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Moletsane Monyake
Abstract

With the failure of state-focused anti-corruption reform packages to reduce systemic corruption, the role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts has gained traction in academia and policy-making quarters. Yet, some of the emerging literature questions the prospect of citizens’ demand for accountability in places where corruption is entrenched. In such settings, high perceptions of corruption can reinforce the notion that most people are likely to act corruptly, undermining belief in the ability and willingness of citizens as well as government to tackle corruption. Nevertheless, some of the countries perceived to be highly corrupt have experienced frequent episodes of collective resistance to abuses of power. This has raised a possibility that exposure to corruption can in fact provoke the willingness to get involved in efforts to bring it under control. Furthermore, it seems that there are contextual conditions (other than country-level corruption) that shape the impact of subjective perceptions as well as direct experience of corruption on propensity to engage in anti-corruption tactics based on collective action.

Using analysis of nationally representative public opinion data covering 35 African countries, this dissertation examines individual and contextual level conditions under which perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery might encourage ordinary people to support citizen-centred and collective action methods of curbing corruption. It is the first study to utilise a data set of this magnitude to study the mobilisation potential of exposure to corruption in the African context. One of the key findings is that across different statistical conditions, an increasing experience of paying bribes fosters the support for the use of citizen-centred and collective action methods of anti-corruption. Importantly, there is strong evidence that an increasing frequency of paying bribes is likely to have the same impact in different countries. The effect of the perception of corruption is more ambiguous and indeed strongly influenced by observed and unobserved country-level conditions. These contextual factors include country-level poverty and state-level clientelism. Apart from a focus on the effects of individual-level corruption, the analysis zeroes-in on the extent to which the collective action that arises in highly clientelistic societies represents a demand for impartiality — a lynchpin of good governance and anti-corruption civic engagement.
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I am forever indebted to my best friend and life-partner, Mabataung Monyake, for holding the fort and raising our son while I focused on this dissertation. I do not cease ‘to give thanks for you, remembering you in my prayers, that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, may continue to give you the grace to be the best partner, wife and mother.

Moletsane Monyake
December 2017
# Table of contents

Declaration ......................................................................................................................................................... i

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. iii

List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................................... vii

List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................................... vii

Appendices ......................................................................................................................................................... viii

Chapter one ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Systemic corruption in Africa ..................................................................................................................... 1

1.2. Government-focused reactions against corruption .................................................................................. 3

1.3. The rise of bottom-up approaches to anti-corruption .............................................................................. 4

1.4. Rising anti-corruption civic engagement and the challenge of a collective action explanation of systemic corruption ......................................................................................................................................................... 7

1.5. Overview of chapters .................................................................................................................................. 12

1.6. Conclusion and brief summary of findings ............................................................................................... 14

Chapter two ....................................................................................................................................................... 17

Controlling corruption: principal-agent thinking and its collective action critique ...................................... 17

2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 17

2.2. The principal-agent analysis .................................................................................................................... 18

2.2.1. Weaknesses of the principal-agent approach ...................................................................................... 20

2.2.2. Africa’s political economy and the perversion of principal-agent relations ........................................... 22

2.3. The application of collective action theory to corruption ........................................................................ 28

2.3.1. Corruption control as an assurance problem ......................................................................................... 29

2.3.2. Corruption control as a free-rider problem ......................................................................................... 31

2.4. The weaknesses of collective action analysis ......................................................................................... 33

2.5. Overlaps between principal-agent and collective action approaches to corruption control .................... 35

2.5.1. The roots of political will in collective civic mobilisation ...................................................................... 39

2.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 41

Chapter three .................................................................................................................................................... 43

Mechanisms of collective civic engagement in highly corrupt settings ......................................................... 43

3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 43

3.2. Understanding collective civic action ....................................................................................................... 44

3.3. The grievance model and its discontents ................................................................................................. 46

3.4. Mobilising grievances ............................................................................................................................... 50
3.4.1. The experience of bribery as a mobilising grievance ........................................51
3.4.2. Perceptions of corruption, economic development and economic grievances ..........................................................................................................................53
3.4.3. Public goods dissatisfaction and the mobilising effect of clientelism ............55
3.4.4. Identity-based grievances and popular perceptions of corruption ..............56

3.5. Civil Society, media and ‘framing’ ........................................................................57
3.6. Democratic and collective action norms: a critique of the dominant literature on
African politics ..................................................................................................................59
3.7. Summary and conclusions .....................................................................................65

Chapter four ..................................................................................................................69

Data and measurements .................................................................................................69
4.1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................69
4.2. A brief review of the concept and measurement of corruption .......................71
4.2.1. Citizens’ perceptions of corruption .................................................................73
4.2.2. Individual experiences of corruption ...............................................................76
4.3. The Afrobarometer surveys ..................................................................................78
4.3.1. Measuring the outcome variable ......................................................................81
4.3.2. Measuring the perceptions of ‘corruption’ and the experiences of bribery ..85
4.3.3. Generalised interpersonal trust and other individual-level control variables85
4.4. Modeling the effect of national context .................................................................87
4.4.1. Control of corruption indicator ......................................................................89
4.4.2. Clientelism at state level and civil society robustness .....................................90
4.4.3. Ethno-linguistic diversity ................................................................................91
4.4.4. Country-level poverty rate ..............................................................................92
4.5. Conclusions and further comments on Afrobarometer data .............................92

Chapter five ....................................................................................................................95

Corruption and support for anti-corruption protests ...................................................95
5.1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................95
5.2. Control variables ................................................................................................96
5.3. Descriptive analysis .............................................................................................97
5.4. The multinomial logistic regression model of preferred action against corruption 98
5.5. Robustness checks .............................................................................................104
5.5.1. Support for other forms of civic action against corruption ...........................107
5.5.2. Bribery and actual participation in protests and demonstrations ...............114
5.6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................117

Chapter six ....................................................................................................................119
Contextual analysis of collective civic action against corruption..........................119
6.1. Introduction.................................................................................................119
6.2. Model specifications and expectations..........................................................120
6.3. Estimation techniques and issues...................................................................122
6.4. Results........................................................................................................124
  6.4.1. The contextual effect of corruption perceptions ........................................128
  6.4.2. The dividend of generalised interpersonal trust........................................133
  6.4.3. Ethnicity and ethnic diversity .................................................................140
6.5. Anti-corruption collective action in context: discussions and conclusion ........144
Chapter Seven .................................................................................................147
Demanding accountability in clientelistic settings: the case of Nigeria ..............147
  7.1. Introduction.................................................................................................147
  7.2. A bird’s eye-view of corruption and collective action in Nigeria..................149
  7.3. Social identity and collectivist culture as the basis for corruption and anti-
      corruption in Nigeria.....................................................................................152
  7.4. Clientelistic perversion of collective action in Nigeria.................................155
  7.5. Clientelism and collective demand for accountability in Nigeria: Evidence from
      Afrobarometer...............................................................................................160
    7.5.1. The protest action model........................................................................164
    7.5.2. Clients versus democratic citizens: Who demands democratic
           accountability? .........................................................................................170
  7.6. Conclusions.................................................................................................173
Chapter eight ....................................................................................................175
The prospect for grassroots anti-corruption movement in Africa: summaries and
conclusions........................................................................................................175
  8.1. Introduction.................................................................................................175
  8.2. Grievances and the mobilising potential of the exposure to corruption.........176
    8.2.1. Ethnic grievances ..................................................................................179
  8.3. Clientelism and clientelistic collective action...............................................180
  8.4. Principled principals? The resilience of collective efficacy to the corrosive
      impact of corruption....................................................................................182
  8.5. Directions for future research......................................................................184
Bibliography.......................................................................................................186
Appendices..........................................................................................................208
### List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>African regions and countries surveyed in rounds three and six</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>Correlations matrix for country-level variables</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Multinominal logistic regression predicting preferred action against corruption</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.2</td>
<td>Complementary log-log regression model predicting preference for anti-corruption protests</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.3</td>
<td>Complementary log-log regression model predicting ‘nothing can be done about corruption’</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.4</td>
<td>Complementary log-log regression of protest participation</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Multilevel complementary log-log regression model showing the effect of ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation and ethnic diversity at country level</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.1</td>
<td>Complementary log-log model of protest participation in Nigeria</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.2</td>
<td>Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of contacting leaders</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.3</td>
<td>Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of contacting political officers</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.4</td>
<td>Probability change in the effect of clientelism (using the contact variable) on support for demand-side accountability variable</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.5</td>
<td>Change in probabilities and associated p values for the contrast between clients and democratic citizens</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table A3</td>
<td>Variables used in the study</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.1</td>
<td>Mean of bribery experience and corruption perceptions variables for each of the five categories of action against corruption</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>Probability of different actions against corruption at different values of the frequency of bribe payment</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.3</td>
<td>What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to help combat corruption in this country?</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.4: Predicted probability of different actions against corruption at different points in the frequency of bribe payments (Round 6 data) .................................................. 110
Figure 5.5: The differential impact of bribery experience on probability of protest participation in rounds three and six ................................................................. 117
Figure 6.1: Precision-weighted estimates of support for anti-corruption collective action with 95% confidence intervals ................................................................. 124
Figure 6.2: An interaction between self-rated poverty and experience with bribery (with 95% confidence intervals) .................................................................................. 127
Figure 6.3: Intercepts and slope residuals for the relationship between the perception of corruption and support for anti-corruption collective action .................................. 129
Figure 6.4: How political clientelism moderates the effect of popular perceptions of corruption (80% confidence intervals) ................................................................. 131
Figure 6.5: The effect of collective efficacy conditional on perceived levels of corruption (with 95% Confidence Intervals) ................................................................. 134
Figure 6.6: Cross-level interaction of control of corruption and the belief that people can fight corruption (with 80% confidence intervals) .................................................. 135
Figure 6.7: Between-country variance as a function of interpersonal trust/ collective efficacy to fight corruption ...................................................................................... 139
Figure 6.8: The effect of perceived ethnic marginalisation conditional on perceived levels corruption (with 95% confidence intervals) .................................................. 143
Figure 7.1: Attitudes towards citizens’ requests for personal assistance from elected leaders .................................................................................................................. 162
Figure 7.2: Reasons for contacting leaders alone or with others .................................. 163

Appendices
Appendix 1: Variables used in the study ...................................................................... 208
Appendix 2: Regression tables for the robustness checks in chapter five ............... 216
Appendix 3: Full regression tables for chapter six .................................................... 220
Appendix 4: Supplemental tables for chapter seven ............................................... 226
1.1. Systemic corruption in Africa

One of the things that most African elites and citizens agree on is that corruption is pervasive in many parts of the African continent. Even Robert Mugabe, a controversial Afro-optimist and Pan-Africanist luminary, condemned the staggering levels of corruption in his country, warning against Zimbabwe becoming like Kenya and Nigeria “where you have to reach into your pocket to get anything done” (Wrong 2014). Academic and mainstream literatures have long drawn attention to the systemic nature of corruption in Africa. The respected Nigerian poet and novelist, Chinua Achebe, observed “that anybody who can say that corruption in Nigeria has not yet become alarming is either a fool, a crook or else does not live in this country” (Achebe 1984:37). Elsewhere, Achebe described levels of corruption in Nigeria as having passed the alarming and entered the fatal stage (Achebe 1983). Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) generalise Achebe’s remarks to the entire African continent, noting that in Africa, “corruption is not …a matter of a few ‘rotten apples’… it is a habitual part of everyday life, an expected element of every social transaction” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:99).

Efforts to estimate levels of corruption at country-level confirm this pervasive nature of corruption in the African continent. In 2016, 14 of the 22 countries that Transparency International (TI) perceived to be most corrupt (i.e. those that are ranked at the bottom of TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index table) were found in Sub-Saharan Africa (TI 2016). Based on a variety of data sources, Verisk Maplecroft, a risk analysis and forecasting company estimates that half of the countries at extreme risk of corruption are in the south of the Sahara Desert.²

Analysis of recent public opinion surveys shows that many ordinary Africans experience bribery on a regular basis. Transparency International estimates that nearly 75 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa paid a bribe in the year 2014 (Pring 2015). According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, three out of five citizens of Sierra Leone paid a bribe to secure public goods and services (see BBC 2013). In Kenya, “estimates suggest that 8 out of 10 interactions with public officials require a bribe and that the average urban Kenyan pays a bribe 16 times per month” (Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and Henrich 2017:1). In South Africa, a recent nationally representative survey found that one in four citizens paid a bribe while two in five knew someone who did (Dobbie 2017). Furthermore, the number of people who knew someone who paid a bribe increased by 11 percentage points between 2015 and 2017 (Dobbie 2017). The work of the award-winning investigative journalist, Anas Anas, has brought into sharp focus the pervasive nature of bribery in Ghana where over a period of two years, 12 judges of the high court, 22 magistrates and more than one hundred court officials were caught on tape accepting bribes in order to facilitate favourable court decisions (see BBC 2016, Aljazeera 2015). Indeed, corruption has become in the words of George Ayittey (2006:12), “the canker of the African body politic; malignant and pervasive”.

It is important to emphasise that while a majority of African countries are classified as ‘thoroughly corrupt’, levels of corruption (or perceptions of it), differ widely across the continent, with the likes of Botswana, Namibia, Rwanda, Cape Verde and Mauritius consistently ranking above the global average on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (also see Medard 2002). Furthermore, as the work of Laurence Cockcroft and Anne-Christine Wegener (2016) suggests, Western countries are not only struggling with the same forms of corruption that confront developing countries (e.g. bribery and fraud), the level of more elusive forms of corruption, in sports and the financial sector, is probably higher than it is in developing countries. Indeed, Cockcroft and Wegener describe how the former vice president of one of the largest Canadian engineering and construction firms who was involved in the financing of political parties in exchange for kickbacks, described corruption in Canada as “a cancer that was

everywhere” — a description that is often used in reference to corruption in developing countries (Cockcroft and Wegener 2016:65).

As the foregoing indicates, corruption is, and should be a concern on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. However, what makes corruption in Africa more interesting for scholars and policy-makers is the fact that it seems to have a more devastating effect on development in Africa than elsewhere (see Hope 2017). Despite the sums involved in grand corruption being distinctly modest in Africa compared to the Pacific Rim for instance, many of the Asian countries have achieved substantial economic growth while their African counterparts stagnated (Szeftel 2000). The most cited example compares Ghana and South Korea; both countries had equivalent per capita GDP in 1957 and roughly similar levels of corruption for a majority of the past 50 years. However, by the end of 1980, South Korean economy was ten times stronger than the economy of Ghana (see Kim 2015, Khan 2000a). Jean-François Medard (2002:382) explains that “while in Western countries, corruption threatens the bases of our democratic system, in Africa, it is the foundations of the state, and of the economic system that are shaken”.

1.2. Government-focused reactions against corruption

Beginning in the late 1980s, the donor community advised many African countries to adopt a holistic anti-corruption reform programme, under the guise of institutional economics. The main thrust of this programme was to limit governmental discretion and the role of the state in economic activities. Privatization and market deregulation were some of the policies being touted for their ability to reduce opportunities for corruption. Generally, this state-focused approach to anti-corruption was premised on the highly pessimistic view of human nature. It argued that, like all human beings, public officials have a strong proclivity to put their own interests above public interests (see Manzetti and Blake 1996, Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999, Mbaku 2007). The involvement of the state in the economy gives officials more incentives to promote self-interest. Susan Rose-

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4 Take for instance that, according to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, the continent has over the past 50 years lost to systemic corruption the sum roughly “equivalent to all of the official development assistance received during the same timeframe” (IFF 2014:13).

5 State-focused in that it focuses on the role of state-actors, and views ‘fixing state apparatus’ (i.e. public-sector reform) as the solution for corruption.
Ackerman, eloquently captured this in her seminal publication on causes of endemic corruption:

Differences in culture and basic values exist across the world, but there is one human trait that is both universal and central to explaining the divergent experiences of different countries. That motivating trait is self-interest. Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility maximization. Whatever the label, societies differ in the way they define and channel self-interest. Endemic corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap self-interest for legitimate and productive purposes (cited in Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016:6-7).

The predominant analytical device of corruption control based on the neo-institutional economics is the principal-agent model (Heywood 2017, Groenedijk 1997). The kernel of the principal-agent thesis is that corruption can be solved by fixing the incentive structure of the organisation in which it occurs. To prevent corruption, the principal (e.g. the state) puts in place institutional devices (i.e. prescribes the pay-off rules) that are supposed to increase the likelihood to detect corruption and ensure that the costs of being punished for it far exceed the benefits of getting involved (Klitgaard 1997, Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999, Khan 2006, Huther and Shah 2000, Groenedijk 1997). As intimated, this approach to corruption control dominated the anti-corruption policy of the past twenty years (Heywood 2017, Hough 2017).

Despite principal-agent reforms being adopted in a majority of highly corrupt African countries, corruption persisted and, in some cases, increased (Szeftel 1998). This led to strong criticisms of the mainstream anti-corruption policies and strategies. Jonathan Hopkin was among the first to blame the principal-agent analysis for the erroneous anti-corruption policy prescriptions (Hopkin 2002). He questioned the logic that expects public officers of highly corrupt countries, who benefit from the status quo, to demonstrate willingness to bring corruption under control (Hopkin 2002:584):

In essence, it is being argued that societies should combat corruption by establishing a functioning state in which politicians and bureaucrats design regulations in the interest of economic efficiency rather than their own personal gain, and independent judges interpret the law honestly and have the powers to block corrupt behaviour. Yet this is precisely what is problematic in a society where corruption is endemic...

1.3. The rise of bottom-up approaches to anti-corruption

The failure of the state-centred approach has led to an increased emphasis on the role of non-state actors — including ordinary citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the
business community — in anti-corruption efforts (Pieth 2014, Klitgaard 2012, 2015, Booth 2013, Grimes 2013). According to Robert Klitgaard, the reason attempts at controlling corruption ought to involve the business community is that business people have an immense understanding of how the corrupt system works (Klitgaard 2015). Most importantly they “have a collective interest in reducing corruption, even when they are virtually required to participate in corruption systems in order to survive” (Klitgaard 2015:39). John Sandage explains that one of the main reasons business people are now willing to get involved in anti-corruption is the awareness, even among the long-term bribe payers and companies working in highly corrupt environments, that “the fight against corruption is a win–win situation” (Sandage 2014:32).

More importantly for this dissertation, citizens of highly corrupt societies are assumed to have a strong interest in anti-corruption efforts given that they are often the greatest victims of institutional dysfunctions (World Bank 2004, Karklins 2005, Landell-Mills 2013, Rose-Ackerman 2010, Rose-Ackerman and Truex 2015, Besley 2006). Monika Bauhr (2012) borrows from the grievance explanation of civic engagement to conjecture that the willingness to challenge corruption would be higher in countries where many people pay bribes for public goods and services they deserve free of charge or at a token fee. Many of such countries are in the African continent. The important role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts was emphasised in the 13th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Greece. As this conference concluded, “an empowered citizen is the best tool we have for fighting corruption... we must strive to reach and mobilise people from all quarters, and from all age groups” (IACC 2008). Indeed, according to Alina Mungiu-Pipidi (2016), international aid organisations with an anti-corruption agenda should commit more resources to empowering ordinary people to seek accountability.

While being a proverbial ‘lone-ranger’ in the fight against corruption is commendable, it is unlikely to be as effective as collective endeavours (Yap 2013). As Pierre Landell-Mills eloquently put it, “the outrage expressed by ordinary citizens, unless channelled into effective collective action, is akin to whistling in the wind” (Landell-Mills 2013:16). Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer concur, adding that even if individuals had “the motivation to ‘stick their necks out’” they would not succeed to overhaul a system based on corruption unless they “engaged in a collective and coordinated effort” (Marquette and Peiffer 2015:17).
According to Fiona Yap (2013) and Shaazka Beyerle (2014), one of the main advantages of the concerted effort by ordinary citizens is its potential to generate political will — a phenomenon that has long been cited as being integral to the successful control of corruption (see Brinkerhoff, 2000, 2010, Williams 2000, Pope and Vogl 2000). Indeed, Ambrose Lee (2006) illustrates how collective civic action added impetus to the government-driven anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong and continues to sustain that country’s impressive efforts to control corruption. Eric Uslaner (2008:243) concurs, pointing out that “without an engaged and supportive public, anti-corruption campaigns as in Hong Kong and Singapore would be difficult to sustain”. Klitgaard (2015) identifies citizens’ demand for corruption control as one of the factors sustaining President Aquino’s anti-corruption crusade in the Philippines.6

The foregoing notwithstanding, some of the emerging studies — mostly anchored in collective action theory — question the prospect of citizens’ demand for accountability in places where corruption is entrenched. In such settings, corruption shapes people’s attitudes and behaviour in ways that perpetuate conformity to the corrupt status quo, undermining the willingness to “actively work with others or the government to seek solutions to the problem of corruption” (Morris and Klesner 2010: 1276). It is against this backdrop that Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) present endemic corruption as a collective action dilemma, rather than a principal-agent problem. They conclude, based on their research in Kenya and Uganda that where corruption is a rule rather than the exception, “we cannot assume the existence of “principled principals,” willing to hold corrupt officials accountable” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013: 450). In these highly corrupt contexts, politicians, and “public officials of different ranks, as well as ordinary citizens’ are likely to perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013: 455).

Central to this thinking is the idea that corruption erodes the underlying mechanisms of co-operation among individuals, including generalised interpersonal trust and a sense of collective efficacy (Morris and Klesner 2010, Johnston 2012, Rothstein 2011, Morris

6 Benigno Aquino III served as President from 2010 until 2016
Even if corruption generated the grievances that the proponents of the citizen-centred approaches say it does, the generalised mistrust that it also provokes would hinder both the willingness and ability of individuals to co-operate in anti-corruption efforts (Morris and Klesner 2010). According to Morris and Klesner (2010:1258), the corrosive effect of corruption on trust is critical because mistrust undermines “efforts to mobilise society to help fight corruption and leads the public to routinely dismiss government promises to fight corruption”. This difficulty to inspire public opinion against corruption where it is endemic increases the propensity for people (even those who dislike corruption) to get involved in it (Rose and Peiffer 2015, Heywood 2017). All these considered, it seems as Verdenicci and Hough (2015) observe that anti-corruption civic action is more likely to arise in places where corruption is less problematic.

To summarise, the collective action problem of systemic corruption can be understood at two levels. On the first level, endemic corruption weakens incentives for non-corrupt behaviour. In thoroughly corrupt societies, most actors are incentivised to act in ways that perpetuate rather than prevent (or avoid) corruption. People are unlikely to stop demanding and/or paying bribes because everyone believes “and ‘for good reason’ that almost all other people are going to play dirty” (Rothstein 2005:7). On the second level, despite its potential to trigger grievances, systemic corruption weakens the mechanisms (e.g. generalised trust and political efficacy) by which citizens can organise and successfully pressure the state to sanction corrupt behaviour (Johnston 2012, Persson et al 2013). It is personally costly for citizens of highly corrupt societies to resist the demands of corrupt officials (level one) and to use collective action methods (protests, boycotts, social audits etc.) to put pressure on the state to bring corruption under control (level two).

1.4. Rising anti-corruption civic engagement and the challenge of a collective action explanation of systemic corruption

On face value, the idea that endemic corruption dampens anti-corruption civic engagement seems to be in stark contrast to the various forms of collective political action against corruption taking place in highly corrupt and clientelistic societies. In 2015, the Petrobras scandal in Brazil ignited a series of protests in that country’s major cities. Between 2011 and 2012, thousands of Indians turned up in mass protests targeting
corruption and impunity in India. More recently in 2017, Romania experienced the largest episodes of mass mobilisation since the anti-communist uprisings of 1989. Hundreds of thousands of Romanians condemned a bill that sought to decriminalise the misuse of public funds amounting to less than 200,000 lei ($46,000). In Africa, the African Development Bank has identified lack of accountability and transparency as well as corruption as the major factors of increasingly regular incidents of public protests in this continent (AfDB 2015).

Indeed, Burkina Faso’s largest (and perhaps most influential) social movement, Coalition nationale de lutte Contre la Vie Chère, la corruption, la fraude, l'impunité et pour les libertés (CCVC) had anti-corruption as one its core claims (Engels 2015). This movement’s work was decisive in the abrupt end of the 27-year reign of President Blaise Campaore, who in 2014-2015, attempted to scrap the country’s newly instituted two-term limit to prolong his hold on power. Through collective action, civilian resistance further prevented heads of security forces from arrogating political power unto themselves after the demise of Campaore. This relentless resistance of ordinary people precipitated another act of collective action as the army, political parties, civil society organisations and religious leaders eventually sat down and nominated a civilian as the head of a transitional government. Roch Marc Kaboré, the former banker who won the presidential poll in the first round, was the first Burkinabe in fifty years to win a presidential election despite never serving in an interim position and having no visible ties to the military.

Less contentious forms of collective action against corruption have also occurred across the developing world as Beyerle (2014), Vogl (2012), Fox (2015) and Landell-Mills (2013) demonstrate. Notably, Africans have taken advantage of national and local government elections to punish unscrupulous incumbents as Nigeria’s presidential election of 2015 and Lesotho’s national election of 2017 demonstrate. Although the incumbent parties won recent elections in countries such as Gabon and Angola, there are indications that a large number of voters rejected them, and that the electoral contest was

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7 This is translated as ‘The coalition against the high cost of living, corruption, fraud, impunity and for basic freedoms’
8 Allegations of corruption were central to the premature collapse, through a vote of no confidence, of Lesotho’s Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s two-year-old administration. In Nigeria, the amount of corruption in the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan allegedly contributed to his failure to win the second term of office.
much tighter than the official results suggested. Surely, these different forms of civilian resistance in highly corrupt settings cannot be dismissed as mere exceptions as the collective action analysis would suggest. It would seem as Frank Vogl has noted and contrary to collective action thinking that “ordinary citizens, even in some of the most corrupt nations in the world — and some of the most dangerous for anti-corruption activists — can organize and secure justice” (Vogl 2012:193). In fact, Beyerle (2014:6) concludes that in spite of the bleak circumstances, “or perhaps because of them, people can move from being victims and bystanders of malfeasance to becoming a force for transforming their societies”.

One of the weaknesses of some of the studies on citizen-centred approaches to anti-corruption is the excessive focus on ‘successful’ cases. Due to this selection bias, studies by Beyerle (2014) and Landell-Mills (2013), for instance, offer a limited account of why various forms of collective action that were ostensibly inspired by ‘corruption’ did not occur, much less succeed in societies that share similar attributes with those in which they were deemed successful. Similarly, these studies do not shed light on the similarities and differences in attributes between individuals who take part in anti-corruption collective action and those who stay away. Mark Lichbach has these methodological pitfalls in mind when he submits that collective action studies must be designed in such a way as to “explain why people do not participate in CA [i.e. collective action] and why they do participate. They must account for why CA never begins or collapses and why CA does start and grow” (Lichbach 1995:127).

More importantly, most of the studies as well the journalistic accounts of political action in highly corrupt societies take for granted that individual-level perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery play a role in willingness to take part in citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts. For instance, although Landell-Mills (2013: iv) does not have data indicating civic activism rates conditional on individual-level exposure to corruption, he suggests that what motivates engagement in anti-corruption activities is

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9 In both Gabon and Angola, presidential candidates from the ruling parties were declared winners even as international observer missions questioned the legitimacy of the election results. Independent media reports suggest that opposition candidates won in many urban areas in Angola. See here for possible election rigging in Angola: https://www.makaangola.org/2017/08/angola-the-stolen-elections/ accessed 08 August 2017.

For further reports on the presidential election in Gabon, see here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37243190 accessed 08 August 2017
that “people are increasingly intolerant of being squeezed for bribes and more incensed at officials growing fat on extortions and crooked deals”.

Lastly, as Serena Verdinicci and Dan Hough (2015:10) conclude, citizen-centred approach to anti-corruption assumes “that the citizen and civil society always act to further the common good, and acts as an inherently pro-democratic force”. In other words, citizens involved in these anti-corruption efforts are caricatured as being genuinely interested in clean and accountable government, rather than seeking to replace a particularised order with the one that serves their own narrow interests. It is in this regard that scholars of African politics warn against the false positives in the collective/social movement literature on Africa (de Waal and Ibreck 2013). As Alex de Waal and Rachel Ibreck (2013) argue, some of the collective action research on Africa overlooks the fact that neo-patrimonial tendencies that characterise state-society relations in Africa shape the nature of collective civic engagement, so that instead of acting as a vehicle for a sustained demand for a governance norm predicated on equality under the law, it seeks to supplant or perpetuate particularistic social and political orders (de Waal and Ibreck 2013).

Indeed, according to William Reno (2002:839), though many Nigerian ‘activists’ “see themselves as marginalised critics of corrupt rulers, they often end up serving elite interests”. Using collective action, these social activists often “try and force their way into the social system from which they are excluded, not overthrow it” (Reno 2002:839). As indicated, this contradicts the basic assumption of citizen-centred approach to accountability, which is that the ultimate goal of those who engage in civic action in the name of anti-corruption is to defend public interests rather than promote particularistic ones. What also complicates matters is the fact that the African state — against which anti-corruption collective civic action is (or should be) directed— “accepts, encourages or even benefits from everyday forms of resistance” against it (de Waal and Ibreck 2013:308).

