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Efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences
This paper focuses on welfare properties of equilibria in exchange economies with time-dependent preferences. We reintroduce the notion of time-consistent overall Pareto efficiency proposed by Herings and Rohde (2006) and show that, whenever all agents in the economy are sophisticated, any equilibrium allocation is efficient in this sense. Therefore, we present a version of the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem for this class of economies.
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- Published
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- Published version
Journal
Journal of Economic TheoryISSN
0022-0531Publisher
ElsevierExternal DOI
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Part AVolume
159Page range
311 - 325Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
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- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2018-09-11First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2018-09-10Usage metrics
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