A University of Sussex PhD thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details
Solidarity born of crisis:
The development of solidarity from the French Revolution until the present, with Émile Durkheim and Jürgen Habermas

Alexander John Elliott
PhD Social and Political Thought
University of Sussex
January 2018
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:..............................................
Summary of thesis

UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

ALEXANDER JOHN ELLIOTT

PHD SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

SOLIDARITY BORN OF CRISIS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLIDARITY FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION UNTIL THE PRESENT, WITH ÉMILE DURKHEIM AND JÜRGEN HABERMAS

The aim of the thesis is to chart the development of the term solidarity as it appears in the European social and political thought tradition. It traces the emergence of the term in its modern form from around the time of the French Revolution to the present. The thesis is divided into three parts, the historical background in France in the early nineteenth century; the consolidation, application and limiting of solidarity theory by Durkheim and its final exhaustion in Habermas’s political thought. A historical perspective is maintained throughout the thesis. However this is not a straightforward intellectual history of a concept. The historical analysis that is present, particularly in the first third of the thesis, is given to show the relationship of solidarity to crisis. Placing the theoretical debates of solidarity into a historical picture allows for a comparative and linked progression to become visible. This helps to demonstrate that solidarity discourse tends to react to social and political reality, in a way that is rarely appreciated in the literature. The central claim is that writing on solidarity cannot be made sense of unless it is historically situated. Solidarity is a chameleon concept changing to fit its environment, be that in theory or in practice. The refusal to be definitively defined is one of solidarity’s more enduring, interesting and significant characteristics. It is this discussion that adds to a growing but very much underdeveloped literature on solidarity. Finally, whilst some form of solidarity must be present for society to function, this thesis argues that there needs to be a serious rethink of the way that it is currently understood, beyond the archetypal writings of Durkheim and Habermas.
Contents

Acknowledgements 5

Introduction 6

Chapter 1: The contested origins of modern solidarity 20

Chapter 2: Durkheim and Solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon 51

Chapter 3: Durkheim: Solidarity and moral education 74

Chapter 4: Habermas and the struggle for universal solidarity: Historically contingent solidarity 89

Chapter 5: Habermas and Solidarity exhausted 110

Conclusion: Cosmopolitan solidarity and the future 129

Bibliography 150
Acknowledgements

Firstly I would like to thank my supervisors: Darrow Schecter, this is almost entirely your fault. You gave the talk at the undergraduate open day that convinced me to come to Sussex. You taught me Modernism in my third year which made me want to do an MA, and agreed to supervise my PhD. Without your encouragement and support I would probably have taken a very different path. Gordon Finlayson, for having the superpower to be able to explain even the most complicated philosophical idea, in a way that even I could understand. And for making sure that meals after research seminars were heavily subsidised and for helping to create and to hold together the SPT community that I came to rely upon. Vinita Damodaran (my unofficial supervisor), you backed me, when you did not know me and I was not even in your department. You put faith in my ability where few would have. I have an actual publication thanks to you! However, most importantly you taught me that academia is not an intellectual game.

I would also like to thank all my friends: Tim Carter, Alice Macnair, James Cullis, Anthony Booth, Mahon O’Brien, Jacob Berkson, Richard Weir, Dafydd Huw Rees, David Martínez Rojas, Arthur Willemse, Elliot Rose, Sian Edwards, Jessica Hammett, David Selway, Dimitri Kladiskakis, Christos Hadjioannou, Jana Elsen, Kris Lipscombe, Chris Davies, Charlotte Coates, Jon Cowan, Amranul Haque, Linda Fernandez, Dave Howard, Joe Hesketh, Larissa Rowe, and Harry Lewis. Also to my family Mum, Dad, Frances, Andy, Bar, Lizzie and Josh.

However, most importantly I would like to thank Victoria Moran for her tireless support emotionally and intellectually. This thesis would not have been possible without you. I would not be possible without you.
Introduction

Solidarity has been used to unite and to separate, to berate and to comfort. It is found in songs, paintings, legal statutes, philosophical essays and eponymous political movements. Solidarity can be called for, performed on the theatre stage and chanted through the streets. It can be worn in ribbons, pins, badges and armbands. It can be shown through walkouts, hunger strikes and hashtags. The history of solidarity is told in many different ways and through very different vocabularies. It could be told through workers’ movements across the globe with their intersectional relationships of immigration, race, gender, religion, culture and the natural/built environment. Their political and ethical realms become the arenas for fights for rights, that some, but not all will enjoy. These are movements that respond to the challenge of difference and similarity, of shared enemies and collective bargaining power. The history of worker and labour movements can be seen to be the energy, practice and limits of solidarity. They contain violent struggle, repressive reactions, and hard-won victories. They have been ideologically informed through intellectual theory and fought out with empty bellies. Physical bodies have been bound together and transcontinental allegiances have been forged. The history of workers’ solidarity is the history of capitalism, is the history of globalisation and contains within it perhaps the resources for liberation and equality in the future.

The history of solidarity could equally be told through the development of the nation and then the nation-state, including the big transformations from Westphalia, past the French guillotine of 1789 and on to the welfare state of post-WW2. It can help to explain what it means to be English, French or German; the patriotism created through symbolic attachment to myths and past deeds, 1066 and 1966; the strong feeling towards a flag or an anthem that celebrates past-glories and past-injuries. The possibility of the nation, of a state, the large scale cooperative moment of a mass of people who do not know each other and yet identify as one,

---


2 For immigration see: Fine, J. and Tichenor, J. (2009) ‘A Movement Wrestling: American Labor’s Enduring Struggle with Immigration, 1866-2007’, Studies in American Political Development, 23, pp. 84-113, which has the following thoughtful summary of solidarity, immigration and labour: “In truth, labor’s positions are often an amalgam of solidarity for some and restriction for others. As history has unfolded, there has been an expansion by fits and starts of whom labor believes it can and should include.” p. 112. For Race, one of the most insightful is Hooker, J. (2009) Race and the Politics of Solidarity, New York: Oxford University Press, especially for the way in which race challenges the ability of forming political solidarity historically. From a North American perspective in the main, though far from exclusively, it highlights real issues of how far race challenges multicultural versions of ‘political’ solidarity in contemporary democracies. Its critical strength lies with its conscious attempt to historicise race and solidarity. See also Gray, B. (2004) ‘Remembering a ‘multicultural’ future through a history of emigration: Towards a feminist politics of solidarity across difference’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 27, pp. 413-429, which offers a useful survey of the literature on empathy, difference and solidarity. It also convincingly demonstrates the need to be aware of the connections between immigration, multiculturalism, global contexts and feminist theories of solidarity, understood historically. These categories will be explored in more detail over the course of the thesis.
is only possible because of something like solidarity. The history of community or of the societies that they form, or the nations and states that hold them together, could be told through a history of solidarity.

The difficulty then with trying to write about solidarity is that there is no clear sense as to where it is located, what sort of thing it is, which methodology best captures its essence and which, if any, discipline can lay claim to it. Therefore, what will follow will not strictly adhere to any one prescribed notion or approach to solidarity. There will be discussions of the various attempts that have been made to give a coherent account of solidarity, however in the main, the historiography as it is, drawn from various different approaches, is meant as a way to explore the complexity of solidarity as a term and as a social, political and lived history. The emphasis will be on the ‘idea’ of solidarity as it comes to be used and understood by philosophers, sociologists and political theorists. The selection or non-selection of particular thinkers or schools of thought is not meant as a value judgement either way. The thinkers that have been chosen as case studies for this thesis are taken to be representatives or exemplars of the way in which solidarity interacts with historical events and social and political transformations over time. Although significant developments in understanding solidarity have emerged and have gained considerable attention in recent global scholarship, in the main, this thesis will be critically Eurocentric. The thinking behind this is to expose dominant ways of understanding solidarity, ones that have eclipsed other perhaps more radical proposals. The critique of the European tradition of solidarity scholarship reveals a potential new way to understand the history of Europe, in particular its self-understanding. Equally, by tracing the development of the idea of solidarity, from its birth around 1789 until the present gives a new perspective on how to understand the formation of nation-states, how welfare-states are possible, and to engage with perennial questions such as, what is a society? Can it be possible, and on what basis, to have an equal and fair society? And finally, how should Europe and the individuals that fall within it, interact with the rest of the globe? This final consideration becoming more pressing in the face of the current migrant and refugee crises.

The thesis follows a structure of 5 chapters that broadly build on each other. They are also chronological, illustrating the way that discussions of solidarity have developed. There are a number of key points that are returned to throughout the thesis, which are the main motivations behind the thesis as a whole. They are; firstly, that to understand solidarity requires knowing solidarity historically. Secondly, and reliant on the first, solidarity has a fixed meaning only insofar as it is understood in context. Thirdly, solidarity is connected almost without fail to crises, implicit in many different ways. Finally, the study of solidarity usage
enables a form of social and political critique that could open up new avenues of discursive analysis and political activism. The layout of the thesis will now be introduced with short summaries of the chapters provided. The introduction will then conclude with a discussion of methodology. This is important to understanding the thesis as a whole, for there is not one overall methodology adhered to throughout.

Chapter 1: The contested origins of modern solidarity

Even when solidarity has been taken to be the direct subject of study it has still been difficult to ascertain in a cogent and clear manner a basic working definition. This first chapter aims to illustrate why this the case, whilst also attempting to provide at least a general definitional structure. Solidarity has lacked an explicit historical dimension and this chapter in particular expands upon an area that is very much underappreciated in the literature. The other historical dimension that is underdeveloped is the enduring relationship between solidarity and crisis, an attempt to rectify this will also begin in this chapter.

Specifically, what will be discussed is the emergence of solidarity as a social and political concept. Up until the French Revolution, solidarity had a restricted, technical meaning, as it was drawn almost exclusivity from the Roman legal tradition. What is examined is how the concept morphs from the legal to the social and political arena. It is made clear that the original foundation in law does not disappear and continues to have real consequences for the parallel development of solidarity socially and politically.

The chapter is split into the following sections:

A background to the term solidarity,

French Social Romanticism and its context 1830-1848,

Charles Fourier: 1772-1837,

Pierre Leroux 1797-1871.

The rationale behind exploring the historical development of solidarity through these topics is given in full in the chapter. However, in essence it is undisputed (although under examined) that solidarity in its modern form arrives in France post-1789. Therefore, France is the setting for most of the discussion in this historical chapter. The time frame covered is from the fallout from the French Revolution until around the beginning of the twentieth century. This is not meant to be a simple intellectual history of a concept. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the tangled progression of solidarity in the nineteenth century, as much of the contestation around the term in later forms stems from these machinations.
The French Social Romantic movement is the focus of the second half of the chapter. After giving some background analysis to the movement in general, a close examination of two thinkers Fourier and Leroux is given. Through analysing and critiquing their positions on solidarity it is shown how solidarity was taken from its legal origins and moved into social and political thought. Additionally, through the discussion of these two thinkers, areas of solidarity scholarship are brought together with unexpected consequences. The question of identity politics with religious, ethnic and national forms of solidarity are shown to be interlinked. In particular the hesitant adoption of solidarity by some in the Jewish community is used to demonstrate both the importance of solidarity but also its ambiguous character.

The selection of topics chosen, it is hoped, goes some way to illustrating that the question as to what solidarity means is not simply an academic one, but is one that is materially palpable and strongly connected to lived experience. In terms of the structure of the thesis the chapter also functions as the foundation for the other chapters. The seeds of the ideas that Durkheim and Habermas develop, expand and mature, are found, to a large extent, in the clash of ideas presented in this chapter.

Chapter 2: Durkheim and Solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon

This second chapter builds in some ways on the first but has a narrower focus in terms of scope. Durkheim as the figure that propels solidarity into being taken seriously as an academic subject is fairly well assured. However, the influence that he has is currently taken for granted and is rarely explored and developed in-depth. Therefore, one of the motivations behind this chapter is to demonstrate that Durkheim’s theory of solidarity, whilst being a classic of sociology that has an important place in intellectual historical terms, is also capable of informing and adding to, current solidarity scholarship. Durkheim’s theory of solidarity is also very important to one of the main themes of the thesis as a whole, namely crisis. Durkheim places a great emphasis on the role of anomie, a concept that could be roughly equated with crisis. The argument can then be made that given Durkheim’s preeminent position, as one of the first and most influential scholars of solidarity, responsible for its introduction into academic discourse, that its anomie (crisis) link is significant to how solidarity is viewed from the start. This entanglement will be explored in the first of the two chapters on Durkheim.

The first chapter deals primarily with Durkheim’s theory of solidarity as articulated in his famous The Division of Labour in Society (1894). After introducing the main argument of that text, the chapter then moves on to focus on the role of law in relation to how Durkheim understood the individual. In general terms the idea of legislating solidarity is a complex and
controversial one, particularly currently in constitutional debates in Europe. Equally, the extent
to which an individual and their individuality is established by and as a form of solidarity is part
of the issues surrounding national and transnational identity. Therefore what constitutes a
society and what is means to be a moral agent within it is important. Lastly, the connection
between these two areas of solidarity and morality are explored. Durkheim, perhaps more
than is appreciated in the secondary literature, is concerned with how society acts in moral
terms. It is also not commonly recognised that for Durkheim solidarity is a moral phenomenon.
The relationship is shown not to be a straightforward one and the implications for
understanding solidarity in moral terms are likewise explored.

Chapter 3: Durkheim: Solidarity and moral education

The second chapter focuses on Durkheim’s educational writings. This is an area of Durkheim
scholarship that is rarely brought together with his writing on solidarity. This chapter aims to
show the benefits in doing so. Much of the current debate around solidarity does not approach
the question of education at all, in contrast this chapter argues that this is a mistake and
demonstrates its potential. Questions such as, can solidarity be taught? Or how might the
family bonds of solidarity conflict with the social obligations of a society’s or nation’s
solidarity? Equally as important, if solidarity is to be seen as containing the potential for radical
change, how can forms of solidarity be transformed by the actors and authors of those forms,
if not through education?

The focus in this chapter on moral education also highlights the practical everydayness of
solidarity in the classroom. The themes of liberty and authority are therefore examined initially
as competing or contradictory aspirations, which are shown within Durkheim’s own writing to
be consistent. However, when they are considered in broader terms it is finally argued that
Durkheim’s theory of transformation is inadequate, although highly instructive in its failure.

Taken together the two chapters broadly align, with the law and individuality mapping onto
authority and liberty. They conclude by arguing that Durkheim’s theory of solidarity was
inadequate, however its importance cannot be underestimated. His theory is historically
situated nevertheless, it also is shown to set the rules for how solidarity is discussed
thereafter. Finally Habermas, the subject of the next two chapters, is better understood given
an appreciation of Durkheim’s influence, with him effectively setting down the rules for what a
solidarity theory could consist of.

Chapter 4: Habermas and the struggle for universal solidarity: Historically contingent solidarity
Habermas represents for the purpose of the argument put forward in this thesis the final expression of a form of solidarity that can be traced back to the French Revolution. The progression of solidarity theory first presented in a fully articulate way by Durkheim, is taken by Habermas to its logical conclusion. Although it is strongly argued that Habermas is a thinker who has solidarity running through most of his most important contributions to social and political theory and practice, this is not reflected in the secondary literature. Therefore one of the tasks of these chapters is to demonstrate the crucial role that solidarity plays in Habermas’s thought, including for some of his most celebrated ideas. However, Habermas was chosen because of what he represents, as much as for what he specifically argues about solidarity. He is the link between the sociological account of solidarity of Durkheim and the cosmopolitan solidarity that is becoming popular today. He probably does not offer the best account of either of these positions but in terms of the broader impact that solidarity can make outside of what is a very narrow band of scholars he is the most influential. He is also used to illustrate that what solidarity means and how it’s used correlates to changes in real world social and political realities. The changes and newer versions of solidarity that Habermas proposes over several decades can be in part explained through the changing circumstances of world events. Habermas, it will finally be argued is the thinker that runs solidarity through to its final form, given the tradition that it is stemming from. The inadequacies in Habermas’s models of solidarity in his most recent writings in particular, show that this type of solidarity thinking has reached its end point. The trajectory from the machinations of the French revolution and the birth of the nation state through the setting of the contours and boundaries of what it could be to, finally, this tradition’s answer to the problems of global capitalism, is fundamentally and perhaps irrevocably flawed and exhausted.

Like for Durkheim, the two chapters build on each other. For the most part the chapters take a chronological examination of Habermas’s various different solidarity positions. Interestingly, what is revealed through doing this is an unexpected correlation between the trajectory of his writing on solidarity and the tense – past, present, future. The chapters therefore reflect progression through time as much as they do the evolution of Habermas’s writing. The first chapter Historically Contingent Solidarity focuses on the historical necessity of solidarity for Habermas, particularly in his early uses of the term. Therefore the chapter is split into two sections, the first History: the nation-state and Religious and Enlightenment Ideas indicates how important solidarity is for Habermas and justifies characterising him as a solidarity theorist. The section also explores how Habermas relates solidarity to historical transformation. This is performed through how he sees the development of the nation-state in
Europe and how it relies on notions of solidarity for it to do it. Equally the role of ideas working in parallel drawn from religion and the enlightenment are shown to be interlinked with his theory of solidarity. Finally, there are aspects of this critique that indicate a strong affinity to what is discussed in the Durkheim chapters.

The second section Socialisation and Personal History explores the importance of history to two interlinked Habermasian ideas. In some ways echoing the discussion in the Durkheim chapters, the social community is placed alongside what it means to be an individual. It is argued that for Habermas, it is a combination of history, both in the longue durée and in the lived life span coupled with the mechanism of solidarity that makes these two phenomena possible.

Chapter 5: Habermas and Solidarity exhausted

The second Habermas chapter Solidarity Exhausted picks up where the first ends and proceeds through three sections; Theory and Practice, The normative foundations for solidarity, and Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights. A key contention of solidarity writing in this tradition is where the difference lies between its theory and its practice. This is shown to be particularly apparent in Habermas. It is demonstrated how often Habermas’s pronouncements about solidarity are unclear as to whether they are meant as descriptive or prescriptive statements. This difficulty is explored further, but it is argued that it is symptomatic of solidarity writing more generally and as such is something that other solidarity theories would have to address.

The next section The Normative Foundations of Solidarity addresses one of the key concerns of solidarity theory, namely what gives it legitimacy. The normative foundations of Habermas’s more general project are brought together with his use of solidarity. This is important in philosophical terms as well as for social and political considerations. The discussion allows Habermas’s critique to be grounded philosophically but also to see how it relates to the important difference between ethics and morality. There is an attempt here to show that Habermas needs to be clearer as to which form of solidarity relates to ethics and which to morality. It is demonstrated that this confusion is a real one in Habermas’s work and that it has consequences for more general discussions about solidarity. Essentially, what is argued is at stake, is the location of the energy for the continuance of solidarity, both now and in the future.

The last section Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights looks at the relationship between civic solidarity and cosmopolitan solidarity across a range of his writing. The
orientation of the discussion is towards the future, but is firmly rooted in contemporary concerns. It asks whether a theory like Habermas’s sufficiently grasps what solidarity is, going forward and whether it has a contribution to make in helping us to understand the various social, political, economic and environmental crises which are currently taking place.

**Conclusion: Cosmopolitan solidarity and the future**

The thesis concludes with an analysis of more contemporary versions of solidarity discourse. In particular what will be examined is cosmopolitan solidarity. This will be linked back to the Durkheim and Habermas parts of the thesis. The emphasis will be on indicating ways in which crisis is imbued in the makeup of solidarity. Additionally, critiques of these more contemporary ideas will be provided, before a short look at the prospects of solidarity moving forward.

**Theoretical Approach**

The methodology that is utilised in the following thesis will now be discussed, with reference to some key thinkers and schools of thought that influenced the general approach. From the beginning this was never meant as a straightforward intellectual history of the term solidarity, however, it is also clear that the tradition has much to offer and should not be ignored. Equally, perhaps more than most, intellectual history is a discipline or approach that is hotly debated within its own field, with repeated attempts by its practitioners to define itself. What appears to be at stake for these writers also bears on how solidarity has been written about in this thesis. It will be shown that how solidarity is approached is as important as how it comes to be understood. Therefore, first, a discussion of the main approaches of intellectual history will now be provided. This will be followed by indicating the ways in which this thesis differs from their methods.

There are a few qualities, despite the heated nature of the debate that surrounds them, which epitomise an intellectual history methodology. There is a sense in which these words have a meaning that is only revealed through careful reconstruction of their time, place and intention of their author. In essence, it is about peeling away the layers of historical baggage that have been attached to the words to reach, as far as is possible, the original perspectives of the author(s) of those words. Crucially, it is the out-right rejection of any notion of a search for universal concepts that would be true at all times and in all places. Dateless wisdom has no relevance to the intellectual historian, except through how the ideal of dateless wisdom could be understood for the authors who produce it with such confidence. In particular, the first

---

chapter of this thesis grapples with examples of solidarity discourse that were reactions to specific historical circumstances and written for specific audiences. Therefore, more than is necessary with the latter chapters, which deal primarily with two writers, contextualisation is important to understanding the origins of solidarity discourse.

It would be impossible to write anything about intellectual history without reference to Quentin Skinner, perhaps the most well-known of its proponents. Skinner’s main argument concerns the importance of context and the subjective quality of conceptual understanding. Words for Skinner expressed ideas whose meaning could not be simply gleaned through close study of the text alone. Words alter in meaning through, what Skinner understands to be, their ideological setting. The text itself cannot reveal what the intention of the author was any more than it can say what the contemporary audience would have understood, felt and realised about a given text. This is Skinner’s most important point, ideas do not remain constant over time. This was the mistake that was made by the earlier writers of the history of ideas. They believed that an idea could be identified in a listed fashion; that a particular idea could be traced across time and under different sets of circumstances. Skinner, and on this he is far from alone, argues that ideas, once set out in the form of words have a specificity of meaning that would be different (even in a general sense) to how they are perceived at different times and places. 4

The aim is therefore to ascertain the following four complementary areas, as suggested latterly by Richard Whatmore. The first is to try as far as possible to ascertain the intentions of the author of the text. Naturally this can prove difficult and can be seen as one of the key challenges to an intellectual historical approach in keeping with the Skinner school. One way to build up a better picture of an author’s intentions is through the second of Whatmore’s suggestions: to look at the texts that the author refers to. This can obviously help in placing the text, and author with it, into an intellectual lineage. It helps to make some of their ideas more understandable and can aid in the search for clues as to what the author was interested in. Importantly, this is not about criticising when an author has perhaps misunderstood another author or has failed to handle the work of others with due care. It is instead about identifying, analysing and revealing why it might be the case that they read a particular author in a particular way, or how they see themselves as differentiating or advancing similar ideas. Third,

---

4 A number of Intellectual Historians decided to attempt to define and to in some way defend the discipline in the following: Collini, S. et al. (1985) ‘What is Intellectual History?’, History Today, 35:10, pp. 46-49. An earlier attempt to do a similar thing can be found in the following: Dunn, J. (1968) ‘The Identity of the History of Ideas’, Philosophy, 43, pp. 85-104.
and this has been touched on already, the practical context. It appears facile to argue that the authors of texts are influenced by practical context, but it is something that is often overlooked or relegated to the banal. A case in point is the writing on solidarity. Much of the early social and political writing on solidarity only makes sense as a response to its context. This is discussed in the first chapter, but is also true of the more theoretical discussions of the later chapters. Essentially, I would argue that each new context requires its own version of solidarity, but for solidarity to be understood it equally requires acknowledgement of its previous manifestations. This leads onto the last of the fundamental rules for this type of intellectual history; why did this text or idea take hold at the time, or why did it not? Why were particular ideas picked back up later? Why do some texts or authors go in and out of fashion? And what is it about the context of their popularity or obscurity that can help to explain that? It is this final approach that I find most compelling and one that I have attempted to use throughout the thesis. I simply do not think that it is a coincidence that the last ten years has seen a dramatic return of solidarity usage, given the financial, social and political crises that have been occurring. The other high points in the use of solidarity do not occur by accident and although this is not addressed in the thesis in general, it should be no surprise that solidarity scholarship wanes in some contexts and not in others.

The final claim that intellectual history sometimes attempts to make is far more controversial. Skinner, although he sometimes appears to waiver slightly on this point, argues forcefully that his “method of linguistic contextualism” in the end, produces higher quality philosophy.\footnote{This is discussed well in: Whatmore, R. (2015) \textit{What Is Intellectual History?}, ProQuest Ebook Central: Polity Press, p.50.} Whether or not he is right on this point is very hard to say, however, the slippage between historical investigation and philosophical exploration is something that is consciously played with in the following thesis. That is not to say that Skinner is right, but more to concede that neither position on either side can be fully sustainable, particularly if (as I wish it to be) it is also going to be a social and political discussion. I will now move on to explain how my methodology differs from that of intellectual history. It will also allow me to demonstrate in slightly more depth the importance that I place on the idea of crisis and its relationship to solidarity.

Moving away from a theoretical approach consciously drawing upon the tradition of intellectual history, there are two contemporary thinkers which have a methodology closer to
the one employed in the following thesis, Axel Honneth and Hauke Brunkhorst. Honneth begins his study of socialism around 150 years ago and moves forward to the present. He argues that by re-examining, among other things, Utopian socialists and the early Marx these ideas can have relevance today. The basic idea is that industrialisation was responded to by socialism in a particular way, which is no longer applicable in contemporary post-industrial societies. Keeping in mind that Honneth’s ultimate aim is the realisation of freedom through solidarity, there is a need to have a different form of economic practice. The key to reaching this goal is to create a society where free communication occurs between equals, which would require the social sphere to be redefined. The argument powerfully made by Honneth is that the resources for understanding and realising this can be gleaned from a socialist tradition that has lost its contemporary appeal. This is clearly a methodology that draws upon historical ideas, takes their historical setting seriously, but nonetheless sees that they can be reimagined to furnish contemporary discussions. Whilst Honneth’s account was very useful, where the methodology differs is in the choice of where to locate solidarity ideas that are worth re-examining. Importantly, I see that Durkheim, as well as the previous forms of socialism identified by Honneth and myself, as worthy of rehabilitation.

Equally Brunkhorst, in his book on solidarity that attempts to give both a theoretical and historical account of democratic solidarity, has influenced the theoretical approach of the thesis. In particular, the way that solidarity as an idea changes and mutates given different historical circumstances. His broad investigation, moves from Greco-Roman roots of civic friendship, through the Judeo-Christian notion of brotherhood, onto modernisation and finally the contemporary globalised world. His argument is essentially that Western societies, through the machinations of modernisation, are forced to alter what solidarity means, moving it from hierarchically defined to more of a democratic version. Brunkhorst’s account ends with a discussion around solidarity’s possible role given the changes brought about through economic globalisation. His argument is both normative and sociological in its search for a democratic model capable of alleviating the conflicts that are so endemic in the contemporary world. Here, in a similar way to Honneth, the methodology is relying on a historical foundation, whilst also looking to argue for a different form of social critique interlinked with contemporary discourse. The use of periodisation and the complicated nature of the relationship between normative and sociological accounts is a theme that runs throughout the following thesis.

---

Finally, for the methodological ideas that influenced my approach, a second work by Brunkhorst will be summarised, before giving more concisely the method used for the thesis. In 2014, he published an influential critique of critical theory. Brunkhorst argues that critical theory should come to mean the theory of crisis. Building on the Frankfurt School, he argues that modern society is fundamentally imbued with crisis. This crisis is mediated between collective learning and social class conflict. This process produces results that become solidified in both public and constitutional law. The importance of law and the legal sphere is something that is addressed in both the Durkheim and Habermas chapters.

Returning to Brunkhorst, as in his earlier work directly on solidarity, argues that a straightforward Marxist approach that sees the economy as the root of class antagonism as no longer applicable (if it ever was). Rather, for modern society, it is the crisis of legitimisation, which causes the antagonism. Again, like in the solidarity volume, Brunkhorst uses a historical scope to demonstrate his argument. This time he focuses much more on the legal revolutionary or evolutionary results of the legitimisation crises. His analysis rests on identifying these crises within social systems, particularly with regards to power and social inequalities. Brunkhorst’s approach and argument that crisis should be given a much more prominent position, at least within critical theory is something that this thesis is fully in agreement with. However, the evolution or close analysis of the law whilst touched upon in the thesis it is not a central concern. Equally, the thesis does not restrict itself to a critical theory lens.

One of the arguments that I wish to make throughout the thesis is that crisis and solidarity can be linked in various ways. It would be simplest, but perhaps misleading, to cite the multiple historical instances where solidarity discourse and ideology have blossomed in close proximity to various forms of crisis. However, that would not be to demonstrate a clear, convincing or helpful relationship. Nor is the claim that one will also lead to other or that where one is found so will the other be. For instance a social crisis as the one that will be partly described in the section on France, particularly in the 1840s, cannot be said to lead naturally to a need for something like solidarity to be articulated as a response. However, what is instead interesting is that the rhetoric around solidarity, the framing of its position and the way that it was weaponised by those who transformed its meaning, were consciously responding to a crisis that they identified in their contemporary reality. Theirs, of course is not the only response, but theirs has received far less attention by later historians or theorists of solidarity. That in itself is not a good enough justification, although not without its merit. What is justified is that

---

there will be shown to be a new way to approach social and political crisis through the apparatus and lens of solidarity discourse. It can reveal a response to a crisis that can be macro and micro, which can be personal and intersubjective, objective, cold and distant; that can, when set against its specificity of context divulge answers that could help guide contemporary forms of crisis analysis.

Crisis itself can come in many different forms and many of those will not have a bearing on forms of solidarity. However, throughout the thesis various forms of crisis are alluded to that operate on multiple levels. Solidarity as it is originally conceived in legal terms, is a mechanism for the recovery of financial loss. This is still part of legal statutes today in, for example, France and Spain (and England, although it operates slightly differently) in much the same way as it was understood when included in Napoleon’s Civil Code. It is understood in this context as an obligation to pay mutual debts either through being a member of a family or a company/business. On the level of mutual liability, crisis could be awaiting those who cannot or are not willing to pay their legally enforced debts. This could be a crisis on the level of the individual, one brought about through the mechanism of solidarity itself, a mechanism that was specifically designed to alleviate the chances of financial crisis. In this instance solidarity can be felt either as a burden or as enabling freedom through decreasing risk (all are responsible for a debt not just the individual, unless everyone else dies or absconds). To take this to a more general level, but still with financial debt in mind, it appears that something at least slightly akin is occurring with a national debt. Thus, when there is a financial crash that leads to a financial crisis, this previous illustration of solidarity could be useful. That solidarity from its inception is tied to financial matters, sounds to modern ears at least, surprising and is something that is looked at in more detail in the rest of the thesis.

That solidarity operates on different levels and within different spheres is also something that is examined in the thesis. This is also something true of crisis. The interplay between the two is taken in the thesis as an opportunity to re-evaluate some of the previously held positions both in terms of theory based analysis of solidarity but also as it relates to historical narratives around crisis. Finally, as has been stressed already, the following thesis is not meant to be a straightforward intellectual history of the concept of solidarity. This is particularly true when the discussion moves onto the two main thinkers that are examined. The goal is to situate

---

8 The following presents arguments connecting the role of crisis stemming from an understanding of the Enlightenment. The breadth of the book indicates in a way that remains convincing that, the political elite have become divorced or set into separate spheres and that this has led to crisis and will continue to do so: Koselleck, R. (1959) 2000) Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Cambridge: MIT Press.

9 The first chapter addresses this in more detail.
their ideas and arguments in their context and to allow their focus to be reflected through their own experiences. However, Durkheim and Habermas’s writings on solidarity and the links that they make to crisis are also analysed in and for themselves. What this means in terms of approach is that their ideas are not only rooted in their context, they are in addition treated as resources for building a theory of solidarity that can help in the present and moving forward. It is clear that we are currently living through an immense crisis that cuts across social, political, economic, moral and religious experience. It can also be seen that one of the ways that a growing number of scholars have sought to make sense of this, and in a way mitigate these various forms of crisis, is to begin to attempt to write a new account or form of solidarity. This response reflects a spreading of the concept in popular forms of expression. The conclusion to this thesis will argue for the relevance of these older historical forms of solidarity and the debates that surrounded their creation, whilst placing them alongside the contemporary and emerging solidarity scholarship of the last few years.

In conclusion, the aim of what follows is to indicate the complicated nature of solidarity and in so doing to attest to the need for it to be taken far more seriously. The importance of the term is argued for through a close engagement with its historical importance to social and political thought. The debt that solidarity has silently accumulated through being relied upon but left under-explained, has started to be paid in the last few years. This thesis hopes to add to the growing literature in what is an area that has tremendous untapped potential.
Chapter 1: The contested origins of modern solidarity

The purpose of this chapter is to set out clearly the roots of the modern forms of solidarity that will be discussed later in the thesis. It will be argued that the early history of the social and political creation of solidarity post-French revolution was born out of crisis and conflict. Equally, it will be shown that current issues with solidarity scholarship today have their roots in the paradoxes produced through evocations of solidarity in the different intellectual traditions of this period. The content that will be covered will be firstly to outline the background to the arrival of solidarity into popular expression and to make note of the terms pre-social and political meaning. This will both enable an argument to begin to develop around the chameleon character of solidarity and how it adapts to the different contexts that it finds itself in. Equally, as important is that this background will not just be an intellectual lineage of the term, it will also argue that the time just preceding solidarity’s popularisation was a time of social, economic, political and religious crisis. What will then follow will build on these two strands through paying close attention to two early protagonists of solidarity discourse, Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and Pierre Leroux (1797-1871). Both writers, broadly construed, are commonly understood to be a part of the movement known as French Social Romanticism. Therefore, a brief introduction to the movement will also be given that sets out why perhaps at this point in French history there was a need for such a movement and to illustrate in more general terms what the aims of the movement were. This will allow the later more detailed discussion of Fourier and Leroux to be framed within their historical reality. Finally, building on specifically the underappreciated influence of Leroux’s work there will be a discussion of Jewish solidarity in this period. This chapter as a whole serves the function of introducing not just the tangled history of the term solidarity, but also some of difficulties that it contains. The argument that will be made is that the issues that both Durkheim and later Habermas have with their own writings on solidarity have their seeds in this period. The choice to discuss Jewish uses and understanding of solidarity in this period highlights a number of difficulties that remain present in the later writings of Durkheim and Habermas, both of whom have a preoccupation with religion. Equally, they can both be seen to be still operating within the same tradition when it comes to ideas around humanity, universalism, nationalism, and charges of Eurocentrism. It is this final point that will be taken up again in the conclusion of the thesis, arguing that this specific tradition of solidarity, whilst hugely rich, critically sophisticated, and powerfully politically seductive, has not been able to rid itself of its problematic birth.
A background to the term solidarity

Most scholars who have taken the time to look into the origins of solidarity agree that it is a Roman legal term. The context for solidarity’s development from its legal meaning to a social and political one occurs in France in the first half of the 19th century. It will be shown that in this French setting, the term solidarity becomes politically volatile and socially important at a time of great change in the dynamics of French society. Solidarity, as it appears in France between 1830 and 1850 is the fore-runner for much of its later philosophical and socio-political manifestations. However, it is worth noting, in the words of the historian Steinar Stjernø that:

Historically speaking, the phenomenon of solidarity existed before the idea was formulated. The idea existed before the term became widespread, and the term was in general use before its modern meaning developed.\(^\text{10}\)

However, this is disputed even by those who do point to a longer history, such as Hayward who would not go so far as to claim that it is a ‘given’ in society. This may be because he is not as concerned with ontological philosophical questions as he is primarily an intellectual historian. However the origin of the term, scholars appear to be unanimous about, arrives through and is instigated by Roman law. Hayward, in his influential essay of 1959 states that solidarity’s origin as a legal term is evidenced by the ‘Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française’ of 1694 and Diderot’s 1765 ‘Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers’. In both texts solidarity has the meaning contained in the indivisibility of “collective debt”.\(^\text{11}\) More recently Bayertz (albeit drawing on different sources) also makes this non-contentious claim about solidarity, arguing that its genesis in Roman law can be recognised as stemming from the phrase obligation in solidum.\(^\text{12}\) These two examples show that solidarity is linked to paying debts, either as group liability, members’ liability to the group, or the group’s liability to its members. This is a point echoed by Metz, who to add to Hayward’s explanation, goes on to suggest that the inclusion of solidarity in the Civil Code of 1804 is an example of solidarity largely retaining its Roman meaning, therefore establishing a form of solidarity usage that extends back much further than is usually appreciated.\(^\text{13}\) The substantiation and formalised continuity between the Roman law tradition and Napoleon’s Civil Code (Code civil

---


des Français) is telling of the parallel retention of meaning between the two instances. Hayward offers this succinct definition of how solidarity was understood in the Civil Code and argues how similar the two meanings of solidarity remained:

The principle of solidarity between creditors and between debtors is traced by the jurists to the co-proprietorial obligations of mutual assistance and collective responsibility within the Roman extended family or “Gens,” each member of which was held responsible for the payment of the whole of the debt contracted by any member, and had the right to receive payment of debts owed to the collectivity. 14

The continuity between the Roman legal meaning of solidarity and its juridical meaning in the Civil Code appears certain. 15 However, the construction, under Napoleon of this codified legal system sought to occlude and minimise the collective quality of solidarity. Hayward understands this as stemming from the authors’ (heavily guided by the prominent jurist Pothier) ideological motivations. 16 According to Hayward, the Civil Code was created through the informed beliefs of the authors, that individualism was paramount and with that individual responsibility. The effect this had on the Civil Code in general and the solidarity clause specifically, was that it led to a favouring of liberty over equality, and consequently the creation of further inequality between worker and employer. 17 Effectively solidarity came to be seen negatively as a constraint on individual liberty through enforced social bonds.