A methodological challenge of studying civic engagement, especially in Africa, is lack of access to suitable individual-level data (Mueller 2014, Rosenfeld 2017). As Bryn Rosenfeld (2017:641) reminds us, “most representative surveys rarely ask about participation in specific protest events.” But even if they did, the resulting data would
not be useful as many mass protests in developing countries hardly ever target a single issue, such as ‘corruption’. Indeed, in-depth interviews with protest participants, especially leaders, often find that ‘corruption’ is mentioned along with a range of other social and political problems that inspired people to turn out. In her analysis of popular resistance against corruption in 12 countries, Beyerle (2014:247) notes that “most of the civic initiatives targeting corruption were linked to other injustices and struggles”.

These conflations make it extremely difficult to isolate the effects of corruption (e.g. scandals, the perceptions of corruption or experiences of bribery) on the willingness to take part in collective civic action. Bauhr (2016:6) has this in mind when she observes that “while citizens do sometimes mobilise against ‘corruption’, it is rather unclear what exactly spurs such movements, since corruption is sometimes used as a “catch-all” concept, including both economic grievances and democratic deficits”. To be precise, it is not entirely clear whether a perception that corruption is widespread has any independent effect on willingness to challenge corruption, or whether it only increases such willingness when accompanied by economic grievances.

With the foregoing literature gaps in mind, this dissertation examines the mobilising potential of individual-level corruption variables. The use of the term ‘mobilising potential’ (see Klandermans 2013) is deliberate to the extent that the study examines the extent to which subjective perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery influence the preference or support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption. Although data limitations is the main reason for focusing on attitudes towards citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics, attitudinal data on collective action should not been seen as necessarily inferior to their behavioural counterpart. In fact, according to Stephen Finkel and Edward Muller (1998) and Bert Klandermans (2013), due to the high risk of endogeneity that comes with the statistical analysis of self-reported participation rates, data on willingness or intentions to participate can be more useful for testing hypotheses based on collective action theories. Nevertheless, drawing upon both attitudinal and behavioural types of data, where possible, can provide more insights on the causal mechanisms driving collective action (Finkel and Muller 1998).

The analysis in this dissertation draws upon survey data on 52,000 individuals from 35 African countries. These data provide information on individual perceptions and
experiences of corruption as well as their views regarding the role of citizens in efforts to bring corruption under control. Currently, Afrobarometer has the largest and most representative public opinion data on Africa. To get a more nuanced picture of the relationship between corruption and citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts, I merge Afrobarometer data set with country-level data drawn from a variety of sources including the V-DEM project and the World Bank Institute.

1.5. Overview of chapters

This dissertation has eight chapters including this introduction. Chapter two outlines the principal-agent and collective action approaches to understanding (anti-)corruption. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches as well as the overlaps between them. It explores the challenges that principal-agent accountability faces in Africa, focusing on the mainstream Africanist literature regarding the linkages between political leaders and citizens. One of the main highlights of chapter two is unpacking how systemic corruption presents an assurance dilemma by eroding generalised interpersonal trust and a sense of collective efficacy. Towards the end, the chapter identifies some of the main weaknesses of the collective action analysis, pointing out in particular, instances in which corruption itself can act as a catalyst for collective action against it.

To the extent that collective action analysis represents what might loosely be described as a pessimistic view towards anti-corruption mobilisation, the discussion in chapter three focuses on more optimistic perspectives. The chapter identifies the individual and context-level explanations for why perceptions of corruption and personal experience of bribery can motivate civic engagement against corruption. It does this by evaluating the social movement and political participation literatures as they relate to corruption and anti-corruption. The chapter also comes back full circle to offer a detailed critique of the idea — rooted in mainstream Africanist literature— that ordinary Africans are more predisposed to acquiesce rather than hold public officers accountable.

Chapter four makes a case for using survey data to analyse the nexus between corruption and anti-corruption collective action. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the literature on measuring corruption and discusses some of the main weaknesses of relying on public opinion data to study it. It introduces the Afrobarometer survey data, and
explains how support for anti-corruption collective action — this study’s dependent variable— is measured. It describes how the main independent variables, experience of bribery and individual-level perceptions of corruption, are measured. It offers a brief summary of the data analysis techniques, especially the multilevel modelling strategy employed in chapter six. The chapter concludes with a few limitations of the Afrobarometer data set and the extent to which these are likely to affect statistical results.

Chapter five focuses on the impact of the experience of bribery and perceptions of corruption on support for anti-corruption protests. As a robustness check, it also explores the impact of corruption on other citizen-centred methods of tackling corruption, including the signing of petitions calling for tougher sanctions against corruption, being involved in raising awareness about corruption, supporting anti-corruption organisations and voting for clean political parties and candidates. Finally, it examines the consistency of the effect of corruption variables by replacing, as a dependent variable, attitudinal support for anti-corruption protests with actual participation in protests and demonstrations.

Taking the analysis further, chapter six examines how context (i.e. unmeasured and measured country-level factors) shape the relationship between individual-level measures of corruption and support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of anti-corruption. The country-level factors being considered are ethnic fractionalisation, civil society robustness, government’s control of corruption, state-level clientelism and economic development. The chapter also examines how these variables, especially the country-level measure of corruption, influence the impact of individual-level corruption variables. Towards the end, the chapter explores how individual- and context-level corruption shape the impact of the perception of ethnic marginalisation on support for anti-corruption civic engagement.

Before the concluding chapter (i.e. chapter eight), the analysis focuses on the dynamics of anti-corruption collective action in highly corrupt societies. Specifically, it delves into the tripartite relationship between corruption, clientelism (measured at individual-level) and collective civic action. Partly due to the complex nature of this relationship, I decided to focus on one country, Nigeria. Nigeria is one of Africa’s highly clientelistic societies with very high levels of anti-government mobilisation. This single case design holds
country-level factors constant and allows the analysis to focus on how individual-level variability in exposure to clientelism affects the propensity to take part in protests and demonstrations. The analysis in this chapter evaluates the idea that various forms of anti-government collective action taking place in highly clientelistic societies do not represent a genuine demand for impartiality as a governance norm. Chapter eight summarises and discusses the key findings of the study, identifies unresolved issues and areas for future research.

1.6. Conclusion and brief summary of findings

As intimated, the debate around the impact of corruption on citizens’ willingness to challenge corruption has optimistic and pessimistic dimensions. Anchored in the grievance model of collective action among others, the optimistic view departs from the premise that as the greatest victims of corruption, ordinary people have an interest in efforts to bring corruption under control. The expectation based on this view is that individuals who have had frequent experiences with corruption or those who think it is highly pervasive will have a higher propensity to support various citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts. Additionally, institutional factors such as poverty can intensify the positive effect of individual-level exposure to corruption. The pessimistic view, on the other hand, posits that especially where corruption is endemic, corruption-related grievances are not enough to motivate people to rally behind a collective-action based anti-corruption drive. In fact, in highly corrupt settings, people who perceive high levels of corruption or have directly experienced it are likely to feel that corruption is ‘normal’, resigning to the fact that there is nothing ordinary people can do about abuses of power (Bauhr and Grimes 2014).

In line with the optimistic view, this study finds that across very different empirical specifications, personal experience of bribery (i.e. petty corruption) has a consistently positive effect on support for anti-corruption civic engagement. Importantly, an increase in the experience of paying bribes increases the likelihood to have taken part in actual protests and demonstrations. Lastly, results based on the sixth round of Afrobarometer data suggest that poor people are more likely to support anti-corruption civic engagement as their experience with bribery increases. The weak cross-national variability in the
effect of bribery suggests that across the entire African continent, a rising experience of paying bribes is likely to increase support for collective action against corruption.

The effect of corruption perceptions is, on the other hand, more inconsistent. In addition to increasing the support for at least one form of civic action against corruption, it has a very strong positive effect on the belief that there is nothing ordinary people can do about corruption. More in-depth analysis shows that an individual with the highest score on the perceptions of corruption variable is significantly more likely to say that ‘nothing can be done about corruption’ than express support for any form of anti-corruption engagement. Results of the multilevel analysis reveal that the best way to understand these contradictory findings is to allow the coefficient of the perception of corruption to be different for each of the 35 countries in the data set. There is indeed, a strong country to country variability in the impact of perceived levels of corruption on support for anti-corruption collective action. This implies that how the perception of corruption influences attitudes towards the role of citizens in efforts to challenge corruption depends, to a large extent, on observed and unobserved country-level factors.

This study is the first to clarify the differential impacts of the direct experience of corruption and perceptions of corruption on anti-corruption mobilisation in the African context. In this regard, it fills an important lacuna in the anti-corruption scholarship, namely that much of anti-corruption research does not anticipate that different forms of corruption might have very different effects on willingness to oppose corruption (see Bauhr 2016). This finding has a practical implication for anti-corruption programming in Africa and developing countries. As Bauhr (2016) and Heywood (2017) have noted, an understanding of how different forms of corruption influence individual behaviour can contribute significantly to ongoing efforts to curb corruption where it is most destructive.

This dissertation also shows, quite surprisingly, that perceived levels of corruption do not enhance the positive impact of the feeling of ethnic marginalisation on support for anti-corruption mobilisation. Rather, an increasing perception of corruption makes those who never feel marginalised to support citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics. At high levels of corruption perception, the effect becomes so strong that both groups have exactly the same probability of supporting citizen-centred methods of tackling corruption. To the extent that corruption is believed to feed a sense of ethnic discrimination in deeply divided
African societies, one would have thought that the perception of corruption would intensify the willingness among those who feel marginalised to use citizen-centred tactics, especially protests.

The analysis also shows that institutional quality — which the pessimists argue shapes the interpersonal trust mechanism of collective action — only affects individuals with a weak sense of interpersonal trust. That is, individuals who do not trust people to fight corruption are quite sensitive to changing institutional context; they are highly likely to support citizen-centered anti-corruption efforts when they live in Botswana or Namibia where corruption is low and least likely to show support for these tactics in highly corrupt settings of Burundi and Sudan. On the contrary, individuals who believe that ordinary people can fight corruption have the same probability to support anti-corruption collective civic action regardless of the level of corruption in their countries. This means that the effectiveness of the sanctioning system is much more relevant when bonds of trust and solidarity are weak. This study is the first to make these findings using public opinion data on Africa.

Chapter eight zeroes in on the other aspect of the pessimistic view on anti-corruption mobilisation, namely that the anti-state (anti-corruption) collective action that occurs in highly corrupt settings does not represent a genuine demand for accountability. Rather, it represents a demand to reconfigure clientelistic relations in ways that benefit the private interests of both elites and their cronies. The analysis shows that clientelistic concerns do play a significant role in the likelihood to join collective civic action in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that concerns for genuine public accountability also drive the propensity to undertake collective civic engagement.
Chapter two
Controlling corruption: principal-agent thinking and its collective action critique

2.1. Introduction

This chapter begins with a summary of the principal-agent approach to corruption control, highlighting some of its main weaknesses as an analytical device and a guide for anti-corruption policy. The chapter homes in on the challenge of applying a principal-agent lens to analyse the scourge of corruption and prescribe its cures in Africa. Many of the weaknesses of the principal-agent approach crystallise into what has been described as the mischaracterisation of the problem of systemic corruption, and have acted as the basis for the application of collective action theory (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). This collective action approach departs from the premise that systemic corruption is a structural problem — an outcome of interactive and reciprocal exchanges among actors so that the decision to challenge or perpetuate corruption depends on the number of individuals in the same setting that are expected to do the same (Mishra 2006, Karklins 2005, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013).

Having described the main elements of collective action theory as applied to the problem of systemic corruption, the chapter identifies some of its main weaknesses emphasising, among other things, that its anchoring in rational choice institutionalism limits its ability to account for the progress being made to combat corruption in places where it is deemed to be endemic. The collective action analysis is unable to explain why individuals as well as firms operating in highly corrupt societies and therefore constrained in their choices, can cooperate and transform their societies. Towards the end of the chapter, I present the literature showing how strategies rooted in both principal-agent thinking and collective action analysis have been used concurrently to tackle corruption where it was most problematic. Specifically, this analysis highlights some of the instances in which principal-agent techniques successfully reduced endemic graft, sometimes by inspiring collective resistance. I underscore that as far as tackling corruption is concerned, the two approaches are more complementary than some analysts would acknowledge. The
theoretical discussions in this chapter provide a basis for the arguments that emerge in chapter three and are assessed throughout the rest of this dissertation.

2.2. The principal-agent analysis

The principal-agent model has been applied to a wide range of disciplines and has as a result produced a substantial body of literature, which this section cannot (feasibly) review in its entirety. Generally, the principal-agent model describes the nature, problems and outcomes of the relationship between principals and agents (Becker and Stigler 1974, Becker 1993, Rose-Ackerman 1978, Klitgaard 1988). In the analysis of corruption, where politicians are cast as principals, civil servants take on the role of agents (Banfield 1975). Where citizens are modelled as principals, all public officers (politicians, judges, civil servants etc.) are cast as agents required “to accomplish those tasks that are the expression of their collective principal, to whom the exercise of their power has to be – at least accountable” (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012:7). Other scholars (e.g. Klitgaard 1991, Lambsdorff 2002, You 2015, Groenedijk 1997, Della Porta and Vannucci 2012) have added ‘a client’ as the third actor in principal-agent relationships, subsequently referring to this as the Principal-Agent Client (PAC) model. The agent acts on behalf of the principal to serve a client.

The principal-agent relationship is characterised by two closely-related problems. The problem of adverse selection arises when the principal is unable to select the ‘right kind of agents’ while ‘moral hazard’ occurs when the agent, using its significant informational advantage and power of discretion, pursues its own interests at the expense of those of the principal (Besley 2005, Aidt 2003). Indeed, given that agents are assumed to be driven by self-interest, unfettered discretion and significant informational advantage puts them at risk of abusing their ‘delegated’ powers for private gain. Principal-agent analysis views corruption as a crime of calculation by an individual public officer (the agent) that is motivated by self-interest (e.g. greed), and that can be prevented by enforcing mechanisms that force her to align her actions with the wishes of the principal (Wedel
When ‘client’ enters the model, corruption becomes according to Della Porta and Vannucci (2012:6):

a ‘three-player game’ in which an invisible and illegal exchange between an agent and a client/briber distorts the incentives to fulfil the terms of the contract with which the principal delegates responsibilities and discretionary power to the agent, in favour of the private interests of the agent and to the detriment of the interests of the principal.

As intimated in the previous chapter, principal-agent notions of accountability have had a significant influence on the way donor agencies have addressed governance and development issues in the global South. The World Bank has promoted a variety of principal-agent inspired public sector reforms aimed at reducing administrative discretions, and with them, opportunities for corruption. These administrative reforms included the establishment of meritocratic systems for appointment, promotion, and performance evaluation (World Bank 1997). The Bank also saw competitive salaries and improved working conditions as being necessary to “attract qualified, better trained and more honest people” (Mbaku 2007:75). The creation of independent oversight bodies (e.g. Ombudsman, Police Complaints Commissions etc.) and anti-corruption agencies formed an integral part of the principal-agent based reform effort. Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, the principal-agent anti-corruption reform sought to increase the probability of detecting and punishing corrupt activities.

In addition to the civil service reforms just described, economic and political reforms fashioned around the ideology of ‘liberalism’ were seen as a remedy for political accountability problems in developing countries (Szeftel 1998). On the political front, competitive elections were touted for their ability to provide a means to replace bad politicians with good ones, “who are principled, competent, and share the electorate’s ends…” (Fearon 1999:82). Furthermore, the World Bank (1997b:44) identified independent media and strong civil society organisations (CSOs) as “arguably the two most important factors in eliminating systemic corruption in public institutions”.

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10 Groenedijk (1997) makes a point that self-interest does not necessary have to be economic (or materialistic) contrary to much of the literature. Personal interests can be anything from greed, altruism and ego, or a little bit of all these. An individual agent decides what their personal interest will be; and corruption occurs when they pursue that interest against the interests of the principal.

11 I use this term ‘liberalism’ narrowly to refer to laissez-faire economics, minimal state intervention and electoral democracy. Some of the policy prescriptions based on this libertarian perspective to anti-corruption reform, including rolling back the state, were briefly highlighted in the previous chapter.
independent media and strong CSOs increase transparency, which in turn, reduces information asymmetry between the electorate as the principal and public officers as the agent (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Aidt 2003, Besley 2006, World Bank 1997b). Transparency increases the probability that a bad politician will be identified, and where elections are competitive, a higher likelihood that she will lose the next election (Groenedijk 1997). By increasing information available to citizens between elections, transparency can increase people’s willingness to put pressure on elected leaders to act in the interests of the broad sections of the population (World Bank 1997b, Besley 2006).

2.2.1. Weaknesses of the principal-agent approach

The main weakness of the principal–agent model lies in its presumption of the existence of a non-corruptible ‘principal’ (Teorell 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, Hopkin 2002, Persson et al 2013, Booth 2012). As Rothstein and Teorell (2015b:241) submit, the notion that society always has people who are prepared to act in the interest of the ‘public’ “is a fairly heroic assumption on a general scale”. Mungiu-Pipiddi (2013) points out that the most senior state official could be the one serving as a gate-keeper in venal activities. Ayittey echoes similar sentiments, suggesting that in Africa, “the chief bandit is often the head of state himself” (Ayittey 2006:50). The principal-agent approach ignores the fact that in high corruption societies, a group of actors cast as principals often collude with the group of actors assumed to be ‘agents’ in furthering corruption. According to Aidt for example, tax officials in high corruption settings “collude with taxpayers to understate tax liabilities with the result that revenues collected fall far short of their potential” (Aidt 2003:636). Olivier de Sardan (2006:94) eloquently describes how collusion works in Senegal:

In Senegal, shady tax collectors who get caught in the net of the municipal police are immediately released by order of the mayor. The collectors, who are selected from the mayor’s political clientele, pay over part of their illicit gains into the informal funds of the municipalities. Similarly, the ‘agents d’affaires’, i.e. lobbyists, who lurk around the corridors of the courts and sell temporary rights or false birth certificates, are never definitively removed from these locations because they constitute the intermediary link in the corruption chain, between those subject to the law and the men of the law.

Studies on political accountability in highly corrupt societies make a point that ordinary people are often reluctant to act as the collective principal, choosing to support efforts that undermine accountability and good governance (see Rothstein 2011). To illustrate
this point, ahead of the 2016 local government elections in South Africa, thousands of residents in the capital city of Tshwane (i.e. Pretoria) took to the streets to oppose the decision by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) “to replace a notorious rent-seeking local politician with a former cabinet minister …as the mayoral candidate in the 2016 local government elections” (Piper and von Lieres 2016: 324). This mass mobilisation was not geared towards demanding a form of governance based on what Mungiu-Pippidi (2013, 2016) has termed ‘ethical universalism’. The aim was to protect the particularistic allocation of public resources that defined the administration of that incumbent mayor, Kgosieltso Ramogopa (Piper and von Lieres 2016).12

Recent studies show that in places where corruption is most endemic, transparency, the “motherhood and apple pie of good governance” (Besley 2006:158) may depress rather than inspire citizens’ willingness to take on their role as a collective principal (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Information revealing widespread abuses of public office fuels “expectations about other people being corrupt, and thereby legitimises corruption” (Bauhr 2012:82). The perception that corruption is pervasive can also dampen interest in politics as well a sense that the political system can respond to citizens’ demands for accountability (i.e. external political efficacy). Declining interest in politics and low political efficacy erode the willingness to get involved in efforts to put limits on political power (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the information that corruption is pervasive is that it can lead, in the long run, to satisfaction with the ‘corrupt’ status quo, further undermining citizens’ willingness to support anti-corruption efforts (Bauhr and Grimes 2014).

Nevertheless, other studies show that the nexus between transparency and willingness to challenge corruption is not as straightforward as the foregoing may seem to suggest. It is contingent upon several contextual factors, one of which is how information about corruption is communicated to ordinary people. Information about corruption can have an empowering effect on citizens if they perceive it as being ‘actionable’ (Fox 2015). That is if it also highlights the importance of taking countervailing action and instils belief

in the ability of ordinary people to take that action as a collective (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). Lastly, the ‘timing’ of the release of information about corruption can also influence the willingness of people to act as the collective principal. Citizens are likely to punish corrupt politicians if negative audit information is made available during or just before the election period (see Bobonis, Camara Fuertes and Schwabe 2016). Indeed, Ferraz and Finnan (2008b) found that incumbent mayors in Brazil were less likely to win municipal elections if audit reports unveiled maladministration and corruption ahead of the election.

One major weakness of the technical policy prescriptions advanced by the principal-agent model is the fact that it undermined the importance of corruption for sustaining governments in developing countries (Szeftel 1998, 2000). As Mungiu-Pippidi reminds us, corruption is one of the pillars of political stability in post-conflict societies such as Bosnia, where the price for disarming ‘ethnocracies’ was to allocate the country’s resources among ethnic groups, thereby entrenching particularism as the dominant governance norm (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal suggests that incumbent leaders have abused state resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation and ‘buy’ peace (Khan 2006b, Ariola 2009, Tangri and Mwenda 2008). Arriola (2009:1340) emphasises that “African leaders expand their patronage-based coalitions to minimize the form of political instability that most directly concerns them — being overthrown through extraconstitutional means”. These ‘political benefits’ of corruption undermine political will and commitment to anti-corruption reform (Khan 2006b). As the next section shows, ordinary Africans also contribute in various ways to the weak political will to address corruption.

2.2.2. Africa’s political economy and the perversion of principal-agent relations

Analysis of political and economic dynamics of many African countries often adopts the framework of neo-patrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle observed more than a decade ago that neo-patrimonial logic is “a distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes” (Bratton and van de Walle 1994:458). Van de Walle (2009) shows that neo-patrimonial tendencies have endured despite the introduction of multiparty politics in many parts of the African continent. Mkandawire notes that despite its limitations as an analytical device, neo-patrimonialism continues to be “a potent force not only in academic terms
but also in framing policies toward Africa by providing a kind of institutionalised common sense” (Mkandawire 2015:601). Neo-patrimonialism refers to an institutional arrangement in which Max Weber’s patrimonial form of authority co-exists with its legal rational counterpart (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Erdmann and Engel 2006, Clapham 1985, Hyden 2013).\(^\text{13}\) The term is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘patron-clientelism’, which Scott (1972:92) defines as the “instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron”.

The literature on Africa’s political economy covers the various ways in which neo-patrimonialism perverts the relations between citizens as principals and politicians as their agents. For instance, Bratton (2006) and Chabal (2009) show that most Africans view themselves as clients and subjects rather than citizens with the right to impose limits on power. Extending this point, Kelsall maintains, summarising the work of Schatzberg (2001) that Africans tend to think about state-society relations “through the metaphor of an idealised extended family and its father” (Kelsall 2008: 7).\(^\text{14}\) African countries’ very high scores on Hofstede’s measure of power distance is one indicator of the hierarchical authority patterns prevalent in African societies (Etounga-Manquelle 2000, Yeboah-Assiamah et al 2016).\(^\text{15}\) The Cameroonian scholar, Etounga-Manguelle, has argued in this regard that many Africans “consider their superiors to be different — having a right to privilege”, and believe that social status takes precedence over the laws of the country (Etounga-Manquelle 2003:68).

\(^\text{13}\) See Erdmann and Engels (2006) and Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) for a fairly exhaustive critique of the concept of neo-patrimonialism and contemporary uses. Erdmann and Engels for instance lament the uncritical use of the concept of neo-patrimonialism. Similarly, for Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009:131), “the vastly different contexts and the variety of purposes to which the concept has been applied have diminished its analytical utility”. Similarly, de Grassi argues that “as the term is increasingly invoked more widely, it is being used more loosely, and precise connotations, justifications, and limitations of the concept are lost as it is turned into a default explanation or deus ex machina” (de Grassi 2008, 110).

\(^\text{14}\) My emphasis.

\(^\text{15}\) Hofstede’s six value dimensions of culture include Power Distance, individualism vs. collectivism, Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation Masculinity vs. Femininity uncertainty Avoidance, Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation and Indulgence vs. Restraint. See here https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html accessed on 27 March 2017.
The main corollary of the paternalistic imageries that shape political relations in Africa is the deferential and acquiescent view of political leadership (Kelsall 2008). The individuals — especially women and youth — who try and question authority figures can often be ostracised by their own peers and same authorities from whom they seek accountability. Indeed, as McNeil and Malena observed, in especially rural parts of Africa, the act of seeking accountability is “perceived as an act of disrespect” (McNeil and Malena 2010:192). Apart from weakening citizens’ willingness to demand accountability, this cultural acceptance of hierarchical distance undermines the constraining effect of formal rules and nourishes the personalisation of power at different levels of the state (Bayart 1993, 2009).

The paternalistic understanding of state-society relations also manifests in that citizens, especially the rural poor, expect their parliamentary representatives to personally cater for their private needs. In fact, according to Lindberg (2009:9), this “personal assistance/benefits type of accountability relationship is the most common in MPs’ relationship to their constituents…” Lindberg (2009, 2010) found that members of the Ghanaian parliament spent a substantial amount of their personal income taking care of the personal needs of their constituents. Apart from providing “pocket money, money for school fees (very common), for the purchase of food items… for funerals and weddings, or towards start-up cost for small businesses or a farm…” (Lindberg 2010:123), Ghanaians expected their MPs to intervene, personally, in their dealings with state officials, including “the police, courts, headmasters, local government officials or ministries” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008:118). Most of the MPs that Lindberg (2009, 2010) interviewed thought that their chances of being re-elected hinged on their ability to carry out these extra-institutional functions.

Closely related to this familial understanding of political relations is the idea that Africans lack a sense of public interest (see Ekeh 1975, Hyden 2013, Chabal 2013). In his *Moral economy of corruption in Africa*, Olivier de Sardan (1999:26) argues that Africa has “almost no ‘practical ethic of the public service’”. In fact, he traces the pervasive nature of corruption to the social norms and values that engender the “general lack of a tradition of the ‘public domain’” (Sardan 1999:29). Mkhandawire (2015:571) aptly captures the kernel of this aspect of neo-patrimonialist argument when he notes that it “provides a
moral cultural gloss that somehow renders corruption understandable and its victims complicit”.

It is important to underscore that when discussing the role of ‘culture’ in undermining a sense of public responsibility among citizens and public officials, some of the leading analysts also blame the influence of colonialism. It is argued, for instance, that many Africans lack the ethic of public service because they consider the post-colonial state as a foreign entity to be plundered or used for the advancement of private interests (Clapham 1996, Bayart 1993, Szeftel 2000, Young 2012, de Sardan 1999). Patrick Chabal (2009) explains how colonial intrusion destroyed accountability systems of pre-colonial Africa; it was during the colonial period that chiefs became unaccountable to their own people, answering instead to the colonial administration. In sharp contrast, Etounga-Manguelle (2000) maintains that traditional African culture persisted through the colonial period and that the poor sense of public office is not necessarily rooted in colonial domination. Whether the reference is to the unaltered, pre-colonial culture or the amalgamated, post-colonial one, the conclusions are the same: cultural norms in modern Africa “‘communicate’ with or influence the practices of corruption” (de Sardan 1999:26).

Apart from cultural norms and values, low levels of information as a result of lack of formal education and poor access to impartial news media undermine the principal-agent notions of accountability. Lack of information forces voters to rely, primarily, on ethnic and religious markers to guide their political decisions (Posner 2009, Mattes and Gouws 1999, Cho 2010, Norris and Mattes 2003). Politicians are also more incentivised to exploit regional, religious and ethnic identities with a net effect being that political campaigns and policies are not focused on long-term development goals, including the control of corruption. This undermines the reliance of voters on developmental performance as a standard against which to assess political candidates and, ultimately, select those most likely to serve in the interest of the public. Moreover, the electoral ‘success’ of clientelistic political parties and candidates can stifle the development of programmatic political formations (Issakson and Bigsten 2014:5).

As I noted on page 19, competitive elections are a sine qua non of principal-agent accountability. But, in contexts in which democratic institutions are weak — which is the case in Africa— the increasingly unpredictable political careers that characterise contexts
in which elections are competitive can generate the incentive for politicians to loot as much as possible while in office. Strong ethnic identification enables these politicians to justify their looting as a way to promote the interests of their ethnic group. The incoming politicians may argue that corruption is a way ‘to balance off the wealth’ that other identity groups accumulated, fraudulently, while in office (Githongo 2006). Indeed, research on politics in Africa shows that the corrupt actions of the incumbent can encourage incoming politicians to become the “main actors of an ‘our turn to eat’ game, which is a bad equilibrium unlikely to be broken” (Burgess, Miquel, Jedwab and Morjaria 2009:4).

