanese higher education system itself to a critical gaze. For example, they commented on Japan’s peripheralization, transmission pedagogy, academic and age-related hierarchies and a time-serving approach, rather than structured support for career development, and
archaic gender regimes. The theme of peripheralization permeated Professor Ross’s observations:

*In terms of the globalised higher education, in Japan you’re on the periphery. Japan is the second largest, besides China, the second largest to the US in terms of higher educational systems but it’s very peripheralised.*

Some of the peripheralization was related to inward-looking governance systems. While Japanese technology is frequently associated with the future, many participants described Japanese higher education systems as overly bureaucratic, hierarchical with cumbersome and archaic practices (Poole, 2016). A further area that elicited commentary related to transmission pedagogy (Poole, 2010). Professor Hara noted how Japan differed from Germany:

*Students are like children, you know, in Japan. I do everything, guidance, orientation and they are waiting for my explanation, and they never ask themselves.*

Dr Jager contrasted the Socratic pedagogies that are promoted in some locations, with teacher-centred transmission modes that seem to dominate in Japan:

*So, in the beginning the students would behave according to very different norms than they do in European countries ... Like for example, in Germany, we would be told to express our own opinion, I know this is a stereotype, but it really exists. Whereas here students are not taught to express their own opinion.*

Student politeness and passivity was a cause of frustration for Dr Nnamani:
I want my students to actually behave differently from typical Japanese, I mean. So, I want them to speak out, shout, not that situation where they always stay and listen to me all the time. So, I wouldn't want that. I want them to have their ideas and push it forward so that we can brainstorm and work together with that idea and see what we can do.

He blamed a hierarchical system which fostered dependence and constructed students as obedient subjects:

*Spoon-feeding the Japanese student... Japanese students will just keep going, finish one line, go ‘okay do you approve this one?’, finish two lines, they go ‘do you approve this one?’ They are all the time asking for approval step-by-step you have to approve.*

Goodman (2007:74) reminds us that:

*The word ‘to learn’ (manabu) in Japanese has the same stem as maneru meaning ‘to imitate’ and therefore a very different origin from the English word ‘educator’ (from the Latin, educare, meaning ‘one who draws out’).*

In 1960, 10.1 per cent of Japanese high school graduates entered higher education; by the 1980s this rose to 49.9 per cent and by 2005 to 76.2 per cent, which was one of the highest rates in the world (Goodman 2010). Dr Lee observed how the post-massification of the Japanese higher education system is intensifying the industrialisation of pedagogy and assessment technologies:

*We're also looking at increased class sizes from under 30 to up to 40 and yes, I'm not used to this kind of teaching ... I'm more resistant to going to a pure Japanese*
system where you’re lecturing 80, 90 students and giving them multiple choice
tests.

Dr Cruz commented on the lack of investment in students:

And one of my laments ...is the low level of mentorship... between Japanese
professors and their students. And probably one reason why this is so is because
the Japanese professors themselves did not go through this system of
mentorship...students just function on their own, and contact with professors is
very minimal.

Lack of mentorship relating to hierarchical power relations was extensively theorised in
Poole’s study of the Japanese professoriate (2010). The learner subjectivity that was required
was performed passivity and deference. Dr Fuji observed how these subject positionings
served to differentially authorise and legitimate speakers and silence difference.

Even if we have good opinions, good strategic opinions, we are not supposed to
say. ...they try to, I don't know, suffocate us... Sometimes, I feel maybe I should be
quiet because I'm starting to be scared because if I say something good without
knowing anything, someone says you shouldn't say that, or something like that... In
meetings, like faculty meetings, you know they are very, very careful in wordings. So,
when I saw those stuff I was scared to say anything right now. So, as a newcomer
probably I'd better be little bit observant, observer position.
Dr Nnamani also used strangulation metaphors to describe the frustration with the seemingly indecipherable bureaucracy and organisational cultures that many migrant academics felt and expressed in Japan:

*I can't survive this place, I can't even say anything to anybody ...even visiting professors. After two months, they start complaining...About the culture...So it's more like how do you get things done? How do you do this? How do you do that? ...The nature of the job at times chokes them, you know... something is strangling, what is it that I can't find it...I can't find it! It's always strangling me... I need air kind of thing, space.*

Dr Park described the friction that emerges when academics who have not been habituated to hierarchy encounter such overt power relations in Japan:

*Many Asian people, Asian academics, if they do not agree about some kind of issue they do not disagree about this issue. Because they respect the seniority, like that way. But, I think academics from Western countries, they really find it hard to accept this situation because that is not that rationale.*