It is additionally true that the Revolution had one important effect on the jurisprudence of solidarity, in that under the Old Regime if you were a member of a corporate body as legally recognised under the system of privileges then you were “treated as a single entity by the law.” In practice this meant that as a member you were held in solidarity or “collective responsibility for each others’ debts or wrongdoings.” It was this clause that was abolished

---

15 It appears certain for solidarity writers, however for legal historians it is less clear. See: Descheemaeker, E. (2009) The Division of Wrongs, New York: Oxford University Press. Although it does not deal directly with solidarity, it argues persuasively that Roman Law, in general, was interpreted by 19th century legal scholars in ways that would not necessarily have been recognised by their Roman counterparts.
16 Again, conventional wisdom readily cites Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) as being the basis for the Civil Code and whilst this is undoubtedly partly true, Descheemaeker (see footnote 15, pp. 107-138) shows that he was not always taken as an authority and on important questions such as obligations (taken from his most significant work, Traité des obligations 1761), some of his ideas were reinterpreted. It could then be the case that solidarity (solidum) was likewise interpreted and reinterpreted, in keeping with contemporary understandings of what the original author intentions were. Useful background on the historical origins of legal understandings of obligation (where solidum is commonly understood to be found), from Roman through medieval times across Europe can be found in Ibbetson, D. (1999) A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Chippenham: Oxford University Press. See also: Zimmermann, R. (1996) The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Chippenham: Oxford University Press, which gives a really thorough and revealing history of obligations and liabilities. It is also one of the only legal histories that directly references solidarity, in this context in its relation to ‘Suretyship’, albeit not in any great detail.
along with the system of privileges after the Revolution. The meaning was retained more clearly in personal or familial relations, through for example marriage. Importantly and something that will be discussed at the close of this chapter, the Jews were understood to be a legal corporation under the Old Regime, however, unlike artisans’ corporations, this remained the case after the Revolution. This continuation of corporate solidarity for only Jews has consequences for the Jewish population in France, and it also has implications for thinking about solidarity more generally, in particular with regard to identity, integration and difference.\footnote{Leff, L. M. (2002) ‘Jewish Solidarity in Nineteenth-Century France: The Evolution of a Concept’, \textit{The Journal of Modern History}, 74:1, p.43.}

In general there was a favouring of legislation that supported individual freedom above social equality; something that can be better understood when considered through the perception and treatment of those living in poverty.\footnote{For a perspective outside of France, see the following for a remarkably well-researched take on the responses to poverty, the changing legal system and expectations of responsibility and assistance in England: Lees, H. L. (2008) \textit{The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People, 1700-1948}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.} It was not the government’s role at this time to interfere in matters concerned with the provision for the poor. Instead this role was the domain of the Church, specifically the Catholic Church, through its institution of charity. Church charity had long been embedded in French society and would have been widely recognised as the primary designator of aid to the poor. Charity, in the context in which the Civil Code was written, had developed a formal meaning with a codified form of its own. The act of giving was taken from the individual and placed in the hands of the Church. Metz summarises how charity was viewed at this time in France as follows:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

The example of Church charity is important in two ways, firstly it was seen to be capable and right that the Church was responsible for those in poverty as opposed to the government and secondly, that the construction of Church Charity meant giving over personal responsibility to the institutionalised charity of the Church. It is significant to note that the laws created reflected a view that the government was not directly responsible, morally or practically, for the poor. The sphere of poor relief was governed largely through the Church. The governing and control of the organ of charity that the Church performed then led to a lessening of the
religiously motivated duty to aid those in need. The duty remained, although it became non-
direct and impersonal. The act of giving loses its immediacy in this context and becomes
calculated rationality.\textsuperscript{21}

Equally, charitable giving, understood in rational terms, is discussed in detail by Marco
Leevwen. He argues that “[t]he poor were not entirely without power, however: the problem
of the poor was their poverty; the problem of the rich was the poor.”\textsuperscript{22} The point more
generally that he wants to make is that in the course of many centuries in Europe, a system of
rights with accompanying duties had arisen through this dichotomy between rich and poor. It
is generally assumed in the literature that the poor were aware of their right to relief and that
the rich likewise knew they had a duty to give it. The final point that Leevwen makes is that the
system of relief was only maintained because it was in the interests of both parties. This it
could be said is a form of solidarity, where one side has an obligation to pay their debts, i.e.
the rich maintain being rich because they exploit the poor, therefore when the poor need
some relief in hard times they must repay this debt. This is just a summation that would be
difficult to prove. What is clear is that this system falls apart in France in the wake of the
French Revolution, which coupled with the increasing need for charity at a time when it is least
equipped to help, clearly creates fertile ground for a new model of social obligation and duty.

However, Metz argues that the phasing out of ‘peasant society’ and the corresponding vast
increase in beggary, brought about by the increase in casual labourers and coupled with
population growth (among other factors), meant that Church directed charity simply became
insufficiently capable of supporting the poor.\textsuperscript{23} Coupled with the unwillingness of the State to
interfere and the incapability of Church charity to cope with the rise of poverty in France, for
him did not lead to a social, moral and political theory such as solidarity, but to the rise of
philanthropy.

Philanthropy can be seen to be both a reaction to the state’s failure to act and the Church’s
inability to do so. There is however an additional possible reason, initiated by the spread of
Enlightenment ideas. Metz understands the rise of philanthropy as both bridging the gap left
open by the two previous institutions, as well as specifically challenging the Church’s curtailing

\textsuperscript{21} See: Bavel, V. B. and Rijpma, A. (2016) ‘How important were formalized charity and social spending before the
rise of the welfare state? A long-run analysis of selected western European cases 1400-1850’, \textit{Economic History}
\textsuperscript{22} Leevwen, M. H. D. (1994) ‘Logic of Charity: Poor Relief in Preindustrial Europe’, \textit{The Journal of Interdisciplinary}
Publishers, p.192. For a very good overview, see: Forrest, A. (1981) \textit{The French Revolution and the Poor}, New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
of individual responsibility, both in the way that its giving of poverty relief and its removal of the receivers’ ability to help themselves, he writes:

Philanthropy reacted to this as an active form of benevolence created within the critical, anti-clerical spirit of the Enlightenment. The human being itself became the normative basis, became the sole meaning of aid.24

The shift from charity to philanthropy as articulated by Metz is set against broader transformations that were occurring across France, up to the French Revolution, particularly in regard to economic migrations from the countryside to the cities. The questioning of the institution of the church and the prevalence and increasing acceptance of some of the ideas of the Enlightenment can be understood and demonstrated by the changing understanding of the role of the individual within French society. It was also perhaps at this stage that an initial critical edge was given to the problem of poverty. Ideas began to circulate that challenged the assumptions of poverty; most importantly that the poor should be given the means to get themselves out of poverty, rather than being the mute receivers of aid.25 These ideas will be discussed in the next section, with reference to the Romantic Socialist movement. There is also a need to remain cautious about these ideas as they cannot be said to be widely held. Importantly, although some of the ideas of the Romantic Socialists did influence certain individual philanthropists, the two phenomena rarely informed each other and when analysed closely were largely in an antithetical relationship.

Philanthropy emerged as a hierarchical phenomenon which was incapable of striving for equality but nonetheless revealed, through its insistence on self-help, the very clear inequalities that did exist within French society. It is under these intellectual developments that during and after the French Revolution the traditional view of poverty and how to care for the poor began to be transformed into a call for aid to become a human and civil right.26

Nevertheless, Metz does not fully detail his causal chain (although I think that he is right) and some further explanation is needed. Hayward argues that the eighteenth century saw the concrete dominance of personal liberty and the juridical protection of individual rights through the legal justice system.27 The idea of a defensive state that had as its duty the role of protecting certain individual rights was made realisable in legal terms by the Civil Code. The

role of a legal right becomes, during and after the French Revolution, exposed or at least critically examined by liberty’s uncomfortable partner, equality. Economic justice became in some sense synonymous with social rights; this movement or oscillation between individual liberty protection and social equality rights marks for both Metz and Hayward the creation of the fertile ground that was needed for solidarity to enter.

There has recently been an argument put forward by Katherine Lynch that relates to changes in social provision, during and after the Revolution. So whilst the Civil Code and a general propensity for ways of tackling social questions such as poverty were circulating, this should be understood against a background of what was actually being provided. Lynch builds her argument through a novel conception of what counts as the ‘public’. For her the public is:

[L]iterally... civil society as a realm where individuals, both men and women, left a purely domestic or family sphere and entered into sustained, face-to-face relations with others who were not necessarily related by blood or marriage. It was the sphere in which programs for the relief of the poor and organizations for mutual assistance were formed.\footnote{Lynch, K. A. (2010) ‘Social Provisions and the Life of Civil Society in Europe: Rethinking Public and Private’, 
*Journal of Urban History*, 36:3, p.287.}

In the centuries leading up to the Revolution in France, this direct form of sociability, informed through the ethical codes of medieval Christianity, created a series of entitlements for the poor.\footnote{This is an area that is well covered in the English context and much of the methodological and conceptual discussions have relevance to the more general concerns here. Namely, what can be asked of a friend and what exactly was a friend in this period? To what extent does the poor demand that entitlements are delivered and what was expected by recipients, practically and morally? In particular how the negotiation of face-to-face interactions actually placed obligations on members of communities that could be labelled a form of solidarity, see: King, S. A. and Jones, P. (2016) ‘Testifying for the Poor: Epistolary Advocates and the Negotiation of Parochial Relief in England, 1800-1834’, *Journal of Social History*, 49:4, pp.784-807; Snell, K. (2012) ‘Belonging and Community: Understandings of ‘Home’ and ‘Friends’ among the English poor, 1750-1850’, *Economic History Review*, 65:1, pp.1-25. Another question that bears on solidarity is what counts as belonging. King makes the convincing argument that belonging in this period was multi-layered, could be brittle, was legally determined at times, but not consistently and could be revoked through moral digressions, see: King, S. (2008) ‘Friendship, kinship and Belonging in the letters of Urban Paupers, 1800-1840’, *Historical Social Research*, 33, pp.249-277.}

The responsibility for administering these entitlements in practice was organised on the local level of village and town. However, after the Revolution the National Constituent Assembly’s ‘Committee on Mendicity’ (1790) was set up to replace these seemingly ad-hoc arrangements. The major change that was brought in with the Committee was that responsibility for the administration of poor relief was now the nation, not village, town or city.\footnote{The Committee on Mendicity had to reckon “what ecclesiastical charity should be if the tithe (dîme) were faithfully paid, and if all of it were spent on helping the poor and sick.” The amount that they calculated came to 10 million livres, 0.17 % of GDP, of which some was used by the church for non-poor relief purposes. The aim had been a modest (by the standards of day) 51.5 million livres, 0.87 % of GDP, see; Lindert, P. H. (1998) ‘Poor relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780-1880’, *European Review of Economic History*, 2:2, p.107.} So whilst some philanthropic or charitable organisations such as the Society for Maternal Charity, did manage to limp on for a few years, ultimately argues Lynch, these were...
either voluntarily disbanded or forcibly so. This is interpreted as the Jacobin leadership’s fear of ‘private’ organisations that were seen as a threat to their “monopoly of authority in furnishing assistance”. This was important as aid at this time was tied to citizens who were seen to be deserving, such as soldiers, but also “unwed mothers (whose reputation they rehabilitated).” This system ultimately failed and in part explains why the early nineteenth century in particular was uncommonly catastrophic for the poor of France.\textsuperscript{31} In part it was this crisis for the poor that precipitated the later solidarity discussions that will be examined in this chapter.

It is likewise common to assume that fraternity was part of the answer to this crisis as a fore-runner of social solidarity in France. Undoubtedly there is a strong connection, however the trajectories are not always parallel, or to be taken without important considerations. Fraternity, as Munoz-Dardé states, has a somewhat metaphorical meaning. Like solidarity its roots protrude further than its invocation and widespread political usage. It stems from religious language as well as “the professional associations of the Ancien Régime”.\textsuperscript{32} Therefore, a link is established between fraternity and that of corporate interests, particularly through the aforementioned phenomenon of philanthropy.

Associations or corporations of workers in some sense can be seen to operate with a degree of fraternal structure. Sewell argues that it was more likely that workers groups who had philanthropic orientation, would likewise contain stronger affiliation with the idea of fraternity or brotherhood. The corporate associations which Sewell cites as being most in keeping with this view are the ‘Fraternal Union of Workers in the Art of Carpentry’ established a little after 1789 and the later ‘Society of Fraternal and Philanthropic Union’ prominent in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{33} These organisations (for Sewell) are evidence that fraternity and philanthropy in combination were present between the French Revolution and at least the end of the 1830s. Indeed Sewell and Munoz-Dardé both make evident that fraternity was part of traditional corporate vocabulary. Sewell however, perhaps slightly underplays the role that fraternity had in political terms as a member of the revolutionary motto ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.’ Stjernø instead understands fraternity as having a more politically active role, arguing that it became a placeholder or signifier for “a feeling of political community and the wish to emphasise what

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
was held in common”. It is possible that both Sewell and Stjernø are right in their characterisation of the term. The connection between philanthropy and fraternity does appear to be strong and would indicate that a worker’s understanding of the term would be informed by their relationship with workers of the same trade. Likewise it is undeniable that fraternity has just as strong a claim to the more universalising political manifestation that was engendered at the time of the French Revolution. The retraction of the meaning of fraternity from the universal during the French Revolution, a meaning that ignored the differences in occupation and financial means, to the specificity of the fraternity of the corporate associates is perhaps one reason why solidarity comes to occupy the territory previously held by fraternity.

It is therefore this political streak, as contained within fraternity and its subsequent dilution by way of philanthropy, which has led many commentators (Stjernø, Gide, Rist, Munoz-Dardé) to argue that solidarity grows out of a need left by the transformation of fraternity. The two terms share many characteristics, perhaps most obviously in their similar allegorical function. Just as fraternity can be seen as a metaphor for the organisations of workers (or the later philanthropic version), solidarity also has a metaphorical power. Solidarity understood as metaphor is something which Gide and Rist argue for in their explanation for solidarity’s replacement of fraternity. Crucially, and in reference to the previous discussion, they also see solidarity replacing or at least challenging the institution of Church charity. This is how they describe this process of displacing fraternity and charity. The date that they cite is also significant:

The new word [solidarity] performed one final service by usurping the functions of the term ‘charity,’ which no one was anxious to retain because of its religious connexion. The other term, ‘fraternity,’ which had done duty since the Revolution of 1848, was somewhat antiquated by this time, and charged with a false kind of sentimentalism.35

The claim here that fraternity had become maudlin, romantic and old-fashioned could be true; however Gide and Rist are mistaken when they assert that solidarity only came to replace the intellectual space of fraternity after 1848 and the implication that fraternity had only been popular since 1848. Munoz-Dardé points out that although fraternity was only officially adopted as part of the republican motto in 1848 it had been in widespread unofficial use since 1789. Solidarity likewise had been used in political contexts since the late 18th century and was

used by Charles Fourier as early as 1808. It could be that Gide and Rist are arguing that it was not until after 1848 that solidarity begins to replace fraternity, but again this appears to be suspect, as fraternity continued to be used regularly until at least the turn of the 20th century. The importance of challenging Gide and Rist’s account of solidarity is that it remains highly influential in the literature on solidarity. Schmelter, who has written one of the most referenced recent works on solidarity (apparently), relies heavily on their account and as a consequence has perhaps reproduced some of the same mistakes.

Following this, even Andreas Wildt, who gives possibly the most recent dates for the arrival of solidarity in the contemporary literature, believes that solidarity was politicised during the 1840s, thus before Gide and Rist’s 1848 date. The difficulty with Wildt’s argument however, as well as his conservative assertions surrounding the arrival of solidarity into the political sphere, is that he never makes clear what he means by politics; in this sense it is hard to analyse how he understands the function of solidarity in the 1840s. The exact dating of the term solidarity may appear to be insignificant to the arguments that will be made in the thesis to follow; however, its politicisation and separation from fraternity connects to a historical context that recurs in the promotion and popularity of the term.

France in the 18th century witnessed many dramatic changes in its social structure. The beginning of the end of the agrarian economy and the start of industrialisation created not only widespread poverty but also a new social dynamic. Coupled with the influence of the Enlightenment on a population that was becoming increasingly stratified, it was not surprising that citizens sought a political philosophy to complement their feelings of, at times, desperation. Solidarity, it appears was born from a crisis in society, one that was called upon and given importance at the most heightened moments of civil unrest. It is therefore the claim of this chapter and thesis in general that although an intellectual and linguistic history of solidarity can be told, the social conditions were what created and necessitated its arrival. That solidarity is a slippery and fungible concept that is perhaps as much reactive as it can be prescriptive is precisely because of the social, economic and political conditions through which

---


37 Schmelter writes a highly influential although refuted doctoral thesis in 1991 titled *Solidarität: Die Entwicklungs geschichte eines sozielethischen Schlüsselbegriffs*. The problem is that, despite this work being influential — both Metz and Bayertz build their arguments on it, it is not widely available. Indeed, there are 20 copies in various libraries in Germany, but no means to buy a copy or access it online. Saving a trip to Germany I will have to rely on the commentaries of Schmelter’s work.

it is articulated. Hayward captures well what this comes to mean in the 19th century stating that:

In the nineteenth century, the appeal to solidarity was made principally by the protagonists of the politically and economically downtrodden and the complacent assertion of “laisser faire” was voiced by the apologists of the political and economic upstarts who had successfully overthrown (in France) or transformed (in Britain) the old order.39

The following chapter will combine philosophical and political theories of solidarity alongside their context, the reality of poverty, population growth and other social questions. The aim is to relate a theoretical debate to the impetus that created the need for there to be a debate in the first place.

**French Social Romanticism and its context 1830-1848**

France, it is sometimes claimed, was experiencing something of a golden age in the years 1830 to 1848; in particular, the loosening of censorship and the creation of a new, emboldened literary middle class.40 Nevertheless, it was also a time of social frustration amongst many French citizens. Acceleration in population growth, increased mobility of the population and the on-going movement from an agrarian to an industrial society are often given as primary factors for this.41 The period 1830-48 saw France create for the first time a substantial transport network to support the new heavy industries. This sacrifice of capital would only give benefits to a later generation and imposed upon France a friction that in some places led to riots. Lyon, for example, experienced riots in both 1831 and 1834, with civil unrest being common elsewhere in France, particularly in the North.42

Indeed, Spencer describes how widespread food shortages had led to perhaps as many as five food crises between 1800 and 1830, with unemployment and high inflation commonplace. For context in 1782, of a population of 135,000 in Lyon, 30,000 were without work; by 1811 this had grown to 50 percent, in northern France around 75 percent and up to 30 percent in Paris.43 These figures begin to illustrate that the period in France that proceeded the ‘golden age’ of the 1830s-1840s was one of dramatic social degradation, division and change.44

---


Intellectual historians such as Beecher, Spencer, Riasanovsky and Evans have argued that the general shifts in population and relative social degradation that accompanied it from 1789 to around 1830 created the ideal backdrop for the arrival of a philosophical movement such as social romanticism. This, coupled with the relaxation of the laws on censorship and increased prevalence of a ready-made educated audience, saw the subsequent period of 1830 to 1848 as ripe for a social philosophy to flourish. Trade unions had recently emigrated from their birth place in England and were becoming increasingly popular in France. Novel ideas were consciously being sought out and there began to be a reaction to the rationalised industry and the living conditions of workers, particularly in the big cities. There was also the emergence of civil society in industrialising towns, which was a negotiated process of non-elitist, at times painful, democratisation. Further to this Naomi Andrews has recently made a compelling argument; that this period is one of transition from eighteenth century universal ideas about humanity to one of “national, racial and sexual difference” related in part to the need for a rational basis for empire.

Social Romanticism was the theoretical articulation of these challenges and should be understood as a powerful intellectual movement in its own right. Social Romanticism was not (as it is commonly assumed by careless readers of Marx) simply a primitive or crude early form of Marxism. The context and therefore the targets of Social Romanticism were altogether different from that of Marx. Marx was writing about an already almost fully developed industrialism, whereas Social Romanticism was reacting to a not yet complete project of industrialisation. There are similarities between the two and certainly one influenced the other in terms of its critique of social, economic and political relations, however there are also major differences, not least of which is the question of religion. The Grandfather of the Social Romantic movement Saint Simon, writing mainly in the years leading up to the 1830s, placed religion in the centre of his philosophical writings. Saint Simon’s prescriptive philosophy, which was subsequently taken over by a number of his disciples, shared a belief that the

rationalisation that stemmed from the Enlightenment must be tethered to religious consideration. The new society to come would remain a religious, not an instrumentally scientific one. The combination of a belief in science and the ideals of the enlightenment, coupled with a strong faith in religion, is a distinctive feature of the Social Romantic movement in general. That is not to say that the religious element in their writings aimed to reinstate the pre-existing Catholic notion of Christianity. It was rather an attempt to redefine completely how Christianity should be understood. Their Christianity would exist outside traditional institutions such as the church and would be in keeping with the spirit of the doctrine, not its practice.

Another key difference between Marx and the Social Romantic movement is one of tactics. The Social Romantic movement was accompanied by an artistic expression that is rarely found in the writings of Marx. It is argued by Evans that many of the early, Saint Simon inspired Social Romantics, believed that the heart was more important than the head, when it came to pushing for social and political change. This is how Evans characterises the movement in somewhat presumptuous language:

> Human beings – the Saint-Simonians were right – will always be more amendable to reasoning when it is diluted with sentiment; and the arguments of the early socialists, might have been relatively futile without the appeal which the poet, the dramatist, and the novelist were able to make. To the credit of the Romantic movement should be laid the enormous contribution which it made to the sense of social solidarity.51

The idea of instilling sentiment into a social philosophy can be viewed in two ways. The first is that to rely on an emotive tenor, alongside a continued faith in God is reactionary. Despite the critical nature that Christianity was subjected to, the underlying belief in God was never questioned. Equally, the reliance on the poets, authors and dramatists to articulate, guide or perhaps create a sense of collective belonging, appears to be reactionary, in the sense that it perhaps needed a mythical community to exist, for their philosophy to be plausible and persuasive. The latter claim is perhaps overly critical; it does not simply follow that the use of poems, novels and plays to communicate a political message is necessarily a form of bad faith. Creating class consciousness, for example, can take many forms and the illuminating of social conditions through literary means can have radical consequences, as Evans is eager to point out:

> No writer of the century rendered greater service than did Hugo to the cause of social justice. No one in any country strove with greater political independence and personal disinterestedness to create a consciousness of human solidarity.52

---

52 Ibid, p.35.
The overstatement and categorical nature of this piece should not detract from the more general point; the theories which carried the most weight in this period were indeed imbued with as a minimum a poetic flair or at most an emotive strength. Human solidarity was not created by these authors; it was revealed, articulated and given a public voice across the newly forming working classes. What complicates this picture is the uncomfortable but significant issue of the Social Romantic movement’s attitude towards French colonialism. It appears that many of the main writers associated with the movement (Proudhon, Blanc, Leroux, Considerant, Fourier, Cabet, Pecqueur and Lamennais) were broadly in favour of colonialisation, in particular of Algeria. The promotion of colonial activity for these writers meant aligning the French nation with “universal civilization”, meaning that the French nation was equated with the universal nation. The consequence being that wellbeing of the French nation was “that of all humanity.” However, it is still unclear what possible damage this ‘compromise’ with colonialism had (or continues to have) on the idea of human solidarity. What is clear is the motivation was one that stemmed from a Christian (European) version of universal humanity, one that was privileged over races and cultures of those colonised.

It is also important to realise that the period 1800 to perhaps as late as 1850 is understood by economic historians as a time of exception, when considered from a poor relief perspective. Many studies have pointed out that this period in Europe sees a break down in established modes of poor relief and a general downturn in the fortunes of the least well off. Bavel and Rijpma argue that this, as has been alluded to already, was contributed to by poor relief not falling within any one fixed (and therefore accountable) realm. Governments, they argue

---

56 Bavel, V. B. and Rijpma, A. (2016) ‘How important were formalized charity and social spending before the rise of the welfare state? A long-run analysis of selected western European cases 1400-1850’, *Economic History Review*, 69:1, p.183. Their argument put crudely was that if you take a long term view the first half of the nineteenth century in terms of expenditure on the poor was much lower than (as a percentage) spending had been. Further, the trend from at least 1400 was one that consistently had gone up and this continued from around 1850.
57 The period is characterised as crisis most prominently in economic history terms in: Lindert, P. H. (1998) ‘Poor relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780-1880’, *European Review of Economic History*, 2:2, pp.101-140, where he shows convincingly that GDP spending on the poor goes down dramatically after around 1780, particularly in Catholic Europe. Lindert states the problem in the following pithy fashion that “for France our few clues suggest that church and private giving, while institutionally elaborate, probably offered the poor a higher ratio of moral guidance to material support.” p.107. It was this state of affairs that leads to firstly the 1790 Committee on Mendicity to be set up that was meant to calculate how much ecclesiastical spending there should have been on the poor given the tithe requirement. This was superseded by the bureaux de bienfaisance (welfare bureaux) that were created in the late eighteenth century when there was a need to resort to “non-voluntary poor relief” coordinated through the government (pp.106-108). Also see: Lindert, P. H. (2004) *Growing public: Social spending and economic growth since the eighteenth century*, Vol 1/2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
became somewhat responsible for the poor around 1800, or at the very least decisions around poor relief became political decisions. This Bavel and Rijpma argue is roughly the pattern across Western European counties. The specific consequence of this politicisation of poverty in France was that it was shot through with an amalgamation of the reality of French foreign exploits (colonialisation), Enlightenment ideals and liberal philosophical thought. This in unison led to “policies directed against corporations, the abolition of guilds and confraternities, secularization” which, as will be argued in the latter part of this chapter, led to a countervailing critique, one that the Romantic Socialists were at the forefront of.

The Romantic Socialist movement which was far from being uniform will now be explored through just two of its lesser known exponents; Charles Fourier 1772-1837 and Pierre Leroux (1797-1871). The decision to discuss these two thinkers, rather than the more obvious choice of Saint Simon is because firstly he is not a writer that is directly connected with solidarity in its explicit sense, although his ideas should not be discounted altogether. Equally, given his fame outside of France, Saint Simon would seem a more fitting choice than these other lesser known writers however he is well covered in the literature, his most important writings are slightly earlier than the period and frankly he does not offer an interesting account of solidarity.\(^58\) However although Fourier, like Saint Simon, is not explicit in his references to solidarity, he does have an underappreciated but significant influence on the ideas that were being formed in radical circles in England, the United States and Russia.\(^59\) However, there has yet to be written any kind of detailed account of the contemporary influence of Fourier or Leroux, through either readership, newspaper articles, pamphlets or translations.\(^60\) Finally, the


\(^{59}\) The influence of Fourier’s writings did extend beyond France, most notably to the United States where there were some ultimately unsuccessful attempts at founding Fourierist communities. Interestingly, he was also read in Russia even being the focus of a reading group attended by Dostoevsky. Although, later credited by the Soviet Union as one of their intellectual forebears, the reading of Fourier was limited in the 19th century given czarist police attempts at stifling the dissemination of his work. For a much more in depth examination see: Beecher, J. (1986) *Charles Fourier – The Visionary and His World*, Berkeley: University of California Press. Also see for a fascinating analysis of the Soviet response to the Romantic Socialists in general, post- glasnost: Beecher, J. and Fomichev, V. N. (2006) ‘French Socialism in Lenin and Stalin’s Moscow: David Riazanov and the French Archive of the Marx-Engels Institute’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 78:1, pp.119-143.

\(^{60}\) It is particularly surprising that there has to date been very little work completed on their influence on English social and political thought, for example for the followers of Robert Owen. Especially given a third group of writers, roughly associated with the newspaper *L’Homme, Journal de la Démocratie Universelle*, a journal mouthpiece for a number of exiled writers, including Blanc and Ribeyrolles. The significance of this group, who wrote primarily in Jersey and London, is that they had direct, documented interactions with a number of important English organisations such as the Chartists and newspapers such as *Freedom* and *The English Republic*. These writers took part in these dialogues and discussions on solidarity and can be seen to be influenced by the work of Fourier and Leroux. See: Pankhurst, R. K. P. (1956) ‘Fourierism in Britain’, *International review of Social History*, 1:3, pp.398-432; although dismissive of a personal connection between Owen and Fourier the following examines their sometimes
selection of Leroux enables a further discussion of Jewish solidarity, something that has lasting implications for both the understanding of the position of Jews within European nations and for the development of solidarity in itself.

*Charles Fourier: 1772-1837*

Fourier is credited by some with the promotion of the cooperative movement in France. He is also seen as laying the foundations for a later social and political articulation of solidarity that moves away from the legal sphere. It should be kept in mind that Fourier was little read in his own time and only later developed a following, firstly in France and then elsewhere. The following remarks indicate why, perhaps, he was little read and understood in France during his life-time. The case for a re-evaluation of his contribution as a social and political figure and why he is so important to understanding the genealogy of solidarity will then follow. Using Fourier presents in itself numerous difficulties from his unforgiving style and actually, his personal temperament, as Riasanovsky summarises:

...his thought was all of a piece, organically united in a kind of overarching universal formula to the extent that it is impossible to do justice to a period, a part, or significant particular aspect of Fourier’s teaching without dealing with the whole. Moreover, this formula was essentially mad and encompassed mostly bizarre and eccentric elements.

All major works on Fourier begin in a similar vein with the degree of apologetic tone being the only variable. This is one reason Fourier made little impact amongst his peers, indeed it was not until the last few years of his life that a following of any kind was established. Fourier’s style was idiosyncratic in the extreme, as he wrote in complex systems, groupings and numerical orderings which baffled many first time readers of his work. There is also a fantastical quality to much of his writing; through his discussion of planetary destines, to ecological changes to the earth which included the transformation of all the oceans into lemonade and his notion that wars could be fought through meat pie making competitions.

---


64 The following quote taken from Fourier, C. (Trans, Patterson, I.) (1996) *The Theory of Four Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.39, will give a flavour of this: “You will therefore come to know the social mechanisms that reign on the other stars, the fortunate or unfortunate revolutions to which their inhabitants are subject. You will learn that our little globe has, for the last five or six thousand years, been in the most wretched state a world can find itself in. But the calculus which will reveal the happiness enjoyed by people on other stars will also give you the means of introducing on your own globe a state of happiness akin to that of more fortunate worlds.”
This made Fourier an easy target for lampooning in the press and meant that it was difficult for Fourier’s philosophical thought to be taken seriously. The charge of being a buffoon and madman stuck, but it was perhaps his outspoken views on women which dented his aspirations the most. Fourier for all of his wild theories actually had a sophisticated, radical and challenging view of women, particularly given the time he was writing. It could be that his radical views on women were too threatening to the patriarchal structure of society.

The following passage highlights these two tendencies in Fourier, when he writes:

As a general proposition: Social progress and changes of historical period are brought about as a result of the progress of women towards liberty; and the decline of social orders is brought about as a result of the diminution of the liberty of women.

Other events influence these political vicissitudes, but there is no other cause which produces such rapid social progress or decline as a change in the condition of women. I have already said that the mere adoption of closed harems would soon return us to the period of barbarism, and the act of opening the harems would be sufficient to transform barbarism into civilization. To sum up, the extension of the privileges of women is the basic principle of all social progress.

Fourier’s social and political critique is perhaps the element of his writing that can be seen to have had the greatest impact on subsequent socialist thought, including both Engels and Marx. Fourier’s view of women is one part of his thinking on the problems of Society, the State and Universal Humanity. Fourier believed strongly in the idea that civilisation progressed through stages; these stages had specific characteristics and could be identified historically. It could be said that Fourier was operating with a form of immanent critique, the state of things was interrogated against a list of normative prescriptions that were contained within each given stage/age of civilization. The technique of critiquing a given society or State was then placed within a grand narrative of historical progress. For Fourier it appears that the final stage of civilization would contain an end to scarcity, an equality of resources and the absolute freedom of individuals. The utopianism of Fourier’s thought appears to be fanciful and open to charges that it would be impossible to reconcile equality and freedom, whilst supporting a system of production that would be efficient enough to supply the satisfaction of all individuals according to their wants and needs. Fourier’s vision of this future state of unbridled happiness is hard to take seriously, there appears to be too many contingent factors involved and there is a question as to whether the seemingly intractable impasse between equality and freedom

could ever be bridged. Instead it is more worthwhile to investigate his less ambitious ideas that centre on his critique of his contemporary French society, a society he saw as in crisis.

Fourier understands the economy, markets and capital accumulation in a way which neither mythologises the economy as an impenetrable sphere that cannot be understood nor one which is not created and maintained by individuals. Equally, Fourier sees that individuals operating within the economy cannot be held responsible for their role within it. He essentially provides a proto-structuralist critique and account of the economy, and more broadly the state and society of France in his period. To illustrate this he writes:

Anyone who denounces the manoeuvrings of market-riggers, lawyers or anybody else might well be even more grasping if he were in their place; one should never blame the passions of individuals, only Civilisation which offers no path but vice for the satisfaction of the passions, and thus forces man to practice vices to obtain wealth, without which there is no happiness.68

This passage reveals some additional important points concerning how Fourier understands the individual. When Fourier talks about passions he is invoking a very categorical claim as to the natural state of individuals; more specifically the passion of attraction, which Fourier argues stems directly from God. The individual is embroiled within civilization, the passions are unalterable and are teleological, and will only become expressed fully in the coming of the utopia. What keeps the passions from becoming realised or perhaps from acting contrary to happiness is the role played by duty; a man-made phenomenon. For Fourier, duty combines with reason, the manufactured enemy of the passions, stating:

the progressive Series [the next which Fourier believes humanity is soon to enter] would ensure that everybody’s passions were fully developed, irrespective of sex, age or social class, and that in the new order these increased passions would bring with them commensurately greater health and strength, I conjectured that if god had given so much influence to passionate attraction and so little to its enemy, reason, it must be in order to lead us to the order of the progressive Series in which all aspects of attraction would be satisfied.69

And again this time in even more explicit terms and in reference to duty:

Duty is man-made, attraction comes from God; so if we want to understand God’s intentions we have to study attraction, in its natural state, with no reference to duty. Duty varies from one century to another and from place to place, but the nature of the passions has been and will remain unchangeable for all people.70

There is a lot to analyse in these two passages. Firstly, Fourier clearly makes a great distinction between individuals, as they are all subject to the same passions. Secondly, passions need to

69 Ibid, p.15.
70 Ibid, p.75.
overcome their current state of being controlled and curtailed by reason as set out in
civilization. Thirdly, duty for Fourier is the malevolent counter-weight to the passions. It blocks
off the possibility of accessing God and is a malleable tool that changes to fit a given situation.
Finally, the objective ownership of each individual to passions both challenges and seeks to re-
evaluate the dialectic between liberty and equality.