Another way in which electoral competition increases adverse selection and moral hazard in the young African democracies is that it can encourage some citizens to trade their votes for personal material benefits (van de Walle 2007a). Lindberg and Morrison (2008:120) drive home this point when they conclude that African “voters are likely to know that their value is higher when [electoral] competition is high and to be encouraged by street talk of money and other handouts from candidates or their aides …”

Although civil society organisations are regarded as a lynchpin of principal-agent accountability, the nature of African politics and economics stifles their ability to fulfil their democratic responsibilities (Piper and von Lieres 2016, de Waal and Ibreck 2013, Hyden 2013). Due partly to poor economic prospects in Africa, the leaders of CSOs are often tempted to get involved in the patronage networks through which much of upward social mobility occurs (see Szeftel 2000). There is a narrative that most leaders of grassroots organisations hold the ambition to enter government. This has two detrimental effects. First, it leaves CSOs at risk of being co-opted, neutralised and used to advance particularistic interests (de Waal and Ibreck 2013). Second, ordinary people grow increasingly suspicious of the motives of the CSOs and their anti-corruption campaigns. Indeed, McNeil and Malena (2010:199) observe that “in Benin, the great majority of people are convinced that CSO leaders, like political leaders, are trying only to protect their own material interests. It is hard for them to believe that some civil society leaders might truly seek to achieve better governance and citizen advancement”.

Some of the civil society organisations seeking democratic accountability have been accused of lacking ‘civicness’ — what Mungiu-Pipidi (2013:104) has termed
“universalist-minded civil-society”. As Hyden (2013:91) observes, leaders of CSOs in Africa seem to struggle with “how to turn their own associations from being havens for affective relations into more civic-minded entities”. Another problem is according to de Waal and Ibreck (2013) that the cultural logic of neo-patrimonialism penetrates and dominates CSOs in Africa. Indeed, some of the influential local CSOs parade as mere extensions of the government of the day, acting to enable rather than disrupt the clientelistic relations that dominate the political system. Piper and von Lieres (2016) show that the close relationship between the ANC government and some influential civil society organisations at the grassroots is designed to benefit the clientelistic machinery of the South African state and entrench the ruling party’s dominance at the local level.16

It is because of this strong symbiosis between the ruling party, government and civil society organisations that the latter are seen as no more than “alternative patronage systems competing for better positions and limited change within a fundamentally unaltered system” (de Waal and Ibreck 2013:309).

Many of the points raised in this and the previous section crystallise into the major criticism against the principal-agent model, persuasively captured by Persson et al (2013:450) as “a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption”17. The authors invite us to distinguish, as a starting point, between corruption as a ‘deviant’ behaviour by rogue individuals (or few bad apples) and as a structure of interactions between individuals. The former can easily be addressed by technical fixes espoused by the principal-agent approach while the latter is more resistant to these techniques (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). It is important to outline the basic tenets of this collective action understanding of corruption, both as an analytical device and potential guide for anti-corruption policy. This is especially because while it seeks to explain why corruption persists in neo-patrimonial systems, the collective action approach rejects the strong emphasis on cultural variables that forms the core of the neo-patrimonial theory (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). Collective action thinking is a progeny of rational-choice institutionalism, and therefore models systemic corruption as a predictor rather than an outcome variable. On the contrary, much of the neo-patrimonial

16 ANC has a close relationship with South Africa’s largest labour federation, COSATU. It is also strongly aligned with South African National Civic Organisation, a less organised formation, “but representing a patchwork of ANC-aligned leaders at community or residential level” (Piper and von Lieres’ 2016:323).
17 Emphasis in original
2.3. The application of collective action theory to corruption

Although its application to corruption and anti-corruption is fairly recent, collective action has always been central to “the subject of political science” (Ostrom 1998:1). This is not surprising given that good governance — one of the key concerns of political studies — is a public good. As part of the ‘good governance’ mosaic, corruption control qualifies as a public good; while a clean government benefits all members of society, those bearing the costs of its production are unable to exclude non-contributors from enjoying the benefits (Rothstein 2011a, Marquette and Peiffer 2015). Besides being a public good in its own right, corruption control is also “an important input into the production of other public goods, including sound economic management, well-functioning markets, and reliable human security” (Eigen and Eigen-Zucchi 2003:577).

Indeed, according to Mauro (1996) highly corrupt societies are less likely to invest in human capital, including spending more on education and healthcare. Like all public goods, corruption control faces a collective action dilemma as each individual has greater immediate pay-offs for placing her own interest above the interests of the public.

The large literature on collective action can be divided into two ‘generations’ of collective action theories (see Ostrom 1998, Ostrom and Ahn 2009). The first generation is associated with the seminal work of Mancur Olson (1965, 1971) and seeks to explain, through classical rational choice theory, why collective action fails. The second generation is more concerned with why collective action occurs and persists (Ostrom 2005). In this regard, and in sharp contrast to the first-generation perspective, the second generation puts emphasis on non-utility considerations (i.e. non-material incentives) (Ostrom 2009; Elster 1989). Elinor Ostrom criticises Olson’s work for overstating the effect of economic incentives, and in the process, undermining the role of norms and values in motivating collective action (Ostrom 2005, 2009). Much of her work demonstrates that individuals have a higher disposition to contribute to public goods without the inducement of material incentives when they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively. As a result, Ostrom proposes a collective action theory that
transcends emphasis on material incentives and seriously considers the role of reputation, trust and reciprocity (Ostrom 2007, 2000).

The application of collective action thinking to corruption control reflects elements of the first and second generations of collective action theory. Elements from the first-generation manifest in the fact that the public good of corruption control faces a free-rider problem. The second generation emerges in the notion that where corruption is systemic, efforts to control it confront ‘an assurance dilemma’ (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013).

2.3.1. Corruption control as an assurance problem

Amartya Sen is credited with developing the concept of ‘assurance problem’ (or assurance game) (see Nichols 2004). In his seminal publication on this topic, Sen (1967:115) argued that an individual will not contribute to public goods provision “except if he has grounds for assurance that others, too, will act in a manner designed to promote the future welfare of the community”. An assurance problem of co-operation arises when “the particular outcome depends both on prior expectations and on a preference for coordinating one's own actions with the actions of others” (Runge 1984:158). What you do depends on what others are likely to do. In the area of corruption, Mauro was one of the first to moot the idea that systemic corruption is akin to an ‘assurance game’ (also known as co-ordination game). He used the following scenario to make this point:

You live in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The probability that you will be caught is low, because the police are very busy chasing other thieves, and, even if you do get caught, the chances of your being punished severely for a crime that is so common are low. Therefore, you too steal (Mauro 1998:12).

As Mauro (1998) suggests, where corruption is pervasive, it becomes optimal for an individual to be corrupt; that is, without the assurance that rules will be enforced, all actors are better off if they cheat than if they comply with the rules. As Rothstein and Teorell (2015b:241) note in reference to the assurance problem of corruption; “almost everyone has something to gain from a corrupt system as long as a large enough body of actors continues to play foul.” Even those individuals who think corruption is morally reprehensible “are usually likely to take part because they see no point in doing otherwise” (Rothstein 2011:246).
Using survey data from Estonia, Tavitz (2010:1267) found that high perceptions of corruption increase the propensity for public officials as well as citizens to engage in corruption. Specifically, the perceived pervasiveness of corruption had a powerful effect on the probability that a public official agreed to facilitate a corrupt deal. Furthermore, holding other variables “at their means (or medians), increasing the value of perceived pervasiveness of corruption from its minimum to its maximum increase[d] the predicted probability” of an individual paying a bribe. More importantly, a combination of perceived acceptability and pervasiveness of corruption “increase[d] the predicted probability of having paid a bribe from .03 to .47” (Tavitz 2010:1268).

The perception that anonymous others are primed to act corruptly in pursuit of self-interest destroys generalised interpersonal trust, which is one of the most important antecedents of voluntary provision of public goods. Generalised trust is defined as the individual belief “that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and at best, that they will act in his interests” (Newton 2001:202). Indeed, several studies attest to the negative relationship between interpersonal trust and personal experience of corruption. Using individual-level data, Seligson (2006) found that those Latin Americans who had a regular experience with bribery were also less trusting of people in general. Based on the analysis of experimental data on Swedish and Romanian students, Rothstein and Eek (2006) concluded that bribers were generally less trusting than people who did not pay any bribes.

Similar findings have been noted in studies focusing on perceptions of corruption rather than personal experiences of bribery. Seligson (2006) found that in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay and El Salvador low generalised interpersonal trust was associated with a high perception of corruption. Similarly, an analysis by Uslaner and Rothstein (2005) reveals that high perception of corruption makes Romanians and Estonians less likely to trust their compatriots. The trust-corruption relationship does not only work at the individual-level. A country-level analysis by Uslaner (2004:16) suggests that “countries that became more trusting (Mexico and Italy, in particular) became less corrupt and countries that became less trusting showed an increase in corruption (Argentina, South Africa, and France, in particular)”.
The dysfunctional public institutions that characterise highly corrupt societies contribute to the assurance problem of corruption control for both public officials and citizens. In an environment where demanding bribes is part of a systematic corruption network, a typical law enforcement officer expects a majority of her colleagues to take advantage of the weak enforcement of rules and use their entrusted powers for private gain. Indeed, Hoffman and Patel (2017:12) show that in Nigeria, “police officers ask for bribes because they think that their colleagues do, and that they are also expected to do so”. In this environment, attempting to ‘stay clean’ does not only make you look foolish, it can be life-threatening (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). As Isaac and Norton (2013:19) point out, “in corrupt civic environments, reformers face the possibility of economic harassment, violent attacks, and even death. The same is true for police officers”.

Ordinary people’s actions are likely to be shaped by their expectations that other citizens facing a highly dysfunctional bureaucracy, in a place where corruption is seen as normal, are most likely to pay bribes in their interactions with public officers (Aidt 2003, Persson, Rothsien and Teorell 2012, 2013, Bauhr 2012). Even those who are personally opposed to bureaucratic corruption understand that refusing to comply with demands for bribes means going without the public goods and services that a bribe normally secures. In this regard, a majority of people living in highly dysfunctional societies may see corruption as a solution (Marquitte and Peiffer 2015, Heywood 2017). It is difficult to convince people to fight what seems to work in the interim, especially when doing so is likely to be personally risky, may result in very slow changes to the status quo and deliver small material gains to the individual (Johnston and Kpundeh 2002, Morris and Klesner 2010, Johnston 2012). In fact, when compared with paying a bribe or crafting personal relationships with officers and getting on with life, joining the ‘war’ on corruption where it is endemic can seem quite daunting for an individual (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013).

2.3.2. Corruption control as a free-rider problem

Contrary to the assurance problem in which an actor prefers to contribute so long as others are doing the same, a free-rider problem is one in which an actor’s decision not to contribute is independent of the actions of others (Chong 1991). This arises from the belief that in public goods’ settings, there is a perpetual conflict between individual pay-
offs and collective benefits, such that regardless of what others do, defection (i.e. non-cooperation) is always a dominant strategy. In such settings, a utility-maximising actor will not pull his weight even when others are expected to contribute towards the provision of public goods (Runge 1984, Chong 1991). Free-rider problems are often illustrated by a two-person single period prisoners’ dilemma game, which was formalised by Albert Tucker and popularised by Garrett Hardin (1968). In the prisoners’ dilemma game, both actors are better off (walk free) if they co-operate and both deny the crime. However, if only one confesses and the accomplice denies, the former will walk free while the latter receives the maximum sentence for the crime. If they both confess, they will go to jail on less serious charges. Although confessing is sub-optimal as both individuals will still end up in prison, they will both confess as they each try to maximise their individual pay offs.

A free-rider problem of anti-corruption is that the individual who does not contribute to the public good of good governance will still enjoy the benefits of living in a corruption-free environment. Most people are therefore expected to shirk their civic responsibilities, knowing that they will enjoy the same benefits as those who take part in efforts to resist corruption (Yap 2013). This results in the overall under-provision of the public good of a clean government. Michael Johnston (2014:647) explains the free-rider problem that anti-corruption faces when he notes:

…checking corruption is difficult, time-consuming and often risky; if others succeed I may well benefit whether or not I have been involved. Why, then, should I become an active reformer? Indeed, fighting corruption may well entail giving up various petty benefits I now receive, or anticipate, and potentially plunge me into an immediate future of considerable risk.

The free-rider perspective illuminates the fact that the persistence of corruption is more than an issue of shared expectations and lack of interpersonal trust as the assurance perspective would have us to believe. There is in fact a possibility that high levels of generalised interpersonal trust may give rise to free-riding (see Elster 1989). Indeed, according to Bauhr (2016), individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit advantages are less likely to participate in anti-corruption efforts when they believe that ordinary people are able to fight corruption. Eigen and Eigen-Zucchi (2003:584) argue that where corruption levels are low (and trust very high), an individual is best off if she pays a bribe, since he/she “faces less competition along this margin, raising the returns from corrupt practices”. This, indeed, tells us that the free-rider problem remains a challenge even when the assurance problem is absent. Nevertheless, endemic corruption is more of an
assurance game than a free-rider problem (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b). As a result, its solutions should be tailored to change expectations about other people’s behaviour; people “must be convinced that ‘another world is possible’ — meaning that they can to some extent envision a situation in which the collective action problem is solved” (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b:244). That is, if they can be made to believe that others are inclined to contribute to the public good of a clean government, individuals can be induced to hold their end of the bargain without recourse to any form of material incentives.

2.4. The weaknesses of collective action analysis

One of the major criticisms of the collective action approach to corruption is its limited ability to account for change endogenously, a feature inherited from its strong anchoring on rational choice institutionalism (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b). The approach is unable to explain, in its current form, why a variety of anti-corruption coalitions are taking place and sometimes succeeding to combat corruption in places where it is viewed as being a rule rather than exception (see Duvanova 2007). Most importantly, as Rothstein and Teorell (2015b) have noted, it is unable to explain how non-corrupt institutions emerge (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b). With specific reference to Africa, collective action thinking fails to shed light on the conditions under which corruption (or specific types of corruption) might undermine a system based on personal relationships, deference and hierarchy — the very system on which it is built.

By casting actors as simply reacting to structural constraints, rational choice institutionalism does not anticipate that there are conditions under which the experience or perceptions of corruption can inspire attempts to change the institution of corruption. Indeed, institutional theorists were sceptical of the idea that perceptions of corruption encouraged the colour revolutions that occurred in Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia in the middle of the last decade. In line with institutional theorisation, much of the commentary on colour revolutions emphasised the role of exogenous factors, including the support opposition parties in these countries received from NGOs based in the United States

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18 According to Harty (2004:52) “rational choice institutionalists view institutions as a set of rules and information that promote ‘gains from exchange’ by reducing the costs associated with the pursuit of individual rationality in strategic interactions.”
(Tucker 2007). Breaking ranks with this thinking, Tucker (2007) stresses the critical role of domestic factors, especially perceptions of corruption, in motivating ordinary people to overcome co-ordination problems and take part in protests and demonstrations. Similarly, Caiden (2013:214) rejects the exogenous factors’ explanation of the 2011 mass uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. As he notes, “the uprisings were not the outcome of any Western–designed democracy promotion programmes or any Western intervention… at the heart they were motivated by the ideals of democracy, human rights, respect for the individual, responsive government, civilised conduct and abhorrence of wrong-doing” (Caiden 2013:214). As Yap (2015) correctly conjectures, the colour revolutions and the Arab uprisings suggest that there are conditions — not accommodated by rational choice institutionalism — which may explain why citizens are able to overcome co-ordination problems and demand accountability. I elaborate more on these in chapter three.

The key proposition of the collective action analysis is that “even if most people morally disapprove of corruption and are fully aware of its negative consequences for society at large, very few rational actors have a clear-cut interest in establishing or defending clean institutions” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013: 463-464). It might indeed be the case that individuals in high corruption societies are not willing to contribute to good governance as a public good. However, it is important to realise that these societies have many individuals and groups who are ready to co-operate in defence of their private interests when deemed to be under threat from greed and corruption. Corruption always creates winners and losers and as Johnston (2014), Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) and Rose-Ackerman (2010) note, it is the latter who are often willing to challenge it. The argument that Johnston (2014) proposes, and which Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) overlook is that where corruption is endemic, collective action arises from the need to challenge various forms of particularism and not necessarily to achieve the public good of a clean government. Institutions of accountability may arise at a later stage as the by-product of political settlement (Johnston 2014).

19 According to Mungiu-Pipiddi (2016:96) “particularism limits access to resources, favouring some applicants while discriminating against others, resulting in unfair allocation. It is a broader concept than corruption, since it includes nominally legal phenomena as well.”
Johnston’s historical analysis demonstrates how attempts by marginalised groups to defend their private interests against institutionalised corruption precipitated efforts to institutionalise merit, rule of law and accountability. During the Elizabethan period in England, for example, it was customary for university graduates to obtain jobs in government or the church through personal preferment. The graduates that this system marginalised were instrumental in efforts to dismantle and replace it with the one based on merit alone (Johnston 2014). In another example, Johnston explains how a coalition of groups inspired by a range of private interests mobilised against the machine politics of the 17th-18th century United States:

> Upper status groups sought to regain lost influence. Less-favoured ethnic communities, many of them poorer than those that had first been drawn into the machine, sought help on a basis of need, not political loyalty. Ending machine corruption might build a better city, but there were personal stakes on the table as well (Johnston 2014:42).

Using cross-national survey data on firms, Duvanova (2007) demonstrates how the increasing burden of corruption encouraged the formation of civil society organisations in places where corruption was systemic. She found, for example, that one of the main reasons for the proliferation of business associations in Russia was the need to protect individual firms against institutional weaknesses (such as lack of contract enforcement), and bureaucratic extortions. The activities of these business associations included training individuals and firms on various tactics for resisting bureaucratic corruption. They also reported allegations of corruption on behalf of members and when the need arose, took such corruption-related matters to court. The point that is worth being emphasised is that the need for protection against corruption was critical for the emergence of collective action against petty corruption in Russia.

### 2.5. Overlaps between principal-agent and collective action approaches to corruption control

The importance of collective action analysis is its ability to provide a sound explanation for why systemic corruption is so difficult to address through the techniques based solely on principal-agent approach (Rothstein and Teorell 2015). However, its framing as primarily a critique of principal-agent analysis creates an impression that it is fundamentally different (rather than complementary) to the principal-agent model. This is despite that both approaches are rooted in rational choice theory, admitting for instance,
that the decision to engage in corruption is a cost benefit calculation (Marquette and Peiffer 2015).^{20}

Indeed, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) undermine the linkage between anti-corruption strategies based on both approaches when they conclude that systemic corruption demands *radically different solutions* to those proposed by principal-agent analysis. It would seem from such a conclusion that when corruption approximates a collective action problem (i.e. when it is an assurance problem), solutions that are inspired by principal-agent thinking are doomed to fail. But, there are several examples demonstrating that principal–agent strategies can still be useful even when corruption approximates an assurance dilemma. This section summarises some of these examples and drives home the point that it is important to consider both approaches as being complementary (Marquette and Peiffer 2015).

Research by scholars at the Innovation for Successful Societies (in the USA) illustrates how approaches based on principal-agent understanding were employed to galvanise an anti-money laundering coalition in Brazil (LaForge 2017). Brazil’s fight against corruption gained much traction in the early 2000 when President Lula and justice minister Marcio Bastos threw their weight behind various efforts to tackle corruption and money laundering. Lula and Bastos undertook several institutional reforms that were inspired by principal-agent thinking. These included staffing key agencies with highly motivated, talented and well-paid individuals. The previously fragmented accountability mechanisms were re-organised into a co-coordinated anti-corruption structure comprising the Office of the Inspector General, Federal Secretariat for Internal Control, the Office of the Ombudsman and a Secretariat for Corruption and Prevention and Strategic Information. Finally, specialised federal courts for prosecuting financial and money laundering crimes were created and empowered with human and financial resources (LaForge 2017).

Many of the anti-corruption reforms were facilitated by the newly created National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Corruption (ENCCLA)— an inter-

^{20} Both approaches share the foundational assumption underlying rational choice models that the maximization of self-interest is the primary driver of human behaviour (Nichols and Robertson 2017).
agency forum that fostered “co-ordination and joint policy-making among public agencies in the fight against money laundering, and later corruption” (LaForge 2017:5). Justice Minister Bastos used his significant influence among the political and business elites to ensure that reluctant agency leaders and other senior officials bought into the ENCCLA initiative.\(^\text{21}\) He convinced the ‘doubting Thomases’ in the highest echelons of the judiciary that Lula’s administration was serious about tackling money laundering and, importantly, that the ENCCLA initiative was key to that endeavour (LaForge 2017).

Under the guise of ENCCLA, representatives of more than 50 state agencies convened annually for up to four days to among other things, share priorities, build inter-agency trust and plan how to co-ordinate actions against corruption and money laundering. The gathering was designed in such a way as to foster interpersonal trust among delegates. This was viewed as being integral to inter-agency co-ordination and collaboration in Brazil’s highly corrupt environment. It encouraged an honest dialogue about the complexities of anti-money laundering and helped to build a strong network of ‘public officials’ who, although privately opposed to corruption, had felt there was nothing much an individual could do about it. In other words, ENCCLA revealed what other public officials were thinking about corruption and anti-corruption, helping to solve what Timur Kuran dubbed a problem of ‘preference falsification’ (Kuran 1995).\(^\text{22}\) Although the sessions were conducted in private, the goals each agency adopted voluntarily were made public, thereby allowing media and civil society organisations to monitor the progress (LaForge 2017).

The ENCCLA initiative created strong agency- and individual-level incentives to fight corruption, thereby limiting the risk of defection. The frequent interactions at ENCCLA and similar gatherings changed beliefs about the efficacy of efforts to bring corruption under control. Delegates learned that the fears and concerns regarding corruption control were in fact widespread and that people were willing to tackle corruption as long as others

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\(^{21}\) He built these connections while he was working as a highly successful attorney.

\(^{22}\) In *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*, Kuran (1995) drives home the point that people's preferences are a function of social conditions, more especially the pressure imposed by other people. Individuals are unlikely to express their true preferences when this is deemed inconsistent with perceived public opinion or other existing social and political pressures. In highly corrupt societies, those who are strongly opposed to corruption are likely to play along until they have information that there are (enough) others willing to challenge corruption.
were willing to keep their end of the bargain. As interpersonal and inter-agency trust developed, it became easier for agencies to share sensitive (bank account and tax-related) material, which proved useful for investigating and prosecuting serious financial crimes (LaForge 2017). As one ENCCLA delegate observed, a sense of solidarity that emerged at ENCCLA inspired individuals to make it their “personal mission to deliver” on anti-corruption (LaForge 2017:11).

Another example of how principal-agent strategies can inspire anti-corruption collective action comes from Isaac and Norton’s (2013) analysis of the work of William Parker — the reformist Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief of the 1950s. Parker employed a variety of tools from the principal-agent arsenal to address endemic corruption in the 1950’s LAPD. He ensured that salaries of police officers were substantially increased, while simultaneously, refusing to relax his policy of immediate dismissal of venal officers (Isaac and Norton 2013). In line with principal-agent thinking, Parker established a requirement for officers to declare their additional sources of income, which though initially resisted, proved useful for detecting illicit sources of income. He also involved the media in monitoring the work of the police, thereby improving transparency — another important principal-agent tool for anti-corruption. As the reform programme gained momentum, collective action began to manifest as community members became increasingly willing to work with the department in crime prevention and to hold individual police officers to a higher standard of accountability (Isaac and Norton 2013). In turn, individual officers were also incentivised to shun corruption in order to avoid being labelled as ‘dirty cops’ in a police department that was increasingly being perceived as ‘clean’ (Isaac and Norton 2013). In less than ten years, Parker’s efforts had sparked anti-corruption collective action and shifted the equilibrium from very high to low corruption.

The foregoing examples reveal important lessons regarding the role of the principal in generating collective action against corruption. Endemic corruption can in fact be tackled by a combination of principal-agent and collective action approaches. In particular, and

23 It is reported that Parker retained a small (i.e. below average) but highly trained and well remunerated police force. He often spoke passionately about “wanting the job of an LAPD officer to be both financially remunerative and socially respectable” (Isaac and Newton 2013:26)
perhaps most importantly, they illustrate that collective action can be triggered by a principal who moves first and bears the large (initial) cost of transformation. In this regard, they are consistent with the argument proposed by Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl that a small group “of interested and resourceful people can begin contributions toward an action that will tend to ‘explode’, to draw in the other, less interested or less resourceful members of the population and to carry the event toward its maximum potential” (Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988:547). These examples are also consistent with Mungiu-Pippidi’s observation that as far as breaking the vicious circle of corruption is concerned, “human agency [matters] a great deal everywhere” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016:104).

The lacuna in much of the literature concerns the question of what motivates some principals such as justice minister Bastos or various justice ministers in Taiwan (see Mungiu-Pippidi 2016) to throw their weight behind anti-corruption and stay the course. In the case of William Parker, the largest incentive for reform was his intense loathing of corruption (Isaac and Norton 2013). In Chile and Uruguay, the incentive seems to have been rooted in political economy; the need to fight poverty provided the initial impetus for political leadership to bring corruption under control (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016). In Georgia and Rwanda, the motivation emanated from the existential threat that both countries faced because of the violent political conflict they had experienced (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016, Marquette and Peiffer 2015). Similarly, as Rothstein (2010) and Rothstein and Teorell (2015b) illustrate, the existential threat facing the 19th century Sweden inspired political elites to prioritise governance and anti-corruption reforms.

2.5.1. The roots of political will in collective civic mobilisation

Nevertheless, and most importantly for this study, political will for anti-corruption can also be generated from the grass-roots (see Beyerle 2014). For instance, in 2000 South Korea’s CSOs launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that included compiling a list of venal politicians, asking major political parties not to nominate them and appealing to voters to reject blacklisted candidates should political parties refuse to oblige (Bayerle 2014, You 2016). Due to strong public support for the campaign, most of the blacklisted politicians did not win their parties’ nominations. Furthermore, more than 60 per cent of the blacklisted candidates who competed as independents were defeated in the polls. In this case, a collective initiative triggered by civil society organisations and
overwhelmingly supported by ordinary people ‘forced’ political parties to demonstrate willingness to challenge corruption.

Another example of how citizens can inspire public officers to tackle corruption is offered by Olken (2006, 2009). His research shows that when citizens were reluctant to be involved in mechanisms of accountability, officials rarely took financial audits — a principal-agent tool for accountability— seriously. In rural Indonesian villages where he conducted his research, a lack of civic engagement was further exacerbated by the fact that negative audit reports rarely attracted punishment, even though the individuals suspected of malfeasance were liable for criminal prosecution. Olken (2006) observes that once citizens’ attendance at community meetings increased, and the results of audits were widely disseminated and discussed in these meetings, officials changed their behaviour despite knowing that ‘malfeasance’ was unlikely to attract any legal action. Olken concluded that the uncomfortable feeling and inconvenience of having to explain irregularities to disapproving community members was one of the main incentives for the willingness and effort to produce a clean audit. Fox underscores this finding, adding that, “it was mainly the threat of community responses to the promised local dissemination of the findings that gave [these] audits the clout to reduce corruption” (Fox 2015:349).

Research by Reinkka and Svensson (2004, 2005) illustrates how increased transparency inspired collective action and how this, in turn, generated the willingness by officials to tackle corruption in the publicly funded schools’ programme in Uganda. Having made the case that ‘local capture’ of funds for primary school programmes was rife in Uganda, the duo proceeded to show how a deliberate effort by the government to change incentive structures changed the corrupt equilibrium. They used data obtained from a natural experiment in which the central government published in the national newspapers monthly transfers of public funds to districts and required schools to do the same with their expenditure. This initiative empowered both schools and parents with information to monitor how local officials handled the programme’s fund. This inspired commitment among public officials to tackle corruption in their ranks. The message of Reinkikka and Svensson’s research is that the national government acting as a principal shaped the behaviour of agents (local officials) and inspired citizens (working together with the recipient schools) to take on the role of the principal through collective action. The findings provide another layer of evidence to the lesson teased out in the examples
presented in previous paragraphs, that by being the first to move, a principal can trigger a cascade of collective initiatives against endemic graft.

2.6. Conclusion

The emerging application of collective action theory to the analysis of corruption has done well to drive home the point that endemic corruption is an institution, and therefore provides the calculus that people use to predict the behaviour of others. This has shed important light on why it is often difficult to address systematic and systemic corruption through the technical fixes espoused by the dominant principal-agent approaches. However, as both a theory and as a guide to anti-corruption policy, the collective action approach has several weaknesses of its own. First, it has inherited the inability to explain change endogenously that is characteristic of rational choice institutionalism. For this reason, it is unable to account for why individuals operating in highly corrupt settings, and apparently severely constrained in their choices, can co-operate and change the corrupt equilibrium.

Because it neglects peoples’ ability to think critically about institutions, rational choice institutionalism is unable to explain why the greatest beneficiaries of the status quo might choose to sacrifice their benefits in support institutional change. Second and perhaps most importantly, because of its anchoring in neo-institutionalism, the collective action model overlooks the fact that corruption itself can be a motivating factor for institutional change. I fully elaborate on this point in the next chapter. Thirdly, the collective action analysis overlooks the possibility that corruption may yield very different effects across similar societies and individuals. Again, the next chapter looks at some of the possible explanations of these variations in more detail.