These fear-laden narratives highlighted the elaborate affective labour that was involved in establishing a legitimate and respectful academic identity and also in functioning effectively and claiming authority in rigidly bureaucratised hierarchies. Exposure to difference is invariably constructed as positive in international policy discourses. Once again, the concept of cruel optimism could be invoked to illustrate how current injuries are a form of turn-taking, promising that the ‘suffocated’ junior staff member’s turn will eventually come to dominate and silence others on attaining seniority. Dr Nnamani reported that some migrant academics risked destabilising the power relations involved in being respectful guests by
complaining and eventually saying ‘no’ to the subordinated subjectivities that were demanded of them in dominant bureaucratic systems. The internationalised academic who had been exposed to different organisational cultures, was more likely to render the everyday hierarchical and brittle power relations strange, according to Professor Araki:

*Japan still has a hierarchy, less hierarchy compared to how it used to be, but still you know, in the UK... we call the first name...even though you have PhD, you are a student, you don’t feel so much difference perhaps...And the Japanese people who stayed long-time in the UK...they don’t like hierarchal culture...Japanese people are a bit too serious, I think...Really, they are tense, really highly tense.*

For some, the power relations were embedded in inter-generational tensions, as Dr Jameson suggested:

*I sort of feel like it’s a mantle that the current generation has inherited from the previous generation and the previous generation. They’ve sort of rested on their laurels and so there’s a lot of cronyism or academic in-breeding as far as I see it.*

Cronyism, sponsorship and support came to those who were anointed as the rightful successors to the ruling classes in the organisation. To be anointed, one had to perform for the evaluative audience (*omote*), while concealing one’s feelings (*oku*). This raises questions about whether certain social groups have to do more affective labour than others?

**Doing Gender Internationally**

Mobility interacts with gendered opportunity structures (Jons 2011; Lynch 2009; Matus and Talburt 2009). Internationalisation makes visible the embeddedness of the patriarchal
premium. The female migrant academic occupies a transgressive subjectivity – one that
contradicts the normative assumption that women should be located in the domestic
sphere, looking inwards, rather than outwards to the global community. In Japan’s higher
education, male international faculty are four times higher than that of the female
international faculty (Huang 2017). Leemann (2010) suggested that mobility is not viewed as
a social experience whose value is neutral, but as something that has value precisely
because it can be drawn into fields of asymmetrical gendered relations. She argued that
women academics are less geographically mobile than their male counterparts, and that
greater geographic immobility can put women at a disadvantage with regard to tenure. Yet
Sang et al. (2013) found that migrant women academics demonstrate exceptional flair for
success, and resource mobilisation towards achieving their career and personal goals.
Professor Ross commented on how identity capital and the gender premium contribute to
the reproduction of academic and social elites:

*I have to say that the social capital in Japan of being a non-Asian, non-Japanese male,
European-American, native English speaker as a one I certainly cannot discount ...They
certainly have given me much more social capital and political capital than a younger
and also my age probably then a younger Asian woman would have.*

Oishi’s (2012; 2013) studies reported that female respondents were deterred from working
in Japan because of the low status of women in the workplace. Professor Araki believed that
gendered research cultures in the STEM disciplines, and also in the wider socio-cultural
contexts, motivated Japanese women to work internationally:

*They like the position of woman much more in the UK...in Japan, being a woman
scientist is still tough, even in the UK or USA, it’s still tough, you know, but Japan is
still a bit behind, so being a scientist in Japan is a bit tough, perhaps.*
The under-representation of women among Japanese faculty is so severe that quota systems have been introduced in some universities. Dr Park described how she was appointed on that basis:

*They want female academics...Less than 20% of academics are female. ... quota policies are quite important to Asian countries, I think.*

Gender is a verb as well as a noun. The academy does gender and simply counting more women into male-dominated systems is not always a victory for gender equality (Morley and Crossouard 2016). Internationalisation can both materialise and challenge traditional gender practices and performances. Professor Hara, like Habu’s (2000) study of Japanese women students in the UK, observed that Japanese women had fewer socio-material restrictions of possibility when they worked or studied abroad:

*Japanese women develop when they are abroad, in Europe or in America...Maybe they feel free to say their own way, to research the way they want to research.*

*...I felt free to research, to... Also in my daily life.*

This view contrasted with Dr Lee’s experiences of migrating to Japan from the USA. Her affective labour included learning and performing new modes of self-governance and self minimisation in order to fit into a more restrictive female identity. She recalled how she was being acted on by norms that she did not chose:

*When I attend work parties where there are Japanese female colleagues or Japanese female students. They're the one who's always there busy pouring*
drinks or serving ... I’m always seated with the wives... The foreign women colleagues are more vocal about it and more dissatisfied with the situation per se here ... I’ve seen very dissatisfied female colleagues.