It is the above passions that make Fourier’s contribution to solidarity scholarship noteworthy.
This is because it is this background that in turn foregrounds the freeing of solidarity from its
legal sphere. However, it must be noted that Fourier rarely uses the term directly and where
he does use it, it is still used in its legal meaning. It may then seem strange to include Fourier in
a discussion of solidarity at all. The argument is that Fourier’s thought had a tremendous
illocutionary force in the realisation of a social, political and philosophical solidarity, in both
France (which is well documented) and England (which has received virtually no critical
appraisal) and elsewhere. What solidarity is for Fourier requires a degree of detective work
and perhaps an amount of imaginative interpretation. Stjernø offers a positive description of
what Fourier’s solidarity is in the following four strands:

1. [T]here is the principle of insurance, the legacy of the code Napoleon concerning
the common responsibility of a group of people for insurance and the repayment of
debt.
2. [T]he preparedness to share resources with people in need.
3. [T]he more general application to describe a feeling of community – solidarités
sociales and solidarités collectives.
4. [T]he introduction of a guaranteed minimum income and for family support.

The first is solidarity as discussed above, in relation to the Civil Code. The other three begin the
movement away from this strict legal meaning towards what is more recognisably a modern
social and political version of solidarity. Stjernø unfortunately does not expand beyond simply
(correctly) identifying these strands in Fourier. Two and three appear to be similar to some
modern understandings of solidarity although with some caveats, this can been seen especially
in subsequent socialist and Marxist traditions. Indeed as Engels writes in a passage praising
Fourier:

[W]e find in Fourier a criticism of the existing conditions of society, genuinely French
and witty, but not upon that account any less thorough. Fourier takes the
bourgeoisie, their inspired prophets before the Revolution, and their interested
eulogists after it, at their own word. He lays bare remorselessly the material and

71 The exception to this is the following: Pankhurst, R. K. P. (1956) ‘Fourierism in Britain’, International Review of
Social History, 1:3, pp.398-432.
(numbers added)
73 Although he does want to make clear that Fourier’s philosophy and understanding of solidarity did have a strong
“illocutionary force”, particularly with its influence on Leroux, ibid p.29.
moral misery of the bourgeois world. He confronts it with the earlier philosophers’ dazzling promises of a society in which reason alone should reign, of a civilisation in which happiness should be universal, of an illimitable human perfectibility, and with the rose-coloured phraseology of the bourgeois ideologists of his time. He points out how everywhere the most pitiful reality corresponds with the most high-sounding phrases, and he overwhelms this hopeless fiasco of phrases with his mordant sarcasm.74

This highlights two important points, one is that Fourier clearly had an important impact on significant later thinkers and two, that his influence was not always straightforward and that his specificity of thought can be hard to detect. However, it does seem probable that the second and third forms of solidarity as laid out by Stjernø, do appear to be similar to later conceptions of solidarity in the tradition of socialism and Marxism. This interpretation of Fourier’s solidarity however, would seek to conflate two and four as it appears that the later proceeds from the former. A look at how this progression works in Fourier is significant to showing the later influence of Fourier’s thought outside the socialist/Marxist tradition. A closer reading of Fourier’s writing will now be presented, one that will lead to a concluding examination of the third form of solidarity; community feeling.

Stjernø’s stated “preparedness to share resources with people in need” could be seen as a call for greater equality. Again however, Fourier does not seek to align this claim with the already existing moral championing of equality as stemming from the French Revolution. He thinks that equality:

[I]s another chimera, praiseworthy when considered in the abstract and ridiculous from the standpoint of the means employed to introduce it in civilization. The first right of men is the right to work and the right to a minimum.75

Here it can already be seen that a share of resources is inseparable from a right to a minimum (a minimum here refers directly to income). It is therefore for Fourier inconceivable to have a legal or abstract right to equality without the guaranteed minimum being also in place. Read this way the aim to procure a society which shares its resources willingly must accept also the need for a minimum for all. Leaving aside the obvious question of how this would be enforced, particularly given that Fourier would disband the army, police and any presently existing government institutions, it is clear that to have one without the other would, to follow Fourier, be impossible. It should also be noted at this point that although Fourier talks of income he does not mean money, as that would likewise be abolished; he is more thinking of material

resources. A further passage that indicates the impossibility of a separation is in the following, when he attacks reason and again writes of sharing resources and a minimum:

[R]eason has contributed nothing to happiness as long as it has not procured social man the fortune which is the object of all his wishes; by social fortune I mean a progressive degree of wealth which protects the least well-off from need and ensures them, as a minimum, the fate we currently call a bourgeois competence.76

There is perhaps an argument, that instead of calling this ‘solidarity’, a term that Fourier used infrequently and unsystematically, it would be more appropriate to discuss fraternity. Fraternity is something which Fourier addresses directly and interestingly is given similar treatment as equality. Whilst Fourier is inclined to treat fraternity with a degree of scorn and irony, it is, nevertheless a concept that if (as has been noted with other ideas) enacted conversely to how it is performed currently would be part of his utopian model. This is how he initially introduces his thoughts on fraternity:

Let’s turn to fraternity. Our discussion here will be amusing, at once loathsome and learned. It is amusing in view of the imbecility of the theories which have purported to establish fraternity. It is loathsome when one recalls the horrors that the ideal of fraternity has masked. But it is a problem which deserves particular attention from science; for societies will attain their goal, and man his dignity, only when universal fraternity has become an established fact. By universal fraternity we mean a degree of general intimacy which can only be realized if four conditions are satisfied.77

In a sense this general feeling of intimacy could account for Stjernø’s third description of solidarity in Fourier; that of a feeling of community. Thus fraternity, if it is to be realised, relies on four conditions, these four conditions have to be for Fourier universal and absolute if universal fraternity is to be achieved. These conditions are:

1. Comfort for the people and the assurance of a splendid minimum...
2. The education and instruction of the lower classes...
3. General truthfulness in work relations...
4. The rendering of reciprocal services by unequal classes.78

It could be seen that within Fourier’s program for universal fraternity lie all of the four forms of solidarity as interpreted by Stjernø. This is most probably the case, however, what needs to be stressed is the first of Fourier’s conditions, the splendid minimum. It seems clear that for Fourier’s system to work at all there has to be an agreement that everyone have access to guaranteed material existence. It would be inconceivable for the other conditions to be realised without the first. Perhaps then Fourier should be reconfigured in the following way: To

establish universal fraternity, it would be necessary firstly to have a concrete solidarity between individuals within society to hold to the view that everyone was entitled to a minimum to live, regardless of their position. This is solidarity rather than fraternity as it is clearly an obligation, a debt to all that is not dictated purely through proximity. In this sense it is in keeping with Fourier’s method of reversal and with his concrete legal understanding of solidarity. Here solidarity becomes the means and universal fraternity the ends. Fourier, although ever the optimist for the success of his own system sees very little hope of establishing this fraternity in the present, and this is because the prior instigation of solidarity cannot be performed. Here Fourier writes of the impossibility of fraternity in the present:

As for the present, how could there be any fraternity between sybarites steeped in refinements and coarse, hungry peasants who are covered with rags and often with vermin and who carry contagious diseases like typhus, mange, plica and other fruits of civilized poverty? What sort of fraternity could ever be established between such heterogeneous classes of men? 

Fourier’s theories are hard to disentangle and understand on their own, however, what has hopefully been shown is that Fourier was indeed a forerunner of later understandings of solidarity. The force with which he attacks the current system may have won him praise by Engels and Marx and, likewise, his original solutions to the problems that he exposes are not as fanciful as they first appear. There does appear to be an undercurrent of solidarity throughout his work which underpins many of his pronouncements concerning equality and freedom from necessity. Fourier believes that all individuals have a right to the best possible life and that each individual has a duty to every other individual to make that possible. It is this reciprocal relationship which can be seen as the germ of the later solidarity theories. Likewise, the evocation of a universal interconnection between all of humanity anticipates later models of solidarity. Crucially it thus also contains the same weaknesses that these later universal models of solidarity can be charged with.

Pierre Leroux (1797-1871)

Leroux was influenced by Fourier, but he was primarily a disciple of Saint Simon. In addition to introducing the term solidarity, he is also understood to have coined the term socialism and it is this that he is best known for. He can be seen to be a link between the utopian visions of

Fourier and Saint Simon and the later sociology of Comte and Durkheim.\(^\text{81}\) Although it can be claimed that Fourier is the original solidarity thinker in this period, it was really Leroux that makes the term solidarity explicitly part of his thought. He also plays a major role in popularising the term in French intellectual circles in the 1840s.

Although Leroux is heavily indebted to other thinkers such as Saint Simon and Fourier, he differs from them in a number of important aspects. He heavily criticises Christian charity (which Fourier had only addressed sparingly), social contract theory and the idea that society could be understood as an organism. For Leroux, solidarity is a relationship between individuals and it is these relationships that make society possible. Leroux in a similar way to Fourier’s universal fraternity thought that solidarity would lead to socialism. The idea for Leroux was to increase relational solidarity to the point that would enable socialism to be possible. Crucially, he did not think that solidarity would be constituted through citizens’ legal rights or that it should have the utility to affect the running of the state.\(^\text{82}\) So whereas Fourier’s solidarity would only be realised within the confines of his utopia (or Phalanx), Leroux sought to place solidarity at the foundation of society and wished to open it up to become even more inclusive than Fourier had envisaged. Solidarity is meant to act as a balancing relationship between the individualism/libertarian notions of selfhood and the growing threat of an authoritarian state. However, this characterisation of his position could be challenged by Wildt, when he implies that his solidarity was characterised not by:

\[
[A\] rightful claim but a “direct” and altruistic feeling, as opposed to an “exterior” duty. In my view, this concept of solidarity turns into a central concept of social reform program – also incipiently into a concept of rights which is, however, barely related to the state...\(^\text{83}\)
\]

Wildt’s argument makes clear why Leroux would seek to distance solidarity from Christian charity. Leroux understood Christian charity as stemming from pity and an obligation to help those in need. However, he wanted to move conceptions of solidarity away from Christian charity and into the realm of equal loving relationships that would exist outside of the traditional Christian notion of love. The unity of society could then act as the binding recognition of the solidarity relations. As with species-being (Gattungswesen) in Marx, the idea is more that as an individual you come to a realisation that you have just as much cause to

---


promote other individuals’ happiness as you have to promote your own. To highlight this slightly ambiguous relation to solidarity in Leroux, the following quote is provided:

...that true love [veritable charité] would be recognized, i.e. that love would be comprehended as life’s own law, as the law of mutually solidaristic creatures, as the law of the identity and hence, the identification of the ego with the non-ego, of man and his fellow human being; and each antinomy dissolves and egoism abases itself in the face of love, because, to the extent that it is legitimate and holy, it recognizes itself within love. 84

Love does appear to underpin solidarity for Leroux but it is not a straightforwardly Christian love of charity, pity or even compassion. It is perhaps closer to friendship. 85 Although Leroux does appear to cement solidarity as a central political and social concern, his writing has not had anything like the circulation of his teacher Saint Simon or Fourier. 86 Leroux can be seen as typical of an emerging movement of thought that aimed to retain a version of religion, whilst also looking to socially engineer a just and equal society. Leroux is perhaps who Hayward has in mind when he attempts to summarise the concerns of, and social motivations for 19th century French thought:

Eighteenth century French social philosophers sought to base the principles of social reorganization upon a conciliation of social moralism and social scientism — associated with, but cutting across, the simultaneously attempted synthesis between individualism and collectivism — as the only... acceptable and viable foundation for social life. What gave their ambitious enterprise urgency was that the early nineteenth century was recognized by some of the more acute thinkers of the time as a period of crisis and convulsion in the realms of science and philosophy, religion and morality, economics and politics. 87

Leroux is perhaps a thinker of his time, traversing both the fallout and failed promise of the Revolution, and the need to think through a possible concrete solution to the crisis of 1830s-1840s. Leroux’s work was less ambitious in scope than either Saint Simon’s or Fourier’s and this may be a reason why his ideas and writings are rarely considered as influential. This at least is how Leroux has been commonly characterised. However, there is another side to his influence, one that is often overlooked in discussions around the genealogy of solidarity;

85 Friendship here could be understood in the Aristotelian sense of Civic Friendship as found in the Nicomachean Ethics, see: Aristotle (Trans: Crisp, R.) (2000) Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in particular Books VIII and IX.
86 However, a recent article by Béland has argued that the influence of Leroux can be seen in the popular notions of solidarity, particularly in France, but also internationally. Béland argues convincingly that the Leon Bourgeois (1851-1925), author of the very widely read political pamphlet Solidarité (1896), who was a prime minister of France and an early recipient of the Nobel Peace prize in 1920, essentially popularises or expresses the pre-existing notions of solidarity as found partly in Leroux’s work as well as Durkheim. See: Béland, D. (2009) ‘Back to Bourgeois? French social policy and the idea of solidarity’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 29:9-10, p.447.
namely, Leroux’s influence on the French Jewish notions of solidarity. It is worth exploring why this is the case because it stands to show clearly the conflictual nature of this tradition of solidarity thinking, the same one that Durkheim and Habermas (it will be argued) inherit. The visibility of Jewish solidarity is low in general discussions of solidarity’s development. However, the work of Lisa Leff has sought to illuminate this underrepresented element of the history of western European notions of solidarity. It will now be argued using Leff’s work that some of what remains problematic in later discussions of solidarity can be seen as having, in part, its genesis here.

Leff begins her study on Jewish solidarity in the following revealing way, stating that, “Jewish solidarity has become so integral to Jewish identity it is usually assumed to be a natural, unchanging part of what it means to be Jewish.”88 However, whilst Jewish collective identity and responsibility has a long history, they only adopted the term solidarity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The history of the Jews in Europe is a complex, vast and important one, therefore this discussion aims merely to focus on specific uses of solidarity by French Jews in this period.89 What should be kept in mind throughout this discussion is the significance of integration, the idea of a nation and the navigation of religious difference, civic congruity and self-identity, to the adoption of the term solidarity.90 What makes the case of the Jewish adoption of solidarity significant is the conceptual changes it has to go through for it to be something that they would choose for themselves. Before the French revolution Jewish communities in France were a small but significant part of legal, social, economic and political life. The argument that Leff makes convincingly is that Jewish identity is transformed in the aftermath of the French Revolution, with the process gaining ground particularly after the 1840s.91 The idea is that what it comes to mean to be Jewish changes through (obviously amongst many other things) partly the adoption of a version of solidarity that played on its legal meaning but sought to undermine it with the intellectual frameworks offered through Romantic Socialists, in particular Leroux.

The unexpected adoption of solidarity by French Jews owes much to how solidarity was presented in Napoleon’s Civil Code, as mentioned above, and the way that the solidarity clause in particular was interpreted when in reference to the position of Jews. In very simplified terms French society undertook a secularisation process in the wake of the revolution. This should (and did in some ways) mean that the position of the Jews changed accordingly. In legal terms the alterations that took place in terms of the Jew as a legal entity for citizenship and as a defined social-religious group are what is important to this discussion of solidarity.

There is a sense the revolution was to symbolise a new beginning, a line in the sand, however, for the Jewish population the collective debt that they owed was not necessarily cancelled and indeed was very much carried over. Solidarity, in the Civil Code meaning, of the obligation to pay mutual debts, applied to Jews in a specific way that was both historically constituted, materially real and exposed the difficulty of the doubling of identity now that Jews were granted citizenship. It is therefore surprising that the term solidarity was adopted at all by the Jewish community. It is this unexpected turn to solidarity that Leff seeks to explain. In general, this unlikely alignment will give further weight to one of the main threads that run throughout this thesis, namely, the chameleon quality of solidarity, its pliable nature and ultimately its refusal to be adequately defined.

Firstly then in terms of legal ramifications, there was an on-going and highly significant attachment made between debts incurred by the “Old Regime Jewish communauté or nation” and Jews who were now recognised citizens. One of the difficulties that Jews faced was that in legal terms they were still counted as being members of formally foreign corporations, not French ones. This meant that even as late as the 1820s, when much of this legal wrangling was taking place, the question remained how could newly granted Jewish citizenship be a guarantee for debts incurred? Further, on what basis could debts that were incurred in the Old Regime through corporations be written off? The answer to these questions is complicated and hotly contested, with more than just monetary matters at stake. For instance, what becomes of the Jewish identity in general if their legal status is formally equalised? What happened in reality is that they were not freed from the debts incurred through the former corporations in fact because of a version of Jewish solidarity. It was argued in the end that Jews were only given loans/credit in the first place because “Jewish “solidarity” had been

---


understood to be perpetual” and that in a similar way to other foreigners, “had no guarantee to offer but the eternal tie binding the community.” Consequently, this meant that although Jews were now granted citizenship their ‘eternal’ solidarity to pay their ancestors’ debts was superior under the law. Jewish leaders therefore attempted in the latter half of the nineteenth century to transform dramatically what Jewish solidarity meant.

It is this transformation where Leroux’s influence can be most obviously felt, in a number of noteworthy ways. Firstly, as the first writer to really define and build a theory around the concept of solidarity, in a move away from the Roman law tradition, he instigates a way of using solidarity which was largely without precedent. This stemmed from a Saint-Simonian apprenticeship that aimed to sit somewhere between the Catholic right and the liberal left, and that wished to mesh new forms of social, economic and religious systems of thinking. What was to be retained was therefore hierarchy and religion per se coupled with the new liberal denunciation of feudalism, as “a new order would respect the fundamental and unity of all people.” It was seen by Leroux, in particular, that social ties had been eroded through the dramatic changes brought on by the Revolution and its aftermath. The response to this was an attempt to articulate a conception of humanity that would grant the necessary essential character of human life as being one of interconnection.

Leroux was so appealing to some Jewish leaders particularly after 1848 because he did not draw a clear distinction between the religious nature of Christianity and that of Judaism. Crucially, he argued that solidarity was something that has its origin in the Hebrew bible, in the story of Adam’s sin. The collective sin of Adam is seen by Leroux as part of the same trajectory that is next witnessed in the Christian moment of solidarity that is the sacrifice of Jesus. Finally the end point is the French Revolution that is seen as a form of revelation, with the slogan liberty, equality and fraternity, being the perfection of these other instances of the same eternal truth. What is important here to realise is that it was this understanding or rather lack of antagonism between Christianity and Judaism that could, according to Leff, allow Jews to adopt the more general theory of solidarity. What Leroux was able to do was to perform an impressive balancing act between those that wanted their social and political theory and

---

95 Ibid, p.41.
practice to be rooted in non-Catholic and therefore in an anti-clerical form of Christianity (as the word itself was not part of that tradition at all), and those that wanted to push for the French Revolution to be infused with religious signification. This meant that solidarity could hold within it the energy and power of traditional religion, without its Catholic and clerical elements (that were coming under such sustained critique at the time), whilst simultaneously harnessing the ideology of the French Revolution, itself in part a demand for a more rigorous system of socially enforced obligation. This construction of solidarity, although originally containing some conservative tendencies was largely abandoned by them, vacating the ground more assuredly to firstly the republicans and later the socialists.

What Leff and others have argued is that it is this movement away from its juridical roots that makes solidarity so appealing to the Jewish community.\(^{100}\) Here Leff states what it came to mean for them in the 1850s at the point at which they first fully embraced it:

> As a republican and socialist term, “solidarity” designated a strong, activist notion of social responsibility. The term was the product of a mediation between protosocialist religious thought, liberalism, and the republicanism of ancient Rome, 1789 and 1848. “Solidarity” implied order, hierarchy, and religiosity; at the same time, it implied fraternity, equality, and connectedness between segments of society.\(^{101}\)

Jewish solidarity would go on to form part of their political vocabularies in the second half of the nineteenth century. This can been seen most prevalently with its use by the influential *Alliance Israélite Universelle* formed around 1860 to partly fuse the protection of the Jewish people with the civic ideals and virtues of the 1789 and 1848 revolutions.\(^{102}\) This meant translating the traditional obligation to the community (which had set them apart whilst held within antagonistic nations) into a new version of Jewish solidarity. This new version was one that sought to maintain bonds of obligation not just between Jews but also with others, both domestically and theoretically everyone in the world.

There is of course much more that can be said about how Jewish communities in Europe and elsewhere sought to protect themselves from persecution as well to establish more equal relations with other peoples. However, what has been described above is enough to

---


demonstrate some important aspects of solidarity that will bear on the rest of this thesis and solidarity discussions more generally. That Jewish solidarity can be traced in part to the writings of Leroux, a religious thinker certainly, but not in a way that is obviously conducive to Judaism in its mainstream forms shows that solidarity developed in unexpected ways. The final description of how the Alliance comes to incorporate solidarity into their rhetoric could just as easily be the way in which workers come to use the term, thus opening up a broader discourse on solidarity.103

This discussion of Leroux also raises some other more general questions as follows: To whom does a particular group owe solidarity? On what basis does one belong to a given community? What role does a national identity have as it interacts with religious, legal and racial communities? And finally, once solidarity is claimed, what is the individual obligated to provide? Answers to some of these questions will be attempted through analysis of Durkheim and Habermas in the next chapters.

*Conclusion*

This chapter has aimed to place the arrival of solidarity in context. It has given historiographical explanations, descriptions and analysis from a range of disciplines, which go beyond a simple intellectual chronological exposition of the development of solidarity from its legal origins to its social and political meanings and uses. The argument made has been that solidarity was a product of a series of conditions that created multiple crises across French society. There was a political crisis after the Revolution, which sought to promote liberty at the cost of the other two key demands, equality and fraternity. Legally, there was conflict that had to be resolved given the administration of the nation’s poor relief and citizenship. Citizenship which was shown to be particularly important to the Jewish community. Spiritually there was a crisis, given the weakening of the authority of the Catholic Church (although not religion). The formal structures of the Church, once weakened, had to be taken into the hands of national administration that was not capable of countering the food shortages that were sweeping France in this period. The argument is not that any one crisis leads to the reason why solidarity becomes, by the end of nineteenth century, such a powerful concept, but that the general melee of the period helped create the ideal conditions for it.

The picture that emerges from this period is one that is multi-layered, fungible, complex and diverse which gives solidarity this very same characterisation, one that it continues to carry

with it. The contention of this thesis is that solidarity takes on and reflects the social, political and historical reality from which it is drawn. It is only by reading solidarity from within this context that its meaning can be reached, if at all, with any exactitude. For example Leroux’s version of solidarity as given above would simply not make any sense without the accompanying historical details. Therefore, solidarity can be both a reflection of the thinking, concerns, and emotions of a particular time, but also as a form of critique. Fourier certainly was using a form of critique where his model of solidarity was placed against the world as he interpreted it and saw that it did not live up to his theory of it. This again is a quality of solidarity that stays with it into later manifestations, certainly with how it is used at times by Habermas.

Part of the motivation behind this chapter and how it fits into the thesis as a whole was to highlight and determine some of the important questions that any theory of solidarity has to address. One of the key questions revolves around the issue of choice, either personally, or as a group/community/nation etc. When solidarity is understood in its legal setting as an obligation to pay mutual debts, there it appears that choice is at a minimum. However, as was shown by the example of the Jews, it is not always straightforward where that obligation should stop, particularly when it could involve a long history. The choice as to who to include with the obligation to provide solidarity either materially, politically or socially, was and remains a contentious issue. What was noted above was that poor relief at times could be tied to perceived good character of one who was to receive it. Here the ethical quality of an individual matters as to whether they are worthy of the solidarity of others. The question as to who gets to decide that is obviously problematic. Equally, if solidarity is going to be something that is formally articulated and regulated in society, or by and through a nation, the question of belonging comes to the fore.

Similarly, the idea of a group dynamic that has solidarity play the role of patroller of its boundaries, implies that there are others to whom solidarity is not extended. It is genuinely not obvious whether solidarity ultimately implies (in theory at least) that it should be extended to everyone in the world, as Leroux would have it. Or whether solidarity itself requires that there be something outside it; a common enemy or threat, as demonstrated by the position of the Jews or equally that of the working class. Finally, there is the way that solidarity can work in its relational structure as being hierarchical. The blurred distinction between charity and philanthropy as discussed above, opens up the question as to whether a relationship of solidarity is horizontal, whereby the bond of solidarity is maintained through a sameness (all members of the same trade) or whether it is about holding those who owe debts and
obligations to others to account. These are all open questions that will be explored in more
detail in the rest of the thesis.

Lastly, the seemingly simple question ‘what does solidarity mean?’ remains inconclusive at the
end of the nineteenth century, in France, its birth place. The next chapter is on Durkheim, who
it will be argued takes the melee of contrary and conflicting meanings of solidarity and at least
presents it back in a cogent fashion, for the first time. However, the question will still remain
to a certain extent an intractable one.
Chapter 2: Durkheim and solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon

Emile Durkheim’s status as the originator of modern solidarity theory is fairly well assured, with most academic work on solidarity at least referencing Durkheim’s *The Division of Labour in Society* (1894) in their bibliographies. However, commonly, the text is often only referred to in opening excursus in articles that note its position as the first major attempt to write seriously and at length about solidarity, before moving on to what they see as more relevant writers and texts. It has become only necessary to acknowledge Durkheim, but not to give his ideas full treatment, and certainly not used for building a new social and political theory of solidarity. An explanation for why this is the case will be given in the body of this chapter.

Needless to say, it will be argued strongly that Durkheim’s absence is detrimental to the study of solidarity. Any thesis on solidarity could not omit Durkheim. However, this chapter is not included arbitrarily. It will be shown that Durkheim, far from having an antiquated theory of solidarity, has a complex, at times prophetic and ultimately telling contribution to make to an area of study currently trying to find its bearings. Further, as will be seen in later discussion of Habermas, Durkheim’s legacy is telling, although it remains unacknowledged. This is not to argue that Durkheim does not in his own right have an important contribution to make to the current ways that solidarity is being discussed. In particular, it will be shown that Durkheim not only anticipates, but helps to initiate a particular understanding of solidarity as a reaction to crisis. The importance of this argument to the thesis but also solidarity discourse more generally, is what solutions to crisis (or anomie in his terminology) he articulates. The solution that is argued for in what follows is found in his understanding of the role of moral education, a connection that is virtually never made in the broader scholarship on Durkheim and solidarity.

Although general trends of scholarship on solidarity have seen little sustained interaction with Durkheim’s ideas, studies of Durkheim are numerous and varied. Durkheim until fairly recently has been labelled a conservative thinker; this in part could help to explain his dips in popularity. Reception of Durkheim outside of France has been coloured strongly by the interpretations of Talcott Parsons and to a lesser extent Robert Nisbet, who both leant heavily on the conservative dimensions of Durkheim’s work. Read as a defender of the status quo

---

104 Durkheim, E. (Trans: W. D. Halls) (1894) *The Division of Labour in Society*, Hong Kong: MacMillan Education. From now on referred to as *The Division*.


and as an advocate for a functionalist conception of society, the writings of Parsons and Nisbet became from the 1930s onwards the standard means of understanding Durkheim. This in part explains why Durkheim loses favour and continued to be somewhat miscategorised until the mid-1980s. Seen as a conservative thinker, his theories appeared inadequate when placed alongside the more obviously critical voices of Foucault and the Frankfurt School. Such a prominent reading of Durkheim, even if it can be defended to a certain extent, meant that his socialist and more radical thinking was left unexplored. Therefore, it is one of the contentions of this chapter to argue that when Durkheim is taken seriously as a thinker employed to answer current social and political questions, he can offer a novel critical vantage point. It is these two positions that are argued for over the course of this chapter.

This builds on the small renaissance in Durkheim scholarship of the past few decades. Partly this can be seen in response to, firstly Steven Lukes’ intellectual biography published in 1973, a point at which Durkheim was at his least popular, and republished again in 1985 where it found a much more receptive audience. Since its publication in 1985 there has been a steady increase of work on Durkheim, not just in sociology, but also in political theory and philosophy. The growing interest in Durkheim can also be partly attributed to another intellectual biography by Marcel Fournier published in French in 2007 and translated into English in 2013. Fournier’s book appears to have been a catalyst for increased attention in Durkheim. However speculative the following claim may be it does appear to be something more than just a coincidence that Durkheim’s popularity correlates, at least in the English speaking world, with social and political worries around society’s function and in real terms to economic, social and political crisis. Durkheim’s initial questions about how society was possible, and attempts to diagnose what might be problematic in a given society, appear to chime with many contemporary concerns over cosmopolitanism, the role of the state and how individualism interacts with the moral norms of society.

The radical implications of Durkheim’s writing have also more recently been explored; the most successful of which have sought to integrate Durkheim into contemporary socialist criticism. It is now not unusual to read Durkheim as belonging to a loose tradition of critical

---

theory, as the recent work by Dawson and Rawls indicate. Similarly, there have been new imaginative approaches to Durkheim that have seen him paired with some unexpected thinkers, ideas and non-western contexts. Traditionally paired with Herbert Spencer and Marcel Mauss, he is now discussed with Max Scheler, Zygmunt Bauman, Thomas Sellars, Emmanuel Levinas, Axel Honneth, Michel Foucault and Niklas Luhmann, which are evidently an eclectic mix of writers. It has also recently been argued that he is both the founder of phenomenological sociology and one of the initiators of collective intentionality. Durkheim scholarship is equally not just confined to Western Europe and North America as witnessed by a resurgence in Turkey and Latin America. This shows that Durkheim is not, as is commonly assumed, a thinker confined to his time, place and discipline. Durkheim is a writer who has great contemporary relevance; it is perhaps surprising that more of the recent scholarship has not sought to investigate more thoroughly his solidarity writings. The contemporary relevance is something that will be argued for in this chapter, as well the conclusion to the thesis.

Finally, there has been a great deal of scholarship on specific aspects of Durkheim’s work, particularly on his three major works *The Division*, *The Elementary forms of the Religious Life*,

---


and *Suicide – A Study of Sociology*. There has also been some fantastic work that has developed links between these studies. Most notably, the attempts to convey the collieries between his understanding of solidarity in *The Division* and what he says about how groups are maintained in *The Elementary forms* usefully clarifies Durkheim’s position on mechanical solidarity. Equally, there has been sustained treatment of the role of anomie put forward initially in *The Division*, and how it operates in *Suicide*. However, what has not been discussed in any great detail is the relationship between his theory of solidarity in *The Division* and how it relates to his work on morality and education; this is something this chapter aims to address.

Durkheim’s most sustained treatment of morality and education are found firstly in a relatively unknown set of lectures, titled *Moral Education: A Study in the theory and Application of the Sociology of Education* and second in *Education and Sociology*. Durkheim is rightly known for being a pioneer of sociology, but he actually spent a great deal of his professional life working on pedagogy. In fact when he finally arrived at the Sorbonne in 1902 he took over the chair of Education. Despite Durkheim’s long and committed interactions with education both in terms of actually teaching students who were training to be teachers and through his writings, he is rarely seen in this light. Equally he is not often considered a moral philosopher even though, as will be shown, morality is at the heart of his ideas. Indeed, the last thing that he planned to write was a book on morality of which he only managed the introduction.

However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to prove that he should been seen as a pedagogical thinker or as a moral philosopher, although he was both. It is rather to show the potential of reading his moral and educational writings alongside *The Division*, something that has not been done in a sustained way before. This will allow certain contours and elements of solidarity to be brought to light that are not emphasised or are assumed in later discussions of

---

solidarity and will indicate aspects of solidarity that are uncomfortable, contradictory and problematic.

The discussion of Durkheim is made up of two chapters. The main line of argument that will run through both chapters centres on Durkheim’s claim in The Division, that solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon. Chapter one examines how solidarity is understood in The Division, this being the place where he sets out most clearly his theory of solidarity. It will be demonstrated that morality grounds his theory and that everything can be traced back to it. This is a controversial claim, in a sense, as it is more common to assume that sociological categorisation is the underlying motivation. However, by examining how law and individuality relate to his theory of solidarity and how that relates to morality, this is shown to not be the case. This is initially performed through utilising Durkheim’s famous mechanical and organic solidarity types. The argument is that morality is at the root of solidarity for Durkheim, but crucially he does not adequately explain what he means by morality. Additionally, his two types of solidarity should be seen as falling under one model, social solidarity. These two aspects are important for the more general considerations of this thesis. The importance of morality (or ethics in some cases) to the underpinning of how and why solidarity is directed under differing and highly demanding circumstances, requires a robust articulation of what that morality consists of. This was partly what was being discussed in the last chapter, that at times of social distress or crisis, the rules of who to hold within your sphere of solidarity become very important. This will be shown in the conclusion to the thesis to be equally as important in terms of understanding any interaction between solidarity and crisis. This chapter will also introduce what this thesis argues is Durkheim’s version of crisis, namely anomie. This is not a straightforward synonym interchange here, but it will be argued that there are enough similarities between the two for a productive discussion.

Chapter two builds on the need to better ascertain what morality is for Durkheim by turning to his work on moral education. The thought is that if his theory of solidarity relies on his understanding of morality then only by understanding his theory of morality can there be an understanding of his theory of solidarity. A similar structure is used in chapter two, as in chapter one, with an examination of authority and liberty. It will show that these two concepts map onto law and individuality in The Division and that they raise similar issues concerning solidarity. The aim is to be able to show with more clarity what Durkheim means by morality and therefore to be able to return to one of the initial threads running through the chapters, that solidarity is a moral phenomenon. The reason that this is so potentially important to the more general trends and discussions in solidarity theory is that it could exclude economic
accounts. Additionally, if solidarity is morality then it perhaps energises it to be more of a command than a choice. This could have ramifications for solidarity theories that do not acknowledge an obligatory character for solidarity as discussed in the previous chapters. The implications of Durkheim’s theory will be discussed in the conclusion to this chapter with specific reference as to how it relates to crisis and broader considerations for solidarity theory.

Chapter 1: Solidarity in *The Division of Labour in Society*

Durkheim distinguishes two types of solidarity; mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity is associated with primitive, small-scale societies that have high levels of homogeneity.\(^\text{129}\) Durkheim understands solidarity in this case as deriving only from the common bond of sentiment and of a shared morality. Therefore individuals are not held together in societies of this sort through mutual independence or reciprocal relations. Anthony Giddens describes this simple form of society as held together through “an aggregate” not dependent unity.\(^\text{130}\) This means that one part of the unity can be lost without losing the unity itself, as each individual part is not required for the whole to function. This form of solidarity has social relations and customs regulated through a rigid adherence to values, beliefs and morality that are shared by all. This is why mechanical solidarity is often used by Durkheim and his commentators interchangeably with the conscious collective.\(^\text{131}\) The solidarity of this type of society is a form of domination of the individual, as Giddens notes, “there is only a rudimentary development of individual self-consciousness”.\(^\text{132}\)

Organic solidarity is characterised as encompassing high levels of individuality, and a well-developed division of labour. Despite the rise of individuality the division of labour acts as a surrogate for the loss of bonds maintained through likeness. Through working in ever more differentiated occupations the individual also comes to see how much their autonomy rests on a dependency on others, through the division of labour.\(^\text{133}\) The reciprocal nature of the bonds that are formed initially for material need also, according to Hawkins, “generate moral bonds

---


which are primarily concerned with the coordination of social functions rather than with the control of individual behaviour."