One of the main challenges in the current literature is the bifurcation of collective action and principal-agent solutions to endemic corruption. This chapter has shown that there are instances in which collective reproduction of corruption has been addressed by approaches based on principal-agent thinking. It would seem, as Marquette and Peiffer (2015) and You (2016) observe that corruption, even where it is admittedly pervasive, is seldom exclusively a collective action problem (also see Rose-Ackerman 2010). It is important therefore not to discard “the usefulness of principal-agent theory’s
understanding of corruption *carte blanche*, even in the context of systemic corruption” (Marquette and Peiffer 2015:12).
Chapter three
Mechanisms of collective civic engagement in highly corrupt settings

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has highlighted the fact that despite the pessimism expressed by the collective action analysis, anti-corruption approaches based on principal-agent thinking can still be useful in efforts to combat corruption in places where it is a rule rather than exception. I summarised examples showing how people residing in highly corrupt societies have tackled corruption through collective action. This chapter builds on this analysis and identifies the individual and contextual level mechanisms that might explain the willingness of ordinary people in highly corrupt societies to co-operate in holding their governments accountable. In particular, it focuses on how personal experience of bribery and subjective perceptions of corruption might motivate people to seek accountability. This inevitably compels us to traverse the colossal social movements and political participation literatures.

I should emphasise, however, that both space and the focus of this research do not permit an exhaustive account of the most important works in social movements’ research. The volume edited by Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans (2013) provides a useful starting point for those interested in a reasonably thorough review of the state of social movement research. Much of the discussion here is limited to explaining individual and contextual-level conditions under which an individual’s perceptions and experiences of corruption can motivate willingness to use collective civic action to challenge corruption.

Two arguments emerge from this literature review. The first is that, even in highly corrupt societies, corruption creates victims and can as a result act as a mobilising grievance. The impact of corruption (as a mobilising grievance) is strongly moderated by several contextual and individual-level factors that work to either intensify the positive impact (e.g. poor economic conditions) or help in reducing co-ordination problems (e.g. associational density). The second argument emerges from the critique of the mainstream literature on African politics which projects ordinary Africans as passive victims of
structural forces rather than autonomous actors with initiative. Based on emerging systematic studies of African publics, I show that a growing number of ordinary Africans have embraced democratic norms and values (or the ethic of democratic citizenship) and could be more willing to support efforts to oppose abuses of power than the mainstream African politics literature summarised in the previous chapter suggests. In essence, the discussions in this chapter are tied together by three different, yet interrelated threads: grievances, resources and democratic values.

The chapter is organised as follows. The following section conceptualises collective civic action or collective demand for accountability. The sections that follow summarise the grievance model of collective action and its main criticisms. I then examine how explanations based on the grievance narrative shed light on the effect of corruption perceptions on the decision to undertake anti-government collective action. I also outline why the experience of bribery might encourage individuals to join the fight against corruption. Towards the end of the chapter, I introduce democratic and collective action norms as another basis for people’s willingness to punish ‘corruption’.

3.2. Understanding collective civic action

All forms of collective action are joined efforts to influence a particular outcome whose benefits go beyond the individual. What distinguishes collective civic action from the larger concept of collective action is that the former is more concerned with putting pressure on political authority to provide public goods and services (Opp 2001). Collective action encompasses joined activities that may or may not involve the ‘government’ or some political authority as an actor. One example of collective action is the maintenance of common/community assets such as when rural fishermen agree to prevent over-fishing. Voluntary contributions by community members to build a school is another example of collective action. Collective civic action, on the other hand, entails making collective claims against a political authority. These distinctions notwithstanding, scholars often use the concept of collective action even when they are describing collective civic action.

Although the term ‘collective’ presupposes joint activity as intimated, sometimes the concept of collective civic action is used to refer to actions of one individual carried out
on behalf of a specific group to influence a political outcome (Wright 2009). In this regard, symbolic acts of political resistance, including sabotage, arson, hunger strikes, and self-immolation can be regarded as forms of collective civic action (Wright and Tropp 2002). Another reason for taking these actions as instances of collective civic action is that they often (but not always) represent an undercurrent of significant mass discontent, and act as a trigger for large-scale protests, wildcat strikes, riots and civil wars (Lohmann 1994). A clear example is the hunger strike by the Indian cleric Anna Hazare which in 2011 inspired one of the biggest anti-corruption uprisings in the history of India.24 The sporadic acts of sabotage against the apartheid government in South Africa can also be considered in the same light.

Scholars in anti-corruption refer to collective civic action as ‘collective demand for accountability’ (see Lee 2011). The literature on collective demand for accountability can be divided into two camps. The first one falls under the rubric of ‘social accountability’ — an umbrella concept that refers to the “diverse approaches to exercise voice, ranging from simple exposure of government failures to participatory performance monitoring, expenditure tracking, budget analysis and participatory budgeting, among others” (Schartz 2013:162). Reflecting its roots in principal-agent thinking, social accountability literature often refers to citizens as principals and national and local politicians and bureaucrats as agents (Booth 2013, Lee 2012, Brinkerhoff and Waterberg 2015).

It is worth pointing out that the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives depends on the willingness of national governments to be held accountable (Verdenicci and Hough 2015, Bauhr 2008, Fox 2015, Booth 2012, Lee 2011). As much of the literature points out, governments of highly corrupt societies often lack the political will (and sometimes, the capacity) to support genuine social accountability programmes, leaving them as window dressing activities (Verdenicci and Hough 2015, Fox 2015). This lack of teeth (as Fox [2015] puts it) of social accountability necessitates extra-institutional and

24 Anna Hazare’s hunger strike spearheaded a movement that sought tougher anti-corruption legislation. He demanded the ombudsman, referred to as the Lokpal (or protector of the people) to be established at all levels of the federal state and empowered to investigate all individuals and state agencies. Public demonstrations, candlelight vigils, open letters and discussions, and the spectacular acts of fasting in public for solidarity with Hazare all marked Anna Hazare’s movement.
sometimes spontaneous methods of exercising voice — which take a form of public protests and demonstrations — “to induce reluctant political leaders to conduct anti-corruption purges” (Williams 2000: xvi). These extra-institutional forms of collective civic action constitute the second camp in the literature on collective demand for accountability.

The distinction between ‘invited spaces and invented spaces’ helps to clarify these institutional and extra-institutional forms of collective civic action. Invited spaces such as social accountability programmes are created from above by the state while invented spaces (e.g. protests) arise through the organic and largely obtrusive efforts by citizens to impose limits on political power (Piper and von Lieres 2016). Citizens often invent the space for participation when they challenge ineffective invited spaces (Mansuri and Rao 2013).

3.3. The grievance model and its discontents

Grievance explanations of collective civic action draw from the seminal work of Ted Robert Gurr (1970). In his attempt to make sense of the political violence of the 1960s, Gurr surmised that relative deprivation, or the gap between individuals’ economic expectations and their present conditions generates anger and the willingness to take part in collective dissent. This gap is triggered by one’s comparison with a standard, “be it one’s past, someone else’s situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice” (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013:887). Over the years, scholars have used the generic concept of ‘grievances’ rather than relative deprivation “to capture the essence of the state of mind that motivates people to [take] political action” (Gurr 2015: 245). Klandermans (1997:38) defines grievances as the “outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem”.

The grievance model posits that personal discontent and the desire for change are central to individual willingness to bear the costs of collective civic action (Gurr 2015). Indeed, as Snow and Soule (2010:23) argue, “none of the various sets of conditions necessary for the emergence and operation of social movements is more important that the generation of deeply felt [and] shared grievances”. The grievance model (or some of its versions) has been used to explain collective civic engagement in many parts of the African
continent (see Resnick 2015). This is largely because most participants in collective endeavours are drawn from the poorest parts of African societies (Mattes 2008, Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Branch and Mampilly 2015, Alexander 2010). Alexander (2010:26) has gone so far as to describe the “stay-aways, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, destruction of buildings [and] chasing unpopular individuals out of townships…” which commonly occur in South Africa’s mainly poor neighbourhoods as “the rebellion of the poor”. Between 2008 and 2009, riots related to sharp increases in the price of food occurred in at least 14 African countries, notably Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Bush 2009). These increasingly frequent and large protest events were attended by a majority of the urban poor, who understandably, used much of their income on food (Bush 2009).

According to Branch and Mampilly (2015), the high participation rates by the poor is one of the major differences between civic engagement in Africa and other parts of the world, notably Europe where most participants belong to the middle class. Nevertheless, it is possible that these differences are due to the fact that a greater proportion of Africans are poor while a larger portion of Western Europeans are in the middle class. What is unclear from studies emphasising the positive impact of socio-economic grievances is why deprivation produces collective action in some African countries and not in similarly poor societies. Bratton and van de Walle (1992) underlined this conundrum in their analysis of the pro-democratization protests of the early 1990s. As they conclude, economic grievance argument fails to explain why protests happened during the times they did and in some poor countries and not others (Bratton and van de Walle 1992).

A major flaw in the economic grievance analysis is that the rate of collective civic engagement does not correspond with the ever-present nature of extreme deprivation (Tarrow 1998, Tilly 2003). As Tarrow observes, “even a cursory look at modern history shows that outbreaks of contention cannot be derived from the deprivation people suffer or the disorganization in their societies. For these preconditions are far more enduring than the movements they support” (Tarrow 1998: 71). Results of a multilevel regression analysis of self-reported rates of protest across the globe indicate that “many people who hold equal grievances do not protest” (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010:17). Lichbach (1996) explains that even if aggrieved individuals wanted to engage in collective action, free-riding would prove to be a major hindrance.
Over the years, theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the grievance model led to a stronger emphasis on ‘resources’ as a more plausible explanation of the propensity to take part in collective action. The resource mobilisation model departed from the premise that individuals took action because they had the means to do so, not necessarily because they had stronger grievances than those who stayed away (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008). It stressed the importance of socio-economic development variables such as income, time and formal education attainment. Other important predictors were previous involvement in collective action and access to social networks (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, Wantchekon and Vermeersch 2011). While these explained differences in participation rates between individuals, Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon (2010:22) found that they also explained differences in average rates of protest between countries; an individual with resources in a rich and democratic country was found to be “significantly more likely to engage in protest activity than an individual with resources in a poorer, less-democratic country”.

Otherwise known as ‘associational density’, a network of strong civil society organisations has been identified as a critical context-level resource for collective civic action (Lee 2011, Grimes 2015). Associational density reduces the potential cost of collective action by providing the ‘assurance’ to people with grievances that like-minded individuals will take part in collective action (Klandermans 2013). Importantly, as Oberschall (1994:86) has argued, this “assurance carries beyond the initial decision to participate to encompass staying the course in the face of police brutality and other efforts to block opposition”. The assurance rooted in robust civil society fosters a sense of collective efficacy, or the belief that working together, ordinary people can overturn their collective disadvantage (Klandermans 2013, Oberschall 1994).

Further to that, civil society organisations are important in that they offer selective incentives for their members to participate in collective action. Members who respond positively to the mobilisation process “get social approval for conforming; those who resist are criticised and lose social standing” (Oberschall 1994:85). Sometimes, members join protests out of loyalty to the organisation not necessarily because the issue around which the protest is organised affects them directly (Opp 1990, Jasper 1998). Indeed, Gibson (1997) found that one of the main motivations for taking part in public protests
against the Soviet putsch of 1991 was the need to fulfil the expectation from a participant’s social group to oppose the coup.

Another important external resource is the regular access to information. The country’s communication infrastructure (i.e. mainstream media, internet penetration) plays a critical role in the flow of information regarding what other people think should be done about public goods’ problems such as poor control of corruption. Ability to share information, especially through online platforms (e.g. WhatsApp, WeChat, Twitter and Facebook) also increases ‘connectivity’ between individuals, forging new identities and ultimately increasing a sense of collective efficacy to tackle social and political problems such as corruption (Mekouar 2016, Williams and Obadare 2014). Both traditional and new media reveal how ordinary people from other countries are responding to the same problems that one’s country is facing. As Oberschall (1994:86) noted, “people observe the trend and diffusion of demonstrations on the same issues against the same target and make an estimate from this information… if no collective protests have happened in one’s country, they observe vicariously the size and trend of anti-regime protests in neighbouring, similar regimes”. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that this cross-national diffusion of regime contention is the reason an increase in number of television sets per country was significantly associated with the probability of anti-government protests that characterised democratic transitions in many parts of Africa in the early 1990s. The probability of protest action rose with an increase in the number of households owning a television set.

The foregoing discussions demonstrate that grievances, resources as well as political and economic environmental forces conspire to foster the willingness to engage in collective action. Indeed, several scholars have argued that a mixture of grievances, resources and structural opportunities offer a more nuanced explanation of the propensity to engage in various forms of collective action (see Regan and Norton 2005, Gurr 2015). Reconciling these various perspectives towards collective action, Klandermans (2013:216) concludes that “grievances are discussed in people’s social networks and the feelings of efficacy of the people who take part influence what emotions they display”. Scacco’s analysis of communal riots in Nigeria led her to conclude that a combination of grievances (e.g. poverty) and resources (e.g. social networks) explained both the willingness and actual participation in collective violence (Scacco 2016). Likewise, Mueller’s extensive analysis
of protests in Niger led her to conclude that “economic grievances, combined with social networks that help protesters organize” explain the 2009-2010 uprisings in Niger (Mueller 2014:3). A meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) found that along with social identity, grievances (or a sense of injustice) and a sense of efficacy (i.e. resources) have approximately equal impact on the propensity to engage in collective action. The analysis that follows draws upon the various perspectives on collective action to explore the individual- and context-level conditions under which the grievances engendered by perceptions and personal experiences of corruption might lead to anti-corruption civic engagement.

3.4. Mobilising grievances

One of the points that proponents of the grievance model stress is that grievances are not created equally (see Snow 1998). That is, in other words, grievances differ in their ability to inspire civic engagement. For instance, declining standards in public transport or education may not create the same intensity of personal discontent as the shortage of such basic commodities as food and fuel or the prospect of losing a job. Similarly, those with school-age children will be inspired to challenge education-related problems than those without such dependents. Most importantly, as the work of Bergstrand (2014) suggests, grievances that are more direct and personal or that lead to significant personal losses can have a particularly strong mobilisation effect.

Research on the individual-level effects of corruption, as a grievance, corroborate Bergstrand’s (2014) argument. Bauhr (2012:80) maintains, for instance, that “If corruption is not clearly felt in everyday life and its effects are divided and diffuse, it may motivate less engagement among broad sections of the population”. For De Sousa and Moriconi (2013:479), “different types of corruption may trigger different degrees of public condemnation” and by extension, willingness to challenge corruption. Analysing survey experimental data obtained in Delhi, India, Weschle (2016) concluded that citizens were more likely to tolerate corruption if the money was used to fund elections (e.g. voter buying) than if it was used to enrich a politician. Johnston’s (2015) historical analysis on the emergence of the institutions of accountability makes a strong case for the role of personalised grievances.
Olken’s (2007) research in rural Indonesia illustrates how personalised grievances motivate citizens to challenge specific types of corruption. Olken (2007) found that Indonesian villagers were keener to prevent the officials (of the road construction projects) from fraudulently billing the labour they (i.e. villagers) had offered voluntarily and keeping the money for themselves. The villagers were less interested in preventing officials from stealing the building materials and selling them off in the black market, even though this was a more harmful form of corruption for the project (and thus for the interests of the entire community). The strong incentive to prevent illegal wage expenditures was grounded in the fact that this type of corruption was felt at the individual-level (i.e. the loss was more personal). Finding out that one has been personally cheated can produce grievances that are more intense than discovering that the community was ripped off.

3.4.1. The experience of bribery as a mobilising grievance

Very few studies have examined the effect of the experience of bribery, as a grievance, on anti-corruption collective action. Scholars interested in Africa often examine individual-level predictors of the direct exposure to corruption (see Justesen and Bjornskov 2014; Peiffer and Rose 2016; Mbate 2017), and not the impact of bribery experience on political participation. Much of what we know about the nexus between bribe experiences and civic action comes from studies conducted in Latin America. Most of these studies found a negative relationship between personal experience of bribery and political legitimacy (see Faughnan and Seligson 2015, Seligson 2006) or support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009). Since low legitimacy often leads to a higher propensity to engage in anti-government protests (see Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010), it is inferred that the increasing experience of paying bribes is more likely to inspire extra-institutional political engagement (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Apart from its corrosive effect on legitimacy and support for democracy, systemic bureaucratic extortions cause intense emotional distress. As Nichols and Robertson (2017:7) observe:

People who have not endured the hardship of living with endemic bribery may think that official demands for bribery are nothing more than background noise, easily and quickly paid and forgotten. In truth, every bribe demand represents an assertion of power over those without power or adequate redress, which over time engenders deep frustration, resentment, and anger.
Based on the analysis of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Bauhr (2016) provides an explanation that is consistent with Nichols and Robertson’s (2017) observation. Bauhr divides bribe payers into two groups: need bribers and greed bribers. Her analysis shows that individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit advantage (i.e. greed bribers) are less willing to undertake civic action targeting corruption. On the contrary, those who are ‘forced’ to pay above and beyond the officially sanctioned fees are more willing to support anti-corruption mobilisation. Bauhr’s (2016) explanation is that demand for bribes (i.e. extortions) provokes a strong sense of indignation and consequently, the willingness to be personally involved in anti-corruption efforts. According to the extant social movement literature, indignation, resentment and anger are the emotions that make individuals to discount the personal costs of taking part in collective dissent (see Jasper 1998, Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). Jasper (1998) calls them ‘reactive emotions’ and contends that they provide a powerful motivation for individuals to support a variety of collective resistance efforts. Paying more attention to the emotional side of the grievance explanation has enabled social movement scholars to explain why collective action arises in highly repressive settings or among individuals who may not feel empowered enough to make a difference (i.e. individuals with a low sense of both internal and external efficacy) (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001).

While Bauhr’s analysis is insightful, it overlooks the impact of the financial burden that having to pay a bribe imposes on individuals and households. The analysis does not reveal whether socio-economic status of a need briber moderates her willingness to act against corruption in a significant way. To the extent that reactive emotions intensify with the amount of personal losses as Bergstrand (2014) has argued, it is possible that poor people who pay bribes on regular basis are more willing to challenge corruption than their well-to-do compatriots who also pay bribes regularly.

Indeed, the analysis by Gingerich (2009) suggests that the accumulated burden of bribe payments intensifies citizens’ propensity to undertake aggressive anti-government protests in Bolivia. In this regard, he finds a non-linear relationship between the experience of bribery and propensity to participate in these activities. As he notes, the initial experiences of bribery do not produce noticeable changes in likelihood to engage in anti-government protests “until the exposure level crosses some threshold point, after which further increases in exposure produce very large increases in the propensity to
engage in anti-government protest” (Gingerich 2009:27). In other words, the positive impact of the experience of bribery has a tipping point. There is a threshold beyond which further extortions lead to a significant impetus to challenge the state through aggressive collective action. It is important to note that the survey items Gingerich (2009) used did not ask how much respondents paid in bribes, instead they provided information on the number of public institutions where bribe was demanded and paid. This justifies his argument that it is not just the paying of bribes that pushes people to challenge the state; it is the accumulated burden of corruption.

3.4.2. Perceptions of corruption, economic development and economic grievances

The relationship between subjective perceptions of corruption and willingness to challenge corruption is often deemed to be strongly moderated by economic factors (see Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). De Sousa and Moriconi (2013) maintain, for instance, that perceptions of corruption may have a mobilising effect when personal economic conditions are hard. As they emphasise, citizens do not fight corruption on moral grounds but due to “the fact that they cannot find a plausible explanation for their sudden loss of wellbeing…” (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013: 478). Results of a field experiment in Senegal show that “perceptions of corruption increase the likelihood of both voting and protesting, particularly when economic conditions are poor” (Inman and Andrews 2009: 24).

The moderating effect of economic conditions also seem to operate at country level. Even if they are not poor themselves, individuals living in poor countries seem to be more sensitive to information about corruption in the political system (see Manzetti and Blake 1996). As Medard (2002:394) argued, “with the generalisation of economic crisis, corruption becomes literally unbearable for the masses of the population, even if they have to practice it in order to survive. Its fundamentally inegalitarian effects become visible and are resented as intolerable”. Analysis by Manzetti and Blake (1996) suggests that residents of poor countries (or those going through an economic crisis) tend to blame corrupt political leadership for the country’s poor economic conditions, and as a result, express strong willingness to get involved in efforts to hold public officials accountable.
Manzetti and Blake (1996) show that while ordinary Venezuelans thought corruption was widespread, most were not aggrieved by it until austerity measures took a toll on overall standards of living. Importantly, as the authors show, individuals held corrupt leadership (and not fiscal austerity policies) responsible for the plummeting living standards, even though it would have been easier to blame these on budget cuts. It was the first time in modern Venezuela that a majority of citizens told pollsters that corruption was the most important problem in the country. Qualitative evidence corroborated these public opinion data. As one prominent Venezuelan journalist remarked, Venezuelans did not mind corruption while the economy was doing well; “nobody minded what [leaders] did as long as we all benefited. When the oil market collapsed, and we in the middle class started seeing the results of corruption in our public services, then we started getting mad” (Manzetti and Blake 1996:684). The increasing public discontent with corruption led to a serious legitimacy crisis that culminated into weeks of mass demonstrations and the eventual demise of the president.

Manzetti and Blake (1996) contrast these findings with the case of Argentina, which had similar levels of corruption prior to the economic crisis and experimented with similar austerity policies as Venezuela. One of the reasons why the president of Argentina enjoyed high public approval ratings despite austerity and frequent corruption scandals in his administration is that people perceived his economic policies to be ‘working’. Over a six-year period, the inflation rate was reduced by approximately 800 per cent, resulting in noticeable improvement in standards of living. Indeed, people felt that the economic sacrifices they made were paying off and that the administration was decisively dealing with allegations of corruption. Ultimately, Argentinian president did not face demands to step down and went on to complete his term of office.

An alternative view of the relationship between corruption and economic factors is premised on modernisation theory and sees anti-corruption collective action as likely to emerge in economically powerful nations. Indeed, according to de Mesquita and Downs (2005:79), economic development creates a large “number of individuals with sufficient time, education, and money to get involved in politics”. Research by Charron and Lapuente demonstrates that citizens of high income countries are more willing to put pressure on “leaders to undertake mid- to long-term investments for improving” institutions of accountability and rule of law (Charron and Lapuente 2010: 463). On the
other hand, citizens of low income countries are unlikely to demand the state to invest in its capacity to combat corruption. Although Charron and Lapuente do not account for the role of individual’s perceptions of corruption, it is possible that citizens of high income countries are also more likely to challenge the government when they perceive high levels of corruption.

3.4.3. Public goods dissatisfaction and the mobilising effect of clientelism

According to Finkel and Muller (1998), an individual’s dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods can act as a powerful incentive for joining anti-government protests. Naturally, those who are more strongly affected by poor provision of a specific public good will be more inclined to participate than those who are less affected. Olken’s (2007) findings provide an important nuance to this thinking; as he argues, citizens are more interested in demanding accountability where they have “a personal stake in ensuring that the goods are delivered, and that theft is minimised” (Olken 2007:244). In particular, he maintains that people are more likely to get involved in collectively monitoring the public provision of “more private goods, such as subsidised food, education, or medical care” (Olken 2007:244). In essence, citizens have greater willingness to challenge corruption if it leads to poor provision of the public goods they deeply care about.

One of the things that usually provoke public goods’ dissatisfaction and therefore willingness to participate in extra-institutional tactics is blatant state-level clientelism. The positive effect of clientelism is likely to be higher among those who perceive high levels of corruption or those who have fallen victim to bureaucratic extortions. In this regard, research by Gingerich (2009) demonstrates that “when victimisers are institutionally linked to the President and his coalition via patronage networks, the inclination of corruption victims to rebel against the government is much greater than when no such linkage exist” (Gingerich 2009:34).

The positive effect of clientelism among those who perceive high levels of corruption makes more sense if we consider the nature of patron-clientelism in many parts of the African continent. Africa’s clientelistic governments are unresponsive to the basic needs of the majority of citizens due to the poor performance of the economy (see Medard 2002, van de Walle 2009). When the number of recipients of favours is small or declining, state-
level clientelism becomes a source of intense grievances and willingness to challenge corruption (Medard 2002). Beeskers and van Gool (2012) and Smith (2009) have pointed out that clientelism as currently practised in Africa suffers from weak legitimacy due to its increasingly predatory nature at community level. These characteristics provide a basis for those who perceive high levels of corruption to support anti-corruption collective civic engagement as clientelism increases.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, clientelistic allocation of resources makes it easy for political entrepreneurs to politicise perceptions of corruption by ascribing to the state or individual politicians the responsibility for poor provision of public goods (Beeskers and van Gool 2012). Reno (2002) demonstrates how Nigeria’s highly clientelistic political system is directly responsible for the high propensity to use collective (at times violent) action to challenge the corrupt machinery of the state.

3.4.4. Identity-based grievances and popular perceptions of corruption

The discussion in chapter two explained how ethnic diversity and strength of ethnic identification can hinder ordinary Africans from rallying behind an anti-corruption drive. In focusing on this, the analysis de-emphasised the fact that social identity can act as a mobilising force against perceived political disadvantages (Opp 2012). Opp (2012:77) summarises the causal link between social identity and collective civic action as follows:

A strong identification with a group is related to a strong interest in the well-being of the group. If there is such an interest, then action on behalf of the group (i.e. ’voice’) is rewarding as well. Thus, if individuals strongly identify with a group they get high (internal) benefits if they act in order to improve the situation of the group, and they incur costs if they are inactive.

As alluded in the previous chapter, in the African context, the most politicising group identity is ethnicity. In Africa, ethnic identities tend to override other social identities, shaping how individuals think and act politically and how they construct the notion of self-interest. Mazrui demonstrates this primacy of ethnic identification when he asserts that “when the chips are down, Igbo peasants are most likely to side with the Igbo bourgeoisie than they are with fellow peasants in Yorubaland” (Mazrui 2014:43). In settings where ethnicity plays such a critical role, perceptions of corruption can often be entwined with a sense of ethnic marginalisation (Orjuela 2013). That is, individuals who perceive high levels of corruption may feel that corruption is specifically targeted at or
has more harmful effects on members of their ethnic groups. This combination of non-
group based grievances (e.g. corruption perceptions) with those associated with a
politiciising group identity (i.e. perceptions of ethnic marginalisation) can be a basis for
high levels of regime disapproval, low institutional trust and willingness to take part in
contentious politics (Klandermans 2013). As Githongo (2006:21) observes with respect
to Kenya:

Ironically, it’s not the corruption in itself that people object to but the fact that it
is perpetrated predominantly by an elite from one ethnic group to the exclusion
of others, especially theirs. …The resentments and sense of exclusion created by
these circumstances often have a more destructive impact than the actual graft
itself – a point that is often missed by those who fail to view the issue
holistically… So, it is not the absolute levels of corruption that complicate
matters politically but the extent to which they exacerbate perceptions of
economic inequality among different ethnic groups.

To complicate matters, in places where corruption is endemic, and some citizens feel that
their groups are marginalised, it is possible that the propensity to engage in corruption
proceeds in tandem with the willingness to engage in collective civic action. From the
perspective of an individual who feels that corruption is more harmful to his identity
group, abusing public office on behalf of the in-group and joining different forms of
civilian resistance against corruption serve the same purpose of defending the interests of
the ethnic group (see Orjuela 2013).

### 3.5. Civil Society, media and ‘framing’

According to Snow and Bendford (1992:137), a frame is “an interpretive schema that
simplifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding
objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one’s present or
past environment”. The main objective of ‘frames’ is to shape grievances and provide a
target against which reactive emotions can be vented (Benford and Snow 2000). The need
for framing arises from the possibility that strong perceptions of corruption or the
experience of paying bribes may not in themselves inspire willingness to participate in
anti-corruption efforts. Someone else, usually Civil Society Organisations, must help
individuals to interpret their experiences from a political vantage point, by ascribing the
blame to some political authority. Social movement research suggests that when blame
can be ascribed to a structural group “such as political leadership, law enforcement, or
other institutional organization, protest behaviour becomes increasingly attractive, as
more normative modes of engagement are perceived as lacking efficacy” (LeFebvre and Armstrong 2016:3).

Successful framing can transform perceptions of grand corruption into more personalised grievances, increasing people’s willingness to participate in collective dissent to protect or advance what they have been made to understand as their ‘personal interests’. It can change a personal experience with bribery into a salient political issue against which collective action is required. It can also inflate a sense of financial loss and dignity among the victims of extortions, increasing their support for social movements attempting to address corruption. Frames that project all bribers as victims of dysfunctional institutions can be used to reach out to those individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit access to public goods and services. This makes more sense if one considers with Seligson (2006) that bureaucratic corruption erodes political legitimacy even for those who are most tolerant of it.