In order to comply with the tacit terms of internationalisation and being a good guest, it was inappropriate to express the injuries, exclusions and subordination of different gender regimes. To name and notice these practices as sexism becomes a failure of integration, marking oneself as different. As Ahmed (2010) elaborates, the migrant is the one who is deemed to have come after, and therefore is expected to integrate into the host culture, however uncomfortable it feels. To be the person who complains carries the risk of self-damage and being the one who invented a problem that did not previously exist. It also implies ingratitude.

Professor Yoshiro remarked on how women were often accountable to a wider family, and lacked the autonomous subjectivity for mobility:

> It’s not easy for females, as such, to move abroad... I did a survey to the postdocs trying to find the gender differences, for female researchers they, when they tried for find the next job, they consult with family members ... so the female researchers tend to consider a lot, but the male researchers, they don’t really consider that much, so probably that’s quite a difference, you know?

Dr Jameson’s observations evoked studies that reported how parenthood appears to be a barrier to geographic mobility of female academics in particular (Vohlídalová 2014).
If you are a Western academic, not necessarily by birth, but by training it probably helps a lot. ...Demographically, I think if you are single, or married with no kids, or if you were a couple... I think that would help....so I think kids make you more cautious, so that’s why I think being single or even just married with no kids would be good...I mean if you are... willing to put career first or at least high it’s probably helpful.

Whereas many of these accounts are constructed within the discourse of heteronormativity and the naturalness of women’s positioning in relation to their nuclear and extended families, two of our women participants were single, and this, they believed greatly enhanced their opportunities for mobility. Skeggs (2004, 48) argued that the (old) mobility paradigm could be linked to a ‘bourgeois masculine subjectivity’ that describes itself as ‘cosmopolitan’. Mobility, as a valuable resource, is not open to everyone and often overlooks the gendered, sexualised, and racialised constraints on freedom of movement (Morley et al. 2018). These gendered narratives re-centre the body in free-flow hegemonic policyscapes of academic mobility promoted by international organisations, states and universities. The embodiment of academic mobility and internationalisation draws attention to the necessity to harness policy to the gendered and embodied –not just the intellect-conditions that make flourishing ontological and epistemological changes possible at societal and individual levels.

**Concluding Comments**

Internationalisation is a polyvalent policy discourse, saturated in conceptual and ideological ambiguity. As a mix of commodification, exploitation and opportunity it is a container for multiple aspirations, anxieties, and affordances. It combines modernisation,
detraditionalisation, expansiveness, knowledge creation, global citizenship and
multiculturalism with knowledge capitalism, ethnocentrism, linguistic imperialism, and
gender and affective inequalities. Neoliberalism was rarely mentioned specifically in our
study, but Japan was constructed as a marketised and largely privatised system that fears
that it is getting left behind in the global knowledge arms race. This raises questions about
whether the driver is the market, rather than a commitment to international partnerships
and participation. What emerged from our study is that internationalisation policies,
processes and practices generate multiple affective engagements. Internationalising oneself
can be repressive and generative, with migrant academics finding themselves both
vulnerable and animated by their experiences. Mobility inaugurates a chain of injury,
pleasure, opportunity and expansiveness that disrupts the enlightenment policy discourse of
transnational mobility. The trespassing/ crossing of borders can promote the reorientation
of identities, belonging and social networks. However, the affective labour that migrant
academics have to do to present themselves as legitimate internationalised subjects in the
global knowledge economy is under-theorised and under-rated, often discounted as part of
policyscapes. Rapidly changing policyscapes, intellectual trends and contemporary socio-
spatial transformations are producing uncertain futures, and the situation of migrant
academics could be symbolic of what is happening within the neoliberalised and colonised
matrix of higher education system as a whole. When confronting and articulating the main
policyscape of internationalisation and academic mobility with the affective economy it
creates, its optimistic, happy, rational, disembodied, and modern linearity is disrupted and
complicated. Through the analysis of the migrant academics’ narratives affective lines of
opposition, rejection, vulnerability, fear, and feelings of marginalisation that configure the
subjective experiences of academic mobilities gain visibility. The affective economy of
academic mobility illustrates the cultural nuances, sensitivities and frictions that an instrumental internationalisation can produce, as well as other valuable subjectivities for a diverse epistemic world that can be marginalised and exposed. Finally, the experiences of these mobile academics, speak to the necessity to overcome policy narratives and economic imaginaries exploiting knowledge labour without acknowledging the embodied experiences of internationalisation; experiences that expose the gendered, racialised, epistemic and affective inequalities constituting academic mobility.

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