Mechanical and organic solidarity are both described through what type of law is operative, what the relationship between the individual and society is, noting levels of social control and autonomy and finally through what sources of morality there are and how shared morality is maintained. There are other elements that make up the definitions such as religion, the family, occupational groups and the State, however, law, autonomy and morality are the most relevant for the purposes of this chapter as they also play a prominent role in his moral educational philosophy. There will obviously be some overlap between these elements and where necessary these will be noted. Firstly the role of law will be discussed for both mechanical and organic solidarity, this will be followed by autonomy. In each case the relationship with morality will be explored. There will also be a discussion of anomie, the term Durkheim uses to denote when either of the types of solidarity or the elements within them are not running as they should be. It will be argued that anomie is inseparable from an understanding of solidarity and that it can help to inform solidarity debates outside of the confines of Durkheimian scholarship. Equally, although not in a straightforward sense, anomie could be seen as a form of crisis. Anomie understood in this way as forming part of a descriptive criteria that links in the strongest sense crisis and solidarity, is something that will be returned to later in the thesis.

The Law, the individual and morality

What can be objectively examined as the facts of the social structure stem from studying the judiciary, with its rules and judgements; these support and co-create social solidarity. Durkheim, in a way that anticipates Habermas, states this position clearly in the Preface from the first Edition:

In particular, it will be seen how we have studied social solidarity through the system of juridical rules, how in the search for causes, we have laid aside everything that too readily lends itself to personal judgements and subjective appraisal – this so as to penetrate certain facts of social structure profound enough to objects of the understanding, and consequently of science.\(^{135}\)

By juridical rules Durkheim is really referring to what he will at length discuss throughout the book, namely, law. Durkheim uses law in ambiguous ways that are difficult to translate into English, the word he uses is ‘droit’ that sits somewhere between law and morality. Lukes and


135 Ibid. pp. xxix.
Scull point out that Durkheim “tended to see law as derivative from and expressive of a society’s morality.”¹³⁶ Morality for Durkheim is a social fact, one that can be expressed through examination of the law, taken to mean both retributive and restorative law and moral norms or oughts (meant in the Kantian way). Thus, for Durkheim law becomes of central importance to much of his project and crucial for understanding his version(s) of solidarity.

In mechanical solidarity, the law is almost exclusively that of repressive criminal law. Crime and punishment are the main devices of this form of law and are enacted on individuals who transgress the collectivity; who challenge the way of life of the whole or infringe the shared beliefs and values of the society. The consequence of this as already stated is that the individual must be fully integrated inside the community; the law prevents the community of likeness from disintegrating. Mechanical solidarity as a bond can therefore be witnessed in terms of repressive law, but only when the law is broken. Additionally, the act of breaking the law must be seen to be a crime, a crime that has a punishment. It is a moment when collective consciousness is affronted. It is the going against the collective that is a crime, the act itself is not a crime.¹³⁷ The condemnation and the actual realisation that there has been a violation at all, is the place where the bond of solidarity can be located. Durkheim writes, clearly linking solidarity, law and crime when he states that: “[t]he bond of social solidarity to which repressive law corresponds is one the breaking of which constitutes the crime.”¹³⁸ Equally, later in the same passage he highlights the importance of recognition to his understanding, stating: “[u]ndoubtedly essential resemblances exist not only among all crimes provided for in the legislation of a single society, but among all crimes recognised as such and punished in different types of society.”¹³⁹ Punishment is then the means by which the violation or violator can be confronted. The affronted feeling (e.g. anger/hurt/fear) is channelled appropriately through the mediating institution of repressive law. Durkheim summarises this as follows:

Thus punishment constitutes essentially a reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organised body over those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct.¹⁴⁰

This furthers Durkheim’s case that mechanical solidarity is an expression of the similarity to be found within the community. This is what is happening when someone transgresses a particular law, one that is a direct challenge to collective consciousness; meaning that most

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 31.
¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 31.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 52.
individuals in a given group agree that it is a breaking of a rule, one that is commonly 
recognised by most, if not by all. It is what is held in common, that can be seen in the other, 
which has been challenged. Therefore a punishment (which is really also an acknowledgment 
that a law has been broken) is given out to, in effect, retain the sameness that holds the 
society together. Where punishment is not debatable or discussion as to whether a law has 
been broken are minimal, this indicates that there is a strong common notion and 
understanding of mechanical solidarity. In methodological terms, the law and the extent to 
which it maps onto the moral sentiments of a society indicates the relative strength of 
solidarity. Hart, in an influential and much discussed article, states this in the following way:

According to Durkheim the law presents a faithful mirror of both forms of solidarity, 
and can be used as a gauge of the relative importance at any time of the two forms 
[mechanical and organic solidarity]. The criminal law, with its repressive sanctions, 
reflects mechanical solidarity; the civil law reflects organic solidarity, since it upholds 
the typical instruments of interdependence... ¹⁴¹

This is the orthodox understanding of mechanical solidarity, that it is formed through small 
undifferentiated groups that share a rigid common set of beliefs or common conscious that is 
held together through adherence to repressive law. Durkheim notes that this is often 
undergirded by adherence to a particular religious hegemony. This is something that is 
discussed at length in the Elementary Forms but is touched on only sparingly in The Division.¹⁴²

Durkheim’s account can be expanded further by turning to how he understands rights. 
Durkheim claims that there are two kinds of juridical rights, the first ‘real’, the second 
‘personal’. Property and mortgage are real, the credit to buy the property is personal. Real 
rights then, give “preference and succession”, essentially it makes possible the, ‘that is mine’ 
statement. This for Durkheim is solidarity that is real i.e. tangible, it is the relationship or bond 
between an individual and some object.¹⁴³

What is interesting about Durkheim’s analysis here is that he uses ‘real’ rights to indicate what 
is going on in the division of labour, in part at least. This gives weight to the claim being made 
that mechanical and organic solidarity are not exclusive forms of solidarity. It also helps give a 
partial explanation for how Durkheim sees change occurring between these two poles of 
solidarity. When personal relationships are formed through ‘real’ rights the outcome is not a 
unified social whole, it does not bring together different elements, rather it separates them. 
Durkheim goes as far as to say that they act as a wall between different elements in society.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p. 72.
The point he is making is that ‘real’ rights are or contain the negative qualities of solidarity, although strictly speaking this is not the exact inverse of solidarity. Instead, it is that they exhibit what is negative in all manifestations of solidarity. Therefore Durkheim is able to claim that justice as in repressive law is not only a part of mechanical solidarity, it is instead a “necessary accompaniment to every kind of solidarity.”

Durkheim makes the further claim built on this conclusion that justice is “necessarily encountered everywhere men live a life in common” through the division of labour “or from attraction of like to like.” Understood in this way solidarity, at either end of the spectrum, involves justice.

The transformation from these earlier societies towards the complex societies that developed thereafter was for Durkheim the result of the observable law of the division of labour, made necessary mainly due to increased population size and larger geographical territory. This is accompanied by increasing interactions between individuals that helps to create the possibility for there to be a division of labour. The division of labour that arises seemingly as a general movement has at the same time to keep step with the moral consciousness of the collective that the individual belongs to. Durkheim thinks there is a choice between resisting the general development of the division of labour and therefore to be “only a part of the whole” or to think that the moral duty of the individual is to become a “complete creature, a whole sufficient unto itself.”

Durkheim responds to this choice is in the following way:

> In short, whilst the division of labour is a law of nature, is it also a moral rule for human conduct and, if it possesses this last characteristic, through what causes and to what extent? There is no need to demonstrate the serious nature of this practical problem: whatever assessment we make of the division of labour, we all sense that it is, and increasingly so, one of the fundamental bases of the social order.

Whatever the broader implications of this slightly tautological statement, it is clear for Durkheim that moral law and the division of labour are crucial for organic solidarity, and as such, for maintaining society. Whereas in mechanical solidarity there was no division of labour, only the law supported by shared morality, when a society advances into a stage where there is a division of labour the moral law must be realigned. As Lukes and Prabhat point out, “organic solidarity, when functioning ‘normally,’ is supposed to render capital – labor relations more just.”

---

144 Ibid, p. 77.
145 Ibid, p. 77.
146 Ibid, p. 3.
147 Ibid, p. 3.
It is a stage in between that contains conflict and social distress because the division of labour outstrips the moral consciousness. The term Durkheim uses to describe this stage is anomie. Anomie occurs at the moment of transformation as an expression of, to use Müller’s formulation;

economic crises - the antagonism between capital and labor, and anarchy in science – arises at times of rapid change, during which new organs and functions develop without a corresponding development of rules of cooperation, and therefore of social ties.  

What is important to realise however, is that this moment of anomie is not a crisis of the system itself, it is rather that adaptation to the new forms and functions present within the system have yet to be realised. Essentially, at the moment of transformation the bond of interdependence has yet to be reached, something which can and will be overcome through incessant interactions. It is through these interactions that morally constituted law will be produced that will form the counterweight to the new divisions of labour. It is at this moment that organic solidarity becomes substantiated as a “new functional equilibrium” one that can balance the now differentiated functions and as such guarantee social integration.

Durkheim’s anomie as set out in The Division is vastly underrepresented and under-appreciated in the secondary literature, with some notable exceptions. Much of the literature tends to subsume the anomie condition either into organic or mechanical solidarity or derives it from his work Suicide. However, it is possible to detect some important points of disagreement on how anomie is interpreted. What is at stake is how a society moves from one type of society to another, why it does this, what part or parts are retained or are necessary for the latter and which factors are really doing the work. Understanding the movement of change stemming from the newly arrived division of labour, Hawkins writes the following of the transition:

Shared values and repressive penal sanctions do not disappear completely, but they play a relatively minor role in the maintenance of solidarity in advanced societies, where the division of labor itself becomes a source of cohesion. As work becomes increasingly specialized, so do individuals become more dependent upon one another for the satisfaction of their needs. Under normal circumstances these

---

150 Ibid. p. 80.
relations of reciprocal dependence generate moral bonds which are primarily concerned with the coordination of social functions rather than with the control of individual behaviour. This normative order is upheld by a system of cooperative laws with restitutive sanctions which act to ensure continuity and equilibrium.153 This is how Hawkins explains what he calls the direction of social evolution, whereby the division of labour creates the conditions for there to be moral bonds of solidarity exhibited in organic solidarity. This interpretation implies an economic dependence that leads to a moral one, it is an idea that relies on the presumption that the satisfaction of needs (material needs) is what drives the uniting force of the division of labour. Although Hawkins does not address anomie directly on this point, it appears that it arises in the gap between the arrival of the division and the as yet to arrive symmetrical morality. The tensions in society stem from a loss of shared identity, as the collective bonds of mechanical solidarity are yet to be replaced with new forms that correspond to the division of labour. Repressive law wedded to moral similitude assures that the common conscience is maintained. Once this grounding is weakened, as happens apparently with the rise of the division of labour, law becomes something removed, even oppressive to the individuals of the given society. Etzioni exemplifies this position when he states that:

Without bonds, people’s profound need for social attachments are frustrated and they are open to demagogic appeals. Without a shared moral culture, ordering life will have to rely on laws not undergirded by moral commitments, which is both highly ineffectual and has numerous ill consequences as we learned during the Prohibition and from the current war on drugs.154

Etzioni’s key concern is how “social moral order [can] be regained.”155 Like Hawkins there is a presumption that morality is lost somehow and that it needs to be found again. Following this is the further assumption that what makes society possible is commonly held morality that must be given agency in law. Although this is certainly in keeping with a partial reading of Durkheim’s own view, it is far from actually being convincing. For example, the material needs that Hawkins takes to be leading to moral counterparts are not according Durkheim at least the source of the morality, as “they correspond to needs, but these needs are not moral ones.”156 Equally, Durkheim writes that “if the division of labour does not produce solidarity it is because the relationships between the organs are not regulated; it is because they are in a state of anomie.”157

Anomie is given a slightly different perspective by Meštrović and Brown, who point out that rather than the above characterisation of anomie as meaning something like normlessness, deregulation or normative confusion, it should be thought about as a form of derangement.\footnote{Meštrović, S. G. and H. M. Brown, (1985) ‘Durkheim’s Concept of Anomie as Délèglement’ Social Problems, 33:2, p. 81.} They also want to make clear that it is felt individually as well as societally as “a painful state or condition.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 81.} They argue, that actually far from being a stop-gap between two positions that of mechanical and organic solidarity in the trajectory of The Division, a necessary explanatory linking device, anomie could or should be understood as the theme of the whole book. Anomie, they write “is the obverse of justice and that “Durkheim considers anomie evil because it causes suffering.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 89.} Their point is that The Division can be read as being “highly critical of Western culture as a whole” and that the anomie ‘stage’ is more reflective of how Durkheim understands his contemporary world and, I would add, it is how he comes to comprehend solidarity in its negative form.\footnote{Durkheim, E. (Trans: W. D. Halls) ([1894] 1984) The Division of Labour in Society, Hong Kong: MacMillan Education, p. 322.}

The readings of anomie as just presented both have merits, however comparing them is somewhat problematic as there is divergence in their original positions. This divergence stems from their understanding of the function of law for Durkheim. Law can be seen as the concrete way to discern the current level of progress in a given society, a way of identifying what point has been reached. This is the teleological version of Durkheim’s project and one that can be identified in his work, inviting the interpretation that there is a natural path that is followed; one that can go wrong, but nevertheless a yardstick for comparison. This view rests mainly on the assumption that Durkheim is giving an actual history of societies, albeit a partial one, and that more or less the current status quo is near enough the final stage. In a similar vein morally constituted law will, if it has not already, catch up to the new demands of the division of labour and equilibrium will be restored. The other view would have law with its two ideal forms; one mechanical and one organic, as a rhetorical device used by Durkheim as a form of critique. This critique model relies on a notion that Durkheim required a recognisable object to extol about, one that his readers would identify. It also sees the ideal forms of law as representations that allow the actual state of affairs to be understood. The pure forms of the types of law that he discusses have no precedent historically; they have always been and will always be a mixture. This gives additional reason to think that likewise mechanical and organic solidarity are also inseparable.
Greenhouse, in a recent article, sets out additional possible ways to understand the role of law in *The Division*, in a similar vein as the second of the above interpretations. She argues that the battleground over law in Durkheim is highly important as she writes:

> Law features prominently (if not always explicitly) among current critical projects, as debates over Durkheim’s contributions to sociology overall hinge to a large extent on what scholars take to be the legal implications of his ideas of solidarity and collective consciousness, or conscience.\(^{162}\)

Greenhouse sees that the conventional reading of Durkheim is the functionalist one that assumes that the point of law is to give social structure agency. Law therefore is “social coordination, mediation, and [the] institutionalization of norms wherever these are manifest.”\(^ {163}\) Instead she argues that the:

> “[L]aw is his literal pretext for distinguishing between meaning and function and for committing sociology to the science of relations among meaning-making subjects in spaces made visible by law’s absence, failure, and moral dubiousness.”\(^ {164}\)

Greenhouse sees law acting as a placeholder both for Durkheim’s purposes and in society. It is a way to make the bonds that do bind people together visible and comprehensible.

Acknowledgement of law as performing this revealing mechanism works with any formulation of law. As Greenhouse points out, “Retribution and restitution are hallmarks by which mechanical and organic solidarity become recognizable to readers.” Additionally, law is essential as “it provides people with the assurance that they do not live for themselves alone.”\(^ {165}\) Thus law should actually be read as a sign that allows access to the two types of solidarity. Organic solidarity in particular is something that is a “logical inference” that fails the evidential test, it is something that can be felt, not seen.\(^ {166}\) Organic solidarity is a change in self-knowledge connected with identity and the widening of diversity. The diversity that occurs through the division of labour acts to enable greater levels of personhood, through the self-realisation that the meaning of difference is what creates the individual, not changes in the organisation of work. Greenhouse points out that:

> One observation that follows from understanding identity as shifting with the form of solidarity is the recognition that the phrase “division of labor” is not a metaphor for industrial work organization, but a literary foil that ironizes modernity by discounting industrial work organization as the source of its advancement.\(^ {167}\)

---


\(^{163}\) Ibid, p. 172.

\(^{164}\) Ibid, p. 172.

\(^{165}\) Ibid, p. 174.

\(^{166}\) Ibid, p. 176.

\(^{167}\) Ibid, p. 178.
Greenhouse’s argument here clearly contradicts what has been said previously in this chapter, which sees the division of labour being the source of organic solidarity. It also challenges the teleological assumption about the projection of society. What is perhaps the most telling contribution that Greenhouse makes is what she takes to be Durkheim’s concern with origins. She argues that Durkheim’s interest in origins stems from an understanding of possible “emergence and... contradiction” not “with a particular evolutionary sequence.”

Organic solidarity therefore does not originate in time, “but in the imagination”, through the possibility of self-knowledge/identity.

Returning to law and with Greenhouse’s formulation in mind, what Durkheim wants to know is what links any individuals with any form of solidarity, what it is that binds them together. Here, morality and its expression in law are given this propensity, as Durkheim states:

> Law and morality represent the totality of bonds that bind us to one another and to society, which shape the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate. We may say that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces man to take account of other people, to regulate his actions by something other than the promptings of his own egoism, and the more numerous and strong these ties are, the more solid is the morality.

Following what has been said, it does not make sense to continue with a strict division between mechanical and organic solidarity, although it will be helpful at times to continue to refer to them for points of clarity. Instead, understanding Durkheim’s methodology as one that is utilising certain rhetorical devices as indicated by the above quote; it is more productive to think of them as encompassing one elastic form – social solidarity. His two forms of solidarity are taken to be representations of ideal forms that are used as exemplars enabling him to isolate key components of solidarity.

The argument will now move on to discuss law alongside individual autonomy and its relationship with morality. Durkheim thinks that individuals in a certain sense gain more and more autonomy, whilst curiously becoming ever more dependent on society. What can solve this conundrum, for Durkheim, is to understand that the balance within social solidarity has

---

171 It is tempting to interpret Durkheim empirically, indeed that was one of his key aims when establishing sociology as a discipline, however, it has been proven quite categorically and from very early in on in the secondary literature that his empirical claims in *The Division* at least are just wrong. The studies that he relies on have been shown to be methodologically faulty and the data that he does use is patchy and was outdated soon after he used it. This, however, is a problem for sociology not for solidarity and as will be argued it makes much more sense to approach Durkheim as a theorist than as an empirical positivist or at least is far more productive. See: Merton, R. K. (1934) ‘Durkheim’s Division of Labor in Society’ *American Journal of Sociology*, 40:3, pp. 319-238; Hart, H. L. A. (1967) ‘Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality’ *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 35:1, pp. 1-13.
been radically altered by the division of labour. Hence to understand the question ‘how is society possible?’ is to understand how the division of labour works with the individual and morality. Durkheim reveals his starting point in the following way:

The question that has been the starting point for our study has been that of the connection between the individual personality and social solidarity. How does it come about that the individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends ever more closely upon society? How can he become at the same time more of an individual and yet more linked to society? For it is indisputable that these two movements, however contradictory they appear to be, are carried on in tandem. Such is the nature of the problem that we have set ourselves. It has seemed to us that what resolved this apparent antimony was the transformation of social solidarity which arises from the ever-increasing division of labour. This is how we have been led to make this subject of our study.\textsuperscript{172}

So what is the problem for Durkheim? He takes the division of labour, like other phenomena, to be a law of nature whilst also being a moral rule, governing human interactions and conduct.\textsuperscript{173} How can it be both and how much control can it exert? The way Durkheim addresses this question is in his methodological approach. The division of labour even as a literary foil should be analysed, examined and explained in terms of how it functions in correlation to specific needs.\textsuperscript{174} These needs, however, could be seen as firstly economic needs as discussed, for example industrial employment requires both the inventor and the toilet cleaner (or think of Adam Smith’s tiresome pin factory, where presumably the addition of people who would like or feel that they need pins is also required). This however is still not corresponding or actualising moral needs.\textsuperscript{175} Therefore it is not yet an explanation of “social solidarity [as] a wholly moral phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{176}

However, taken in a slightly different direction, there is also the question for Durkheim as to whether social solidarity arises only when one individual can see themselves in the other. Simply stated, is social solidarity born of similarity or even sameness? Part of what Durkheim is attempting is to see whether this latter claim is an essential characteristic for contemporary society’s social solidarity. However, again, as social solidarity is a “wholly moral phenomenon” being able to observe and evaluate it is very difficult even when morality is understood as a

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, p. 24.
social fact. Durkheim thinks that he has found a placeholder in the form of the law, as representing symbolically the moral essence of social solidarity.

Locating the individual from this picture is reached through a similar strategy. It is important to stress that the idea is not to look at individuals directly as that would be to become muddled up with psychological manifestations of social solidarity. Individual psychology cannot for Durkheim free itself from becoming fungible, contaminated by subjective experience and ultimately obscure to an observer. What can be studied or at least viewed is what is external to the individual, the outcomes or consequences that occur in the realm of the social. To get a clearer understanding of the individual and its accompanying autonomy it is necessary to return to the trajectory of societal development. This is because the individuals’ social position, is where the law, autonomy and morality intersect to form social solidarity. Overall, one of the key things that Durkheim is attempting throughout The Division is to account for changes over time in the moral outlook or collective consciousness of societies. Durkheim defines the collective consciousness in the following way:

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness. Undoubtedly the substratum of this consciousness does not consist of a single organ. By definition it is diffused over society as a whole, but nonetheless possesses specific characteristics that make it a distinctive reality. In fact it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals find themselves. Individuals pass on, but it abides.

The collective consciousness has often been seen as synonymous with mechanical solidarity. A simplistic reading of Durkheim that collapses the collective consciousness into mechanical solidarity argues that when mechanical solidarity subsides and is replaced with organic solidarity (more closely associated with modern nation states), that the collective consciousness also disappears. There tends to be an acceptance that it continues for a time (not stated specifically either by simplistic readers or by Durkheim) where there is a lag between the rigid totalising beliefs of the previous society and their inevitable evaporation in the eventual society to come.

179 Ibid, p. 27.
Durkheim contends that the collective conscience and the individual tends towards ever greater rationality, which conversely acts as a challenge to the already existing collective beliefs. For as collective consciousness becomes more rational it seeks to be able to accommodate new levels of individuality. In some ways this anticipates the way in which Habermas articulates sociability as rational justice and more generally his well-known theory of the rationalisation of the lifeworld. More will be said about this connection in the Habermas chapters. It is not simply the case that the historically categorical judgments of repressive law are completely abandoned as a new form of rationality comes in. Rather, a process of acknowledgement of the procession of the past and its legacy to the present is both realised, critiqued and to degrees accommodated.  

Alternatively, in the transition phase, anomie leads to a questioning of some of the moral judgements of a given society; the morality of the previous society cannot accommodate all that is new in the changing development of social, economic and political relationships. However, it is through building upon the traditional morality the collective consciousness of a society, that it is re-evaluated and altered and ultimately settled again. It is a process, not a replacement; this is not a revolution. How the moral landscape is altered, how individuals substantiate and negotiate new forms of interactions and how solidarity can be seen as the bond that keeps the whole thing from falling apart, is what Durkheim is looking for. Durkheim is (partly) a sociologist, so this is not necessarily a metaphysical debate about morality; stating that:

Moral facts are phenomena like any others. They consist of rules for action that are recognisable by certain distinctive characteristics. It should thus be possible to observe, describe and classify them, as well as to seek out the laws that explain them.

Morality for Durkheim is also context specific, it can be read through the social structure of society. Durkheim is attempting to learn and present the rule book of his present society, what makes the present society possible and to what extent a critique of the present society could be utilised to create a better future, although in the main not in programmatic way. As Merton, an early and highly influential commentator on The Division, comments that “[t]he inviolate unity of a group becomes imperative during inter-societal conflicts, and this unity is largely achieved through appeals to common sentiments.”

---

182 Ibid, p.333.
Thus, after the period of transformation or anomie (or crisis) that must occur after leaving the community of mechanical solidarity there is what Durkheim identifies as organic solidarity. Organic solidarity is based upon economic exchange relations, however, unlike Spencer for example, this is not to be understood as stemming from self-interest. Durkheim’s characterisation of organic solidarity must be put in context, although it is never fully clear whether he is being descriptive or slips (perhaps inadvertently) in a prescriptive account. The period in France that was described in the first chapter of this thesis was the backdrop for Durkheim’s writing. That a transformation had taken place in France that was neither a categorical break with the past nor settled without a demanding set of altercations, perhaps required Durkheim to bring forth a version of society’s function that had cognisance of the requirement to see other people as demanding moral agents. The question of morality is ever present in Durkheim’s description of organic solidarity, thus self-interest understood as the pure freedom to pursue individual aims misses a fundamental element as Durkheim states in a forceful passage:

> We may say that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces man to take account of other people, to regulate his actions by something other than the promptings of his own egoism, and the more numerous and strong these ties are, the more solid is the morality.\(^\text{186}\)

Therefore the necessary specialisation of production that is driving the division of labour is only made possible through the relationships with others based on commonly held beliefs and norms. Durkheim does not see this as a check on freedom but rather as a way of enabling freedom. Giddens describes this argument succinctly by stating that:

> Freedom consists, not in escape from social forces and social bonds, but in the autonomy of action that membership of society makes possible. In the simple societies, the dominance of the conscience collective limits the scope of individual action: this situation is transformed by the process of social development, not however by destroying moral authority, but by altering its form.\(^\text{187}\)

The question for Durkheim is how to maintain the individuality of the individual within the complexity of modern societies. His answer appears to be that individuality is firstly expressed through the specialisation of the division of labour and then maintained through the moral law of social interchange or organic solidarity. Durkheim thinks that the ability to specialise and thus to differentiate oneself from the whole, something that is impossible in mechanical solidarity, is predicated on belonging to and maintaining social bonds that are the moral glue that holds the conditions for such specialisation together. Ever increasing division of labour

---

\(^\text{186}\) Ibid, p. 331.
creates even greater need for solidarity as specialisation of function can only operate if it is one part of a collective whole; the specialisation on its own would have no function as it could not be utilised in its own right, only when put in relation to the other specialised divisions. In a long passage Durkheim articulates perhaps what an ideal form of the division of labour would look like under organic solidarity:

The division of labour supposes that the worker, far from remaining bent over his task, does not lose sight of those co-operating with him, but acts upon them and is acted upon by them. He is not therefore a machine who repeats movements the sense of which he does not perceive, but he knows that they are tending in a certain direction, towards a goal that he can conceive of more or less distinctly. He feels that he is of some use. For this he has no need to take in very vast areas of the social horizon; it is enough for him to perceive enough of it to understand that his actions have a goal beyond themselves. Thenceforth, however specialised, however uniform his activity may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for he knows that his activity has a meaning. The economists would not have left this essential characteristic of the division of labour unclarified and as a result would not have lain it open to this undeserved reproach, if they had not reduced it to being only a way of increasing the efficiency of the social forces, but had seen it above all as a source of solidarity.188

Durkheim uses the analogy of the family to bolster his claims round the nature of the division of labour. The argument runs in the following manner: The family has, over time, become more and more dissociated, in terms of function. In early forms of the family, tasks would be performed in a unified manner, however, they (the tasks) are now performed in a unitary way, assigned through gender, age and dependency. This movement according to Durkheim creates a specialisation of the domestic sphere, a division of labour that has in his eyes, come to dominate “the whole of development of the family.”189 Durkheim uses the example of the family to make clearer his more important argument relating to cooperation. Once cooperation operates as a division of labour then that relationship, supported by restorative repressive law, expresses relations of solidarity that can be seen to arise directly from the social division of labour.190

Durkheim seeks to present two aspects of a positive solidarity that arise from the division of labour. In the first the solidarity is the link formed between a person and the society without remainder. The second is a dependency relationship whereby the person relies on the segmented parts that make up the society.191

189 Ibid, p. 79.
190 Ibid, p. 82.
191 Ibid, p. 83.
Taken a step further, what the two aspects are in essence are different perspectives on society. The first type stems from the collective unity of a society that holds to common beliefs and sentiments. The second type is that society is seen to be held together through a series of specific relationships born of specific functions. The relationships are concrete and come to be identifiable through the division of labour. The point Durkheim is attempting to make is that aspect one and two of positive solidarity belong to the same society, two sides of the same coin.\textsuperscript{192} The aim for Durkheim is to distinguish between the two, given that they are part of the same real society, understood as a kind of oscillation between the two aspects. Aspect one, the collective type, at its most extreme or “maximum” is when the conscience of the group coincides completely with the individual.\textsuperscript{193} This makes individuality impossible, there is only us the “collective being”.\textsuperscript{194} Although Durkheim does have some empirical data to back up this claim, it is clear that it is more a possible or even illustrative example than an actual reality. This is mechanical solidarity in its most robust formulation.

In type two, or organic solidarity, ‘real’ rights that regulate the relationship between the individual and society are to be understood as the same as that between the individual and an object of property, for example. The individual belongs completely to society and moves in step with it. The individual is practically an inanimate object in the hands of society. The progressive linear element of Durkheim’s theory is that historically societies have high levels, if not complete, homogeneity but that over time the disintegration of the homogeneity occurs, thanks to the increasing division of labour.

The division of labour is to replace the lost bond that existed in mechanical solidarity. Essentially it takes the place of collective consciousness and with that its moral authority; particularly, the movement away from a totalising religious world view. Again it is important to note that this is not strictly speaking an economic explanation, it is above all a moral one.

In organic solidarity the homogenous nature of functional tasks gives way to specialist roles, which become ever more divided. The solidarity that existed in the previous undifferentiated model is transferred to the essentialism of differentiation of the division of labour. What is significant about this shift, is that society is bound no longer by shared beliefs, history etc. but instead by work or more correctly professionalism. Solidarity, when the professional division of labour comes in its most maximal state (according to Durkheim), comes to be the social and political organisation of the society. Much of what has been discussed thus far can be

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, p. 84.
illustrated in the following quote, the relationship between the individual and society and indeed what it means to be an individual is explored:

Social life is derived from a dual source, the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the social division of labour. In the first case the individual is socialised because, lacking any individuality of his own, he is mixed up with his fellows in the same collective type. In the second case it is because, whilst his physiognomy and his activities are personal to him, distinguishing him from others, he depends upon them to the extent that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the society that is the result of their combining together.\footnote{Ibid, p. 172.}

As discussed already this description allows the individual to establish its individuality, whilst at the same time becoming even more tied to the collective. A person’s individuality is only made possible through the performance of the social division of labour which is the society: Division of labour as society. Durkheim’s discussions tend to move in the margins beyond what could feasibly actually happen as a tactic to illustrate his arguments. Therefore the above situation for example, he goes on to qualify, requires something as yet not mentioned, the State.

The State’s role is to encapsulate the individual contacts, to give it a shape or limit to operate within, crucially guaranteeing recourse to repressive measures. There then is the return of an element of mechanical solidarity. The State on behalf of society performs punishment. It upholds community; the solidarity of sameness. As such “it is charged with reminding us of the sentiment of our common solidarity.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 173.} The State also has another crucial role and that is to ensure that education is provided for all. It is this aspect of the State that will be discussed further in the next chapter.

This chapter has been a discussion of how Durkheim understands solidarity working in The Division. What has been made clear is that Durkheim sees there being various tensions existing within society, between the individual and society, between morality and law and between pure forms of solidarity and concrete reality. Arguments have also been presented that seek to show the more radical ways that Durkheim can be understood. As such it has been suggested that Durkheim’s use of the mechanical and organic distinction be understood as an allegorical device. The consequence of this interpretation is that it collapses the two types of solidarity into one elastic form. This is important if solidarity is going to be used as a critical tool for investigating contemporary social and political questions, i.e. whether it is mechanical or organic has consequences. If, as has been argued here, it is nearly always going to be a combination of both, in fact, that they could be considered symbiotic; this is going to impact what kind of analysis can be done using a solidarity framework. What will be explored in the

\footnote{Ibid, p. 172.}
next chapter is moral education, which it will be argued is a substantiation of the tension that exists within this definition of solidarity; the tension between the mechanical and organic strands with their ongoing relationship to anomie or crisis.
Chapter 3: Durkheim: Solidarity and moral education

Locating and analysing the role of morality has been the task of the last chapter. This part aims to interrogate further what morality means, how it is maintained for the purposes of solidarity within society and how it may be altered. The way in which law and the individual will map onto a similar two part analysis, that will examine authority and liberty will reveal a very similar set of conditions as to law and individuality. Reflections on this continuity, along with the added clarity that will be given to morality will enable a more adequate understanding of solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon, than has previously been possible by looking only at *The Division*. The conclusion of this second chapter will go on to indicate ways in which this could impact on solidarity theories more generally.

Beginning from how he understands the tension that exists within individuality, Durkheim states the following dualistic approach and purpose of education:

> In each of us, it may be said, there exists two beings which, while inseparable except by abstraction, remains distinct. One is made up of all the mental states that apply only to ourselves and to the events of our personal lives: this is what might be called the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, sentiments and practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are apart; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or professional traditions, collective opinions of every kind. Their totality forms the social being. To constitute this being in each of us is the end of education.\(^{197}\)

This passage reveals Durkheim’s construction of the problem as witnessed (although not stated in these terms) in organic solidarity. When Durkheim abandons the terminology of mechanical and organic solidarity after *The Division*, it has been argued he abandons the ideas that support their characterisation. I will argue that this is wrong. It is true that he no longer refers to the two types of solidarity, however, as was indicated at the close of the last chapter, mechanical and organic solidity can be thought of rather as making up one social solidarity. Equally, the concerns that he has regarding how society is possible, the concerns that he addresses through his discussion of solidarity, are (it will be shown) very similar to the concerns that he articulates in his discussions on moral education. Likewise, although discussions of solidarity using the term are rare, most if not all of his elements, conditions and consequences of solidarity are very much of central importance. Why Durkheim decides to drop the aforementioned formulation of solidarity is not clear, however, it may be that he saw that he had drawn too distinctive a line between the two, one that had led to misinterpretation of his work. It could also simply be that the technical language and

explicatory work that would be needed to accompany references to those types of solidarity were unsuitable for the different audience of his moral education, namely trainee teachers.

This chapter will be structured in the following way; firstly a summary of Durkheim’s position will be given, paying close attention to how his ideas about education and morality relate to questions of law and individuality. Durkheim’s position will then be mapped back onto the discussion above, indicating areas where a combined reading can yield a clearer understanding of how to understand his solidarity position. This fuller picture of solidarity will then be discussed in conclusion alongside the key questions of the thesis, most importantly, how it can be used as a critical tool in contemporary social and political debates and how it relates to crisis. In particular the inclusion of education within the solidarity construction raises new, difficult and potentially significant questions.

Turning now to Paul Fauconnet, in his introduction to Durkheim’s *Education and Sociology*, he writes the following, looking back on *The Division*:

His first work, *The Division of Labor in Society*, offers a whole philosophy of history in which the genesis, the differentiation, and the freeing of the individual appear as the dominant trait of the progress of civilization, the exaltation of the human person, as its actual limit.198

History and knowing how one comes to arrive at a certain point in the development of a society was important in *The Division* and remains an important theme throughout his writing on education. Right at the start of *Education and Sociology* Durkheim claims “that to establish the preliminary notion of education, to determine what is so called, historical observation is indispensable.”199 This is because Durkheim thinks that individuals themselves cannot say to what education aims, as it must involve tradition and customs over which they have little to no control. Education has many functions in society for Durkheim, equality of opportunity, maintenance of a certain amount of necessary homogeneity, preparation for a diverse specialised society200 and finally; “Education is, then, only the means by which society prepares, within the children, the essential conditions of its very existence.”201 Durkheim addresses these functions through three main themes, liberty, authority and morality. Like the previous discussion on solidarity in *The Division* this chapter will firstly look at the individual as linked this time with liberty, then authority that is coupled with discipline and ultimately with law. In each case it will be shown that it is morality that regulates the relationship between these two sometimes opposed themes. It will be shown that morality is the way that Durkheim

201 Ibid, p. 71.
understands society and with that a way to make sense of the claim that solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon.