Beyerle (2013) illustrates how the civil society organisations working in highly corrupt societies ‘frame’ major corruption scandals in ways that rouse the spirit of resistance and build a critical mass against further abuses. In Indonesia for instance, civil society organisations took advantage of the government’s attempts to undermine the anti-corruption agency, to mount a powerful anti-corruption civic action. As the state-sponsored victimisation of the leaders of the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) increased, civic leaders responded by framing this as an attack on Indonesians, which necessitated collective resistance. They subsequently launched the ‘Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption Commission (CICAK) campaign.’

Part of the framing process involved using the popular gecko lizard as the symbol of the defiance campaign. This was after the chief of police, who was being investigated by the anti-corruption commission, poked fun at the mass mobilisation effort by suggesting that it was akin to “a gecko challenging a crocodile” (Beyerle 2017:93). Popular musicians composed songs and slogans extolling the power of ordinary Indonesians to fight abuses of power. One of the popular songs was based on the sarcastic remarks of the police chief and implied that the gecko was in fact going to swallow the crocodile. The song could be downloaded free of charge either as a song or ringtone. Pictures of a gecko were emblazoned on t-shirts that thousands of protesters wore during protest events. Coupled
with supportive private media, these efforts provoked a strong patriotic sentiment, a sense of injustice among ordinary people and a belief that change through collective action was possible.

All in all, the ability to frame corruption as a moral evil that citizens should oppose and as both a ‘personal’ and ‘political’ issue makes individuals appreciate the imperatives of being personally involved. Additionally, the framing efforts tend to be more successful in places where media and civil society are relatively free to operate such as in Ghana, Senegal, Namibia and South Africa. In this regard, two individuals with the same perception or experience of corruption, but who live in societies that differ in levels of political openness and strength of civil society may have vastly different attitudes towards the effectiveness of citizens’ involvement in anti-corruption efforts. One would expect a Ghanaian with high perceptions of corruption to have a higher propensity to support anti-corruption collective action than a Burundian with similar attributes.

3.6. Democratic and collective action norms: a critique of the dominant literature on African politics

Much of what we know about politics and corruption in Africa can be organised under the rubric of ‘African studies’ — a field of study rooted in history, anthropology and development studies (see Mattes and Bratton 2008). In this regard, the dominant perspective regarding both elites and mass political behaviour has often emphasised the strong effect of cultural factors (see for instance Smith 2008, de Sardan 1999, Blundo and de Sardan 2006). Partly as a result of this strong emphasis on structural factors, much of the more influential Africanist literature reduces “African politics to personal accumulation and patronage, devoid of ideals, struggles for justice, notions of equality, and so on” (Szefetl 1998:223). Most of the main ideas in this literature as they relate to demand for accountability were extensively covered in chapter two, and there is no need to rehash them here. However, there is a need to discuss some of this literature’s main theoretical and methodological weaknesses, and state why in light of the emerging

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25 These are some of the African countries that have high scores on the Freedom House and Polity measures of democracy. According to Grasso and Giugni (2016:676) “individuals in more social democratic arrangements appear to be more likely to react politically when they feel that the crisis has impacted them negatively”.
scholarly evidence, its pessimism regarding a genuine citizen-driven anti-corruption drive could be misplaced.

The view that problems regarding political accountability have their roots in a similar ‘African culture’ — or to be politically correct — ‘similar structural conditions’ was reiterated by Crawford Young (2012) in his attempt to justify broad generalisations about politics in this continent. He noted:

There are large similarities in cultural patterns, similarities that underpin the regular invocation of an “African society” as a generic entity by leaders and analysts. Historians find an elaborated tradition constructed over broad areas. African philosophers postulate a distinctively African view of the world and its causative mainsprings. The premise of a common African culture was a staple of nationalist discourse, from Julius Nyerere to Léopold Senghor (Young 2012:6).

It is worth pointing out that Young is merely repeating the mantra that many adherents of neo-patrimonialism offered to justify its use as a general framework for understanding politics in ‘Africa’. His argument bears striking resemblance with Christopher Clapham’s conjecture that it is “plausible to suggest that there is some continent-wide African ‘political culture’, presumably deriving from the interaction between colonial statehood on the one hand and embedded social structures and values” (Clapham 1996:819). Taking cue from these and similar remarks, international media, the donor community and policy advocates often generalise to the whole African continent, the political processes observed in individual countries, as though “to know one [African country] is to know them all” (Allen 1995:302).26

What explains, further, the predominance of narratives inspired in neo-patrimonialism school is its “influence on key donors, its privileged access to leading journals, and the constitution of tight self-referential networks of Africanist scholarship” (Mkandawire 2015:563). As Mkandawire points out, over the years, Africa-based scholars who subscribed to neo-patrimonialism and promoted among others the idea that ordinary citizens are complicit in corruption were eulogised and extensively cited, partly due to the perception that “self-criticism is more objective than self-adulation or self-exculpation” (Mkandawire 2015:570).

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26 My emphasis.
Mustapha (2002) is among the first African scholars to challenge the validity of the data that neo-patrimonialist scholars use to support the portrayal of ordinary Africans as passive victims of structural factors. More recently, Mkandawire has criticised the neopatrimonialism scholars’ excessive reliance on highly subjective information from the locals who “tell delectable tales of mischief in the tropics…” (Mkandawire 2015: 570). As he observes, the copious cross-citations of these personal anecdotes in leading academic publications has had an effect of concealing the reality that much of the evidence in the mainstream African politics literature “comes from sporadic empiricism that is largely anecdotal in nature” (Mkandawire 2015:570).

Apart from drawing upon largely questionable data, much of the commentary on the political economy of Africa ignores the drive and the capacity of ordinary Africans to challenge political misconduct (Allen 1995, Mkandawire 2015). The neo-patrimonialism school glosses over the many examples of collective anti-elite resistance during the pre-colonial period in which political acquiescence and deference to authority— which supposedly underpin the logic of neo-patrimonialism— are supposedly rooted. One example of such collective resistance is found in the work of the Senegalese historian and anthropologist, Cheick anta-Diop (1987), who discusses a particularly violent revolt against a corrupt dynasty in pre-colonial Ghana. In light of such largely ignored evidence of collective resistance against political misconduct in Africa’s patrimonial (and neo-patrimonial) states, Mkhandawire (2015:572) observes that “the prevalence of coercion on the one hand, and resistance, defiance, and injustice on the other, clearly suggests that neo-patrimonial relations are not as self-stabilising as often presumed”.

Further to that, contemporary African studies do not interrogate, systematically, cross-regional differences in corruption permissiveness, and citizens’ complicity and acquiescence. This is largely due to the predominance of single case analysis that until very recently dominated the study of politics in Africa. Notwithstanding this limitation, many Africanists have never shied away from making broad generalisations about African politics based on their observations of one or very few countries (see Briggs 2017). According to Briggs, the “problem of generalising from specific, and often

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atypical, countries to the continent as a whole” continues to perpetuate the stereotype, especially “among researchers based at institutions outside of Africa”, that political institutions and processes in Africa are homogenous (Briggs 2017:6). It also perpetuates the view that similar attributes such as similarly high levels of corruption in Kenya and Uganda have the same foundations, and that they yield similar outcomes at individual level (see for example, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013).

An explanation based solely on “neo-patrimonialism does not do justice to the processes of social change actually taking place in Africa today” (Chabal 2009:11). 28 It underestimates the changes in democratic norms and values that partly emanate from democratic socialisation process underway in many parts of the continent (Williams and Obadare 2014, Mattes and Bratton 2007). Some of these changes in values and norms are exemplified by the increasing reliance on democratic institutions such as elections (rather than violence) to settle political conflict (Posner and Young 2007). An increasing number of the democratically elected African leaders now leave at the end of their maximum terms in office or through electoral defeat. According to Posner and Young (2007), the large increase in both the regularity and competitiveness of elections attest to the fact that Africans see voting as an important leadership selection mechanism.

Importantly, as the work of Barkan (2008) has shown, legislatures are gaining considerable influence in Africa, although there are instances in which they still pander to the whims of the executive. Legislatures have blocked attempts by presidents in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi to change the constitution in order to prolong their hold on power (Posner and Young 2007). The presidents of Mozambique and Tanzania only withdrew their intentions to seek the third term when it became clear that both the public opinion and the majority of MPs were strongly opposed to constitutional changes. Indeed, as Posner and Young (2007) have noted, these examples strongly indicate an increasing institutionalisation of democracy, challenging the “caricature of Africa as a place where ‘abstract constitutions and formal institutions exist on paper, but …do not shape the conduct of individual actors, especially those in power’”. This is the depiction that has

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28 Emphasis in original
informed some of the influential accounts on the failures of democratic accountability in Africa.

Focusing on citizens, Mattes and Bratton (2007) explain in sharp contrast to the way Africa has been portrayed that individual and collective (i.e. generational) experience with multiparty democracy account for the differences in democratic norms and values expressed by ordinary citizens. Moreover, their analysis illuminates the differential effects of the nature of the pre-democratic regime on citizens’ commitment to democracy as an ideal — something that the neo-patrimonialism school overlooks. Additionally, part of their analysis challenges the view that Africans care more about economic goods than the provision of more political goods such as accountability, transparency and the rule of law.

Lindberg (2006), analysing more than 200 African elections, finds a strong positive effect of elections on the development of democratic attitudes and values. Oddly, this finding is robust to the quality of such elections. Lindberg attributes these changes in values and norms to the lasting effect of civil and democratic education campaigns that usually occur during election periods. Once the election is over, many citizens retain the political awareness and a sense of empowerment they received during the electioneering period. The after-effect is so strong that some people “may even become ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ transferring their awareness to others in the social sphere” (Lindberg 2006:146).

In a study that focuses on the role of the emerging black middle class in South Africa, Mattes (2015) finds that “middle-class Blacks are more likely to prioritize issues of corruption, governance and democracy as priorities for government action and less likely to want government to focus on securing basic needs” (Mattes 2015:685). The group is also less likely to support the ruling African National Congress, which has been in power since the fall of apartheid in 1994, and which has increasingly been accused of corruption in recent years. Nevertheless, compared to the lower class, South Africa’s middle class is less likely to support various forms of collective civic engagement, including taking part in protests and demonstrations. This means that even though members of the middle class are not as actively involved in civic action as their lower-class compatriots, their supportive attitudes towards accountability and the rule of law make them a potentially strong constituency for anti-corruption mobilisation.
The emphasis on the role of ethnicity, religion and other social identifiers in African electoral politics has been strongly contested. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) and Ichino and Nathan (2013) provide evidence suggesting that when political information is limited, Africans use heuristics other than identity to inform voting decisions. Additionally, according to Elischer (2013) and Cheeseman and Larmer (2013), the low number of political parties that contest on the basis of ethnic identity, and the rise in the number of multi-ethnic political parties provide evidence that ethnic clientelism is becoming a less important element in African electoral politics. Lastly, the fact that more than 40 per cent of African countries, including ethno-linguistically diverse societies have witnessed a change of government through highly competitive elections calls “into question views of the African voter as unidimensionally clientelistic and devoid of interest in policies and performance” (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013:718). They conclude that “empirical accounts of African elections as a ‘clientelistic harvesting season’ overlook the increasing sophistication of voters” (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013:718).

In general, what this emerging Africanist literature illustrates is that ordinary Africans may be more willing to support accountability and rule of law than much of the African studies’ literature suggests (also see Williams and Obadare 2014). Nevertheless, the contradictions in African politics literature may also suggest that popular demand for political accountability is a much more complex subject; the individual-level propensity to demand accountability could be shaped by variations in country-specific factors often omitted in much of the emerging large N studies on Africa. It is with these in mind, that Lynch and Crawford caution scholars to take into account “differences between and within countries” when analysing political relations in contemporary Africa (Lynch and Crawford 2011:276).

There are at least two ways in which democratic norms and values could increase the propensity to engage in citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption. First, to the extent that political participation is an important part of democratic citizenship, individuals who embrace democratic ideals, that is, those who identify as ‘democrats’ are likely to support citizens’ involvement in efforts to demand accountability (Dalton 2008, Norris 2011). Second, corruption is likely to clash with the core values of democratic citizenship including equality, inclusive political process,
fairness and the “ethical and moral responsibility to others in the polity and beyond” (Dalton 2008:79). In their analysis of (the 19th century) Sweden’s transition from a systematically corrupt society, Rothstein and Teorell (2015b) and Rothstein (2011) identify the emergence of civic norms and values as an important factor.

Once individuals internalise democracy as part of their personal identity, it shapes their interests and goals (Welzel 2006). As Lindberg (2006:146) argues, once individuals identify themselves as democrats, “and are recognized as such among friends, family, and perhaps even enemies, they have a vested interest in voicing their concerns in the social sphere”. They are likely to support courses and ideas that align with and promote their democratic ethos (Lindberg 2006). When coupled with an existing preference for collective civic action as a feature of a democratic citizenship, a perception that corruption is widespread is likely to increase the propensity to support citizen-centred approaches to anti-corruption.

Paying attention to individual norms and values as motivation for anti-corruption collective action strongly challenges the literature on collective action against corruption anchored in rational choice institutionalism. Apart from that, a focus on values justifies the expectation that individuals who think that corruption is widespread will support efforts to oppose it, even when they do not have personalised economic grievances related to corruption. When informed by personal values, resisting corruption while working hard to motivate others to do the same has significant internal benefits (see Opp 1997). Indeed, according to Mishra (2006:355), personal norms and values — the individual phenomena about which people usually feel strongly— make it easy to resist corruption and carry on with “honest behaviour despite the corrupt strategy yielding higher economic pay-offs”.

3.7. Summary and conclusions

One of the aims of this chapter was to present an alternative to the pessimistic account of anti-corruption resistance that formed a large part of chapter two. In particular, I questioned the view that endemic corruption automatically makes individuals less willing to resist various forms of corruption. The bulk of this chapter demonstrated how corruption can create an incentive for individuals to be involved in efforts to bring it under
control — something that explanations anchored in rational choice institutionalism overlook. Rooted in rational choice institutionalism, collective action analysis of corruption control cannot accommodate the role of reactive emotions in generating ideas and incentives for endogenous institutional change. Additionally, it is unable to anticipate that democratic values can motivate individuals to challenge corruption as a matter of principle.

The analysis has shown how perceptions of corruption can generate a sense of collective injustice, and subsequent willingness to punish corruption. I have demonstrated why individuals with high perceptions of corruption are likely to be willing to participate in especially anti-state protests when they think grand corruption is harmful to the interests of their reference group — particularly ethnic groups. In this regard, we can expect an increase in perceptions of corruption to have a stronger mobilising impact in highly corrupt and fractionalised countries (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya) than in highly corrupt but less fractionalised societies (e.g. Burundi and Zimbabwe).

The chapter has also shown that the corrosive effect of corruption on political legitimacy is likely to lead to an increase in support for various forms of civic engagement, including protests and demonstrations. Moving on, I presented literature suggesting that perceptions of corruption and experiences of bribery can inspire willingness to challenge corruption when they coincide with intense dissatisfaction with the way public goods are provided. Differently put, support for anti-corruption collective action is likely to arise from the discontent with poor public goods provision combined with a strong perception of corruption or frequent personal experience with bribery. In this regard, we can expect people who perceive high levels of corruption to support anti-corruption civic engagement when they live in countries where clientelism dominates much of the provision of public goods.

I demonstrated how the preferential treatment of certain groups can make it easy for rival politicians and interest groups to politicise perceptions of corruption and use them to inspire anti-government action. The important caveat to this point is that this elite-manipulated contentious action under the guise of anti-corruption may not represent a genuine demand for impartial governance processes. Branch and Mampilly have this in mind when they argue that in Africa, “anti-corruption can be a guise for very different
political programmes, many of which may not be democratic, or even liberal” (Branch and Mampilly 2015:213). This indicates that clientelism has the potential to produce what one might call a ‘corrupted’ collective civic action — the type that is not intended for promoting impartiality as a guiding principle of good governance. This takes us back to the pessimistic view towards anti-corruption collective action discussed in chapter two, especially the fact that where corruption is systemic, citizens (i.e., principals) are unlikely to act in ways that promote the interests of the broad sections of the society (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). In terms of that view, collective civic action can occur in highly corrupt societies, but it will not be representative of a demand for impartiality as a governance norm — the ultimate aim of the fight against corruption.

Nevertheless, and in defence of the optimistic perspective, the foregoing point should not be interpreted as disavowing the role of grievances in influencing a genuine demand for accountability. Indeed, as the work of Gingerich (2009) demonstrates, the mobilising effect of the accumulated experience of paying bribes remains even when the model is adjusted for the impact of clientelism. Apart from that, the literature review has shown that other individual-level characteristics such as negative assessment of personal living conditions is likely to intensify the positive impact of the accumulated experience of bribery. This all means that independent of the individual experience of clientelism, an increasing experience of bribery (or high perceptions of corruption) is more likely to trigger the willingness to challenge corruption.

In keeping with the optimistic perspective, this chapter provided a strong critique of the mainstream literature on African politics. It presented literature showing that much of the influential Africanist literature overlooks the positive changes in democratic norms and values taking place in various parts of the continent. Based on these changes in value orientations, one expects strong propensity to challenge corruption among those who think it is widespread. Specifically, respondents that display the characteristics of democratic citizenship (i.e., those who unconditionally support democracy and citizens’ involvement in governance processes) are likely to support citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts, when they harbour high levels of corruption.

Throughout this chapter, I have emphasised the role of national context in shaping the impact of corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. In this regard, I proposed that
one would expect the effect of the perceptions of corruption to depend on, among others, strength of civil society, media openness and economic development. Chapter four discusses how several country-level variables are measured and summarise how I expect them to moderate the nexus between corruption and the propensity to engage in collective action against it.
Chapter four

Data and measurements

4.1. Introduction

This dissertation draws upon public opinion survey data spanning 35 African countries and more than 50,000 individuals to investigate the role of corruption in support for collective action against it. The choice of public opinion surveys as the main source of data is both practical and research-problem driven. To the extent that “any acting that is done in the pursuit of collective goods is done by individuals” (Hechter, Friedman and Appelbaum 1982:415), a study that seeks to explain the impact of corruption on citizens’ reaction to it must draw upon individual-level data as the starting point. From the perspective of available resources, publicly available surveys are most accessible and high-quality sources of data for cross-national research that is conducted under time constraints (i.e. within a period of 36 months).

Although availability of public opinion data on Africa is a recent phenomenon, surveys have been a mainstay of the studies on the impact of various individual-level variables on propensity to get involved in collective action. Surveys enable researchers to focus on material incentives, beliefs, fears and unique experiences of a large number of potential actors, across time and space. Drawing upon the rational choice framework, a German political sociologist, Karl-Dieter Opp has for the past three decades relied on survey data to examine the mobilising potential of a host of individual-level variables. He argues that surveys can be leveraged to provide reliable information about the motivational structure of actors— an important goal of studies on collective action. Furthermore, survey data are useful for doing what he calls “impact analysis, which is based on the idea that the researcher measures certain incentives and then tests whether these incentives have an impact on the action to be explained” (Opp 2001:7). 29

My choice of the Afrobarometer data set is rooted in the fact that it covers the highest number of African countries and has the variables that are relevant for this analysis. The

29 Emphasis in original
Afrobarometer data set covers among other things, self-reported rates of participation in protests and demonstrations, views about the most effective way to tackle corruption, attitudes towards the role of citizens in political accountability, subjective perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery. It also provides measures of the variables that potentially confound the association between corruption and citizens’ reactions to corruption. In other words, Afrobarometer data offer a rare opportunity to examine corruption-related individual-level incentives or disincentives for taking part in anti-corruption collective action.

Having laid out the foregoing preliminaries, this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the concept and measures of corruption, conscious of the fact that definitions of corruption “are controversial, and solid evidence is often elusive…” (Johnston 1991:48). From there, the chapter zeroes in on strengths and weaknesses of this study’s main predictor variables, personal experiences of bribery and subjective perceptions of corruption. Section 4.2 introduces Afrobarometer data and describes how the survey items from Afrobarometer will be used to construct the key variables used throughout this analysis. The section after that briefly describes the reasons behind the statistical techniques being employed in especially chapter six of this dissertation.

As intimated in the previous chapter, observable and unobservable country-level factors are likely to shape citizens’ willingness to support efforts to put corruption under control. More importantly, they can also moderate the impact of the key predictor variables of corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. As I explain towards the end of this chapter, multilevel modelling technique provides the best method of investigating whether the impact of individual-level variables changes as a function of country-level factors (Snijders and Bosker 2012). This method also enables researchers to account for the nested structure of cross-national public opinion data such as those that the Afrobarometer provides. Having made a case for the use of multilevel regression techniques, this chapter briefly discusses the measures of the country-level variables that I believe, based on the discussion in the previous chapter, shape the relationship between individual-level corruption variables and support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics. The chapter concludes with a few weaknesses of the Afrobarometer data and the extent to which these might affect the reliability of the findings.
4.2. A brief review of the concept and measurement of corruption

Besides the fact that several languages lack local equivalents of the key concepts in corruption research, such as ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (see Hough 2017), the illegal and clandestine nature of ‘corruption’, its varied manifestations in the real world (Sequeira 2012, Heywood 2015) and its moralistic overtones (see Génaux 2004), make it extremely difficult for scholars to accurately estimate its prevalence within and across nations and institutions (Hellman 2013). Making matters worse, as Hough (2017) reminds us, the term ‘corruption’ is often used indiscriminately to vilify political opponents or describe what and who the speaker does not like. Corruption is “now often utilised as a stick with which to beat political opponents, and it frequently appears to be more of a term of abuse than a statement with any basis in reality” (Hough 2017:33).

These challenges notwithstanding, according to Deborah Hellman, “most theories agree that corruption requires the violation of a normative standard, some benefit (personal or political), and some connection between the two” (Hellman 2013:1393). Joseph Nye provides a more precise definition. For him, corruption entails a “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967:419). Drawing largely from Nye’s definition, many in the academia and policy-making quarters view corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, recognising with Johnston “that terms such as ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘private’, and even ‘benefit’ can be matters of considerable dispute” (Johnston 1999:6). Indeed, as Heywood (2017:23) points out, while this definition is less than ideal, it “nonetheless serves to capture the essence of what we instinctively understand by the term [corruption]...”

Most attempts to measure corruption begin with a distinction between petty (or lower level/ bureaucratic) and grand (higher level/ political) forms of corruption. The former usually takes the form of illegal rewards that low ranking public officials demand from

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30 According to Hellman (2013), actions that are corrupt in one institutional setting are not necessarily corrupt in another.
citizens in exchange for doing their jobs, or which citizens offer voluntarily\(^31\) in order to influence decisions of such officials (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Grand corruption occurs at higher levels of the state and may involve, among other things, illicit payments of huge sums of money by corporations to exert undue influence on the entire political process. Whilst petty corruption is illegal in many parts of the world, grand/political corruption may not necessarily violate official regulations. Daniel Kaufmann has this in mind when he asserts:

> Corruption ought to also encompass some acts that may be legal in a strict narrow sense, but where the rules of the game and the state laws, policies, regulations and institutions may have been shaped in part by undue influence of certain vested interests for their own private benefit (and not for the benefit of the public at large). It may not be strictly illegal, but unethical and extra-legal (cited in Bauhr 2012:73).

Studies on corruption have used a variety of data-generation techniques to estimate the nature, causes, outcomes and scale of corruption. Hough (2017), Johnston (2014) and Lambsdorff and Schulze (2015) expertly summarise many of these methods, including public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), corruption convictions, laboratory and field experiments and more recently, the use of large data sets on public procurement (i.e. big data). Useful though these techniques are, they are often unsuitable for cross-national studies seeking to evaluate the effect of corruption on mass political behaviour in the African continent. The publicly-available ‘big data’ and PETS are often too domain-specific, focusing on for example public tendering and risks of corruption in education and healthcare sectors. Moreover, I have not seen a large N study that utilises experimental data about corruption and collective action against it. This is partly due to the logistical and costs-related challenges of conducting field experiments in many different countries, especially those found in the south of the Sahara Desert (see Habyriamana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein 2009).

Some researchers have resorted to the use of laboratory experiments involving University students (or other participants) from different parts of the world (see for example,

\(^{31}\) I use this adjective cautiously, aware that there is a debate as to whether citizens can in fact willingly offer bribes to public officials in the absence of endemic corruption. As Seligson (2006) points out, bribe payers are often forced by circumstances (unfair and cumbersome regulations, sluggish service provision, generally dysfunctional public administration) to seek for patrons whom they can use to expedite provision of public goods and services. But it can also be argued that people can voluntary offer bribes to make public officers bend rules; e.g. bribing police officers to avoid being arrested for speeding, drug possession etc.
Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and Henrich (2017). The value of laboratory experiments lies in their ability to get “deeper insights into the motivations that underlie corrupt transactions and getting clearer guidance for reform” (Lambsdorff and Schulze 2015:106). However, the extent to which results of lab-experiments and experimental designs in general can be generalised to the real world remains a grave concern (Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and Henrich 2017). These constraints often ‘force’ those who seek to assess the effects of corruption to rely more on expert and public opinion surveys (Treisman 2000).

As Lee (2011:14) reminds us, “the great allure of polls is their ability—when properly sampled to reflect a representative cross section of the population in question—to let the few speak efficiently and accurately for the many”. Rose-Ackerman (2010:6) notes that over and above giving a more cross-nationally comparable data on levels of perceived corruption, public opinion surveys “help to capture the way corruption affects different parts of society, and … highlight the connections between corruption and government legitimacy” (Rose-Ackerman 2010:61). It is also important to point out that subjective perceptions of corruption — which are captured by public opinion surveys — might have more important consequences than actual levels of corruption. As Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) argue, people’s perceptions of corruption tend to influence their behaviour more than the objective reality does. Melgar, Rossi and Smith (2010: 121) make a point that “even when corruption perception may strongly differ from the current level of corruption, the latter influences the former”. That is, a society in which a majority of people think corruption is very high might actually end up having many individuals taking part in corruption. Lastly, surveys provide the best way to study motivations for corruption, evaluations and interpretations of corrupt practices and how citizens are likely to react to corruption (Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 2001).

The above-mentioned strengths notwithstanding, there are several limitations in the use of public opinion surveys to study corruption, including the difficulty in identifying causal effects as a result of endogeneity bias among other things (Serra and Watchenkon 2012). The next section briefly examines some of these concerns.

4.2.1. Citizens’ perceptions of corruption
Most opinion surveys ask respondents to assess the level of corruption in several public institutions. Following Mauro (1995), the term ‘corruption’ is often left undefined, allowing respondents to use a range of heuristics and unique experiences when answering the questions. The inferential logic seems to be that an “act is corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it so” (Peters and Welch 1978a: 975). Manzetti and Wilson (2006:958) contend that perception-based data about corruption reflect particular acts that “the respondent has witnessed or otherwise acquired information about and deems those acts corrupt”. While such acts vary widely across contexts, they are everywhere regarded as reprehensible. Orjuela (2014:756) proves this point when she argues that, in all societies, “corruption has a distinctly moral character – it is ‘evil’, ‘a cancer in society’”. Charron and Lapuente (2010:451) concur, adding that “most humans, irrespective of their cultural background, tend to perceive corruption as something wrong.” It is safe to conclude therefore that when citizens tell pollsters that judges or police officers are involved in corruption for instance, they have in mind reprehensible actions that these public officers might have committed.

But leaving the term ‘corruption’ indeterminate can limit the comparability of public opinion survey data across individuals and societies (Miller 2006, Leon, Arana and Leon 2013, Heywood 2015). It is possible that the heuristics that individuals use when asked to estimate the level of corruption in their countries vary too randomly as to be useful for systematic analysis. Most importantly, such heuristics may “not necessarily bear a relationship to actual corruption” (Bohn 2012:70). As Hough observes, the fact that perception-based data are strongly correlated with things like violence and human rights suggest that these questions could be “tapping into a much larger worldview” (Hough 2017:62). Olken (2009) discovered that at least in Indonesia, citizens’ perceptions of corruption contradict the objective reality and tend to vary by both individual level characteristics (e.g. gender and education) and the social structure (e.g. ethnic heterogeneity of the community). In their research on the comparability of corruption perception data, Leon, Arana and Leon (2013) found that the reason why Spain appears to be less corrupt than Chile is scale dependent. Chileans tend to adopt a stricter view of the concept of corruption while Spaniards use a lower standard for identical practices. In
other words, “the threshold levels of corruption perceptions for citizens in Chile are much higher than the threshold levels for citizens in Spain…” (Leon, Arana and Leon 2013:990).

It is also worrisome that widely publicised anti-corruption efforts can increase perceptions of corruption to a point where citizens of countries in which aggressive anti-corruption campaigns occur overestimate levels of corruption in their countries (see Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Morris and Klesner 2010; Miller 2006). The danger, as Seligson noted, is that increases in the perception of corruption due to these efforts could occur “precisely at the time when actual corruption is declining” (Seligson 2006:390). Another challenge is that perceptions can be swayed by one big (sometimes isolated) corruption scandal. The sharp increase will momentarily make an otherwise clean country appear as though it has a bigger corruption problem than countries without a recent scandal, even if corruption is more systemic in the latter. Zhang has also argued that corruption scandals are likely to aggravate corruption perceptions in western democracies where “reporting about politics tend to take on a predominantly negative slant” (Zhang 2015:5). Indeed, Faughnan and Seligson (2015: 212) worry “about over-reporting of corruption in a country in which the press is free but irresponsible”.

Another weakness is that the simple act of asking questions about corruption can significantly influence perceptions of corruption and this effect can vary widely across societies and individuals. This bias can also extend to questions regarding what citizens think ordinary people should do about corruption. As Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina (2001:22) observe, “If a person hardly thinks about corruption on a daily basis but is suddenly presented with dozens of questions on this topic, their answers may overstate the importance of corruption in their lives, or even in their dealings with officials”. In a nutshell, the main risk of relying on corruption perceptions is that they are influenced by too many contextual factors that are likely to be hard to identify and measure (Leon, Arana and Leon 2013, Miller 2006). These sources of ‘error’ can make it difficult to undertake meaningful cross-national research on the political outcomes of corruption.

The foregoing criticisms notwithstanding, Uslaner (2008:243) argues that “People’s perceptions of corruption are rarely so out of sync with ‘reality’”. Similarly, Jonathan Rose’s research has led him to “rule out the suggestion that corruption perceptions are
solely a function of ostensibly unrelated factors, such as the level of democracy, economic development or subjective well-being” (Rose 2015: 416). Rose found that subjective perceptions of corruption were consistent with objective data about the corruptibility of particular institutions and individuals. For instance, the British MPs who were implicated in the parliamentary expenses scandal in 2009 had been perceived by the public as more corrupt than the MPs who had not been mentioned (Rose 2015). Charron (2015:163) also found that at least in Europe, citizens’ perceptions of corruption were “mostly devoid of outside noise”. In particular, subjective perceptions of corruption were largely consistent with citizens’ experiences of bribery as well as expert assessments of corruption levels in particular countries. Charron’s research addresses the long-standing concern that citizens of low-corruption countries may inflate their perceptions of corruption than people from high-corruption countries where the vice is perceived as normal. His findings do not support this speculation.

However, some of his findings suggest that perceived levels of corruption could be shaped by geographical, economic and political (institutional) factors (Charron 2015). If Charron’s analysis is sound, cross-national studies that draw upon perception-based data have to adopt statistical techniques that allow researchers to explicitly model these country-level error structures. This would be a prudent approach even for studies whose primary interest lies at individual- rather than country-level. As I have intimated in the introduction to this chapter and as I shall show in section 4.4, chapter six of this dissertation adopts multilevel modelling technique as one of the best ways to handle contextual heterogeneity.

4.2.2. Individual experiences of corruption

Due partly to the limitations of perception-based data, cross-national surveys often include questions about personal experience with bribery or what Seligson (2006,) terms ‘corruption victimisation’. Usually respondents are asked about the frequency with

33 The Parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 was precipitated by media revelations of the full extent of expenses’ claims by Members of the British Parliament. The Daily Telegraph published a detailed breakdown of expenses claimed by MPs, some of which were regarded as constituting abuses of power for private gain. Some MPs were accused of, among other things, ‘exploiting’ their ‘expenses’ benefit in order to maximise claims. Speaker of Parliament resigned following criticism with the way the scandal was handled.

34 I do not necessarily agree with the labelling ‘corruption victimisation’ as it appears to suggest that all bribes involve victimisation of briber payers. It excludes instances of collusion between bribe payers and receivers or instances where
which they or a member of their household has paid a bribe over the past 12 months. Although these questions offer potentially more valid measurement of corruption compared to their perception-based counterparts, they also face several challenges of their own. First, they do not completely solve the issue of non-comparability as the definition of ‘bribe’ can vary across countries and individuals. Second, since bribery is illegal and sometimes regarded as immoral, survey questions about personal involvement in bribery can suffer from under-reporting due to the need to present oneself in a favourable light (i.e. social desirability bias).

Third, citizens from societies where gift-giving is acceptable — usually highly corrupt societies— may under-report their involvement in corruption as they would not consider the ‘gifts’ they offered voluntarily to government officials as constituting a ‘bribe’ per se (see Blundo and de Sardan 2006). If this is the case, bribery questions are likely to underestimate levels of corruption in highly corrupt societies.

However, studies conducted in highly corrupt societies find that bribery items provoke very minimal, if any, social desirability biases. For instance, Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina (2001) found that citizens of the highly corrupt post-communist societies freely share their experiences of bribery in focus group discussions. Analysing Afrobarometer survey data from more than 30 African countries, Peiffer and Rose (2015) found no evidence suggesting the risk of social desirability bias. Four out of five of the respondents who reported paying a bribe thought that bribery was wrong and punishable, contrary to the authors’ expectation that most bribers would not admit the wrongfulness of the exchange (Peiffer and Rose 2015). But, Peiffer and Rose’s results are unidimensional in that they deal with the potential for under-reporting and not why, if at all, some respondents might deliberately overstate35 their participation in bribery (see Sequeira 2012).

Another weakness of bribery survey items is that they only capture ‘street-level corruption’, which as Lambsdorff and Schulze (2015) point out, may not be as

35 Perhaps as Sequeira (2012) contends, a strategy to emphasise how widespread corruption really is and potentially influence action.
fundamentally important for country’s development as grand corruption. However, Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina (2001:12) fervently disagree with this argument, pointing out that “at systemic level, pervasive low-level corruption itself becomes a high-level problem”. Indeed, as Uslaner observes, corrupt street-level officials often get their cues from higher echelons (Uslaner 2008); they are also unlikely to change their ways when they get promoted. Students who enter Universities via bribery payments are likely “to believe that they will only be able to get ahead by making further payments” (Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 2001:13). The most important problem of bureaucratic corruption is the fact that it distorts the relationship between citizens and the state, undermining the democratic principle of fairness and equal treatment by the state.

It is useful to utilise both the perceptions-based and experience-based measures of corruption to leverage their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses (You 2015). Apart from this, they could be tapping into different dimensions of the concept of corruption. As intimated, the survey items about experiences of bribery are regarded as measures of petty corruption while subjective perceptions indicate the prevalence of grand corruption (Charron 2015). Lastly, using both measures helps us to establish whether direct objective experience of bribery and subjective perception of corruption have similar effects on propensity to be personally involved in efforts to tackle corruption. This is one of the largest gaps in anti-corruption studies focusing on Africa.

4.3. The Afrobarometer surveys

As indicated, this study draws from the publicly available data supplied by the Afrobarometer network (http://www.afrobarometer.org/). Afrobarometer is an independent and non-partisan research network that runs a comparative series of nationally representative surveys covering various social, economic and political dynamics in Africa. Since 1999, Afrobarometer has conducted six rounds of these surveys in a growing number of African countries. Each round uses identical sets of survey items, making it possible for scholars to undertake cross-national research. Afrobarometer carefully translates these standardised questionnaires into local languages and administers them in the preferred language of each respondent36. Caution is usually exercised in

36 Afrobarometer often engages services of professional linguists for these tasks
questionnaire translations to preserve the meaning of concepts while making sure that questions are comprehensible to all respondents, irrespective of their levels of education.

While Afrobarometer’s face to face interviewing method can potentially inhibit truthful answering of more sensitive questions, it helps to ensure that all respondents understand the questions as well as the ethical considerations of survey research such as anonymity, confidentiality and the respondent’s right to terminate the interview. All Afrobarometer questionnaires are piloted in various local languages and appropriately refined before the actual survey takes place. The Afrobarometer survey manual provides information about the pre-testing of questionnaires, training of data collectors and data entrants, sampling, monitoring and evaluation, ethical considerations and other issues relating to conducting surveys according to scientific and international best practices.

While I draw insights from other rounds (especially in chapter seven), this study uses rounds three and six as primary sources of data. Round three was conducted in 2005 in 18 African countries while round six took place between 2014 and 2016 in 36 countries. At the time of conducting this research, round six data were only available for 35 countries. Afrobarometer sample sizes range between 1200 and 2400 respondents per country. The main reason for using two datasets is to take advantage of their different strengths in so far as the aim of this dissertation is concerned. For example, the way in which an item measuring action against corruption was designed in round six complements the way in which it was asked in round three as I demonstrate in the next section. Respondents in round six surveys were drawn from the five major parts of the African continent as shown in the first column of Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: African regions and countries surveyed in rounds three and six

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Number of observations in round three</th>
<th>Number of observations in round six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
<td>1,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>2,397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total No. of Observations</th>
<th>Not surveyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
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<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Not surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total No. of observations</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,397</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,537</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.1. Measuring the outcome variable

As indicated above, this study’s dependent variable is measured using items drawn from rounds three and six of Afrobarometer surveys. To be sure, these items do not tell us what citizens have actually done to address corruption. Rather, they elicit opinions about the action they would take (or prefer people like them to take) against corruption. Thus, the items can be construed as measuring attitudinal ‘support for collective action against corruption’. In round three, Afrobarometer posed the following question: What, if anything, would you do to try to resolve each of the following situations: ‘you suspected a school or clinic official of stealing’. Answers were coded as follows:

- do nothing
- don’t worry, things will be resolved given enough time
- lodge a complaint through proper channels or procedures
- use connections with influential people
- offer a tip or bribe and
- join in public protest.

Few people would contest the view that the act of stealing from local schools and clinics by officials constitutes ‘corruption’, to the extent that it violates the relationship of trust between citizens as a collective principal and officers as their agent. As I noted in section 4.1.1 of this chapter, asking people about a vague phenomenon as corruption can be fraught with measurement errors as respondents are likely to invoke a wide range of practices to answer the question. These errors are significantly reduced when respondents are made to adopt a similar frame of reference that this item provides by speaking of theft by officials instead of the value-laden concept of ‘corruption’. The inclusion of ‘join protests’ in the list of responses enables us to examine who among the supposed ‘principals’ supports collective civic action against corruption.

Saying that one would ‘offer a tip or bribe’ or ‘use connections with influential people’ may seem to be a strange way to tackle corruption, until one considers with Alam (1995) that corruption is one way in which victims of corruption can deal with venal officials. Alam calls this an ‘illicit countervailing action against corruption’. To illustrate how it works, he provides an example involving a powerful factory that pays bribes so that government officials ignore the toxic chemicals it dumps into the river, thereby hurting the fisheries. Illicit countervailing action arises when the fishermen respond with bribes of their own to ‘influence’ the government to enforce the law regarding appropriate
disposal of this toxic waste (Alam 1995). Alam’s illicit countervailing action echoes the sentiments by James Scott who noted that, “those who feel that their essential interests are ignored or considered illegitimate in the formal political system will gravitate to the informal channel of influence represented by corruption” (Scott 1969: 328).

Furthermore, the option to use influential connections to address a public-goods problem (such as corruption in schools and clinics) enables us to probe the role of corruption in willingness to draw on clientelistic networks. As Chang and Kerr (2016:73) have noted, “those individuals who respond ‘use connections with influential people’ to solve problems likely belong to a patronage network and have ‘strings to pull’.” In this regard, one can think of ‘offering a tip or bribe’ and ‘using connections with influential people’ as indicating the willingness to use ‘corruption’ and/or clientelistic relations to tackle suspected acts of malfeasance. Since these options have a similar interpretation, I merge them into a single response option. The other options remain unchanged. Thus, the dependent variable “action against corruption” has five response categories with “do nothing” taking the lowest value and “join in public protests” the highest.

As indicated in section 3.1 of chapter three, while definitions of collective action emphasise spatio-temporal proximity of actors (e.g. public protests), non-simultaneous actions of single individuals carried out with an intention to promote shared interests also qualify as instances of collective action (also see Chant 2007; Simon and Klandermans 2001). As Wright (2009: 860) argues, “a group member engages in collective action any time she or he acts as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole.” This more comprehensive view of collective civic action is much more evident in the emerging anti-corruption research and practice. As Beyerle (2014: 33) has noted, “grassroots civic initiatives targeting corruption have significantly expanded the civil resistance repertoire…” She compiles a long list of collective action tactics that were employed to tackle various types of corruption in twelve countries including Uganda, Kenya and Egypt. Such tactics include among others, civil disobedience, boycotts, public protests, writing letters to newspaper editors, participating in radio call-in programmes and contributing to anti-corruption campaigns (Beyerle 2014).
Furthermore, an attempt to replace a corrupt incumbent through the ballot (i.e. protest voting) is also increasingly being considered as part of the gamut of anti-corruption collective resistance (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Yap demonstrates this understanding when she concludes that “demand for punishment occurs when citizens withdraw support from the government for failing to penalise government officers or representatives for corruption, such as through protests, demonstrations or electoral overthrow” (Yap 2013: 58-59).

In the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked what they thought was “the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to help combat corruption”. This item has two important features. First, the use of the phrase “ordinary person like you” positions respondents at the centre of the fight against corruption. Secondly, in contrast with the item used in round three which has ‘join protests’ as the only form of collective demand for accountability, this item has several response options that qualify as examples of ‘civic engagement’ against corruption. These are:

- Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight against corruption
- Join or support an organization that is fighting corruption
- Participate in protest marches or demonstrations against corruption
- Vote for clean candidates or parties or for parties that promise to fight corruption
- Speak out about corruption, for example, by calling a radio program or writing a letter
- Talk to friends and relatives about the problem

In addition to these ‘civic action strategies’, this survey item offers three more answering options. Two of these, ‘ordinary people cannot do anything’ and ‘report corruption’ were included in the item posed in round three. The other one, ‘refuse to pay bribes’ allows us to investigate the individual-level factors of the belief that citizens can, in fact, stand up to venal officials. It enables us to examine the proposition in recent studies on collective analysis of corruption that corruption makes individuals less likely to believe that refusing to pay a bribe is a viable option. That is, in other words, high levels of corruption increase the likelihood to see corruption as a solution, thereby reducing the willingness to take a stand against it. As Heywood (2017:25) observes, “this ‘problem-solving’ understanding of corruption — in which lived experience means that it may be the only means of accessing basic needs — stresses how corruption can therefore serve as a positive function for citizens (and political leaders) who need to operate and survive in the context of weak or ineffective state institutions”.
Applying the same models in both the third and sixth rounds of the surveys allows this study to validate the results; that is, check to ensure that data-specific peculiarities do not explain some of the major ‘findings’. As I explain in section 5.5 of chapter five, data from round three are likely to suffer from design effects contamination. Further to that, limiting an instance of collective action to protests seems to be extreme, if one considers with Lichbach (1998) that protests are rare events, even in democracies.\textsuperscript{38} Because of their likelihood to turn violent in places like South Africa and Kenya, some respondents may not consider protests as a legitimate form of collective action against corruption, preferring less extreme civilian resistance tactics. Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2014:344) have this in mind when they note that “an individual might be motivated to take part in one activity — for example signing a petition — but not necessarily in another, for example, taking part in street demonstration. Many people defect because the type of activity does not appeal to them”.\textsuperscript{39}

One of the main challenges of asking citizens about what they might do to tackle corruption is the potential to trigger social desirability bias. It is conceivable that the majority of the respondents in round three (approximately 70\%) only said they would lodge a complaint against corruption because it sounded like the type of thing that someone who is suspicious of malfeasance should do. Although preliminary robustness tests do not change the results (as I show in chapter five), I provide an extra layer of robustness by further looking at how corruption influences actual participation in protests and demonstrations. The survey item used for this purpose reads as follows: ‘Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year: Attended a street demonstration or protest march?’ Analysing how the same variables used to predict the likelihood of supporting anti-corruption collective action shape the likelihood of taking part in actual protests addresses the concern that attitudinal support may not fully convert into actual collective action, because intentions and actual action may be driven

\textsuperscript{38} According to Lichbach, protestors represent only 5 per cent of the population. Those who do not protest represent “at least ninety five percent of aggrieved people, at least ninety-five percent of the time, in at least ninety-five percent of places” (Lichbach 1998, 12).

\textsuperscript{39} My emphasis
by different factors (see Klandermans 2013). This protest question is also utilised (as a dependent variable) in the analysis offered in chapter seven.

4.3.2. Measuring the perceptions of ‘corruption’ and the experiences of bribery

In both rounds three and six, Afrobarometer asked respondents to assess how many of the officials in several public institutions were corrupt. The response options on a four-point Likert scale ranged from ‘none of them are involved in corruption’ to ‘all of them are involved’ (see Appendix 1). A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value greater than 0.80 in both rounds three and six, suggesting that these survey items can form a reliable measure of corruption perceptions index. Subsequently, I created with these items a composite index of popular perceptions of corruption. Personal experience with bribery is measured based on an additive index of five similarly worded questions about respondents’ payments of bribes. The questions read as follows: ‘In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to: A) Get a document or permit? B) Get a child admitted in school? C) Get medicine or medical attention? D) Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)? E) Avoid problems with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)?’

For each of the items, respondents chose one of the following options: ‘No experience with this in the past year,’ ‘Once or twice,’ ‘A few times,’ or ‘often. I conducted a maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation to allow factors to be correlated. The procedure extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value of greater than 0.70 (in both sets of data), indicating that these items can form a reliable additive index of bribery experience. The experience of paying bribes is therefore a 16-point additive scale of five items about the frequency of bribe payment. Higher values on the scale indicate a higher frequency of bribery payment while lower values indicate the opposite.

4.3.3. Generalised interpersonal trust and other individual-level control variables

The ideas around generalised interpersonal trust and efficacy are central to the collective action analysis of anti-corruption and feature prominently in social movement studies. The pessimistic view towards anti-corruption civic engagement outlined in chapter two
describes how endemic corruption erodes both generalised interpersonal trust and various forms of efficacy (i.e. internal, external and collective efficacy). Afrobarometer data allows us to explore how corruption influences the impact of generalised social trust and efficacy on support for anti-corruption civic engagement.

In the third round of surveys, Afrobarometer used the following standard trust question to measure generalised interpersonal trust: ‘Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you should be careful in dealing with people?’ In quantitative studies of social capital, those who agree that most people can be trusted are regarded as ‘generalised trusters’. Popular though this question is, a large body of literature has raised serious concerns about its apparently poor validity and reliability as a measure of generalised interpersonal trust (see Beugelsdijk 2008, Sturgis and Smith, 2010, Uslaner 2012). As Nannestad observes, “for good reasons, probably nobody trusts anybody with respect to everything. Trust can be argued to be issue or domain-specific: I may trust you to handle my economic affairs but not my children, or vice versa. The generalised trust question as it is normally posed ignores this aspect…” (Nannestad 2008:417). Taking this weakness into account, the sixth round of Afrobarometer asked a question that is more specific to corruption; ‘please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption?’ [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion.]. For reasons I shall explain in chapter six, I consider this question as a measure of both generalised interpersonal trust and perceived collective efficacy to fight corruption.

Other individual-level control variables, including measures of poverty, relative living conditions, institutional trust and membership in voluntary associations are discussed in specific chapters. Generally, the models presented in each of the three empirical chapters (i.e. chapters five, six and seven) were adjusted for the effects of the variables that are likely to have a direct effect on support for collective action or moderate the effects of the key predictor variables of corruption perceptions and experiences. The discussions

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40 Originally devised by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman in 1948, and first used in a paper in the American Sociological Review (Rosenberg, 1956), this question is widely used as a measure of generalised interpersonal trust. Because of this wide usage, it is often referred to as the ‘standard trust question’ (see Uslaner 2002, Zmerli and Newton 2008, Beugelsdijk 2008).
presented in chapter two and three have been used as a basis for selecting these control variables.

4.4. Modeling the effect of national context

The Afrobarometer data have an explicit multilevel structure. The multistage sampling technique that Afrobarometer employs selects individuals that are nested within households, which are nested within enumeration areas (EA), which are nested within districts and/or regions and finally, within countries. Obviously, the political attitudes of the individuals within the same ‘nest’ (e.g. country) are more similar than attitudes of individuals from a different nest. The largest and most theoretically informative differences are likely to be between countries. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the way Africa has been portrayed by the qualitatively oriented studies (as explained in section 3.6 of chapter three), the nascent public opinion research finds large cross-national variability in political attitudes and behaviours in Africa. As Mattes and Bratton (2007) observed, such cross-national differences are much wider than the differences between Western European countries, which comparative political scientists frequently analyse using multilevel techniques (see Stockemer and Sundström 2013, Dahlberg and Solevid 2016, Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Curiously, there is also regional variation in citizens’ demand for democracy within the African continent. For instance, Bratton and Houessou (2014:13) found, that demand for democracy is greatest in West Africa, where “regimes are particularly susceptible to mass mobilisation from below.”

These findings suggest that research on Africa must take contextual heterogeneity much more seriously. One way to address the impact of contextual heterogeneity is to focus on a single country. This holds country-level factors constant and allows the analysis to focus on differences between individuals. Another one is to consider contextual variation as a nuisance and employ statistical techniques that adjust for its effect on the outcome variable. This technique is referred to as a fixed-effects (or dummy variable) modeling. The regression models presented in chapter five utilise this technique since the limited number of higher level units (18 countries) that come with round three data set prohibits
the use of multilevel analysis. Several simulation studies agree with Kreft’s (1996) finding that at least 50 groups are likely to yield reliable multilevel regression results, and that 30 groups should be considered as a minimum (see Hox 2010, Bryan and Jenkins 2015). Another reason for using the fixed effects approach in chapter five is based on the estimation challenges that go with multinomial multilevel regression modelling required by the discrete choice data. This is explained in more detail in chapter six.

One problem with fixed effects statistical technique is that the results are only applicable to the countries in the sample (i.e. the 18 countries represented in round three data set) (see Jones and Steenbergen 2002). On the contrary, the results of the multilevel models can be applied to the rest of the African continent since the models assume that the units of observations (e.g. countries) were drawn from a random population of African countries. Using multilevel techniques, we are able to quantify the variability between countries in support for collective civic action against corruption. Apart from that, by allowing the effect of key individual-level predictors (e.g. perceptions of corruption) to be different for each of the countries in the data, multilevel estimation enables us to explore how national context shapes the relationship between corruption at individual-level and citizens’ support for collective civic engagement against corruption. Finally, multilevel analysis enables us to show how, and for which type of people these contextual effects matter. Another advantage is that several different country-level variables can be included simultaneously with individual-level variables — something that cannot be achieved with fixed effects estimation (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). Multilevel analysis is also quite informative even when we do not include higher-level variables. This is because the ‘random effects’ themselves can be conceived as latent variables, capturing the underlying, unobserved or unmeasured processes influencing the dependent variable of interest.

There are many country-level variables likely to moderate the relationship between exposure to corruption and potential reactions to corruption. Based on the literature assessment in chapters two and three, I have narrowed these down to the following: the general corruption context, the strength of civil society, country-level poverty, state-level

As Hox (2010:233) observes “the maximum likelihood estimation methods used commonly in multilevel analysis are asymptomatic, which translates to the assumption that the sample size is large”.

41
clientelism, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, media freedom/repression, democracy/political competition and per capita GDP. Besides the fact that these variables are very strongly correlated\textsuperscript{42}, the limited number of countries (35 in total) prohibits adding more than a handful of context-level variables in each multilevel regression model. As a result, I limit myself to the first five country-level variables. In the following sections, I briefly outline how each of these variables has been operationalised and the corresponding sources of data.

\textbf{4.4.1. Control of corruption indicator}

As part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the control of corruption indicator (CCI) “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010:4). For large N studies, the CCI is regarded as the most comprehensive perceptions-based measure of corruption, being superior to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in terms of variety of sources and scope of indicators (Hough 2017, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010). The CCI’s data sources are more heterogenous than it is often the case with other global measures of corruption such as Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In addition to sourcing information from a wide range of national and international experts, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) make use of public opinion data from the likes of Afrobarometer, Latinobarometro and AsiaBarometer. A country’s CCI score is reported in terms of standard normal unit, and falls within -2.5 to 2.5, or in percentile rank ranging from 0 to 100. As it is the case with standardised measures, zero represents the average. Numbers below zero represent poor control of corruption while those above zero represent stronger corruption control (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).

A context-level measure of corruption such as the CCI allows us to investigate the idea that differences in willingness to oppose corruption is a structural problem, not an individual one. From the discussion in chapter two, one expects individuals from

\textsuperscript{42} The correlation between the natural log of per capita GDP and internet penetration is $r=0.85$ for instance. The media repression variable is also strongly correlated with the strength of civil society variable ($r=0.88$) (both from the V-DEM dataset). Mean poverty rate and log of GDP are strongly correlated as well ($r=-0.81$).
countries with high scores on CCI to be less willing to challenge corruption than those residing in countries with low scores on CCI. Importantly, in line with collective action analysis of corruption, one expects an increase in perceptions and experiences of corruption to have a stronger corrosive effect on support for collective action at low values of the CCI (i.e. in highly corrupt societies).

4.4.2. Clientelism at state level and civil society robustness

Over the years, quantitative research has struggled to capture systematically the slippery concept of clientelism (see Muno 2013). The Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project has, however, made a commendable effort to gauge state-level clientelism, defining it as the extent to which public resources are used for the benefit of “a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents” (Coppedge et al 2016:195). Values in this variable range from zero (where all the public spending is used for the benefit of certain subnational groupings to the exclusion of others), to four (where all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character) (Coppedge et al 2016). This variable enables us to examine whether an individual who lives in a country where most public goods and services are distributed via clientelistic affiliations will be less willing to get involved in citizens’ efforts to demand accountability, even if she thinks that corruption is widespread. Or alternatively, as proposed in chapter three, whether an increase in state-level clientelism increases the positive effect of the perceptions of corruption on support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics (see pages 55 and 56).

The V-DEM’s ‘core civil society index’ (CCSI) provides a very useful measure of the strength of civil society. V-DEM defines strength of civil society (or civil society robustness) as the extent to which civil society organisations enjoy “autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived” (Coppedge et al 2016:57). The measure is made up of items asking about the extent to which (a) CSOs are free to enter and exit the political arena or public life (i.e. the extent to which the government monopolises CSOs), (b) citizens are free to join any CSO of their choice and (c) government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. Further details of this measure are provided

43 Consider for instance that Phillip Keefer (2005, 2007) uses seven indicators to measure clientelism.
in Appendix 1. This measure allows us to investigate the proposition that the assurance rooted in strong associational density underpins differences in willingness to challenge corruption through collective civic action (see page 48).

For ease of interpretation, I reversed the scale of the measure of clientelism so that higher scores represent more clientelism. Similarly, the scale of CCI has been reversed such that the numbers below zero represent stronger control of corruption (i.e. less corruption) while those above zero represent weaker corruption control (i.e. more corruption). I utilised the 2014-2015 versions of both WGI and V-DEM data sets to coincide with the period within which the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted. For countries for which V-DEM did not provide the 2014-2015 update, I used the 2012 estimates. These were the most recent estimates for the countries in which the 2014-2015 versions were incomplete.44

4.4.3. Ethno-linguistic diversity

One of the most controversial topics in cross-national research is the measure of ethnic diversity (see Posner 2004, Fearon 2003). Posner (2004) compiles a list of seven measures of ethnic diversity currently being used in comparative cross-national studies. These include ethnic fractionalisation index calculated by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), Fearon’s (2003) fractionalisation index and Africa-specific fractionalisation index developed by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999). Posner then identifies how these measures, in particular the widely used Alesina et al’s measure, misrepresent the nature and consequences of ethnicity in Africa. As Posner argues, this measure does not take into account the fact that some ethno-linguistic groups are more politically relevant than others. Furthermore, in some highly fractionalised African countries (e.g. Burkina Faso), none of the ethnic groups is politically salient (i.e. ethnic groups are not being mobilised for political advantage). Posner offers an improved measure of ethnic fractionalisation in Africa based on the number of ethnic groups that are politically relevant.

44 There are less than five countries for which this is the case.
Persuasive though Posner’s argument is, his measure only covers 42 African countries. It has no information on six of the 35 countries represented in Afrobarometer data (Cape Verde, Sao-Tome, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The same lack of information on some African countries confronts Scarritt and Mozaffar’s (1999) Africa-sensitive measure of ethnic diversity. Because of the negative impact on reliability that loss of data at country-level can have on the results of multilevel regressions, the analysis in chapter six draws upon the widely used Alesina et al.’s data on ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. This measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the overall population belong to different ethnic groups. More diverse countries have a higher probability score (thus, a higher ELF score) while less diverse countries get a lower a score.

4.4.4. Country-level poverty rate

4.5. Conclusions and further comments on Afrobarometer data

The chapter has justified the use of public opinion data to explore the relationship between corruption and collective action against it. It has also raised potential weaknesses of the survey methodology in investigating anti-corruption and proffered various ways to mitigate their negative effects on the quality of the results. Of particular concern is the fact that the study measures the attitudes towards collective action against corruption rather than actual involvement in anti-corruption efforts. There is simply no publicly available cross-national data on how citizens actually behave when they suspect corruption. This study can therefore be described as the systematic exploration of what Klandermans (2015) terms ‘mobilisation potential’. He makes a sharp distinction between mobilisation potential and action mobilisation (or manifest participation). The former refers to a mental disposition, the propensity to take part in collective civic action while the latter is “the transformation of that potential into action” (Klandermans 2015:11).