**Liberty and Authority**

Liberty and authority have sometimes been opposed, as if these two factors of education contradicted and limited each other. But this opposition is factitious. In reality these two terms imply, rather than exclude, each other. Liberty is the daughter of authority properly understood. For to be free is not to do what one pleases; it is to be master of oneself, it is to know how to act with reason and to do one’s duty. Now, it is precisely to endow the child with this self-mastery that the authority of the teacher should be employed.\(^{202}\)

Intuitively it does appear that liberty is at odds with authority in their purest forms. However, as was seen in terms of the discussion with individuality in the last chapter, Durkheim is apt to present the conditions for the possibility of one thing in the realisation of its apparent opposite. In the aforementioned case, you are an individual because you are in society, there is no individual without submitting to sociality. In this case, something very similar is going on, whereby to really experience what liberty is in its fullest sense, requires submitting firstly to an authority, in this instance the teacher. This is what at first sight appears to be highly problematic in Durkheim’s account. It sounds initially like it is forcing the individual to submit to authority and the consequences for free action that that entails, whilst arguing that this makes the individual free. It will be argued that Durkheim is able to make the two work together in the way that he envisions them, however, in the final analysis it will be shown that by doing that solidarity itself becomes, potentially, highly problematic.

Authority, which is closely associated for Durkheim with discipline, is a requirement and part of morality as shown by the following statement: “Morality... constitutes a category of rules where the idea of authority plays an absolutely preponderant role.”\(^{203}\) As should be clear by now, Durkheim is entrenched as a moral thinker and thus authority which, he sees as an essential and real social fact, could not be anything other than an expression of morality. As Nisbet remarks, “Authority not only buttresses morality; in a real sense authority is morality.”\(^{204}\) One of the purposes of this chapter is to find out what Durkheim means by morality, to therefore be able to address what solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon means. If then authority is morality as Nisbet suggests, then would solidarity also be authority?

\(^{202}\) Ibid, pp. 89-90.


Seeing whether this is actually the case will require presenting how Durkheim expresses authority and how it works in conjunction with other key Durkheimian concepts.

There are two dualist constructions in Durkheim that will help to illustrate his position on authority. The first is one that maps clearly back onto his work in *The Division*, that presents two forms of society; mechanical and organic solidarity. The other is with his notion of the *Homo duplex*, the dualism that is contained within each individual, exemplified by the quote that opened this chapter. This sees there being an on-going struggle between the ego of the individual and their moral responsibilities as part of a society. On the question of the first dualism, Giddens writes that; “Durkheim quite clearly intended his general account of morality to be both compatible with, and read in the light of, the transformation of moral standards that has been brought about by the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity.”

As seen in the previous chapter the movement from mechanical to organic solidity involves changes in the way that morality operates. The challenge that Durkheim sets himself in his writing on moral education is a way to smooth the transition, to retain an awareness of the historicity of morality, whilst allowing for new forms of morality to emerge out of the older conceptions. As Durkheim writes:

> We must discover, in the old system, moral forces hidden in it, hidden under forms that concealed their intrinsic nature. We must make their true reality appear; and we must find what comes of them under present conditions, where even they themselves could not remain immutable.

And slightly earlier in the same chapter and with shades of Marx: “To orient them in that direction it is not enough for him to conserve the past; he must prepare the future.”

One of the problems for Durkheim is locating a viable replacement for the erosion of religious authority, without throwing out what he sees as the still requisite moral elements that make society possible in the first place: “In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for those religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas” as “there is nothing in reality that one is justified in considering as fundamentally beyond the scope of human reason.” And again that “[t]here is no people without morality. However, the morality of undeveloped societies is not ours.” It is this oscillation between the morality that is part of mechanical solidarity and the morality
operative in organic solidarity as an ever moving object that Durkheim is attempting to give structure and rational understanding.

It is in moral education that part of the answer lies, although, it should be noted that education exists because society exists and that it is in a very real sense a reflection of a particular society. Durkheim believes this very strongly and states that his “aim is not to formulate moral education for man in general; but for men of our time in this country.”211 This position has led some commentators, such as Mitchell, to argue that Durkheim wished “to maintain ... [and] strengthen the French nation” and that his nationalism tended towards a defence of the uniqueness of the French people marking a jingoistic quality to his thought.212 Giving weight to this argument is a statement that Durkheim makes in the first draft of his unfinished book on ethics:

The morality which a nation subscribes to expresses its temperament, its mentality and the conditions in which it lives. It is a product of its history and an integral element of all civilizations. Yet, whereas all civilizations have a common basis, they resemble one another only in their most general features. Each has its own particular character and therefore depends only in part upon human faculties in general. The same may be said of morality.213

Durkheim certainly sees that what he is doing, particularly with regards to morality, as context specific. In contextual terms Durkheim was fighting for what he saw as a French republicanism under threat from both the church and a particular strain of traditional conservatism that wished to restore France’s pre-revolution character. Through his educational thought he thinks that he has found a way to combat these tendencies and additionally, to move France into a more rational moral equilibrium. However, precisely because Durkheim offers a particularistic non-transcendental version of morality, one that “is not immutable: despite the respect with which it is vested, it is alive, constantly changing and evolving. The future will have a different ideal from that which obtains now.”214 Durkheim is able to offer a way of examining and thinking about morality as a social fact, one that changes over time and is historically grounded. It is Durkheim’s methodology or rather his moral philosophy that retains interest outside of his intended target. Likewise, although Durkheim claims to be merely addressing the French context he slips into more general positions so often in his writing that it is hard to

---

211 Ibid, p.3.
214 Ibid, p. 81.
collaborate his initial motive. Take the following statement for example, where he brings in authority, of which we will now return:

Indeed, history records no crisis as serious as that in which European societies have been involved for more than a century. Collective discipline in its traditional form has lost its authority, as the resulting general anxiety demonstrate.  

Or here, where he moves from the nation to humanity in a statement that foreshadows latter discussions of human rights:

If one loves his country, or humanity in general, he cannot see the suffering of his compatriots – or, more generally, of any human being – without suffering himself and without demonstrating, consequently, the impulse to relieve it.

It will be demonstrated in what follows that Durkheim does offer a non-context specific way of thinking about morality. It is important to show this as it adds weight to the idea that Durkheim retains relevance beyond traditional context. Keeping that in mind and returning to authority, Durkheim in a chapter titled *The First Element of Morality: The Spirit of Discipline* says the following two things about the nature of morality and subsequently the role of authority, from this it will be possible to build up a picture of how he understands authority (as expressed through discipline) and how it can be thought as moral. Firstly, Durkheim states:

> [O]ne can inquire what morality ought to be only if one has first determined the complex of things that goes under this rubric, what its nature is, what ends it serves. Let us begin, then, by looking at morality as a fact, and let us see what we are actually able to understand by it.

Secondly,

> Thus, we can say that morality consists of system of rules of action that predetermine conduct. They state how one must act in given situations; and to behave properly is to obey conscientiously.

Durkheim chooses his words carefully here, so when he uses the term conscientiously he is referring to “moral conscience” that “is so often envisaged as a kind of voice which is heard within us, even though we are for the most part unable to say what it is or whence it derives its authority.” Durkheim describes this feeling in different terms when he writes that: “When a normally constituted man tries to behave in a way repugnant to morality, he feels something that stops him just as clearly as when he tries to lift a weight too heavy for him.” What

---

216 Ibid, p. 83.
Durkheim needs to demonstrate is that the authority that is created through education is what creates this feeling or conscience.

It is important to note again that Durkheim understands education as a part of society or indeed perhaps an ideal community. So when he states that, “[w]hen our conscience speaks, it is society speaking within us. The tone with which it speaks is the best demonstration of its remarkable authority.” The way that society breaks into the individual is through education or at least it should be. Durkheim recognises that the family plays a part, although he thinks that it should be kept to a minimum and that religion and other social groups equally can infer moral consciousness on individuals. However, the best way that Durkheim sees as having a just society is when education is taken out of the aforementioned hands. Education is a way to preserve the unity of a society that comes with acknowledgement of a shared history, traditions and moral laws, yet it also must be a vehicle for equality and give rise to individuals who can mould out of pre-existing moral norms, new and fairer laws. About equality Durkheim writes that, “[i]t is evident that the education of our children should not depend upon the chance of their having been born here or there, of some parents rather than others.” The second point is more complex, Durkheim sees that there must be a degree of preservation of past generations whilst at the same time allowing for there to be the possibility to develop new moral standards, with each passing generation having the ability to leave their mark on the development of their society. The following two passages highlight this tension and open up the role that authority will play in the discussion:

For in order that the legacy of each generation may be able to be preserved and added to others, it is necessary that there be a moral personality which last beyond the generations that pass, which binds them to one another: it is society. Thus the antagonism that has too often been admitted between society and individual corresponds to nothing in the facts. Indeed, far from these two terms being in opposition and being able to develop only each at the expense of the other, they imply each other. The individual, in willing society, wills himself.

Here, Durkheim can be seen to be invoking a similar argument to the one that he gives in *The Division*. The balancing act between mechanical and organic solidarity is tied to tradition and individuality. As noted above it is clear that there is a requirement that both types of solidarity are present. The second passage refers directly to the role of education:

The influence that it [society] exerts on him, notably through education, does not at all have as its object and its effect to repress him, to diminish him, to denature him.

---

222 Ibid, p. 68.
223 Ibid, p. 78.
but, on the contrary, to make him grow and to make of him a truly human being. No doubt, he can grow thus only by making an effort. But this is precisely because this power to put forth voluntary effort is one of the most essential characteristics of man.224

The rejoinder to this passage is that, “[n]ow, it is precisely to endow the child with this self-mastery that the authority of the teacher should be employed.”225 Therefore it is not just the authority to impose a rule for that amounts to simply the power to force submission. The individual or child in this case must also acknowledge the superiority of the authority: “By authority, we must understand that influence which imposes upon us all the moral power that we acknowledge as superior to us.”226 The particular moral rule, is not what is important, it is moral rules in themselves that are important. Moral rules are equivalent to a command and as such “permits no equivocation.”227 They are also regular in their application and as such work as a guide for conduct. Repetitive conduct requires the addition of what is central to his account of authority in the Moral Education, discipline:

Discipline in effect regularizes conduct. It implies repetitive behaviour under determinate conditions. But discipline does not emerge without authority – a regulating authority... we can say that the fundamental element of morality is the spirit of discipline.228

This has a practical purpose as well as purely moral ends as it takes some of the hard work away from the individual; they do not need to in each case that calls for an ought, work it out for themselves. This is a part of daily life and not tied to metaphysical or transcendental thought. Here, Durkheim is concerned with the proper running of an effective society. It can also be read as defending the individual both against his own desires as in the homo duplex and the smooth running of society. As he writes:

At each point in time, it is necessary that the functioning of familial, vocational, and civic life be assured; to this end, it is altogether necessary that the person be free from an incessant search for appropriate conduct. Norms must be established which determine what proper relationships are, and to which people conform. Deference to established norms is the stuff of our daily duties.229

On the one hand authority and discipline have a regularising function that creates a society for the individual with predictability as well as the assurance of a shared moral community. On the other hand discipline, in particular, has the further function that it helps to moderate the

224 Ibid, p. 78.
225 Ibid, p. 90.
227 Ibid, p. 31.
228 Ibid, p. 31.
desires of the individual and to promote morality. Durkheim thinks that when an individual does not have checks on their goals, or does not have achievable goals, that they will become deeply unhappy and will be less able to act morally. This can be through the lack of financially imposed restraint:

Through the power wealth confers on us, it actually diminishes the power of things to oppose us. Consequently, it lends an increment of strength to our desires, which makes it harder to hold them in check. Under such conditions, moral equilibrium is unstable: it requires but a slight blow to disrupt it.

Or through an excess in the society itself that acquires an aspirant environment that is unachievable for most individuals. This would be a society where individual desires, the ego side of the homo duplex, were not kept in check through moral discipline. What Durkheim means by this is that individuals come to have unrealisable goals and that as these goals cannot be reached the individual therefore lacks a determinate object for its energy. This is why a wealthy individual can feel the distress of this as well as someone of lesser means. The removal of self-discipline also takes away a pathway for the individual robbing them of the satisfaction of completing projects and so on. The wealthy person who has more obvious means for attaining what they want is tied, according to Durkheim to ever increasing desires, as there is not a determinate end point:

A need, a desire freed of all restraints, and all rules, no longer geared to some determinate objective and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it.

The problem of “infinite aspiration” is what creates the malady that has afflicted Durkheim’s own society, and perhaps is the characteristic of his historical age. As Durkheim does in The Division, there is indicated a normal and an abnormal state of affairs. The above is the abnormal whereby, individual desires take control but yet cannot be satisfied leading to the state of anomie as described earlier. The normally functioning way that things should work is the following:

Morality is a comprehensive system of prohibitions. That is to say, its objective is to limit the range within which individual behaviour should and must normally occur.

And:

---

230 Ibid, p. 47.
231 Ibid, p. 43.
234 Ibid, p. 42.
Morality, we have said, is basically a discipline. All discipline has a double objective: to promote a certain regularity in people’s conduct, and to provide them with determinate goals that at the same time limit their horizons. \(^{235}\)

Through these two forms of discipline, regulation and limited horizons, it is possible to have liberty: “Through the practice of moral rules we develop the capacity to govern and regulate ourselves, which is the whole reality of liberty.” It is the function therefore of the school to instil in the individual this discipline so that when they enter society as an adult they have the ability to feel actual liberty. Hookway remarks that morality unlike in the Kantian sense, “must come from something higher than the self; the self cannot be a source of morality.”\(^{236}\)

Hookway is evoking more general social structures and does not refer directly to education, however, it seems clear that Durkheim sees the school and the teacher as embodying this higher authority. Cladis, in a very influential piece, argues that what is important about education is that it enables individuals to know about the traditional, beliefs, values and moral laws as they are a part of the society that they belong to. It is not however, according to Cladis, that these children are indoctrinated into submitting but that they come to see rational reasons for their existence. Equally, having a knowledge of a wide range of competing deontological schemas allows a society to exist that is pluralistic and democratic. As Cladis writes:

> Autonomous agents are those who are aware of the social and historical warrants for moral beliefs and practices, and who are thereby free to embrace and criticize them. Autonomy, then, is an important virtue to inculcate in young citizens of modern, pluralistic democracies, for these societies benefit from an active citizenry that explores present social practices, asks for reasons and pursues just reforms.\(^ {237}\)

The picture that emerges is one that Durkheim thinks is paramount to the continuance of his society and those like it across Europe. The loss of traditional authority rooted in religion and other forms of mechanical solidarity has been severely loosened at the same time as unchecked individualism has increased incessantly, something Hookway labels ‘cultural pessimism’.\(^ {238}\) Durkheim needs to find a way to replace this loss of traditional authority as well as nurturing a non-destructive individualism. This is something that he thinks that he has found in his moral education and as seen earlier with the replacement of religion with the supra-

\(^{235}\)Ibid, p. 47.
individual. The following two passages both highlight what is at stake for Durkheim and what he sees as the solution:

For we are living precisely in one of those critical, revolutionary periods when authority is usually weakened through the loss of traditional discipline – a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy. This is the source of the anarchic aspirations that, whether consciously or not, are emerging today, not only in the particular sects bearing the name, but in the very doctrines that, although opposed on other points, join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regulation.  

And the solution:

Moral action pursues impersonal objectives. But the impersonal goals of moral action cannot be either those of a person other than the actor, or those of many others. Hence, it follows that they must necessarily involve something other than individuals. They are supra-individual.

The supra-individual is society for Durkheim and as such is the object of, and generator of, morality. The authority and discipline that the individual requires and that society sets up as a duty and obligation stems from society, which is what gives it its force. So whereas it might appear that discipline is something individual, as Cladis argues, when he likens it to “Nietzsche’s will-to-power, that is, the will to master one’s life” it is actually a means of asserting the community:

Discipline seems to be one thing, and the collective ideal to which we are committed another, quite different thing. As a matter of fact, however, there is a close connection between the two. They are only two aspects of the same, single reality.

Morality is the resource that only a society can use and as such the individuals’ existence within that society is held in place through morality. There is however an element of the construction of morality and authority which could be seen as a necessary illusion. With the replacement of religious/traditional authority there is a void left that must be filled, as described in the above manner. However, it is hard to reconcile morality and with that authority as a social fact, with how he characterises it in the following passage, although it does appear to retain its concrete manifestation:

\[\text{Authority is a quality with which a being, either actual or imaginary, is invested through his relationship with given individuals, and it is because of this alone that he is thought by the latter to be endowed with powers superior to those they find in themselves. It is of no importance, as a matter of fact, whether these powers are real or imaginary. It is enough that they exist as real in people’s minds. The sorcerer is an}\]

authority for those who believe in him. This is why authority is called moral: it is because it exists in minds, not in things.²⁴³

This does not give the individual the compelling rational reasons to submit to discipline and authority yet. That comes through the realisation that is instilled in children through school that they are obligated in a very strong and actual way to the society that they are a part of. Society, with its history and its hard won self-determination, and cultural and material accomplishments, creates a debt for the individual:

> For it is society that is the repository of all the wealth of civilization; it is society that accumulates and preserves these treasures transmitting them from age to age; it is through society that those riches reach us. Thus it is that we are obligated to society, since it is from society that we receive these things...One can understand, therefore, how a powerful morality, of which our conscience is merely a partial embodiment, must be invested with such authority.²⁴⁴

Therefore it is what society gives to the individual that both binds it to society and the other individuals occupied within it. The need for a moral restraint that is charged with the authority of societies’ gifts to the individual has “a double aspect: on the one hand, as imperative law, which demands complete obedience of us; on the other hand, as a splendid ideal, to which we spontaneously aspire.”²⁴⁵ There is a threat to this state of affairs and one that can been seen as Durkheim’s critique and explanation of what he sees as anomie type society, to which he belongs. This critique mirrors the former critique (as discussed in the previous chapter) that as mechanical solidarity with its collective discipline breaks down, and with the as yet unrealised organic solidarity of diversity, there is a period where there is only the ideal. The means for striving for the ideal, the duty to obey moral law is too weak and as such the ideal can never be reached. Durkheim is not calling for a rigid imposition of moral law, he instead thinks that this time of anomie has the potential for developing new forms of morality that better reflect the changing conditions of society. This is always a risk for Durkheim and is why he thinks that through moral education, the adults of the society to come must be instilled with a belief in the authority of society: “We ourselves noted that it was especially essential to feel the necessity of moral rules at the time when one was working to change them.”²⁴⁶

The transition out of anomie and into organic solidarity is problematic for Durkheim especially if only *The Division* is taken into account. If it is the case that society becomes the determiner of change and holder of authority, the individual, albeit with increased self-determinism and freedom, must surely be incapable of realising the ideal. However, what Durkheim argues in

Moral Education is that individuals that have received the appropriate schooling, whilst understanding the importance of historically constituted moral law, will also be able to, through knowing the moral law as co-created through society, see that it can also be altered by individuals working within society. This is why Durkheim can say that: “New ideas of justice and solidarity are now developing and sooner or later, will prompt the establishment of appropriate institutions.”

Certain conditions have to be met before this can occur; the old authority of religion has to be replaced with adherence to the idea that society represents the supra-individual. The human being has to become sacred rather than profane. Humanity must become the ideal end of the way that a society can express itself as “the raison d’être of the nation.” Durkheim makes clear that it is not enough to simply have discipline as in mechanical solidarity, there is also a requirement that individuals understand why they should submit to authority. Knowledge of the moral laws of a given society is the prerequisite for organic solidarity. Knowing that moral laws are the product of human hands, gives a “clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons for our conduct.” It is “[t]his consciousness [that] confers on our behavior the autonomy that the public conscience from now on requires of every genuinely and complete moral being.” Therefore, in its most well developed formulation “morality is the understanding of it.”

This chapter has argued that moral education and solidarity in Durkheim can be read together in a productive way. There has been an attempt made, which is rarely done in the solidarity literature on Durkheim, to understand what he means by morality in non-sociological ways. It has been shown how his construction of morality, how it is maintained and possibly altered relates to the previous discussion of solidarity. This chapter has also demonstrated the importance of morality to understanding solidarity, raising important questions that any theory of solidarity would have to answer, relating to the legitimacy of authority and recourse to tradition. It has also highlighted an underdeveloped, interesting and significant question relating to how solidarity is instilled in an individual. Is the classroom the right setting? What other communities within a given society can lay claim to this authority, such as family or religious association? At what point can there be a legitimate challenging of the morality that underpins solidarity in a given society? And finally, what role does education have to play within that?

247 Ibid, pp. 102-103.
249 Ibid, p. 120.
Conclusion

In conclusion these chapters set out to present, in a new way, Durkheim’s theory of solidarity. It has been shown that law, individuality, authority and liberty create the possibility for both the creation and maintenance of solidarity as well as allowing access to it. It has been argued strongly that they are manifestations of a broader grounding in morality, one that becomes visible in these social constructions. It has also been argued that morality remains an elusive concept when analysed in The Division; something that is rectified through analysis of Durkheim’s moral education project. The final conclusion, that to know what morality consists of, is essential to being moral, logically means as solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon that it is essential to have understanding of solidarity to be in solidarity. Having an awareness of solidarity, even not named directly, appears to be a high bar to its realisation, just as becoming a ‘complete moral being’ does. Likewise, the argument that has been made that Durkheim does not actually think that there are two separate types of solidarity, rather two aspects contained within one form, raises important questions about the status of solidarity more generally.

What was discussed in the last chapter was the birth of modern solidarity in France and its development into an array of competing meanings. Therefore the problem is that, although solidarity is invoked in many different contexts, genres of thought and political, economic and religious praxis, the term is rarely clarified. The consequence of which is that it becomes hard to at times compare, contrast and critique, evocations of solidarity. Therefore if Durkheim’s formula, as articulated above, has merit then it indicates that rather than there being a simple contradiction in appropriation of solidarity, that perhaps instead they can be held within the same broad conceptual framework. That there are some things that pertain to most if not all forms of solidarity and that their variety is more in terms of degree than outright incompatibility. This will be a problem that will be returned to later in the thesis.

Other potentially significant implications that follow from the investigation into Durkheim’s solidarity theory are the following. Firstly, if solidarity is to be used as part of an explanation of how society is possible, how it functions and recreates itself and interacts with other societies, then it must take into account the role of law, individuality, liberty and authority. As how would talking about solidarity and society make sense without them or something close to them being part of the discussion? Further, and this would apply to all forms of solidarity, is morality an essential part of what solidarity is? Could it be conceived in non-moral terms? Also, is Durkheim’s need (however well argued) for discipline and obedience stemming from adhence to the traditions and historical progress of a given society/nation, something that is
compatible with solidarity theories that seek to overthrow existing power structures? Equally, is the moral relativism implied by Durkheim, strong enough in the long run to support a form of solidarity capable of holding a complex modern society together?

These are the key questions that Durkheim raises and ones that will inform the discussions in the coming chapters on Habermas. If nothing else, Durkheim offers a well worked out, defensible definition and explanation of solidarity that can be used as a yardstick against which the other solidarity theories can be measured, and a framework from which they can be discussed.
Chapter 4: Habermas and the struggle for universal solidarity: Historically contingent solidarity

Jürgen Habermas, perhaps more than any contemporary writer, has solidarity at the centre of his thinking. It is, as Max Pensky has written, “the golden thread that connects the range of projects grouped together in what has come to be known as “discourse theory”.” From at least his mature work on communicative action in the late 1980s Habermas has been attempting through various schemas to articulate what solidarity is and what its role has been, is now, and could look like under altered social and political conditions. As with Durkheim in the previous chapter, solidarity comes to be both a crucial part of the explanation of how premodern states become modern nation-states, as well as the basis for Habermas’s vision of a post-national theory.

However, despite the importance of solidarity to Habermas’s project, except for Pensky, William Outhwaite and William Rehg, there has been little sustained scholarship in the area. Many of the most influential commentaries on Habermas fail to acknowledge the central position of solidarity, or ignore it altogether. This is made all the more surprising when it can clearly be shown to be tied to some of his most over-analysed ideas. For example, he frequently writes that solidarity is the reverse side of justice; justice being essential to an understanding of Habermas’s discourse ethics. Elsewhere, it is one of the “three major forces” that hold a state together, the other two being money and administrative power. Finally, it is clearly fundamental to perhaps his most famous theory, that of communicative action. There could be a number of reasons why solidarity has had this lack of attention. It could be that, as is being argued throughout this thesis, it is the nature of solidarity itself as a seemingly chaotic, inarticulate and chameleon concept that its understood (if it is addressed at all) as not equal with other more established concepts, such as freedom, justice, equality etc. Another reason could be that Habermas is not forthcoming with a detailed account of solidarity. So although it appears (fleeting) at times throughout his work post- *Theory of Communicative Action*, there are only a few instances of sustained treatment. Likewise, it is rarely the sole focus of a text and in nearly all cases where he uses the concept, there is not a clear definition given. This last

---

consideration would not matter, if it was not the case that he does give lengthy and careful definitions of other concepts. Whatever the reasons may be, and it is probably a combination of the above, there has been far too little attention paid to solidarity in the secondary literature. Therefore one of the aims of this chapter is to argue that Habermas should be considered a solidarity thinker, in much the same way as Durkheim is often characterised. However, Habermas will be shown to be a solidarity thinker more through implication, as the main aim of this and all the chapters is to try to illustrate and understand what solidarity is, or what it’s possible meanings could be. The aim ultimately is to explore solidarity through a close engagement with Habermas’s writing.

It would be impossible to do justice to the entirety of Habermas’s engagement with solidarity. Instead this chapter will attempt to indicate the major positions that Habermas has on solidarity. There is also not a straightforward way of structuring Habermas’s positions on solidarity, as shifts in his position are not clearly marked. They vary in relation to the broader object of study, the discipline that a debate is being situated in or the addressee of his comments. For instance when the object of study is the European Union he emphasises different qualities of solidarity than when he is presenting his theory of communicative action. Likewise, when Habermas is discussing solidarity in relation to law, in, for example, Between Facts and Norms, this is a discussion that is situated within a particular legal discourse one that does not lead to easy comparison with for instance, his writing on Kohlberg in Justice and Solidarity. Finally, there are the sometimes overplayed differences between his public writing and speeches, and his academic writing. Highlighted in the case of solidarity, with the comments in a speech given in 2013 Democracy, Solidarity and the European Union, in which he says that solidarity should not be thought of as “synonymous with “justice” ” something that is clearly implied by numerous comments elsewhere. The problem of squaring public with academic pronouncements notwithstanding, it is nevertheless hard to form a straightforward development in Habermas’s various uses of solidarity. One option would be to chart solidarity through his work whilst citing the various ways in which the term alters. This would certainly reveal that solidarity undergoes many important changes in Habermas’s work. However, this is not meant to be an intellectual history of Habermas’s treatment of solidarity.

---


Rather, the various manifestations of solidarity act as representative of more broadly held positions. The different positions of Habermas fall under three headings. They reflect progression through time but are not tied to Habermas’s own writing chronology. Therefore, the first chapter will focus on how Habermas understands solidarity historically. This will have several different strands. First, there are the grand historical narratives that involve the creation of nation-states at the end of the 18th century, the development of modern capitalism and latterly welfare-capitalism. This is in keeping with classical sociological and historical questions, culminating in the question of ‘how is society possible?’ Parallel, although often discussed separately, is the role of personal history; or socialisation. This is key for understanding Habermas’s thinking on solidarity, the interplay between the grand historical schemes and the very personal lived history of individuals. This dialectic can be seen in many of his most well-known ideas: for example in the interaction between lifeworld and system.

Taking a historical stance on Habermas’s approach to solidarity will allow for both a greater understanding of how his thinking on solidarity evolves through and is grounded in historical reality and historically lived experience. And this will reveal the tensions that exist in his treatment and presentation of solidarity, something that will ultimately give greater clarity to more fundamental questions of solidarity itself. The question of historical scale both in terms of time and individual lived experience is very important to the ways that solidarity are thought about. In particular for the questions being raised by this thesis, if solidarity (as I contend) is partnered with crisis, on what level does this operate? Does it describe a structural crisis that would derive its explanatory power from its ability to help to explain how a particular society can be understood to be in ‘crisis’? Could it make sense to explain a personal crisis as deriving from a lack of solidarity? In a sense it will be shown that solidarity is used on both of these levels, albeit in divergent ways. Therefore, when it comes to addressing the broader argument of the thesis, which is that solidarity accompanies crisis and yet is too ill-defined, within this tradition, to be the route out of it; it matters where solidarity is situated.

Chapter 5 approaches solidarity in Habermas from a presentist or theoretical stance. Here, what is examined is how Habermas describes and analyses solidarity in relation to his contemporary reality. What his contemporary reality is, changes of course, and this can be seen to lead to changes in how he writes about solidarity. There is a clear difference between the pre- and post- worlds of divided and then united Germany. Likewise, a more integrated, less economically dependent European Union alters how he conceives of the role of solidarity. The difficulty that will be explored in these chapters is how to identify, what for Habermas is the case for, solidarity ‘now’ i.e. a descriptive account of what solidarity does in his
contemporary understanding of (in particular) welfare capitalist societies of which he is a part. And conversely, what solidarity should be i.e. a prescriptive account of what solidarity should be doing, but is not. The line between these two positions is at times blurred and unpicking the descriptive from the prescriptive in his writings on solidarity will be the main part of this section. Through this analysis we get a clearer sense of what Habermas’s distinctive idea of solidarity is. The section builds on the previous one by indicating the historical nature of Habermas’s solidarity. Again, it will be argued that Habermas’s use of solidarity in this setting, to address contemporary social and political reality, is most useful when viewed as a critical tool. To clarify, it will be shown that Habermas uses solidarity to replace the need for a normative critical position that would rely on metaphysical or religious justification. This second Habermas chapter can be seen to be the end point of the project that was initiated by Durkheim that was discussed in the previous two chapters.

The third section is more firmly centred in a future oriented perspective. It is in this section that the culmination of the previous two sections will be brought to bear on what Habermas wants solidarity to become. The setting for the discussion is how he attempts to address concerns around multicultural societies but more crucially how he envisions a post-national globalised world, one that would have solidarity as a crucial component. Ultimately what will be argued in this section is that when Habermas attempts to move beyond the national or European setting for the possibility of a more global solidarity, his theory becomes unsuccessful. This will be shown through an analysis that confronts his own historical narrative of solidarity formation with that of a post-national one. The latter relies on an understanding of human rights and a certain strain of universalism that it will be argued is not sustainable, either theoretically within his own thinking, or as a practical program to be developed with some slight amendments that would be broadly in keeping with his framework, as some have tried to do. 255 The conclusion of this section, however, is not intended to be negative, as with the rest of the thesis, it will be argued that precisely at those points at which solidarity reaches its limits is where it is at its most instructive in terms of what it can offer by way of social and political critique. It will also be hoped that by the end of this section on Habermas it will be shown that solidarity as articulated within this dominant European tradition has reached its end point. Although Pensky and others have argued that his version of solidarity is the end

point but, that it can still be salvaged, the proposal that will be made is that it cannot. This ultimate exhaustion of the possibilities of even the constellation of solidarity, has consequences for the contemporary welfare state as well as a crisis in the lifeworld.

**Chapter 1: Historically contingent solidarity**

Habermas uses history in various different ways when discussing solidarity. Firstly, he understands the origins and creation of nation-states, as coupled with the influence of prior religious and enlightenment ideas. The rise of the nation-state is a history of conscious or semi-conscious transformation. It involves the territorial transformation from early modern states in Europe to, at the end of the 18th century, what could be identified as the modern nation-state. This transformation Habermas argues has coercive and conflict driven characteristics. Nevertheless the birth of the modern nation-state coincides for Habermas with the creation of a particular form of solidarity, one that is a necessary part of the process. The other long-term historical narrative that Habermas relies on for his explanation of the role of solidarity in nation-state formation, is the intellectual effects of religion and the Enlightenment. The basic idea that will be explored below is that Habermas sees solidarity stemming from a particular grounding in a Judaeo-Christian tradition that is then overlaid by certain ideas of the Enlightenment. In both cases the political and intellectual history that Habermas draws upon is almost exclusively the history of Europe.256

The second way in which solidarity is historically contingent is in his theory of socialisation. In some ways his theory is similar to prior thinkers such as Hegel and Durkheim, but in other ways, such as how the individual can act contrary to some forms of socialisation, he is marking out different territory. Socialisation, as was seen in the previous chapter in Durkheim’s prescriptive analysis of education, is the place where the individual learns the norms of a particular society or community. As such, it is through socialisation or the history of individual lived experience that solidarity is formed, reformed, acted upon, transgressed and enforced. How the process of socialisation, or lifeworld, interacts with the long durée of historical change, helps Habermas to make important claims about how solidarity is created, maintained and (as will been seen near the end of this chapter) transformed in the future.

**History: the nation-state and Religious and Enlightenment ideas**

The moment of nation-state building that occurs around the time of the French Revolution in Europe coincides for Habermas with the arrival of a new form of solidarity. On the timing he is

---

256 This is something that will be examined and critiqued as it raises important questions about the viability of this traditions version of solidarity. However, this does not preclude the usefulness of his thinking in this area.
correct, as shown in the first chapter. However, what his emphasis or explanation is tied to is his own theoretical framework, as he writes in a very recent lecture addressing concerns around the European Union in 2013:

The concept of solidarity first appeared in a situation in which revolutionaries were suing for solidarity in the sense of a redemptive reconstruction of relations of reciprocal support that were familiar but had become hollowed out by the surpassing processes of modernization.257

The transformation towards nation-states requires for Habermas a form of solidarity that can answer the longstanding problem of social order, perhaps most famously articulated by Hobbes. Habermas understands solidarity as having to contend with some of the same problems that Hobbes identifies, such as that of the free rider and why laws are obeyed when punishment is unlikely. The drive towards modernisation identified in the above quote creates additional concerns. The history of modernisation is difficult to track, even when viewed only in European terms. Rates of modernisation and the establishment of nation-states are uneven across Europe, with some places such as England and Holland experiencing early forms of industrialisation (often seen as a necessary element of modernisation) much earlier than elsewhere, in France for example.258 Likewise, the now fairly stable nation-states of Europe were secured relatively recently, with perhaps the most important example being the creation of Germany as late as 1871.259 The uneven progression of modernisation that occurs in Europe should be kept in mind, however many historians reluctantly utilise the French Revolution of 1789 to mark the end of early modern Europe and the beginning of modern Europe. Habermas’s remarks roughly follow this latter demarcation.260

In Habermas’s early writing, and to lesser degree in Communicative Action, he is fairly close to a Durkheimian understanding of this transformative process of modern nation-state building.


This can be seen in the following passage that is in reference to Durkheim’s critique of Spencer, that cooperative money ties would not be enough without moral norms to hold together organic solidarity. However Habermas offers a decisive critique to Durkheim’s position:

On this account, there would have to be a causal connection between the growing differentiation of the social system and the development of an independent morality effective for integration. But there is scarcely any empirical evidence for this thesis. Modern societies present us with a different picture. The differentiation of a highly complex market system destroys traditional forms of solidarity without at the same time producing normative orientations capable of securing an organic form of solidarity. On Durkheim’s own diagnosis, democratic forms of political will-formation and universalistic morality are too weak to counter the disintegrating effects of the division of labor. He sees industrial capitalist societies driving toward a state of anomie. And he traces this anomie back to the same processes of differentiation from which a new morality is supposed to arise “as if by a law of nature.”