The chapter has also raised a number of concerns about data reliability. The first one entails the potential for social desirability bias when respondents answer the questions about their involvement in bribery and what they think people should do to help curb corruption. Nevertheless, recent findings that Afrobarometer bribery data are not at risk of such social desirability biases are reassuring (see Peiffer and Rose 2013). A further concern entails whether the meaning of ‘bribe’ is consistent across countries and
individuals. The Afrobarometer minimised this risk by specifying that a ‘bribe’ refers to a gift or favour provided in exchange for public service or to address a problem with the police.

Other potential drawbacks include the fact that the third round of the surveys was conducted in societies that were, politically-speaking, relatively open. This limits the analysis to largely democratic countries. The sixth round addressed this challenge by including several countries that are widely viewed as autocracies (e.g. Swaziland and Sudan) or flawed democracies (e.g. Morocco, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Egypt). Nevertheless, this representativeness may have come at the price of data reliability. It is possible that a climate of fear and suspicion, which characterises some authoritarian societies undermines people’s willingness to freely express their views about governance and politics (see Moore 2005). Afrobarometer’s implementing organisation (i.e. the local partner) for Morocco has, for instance, cited the “fear of participating in surveys and expressing opinions about politics” as one of the main reasons for a relatively high refusal rate of 38 per cent in round six. Fortunately, at the end of each interview, Afrobarometer requires the interviewer to assess the extent to which the respondent looked uneasy, suspicious, unfriendly and dishonest. I use these items in various robustness checks of the models estimated in this dissertation.

Indeed, as Bratton (2005) has noted in response to a published critique of the analysis based on Afrobarometer data on Zimbabwe (Moore 2005), using interviewers’ assessment of each respondent is the best way to gauge the extent to which political fear influences public opinion in Africa. Bratton (2005) uses these data to show that fear and suspicion did not influence results obtained in Zimbabwe. In fact, those Zimbabweans “who said that open expression was unsafe were twice as likely to criticise the incumbent president…” (Bratton 2005:121). Furthermore, despite the repressions that regime critics were often subjected to, almost half of the respondents (44%) said they did not trust the ruling party, while a further 41% said they did not trust President Robert Mugabe. Bratton (2005:122) concludes that the safeguards that Afrobarometer provides, including “seeking respondents’ informed consent, allowing them to refuse to respond to particular

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46 This is according to the codebook of round six survey data for Morocco. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/data/round-6/mor_r6_codebook.pdf accessed 20 August 2017
items or the whole survey, guaranteeing both anonymity and confidentiality and stressing the non-partisan identity of the survey organisation” go a long way towards putting apprehensive respondents at ease.

The second weakness is that the number of corruption perception items has not been consistent across countries and rounds. For example, questions about perceived corruption among religious leaders and business people, which were included in round three were not asked in round six. In their place, Afrobarometer asked respondents to assess levels of corruption in education and healthcare facilities. Similarly, there are more questions on trust in institutions in round three than in round six. This implies that the additive indexes (e.g. corruption perception index, institutional trust index etc.) may contain slightly different items for each of the two data sets. Notwithstanding that equal and similar questions would have been desirable, one might argue that the additive scales formed out of unequal number of questions do not seriously undermine the overall substantive conclusions of this study to the extent that each corresponds to the concept being measured.

Lastly, the infrastructural and topographical challenges of many African countries can compromise the quality of data. Poor road networks make it extremely difficult to reach all areas and the individuals selected. As Mattes (2008:116) has noted, “in mountainous Lesotho, for example, Afrobarometer researchers ride on horseback to conduct interviews in selected villages”. Lack of capacity of national statistics offices means that the sampling frame that Afrobarometer relies on may be outdated (see Mattes 2008). Fortunately, the sampling frames used in both rounds three and six were fairly recent (less than 10 years old in 70 per cent of the countries included in both samples). For instance, in Morocco, the sampling frame for round six was based on the 2014 national census data. The most recent census data for Niger was compiled in 2012 while Guinea and Benin’s census datafiles were updated in 2013. The oldest sampling frames were for Malawi, Sudan and Burundi, which were based on the 2008 census information.
Chapter five

Corruption and support for anti-corruption protests

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses exclusively on the effect of subjective perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery on the propensity to engage in collective civic action against corruption. The main analysis juxtaposes the preference for the use of protests as a way of dealing with suspected acts of corruption with the preferences for other methods. This analysis relies on round three of the Afrobarometer surveys (18 countries) as a primary source of data. I use pooled data from round six (35 countries) to validate the model developed and tested using round three data set. As I have noted in section 4.3.1 of chapter four, these data do not address actual participation in protests and demonstrations targeting corruption. As some scholars have argued, there could be a disjuncture between reported willingness to engage in civic action and taking part in it (see Norris et al 2006, van Zomeren et al 2012). This necessitates the comparison of the results regarding support for protests with the results on actual participation in protests and demonstrations. Indeed, according to Finkel and Muller (1998), utilising data on willingness or intentions to take part in protests with data on past protest behaviour can yield much more useful findings. Although the Afrobarometer did not ask about the main subject of the protest events that respondents attended, analysing the impact of corruption on the likelihood to have attended offers a layer of robustness for the results of the main analysis.

To anticipate the findings, the notion that an increase in experience of paying bribes acts as a mobilising grievance received strong empirical backing. Bribery experience increases the support for anti-corruption protests as well as other citizens-centred anti-corruption tactics, including ‘voting for anti-corruption champions’ and being personally involved in raising awareness about corruption. Finally, regular bribers are significantly more likely to have taken part in public protests and demonstrations in the year prior to the survey. Regarding the effect of the perceived levels of corruption, the results suggest an inconsistent relationship. An increase in perceptions of corruption increases the relative probability to say that citizens should not worry as corruption issues will be
resolved without their involvement. It has no effect on support for anti-corruption protests. However, in the analysis of round six data, the variable emerges as a strong predictor of the propensity to say that nothing can be done about corruption and that citizens should engage in protests and demonstrations as a way to tackle corruption.

### 5.2. Control variables

As intimated, the analysis examines the relationship between individual level measures of corruption on support for protest action against corruption. The operationalisation of these two predictors and the response variable has been discussed extensively in chapter four. Before reporting the results, it is important to provide a brief account of the variables that are likely to confound the estimated relationships. The model adjusts for the effects of the individual-level variables posited in the literature as the main antecedents of civic engagement, particularly protests. At the individual level, these can be grouped into grievances, resources and values (see Dalton et al 2007, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans. 2013, Klandermans and van der Toorn 2010). To account for the effect of socio-economic grievances, I include three variables that cover much of the spectrum of the economic deprivation concept: experiential poverty, personal living condition and relative living conditions. Experiential poverty is measured based on Afrobarometer’s lived poverty index (LPI) as described in chapter four. The personal living conditions is measured based on the item asking respondents to assess their present economic condition. Lastly, I consider respondents’ evaluation of their personal living conditions relative to other citizens as a measure of relative deprivation. It is important to note that the correlations between the variables are not strong enough to introduce collinearity problems in the regression models ($r > 0.30$ in both rounds three and six surveys).

I use the index of institutional trust as a proxy for political grievances (see Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, Braun and Huttler 2016). This is made up of items asking how much trust a respondent has in the president/prime minister, parliament, the police, the army and the courts of law. Apart from acting as a control variable, the institutional trust variable enables us to explore the idea that corruption (especially bribery) erodes political legitimacy, increasing support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics (see page 51). The individual resources likely to influence support for anti-corruption protests are formal education attainment, membership in voluntary associations, generalised trust, a sense of
self-efficacy (i.e. internal efficacy) and interest in politics (Oberschall 1994, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013, Benson and Rochon 2004, Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Lastly, in terms of the impact of ‘values’ and ‘norms’, the model is adjusted for tolerance for corruption. This is measured based on three questions about the extent to which citizens think incidents such as political patronage, nepotism and bribery are ‘not wrong at all’, ‘wrong but understandable’ or ‘wrong and punishable’.

In addition to these variables, the model includes the usual demographic variables of age, gender and urban-rural status. Table A3 (in appendix 1) provide the exact wording of the items used to measure these variables and the Cronbach alpha values of the composite measures.

5.3. Descriptive analysis

When asked how they would react to suspected acts of corruption in schools and clinics, more than two-thirds of the 25,391 respondents said they would report these to the authorities. I label this group of respondents as the reporters. About 18 per cent of the respondents felt that there was nothing a citizen could do about suspected acts of corruption (hereafter, the acquiescents). Seven per cent said they would use their connections with influential people or offer tips and bribes (hereafter, the bribers); four per cent said they would not worry about the problem as it would eventually get resolved given enough time (hereafter, the carefrees). A small minority (2%) said they would resort to protests and demonstrations (hereafter, the protesters). Figure 5.1 presents the average experience of bribery and average perception of corruption for each of these groups of respondents. The protesters’ group has the highest average score on both corruption perceptions and bribery experience variables. The bribers’ group registers the second highest score on both corruption variables. The carefrees, acquiescents and reporters’ have roughly equal average bribery experience and average perceptions of corruption.
Within individual countries, the relationship between the two corruption variables and preferred action against corruption does not mirror the pattern presented in Figure 5.1. In Senegal and Zambia for instance, the average bribery experience for those who prefer to acquiesce is much higher than the average for those who prefer to engage in protests. In sharp contrast, in South Africa and Nigeria, protesters have an average bribery experience that is more than four times the average experience of acquiescents or reporters. In Ghana, Kenya and Benin, the average bribery experience of protesters is roughly equivalent to the average bribery experience of the acquiescing group. These differences may indicate an influence of country-level conditions on the relationship between corruption and preferred action against it. The extent to which such differences are statistically significant will be explored in chapter six. In the interim, the estimated regression models will include countries as dummy variables (also known as fixed effects modelling) to adjust for the potential biasing effect of all observed and unobserved country-level processes. Further to that, I add the Afrobarometer’s ‘combined weighting factor’ which corrects for over/under sampling within countries and equalizes the samples across countries.

5.4. The multinomial logistic regression model of preferred action against corruption
Since the main response variable is a discrete choice set (i.e. unordered categorical variable), the analysis employs a multinomial logistic regression model and reports the relative probability of preferring a particular action against corruption. Towards the end of this section, two alternative estimations are employed as robustness checks. Since the objective of this chapter is to assess how preference for anti-corruption protests respond to changes in corruption, it would be more meaningful to contrast the preference for other actions with the preference for protests. However, given that two thirds of the Afrobarometer respondents would rather report suspected acts of corruption, using reporters as a reference category is more efficient from the statistical perspective.47 This notwithstanding, I re-estimated the MNL model using different reference categories to ascertain whether results are sensitive to changes in the base outcome.

The MNL model indicates that the perception of corruption has a statistically significant overall effect on preferred action against corruption allegations ($X^2= 136, \text{df } =4, p<0.001$). A unit increase in perceptions of corruption initially increases the preference for using bribery and influential connections and being carefree rather than reporting. It reduces by more than 20% the relative risk of preferring to acquiesce rather than report corruption. It has practically no effect on preference for protest action. However, when the highly significant bribery experience variable is added, the coefficient of corruption perceptions becomes non-significant except for the ‘acquiescents vs. reporters’ contrast, and this remains the case even as more control variables are added into the model. The interaction between the two corruption variables is not significant and was excluded in the results reported in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acquiescents</th>
<th>Carefrees</th>
<th>Bribers</th>
<th>Protesters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.385***</td>
<td>0.454***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions</td>
<td>-0.137***</td>
<td>0.149*</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational membership</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.123***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Indeed, the rule of thumb in multinomial logistic regression is that the reference category should be the response category with the highest frequency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate 1</th>
<th>Estimate 2</th>
<th>Estimate 3</th>
<th>Estimate 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tolerance for corruption</td>
<td>-0.291***</td>
<td>-0.724***</td>
<td>-0.449***</td>
<td>-0.215**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons living conditions</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative living conditions</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>-0.225***</td>
<td>-0.228***</td>
<td>-0.165***</td>
<td>-0.203**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.259***</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised trust</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.401***</td>
<td>0.324***</td>
<td>0.374**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-0.129***</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.205***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>0.044*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.108*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.874</td>
<td>-2.054</td>
<td>-1.640</td>
<td>-2.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Reference category is ‘report corruption’
* = significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Note: country fixed effects included in regression but omitted from the table

Before paying more attention to the impact of bribery experience, it is important to describe the effects of control variables, most of which, as we shall see are interesting in their own right. The demographic variables of age and gender have a statistically significant overall effect on preferred action against corruption. However, only the effects of age are significant for the contrast between protesters and reporters. The urban-rural status has no effect on the model ($X^2$ = 2.29, df = 4, p = 0.6831) and has been excluded from the results shown in Table 5.1. Formal education attainment has a strong overall effect on preferred action against corruption. Further to that, an increase in education increases the odds of preferring to report relative to any other option. However, the effect is not significant for the protest-reporting contrast.

The internal resources variable of political interest increases the relative probability of preferring to join anti-corruption protests. Importantly, adding this variable into the model reduces the impact of bribery experience on preference for protest but appears to have no effect on other contrasts. Those who feel that most people can be trusted are more likely to prefer to protest rather than report allegations of corruption. This effect is highly robust
to changes in the reference outcome. The strong positive effect of generalised social trust suggests, as expected, that social capital acts as an incentive for working with others to find solutions to the problem of corruption.

Although tolerance for corruption has a strong overall effect on reactions to allegations of corruption ($X^2 = 111.02$, df. =4, $p<0.001$), it has no significant effect on the preference for protest relative to reporting. Instead, admitting that corruption is acceptable or understandable has a strong positive effect on the relative probability of preferring to use a bribe or influential connections as a countervailing measure against corruption. Furthermore, those who are most tolerant of corruption are also significantly more likely to say that nothing can be done about suspected acts of corruption or that they wouldn’t worry as corruption can be solved without their involvement. It seems therefore that those who are most tolerant of corruption are unlikely to support collective anti-corruption efforts. Instead, they are more likely to draw upon clientelistic networks or offer bribes when they require a solution to public goods problems.

Net of the effects of the other variables, an increasingly negative evaluation of one’s living condition relative to that of fellow citizens’ increases the likelihood of preferring to protest rather than report allegations of corruption ($z = 2.87$). Nevertheless, subjective evaluations of personal living condition and experiential poverty (i.e. LPI) have non-significant but positive effects. The proxy for political grievances, institutional trust, has a significant overall effect on action against corruption. Moreover, institutional trust significantly increases the likelihood of preferring to report rather than join protests or use clientelistic networks. Most importantly, a unit increase in institutional trust reduces the probability of saying that nothing can be done about corruption. The overall message is that people who prefer to report corruption have higher confidence in state institutions than those who prefer other ways of dealing with corruption. The negative effect of institutional trust on the relative willingness to join protests supports the well-established idea in the literature that those who have lost confidence in state institutions and the rule of law are likely to be attracted to contentious politics to express their dissatisfaction (Booth and Seligson 2009, Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, Klandermans, Roefs and Oliver 1998).
The results reported so far do not change when the institutional trust variable is replaced with subjective evaluations of government effectiveness. The important finding here is that the perception that the government is effective in handling various problems, including among others, corruption, unemployment, crime, inequality and HIV/AIDS, also increases the likelihood of preferring to report corruption. When institutional trust and perceived effectiveness of the government are both entered into the model, they keep their negative signs but lose significance in the protest-report and bribery-report contrasts.

Following Bauhr (2016) and Peiffer and Alvarez (2015), I used the item about the effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption instead of the additive indexes of institutional trust and government effectiveness. The results are not affected; those who think the government is effectively handling corruption are more likely to report than take any of the other actions.

Overall, the consistently negative effect of institutional trust on the relative probability of joining protests contradicts the findings of Peiffer and Alvarez (2015) who noted that confidence in the anti-corruption efforts of the government increased the willingness to use civic action to challenge corruption in non-OECD settings, which included African countries. The results are more in line with what they found when they analysed their OECD sample. In that sample, perceived effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption reduced the overall willingness to get personally involved in civic action against corruption. In particular, it reduced the willingness to join protests and demonstrations.

Having discussed the influence of control variables, the rest of this chapter offers a more in-depth analysis of the effect of personal experience of bribery. Holding all variables at their mean values, a positive change from having an average experience with bribery increases the probability of preferring to join protests by 0.011 (p< 0.01). The same change increases the probability of preferring to draw on influential connections by almost twice the amount (0.026, p<0.001). The fact that the average marginal effect of the experience of bribery on the preference for the use of bribes and influential connections is higher than that of the preference for protest should not come as a surprise. Indeed, one would expect the regular paying of bribes to reinforce the perception that individual solutions actually work (see Seligson 2006:401). The important practical implication of this finding is that regular bribers are increasingly likely to choose to pay
a bribe or approach influential people (e.g. local political leaders, business-people, traditional authorities, religious leaders, etc.) when they face problems in their communities and personal lives. This is likely to perpetuate corruption.

To capture the differential effects of the increase in the frequency of bribery, I plot predicted probabilities of each of the five reactions to allegations of corruption at specific values of the bribery index (see Figure 5.2). When no bribe has been paid in the past year (i.e. point zero on the graph), the probability of being willing to join protests is almost zero. In sharp contrast, the probability of preferring to report or acquiesce is highest for an individual with no bribery experience. The predicted probability of reporting or acquiescing declines steadily as the experience of bribery accumulates. It would seem therefore that the majority of those who prefer to report or say that nothing can be done did not have much, if any direct experience with bribery, and that having this experience would increase their likelihood of choosing to either join protests or pay bribes as a response to corruption allegations.

*Figure 5.2: Probability of different actions against corruption at different values of the frequency of bribe payment*
Indeed, a respondent who has the highest experience of paying bribes is predicted to have a 40 per cent probability of preferring anti-corruption protests. On the other hand, the same individual has less than 5 per cent chance of preferring to report or say that nothing can be done about corruption. Although these results are instructive, a caveat is in order; the predicted estimates for the protest category are less reliable at higher values of bribery payment due to insufficient data. Overall, the analysis indicates that bribery increases the individual preference for using protests and influential connections (and bribery) to address corruption allegations while, at the same time, reducing the preference for other ways of addressing corruption. It is important to note that the relative probability of preferring to use every other action besides protesting declines at some point in the progression of bribery experience. The diminishing probabilities of preferring other forms of action against corruption indicate that protest is likely to be the most preferred reaction against corruption allegations for citizens with very high experience of corruption.

In summary, the results show that individuals who are increasingly being exposed to bribery are less likely to report corruption allegations or say that nothing can be done about it. When such individuals suspect that corruption is taking place, they are more likely to initiate a protest or use their patron-client relations to address the problem. In general, therefore, bribers are significantly more likely to resort to extra-institutional methods to address public goods’ problems. Importantly, the effect of bribery experience as a grievance seems to be independent of other socio-economic and political grievances, personal values and resource mobilisation variables. That is, the experience of bribery increases the potential for anti-corruption collective action in spite of the impact of other predictors of civic engagement.

5.5. Robustness checks

Multinomial logistic models (MNL) impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This implies in the context of this study that preference for a particular action is assumed to be independent of the preference for each of the four other types of actions against corruption. The results of the ‘suest-based’ Hausman test indicate that the MNL model presented in the foregoing section violates the IIA assumption in two of the five tests. Nevertheless, according to Cheng and Long (2007), tests of IIA are not always accurate or even useful. Freese and Long (2014) discourage their use altogether. This
notwithstanding, and because violations of the IIA assumption may lead to incorrect estimates, I employ the generalized ordered logit (gologit) estimation as the first robustness check of the MNL results. This is a robust yet computationally less intensive method of modelling unordered categorical data (William 2016). The results of the gologit model are highly consistent with those yielded by the MNL, and indicate that in general, the odds of preferring higher categories of action against corruption (with protest being the highest category) increase as the experience of bribery accumulates (see Table 5.1A in Appendix 2).

Another strategy involves creating a dichotomous variable out of the five-category ‘action against corruption’ item. To this end, I group all the four non-collective action categories into a single category and label it zero while the option for joining protests is labelled one. Due to the very low percentage of the respondents who preferred to engage in protests (2% of the sample), using the familiar binary logit regression may yield unreliable parameter estimates (see Allison 2012). This calls for a technique that accounts for the rarity of the event being modelled. Thus, I employ the complementary log-log regression as it is more suitable for modelling this type of data. The results shown in Table 2 are identical to those yielded by the MNL and gologit models.

Table 5.2: Complimentary log-log regression model predicting preference for anti-corruption protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>P&gt;z</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.112 0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>-0.207 0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational membership</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.01 0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>-0.127 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for corruption</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>-0.242 0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons living conditions</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>-0.18 0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative living condition</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.055 0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-0.251 0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>-0.026 0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-2.93</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.025 -0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>-0.168 0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised trust</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.015 0.529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An increase in the frequency of paying bribes has a very strong positive effect on the log-odds of preferring to engage in protests, while the coefficient of popular perceptions of corruption remains non-significant. As a further robustness check, I have also employed the computationally intensive `firthlogit` transformation. By penalising the likelihood function, `firthlogit` tends to yield less biased regression estimates, and it is sometimes seen as the most stable estimation for extremely skewed binary outcomes. While the results are substantively similar to those yielded by complimentary log-log model, the parameter estimates of the experience of bribery are larger (see Table 5.2A in appendix 2). These minor differences notwithstanding, the three models communicate a coherent message: an increasing frequency of paying bribes increases the preference for anti-corruption protests.

As intimated in chapter four, one of the main challenges of asking citizens about their potential reaction to corruption is that they can offer answers that conform to social expectations. In this context, it is possible that a majority of the 69 per cent of those who said they would lodge a complaint misrepresented their attitudes by giving a response that sounded like the type of thing ‘good citizens’ should say when suspecting corruption. This social desirability bias can get worse if the same people also underreported their involvement in bribery. There is no easy way to address this concern in a study that uses secondary data. However, because literature shows that social desirability is stronger among educated respondents (see Tourangeau and Yan 2007, Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001), I repeated all the analyses on a sample that excluded respondents who have at least some college education. These procedures did not alter the effect of bribery on action against corruption, particularly preference for anti-corruption protests.48

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48 Using round three data, Justesen and Bjørnkorv (2015) observed that excluding respondents with secondary and/or tertiary education does not alter the parameter estimates of effect of self-reported poverty on bribery.
It is also possible that despite assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, some of the respondents who thought their government had sponsored the survey (48 per cent of the sample) did not give an honest opinion about what they would do if they suspected that corruption was taking place in schools and clinics. Furthermore, some of these individuals may not have been honest about taking part in bribery as this is a criminal offence in all the eighteen countries in the sample. Estimating the models on a sub-sample that excludes respondents who thought their government was the main sponsor of the survey does not significantly change the parameter estimates of the experience of bribery, even though it changes their standard errors due to the reduction in sample size. Additionally, simply adding this variable as a control instead of using it as a filter does not change the results.

Apart from social desirability, the data might suffer from what is known as a response set bias. This is because the survey item about reactions to corruption was asked as part of a set of five similarly worded questions regarding citizens’ reactions to a range of institutional dysfunctions (e.g. encountering delays in the processing of one’s passport of permit, being wrongfully arrested etc.). For various reasons, some of the respondents might have given the same answers for each of the five questions. However, frequency distributions of the responses to each of the five questions are quite different. For example, the proportion of respondents preferring to report corruption ranges from 50 per cent if they ‘waited for a permit but kept encountering delays’ to 80 per cent if someone tried to ‘seize their family’s land’. Nevertheless, the most effective way to rule out the possibility of response set bias is to utilise a question that was not asked as part of a ‘set’. The sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys provides such an item. I use this item as a response outcome in a regression model whose results I use to ‘validate’ the effect of bribery on support for anti-corruption protests. This is one of the toughest robustness checks because the round six data set contains more than three times the number of observations used to establish the consistently positive effect of the experience of bribery.

5.5.1. Support for other forms of civic action against corruption

As indicated in chapter four, round six surveys asked what respondents thought was the most effective thing that ‘ordinary people like you can do to help combat corruption’. Most of the respondents mentioned reporting the corrupt practices (29%) or refusing to pay bribes (25%). One in four respondents felt that there was nothing civilians could do
to challenge corruption. Voting for clean candidates was mentioned by seven per cent of the respondents while speaking out (e.g. by calling a radio programme or writing a letter to the newspaper) was approved by 5 per cent of the respondents. Another 5 per cent felt that joining or supporting organisations that are fighting corruption could be the most effective thing to do. The least popular strategies were joining public protests (2%) and signing a petition calling for tougher sanctions against corruption (1.52%). Figure 5.3 illustrates these frequency distributions.

Figure 5.3: What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to help combat corruption in this country?

Since estimating and interpreting the results of a multinomial logistic regression model with a nine-category outcome is cumbersome, and likely to consume too many degrees of freedom, I merge the options ‘speak about the problem’ with ‘talk to friends’ and label the resulting response category as ‘raise awareness’.49 I also merge ‘sign petitions’ with ‘support anti-corruption organisations’ into a single category. This leads to a new seven-category variable in which about 6 per cent of the respondents prefer to sign a petition or support anti-corruption organisations, while 8 per cent prefer to raise awareness about corruption. The frequency values of the other response options remain the same.

49 Indeed, according to Hough (2017:153), in the field of anti-corruption, awareness-raising “comes from finding innovative ways of either getting the public to think about corruption or making people more conscious of their rights”
Descriptive analysis shows a modest variability in support for different methods of tackling corruption across the African continent. The option to join protests and demonstrations is least preferred in Swaziland and Guinea where it was mentioned by less than one percent of the respondents and most preferred in Morocco, where nine percent of the respondents saw it as the most effective anti-corruption tactic. The option to ‘vote for clean parties and candidates’ ranges from 20 per cent approval rate in Nigeria to only one percent in Lesotho and Madagascar. With approximately 14 per cent of the respondents preferring to raise awareness about corruption, Nigeria takes the first spot on the ‘awareness’ option while Zimbabwe occupies the last position with only four percent preference rate. The preference for signing a petition or being actively involved in anti-corruption organisations is highest in Lesotho (17%) and lowest in Egypt (2%). On the other hand, Lesotho registers the lowest support for ‘refuse to pay bribes’ option while the highest support is found in Madagascar (41%), Tanzania (41%) and Egypt (42%). Lastly, Botswana ranks the highest in the preference for reporting corruption (55%) while Nigeria ranks the lowest (15%). The response option ‘do nothing’ is most common in Sierra-Leone where it was mentioned by 45 per cent of the respondents and least popular in Botswana where it was approved by only 10 percent.

Regressing this seven-category variable against the variables used in the models estimated in the previous section yields results that are broadly consistent with the main narrative in that section. Holding other variables at their mean values, the relative probability of supporting anti-corruption protests rises with an increasing frequency of paying a bribe. Furthermore, an increase in frequency of paying a bribe increases support for raising awareness or voting for clean political parties relative to reporting corruption. On the contrary, an increase in the experience of bribery decreases the relative probability of thinking that reporting corruption or refusing to pay bribes is the most effective thing citizens can do about corruption. Similarly, the likelihood of saying that there is nothing ordinary people can do declines as the experience of bribery accumulates (see Table 5.3A in appendix 2). To get a more nuanced picture of the effect of the experience of bribery, I plot changes in the probability to prefer each of the seven anti-corruption tactics at

50 Round six does not have questions about corruption tolerance and generalised trust
different values of the experience of bribery variable. The two panels shown in Figure 5.4 present the results of this procedure.

*Figure 5.4: Predicted probability of different actions against corruption at different points in the frequency of bribe payments (Round 6 data)*
Panel 1 in Figure 5.4 shows that overall, as the experience of bribery increases, the predicted probability of saying that ‘ordinary people cannot do anything against corruption’ or that ‘they should refuse to pay bribes’ declines. However, contrary to the results based on round three, the predicted probability of saying people should report corruption does not decline after the first experience of paying a bribe. This means that it might take several encounters with demands for bribes before a payer’s confidence in the ability of public institutions to address corruption declines. This variation notwithstanding, the message is the same as the one in the previous section; those for whom corruption is a more regular experience (i.e. whom corruption is endemic) are highly unlikely to see reporting as a viable anti-corruption strategy.

The results shown in panel 2 suggest that generally, the probability of selecting response categories ‘raise awareness’, ‘vote for clean candidates and ‘join protests’ rises as the experience of bribery increases. For the ‘sign petitions or support anti-corruption organisations’ option, the relationship changes its positive trajectory to negative as bribery experiences accumulate. Apart from this strong non-linearity, those who do not have any direct experience with corruption have a higher probability of preferring this option compared to the other forms of civic engagement against corruption. These results indicate quite strongly that individuals with high experience of bribery are less likely to see offering support for anti-corruption organisations or signing a petition as viable strategy against endemic graft.