Aside from highlighting the well-known empirical deficiencies of Durkheim’s account, Habermas sees a further problem with his argument, stemming from the possible origin of a new morality. Habermas does however concede that there is a need for a new normative moral basis to support the new form of solidarity. His criticism of Durkheim, although relying on a fairly traditional interpretation of his work, does raise an important consideration. If it is the case that differentiation is the site where the new morality is to be generated, and if that proves to be inadequate on Habermas’s reading, then where does it arise from? Importantly, Habermas does think that a new form of morality is produced, however, he argues that it stems from a pre-existing cultural base.

In the nineteenth century, the peoples of Europe – each on its own, of course – were faced with a structurally similar problem. A European identity, which today has to be created from a communicative context stretching over national public spheres, was at that time the product of national consciousness. Of course, the idea of the nation in its populist version led to devastating acts of exclusion, to the expulsion of enemies of the state – and to the annihilation of Jews. But in its culturalistic version, the idea of the nation also contributed to the creation of a mode of solidarity between persons who had until then remained strangers to one another. The universalistic reformulation of inherited loyalties to village and clan, landscape and dynasty was a difficult and protracted process, and it did not permeate the entire population until well into the twentieth century, even in the classical nation-states of the West.

---


262 The interpretation given in the previous chapter would perhaps be more difficult to dismiss. However, whether Habermas reads Durkheim in keeping with the way I think he should be read is not what is important here.

This lengthy passage summarises much of how Habermas understands the creation of this new form of solidarity, one that is fit for the more complex, differentiated and populous modern nation-state. The key aspects of Habermas’s explanation build from an already existing cultural basis stemming from and informing a national consciousness. The basic move that Habermas articulates is that the solidarity that was present in the loyalty of traditional forms of bonding between people becomes capable of expanding to incorporate strangers and potentially foreigners. The idea of the stranger or foreigner is very important throughout nearly all the various manifestations of solidarity that Habermas writes about. This is because the universal aspect of solidarity only makes sense if it can be applied beyond the personal lived experience of any one individual. Habermas has to be able to show that solidarity operates at a level beyond immediate interpersonal interactions, otherwise, his assertions about how nation-states work and with that solidarity as a generalizable moral norm will not work.

The other key element that comes out of this passage is the necessity, but also the danger, of the idea of a nation premised along populist lines. Although Habermas certainly flags the danger of populism, in this case with regards to the Holocaust, it appears to also be an essential ingredient in forming a coherent nation-state. More will be said about this later in the chapter exploring whether Habermas underplays the real danger involved. For now, what is important is that the universalism that allows for a solidarity to stretch across and beyond its traditional areas, implicitly and at times explicitly requires exclusion. On Habermas’s reading and one that certainly is in keeping with many others on this subject, the nation-state is grounded on the premise that there are those for whom membership is not allowed. It is so created against what it is not, along the cultural traditions that Habermas highlights in the passage that follows:

Democratic self-determinism can only come about if the population of a state is transformed into a nation of citizens who take their political destiny into their own hands. The political mobilization of “subjects,” however, depends on a prior cultural integration of what is initially a number of people who have been thrown together with each other. This desideratum is fulfilled by the idea of the nation, with whose help the members of a state construct a new form of collective identity beyond their inherited loyalties to village, family, place, or clan. The cultural symbolism of “people” secures its own particular character, its “spirit of the people,” in the presumed commonalities of descent, language, and history, and in this way generates a unity, even if only an imaginary one. It hereby makes the residents of a single state-controlled territory aware of a collective belonging that, until then, had

---

been merely abstract and legal. Only the symbolic construction of “a people” makes the modern state into a nation-state.  

Here Habermas is invoking in part something very similar to the argument that is found in Anderson’s famous *Imagined Communities* (1983). On one level this is important as it de-naturalises the idea of the nation-state and affirms its arbitrary construction. On another level, and perhaps more significantly for the way in which Habermas will premise his idea of post-national cosmopolitan solidarity, the nation is created by and through its members. The extent to which agency can be attached to such an undertaking is hard to discern. Habermas is clearly arguing that it stems through interactions (communicatively) between firstly subjects and then citizens. The direction that these interactions take, when thought of through structures of power that existed before and after the creation of the modern nation-state remain largely underdeveloped in Habermas. It is clear however, that for a nation or people to be realised, a certain degree of willingness on the part of the individuals concerned will have had to be expressed. The amount of consent involved is an open question, but once established, if only symbolically, it is for Habermas a powerful and ideologically successful social and political reality. The question that is then raised by Habermas is how these new nation-states can be kept stable and how they can reproduce themselves without the need for the conflict that created them. One of the solutions that could explain this would be that the solidarity that was initially activated through the struggle to form a coherent people or nation becomes substantiated in a system of laws. In the following passage Habermas sets out this part of his solution:

"constructed through the medium of modern law, the modern territorial state thus depends on the development of a national consciousness to provide it with the cultural substrate for civil solidarity. With this solidarity, the bonds that had formed between members of a concrete community on the basis of personal relationships now change into a new, more abstract form. While remaining strangers to one another, members of the same “nation” feel responsible enough for one another that they are prepared to make “sacrifices” – as in military service or the burden of redistributive taxation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, financial redistribution..."
between federal states is an example of the willingness of citizens to stand up for one another; a willingness that an egalitarian, universalistic legal order expects from its citizens.\textsuperscript{269}

The movement that Habermas detects is one that takes what he is now calling civil solidarity (presumably because it involves citizens rather than subjects) to be demanding a form of law that reflects the new abstract universal bonds. This is in contrast to what will be discussed in the next chapter, namely ‘moral’ solidarity. It is important to realise that this universalism is actually only nationally manifested, in practice at least. Habermas, however, argues that this initial convergence between a civic solidarity that is capable of supporting a normatively prescriptive abstract universal consideration for strangers and foreigners as equals (within the defined nation-state) and its legal institutionalisation, becomes corrupted. The corruption or undermining of the universal aspect of civil solidarity occurs in two ways; firstly through classic liberalism and secondly through republicanism. The relative success of these two rival ideas is affirmed by Habermas, however, they also erode the underlying basis of civic solidarity. He writes the following in terms of classic liberalism:

[C]lassic liberalism threatened to reduce the meaning of equal ethical liberties to a possessive-individualist reading of subjective rights, misunderstood in instrumentalist terms. In so doing, it missed an important normative intuition, which ought to be recovered even under conditions of modern societies — an intuition about forms of solidarity that link not only relatives, friends and neighbors within private spheres of life, but also unite citizens as members of a political community beyond merely legal relations.\textsuperscript{270}

The transformation of solidarity from one that is based on proximity and traditional forms of bonding, as stated above, to one that does not give priority to those bonds but any other individual that falls within the confines of the nation-state is crucial for Habermas. Therefore, if, according to Habermas, classic liberalism takes the law to be responding to individual property rights for example, it too quickly transfers the energy that forms civic solidarity into instrumental relations.\textsuperscript{271} Understood a different way, the normative basis falls away, in effect civic solidarity is not transformed but replaced by legal structures. Habermas, however, counters that there is a way to save civic solidarity, but only if the remaining traditional threads of solidarity are cut off. Basically, Habermas thinks that civic solidarity in some sense is an extension of the traditional bonds, family, friends, etc. that now includes all members of a


\textsuperscript{271} Presumably, Habermas has in mind the classical liberalism of the John Locke and Thomas Malthus as influenced by Adam Smith. It can also be assumed that he is refereeing to that period of the Industrial Revolution (c. 1760-1840) that was, in part, the catalyst for classic liberal thought.
larger defined group, usually along racial or ethnic lines. This in effect is a contradiction of the impulse towards a universal form of civic solidarity. Habermas highlights this in the following passage, which also introduces ideas of human rights and democracy:

These problems [classic liberalism] can be solved only within a framework that, from the perspective of egalitarian universalism, disconnects the mobilization of civic solidarity from ethnic nationality and radicalizes it toward a solidarity among “others.” In binding itself to universalistic constitutional principles and to “human” rights, the sovereign will-formation of democratic citizens is only acting according to the necessary presuppositions of a legitimate legal institutionalization of its own practice.272

There is a sense here that there needs to be a process of recognition or at least that the citizens feel that they contribute to the creation of the legal system. Reflecting on this in terms of human rights, that by definition have to apply to all others, and the input (however weak) of a democratic system, even when tied to a national setting frees solidarity to apply to all others. Habermas argues that this position can operate between the poles of classic liberalism and republicanism. The republican aspect is the active will formation stemming from the practice of popular sovereignty combined with a rights based discourse more closely aligned with classic liberalism, this can be seen when Habermas states that:

Historically-evolved forms of solidarity are transformed, but not destroyed, by the intersecting of the republican idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of a rule spelled out in terms of basic rights. According to this third reading, which mediates between liberalism and republicanism, citizens understand the political ethos that keeps them together as a nation as the intentional outcome of the democratic will-formation of a populace accustomed to political freedom. The internal relation between the private autonomy of the individual member of society and the commonly-exercised political autonomy of citizens has been progressively worked out; the historical experience of this fact is eventually expressed in the national pride of an acquired, intersubjectively shared consciousness of freedom.273

In summary the above passage could have two interpretations. Firstly, it could be the actual culmination of a negotiated stage of the nation-state, underpinned albeit seemingly in a non-obvious way by solidarity, which roughly equates with modern (western) democratic states, since the late 19th century to around the 1980s. Alternatively this could be a model for how Habermas wants nation-states to be. Some of the elements are present but perhaps they are either not fully formed yet, or are being held back or eroded in some way. It can be seen as simultaneously an explanation for how modern nation-states are held together and as a set of criteria for a theory of democracy. In either case the role of solidarity, even in a transformed

273 Ibid, p.3.
manner, appears essential. This may have important implications for Habermas's more general theory of democracy, but it does not give a clear enough account of solidarity itself. By 'solidarity itself' is meant the active parts of solidarity, the bit of solidarity that motivates people and causes and creates changes in society. Therefore Habermas can state that:

The legacy of the Judeo-Christian ethics of fraternity was fused, in the concept of solidarity, with the republicanism of Roman origin. The orientation toward salvation or emancipation became amalgamated with that toward legal and political freedom.274

This statement encapsulates the above trajectory of solidarity in terms of its intellectual development (more will be said about the Judeo-Christian legacy later), although it misses the material history of everyday life, which finds ultimate expression in class antagonism. Habermas, in perhaps, his most materially historically relevant way, describes the role that solidarity played in practical terms. How solidarity forced through the transformation that is largely left unexplored in his other historical writing about solidarity, can be seen in the following passage:

By the midst of the 19th century, an accelerated functional differentiation of society gave rise to extensive interdependencies behind the back of a paternalistic, still largely corporative and occupationally stratified every-day-world. Under the pressure of these reciprocal functional dependencies the older forms of social integration broke down and led to the rise of class antagonisms which were finally contained only with the extended forms of political integration of the nation state. The appeals to "solidarity" had their historical origin in the dynamic of the new class struggles. The organizations of the workers movement with their well-founded appeals to solidarity reacted to the occasion provided by the fact that the systemic, mainly economic constraints had outstripped the old relations of solidarity. The socially uprooted journeymen, workers, employees, and day laborers were supposed to form an alliance beyond the systemically generated competitive relations on the labor market. The opposition between the social classes of industrial capitalism was finally institutionalized within the framework of the democratically constituted nation states.275

This long passage is one that is largely in agreement with how Durkheim describes the transformation of society, brought about through occupational differentiation. As this passage comes from a public lecture, perhaps some degree of charity needs to be applied to what he says. However, there does appear to be a contradiction between saying, “[t]he socially uprooted journeymen, workers, employees, and day laborers were supposed to form an alliance”, and that the oppositions were institutionalised through the democratic process; presumably through an expansion in the voting franchise. Is it that the alliances or goal

orientated solidarity networks failed and the antagonism present in the creation of nation-states gets sublimated through democratic means, as in they lost? Alternatively is it that the alliances forced through a demand to become part of a will-formation that could act in such a way as to attend to their grievances? Again it is unclear whether Habermas wants to see earlier forms of traditional solidarity (that were replaced by later forms of solidarity that were ultimately unsuccessful) as reenergising the impetus behind such a movement. Or whether Habermas is arguing that the workers’ social movements are in fact the precursors to a form of democracy that can “eventually [be] expressed in the national pride of an acquired, intersubjectively shared consciousness of freedom.” Elsewhere Habermas makes this point in a clearer way, citing the work of Schulze:

Interpreted in light of their results, the complex and long-running processes of the “invention of the nation” (Schulze) played the role of a catalyst in the transformation of the early modern state into a democratic republic. Popular national self-consciousness provided the cultural background against which “subjects” could become politically active “citizens.” Belonging to the “nation” made possible for the first time a relation of solidarity between persons who had previously been strangers to one another. Thus the achievement of the nation-state consisted in solving two problems at once: it made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, more abstract form of social integration.

It is clear in this passage that Habermas thinks that the project of the nation-state has been successful, as it has as its core an answer to the disintegration that occurs as the traditional states become torn apart through economic expansion and diversity, leading to demographic increases in population size and the geographical uprooting of people. This integration understood as a form of civic solidarity leads to, and is then maintained by, legitimate governance. Legitimate, as the citizenry can now recognise their contribution in its creation through the process of communicative action. What is important to note is that there remains a tension in solidarity between its pre-modern and nation-state presentation. Essentially, what appears to remain is the willingness on the part of individuals to act in a sacrificing capacity which appears to go beyond simply custom or habit; the element of sacrifice that is required for universal legal formations, legitimate governance and its accompanying social integration. It is a movement between the particular and the universal or the subjective and the objective that occurs, as Habermas writes:

As a component of a universalistic morality, of course, solidarity loses its merely particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships of a collectivity that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups that character of forced

---

willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion that is always present in premodern forms of solidarity.277

This final part of the historical progression of solidarity can be seen here to take on the language of a Judeo-Christian tradition. Although Habermas is not explicit on this point, it appears to follow that the use of sacrifice based terminology stems from its basis in Europeans’ long involvement with a certain kind of religious thought. This is the other strand of the explanation that Habermas wants to present: that ideas that are present in the Judeo-Christian tradition form part of the basis for practiced solidarity. In the pre-modern case it provides a doctrine for action towards others that both gives a rhetorical meaning to interpersonal forms of kinship and also licence for a justifiable sacrificial worldview with regards to the needs of others.

What follows is an examination of how Habermas sees religious worldviews, in relation to forms of solidarity. In the final analysis it will be argued that Habermas thinks solidarity is innate and prelinguistic, but is carried through the symbolic language of the sacred, which even in modern (supposedly secular) societies cannot be fully translated into the profane. This aspect of Habermas’s thinking has been touched on by commentators and their analysis will therefore be looked at. However, it will be shown that they have not gone far enough in exposing the important consequences of this aspect of Habermas’s theory with respect to solidarity. To begin with it will be useful to see where Habermas wishes to end up. The following passage indicates the trajectory that he wishes society to follow:

In traditional societies, moral norms are indeed so closely bound up with religious worldviews and shared forms of life that individuals learn what it means to enjoy the status of membership in a community thus founded through identification with the contents of this established concrete ethical life. But in modern societies, moral norms must detach themselves from the concrete contents of the plurality of attitudes toward life that now manifest themselves; they are grounded solely in an abstract social identity that is henceforth circumscribed only by the status of membership in some society, not in this or that particular society. This explains the two salient features of a secularized morality that has transcended the context of an over-arching social ethos. A morality that rests only on the normative content of universal conditions of coexistence in a society (founded on mutual respect for persons) in general must be universalistic and egalitarian in respect of the validity and sphere of application of its norms; at the same time, it is formal and empty in the content of its norms.278

There are many important points raised here by Habermas. Firstly, there is the relationship between a given community and religiously justified moral norms. The implication is that

278 Ibid, p.47.
religion is an essential ingredient to maintaining a community, but that when the leap is made towards a society the religiously enforceable ethical values have to undergo a secularisation process. Secularisation promotes a new worldview which removes the particular directed moral code and instead has the ability to be universally applicable. In this particular passage Habermas is arguing further that it is the universal and egalitarian quality of moral norms that must be respected, not the normative content in and for itself. Interestingly, at this point Habermas is arguing that therefore norms must remain empty, implying that they are properly detached from religious worldviews. The point is that instead of religion telling us what to do and how to behave, it gives us principles by which we can determine this for ‘ourselves’. In searching for a clearer understanding of Habermas’s position of how religion relates to solidarity, it is necessary to present some of the ways that he understands religion in terms of the development of communication. The importance of this can be seen when Habermas states:

> Religious symbolism represents one of three prelinguistic [in the sense of propositionally differentiated language] roots of communicative action. Only in and through communicative action can the energies of social solidarity attached to religious symbolism branch out and be imparted, in the form of moral authority, both to institutions and to persons. This statement appears to be unequivocal in tying religious thought to what he here calls social solidarity (social solidarity as in this instance in *Communicative Action* where he is still heavily reliant on Durkheimian sociology). It also seems reasonable to assume that solidarity comes out of religious symbolism that is prelinguistic. The question then is, does that mean that solidarity should be considered to be prelinguistic? Before being able to answer this question it is worth examining how Habermas understands the different stages of the disengagement of the sacred and the profane in the development of communication.

First, Habermas claims that “instinctual residues” is the ground the symbolic (religious) is built upon (or reflected in). Second, it is from this religious symbolism with its ability to make concrete the instinctual residues that enables the common ground for communal relations of cooperation that pertains even after the split between the sacred and the profane, or symbolic and propositional forms of communication. The final part, Habermas argues that religious

---

279 For Habermas, ethics have values which can be understood as goods, whereas morality has norms which are rules that take the form of imperatives.

symbols still concurrently and after their disengagement from epistemological uses in terms of explaining, using and understanding the perceptible world, still possess an instinctive basis. 281

Articulated in a slightly different way Melissa Yates notes that the religious element has “perhaps [an] irreplaceable role to play in public deliberation” and that “[h]e takes for granted that religious language sometimes conceals deep, universal moral truths that have not yet been adequately understood in secular terms.” 282 On this reading Yates is not committing Habermas to saying that solidarity is one of the ‘universal moral truths’ that cannot be translated through secularisation. However, if the above reading is correct in linking instincts to religious symbolism as fused to solidarity, then it would fall under this rubric. Equally, it could be that the religious symbolism is circumvented by the secularisation program and that it links directly to instinctual solidarity. One possible consequence of this line of thought is that communicative action is really about solidarity and solidarity is drawn from the ‘community of believers’. Habermas’s discussion of Horkheimer and solidarity can help to make this point more understandable as it links moral ideas and secularisation. In the following passage Habermas appears to be arguing that once rationalisation becomes ubiquitous then ideas or sentiments of the religious worldviews are superseded:

Once the rationality of the remorse experienced by a religiously tutored conscience is rejected by a secularized world, its place is taken by the moral sentiment of compassion. When Horkheimer expressly defines the good tautologically as the attempt to abolish evil, he has in view a solidarity with the suffering of vulnerable and forsaken creatures provoked by outrage against concrete injustices. The reconciling power of compassion does not stand in opposition to the galvanizing power of rebellion against a world devoid of atonement and reparation for injustice. Solidarity and justice are two sides of the same coin: hence, the ethics of compassion does not dispute the legitimacy of morality or justice but merely frees it from the rigidity of the ethics of conscience. 283

In this telling passage Habermas argues that religiously minded individuals learn to become secular. They undergo almost a process of active realignment where they readjust the direction of their sentiments from one that is an individual concern to one that is universally verifiable. Likewise, it also brings into play a recurring theme for Habermas, that solidarity and justice are indelibly linked. They not only reinforce each other but they cannot be understood apart, once rationalisation/secularisation has taken place. Habermas changes his mind somewhat on how religious ideas relate to solidarity before and after modern nation-states are substantiated through the duel aspects of rationalisation and secularisation. He offers at

281 Ibid, p.54.
least three different ways that it can be understood. First, that solidarity is an aspect of Christian Europe that remains even in the modern sense as a remnant of the religious heritage that has gone before, that it is something that in a sense cannot be fully articulated in rational terms. Second, it does in fact become rationalised when it becomes fused to universal notions of morality stemming from the enlightenment and felt most keenly when considered with justice. Third, it could be that solidarity is part of the instinctual make-up of human beings from the start and that first religion and then later rational discourse finds differing ways of using and explaining this basic instinct. There are probably other ways still that this can be thought of along with Habermas, but just on this reading it indicates some very important aspects of solidarity more generally. Can solidarity be fully rationalised? Are we programmed towards solidarity? Is solidarity best articulated through sacred or profane language, whatever its underlying reality? Habermas could be interpreted as having a contradictory history of solidarity something that goes to prove again the difficulty of defining solidarity. Equally, it could be that Habermas fundamentally changes his mind as his thought develops from a rationalist secularisation thesis (similar to Weber) in TCA to his reflections on post-secular society and modernisation in TIO. In Habermas’s defence it should be made clear that the passages chosen are taken out of sequence and with little consideration for their context. Certainly, Habermas does change his mind on this topic, however, but that is not what is being criticised. More precisely, the divergence and the difficulties that Habermas reveals are really uncovering what this thesis is attempting to show about the nature of solidarity. As a last thought on the role of history, religion and solidarity Eduardo Mendieta perhaps comes closest to articulating the situation that Habermas is trying to explain:

[T]he horizontal relationship among believers and the vertical relationship between each believer and God shapes the two corresponding aspects: that of solidarity and that of justice (IO:10). Here the grammar of one’s religious relationship to God and the corresponding community of believers are like the exoskeleton of a magnificent species, which once the religious worldviews contained in them have desiccated under the impact of the forces of secularization leave behind a casing to be used as a structuring shape for other contents.

Socialisation and personal history

The last chapter on Durkheim argued that the way that solidarity is generated and passed on, in and through communities, is through a process of socialisation. The above section on ‘the

---

284 For example, Habermas’s early view, in TCA vol 1, and Post metaphysical Thinking – Philosophical Essays, of secularisation is that everything that is not rationally understood normative content is sloughed off as an archaic relic.

big picture’ with regards to solidarity and history, fails to explain how individuals become enmeshed with solidarity and how they come to shape solidarity themselves through socialisation. The other aspect often overlooked, is that individuals or persons have their own history or story and that this has important consequences for how solidarity can be understood. The discussion in the following section centres on, how communicative action replaces the sacred in terms of the everyday considerations of solidarity, how this impacts on individual human agency and the function of solidarity as a form of social integration.

Socialisation appears to be something that Habermas thinks is a different type of phenomenon to coordination. As outlined above coordination belongs to pre-modern states and socialisation emerges out of the stresses put on individuals through the processes of modernisation. The difference could seem trivial, as one wonders how different the everyday interactions really became. However, Habermas argues that a significant switch does take place, one that can be detected through language.286 In the following complicated passage Habermas returns to the theme of the sacred and religiously enforced qualities of human intersubjective experiences and argues that the mechanism of language itself alters these experiences as secularisation or rationalisation takes place:

At the same time, this transposition of cognitions, obligations, and expressions onto a linguistic basis makes it possible in turn for the means of communication to take on new functions – in addition to the function of reaching understanding, those of coordinating action and socializing actors as well. Under the aspect of reaching understanding, communicative acts serve the transmission of culturally stored knowledge – as shown above, cultural tradition reproduces itself through the medium of action oriented to reaching understanding. Under the aspect of coordinating action, the same communicative acts serve the fulfilment of norms appropriate to a given context; social integration also takes place via this medium. Under the aspect of socialization, finally, communicative acts serve the construction of internal controls on behaviour, in general, the formation of personality structures; one of Meads’s fundamental insights is that socialization processes take place via linguistically mediated interaction.287

The important thing to realise about this passage is that Habermas thinks that cultural knowledge (which might include religious knowledge) is passed onto to each new individual through the mechanism and power of the way that language functions. That language comes to be the medium through which action is coordinated also has the quality of an obligation. The obligation to seek mutual understanding is the means by which society is held together. The socialisation aspect here is that this process creates inside the individual a personality that

286 Useful historical background to this process can be in: Burke, P. (2009) Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
adheres to a principle of intersubjective communicative action. This has the consequence that the norms which come to be binding, although may get their grounding through the process of internalising the shared cultural history of a given society, actually act according to the rules of how the norms are transcribed, namely through communicative acts. Habermas makes this point clear when he states that:

Communicative action turns out to be a switching station for energies of social solidarity, but this time we viewed the switch point not under the aspect of coordination but of socialization, in order to discover how the collective consciousness is communicated, via illocutionary forces, not to institutions but to individuals.  

This idea is highly significant because it raises the individual in terms of their role and their responsibility. It gives a certain degree of agency to the individual by revealing the emptiness at the heart of the norms that oscillate through the collective consciousness. The rigid symbolic sacredness of traditional moral codes is now unjustifiable on its own terms. Norms have to be rationally agreed upon by the individuals concerned. It is in the act of real agreement, that conversation made possible by the transformation towards a rationalised language, which is where solidarity is located. The following passage indicates the steps of this process, one that grounds in everyday experience what was described above only in general terms:

[T]he hypothesis that the socially integrative and expressive functions that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action: the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus. This means a freeing of communicative action from sacral protected normative contexts. The disenchantment and disempowering of the domain of the sacred takes place by way of a linguistification of the ritually secured, basic normative agreement; going along with this is a release of the rationality potential in communicative action. The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticizable validity claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence.

The importance of authority was discussed in some detail in the last chapter, however here when authority is removed from the sacred, it is not given over to an educative role that is institutionalised. Rather, it is the communicatively reached consensus where the authority sits, one that is grounded in the everyday profane reality of the individual. The power of the authority that compels the individual to obey certain norms in the religious case, is no less powerful when it is enacted through the obligation to reach consensus. In fact, as the consensus has been reached through a rational process that can be recognised by the

---

288 Ibid, p.60.
289 Ibid, p.77.
participants it is perhaps even stronger, albeit the threat of eternal damnation is less pronounced. The power and authority of the ‘holy’ once transformed into debatable validity claims, is the bonding or binding force that encapsulates perhaps a version of solidarity necessary in a secularised world. As has been discussed in the last section, it is not that the new forms of linguistic expression appear brand new and ready formed, separate from the history that created them. Habermas argues that understanding relies on a shared foundation of culturally translated history. If this was not the case then communication would be impossible, as he writes in the following passage that ends with a pronouncement of the importance of solidarity:

Both in its argumentative methods and its communicative presuppositions, the procedure of discourse has reference to an existential preunderstanding among participants regarding the most universal structures of a lifeworld that has been shared intersubjectively from the beginning. Even this procedure of discursive will formation can seduce us into the one-sided interpretation that the universalizability of contested interests guarantees only the equal treatment of all concerned. That interpretation overlooks the fact that every requirement of universalization must remain powerless unless there also arises, from membership in an ideal communication community, a consciousness of irrevocable solidarity, the certainty of intimate relatedness in a shared life context.

This passage again highlights that solidarity is the thread that runs through all forms of communal relationships. It is present before the linguistification of the sacred and it is required thereafter. In a certain way in both cases it is the element at the root of intersubjective experience that makes community and then society possible. This occurs on both the micro and macro level; on the universal and the particular plane. An aspect of Habermas’s somewhat teleological historical approach to solidarity that has been flagged already as possibly problematic, returns here, namely the success of certain forms of society over others. This is a problem that Anthony Giddens summarises well when he writes:

Here we reach one of Habermas’s main – and, one might add, most questionable – proposals. The development of arenas of discourse, which he tries to trace through the emergence of the “world religions,” and the subsequent differentiation of science, morality, and art in modern culture signifies a general evolution towards an expansion of rationality. The more we are able rationally to ground the conduct of our lives in the three main spheres of existence – relations with the material world, with others, and in the expressive realm of aesthetics – the more advanced our form of society can be said to be.

---

290 The exact moment when Habermas thinks this occurs is unclear, particularly as Habermas appears to change his mind on secularization, especially after the 9/11, see: Gordon, P. E. (2013) ‘Between Christianity Democracy and Critical Theory: Habermas, Böckenförde, and the Dialectics of Secularization in Postwar Germany’, Social Research, 80:1, pp.173-202.


This is perhaps one of the most telling critiques of Habermas, however, it is not one that discounts his account of solidarity directly. In one way it actually reveals something important about the way that solidarity is often written, namely from a particular western and religious perspective. It also highlights the way that solidarity is often characterised as being a barometer for perceived changes in the make-up of given societies. So although Habermas may be wrong to argue that the form of solidarity that is active within Western modern nation-states, is a more advanced (read better) form than forms found either in the past or like Durkheim before him in places found elsewhere. This way of understanding a progressive trajectory of society development that has one model as the yardstick for the others to be graded by, is of course problematic.293 However, for our purposes it demonstrates that solidarity is used as a means of comparing and contrasting relative rates of progress both in time and across space.

This section on the importance of history for Habermas’s account of solidarity has looked at his account of the fundamental shifts from pre-modern states to modern nation-states. This has been related to how Habermas thinks solidarity is likewise transformed.294 Additionally the crucial role of religious worldviews, when confronted with the force of secularisation and a particular form of rational discourse that both stem from the Enlightenment, are transformed in terms of their relationship with solidarity. There has also been discussion of the way that solidarity continues to influence individual lived experience, once the aforementioned process occurs. That individuals in the end bind themselves to others consciously; this perhaps indicates which forms of solidarity can be chosen, as much as they are sometimes forced upon individuals. Finally, it has again been shown that solidarity would be meaningless without it being understood historically. It is this more than anything else that will be crucial as we move into the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Habermas and Solidarity exhausted

What was shown in the previous chapter on Habermas was the importance of history to his theory of solidarity. In a variety of ways history can be seen to be of crucial importance as it informs, shapes and grounds his different uses of solidarity. This chapter will move forward from this position to examine how Habermas sees solidarity acting and reacting from this historical perspective. Firstly, in the tension that exists between theoretical descriptions of solidarity and its practice in political reality. Secondly, how Habermas orientates solidarity towards future cultural, social and political possibilities. The underlying argument for both is that all of Habermas’s thinking on solidarity relies on a particular historical progression. It will be shown that this is not a straightforward position with regards to historical processes. However, it will be argued that Habermas is tied to a deterministic view of both history and most importantly solidarity. This view in turn, it will be shown, has consequences for a range of ideas that Habermas argues for; in particular, his recent reflections on the future of the European Union, the changing role of nation-states and possible systems of governance that could act globally. However, the focus will remain how Habermas’s theory affects, illustrates and defines what solidarity can be, should be and is within the tradition that has been the focus of this thesis. Habermas’s attempts in recent years to propose solidarity as the solution to the crisis in the European Union is shown to be further proof that the two are intertwined. It should be noted from the start that Habermas fails to articulate or define what he means by solidarity. This will be shown to be particularly true when it comes to his use of civic solidarity. This lack of definition, which has been one of the themes running throughout this thesis, goes to further prove that getting a firm handle on what exactly solidarity means is largely impossible.

The chapter is formed of sections beginning with his earlier work in *Justice and Solidarity*, through *The Inclusion of the Other*, and finally ending in his most recent work, *Plea for a constitutionalization of international law*. Through this analysis Habermas will be shown to have reached an end point of a process that began in the post-French revolutionary milieu that was described in chapter one of this thesis. Effectively, Habermas takes a form of solidarity that has its origins in 1830s France to its logical end point, and ultimately exhausts it. The discussion will take place under four sub-headings:

- Theory and Practice
- The Normative Foundations for Solidarity
- Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights
Finally, following this there will be a summary of Habermas’s relationship with solidarity in general. This will be the place where his various versions of solidarity will be critiqued and where the broader implications of the problems of Habermas’s account will be drawn out.

Theory and Practice

Beginning with *Justice and Solidarity* Habermas starts to articulate a moral argument for solidarity. This marks a shift in his previous thinking that saw solidarity as only a balancing force holding society together, along with administrative power and money. Solidarity, from *Justice and Solidarity* until *The Post-National Constellation*, is understood as the reverse side of justice. In both cases, solidarity and justice get their now deontological normative basis from the morality that arises from communicative acts and discourse more generally. These functions of communication are wedded to and made possible through the concrete reality of forms of life that are shared and intersubjectively re-enforced. In essence, each individual comes to see that they have a responsibility towards every other individual that happens to have membership with their shared life. Here, solidarity requires that individuals respect all other members as irreplaceable and thus worthy of equal justice. An attack on one would in effect be an attack on all, but, importantly, not reducible to all. It is argued, the qualifying status required to be a member of the same interconnected shared life can be ever more expanded to be inclusive of all members of the human race. The solidarity that is invoked through realising the need for fair treatment for all who are members of the shared life, implies it could be taken to the level of the universal. The possibility of a universal solidarity will be addressed later. However, solidarity constructed this way is open to questions relating to theory and practice.

It is unclear when Habermas is discussing ‘shared life’ what he means. The difficulty stems from it being unclear whether Habermas is describing a process that has taken place, is currently taking place or will take place. Assuming that Habermas has in mind the context of European nation-states, is this description applicable across the continent? Likewise, if what Habermas is setting out is not just theoretical but prescriptive, as in, here is how solidarity should work if shared life came to be understood in this sense, then how could such a state of affairs be realised, what steps would need to be taken? To illustrate this point the following passage is given:

> From the perspective of communication theory there emerges instead a close connection between concern for the welfare of one’s fellow man and interest in the general welfare: the identity of the group is reproduced through intact relationships
of mutual recognition. Thus the perspective complementing that of equal treatment of individuals is not benevolence but solidarity. This principle is rooted in the realization that each person must take responsibility for the other because as consociates all must have an interest in the integrity of their shared life context in the same way.295

The final sentence is the most telling. The realisation could be something that some individuals have acquired or it could imply that all ‘consociates’ have acquired it. Is it a condition of being a consociate that one has this realisation? It does appear that there is a requirement of ‘mutual recognition’, one that is tied to the identity of the group. The further implication is that once mutual recognition of the members of a stable group can be identified, then individuals belonging to the group have an interest in maintaining and protecting others who are also members. In one sense this appears to be a straightforward example of a rational self-interest argument that is part of many models of solidarity; by wanting equal treatment for those who are part of your group you are in effect wanting those rights for yourself. However, if “Justice conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse side” then there is more required than a protective stance.296 Justice cannot simply operate on the assumption that each individual within the group is substitutable for any other; that the solidarity created through realising that one is a member of an identifiable group means that one could take the place of anyone else within that group.297 Although Habermas is clear that individuality and the non-substitutability is paramount, the more complex the group becomes, the less this appears plausible. For example, in the nation-state, equal treatment for men and women, or for different ethnic groups, requires special status and not necessarily equal treatment. Likewise, the varied lived experiences of individuals held within a nation-state makes the practice of such a reality as described above hard to prove. This is where the boundary between theory and practice is important. In theory, it is consistent to think that once individuals come to recognise themselves and select others as belonging to one and the same group (nation-state) that they would wish to have equal treatment for all. However, when this theory is placed against historical and contemporary reality it does not appear to be adequately witnessed or documented. There is a further option, it could be that Habermas is proposing (with his ideal of solidarity as the other side of justice) solidarity theory as a form of social and political critique.298

296 Ibid, p. 244.
297 This essentially is what moral agents do in ideal role taking in moral discourse: they look at a situation from the perspective of all other valid agents, to see whether a norm is in fact acceptable to all.
298 See the following for two interesting attempts to perform this in reverse on Habermas through immanent critique: Carrabregu, G. (2016) ‘Habermas on Solidarity: An Immanent Critique’, Constellations, 23:4, pp. 507-522;
Every autonomous morality has to serve two purposes at once: it brings to bear the inviolability of socialized individuals by requiring equal treatment and thereby equal respect for the dignity of each one; and it protects intersubjective relationships of mutual recognition requiring solidarity of individual members of a community, in which they have been socialized. Justice concerns the equal freedoms of unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity concerns the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life and thus also to the maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself. Moral norms cannot protect one without the other: they cannot protect the equal rights and freedoms of the individual without protecting the welfare of one’s fellow man and of the community to which the individuals belong.299

This passage indicates the slippage between describing solidarity’s current function in practice, and how it is described in theory. Clearly, taken as a description of a current society (in Habermas’s case Germany or perhaps more broadly north-western Europe), there could be multiple objections to its validity. Whereas, it is defensible to say that there are socialized individuals in these communities, it does not follow that this creates equal respect for all, although it is an implicit norm of communication and discourse. When a community is entirely homogenous along racial, cultural, linguistic and historical grounds, then this possibility appears to be broadly likely, for the un-group but not towards the out-group. Equal treatment specifically refers to the norms of the communicative preconditions of discourse, moral norms of equal worth and legal norms of equality before the law. However, the multi-cultural reality of many of the nation-states that Habermas has in mind would struggle to fulfil these criteria. It is not impossible but it is improbable that the mere fact of membership to a particular nation-state would negate the other differences between the individuals. This appears especially true in societies such as England where there remains a class system, wild economic inequality and an undercurrent of racial discrimination. It could be the case that the intersubjective reality of becoming a consociate in a given society would also lead to an understanding by those individuals, requiring each individual be treated equally. However the recognition of the substitutability that is required, by simply being a member, appears to be insufficient. The widespread inequality, both material and cultural, between different groups within a nation-state appears to preclude this seemingly straightforward position, namely that an attack on one is an attack on all. It should also be noted that just because a norm of equality exists, even one that is a commitment of commutative agents or moral agents or as enshrined in law, does not imply that there must exist material equality in the actual world. The norm could be ideal, but weak or ineffective, or there could be countervailing pressures.


An alternative view, in keeping with the descriptive tendency, is that Habermas is offering an explanation as to how a given society can be self-sustaining. This certainly holds for at least one of his other views on solidarity; that it is one of the three elements that ensure social intergradation and reproduction is possible, along with administrative power and money. Here however, solidarity is understood as the reverse side of justice, and so it could not be taken to have an explanatory role. When solidarity is charged with the responsibility to hold in check the coercive manifestations of administrative power and the corrupting influence of money, it is shown to be necessary. This is because if it was not present at all, then the other two would be insufficient to create the conditions for society to reproduce itself. By shifting solidarity’s position to one that has a moral purpose creates the need for greater qualification of its function than is given by Habermas. Morality comes with its own set of difficulties; in this case, it raises questions about its subject and objective creation and enactment. If the morality that is being expressed with the help of solidarity, with its relationship to justice, is one formed through historical accumulation, as was indicated in the previous chapter, it is a process not requiring equal treatment as a component. Likewise, there have been choices made as to what comes to represent the moral basis in a given nation-state. All the actors involved have not contributed equally, voices have been silenced along the way and some internal groups’ opinions (for example Christian groups or newspaper owners) have had their views amplified. Habermas, is of course very much aware of these problems and it would be grossly unfair to suggest otherwise. However, the critique above is more meant as a way of highlighting an ongoing issue with solidarity as it appears in academic writing, of which Habermas is a prominent example. Habermas’s move from an explanatory descriptive sociological understanding of solidarity, to one tied to the moral terrain, muddies solidarity as a social and political concept. Perhaps, what this division in Habermas’s conception of solidarity shows (which Habermas has failed to ever articulate) is that solidarity exists in many different forms. The solidarity that is necessary to hold money and administrative power in balance, is a different thing entirely to the solidarity required for a just society. This appears to be the case when he writes that:

As a component of a universalistic morality, of course, solidarity loses its merely particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships of a collectivity that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups that character of forced willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion that is always present in premodern forms of solidarity.300

This is then followed by:

---

300 Ibid, pp. 244-245.
Justice conceived in postconventional terms can converge with solidarity as its reverse side only when solidarity has been transformed in the light of the idea of general discursive will formation.\textsuperscript{301}

In the first passage, Habermas argues, solidarity, as part of universal morality (within a given territorial space), is separated from its early premodern manifestation as enforced collectivisation. This, contrary to what has just been argued, would mean that solidarity is replaced or modified, rather than operating concurrently. Habermas, in the second quotation, argues that solidarity (morally universal) will have to be ‘transformed’ to fit its new justice enforcing capacity. It seems clear that there is a missing stage, not articulated, between the solidarity of the ‘premodern’ era and the morally reinforcing solidarity of the future. The historical picture, painted in the last chapter, shows that these two positions are not clearly demarcated and the arrival of this new form of solidarity, although sometimes written about as if it was already present, is more theory than practice.

What is also clear from the above passages is the tension existing between conservative or defensive qualities of solidarity and its transformed forms. Taken with the previous chapter, there is an implied criticism of the ‘pre-modern’ forms of solidarity, whilst simultaneously noting its essential character. This was also a tension highlighted in the Durkheim chapters, that there does still appear to be a need for what Durkheim calls mechanical solidarity even in ‘advanced societies’. Durkheim accepts this to a certain extent and argues instead that advanced societies require both versions of solidarity and that one does not completely supersede the other. For Durkheim this is a way of by-passing the need for a fixed set of free standing norms. That route, however, is not available for Habermas. Therefore, where Durkheim accepts that solidarity is two parts conservative and one part transformative, Habermas can only draw upon history as a learning process, but cannot have it as his grounding.

Nevertheless, Habermas argues, solidarity as the other side of justice cannot be ahistorical. Rather, individuals have to also relativize their own personal norms, created through historical experience, to be able to adequately take part in ‘discursive will formation’. Initially, this appears to be a progressive position, especially as Durkheim’s proposal of essentially enforced homogeneity of morals has many obvious drawbacks, not least of which is how social progress of race, gender, material inequality etc, are supposed to develop. More will be said about how Habermas attempts to overcome the need for the older, more rigid form of solidarity below. However, what has been argued is that it is not clear in Habermas’s own argument where one

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid, p. 245.
solidarity ends and the other begins; it is not even clear whether these are two distinct phenomena or one that is reoriented. Ultimately, is the energy that went into ‘pre-modern’ solidarity the same as that required for solidarity as the other side of justice? Precisely these type of questions have motivated this thesis and certainly the conservative version of transformative forms of solidarity will be discussed in conclusion. For now, what is important to highlight is that solidarity again is shown to be elusive and resistant to this kind of mainstream social and political analysis. The historical problem will now be addressed in more detail with reference to how Habermas identifies the withdrawing of metaphysics and religious moral norms, as a historical and social process of modernization.

**Normativity: What are the normative foundations for solidarity?**

One of the difficulties just highlighted was how early forms of solidarity can be set aside or transformed to be more aligned with how Habermas wishes them to be. This section addresses this difficulty by examining how Habermas understands metaphysical and religiously supported solidarity and how it could operate without this grounding. As shown in the previous chapter, the role of metaphysics and more obviously religious language creates a unique progression in Europe. It is still within this context that the following discussion will be based. The two main texts that will be used are *Between Facts and Norms* and *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*. These two texts mark a shift in Habermas’s articulation of solidarity and act as a bridge to his most contemporary remarks, initiated by the publication of *The Post-National Constellation*.

The historical attachment of religious and metaphysical moral norms and language has been discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, the focus here will be on what Habermas argues can replace them. In the first instance the role of law will be examined to underline its importance to solidarity. It will show that law enables solidarity in contemporary society, but also requires it. In this discussion, solidarity is initially understood as an integrating force, yet when discussing *The Inclusion of the Other* it will again be seen as the other side of justice. The latter analysis will demonstrate the importance of defining the right against the good in his work, which will further indicate the relationship between religious/metaphysical motivations for norm forming.

In the following passage Habermas sets out the problem as he understands it, with relying on metaphysical or religiously substantiated law:

> Either the legal order remains embedded in an encompassing social ethos and subordinate to the authority of a suprapositive or sacred law (as in the stratified societies and absolute states of early modernity), or else individual liberties are
supplemented by rights of a different type, rights of citizenship that are geared no longer to rational choice but to autonomy in the Kantian sense. For without religious or metaphysical support, the coercive law tailored for the self-interested use of individual rights can preserve its socially integrating force only insofar as the addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those norms. To this extent, modern law lives off a solidarity concentrated in the value orientations of citizens and ultimately issuing from communicative action and deliberation.  

In order to understand what Habermas means here it is necessary to briefly sketch the broad aims of Between Facts and Norms, and in particular to highlight a number of key points that he makes in regards to the distinction between moral and ethical discourse, democracy and the rule of law. Moral and ethical discourse can be said to be the underpinning of much of Habermas’s total project, therefore there is much that could be said about them. However, here what is important to note is that ethical discourse entails those values that have been generated and are supported through a particular tradition, held within a certain cultural group. In essence the way this works is that as someone is socialised within a given community they simultaneously absorb the values of that community. Therefore, Habermas argues that these values can be relativised and are by definition conditional when called upon for validity. It is also the case that for ethical discourse, values are understood to be on a sliding scale of good and bad that calls for judgement of choices made. Conversely, moral discourse pertains to norms that are either right or wrong, just or unjust. Therefore, they are absolute not relative and are non-contingent. They do not spring from a given community’s traditions, instead they should be valid for all traditions irrespective of culture, geographical area or history. The extent to which Habermas’s distinction here works in practice has been a topic of much debate. There have been concerns raised over Habermas’s ability to actually separate out these two ideas into discrete spheres that can exist side by side. His reason for thinking that they can, is based on his argument that they are answers to different but complementary questions. The ethical helps to answer questions about how to live the good life, pursuit of desires and interests etc, whilst the moral answers questions centring around what you ought to do and what is just. The problem with this distinction is that it appears very difficult to separate the two positions. Especially as Habermas thinks both have a historical component.

---

304 See above footnote.
For the ethical, this is culturally contingent whereas the moral claims to be universal.\textsuperscript{305} However the idea of, for example, universal justice, stems from a particular mainly religious background most prevalently witnessed in Europe. Why this tension is important to Habermas’s theory of solidarity becomes clear from the above passage where legal norms are supported (once secularised) by the values connected with solidarity. Continuing with this theme in starker terms the following passage seeks to set up a dialogue between the two positions:

The changes just sketched in the two other components can explain why modern legal orders must find their legitimation, to an increasing degree, only in sources that do not bring the law into conflict with those posttraditional ideals of life and ideas of justice that first made their impact on persons and culture. Reasons that are convenient for the legitimation of law must, on pain of cognitive dissonances, harmonize with the moral principles of universal justice and solidarity. They must also harmonize with the ethical principles of a consciously “projected” life conduct for which the subjects themselves, at both the individual and collective levels, take responsibility.\textsuperscript{306} Here the tension between whether solidarity falls under a moral or ethical category is made somewhat more complicated. In the first passage solidarity is linked to values and therefore is more attuned to ethical discourse, however, in this passage solidarity is more firmly held under moral discourse. Stemming from the long process of secularisation that gets its impetus from enlightenment ideas, post-traditional ideals and justice must ‘harmonize with the moral principles of universal justice and solidarity’.\textsuperscript{307} Highlighting a point that has been raised already, perhaps the slippage between ethical and morally constituted solidarity is more a question of how it is directed. Thus, in the above sense it is directed towards a form of justice legally understood and therefore under morality, however in the following passage the direction is towards strangers (or foreigners) through the conduit of communication and so is closer to ethical discourse:

\textsuperscript{305} Habermas does give several criteria by which to distinguish ethical and moral discourse including scope, kind of question and priority in the following: Habermas, J. (Trans: C. Cronin) ([1991/1990] 1993) \textit{Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics}, Cambridge: Polity Press. However in TIO he presents morality as energizing via generalisation and modernisation from ethics – via monotheistic religions.


\textsuperscript{307} In some ways this is anticipating Habermas’s later discussions of universal, post-national solidarity, although here he appears to be more concerned with working through national identity, perhaps in reflection of the political discussions of the 1980s and early 1990s in Germany. These mainly centred before unification on what it meant to be German given the long-shadow of the Holocaust, but also social and economic prosperity in Western Germany and subsequently what Germanness might mean after unification. Habermas, as a public intellectual engaged in both these debates, most famously with the ‘historian controversy’. See: Habermas, J. (Trans: S. W. Nicholsen) ([1985] 1994) \textit{The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians’ Debate}, Cornwall: Polity Press; James, H. and Stone, M. (eds) (1992) \textit{When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification}, London: Routledge; and for an good secondary source: Müller, J. (2000) \textit{Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity}, London: Yale University Press.
Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential that no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life. But in a secularized society that has learned to deal with its complexity consciously and deliberately, the communicative mastery of these conflicts constitutes the sole source of solidarity among strangers – strangers who renounce violence and, in the cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the right to remain strangers.308

In this passage, what is interesting is the strong connection between communicative action and what solidarity is. This has already been alluded to in the previous chapter, however it does raise the question as to whether solidarity can be understood as a communicative phenomenon, rather than say an ethical stance, or a moral obligation. The passage also reveals that part of what is realised in a post-traditional secular society is that there is conflict.

Obviously, traditional societies were full of conflict, however, the terms of what constitute a conflict have changed. Originally Habermas is, broadly speaking, in agreement with Durkheim’s categorisation of conflict in pre-modern societies; whereby conflicts arose when an individual or individuals broke, or subverted an established norm that was recognised by most if not all of the members of the community. This therefore could be understood as a breaking of a rule that could then only be resolved through the mechanism of punishment. This restores the equilibrium that had previously existed before the conflict had taken place. In the new arena of modern societies conflicts are established and carried out through the mechanism of communicative action. Respect for the medium of communication as the means to engage with conflicts and disagreements means by consequence having respect for the medium itself. It is the allegiance towards communication’s mediating nature that is the source of solidarity, argues Habermas.309

Moving away from the legal context, Habermas further elaborates on solidarity in, The Inclusion of the Other (TIO). This has two benefits, it allows a greater elaboration of how solidarity with strangers works, and it acts as a bridge to the later civic and cosmopolitan solidarity. Much of the above discussion of Between Facts and Norms relied on solidarity by implication; it is in TIO that explicit treatment is given.

In TIO, Habermas is arguing that a shared fate, built upon an expanded version of the communicative character, articulated in BFN, can create a recognition of a shared life. It is this vision of a shared universal fate that leads Habermas to think the need for metaphysical or religious norms can be avoided. Habermas turns to solidarity to help fill the moral deficit left

behind by the vacated, or the retreating, metaphysical and religious worldviews. It essentially helps to form reasons for action and motivations for taking the place of the other. This also helps to form his later, more overtly political program for a world society. In the following quotation he sets out his aims clearly in the preface, writing:


It is important to note here that Habermas’s defence of a form of universalism is also his defence of (universal) solidarity. Therefore, if his defence of universalism is not successful then neither is his version of solidarity in this context. Equally, it is here where Habermas introduces perhaps his most demanding version of solidarity theory. In the following he sets out his aims in a succinct way:

Equal respect for everyone is not limited to those who are like us; it extends to the person of the other in his or her otherness. And solidarity with the other as one of us refers to the flexible “we” of a community that resists all substantive determinations and extends its permeable boundaries ever further. This moral community constitutes itself solely by way of the negative idea of abolishing discrimination and harm and of extending relations of mutual recognition to include marginalized men and women.\footnote{Habermas, J. (Trans: C. Cronin) ([1996] 1999) \textit{The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory}, New Baskerville: Polity Press, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.}

For Habermas to be able to realise this vision, he again needs to return to the problematic nature of the difference between morality and ethics or the right and the good.\footnote{For a really interesting recent comparison with Rawls see: Finlayson, J. G. (2016) ‘Where the Right Gets in: On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy’ \textit{Kantian Review}, 21:2, pp. 161-183.} This has been discussed already with regard to legal regulations that pertain mainly to citizens of a nation-state. Here, however Habermas wishes to go further and encapsulate a global picture. In order to do this he has to place the right (moral) over the good (ethics). The importance of this hierarchy is clearly argued for in the following passage where he essentially states that only with the right informing justice, a chance at actual universalism is possible:

Without the priority of the right over the good one cannot have an ethically neutral conception of justice. This deficit would have unfortunate consequences for equal treatment in pluralistic societies. For the equal treatment of different individuals and
groups, each of which has its own individual or collective identity, could only be assured by standards that are part of a shared conception of the good equally recognized by all of them. The same condition would hold mutatis mutandis for the just regulation of international relations between states, for cosmopolitan relations between world citizens, and for global relations between cultures. The improbability of this requirement of a globally shared conception of the good shows why neo-Aristotelian approaches fall short of the universalistic content of a morality of equal respect and solidaristic responsibility for everyone. For any attempt to project a universally binding collective good on which the solidarity of all human beings – including future generations – could be founded runs up against a dilemma: a substantive conception that is still sufficiently informative entails an intolerable form of paternalism (at least with regard to the happiness of future generations); but an empty conception that abstracts from all local contexts undermines the concept of the good.313

The key aspect of this passage for understanding the place of solidarity is that it is linked to responsibility. Responsibility, in this instance could also be understood as an obligation or something that you ought to do. Therefore, the significance of claiming that the moral can be universal as opposed to an ethical good that is culturally specific is that, although it is demanding, it only applies to a thin understanding or normative base. Solidarity, in this case, supports the universal justice claim that respects the difference of competing ethically informed conceptions of the good.

Initially, this line between moral and ethical considerations appears to run into a problem, namely the issue of authority. For the ethical or the good, the appeal can be made to the immediate community that helped to form it. This can work in different ways, perhaps through democratic structures and conduits of general will formation, arrived at through communicative acts. Alternatively, one could turn to the authority of a religious community that may well exceed the confines of a nation-state. Habermas argues that this is not by itself adequate to resolve all questions of what ought to be done. Therefore, there is a requirement in certain circumstances to be able to appeal to an external arbitrator. Traditionally, the role played by the world religions, however, as he now regards these to be a part of an ethical community, he must look elsewhere for an external yardstick. Basically Habermas thinks (and he is right on this) that individuals are simultaneously both a part of their own community (nation-state) and equally that “[a]ll individuals who have been socialized into any communicative form of life at all belong to this [universal] community.”

Therefore Habermas’s phrase that “solidarity is simply the reverse side of justice” can now be better understood. Justice or universal morality has to accept that every individual, no matter

from where, has had their individuality made possible through the process of socialisation. This socialisation is only possible, according to Habermas, because of the mechanism of communication. Therefore, two universals can be established, that we are all socialised through communication and that socialisation makes it possible to be an individual. It is on this basis that Habermas claims the possibility for a universal understanding of solidarity.

What this is leading towards is the formalisation of human rights. As rights are not subject to gradation or grey areas, they are unlike the good that is on a sliding scale. They can be appealed to as the embodiment of the (external) moral community. The authoritative nature of the rights however, for Habermas, requires also the mechanism of solidarity. It is solidarity that moves the realisation that our individuality is made possible through our interdependence (socialisation) to accepting there is a just position that applies to all. This raises the question as to what should count as a universal moral norm. The only form of guidance that Habermas appears willing to offer at this stage is to resort to his universal principle, which is as follows: “a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned.”

Therefore, it is perhaps the willingness to go through this process and the recognition that one ought to, which is the essence of solidarity in this case. However, it is important to point out that this is not a first-order norm, such as, do not kill. It is a reconstituted principle for the selection and validation of norms.

In summary, solidarity is at the heart of Habermas’s solution to both the normative deficit left by retreating metaphysical and religious world views, and a way of supporting its replacement, universal justice. Solidarity helps, in the first instance as it forces individuals of one community to recognise the equality of different communities, which have different languages, traditions, religions, culture etc. It does this through individuals coming to see that all others are equally a part of the same overarching community of humans. The second is that it supports this realisation by linking it to the idea of universal justice. This duel personality of solidarity will be discussed in the next section.

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly for a broader understanding of solidarity, the implications of whether to designate it as a moral or ethical concept are very significant. The previous discussion in the Durkheim chapters argue that moral education is central to his conception of solidarity, however, to translate this into Habermas’s schema, it would almost certainly fall under ethical discourse. This is because in Durkheim’s case, what is at stake is the passing on of

relative and therefore specific norms of that given society, through education, and as such should be considered to be ethical rather than moral in Habermas terms. Habermas would perhaps agree to this to a certain extent, but would probably argue that the authority that Durkheim identifies is misplaced and should rather be found in the moral community of which everyone is a member, irrespective of their given community or nation-state. It is this challenge, the movement between the nation-state and the total moral community, which will now be explored.

*Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights*

Habermas understands globalisation as both an economic process and as a perspectival shift in relation to shared risk and fate. Therefore, the social ties and interdependence of social groups, communities and networks of all kinds, communicative and commercial, are shrinking spatially and temporally. This contraction reveals the globe’s natural limits and the offsetting of economic and social costs/risks (or exploitation) to previously invisible regions and workforces, and acknowledges potential detrimental effects for future generations which can no longer be ignored. 315

The idea for Habermas is that now that this picture is emerging more and more visibly, global actors (politicians, international commercial leaders, nebulous members of international organisations such as NATO, the EU and the WTO) need to be pressurised by their national populations to express some sort of solidarity with those effected most negatively by globalisation. Essentially, ruling elites need to be forced to realise that the populations that support and maintain them will only keep doing so if they move towards fairer distribution of burdens, costs and risks. It is this domestic population pressure that is, or could be, the result of Habermas’s version of civic solidarity. 316

National solidarity, the forerunner to civic solidarity, is historically constituted through its development alongside the creation and recreation of the modern nation-state, with its mythical origins and its unlikely but subscribed to cultural and ethnic homogeneity, ties of kinship, shared language, history and religion. 317 These factors, that help to give birth to the modern nation-state and its subsequent democratic welfare version, come to no longer be as reliable as they once were. Immigration in particular, both between European partners but also from across the world, increasingly intertwined financial systems, perhaps cultural

316 Ibid, pp.55-56.
hegemony and systems of regional and global governance all add up, for Habermas, to a process of globalisation that requires a reformed version of national solidarity. It would no longer make sense to have it tied to only a national picture (although its roots will remain there); it must be free to cross borders. Essentially, it is the realisation that accompanies the outgrowing of the nation, the recognition of the interconnectedness of commerce, culture, politics and the environment that acts as the catalyst for the promotion of civic solidarity. The few thin moral rules that are left give the foundation for how a solidarity can emerge between populations that have developed both in a conjoined way such as France and Germany, as well as through less clear means, for instance Argentina and Wales. Most importantly for Habermas’s model to be plausible populations come to see the legitimacy of other interconnected populations as having the right to express their interests and to have their concerns addressed. This is basically, communicative action on a global scale. This transformation of national solidarity to a new form of civic solidarity needs to be powerful enough to challenge global elites (or replace them).

Forcing these organisations to be responsive to the interests of the populations that support them, both in the short term but also crucially in the planning of long term projects (think tackling climate change) is what is made possible through civic solidarity. The caveat is that this possibility relies on knowledge networks being transparent and widely available. Habermas thinks that the existing modes of traditional media can perform this task, but that they need to get a lot better at communicating, firstly political discussions in other countries, but also social discussions of non-elite actors and general dispassionate reporting of regional and global events. The reliance on traditional media and the plausibility that it will accurately portray these discourses is one of the weakest points in Habermas’s argument. Civic solidarity at its best aims at pushing for equality between national populations spurred on by the realisation that the globe is interconnected in many ways, this realisation being bolstered and maintained through increasing knowledge of what is going on out there, beyond national borders. It is a form of solidarity that is elicited through downplaying the uniqueness of prescribed nationalism and instead relying on rational ethical discourse that promotes fair treatment for

---

318 This is most clearly articulated in: Habermas, J. (2014) ‘Plea for a Constitutionalization of International Law’ Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40:1, pp. 5-12.
319 Ibid, pp.5-12.
320 This is related to his universal principle defined as “a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be feely accepted jointly by all concerned.” Habermas, J. (Trans: C. Cronin) ([1996] 1999) The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, New Baskerville: Polity Press, p.42.
321 He has started to think a bit more about the internet and its possibilities however, he does remain, as far as I know, pretty sceptical. See the following for a short interview with him following his ‘twitterjacking’ in 2010: https://www.ft.com/content/eda3bcd8-5327-11df-813e-00144feab49a
all those effected. It is the adherence and defence of this process which encapsulates civic solidarity for Habermas.

Moving on now to cosmopolitan solidarity which is a different type of thing, one that is unlike civic solidarity in its scaffolding. Civic solidarity is historically constituted, malleable and leaves itself exposed to changing emphasis and to whom it is directed and to whom is included. Civic solidarity is a negotiated process, one that gets its energy from a specific population that remains tied to a particular geographical space i.e. the nation-state; cosmopolitan solidarity relies on a different form of energy, one that is free floating from a specific concrete base such as a nation-state. For Habermas, it is a part of the few thin universally applicable ideas which are non-contingent.

The need for cosmopolitan solidarity, as opposed to simply extending ever further civic solidarity, is that it does different things. Civic solidarity has been the means for making it possible to have a welfare state, transnational semi-democratic organisations such as the EU and to coordinate things like aid and war. It is the mechanism through which the willing energy of sacrifice and redistribution of resources is delivered, mainly through taxation and adherence to the law, both domestic and international. In essence, projects that cost individuals in the immediate or medium term for benefits that could, but do not necessarily, benefit them directly either in the short term or in the future. For example the childless adult hopefully does not mind that some of their taxes go to schools etc. Therefore, the basic way civic solidarity works is that some sacrifice is required to maintain universal institutions for all who fall within specifically pre-defined groups, most commonly the nation-state, but could according to Habermas, also be transnational configurations where state representatives act on behalf of the nation-state, albeit in a more diluted form than the previous national solidarity.

Cosmopolitan solidarity cannot rely on this kind of rational model, it can only rest on the presumption and ubiquitously recognisability of human rights. It is also not proactive, it is merely retroactively initiated after human rights abuses become known. Unlike the breaking of a domestic law however, the retroactive position is not a cold one, quite the opposite, it is according to Habermas indignation. Cosmopolitan solidarity is inherently an almost involuntary emotional reaction to the suffering of any other person, no matter who they are.

The irascible rage that one feels when confronted with the suffering of another human especially directly but also through a medium such as television, is something that most if not all of us share, Habermas thinks, because we are human. The issue remains however, how to translate this emotive (and perhaps universal capacity) from being practically non-cognitive
and non-expressible in the first instance, into political practice. It is on this crucial point that Habermas is most inadequate as a theorist of the liberal left. This might be because he is too attached to a particular procedural democratic system, one that would (in theory) channel the indignation into mechanisms supported by civic solidarity, to redress the ‘crime against humanity’.

However as civic solidarity operates at the level of nation-states through transnational organisations, the question is, can a reformed version, of say, the EU or more tangentially the UN, be the conduit for our indignation? For instance could the EU’s fortress mentality in the face of the refugee crises be overcome, through elite actors being more responsive to the voices of their indignant citizens? Could something like the EU, or taken on a larger scale the UN, truly shake its obvious vested interests in favour of a common feeling of solidarity with everything that wears a human face, as Habermas thinks is possible (although difficult to achieve)? Operating on a different more fundamental and philosophical level, cosmopolitan solidarity is actually a demand for universalism, which is perhaps inadequately expressed through civic solidarity. Does not this insistence of universalism exhaust solidarity’s energy and its possible practical application? The untargeted nature of cosmopolitan solidarity coupled with the overly targeted and pragmatic nature of civic solidarity leaves little room in between for redressing the unequal burdens and treatment felt globally.

In conclusion, solidarity should be thought of as historically contingent, Habermas being a prime example of this. Civic solidarity, in one form or another is still supported by nation-states, albeit in a more detached way and cosmopolitan solidarity does look as though it captures something about what it might mean to be human. However, neither offer convincing next steps to be taken nor frankly to offer a powerful enough critique of neo-liberal capitalism and its institutions. What he describes as civic solidarity assumes that nationalist feeling and attachment is becoming more benign when actually it is becoming more strident. Civic solidarity was for a more hopeful time, long enough after fascism for it to feel that nationalism was no longer the threat it once was and the means to unite Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. It could be argued that it was a necessary part of European prosperity. However, and Habermas is routinely criticised for this, his theory of civic solidarity is overwhelmingly Eurocentric. Equally, cosmopolitan solidarity appears overwhelmed by its own scope and so

---


323 He is clear that world governance is not what he is after. See: Habermas, J. (Trans: C. Cronin) (2008) ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society’ *Constellations*, 15:4, pp. 444-455. It would be unfair to suggest that Habermas is not aware of this line of criticism.
instead of being the vehicle for our indignation it instead falls too easily into catatonic anger and helpless silence.

**Conclusion**

This selection of Habermas has been less to do with how convincing his arguments are, or how they might guide future oriented social and political practice. It is instead that his views represent, both a particular historical moment in thinking about solidarity and that the problems with his account are problems that many accounts of solidarity would have to deal with. Habermas himself is also interesting, in that he represents a dying breed of public intellectuals which came to prominence in the last third of the 20th century. They can be characterised by needing to articulate a form of social and political thought that could never allow for the rise of fascism or the possibility of total war. Whilst at the same time being defensive of the political system that had allowed for sustained peace in Western Europe since the end of WW2. This balancing act between a genuine fear of fascism’s return and a critical defence of the newly formed capitalist democratic welfare state, was further complicated by the inheritance of the end of a particular form of German Idealism, metaphysics and the falling away of the authority of religion. Essentially, the foundations of philosophical enquiry were massively destabilised in this period, precisely at a moment when normative grounds were most in need.

Habermas traversed this balancing act through his now famous theory of communicative action, which saw the communicative infrastructure of society as able to restore meaning to a social and political body under threat from colonisation. The rise to prominence of normative deliberative democratic theory was, and is, supported by a presumption and reliance on the presence of solidarity. The acquiescence around a foundation of solidarity that in turn rests upon a shorn basis in shared historical ties and adherence to perceived retreating influence of Judeo-Christian ethical practices requires an additional normative basis. Various proposals have been put forward; John Rawls’s ‘Veil of ignorance’, Richard Rorty’s ever expanding ‘we’ and Axel Honneth’s ‘theory of recognition’.324 Habermas’s response has altered through time, reacting to these thinkers as well as the changes to social and political reality, most

---


importantly the fall of the Berlin wall and with that, the supposed triumph of neo-liberalism globally.

The period from around 1992/3 until the present has witnessed firstly the swaggering chauvinism of a victorious political and economic system, which saw itself, to hackney Fredric Jameson, as unimaginably unending.325 This arrogance, although challenged repetitively by crisis after crisis, most recently with the 2008 global financial crash and the self-mutilation of Brexit, remains largely intact. Habermas, although critical at times, does have a sustained and occasionally naïve defence of the European Union.326 Nevertheless, this is informative as it indicates the limits of a way of thinking that cannot detach itself from its post-WWII roots, where peace in Europe was the first priority. Habermas is of particular importance because by examining how he tries to articulate his theory of solidarity within the confines of the aforementioned constraints, broader issues with solidarity are revealed more generally.

325 “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” In Jameson, F. (2003) ‘Future City’, New Left Review, 21, p.76.
Conclusion: Cosmopolitan solidarity and the future

The first chapter of this thesis told the largely unacknowledged story of the historical birth of the modern concept of solidarity. The next four chapters, on Durkheim and Habermas, typified the range of ways that solidarity is understood following this tradition in the modern period. There is further and fruitful discussion of these two thinkers in this conclusion as they are brought together in a more precise way. Equally, it is here where their concepts of solidarity and how they relate to various forms of crisis will be joined with contemporary discourse on solidarity. It is shown that Durkheim and Habermas’s ideas, whilst remaining conscious of their historical creation, can add to the growing current literature. In particular with regards to anomie in Durkheim, this is a concept that has greater explanatory power than when discussed only within the Durkheim paradigm. The reason for this is that Durkheim himself did not advance the theory greatly in relation to solidarity. Therefore, it is more productive to discuss this intriguing notion alongside the contemporary debate where it can more easily interact with contemporary notions of solidarity and crisis. Equally, the Habermas chapters omit some of his more recent writings, something rectified in this conclusion. The reason for this ordering is so that these writings can interact with contemporary discourse. Put simply, for a time Habermas was (with the exception of Rorty) somewhat of an outlier in placing solidarity so prominently within his writing. Although Habermas was forced to rethink certain aspects of his thinking on solidarity, most notably through the challenge that was brought through feminist writings on care, it is his later writings that most clearly respond to an ongoing literature on solidarity. The structure of this conclusion will be to, first, discuss the most recent developments in solidarity theory, citing where necessary how these new forms of thinking about solidarity challenge Durkheim’s and Habermas’s ideas. This is not meant as an exhaustive literature review but more to highlight the recent ways that solidarity discussions have been developing. It will be shown that much of what concerns the contemporary solidarity debate has its roots in what has been the focus of this thesis. This therefore invites interactions between the two thinkers and these newer forms of thinking. The conclusion will end with a reflection and analysis of where the solidarity debate currently is. It will indicate that Habermas, in particular, does still offer useful insights, but most importantly he represents perhaps the limits of this form of solidarity thinking.

Coral Gould, in a recent article, argues compellingly for a version of solidarity that aims to be more democratic, transnational and to work within a framework of human rights. 327 Gould

argues that human rights require the affective nature of solidarity to work. Gould believes that her version of solidarity would, through being enacted through overlapping networks, be tied to the idea of justice (even global justice) in a significant way. The linking of solidarity and justice is something that has already been discussed at length in the Habermas chapters; however, Gould offers a differing version, one that ultimately challenges some of Habermas’s fundamental philosophical argumentation, if not his political thought.

Consciously building on the work of Fiona Robinson and Virginia Held, Gould wishes to replace care with solidarity. Solidarity, it is argued has the advantage of being more applicable for social and political groups and association interactions. The argument continues that solidarity, when seen as a form of “social empathy”, is more useful in transnational or global interactions than empathy or care alone. The proposal is that solidarity be partnered with empathy as its “social counterpart”. It is therefore to be viewed helping to form and maintain relations between “an individual to the members of a different group, and to the relations among groups.” So far this has not introduced anything strikingly new, however, what follows from this premise does move away from the Habermasian model in significant ways. The obvious problem that Gould is keenly aware of, and something that both Habermas and Rorty were also very much concerned with, is what she describes here as “whether or not we can speak of mutual concern among strangers, and particularly when others may not even be aware of the people standing in solidarity with them.” This has clear resonance with one of Habermas’s positions as previously discussed, concerned with the right to remain a stranger. Equally, what is again raised is the important question or problem of reciprocity. This could be said to be one of the real difficulties that is perhaps inherent in any use of the term solidarity.

Gould, likewise, acknowledges that to have the norm, such as found in Habermas, that one should have solidarity with everyone “would be impossible to apply, if not also utterly vague.” Interestingly, Gould’s response to this is not to instead insist on a particular or narrower form of solidarity, something that in the end is part of Habermas’s political solidarity, but rather to hold onto the notion with certain clarifications. The idea of solidarity with every human being can be retained if it is understood as a “limit” case or something held within a “horizon of possibility”. Therefore, solidarity would be felt more as a “disposition” towards action as and when the others required it. Becoming aware and being open to the possibility

---

that all others may be in need and being conscious of this can lead to support for universal human rights, for example. It could also help to maintain, transform or build institutions that would be capable of acting on a global scale. Equally, “general human solidarity” can lead to involvement in social movements whose explicit aims are human rights accomplishment.333

What sits behind Gould’s thinking on this is an accepted notion that solidarity is generated through at least a minimal amount of empathy. It is unclear whether empathy is to be understood here as something that we have by virtue of simply being human or whether it is a capacity that human beings tend in general to possess. What Gould is attempting to articulate is a way of thinking about solidarity that could counter some of the ways that it perhaps fails in previous accounts. Therefore, what is important to Gould is not whether the quality of empathy is synthetic or natural, but given that it appears to be something that can be said of most people, what could this lead to. Gould does not want to simply limit solidarity by designating it as a moral outlook. Rather she wishes to see whether solidarity built on a thin basic level of empathy could be turned towards a form of social critique. This would mean that there would be a demanding element in the solidarity that she has in mind, which leads to individuals attending to “institutional structures, as well as to the opportunities that changes in such structures might afford for improving the lot of others.”334 This leads to what Gould is ultimately proposing; solidarity as overlapping networks. The aim is to find a way to curtail the vagueness and perhaps impossibility of a universal demand for solidarity with everyone, whilst not denying the energy of motivation that it gives to individuals. Gould’s solidarity is one characterised through relationships and networks made up of people. For these to work effectively there is a requirement of the participants towards “openness”. She believes that this openness can transform “particularity, without moving it completely to a universality of principles.”335 This is the most difficult aspect of Gould’s proposal because it is hard to work out in a philosophical construction that can be presented without fungible elements. However, that is not what is important for her or her proposal, she is not interested in deep philosophical matters, rather she is setting out a possible way to instantiate a solidarity model that could lead to practical results.

The difficulty of solidarity in this context, the question of universality, is that solidarity can be seen to dwell within both camps, the particular and the universal. Gould does not think that this is a difficulty or a problem but actually a strength of solidarity. Once those who engage in

334 Ibid, p.158.
335 Ibid. p.159.
solidarity networks and relationships based upon their predisposition towards openness, they begin to “establish commonalities across differences”. They are able to put in place structures that allow individuals and groups to be incorporated within broader solidarity movements and ultimately, “help to construct more universalistic conceptions of our obligations to each other.”

Finally, solidarity comes to be understood within the backdrop of global ethics as a mediating device, its quality or lack of certainty as to whether it is particular or abstract, is actually its most useful quality. One of the key questions for Habermas was whether his various versions of solidarity could handle the difference between the actual concrete, interpersonal relationships established and maintained through solidarity, a more philosophical acceptance that all human beings deserve our solidarity understood as universal principles, and finally how to link these two with their practical implementation, supporting human rights and justice.

Whilst Gould’s proposals are useful for moving away from Habermasian models of solidarity as discussed in the previous chapters, and for thinking about solidarity in a more practical fashion, there remains a need to expand upon and clarify her ground work. In a similar vein, attempting to capture and express something akin, but more grounded in practical international politics, Joseph Schwartz articulates a dialectic between the particular and the universal with regards to global solidarity.

Schwartz shows that in contemporary thinking about solidarity as moral and political philosophy, there are two camps; pragmatic communitarians and neo-Kantian universalists. For Schwartz, pragmatic communitarians see solidarity as growing out of a strong shared identity, which is expressed through a willingness towards mutual care. In a similar way as articulated in the Durkheim version of solidarity (particularly mechanical solidarity), the particularity of the group is reinforced through identifying others that do not belong (simply us and them is required). The neo-Kantian or Rawlsian inspired position is, according to Schwartz, the “claim that human cooperative endeavors can only be sustained over time if carried out under just conditions of mutual respect.” In essence, this is an extended version of the difference principle, only this time thrown into the global sphere. These two positions, in one way or another, have been covered in the thesis and do not add radically new understandings.

---

337 Gould is very up front that what she proposes is a first shot at articulating a response to the issue of solidarity and was meant more as a way to begin discussions.
of solidarity. However, it is what Schwartz goes on to say about the impasse between these two positions that is worthy of further exploration.

Schwartz is clear that if there is to be international solidarity it will be led firstly by transnational movements powerful enough to shift domestic politics towards that end. The aim being that states are forced to act to “enhance global labor, environmental, and human rights conditions.” In a similar way to how Gould viewed the moral component of solidarity as an outer limit, here Schwartz sees it as working as a “horizon”. However, the difference (in a somewhat similar way to a hermeneutic methodology), the moral horizon can be expanded. Just as was seen in Habermas’s version, solidarity is capable of being expanded to greater and greater numbers of groups. Although, in Habermas’s examples it became unclear when he was discussing a practical reality or a philosophical aspiration. Schwartz is clear that more and more social groups can become included within the horizon and that we have historical evidence for that. Equally, the aspirant part of Schwartz’s argument rests on this previous expansion, stating that for there to be a transition from the domestic to a “regional to international solidarity” there will be a requirement to force it. Schwartz does not mean violence, he thinks that for his version of solidarity to transition from the particular to the universal, or from the nation-state to the global setting, would mean a great deal of what he calls “political contestation”.

What constitutes the limits of the horizon for Schwartz are important, given what he tentatively puts forward as a definition of solidarity. One of the important things to realise before analysing Schwartz’s definition is that he is reflecting on its possibility for the contemporary United States. His definition is as follows:

[S]olidarity [is] the readiness of individuals to aid other members of a common enterprise – an enterprise in which each feels a duty to promote a minimal level of well-being for all other members.

The context is therefore important, as the above definition is understood to be held within the particular democratic system of the United States. This is significant as it means that Schwartz sees solidarity as part of a democratic process. He is clear that it therefore cannot be enacted in particularistic or universal means. The horizon of those that come to be included within his, fairly thin, definition of solidarity becomes something that is decided through democratic means. The issue that Schwartz raises with this is that it is far from certain that the horizon of those included will become broader, and so move towards a move inclusive perhaps universal.

---

341 Ibid, p.132.
342 Ibid, p.133.
duty. The history of the United States does have many instances where it has been increased, through for example, civil rights. However, this is no guarantee that this will continue. In fact, Schwartz is quick to point out that democratic social solidarity could just as easily “degenerate into brutal hatred of others.” 343 And just as there are many historical instances that can be drawn upon as inspiration, there are equally many cases that can be pointed to that should be seen as a warning of the opposite. Solidarity understood in this way has been touched upon in this thesis already. It is not to be assumed that solidarity automatically is to be seen as a progressive tool; it has been argued that it is neutral on moral grounds. The point that Schwartz makes convincingly is that solidarity should not be taken for granted, that there is nothing to show that it is inherently teleological. It is something that has to be continuously fought for and defended. Instead the method that Schwartz argues in favour of, is active engagement in politics. It is through that conduit where the ‘political contestation’ occurs. So far so uncontroversial. This is a model that is not that far away from what Habermas would propose, although they probably have a different understanding of what politics is and what it would mean to partake in ‘political contestation’. It is what Schwartz goes on to argue that is more controversial and noteworthy.

Schwartz states that “the future of global social solidarity rests considerably upon the future of social solidarity in the United States.” 344 His logic for this is not unsound. It is based on the presumption that the United States will remain:

\[\text{Not only the global military hegemon, but its foreign policy will be a key valence factor in the future development of international regulatory regimes governing labor, investment, trade, human rights, and the environment.}\]

345 Instinctively, it feels that there should be resistance to any model that has the continued dominance of the United States as even a description of likely reality. This is not just because having one central pull of soft or hard political power would require checks and balances that have hitherto never materialised. Attempts have been made along procedural lines, however, it appears pretty clear that the rules of game rarely apply equally among all actors. Another reason to be sceptical of Schwartz’s assertion that the United States will set the parameters for what a global social solidarity will look like, is that it has rarely articulated a self-conscious version of its own solidarity. Naturally, that does not mean that it has not relied upon some kind of social solidarity for its continued reproduction, however, if it is to export this it would at least need to be able to articulate to others what its version would entail.

344 Ibid, p.145.
345 Ibid, p.145.
It would be foolhardy to think that the United States is not going to play a hugely prominent role in setting the tone and agenda of future international arrangements. However, they will not be alone, and power centres are becoming more varied particularly with the rise of China and other BRIC countries. It has certainly not been the business of this thesis to prophesise about the future of solidarity, but to think that social solidarity should be drawn by the United State’s belief that they are moral leaders by virtue of being militarily and monetarily superior does not appear to be sound logic and should at the very least be something that is actively resisted. An alternative model of solidarity, one argued for persuasively by Fuyuki Kurasawa, will now be examined.

Schwartz’s account although compelling in some ways could be accused of denying or simply leaving unacknowledged possible other resources of solidarity networks. These networks are ones capable of transnational or global reach. The energy for such distance covering solidarity networks if it was to be drawn from an understanding akin to Schwartz’s would be hard pressed to not be seen as top down in at least its construction and application. Maybe, something like a Schwartz model is a realistic account, however, Kurasawa thinks that an alternative is possible, one built from below.

Kurasawa’s stated aim is to construct a form of “cosmopolitanism from below” through “normatively and politically oriented forms of global social action.”346 This would be capable of meeting the challenge that most manifest forms of global solidarity face, that of “cultural homogenization, political fragmentation, and social thinness.”347 The view contends that social bonding with distant others, is founded upon neither just “normative principle[s] or institutional arrangements” alone.348 The contention being put forward is that these are second order constructions of global cosmopolitan solidarity that require the establishment of networks from below. This, Kurasawa argues, fails to see therefore how actual “individuals and groups are cultivating relatively thick global social relations.”349

Part of the problem as Kurasawa sees it, is that the two explanations or proposals for cosmopolitanism each have their own set of draw backs, although he is clear that they certainly should not be discounted all together. Firstly, normative cosmopolitanism, understood as being ethically universal, moves too quickly to dismiss the “rooted experiences” of people. This leads to a devaluing or outright animosity towards local or national subjectivity,

348 Ibid, p.236.
349 Ibid, p.236.
believing it to be “ethnic nationalism” in character. However, as Kurasawa points out, the normative cosmopolitan cannot show the causal chain for how the ends will be achieved. Through what process can actual “progressive global civil society struggles” be realised? On this the normative cosmopolitan does not have a very convincing argument.

The other proposal Kurasawa identifies is institutional cosmopolitanism, otherwise known as some kind of global or regional governance. This is a version of the procedural solution that is most commonly associated with Habermas. Here, in more general terms, there is a reliance on just international laws. Some of the drawbacks of this approach have already been noted in the Habermas chapters. The point here is more that when these two models are placed alongside one another, they make up three aspects of cosmopolitanism, but crucially do not exhaust it. The three are; global ethical standards, models of global governance and procedurally justifiable international law.

What Kurasawa wants to make clear is that this understanding of cosmopolitan limits comes up against what he regards as a recognition of global pluralism. Essentially, the issue that it raises is a complex one, which has at its core the question of equal treatment of human beings. Basically, for thinkers such as Gitlin and Rorty, who Kurasawa labels assimilationist egalitarians there is a need for cultural similitude from national to global settings. Ostensibly, an individual is treated identically as they are citizens with uniform rights, in all places. This implies or relies upon a universal notion of rights and duties that crucially, or at least tends towards, ignoring “socio-cultural specificities” that are replete with hierarchies and structures of domination. This has not gone unnoticed by proponents of what Kurasawa identifies as the alternative globalization movement (AGM). Their consideration and appreciation of the lack of heterogeneity that is witnessed across the global, culturally, economically, politically and socially, has led to a revaluation of the role of solidarity itself.

Solidarity becomes in this new understanding aligned with the dispossessed and oppressed, the excluded from gaining control of the mechanisms that govern their living experience. This does raise a difficulty in the mode that solidarity takes. Namely, in this context, i.e. a global one whereby solidarity is directed at those whom do not necessarily have a common lived experience with those who are extending the bonds of solidarity. Equally, and this is something that has been a difficulty for at least the theory of solidarity if not its practice; does it matter for solidarity, whether it is unidirectional? Leaving that question aside for now, Kurasawa offers a really interesting solution to the seeming impasse between global universal rights type

cosmopolitanism and its (seemingly) diametrically opposed particularistic opposite. He states that it is “[b]etter to think of a cosmopolitanism built out of cross-cutting lines of affinity between civic associations in different parts of the world.” What this view recognises, to its advantage, is that there is not a plan/blueprint/roadmap that precisely sets out a course for the building of these lines of affinity. Kurasawa instead suggests the analogy of a web as the best way to understand how it could fit together.

He states it succinctly in the following manner:

[A] vast web of this sort contains shifting nodes of commonality and shared interests, with groups discursively negotiating solidaristic bonds and pragmatically assembling alliances that join forces around specific issues while remaining united in resistance to global neoliberalism.

Leaving aside, for a moment, the first part of this statement that requires further analysis, the second aspect of identifying a common general or perhaps even universal shared goal, is potentially very significant. This is particularly true if Kurasawa’s characterisation of cosmopolitan solidarity is correct. This turn towards resistance to global neoliberalism as something that could underpin more specific political action and change offers perhaps a different approach to the one articulated by Habermas (as discussed in the previous chapters). This will certainly be something that will need to be returned to in the concluding analysis of this final chapter.

The first part of the above statement will now be explored in more detail, as it initially appears to be a passable answer to the problematic question as to how such, webs in this case, could be realised in practice. One of the criticisms that could be levelled at the previously discussed account of global solidarity argued for by Schwartz was that it reaffirmed a centralised structure, with the United States at its centre. Kurasawa is keen to instead develop a structure of AGM that is decentralised.

It is important to note that the structure that Kurasawa is envisioning is one that is flexible and capable of adaptation. The network of ‘nodes’ are to be assembled to interact with specific needs arising from “precise issues and events”. Subsequently, these networks can be formed and reformed through interactions with specific communities. The idea is that these kinds of networks of solidarity would lead to new “subaltern counter-publics and communities of interest.” One of the more interesting and perhaps novel possible consequences of pursuing this kind of decentred structure that has this degree of built in flexibility is that it is open-

---

354 Ibid, p.245.
ended. So, although there are clear goals, what the networks go on to address, or how they are constructed even, is unknown. There is however, a drawback to this type of AGM arrangement that Kurasawa himself points out, namely, the difficulty of decision making.

Effectively, what needs to be built into the system as proposed is a mechanism or a thorough defence of the right to disagree. Basically, it can often be the case when groups, particularly perhaps ones that are on a large, potentially impersonal scale, that decisions passed by the majority should be followed by the minority as a requisite of belonging in the first place. This is not an easily sidestepped issue and the protection of minority interests and their right to dissent has been important to many political theories. Following Graeber, Kurasawa states that “participants should not be coerced to adopt a position or commit an act with which they do not explicitly and freely agree.”355 This certainly appears to be a high bar to be reached, however, the idea is that decisions are made through a dialogical non-hierarchical learning process. The centre of which is the assumption that compromise makes decisions, in the long run, stronger, as they have been arrived at through a recognised process of which all participants can see their involvement acknowledged.

Finally, Kurasawa’s thoughtful and largely convincing conceptualisation of what a cosmopolitan solidarity would resemble on global scale, appears to rest ultimately on a Habermasian insight. Namely, the D principle for deliberations and imagining a communicative action that would be transnational. Becoming active in the kind of AGM that Kurasawa is picturing would strive to tap into a sense of belonging that stems from an accountability towards all humankind. It would be capable of offsetting ‘clash of civilisations’ type of “primordialism” through a series of networks that help to realise intersubjective bonds based on “trust, respect and mutual assistance among individuals and groups active in the AGM.”356 The difficulty that often accompanies this type of project is how are these networks meant to both be created in the first place, and maintained over distance and time. Kurasawa offers what in many ways is a rather traditional method; taking back and maintaining public spaces where these kinds of deliberations can happen, without interference from those in power. At least part of the answer then is “ludic” by design; “a crowd that marches through the streets of a city, can cultivate transnational relations of solidarity.”357 The networks are co-created by those who take part in expressions of political action. The spaces that are occupied supply the very real grounds for forms of direct communication that are often denied in more general

357 Ibid, p.251.
everyday life. Behind this there also appears to be an insistence that public spaces be re-imagined and wrestled away from neo-liberal control and power. The solidarity that Kurasawa is ultimately arguing for is more a first step, it is creating or forcing through the ability of individuals to connect with each other in ways that will enable them to have the ability to form the bonds that would have the strength to challenge elite forms of power.

The question as to how, or even if it is possible, to form bonds strong enough to challenge dominant forms of power remains an open one. However, in a recent article by Vivienne Jabri, the framing of what these bonds could or would have to resemble is usefully clarified. Jabri’s argument centres on one of solidarity’s difficult qualities, as has already been discussed above, that it can sit somewhere “between the international and the human” in a “indefinable location where the political takes place beyond the confines of the sovereign state.”\(^\text{358}\) What she wants to understand is what the possible implications might be of understanding solidarity in this way, to the ways in which international structures are envisioned (and ultimately critiqued and challenged). She limits her study to only those forms of solidarity that move beyond a mere community/state dichotomy to “distinctly liberal and cosmopolitan interpretations.”\(^\text{359}\) This is clarified still further through solidarity being characterised as two forms of cosmopolitanism; liberal and political. Further, one of the claims that Jabri goes on to make is: “that the ways in which solidarity is understood, formulated and practised will have a profound impact on how solidarity is related to structures of domination globally.”\(^\text{360}\) This is an aim that chimes with one of the main arguments of this thesis, namely that to investigate what solidarity comes to mean or represent at a particular moment is to reveal something important about the social, cultural and political history of that given context. The difference here is that Jabri is applying it directly to current and global realities. Her argument naturally rests upon a historical account, however, it is attempting to reveal a contemporary situation in order, ultimately, to change it.

Jabri’s two forms of cosmopolitan solidarity will now be presented and then critiqued. This will be useful to demonstrate how a better understanding of solidarity might lead to novel ways of understanding global inequalities as well as potentially offering some clues as to how the bonds (as discussed above) could actually be created and maintained. Firstly, liberal cosmopolitanism, perhaps a version of solidarity which can most readily be thought of as connected to universal human rights.

---


\(^{359}\) Ibid, p.716.

\(^{360}\) Ibid, p.717.
Significantly, Jabri points to the mechanism at the heart of the liberal cosmopolitanism world view that the law trumps sovereign right. Equally, the individual within that is the product of the “historical project of modernity” which views:

the individual self as autonomous and hence as a holder of rights protected in a transformed global order where sovereign impunity comes face to face with a legally enshrined cosmopolitan law that can hold sovereigns to account.\(^{361}\)

Certainly, here there can be witnessed the earlier problem that Jabri highlights of solidarity, that it sits between the sovereign state and transnational structures. In this liberal version human rights are directed as self-evidently universal and therefore applicable to all circumstances of time and place. It necessarily has to be global in reach and would require an accompanying framework of power relations and mechanisms to enforce compliance. Equally, to been seen to have broken or contravened a human right has to be assessed by some means. This creates the further question of who gets to be the judge and to what extent that structure of juridical power can be said to be impartial and legitimate to all parties concerned. At the core of this conundrum Jabri locates a more fundamental, and also subtler, legitimacy concern. Stating:

The charge goes further, however, and highlights the systems of knowledge that confer legitimacy to modes of representation that elevate the liberal self in relation to the ‘rescued’ other.\(^{362}\)

Naturally, there is a lot of literature that has been written about the western gaze or attitude towards those which, are seen as, in need of saving. Perhaps the most famous example in the public sphere is the Live Aid imagery. However, specifically on the question raised by Jabri, it is about countering or overcoming the unequal nature of the relationship. Effectively there does exist, both economic and social inequality in the global and national setting that make the conditions for a possible version of solidarity, complex at a minimum and maybe wishful thinking at the other extreme. Liberal cosmopolitan solidarity has to contend with the hard reality that humans do not exist outside of their lived experience and social, political and economic conditions. An awareness that humans who come to extend solidarity relations, come to the table not as equals, other than through their membership as a human, is not enough for Jabri to think that the liberal version can succeed alone. It needs to be at least complemented by some of the characteristics from a form of cosmopolitan solidarity rooted in an acknowledgement of cultural diversity.

\(^{361}\) Ibid, p.720.
\(^{362}\) Ibid, p.724.
Political cosmopolitanism, has for Jabri, an inbuilt capacity for “contestation” of ideas. It recognises that the political is rooted in and expressed, at times, through cultural institutions. It is a view that promotes the public sphere as an arena for debate amongst, in the best case, equal participants. This view can leave open concrete and future binding definitions of universal values and instead assumes that “the universal is a contested space.” What is at the heart of political cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a requirement, perhaps no less demanding than that found in its liberal form, for a “a political agency that has the politics of mobilisation at its core”. The consequence for solidarity of this latter political agency clause is that it is consciously specific in scope. It could be that this political version needs to have clear vision of exactly what the participants are mobilising for and just what they are against. It is here that the door is left open for some of the more universal principles or goals associated with the liberal tradition. Finally, Jabri offers the following succinct formulation of how the two forms might interact:

Solidarity is hence always a solidarity of claims and a solidarity of effort, driven aspirationally through some conception of an otherwise to the present while drawing on and constituting the fictive universality that is the modern state and the modern global arena.

This in many ways offers perhaps the clearest formulation of what this thesis has attempted to highlight. The main critique that was articulated against Durkheim’s version for an educational project capable of constructing a critical form of, what I am calling, solidarity is that it relies too heavily on a shared conception of a historical project of nation-state building. This is whilst not being concise enough about how a changing social, cultural, and political landscape could be sought in a possible future. Essentially, the balance between the two positions as put forward by Jabri leans too far towards the solidarity through shared history and cultural values and does not leave enough space for a critical engagement with those historical narratives and cultural norms.

Habermas is likewise grappling with something similar to the problem highlighted by Jabri. Habermas can perhaps be accused of wanting to have his cake and eat it. So, for example, in a 2001 article, he again reiterates, in a statement that could be either a description of Western Europe or an argument in its favour:

Here [Western Europe] the political traditions of the workers’ movement, the salience of Christian social doctrines and even a certain normative core of social liberalism still provide a formative background for social solidarity.  

However, whilst this can be criticised in the same way as his earlier work was in the Habermas chapter, when it is read alongside the current cosmopolitan debate, different aspects become more significant. Essentially, is it possible to hold that historically constituted fights for workers’ rights (and presumably social/legal rights) can sit alongside religious doctrines, however well integrated into Western European society? Likewise, how do these two sources of solidarity complement social liberalism, when they could be at odds? There are a range of responses to these questions. Firstly, the Habermasian response will be given, followed by and to bring this conclusion to an end, other possible responses. This will be an analysis that draws on the thesis taken together with what has been presented in this conclusion. This will then be linked back to crisis and solidarity.

Habermas’s response is in keeping with much of what he has said previously on the topic of solidarity, but also on how he views history. Habermas commits himself to a non-deterministic metaphysical or transcendental idea of historical understanding. However, as has been made clear in the Habermas chapter, history is vitally important to any argument that he makes about solidarity. The following is his clarification about how solidarity arises or should arise. It returns to his need to be able to accommodate the notion of strangers, whilst not commanding participation as a requirement for membership. He states:

A nation of citizens must not be confused with a community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history. This confusion fails to capture the voluntaristic character of a civic nation, the collective identity of which exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which it springs. Such a civic, as opposed to ethnic, conception of ‘the nation’ reflects both the actual historical trajectory of the European nation-states and the fact that democratic citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers.  

What this passage highlights is a tension that exists in the idea of solidarity itself, particularly in the contemporary realm. Although Habermas merely speculates about the possibility that it could be rolled out to include the globe, he is consciously highly hesitant to promote that idea in concrete terms. This passage is only relevant to Western Europe, with its particular set of historical, cultural and political realities. However Western Europe does not exist in a vacuum; its history, and with that its spreading of a specific cultural and religious heritage, has been and remains dominant globally, but it also has to acknowledge the influence from outside. The argument can be made that Habermas’s own theory, whilst remaining an admirable aspiration,

367 Ibid, pp.15-16.
eventually reaches its limit of possibility when confronted with the scope and literal size that would be required to achieve it. This is in reference specifically to Habermas’s most famous idea, that of communication. Habermas argues that the only way for the “legitimation deficit” to be bridged is through “a European-wide public sphere – a network that gives citizens of all member states an equal opportunity to take part in an encompassing process of focused political communication.”

Habermas concedes that at present this possibility only exists inside nation-states and that as yet the mechanism for extending it beyond has not been constructed. This is where perhaps Habermas’s theory fails to move towards practice. If it is the case, as Habermas rightly points out, that a functional public sphere has only ever been (partially) possible within a nation-state and has not extended beyond that, this raises serious questions for how it could be possible to even begin to think that it could work, ultimately on a global scale. This is where the thinkers just discussed can perhaps help to find a way to conceptualise a more probable version of solidarity, one that could be globally achieved. The key is to reframe what would count as a global form of solidarity. The aim is to assert a different set of criteria, one that recognises the contributions made by the cosmopolitan thinkers just discussed, but also the possible problematic consequences of their theories.

Here it will be helpful to return to the discussion touched upon in the Durkheim part of this thesis, namely the question of anomie. It is a concept that Durkheim fails to develop or really articulate in any great depth, however, its usefulness is nevertheless not diminished. Unlike Marxists’ view of crisis, which is more wondering with increasing desperation how it is the case that current societies do not revolt given their crippling inequality; Durkheim is seeking to show how a society once in anomie/crisis can find its way out. The comparison between the Marxist tradition and the Durkheimian model is theorised most famously by David Lockwood.

Lockwood essentially builds upon a Parsons reading of Durkheim in attempting to show that he is a normative functionalist. This is an approach that was something argued against in the earlier Durkheim chapters. However, on conflict or crisis, Lockwood does offer some important insights that are not clear from a straightforward (or necessarily accurate reading) of Durkheim. Following Parsons’s 1951 book *The Social System*, Lockwood is trying to distinguish social from system forms of integration. Incidentally, this is also a central concern for

---

368 Ibid, pp.16-17.
Habermas in 1989 where he discusses at length the connection between system and what he names the lifeworld. Lockwood, whilst being highly sympathetic to Durkheim, does offer an important criticism centring on an underdeveloped aspect of his project (something alluded to already in the first Durkheim chapter of the thesis). The question is, what is it that initiates disorder in the first place? Lockwood goes on to argue, or at least infer, that the Marxist tradition solves this question and therefore implies that combination of the two is possible. Whilst it could be the case that the Marxist tradition can offer important insights into how crisis arises, thus solving its absence in Durkheim’s theory, there is I believe a better solution, one found in Habermas.

The framing of the question has altered from that initiated by Durkheim and the Marxists, and later Lockwood. It is evident that crisis occurs or arises out of different sets of circumstances and is felt across different levels of human society. However, the possible reactions to crisis have at times failed to keep up with the changed circumstances. In following Durkheim’s thinking on anomie, it seems fair to say that he was picturing its cessation (although it would often return) in the future. Anomic times were Durkheim’s times and not only a descriptive sociological category for describing his (and possibly other) societies. What the second chapter on Durkheim in this thesis sought to show was that he saw one possible solution to his own society’s anomie being moral education. Moving beyond Durkheim’s rather restricted view of what moral education should consist of, the basic idea appears sound, although vulnerable to the changing of political tide. Equally, and this is certainly something that a Durkheimian account of education as social change would have to address; education is a reproduction of the society that it is situated within. Therefore, although Durkheim stipulates that education must be free from church, politics, and prescribed occupational determinism, it would appear that this proposal would be very hard to achieve in practice. That is not to say that education would not have to be a crucial part of any thinking that sought a way out of a social crisis, such as the one we are experiencing currently.

One of the difficulties described already in the Durkheim chapter on moral education is how change can come about given his insistence on the authority of the schooling received by the pupils. Although possible solutions were discussed above, it is this aspect that is least convincing in his account. However if we see education in a different way, one that is not rigidly set in the school environment, but in our contested social spaces, then it can impact solidarity’s interaction with crisis. To illustrate the point, a short discussion of Gerard Delanty’s recent work will be given, before finally returning to the idea of education and an analysis of Habermas.
Delanty begins his discussion of solidarity by dividing it into two general camps, one that is culturally and spatially defined, the other broadly or potentially global in scope, whilst relying on some form of moral universalism.\(^{371}\) He labels these two views bounded and unbounded. Delanty thinks that neither form of solidarity is adequate, either descriptively or prescriptively as they fail to address key concerns, some of which has already been stated in this conclusion. Importantly he understands solidarity only as political, relying, according to him, on a defined political community. The concern that Delanty rightly raises is how do the limits of a political community get defined. The bounded view would have it that it is based, most typically, on a shared or common identity usually found within a national context. The unbounded, presumably must extend the community to include all human life. This is broadly speaking in keeping with the above discussion, however Delanty then goes further to argue that the paradigm of political tradition since the French Revolution has come to an end. He thinks that it no longer makes sense to see the dialectic as one between liberalism and socialism. His reason for thinking this is that he understands the primacy of liberty and equality to have vacated the political realm. Delanty effectively reverses the common notion that you establish liberty and equality so that solidarity can then develop. He argues convincingly that solidarity needs to come first for the other two to be realised.

Returning to crisis, Delanty introduces the idea that it is both the absence of solidarity and not knowing how to create it, which leads to transformation in social life. In a similar way to how Durkheim described anomie, it is the reaction to the absence or break down of solidarity that is a part of the social crisis, its cause and the source of its eventual renewal. Part of what has motivated this thesis is to investigate the chameleon quality of solidarity. Although something that is not unique to solidarity, it is certainly something that is rarely acknowledged; solidarity most typically shifts its meaning in line with the particular crisis that demands it. This is a point made by Delanty as he attempts to navigate a path between bounded and unbounded solidarity.

The key to Delanty’s speculative proposal is based on the idea that if nation-sates require there to be an imagined community for them to continue to exist, then an enlarged cross-border version of solidarity could likewise be plausible. It would need political order and something approaching a functioning public sphere. It also returns to the question as to who is included/excluded and what comes to define these boundaries and who polices them. What Delanty argues is that with every crisis there is a breaking point whereby the crisis becomes

unacceptable to those experiencing it. This was also something looked at in the earlier Durkheim chapters, namely that a law can only remain a law if the majority accept that the breaking of the law requires, at minimum, recognition that it has been broken and at maximum, that punishment, which is agreeable to the majority is handed out. Here though, and following to a certain extent Habermas, this is not a question of the law.

A crisis is therefore felt when what is acceptable for a political community reaches its limit. This can be a crisis brought on in spite of the law, even one that has been procedurally secured, even through democratic means. An example of this would be the abolition of slavery. There are many reasons why this happened at particular times and places, however, it was not the law acting independently that ended it. It was, in no small part, due to it becoming unacceptable to most people. That human slavery became, and is today almost universally seen, as unacceptable does not happen by accident. It is, to follow both Habermas and Delanty, because of the establishment of social relations that come to recognise all humans as humans and that no human should be a slave. However, to again follow Delanty, it is not common experience that makes this possible (I have never been a slave), but instead the act of sharing, of connecting, however fleetingly with others. What this means for thinking about solidarity is that it can therefore escape one of the problems with the bounded account of solidarity, namely that it is defined spatially. Cultural sharing is now possible across any state lines at a speed that was not even possible 20 years ago. The sharing bypasses the old territorial dividing lines and moves closes to a global web of social relations. This in turn will not give rise to a global form of solidarity based on universal moral norms, but could instead be specific in its political targets, whilst not being limited to a particular location.

This is where I believe Durkheim can still offer some useful inspiration. If Delanty is right about the freeing of social networks from their spatial specificity and I think that he clearly is, then those who take part need to come to those interactions prepared. The way that individuals come to share through this recently developed infrastructure, is partly through education. Durkheim’s view on education could be seen as a way of instilling in the citizens of tomorrow the moral codes and practices of that society, whilst also equipping them with the ability to question those same morals. Although this could be disputed, education in England at least attempts something roughly akin to this. However, the real problem is that the second purpose appears to be rarely achieved, at least not on a large scale. The sharing that Delanty cites could be part of the answer to this. Through interactions between individuals from very different backgrounds shared goals can be revealed, links can then be made and international movements can be formed. This is not to say that it is straightforward, however, this appears
to be a more plausible route to take than roughly speaking the bounded or unbounded forms of solidarity. Seeing social relations extend globally creates the possibility of not just sharing but also learning. Gaining knowledge and knowing how to place it within a global context is as close as we are likely to get to a global solidarity.

**Conclusion**

On January 20th 2017 Donald Trump stepped up to give his inaugural speech to the American people. This, after one of the most divisive presidential races in living memory, was hoped to be a speech that would help to heal a fractured nation. It was expected that Trump would strike a conciliatory tone, one that reached out to all Americans. It was also anticipated that he would attempt to reassure global allies, made nervous by the nativist rhetoric of the Republican’s campaign. It is an open question as to whether he managed any of these things or whether or not he even set out to. What is striking is that two-thirds of the way through a speech that was being watched not just by millions in the United States, but around the world, he chose to use the word solidarity. For many of those watching the President that day, the use of the term solidarity would have barely registered. However, for anyone who had even a passing interest or awareness of the significance of the word, it was startling to hear solidarity, fall from the lips of the newly inaugurated, most powerful man in the world. Surprising as it was initially, Trump is not the first right-wing politician to add solidarity to their vocabulary.

A little over a week before this on January 9th, the UK Prime Minster Theresa May gave a speech to the Charity Commission to set out her vision for a shared society. The speech had been widely billed as May’s attempt to articulate her version of what Conservatism would mean. This was a speech from the play book of the compassionate Tory, a deliberate move away from their ‘nasty’ image. It was a speech that aimed to reposition the Conservatives as a party that would leave no one behind. A party committed to providing the foundation for aspirations of all to be realisable regardless of background. It is also in this speech where she defends the notion that “if you think you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere”. It is within this context that May calls, repetitively, for a “new philosophy”, one that has “solidarity at its heart”. May makes clear throughout her speech, consciously given in a

---


We must speak our minds openly, debate our disagreements honestly, but always pursue solidarity. When America is united, America is totally unstoppable.”
third sector environment, that solidarity is the bond that creates and maintains communities, that it is a resource for protecting Britain and that finally, it should be regulated. 373

Solidarity has never been simply under the ownership of left wing labour movements, trade unions or cooperative organisations. However solidarity today, more than at any time since the mid-19th century, is at a cross roads. Politically, solidarity could become synonymous with nativism, patriotism and jingoism. Socially, it could be used to strengthen nationalism and racist sentiment. Economically, it may be used as a justification for protectionist policies that further entrench global inequalities. The theory of solidarity is receiving more attention than ever before, with a growing number of academics from across disciplines engaging in an on-going debate. Therefore, it is equally a possibility that the abuse of the rhetoric of solidarity will be met with critical voices that can dismantle this dangerous ideology.

This thesis has sought to add to the growing number who are engaging with the issues that a proper study of solidarity throws open. It has done this through examining the most central figures in the history of solidarity writing, whilst offering a background to the current debates that is rarely examined. The structure has intended to offer a progression through time of the development of solidarity discourse. Attention has been paid to how the ideas of what solidarity comes to mean and under what set of circumstances particular variants have developed. It has demonstrated that there is nothing inevitable about the unfolding of a term such as solidarity.

The first chapter therefore focused on its irregular arrival out of legal terminology and into social and political vernacular, thus standing as a testament to the unpredictability of its development. Effort has been made to present writers and thinkers who best exemplified the most prominent areas of solidarity scholarship. They, although perhaps not the most radical in the genre, should be understood as representatives of general trends in understanding solidarity. What has been looked at has been far from exhaustive and has remained firmly within a particular European tradition. Yet, just as solidarity stands at the apex of choice between reaching out or withdrawing in, so does Europe itself. The crisis in the European Union mirrors the retreating hegemony of European ideas. The time when Durkheim could write about the sociological structure of French society as being separable from the rest of the world would be impossible to say today about French society and its on-going entanglement with its colonial past. Likewise, the dilemma at the heart of Habermas’s recent writing is also

Europe’s; how to maintain a united Europe that continues to require far reaching reform, with its relationship to the rest of the world. Solidarity, a simple but highly frustrating little word, which on first glance appears not to warrant much by way of explanation, has been drawn into the centre of these concerns.

This thesis set out to demonstrate the limits of a particular tradition of solidarity that starts around the time of the French Revolution, is substantiated through Durkheim and is taken to its limit by Habermas. Whilst there is certainly some potential left in this way of thinking about solidarity as a form of critique, outside in the real world however the forms of solidarity that are identified by this tradition, are perhaps reaching exhaustion. The ability of solidarity to keep in check the most rapacious current forms of capitalism, appear seriously undermined, perhaps irrevocably.
Bibliography


**Web Resources**