Apart from acting as a robustness check, analysing round six data reveals more interesting nuances about the nature of the impact of direct exposure to corruption. The declining probability of refusing to pay a bribe as personal experience of bribery increases is highly consistent with the rising probability of using bribes and influential connections as the experience of bribery accumulates as reported on page 104. Simply put, an individual with the highest personal experience of bribery has the lowest probability of refusing to pay a bribe (round six data) and the highest likelihood of using bribery and influential connections when she needs to solve a public-goods problem (round three data).

This finding casts light on Persson, Rothstein and Teorell’s assertion that, “while it is important not to overlook the masses of people who are collectively rising in defiance of corrupt and abusive governments around the world, in their individual encounters with
public officials, the majority of citizens in the end still seem to perpetuate rather than fight corrupt exchanges…” (Persson, Teorell and Rothstein 2013:455). Indeed, to the extent that regular bribers are unlikely to see refusal to pay bribes as the solution to corruption, and by extension more likely to continue to pay a bribe, the results can be interpreted through the pessimistic (i.e. collective action) lens that Persson, Rothstein and Teorell have popularised. As intimated on page 31, residents of highly corrupt societies, especially those who are regularly being involved in corruption, appreciate the ‘problem-solving’ function of bribery. They know that refusing to pay often means going without the public good or service that petty corruption or connections with influential individuals secures for them (see Hope 2014). What is more, as Persson, Teorell and Rothstein (2013:463) observe, “the amounts paid to venal officials are often surprisingly small compared to the sorts of relative, short-term gains realised by those who pay the bribes”.

What previous studies have not revealed and, indeed what acts as a basis for optimism is the fact that regular bribers are also likely to see citizens’ centred interventions as effective means of tackling corruption. Moreover, if presented with the choice between refusing to pay a bribe and taking part in anti-corruption protests and demonstrations, bribers are significantly more likely to prefer the latter. Taken together, these results imply that seeing corruption as a problem-solving device should not be interpreted as a sign of ‘resignation’ or cynicism. It does not imply that victims of corruption will shy away from using other means available to them to express their discontent. While most ordinary Africans with an experience of paying bribes are unlikely to resist demands for bribes or report incidences of corruption, they are much more likely to support citizens’ efforts to bring corruption under control. This study is the first to articulate this finding.

Another nuance that this analysis adds to the link between corruption and anti-corruption civic action is that there is an order in the way bribery influences the support for anti-corruption collective action. There are most favourable and least favourable forms of civic engagement against corruption conditional on changes in the frequency of bribe payments. Holding other variables at their mean values, frequent bribers are most likely to prefer to raise awareness about corruption before opting to vote for a different political party or candidate and eventually taking to the streets. This is understandable if we consider the differential costs implications of each of these forms of collective action. Signing a petition, raising awareness and voting for anti-corruption champions are less
costly forms of civic engagement than taking part in protests and demonstrations (which often turn violent in many parts of Africa). This finding is consistent with the findings of Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2014) who demonstrate that individuals gravitate towards activities that help redress their grievances at affordable costs. Costlier forms of collective action are chosen as the last resort.

The results of the multinomial logit model based on round three data suggested that an increase in corruption perceptions increases the relative likelihood of saying that people should not worry about corruption as ‘things will be resolved given enough time’. The model based on round six also indicate, curiously, that an increasing perception of corruption has a very strong positive effect on the relative probability of saying that nothing can be done about corruption. In fact, when the reference category is changed to ‘nothing can be done’, the results show that acquiescing becomes the most preferred choice as the perceptions of the level of corruption increase.

This is further confirmed by running a complementary log-log regression model predicting the probability of selecting the option ‘nothing can be done’ against the other options combined (see Table 5.3). This model suggests that a rising corruption perception has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of saying that nothing can be done about corruption. It is worth pointing out that the coefficient of the experience of bribery remains highly significant and negative, indicating that overall, an increasing frequency of paying bribes reduces the likelihood of saying that there is nothing citizens can do about corruption.

Table 5.3: Complementary log-log regression model predicting ‘nothing can be done about corruption’

|                           | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | z    | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------------------------|-------|------------------|------|------|----------------------|
| Experience of bribery     | -0.204| 0.045            | -4.550| 0.000| -0.291               |
| **Corruption perceptions**| **0.146**| **0.019**| **7.570**| **0.000**| **0.108**          |
| Institutional trust       | -0.026| 0.014            | -1.830| 0.068| -0.055               |
| Relative living condition | -0.062| 0.013            | -4.840| 0.000| -0.087               |
| Persons living conditions | -0.053| 0.012            | -4.520| 0.000| -0.075               |
| Lived poverty             | -0.004| 0.003            | -1.490| 0.136| -0.010               |
| Education attainment      | -0.074| 0.006            | -11.960| 0.000| -0.086               |
| Female                    | 0.061 | 0.023            | 2.640 | 0.008| 0.016                |
| Age                       | 0.000 | 0.001            | 0.570 | 0.571| -0.001               |


This highly divergent effects of the subjective perceptions of corruption and personal experience of bribery have not been articulated in studies on individual level outcomes of corruption in the African continent. So far, it seems reasonable to conclude that bureaucratic corruption provides a stronger motivation for civic engagement than grand corruption (for which the perception of corruption index is regarded as a proxy).

It is worth mentioning that this study is not the first to find that an increase in perceptions of corruption has a corrosive but inconsistent effect on willingness to challenge corruption. Peiffer and Alvarez concluded that although corruption “perceptions have inconsistently estimated direct effects on the dependent variables …perceived systematic corruption works to reduce willingness to engage in activism in the non-OECD setting” (Peiffer and Alvarez 2015:12-13). The analysis in chapter six reveals one of the main reasons an increase in perception of corruption has an inconsistent effect at individual level.

5.5.2. Bribery and actual participation in protests and demonstrations

Across the 18 African countries, only 14 per cent of the respondents reported taking part in the protests that occurred a year prior to the survey. The rarity of the self-reported protest action corresponds with the strikingly low preference for anti-corruption protest reported in previous sections. It is also in line with a large literature on collective action suggesting that taking part in protests is an uncommon phenomenon (Lichbach 1998).

The so-called five per cent rule by Lichbach (1995,1998) maintains that not more than five per cent of the population participate in protests and rebellions at least ninety-five per cent of the time. As he argues, “because the percentage of people mobilised into collective dissent is almost always small, the study of collective dissent involves the study of minorities and not the majority, irregularities and not regularities” (Lichbach 1995:126).
The data however suggests that the propensity to take part in protest differs widely across African countries. South Africa had the highest percentage of respondents reporting to have taken part in protests (24%), followed by Mozambique (23%) Namibia (19%), Botswana (18%), Tanzania (17%) and Nigeria (15%). Taking part in protests was less frequent in Lesotho (4%), Mali (6%), Cape Verde (8%), Ghana (8%), Malawi (8%) and Zimbabwe (8%). The protest rates in the remaining six countries fell between these extremes. These participation rates correspond with objective country-level data on the rates of protests in Africa. For instance, according to the African Development Bank, between 2013 and 2015, South Africa experienced the highest number of protests in Africa while Lesotho experienced the lowest (AfDB 2015). The lack of accountability, transparency and corruption are cited as some of the major factors in Africa’s mass uprisings (AfDB 2015, Branch and Mampilly 2015).

I estimate a fixed effects complimentary log-log regression model to ascertain the effect of corruption perceptions and experience of bribery on propensity to take part in actual protests and demonstrations. Since this section is designed mainly as a robustness check of the results in previous sections, the analysis focuses on the effect of these two corruption variables, more especially the experience of bribery which emerged as highly significant in the models presented in previous sections. Although the quadratic terms for each of these variables were estimated to check for non-monotonic relationships, only the statistically significant bribery quadratic term was retained.

Consistent with the results of the previous section, the perception of corruption has a non-significant effect on the odds of having taken part in past protests and demonstrations. The experience of bribery has a strong positive effect. Additionally, the quadratic term of the frequency of bribery is negative and statistically significant, indicating a concave relationship between bribery experience and the probability of taking part in protests (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Complimentary log-log regression of protest participation

|                      | Robust Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|-----|-----------------------|
| Experience of bribery| 0.823        | 0.117     | 7.03  | 0.00| 0.593-1.052           |
| Quadratic term of bribery| -0.279     | 0.065     | -4.31 | 0.00| -0.405-0.152          |
The results indicate that an increasing experience of bribery has a strong positive effect on the probability of taking part in protests. This is consistent with the interpretation that the experience of paying bribes is, indeed, a mobilising grievance as established in previous sections. Nevertheless, the negative quadratic term adds a caveat to this interpretation. It seems that a much more regular encounter with bribery has a corrosive effect on the propensity to take part in protests and demonstrations. But it should be emphasised that although the effect tapers off at high values of the bribery variable, it still remains very high as shown in Figure 5.4. It is worth pointing out that this strong effect of the bribery experience variable can also be detected when round six data are used. Importantly, the quadratic term of bribery is also significantly negative in the regression models based on round six data. (see Figure 5.4). This implies that the non-linear effect of bribery experience on propensity to join protests and demonstrations may not be an artefact of a specific data set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.027</th>
<th>0.037</th>
<th>0.73</th>
<th>0.46</th>
<th>-0.045</th>
<th>0.099</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational membership</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>16.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
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<td>2.29</td>
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<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons living condition</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative living condition</td>
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<td>0.025</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
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<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
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<td>0.013</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>-2.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-5.74</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generalised trust</td>
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<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.302</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
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<td>0.018</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>0.048</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.281</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>-16.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-2.556</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: country fixed effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table
Although the multinomial regression model presented in the previous section and the logistic model of past participation in protests are not entirely comparable, it is remarkable that the effect of bribery comes out so significant in both. This is because collective action scholars often point to the discrepancies that arise when models that predict people’s intentions are compared with those on actual behaviour. In fact, studies conducted in Europe show that people who expressed support for protests do not always follow through with corresponding action. Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2014) for instance found that only two out of five Dutch citizens who supported protest action against the proliferation of nuclear weapons actually took part in the anti-nuclear protests. According to Zomeren et al (2008:510) the disjuncture between intentions and actual behaviour arises because “compared with intentions, behaviour is subject to interference from additional random or systematic factors”.

5.6. Conclusion

Using citizens’ preferred actions against corruption as the main dependent variable, this chapter examined the mobilisation impact of the perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery. The results show that on average, regular bribers prefer the use of protests to address corruption and that they do take part in actual protests and demonstrations. The generally positive effect of the experience of bribery survives various empirical conditions. It is detectable when the model is tested on a dataset that
has more than three times the number of individuals. Importantly, an increase in the experience of bribery increases support for forms of civic action against corruption other than protest. This increases our confidence in the view that having to pay a bribe provokes willingness to get personally involved in efforts to bring corruption under control. This consistency in the effect of the bribery variable is noteworthy if one considers that such minor issues as the features of survey design can introduce significant variance between surveys measuring the same attitudes (see Zaller and Feldman 1992).

Further analysis of the data shows that an experience with bribery increases the probability of actually joining protests only up to a certain point, after which the effect of additional payments tapers off. This corresponds to the interpretation that individuals for whom corruption has become a routine could be slightly less willing to participate in collective dissent. The results of the protest participation model should be cautiously interpreted since we do not know whether the protests that a respondent attended were about corruption or governance issues more broadly.

The analysis has shown that perceptions of corruption have an inconsistent but largely corrosive effect on support for citizens-centred anti-corruption efforts. The next chapter probes this finding further by allowing the effect of corruption to vary cross-nationally — something that several studies on anti-corruption civic engagement do not employ (see for example, Peiffer and Alvarez 2015). Indeed, I should point out that controlling for country-level effects rather than specifically modelling for them is one of the weaknesses of the analysis in this chapter, and much of the analysis of public opinion data on Africa. The multilevel technique employed in the next chapter was unsuitable for analysis of round three data due to the limited higher-level units (i.e. 18 countries).

Seen from the grievance perspective, the highly consistent mobilising effect of the experience of bribery seems to stand in sharp contrast to Uslaner’s (2008) assertion that petty corruption is not a source of anger and frustration for ordinary people. As he notes, “the sort of corruption that engulfs ordinary citizens—petty corruption — is not as morally troubling as the grand thievery of the rich and powerful” (Uslaner 2008:244). “It is the high-level corruption— among government officials and business people— that makes ordinary people disaffected” and willing to challenge it (Uslaner 2008:123).
Chapter six

Contextual analysis of collective civic action against corruption

6.1. Introduction

This chapter shifts attention to the cross-national variability in support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption. Using multilevel regression models, the analysis explains why individual-level corruption might work differently across African countries, acting as a catalyst for collective action in some countries and a demobilising force in others. Employing a multilevel regression technique, which models the impact of observed and unobserved context-level factors, this analysis departs from the way in which the majority of corruption studies in Africa have been conducted. The analysis draws upon the sixth round of the Afrobarometer surveys.

To preview the results, there is a negligible contextual variability in the effect of the experience of bribery. This means that contextual heterogeneity is unlikely to have a significant impact on the association between direct experience of bribery and support for anti-corruption collective action. On the contrary, the variability in the effect of corruption perceptions can be explained, to a large extent, by observed and unobserved country-level processes. For instance, an increase in the perception of corruption is more likely to increase support for collective action in poor, ethnically divided and clientelistic societies. Curiously, the context-level measure of corruption does not influence the impact of individual-level corruption variables.

Nevertheless, the national context characterised by poor control of corruption reduces support for collective action for individuals who do not believe that ordinary people can fight corruption. But curiously, those who strongly believe in the ability of citizens to fight corruption are impervious to the corrosive effects of the context characterised by extremely high levels of corruption. Further to that, and most importantly, individuals who believe that ordinary people can make a difference in anti-corruption become increasingly likely to support collective action as their perceptions of corruption increase. The practical and theoretical implications of this resiliency to the corrosive effects of corruption are teased out in the conclusion.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next two sections offer a summary of the model specification and estimation procedures. The results section briefly discusses the individual level effects before turning to the contextual effects—the thrust of this chapter. It is important to clarify that the reason for focusing on corruption perceptions (rather than experiences of bribery) is based on the need to explain the strong contextual effect of the perception of corruption. A similar logic underpins the focus on the contextual analysis of collective efficacy to fight corruption, which I also consider as the measure of generalised interpersonal trust. Towards the end, the chapter examines the role of ethnicity in the support for anti-corruption collective action. The results suggest that an increasing sense of ethnic marginalisation increases the preference for collective action against corruption. Furthermore, increase in ethnic identification increases the support for collective action strategies of anti-corruption.

6.2. Model specifications and expectations

As indicated in chapter four, this contextual analysis focused on the following country-level variables: national-level poverty rate, country-level measure of corruption (i.e. WGI control of corruption indicator), civil society robustness, poverty at country level, clientelism at country level and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Support for collective action against corruption was expected to decline as the context-level corruption increases. Second, a national context characterised by a strong network of civil society organisations was expected to increase support for collectively oriented strategies of tackling corruption. Third, country poverty level was expected to reduce the cross-national variability in support for collective action strategies. Fourth, increase in clientelism was expected to increase the support for anti-corruption collective action.

In addition to explaining country-level differences in support for anti-corruption collective action, I expected these variables to moderate the effects of the main individual-level predictors, namely corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. For instance, individuals who perceive high levels of corruption were expected to have lower propensity to support collective action if they lived in highly corrupt societies. Furthermore, in places where civil society is robust, an increase in perception of corruption or experience of bribery was to increase the propensity to support anti-
corruption collective action. I expected individuals living in poor countries to be more willing to challenge corruption as their perceptions of corruption or experience of bribery accumulated. An increase in the non-universalist distribution of public goods was expected to increase the positive effect of these two individual-level corruption variables.

As I have noted in chapter two, endemic corruption is regarded as a co-ordination dilemma (i.e. an assurance problem). This means that when corruption is high, the average belief in citizens’ ability and willingness to challenge it is likely to be low since most people think that the system will not respond when citizens try to exert influence on it (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). Afrobarometer allows us to test this proposition using an item that enquires about respondents’ belief that ordinary people can challenge corruption. Scholars have used this question as a measure of both collective efficacy (Isbell 2017) and generalised interpersonal trust (Bauhr 2016). To the extent that the concepts of collective efficacy and generalised trust are intertwined, being the core elements of social capital (see Sampson and Graif 2009), I consider this item as a measure of both, and use the concepts of trust and collective efficacy interchangeably throughout this analysis.51

Apart from the key variables of corruption perceptions and bribery experiences, I also include, where possible, the individual-level control variables that came out significant in the models presented in the previous chapter. I add to this list of controls four survey items capturing the various dimensions of the concept of ‘democratic values’. These items represent attitudes towards vertical accountability. The first one measures support for unconditional involvement of citizens in efforts to hold the government accountable. The second one measures the extent to which respondents believe democratic citizens ought to question (or criticise) the government. The third one is about the belief that the media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption versus the idea that too much reporting on corruption only harms the country. The last one is the classic measure of the support for democracy (see Mattes and Bratton 2007, Bratton and

51 The analysis of Sampson and Graif (2009) demonstrates that collective efficacy is indeed empowered by generalised interpersonal trust and vice versa. They see collective efficacy as “the combination of trust and shared willingness of residents to intervene in social control” (Sampson and Graif 2009:184). Ansari (2013) also argues that the concepts of bridging social capital (especially generalised trust) and collective efficacy are complimentary and overlapping.
Mattes 2001, Diamond 2001); it asks respondents to choose between three statements as follows: 1) whether democracy is always preferable to any kind of government; 2) in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, and 3) For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have. An individual who has democratic values agrees that democracy is always preferable to any kind of government, believes that media should always probe corruption, citizens should always question the decisions of government and that citizens ought to always be involved in government processes. I expect such an individual to support citizens-centred and collective action methods of anti-corruption.

6.3. Estimation techniques and issues

Due to the large within country samples (compared to the number of countries), most multilevel analyses of cross-national public opinion surveys tend to estimate individual-level effects more reliably than their country-level counterparts (see Bryan and Jenkins 2015, Hox 2010, Heck, Thomas and Tabata 2012). For this reason, most scholars accept a 10 per cent significance rate for higher-level variables and the nominal 5 per cent for their lower level counterparts (see Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). I follow this convention. Allowing the effects of individual-level predictors to vary across higher-level units introduces two extra parameters into the model, namely the variance of the slope and the covariance of the slope and the intercept. When the number of countries is small, which is the case in this analysis, these extra parameters can consume too many degrees of freedom, thereby reducing the predictive power of the model. In this regard, I follow Heck, Thomas and Tabata’s (2012) recommendation to examine the random effects of key individual-level predictors one at a time. Lastly, I follow the standard practice of testing for the random effects separately before adding country-level variables and cross-level interactions.

As a reminder, I rely exclusively on the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys. Because of the nominal nature of the item measuring the dependent variable (see page 110), multilevel multinomial logit regression is the most appropriate statistical technique. However, this modeling strategy proved too complex and indeed failed to converge due, in part, to the small frequencies of some of the response options (e.g. join protests). An additional source of convergence problems was that typically, multilevel multinomial
regression models require a large number of observations at macro-level (at least 50 observations), whereas the Afrobarometer data set provides only 35 countries. One solution is to pay a small price of model misspecification that could result from changing the nine-category item into a dichotomous measure. To this end, I group the response categories ‘refuse to pay bribes, report corruption’ and ‘do nothing’ and assign them a value of zero and assign the remaining collectively-orientated categories, the value of one. The values of the resulting binary response variable can be construed as representing on one hand individual strategies against corruption (i.e. refuse to pay bribes, report corruption and do nothing) and on the other hand, collectively-oriented strategies (raise awareness, sign petitions, join protests and vote for clean candidates and parties).

Although reducing these response categories into a binary variable is based on practical (i.e. software and statistical) limitations, there is some evidence that the collectively oriented strategies ‘hang’ together at country-level. There is a modest positive correlation between the random effects of ‘join protests’, ‘sign petitions’ ‘raise awareness’ and ‘vote for clean candidates’. These are all negatively correlated with the response categories of ‘do nothing’ and ‘report corruption’. The three strongest correlations are between ‘join protests’ and ‘vote clean candidates’ (r=0.659), followed by ‘sign petitions’ and ‘raise awareness’ (r=0.644), ‘vote clean candidates’ and ‘raise awareness’ (r=0.592) and finally, ‘sign petitions’ and ‘join protests’ (r=0.522)\(^2\). These indicate that, at the country level, a preference for one of these strategies (relative to ‘do nothing or report corruption) rises with an increase in preferences for others.

About one in four respondents prefer collectively oriented strategies for tackling corruption. Because of this low rate of support for collective action, I employ a multilevel complementary log-log regression model instead of the familiar logistic transformation. As highlighted in chapter five, the complementary log-log transformation is the best alternative to the more commonly used binary logit and probit transformations when one of the categories in the dichotomous variable has very low values (typically less than 75 per cent).

\(^2\) This unconditional multinomial multilevel regression model was estimated in Mlwin programme. Since the estimates obtained by maximum likelihood methods can be biased when the higher-level units are small, I first employed quasi-likelihood (RGLS, PQL, 2nd order linearisation) and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to obtain more credible estimates in Mlwin.
6.4. Results

Although 14 countries have above-average support for collective action, only 11 have mean values that differ significantly from the overall average at the five per cent level. These are countries whose precision weighted estimates (and confidence intervals) lie completely above the horizontal line that crosses through zero in Figure 6.1. Given that this zero-line represents a negative value (i.e. the value of the overall intercept is negative), most people in countries whose residual values are around zero and those that are below it support non-collective action strategies such as reporting corruption or saying that nothing can be done about corruption. Collective demand for accountability is only supported in less than a third of the countries in the sample.

Figure 6.1: Precision-weighted estimates of support for anti-corruption collective action with 95% confidence intervals

Nigeria and Sudan have the strongest support for collective action against corruption while Tunisia and Madagascar register the lowest. Considering that Nigeria and Sudan are regarded as some of the most corrupt countries in the world (see Transparency International 2016), their citizens’ strong approval of collectively oriented methods challenges the notion that residents of countries where corruption is systemic are automatically less likely to challenge corruption. However, support for collective action
is not particularly high in countries that Transparency International considers as relatively clean either (e.g. Mauritius or Botswana). Taken together, these preliminary results suggest that what experts tell us about a country’s level of corruption may not, on its own, justify conclusions about ordinary people’s attitudes towards anti-corruption mobilisation. Indeed, as we shall see, the context-level measure of corruption has does not account for country-level variability in support for collective action against corruption. Given the large average support for collective action against corruption in Nigeria, it is wise to check whether it exerts undue influence on the models. I replicated all the findings in this chapter using samples that exclude Nigeria. This does not change the results.\(^53\)

**Table 6.1A** in appendix 3 presents the results of the multilevel complimentary log-log models. Model 1 indicates that men and younger people are significantly more likely to think that collective civic action is the most effective strategy against corruption. In terms of resource mobilisation variables, the increasing frequency of using traditional news media (i.e. radio) has a weak positive effect. Curiously, an increase in the frequency of using the internet has a negative but non-significant effect on the likelihood to support collective action. The coefficient of membership in voluntary associations is highly significant and positive as it was the case in the models reported in chapter five. Having attended protests and demonstrations in the past year increases the preference for collective action strategies, confirming the positive effect that the individual experience of civic engagement has been found to exert on attitude towards collective action (see Gibson 1997; Ostrom 2000).

Regarding the impact of democratic norms and values, the results are inconclusive. The item probing attitudes about citizens’ right to question political authority is highly non-significant ($z = 0.63$) and has been excluded in the models shown in **Table 6.1A**. Also, there is no statistically significant difference in support for anti-corruption collective action between those who support citizens’ involvement in accountability efforts and those who don’t. Furthermore, there is no difference between individuals who feel that

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\(^53\) Another alternative is to ‘absorb’ the outlier into a dummy variable and run the model on the rest of the data. These holds ‘Nigeria’ estimates at the average values and fits the model on the rest of the data. This alternative strategy was performed in Mlwin programme. The results remain the same.
democratic rule does not matter and those who think democracy is always preferable to any kind of government. Instead, it is those who think that non-democratic alternatives are sometimes preferable who are likely to support collective action against corruption. Lastly, the respondents who agree and strongly agree that media should constantly investigate, and report on government mistakes and corruption are significantly less likely to support collective action against corruption.

Before proceeding with the rest of the analysis, there is a need for further reflection on the above-mentioned results. The positive effects of membership in voluntary associations, previous involvement in collective action and access to news media are all consistent with the predictions of the resource mobilisation and civic culture hypotheses (see Mungiu-Pipidi 2013). Drawing from Tocqueville, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013:104) considers these as some of the main components of the “normative constraints that empower ethnical universalism”. The fly in this civic culture ointment though is the non-significant effect of access to the internet as well as the largely negative effect of various measures of democratic values. The verdict seems to be that democratic values (or civic culture) plays a minor, if any, role in anti-corruption mobilisation in Africa. That is, in Africa, support for anti-corruption collective action is not strongly rooted in civic culture. I return to the issue of democratic citizenship in the analysis in chapter eight.

An increase in perceived collective efficacy to fight corruption (or generalised trust) has a strong positive effect, indicating that all else being equal, those who believe that ordinary people can help combat corruption are significantly likely to support civic engagement. The main effect of popular perceptions of corruption is rather inconsistent. I noted in chapter five that the perception of corruption being widespread seems to have both a corrosive and mobilisation effect. In the current model, the perception of corruption variable starts off with a positive coefficient which becomes negative when we control for its highly significant and positive interaction with collective efficacy/ generalised trust. This implies that an increasing confidence in the ability of ordinary people to fight corruption reduces the corrosive effect of the perception of corruption. I elaborate on this interaction in section 6.4.2.

Consistent with the results in the previous chapter, the average effect of the experience of paying bribes is significantly positive, indicating that the mobilising impact of bribery
survives different model estimations and specifications’ procedures. This analysis also suggests that an increasing experience of paying bribes has the strongest effect among the poorest individuals. **Figure 6.2** depicts this interaction. In this graph, the line labelled as ‘least poor’ represents respondents whose self-rated poverty scores fall within the lowest 25 per cent on the poverty scale. A majority of the individuals (75%) in this category did not go without any of the basic necessities mentioned in the items comprising the lived poverty index (LPI). An increase in the experience of paying bribes doesn’t change this group’s probability to support collective action strategies.

*Figure 6.2: An interaction between self-rated poverty and experience with bribery (with 95% confidence intervals)*

The group labelled ‘average poor’ comprises respondents whose self-rated poverty scores approximate the middle point of all scores. Finally, the line labelled as ‘most poor’ represents respondents whose poverty scores make up the top 25 per cent of the poverty index. For this group, a positive change from lowest to the highest experience with paying bribes increases the probability of preferring collectively oriented methods by up to 16 percentage points. The results indicate therefore that accumulated experience of bribery has a strong influence on poor people’s propensity to support anti-corruption collective action. This finding has not previously been demonstrated in an African context.
6.4.1. The contextual effect of corruption perceptions

Allowing the effect of bribery to vary across countries does not substantially improve the model. Specifically, it does not alter the significance and size of the within-country effect. It seems therefore that the characteristics of countries do not influence differences in support for anti-corruption collective action between those who pay bribes and those who don’t. An increase in the experience of paying bribes is therefore likely to influence the propensity for collective action in roughly similar ways across the African continent. The effect of corruption perceptions, on the other hand, is largely contingent upon where corruption is being perceived. As shown in model 2 in Table 6.1A (in appendix 3), the fixed coefficient of the perceptions of corruption becomes non-significant when the variable is allowed to have a separate effect on each of the 35 countries in the data set. This implies that how the perception of corruption influences attitudes towards the role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts depends, to a large extent, on unobserved country-level processes. Although the reduction in fit statistics (i.e. BIC and AIC) suggest that the random coefficient model is the better fit of the data, the between variance of this model increases substantially. This means that adding a differential slope of corruption perceptions increases the unexplained heterogeneity between countries in support for anti-corruption collective action.

Figure 6.3 represents the covariance plot of the country-level residuals of the slope of popular perceptions of corruption and the country-level deviations of the overall intercept. The vertical line represents the overall average effect of the preference for collective civic action against corruption while the horizontal line represents the average effect of the perception of corruption. Countries that lie closer to the horizontal line have parameter estimates that are more similar to the overall effect of the perception of corruption (e.g. Togo, Lesotho and Tanzania). An increase in corruption perceptions has a positive effect in slightly over a third of the African countries (i.e. 13 of the 35 countries). The countries shown in the top-left corner of this covariance plot have a below-average support for collective action methods but a higher-than average effect of corruption perceptions. These are the countries in which small increases in corruption perceptions can have a strong positive effect on anti-corruption mobilisation. Namibia is a notable exception in that an increase in perceptions of corruption compounds the already high propensity to support anti-corruption civic engagement.
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia and Madagascar are some of the countries with negative slope residuals of the perception of corruption. This corrosive effect of corruption perceptions may come as a surprise considering the numerous violent protests that have been staged in the name of anti-corruption and poor public services in South Africa. Furthermore, given the high premium placed on the mobilising effect of corruption during the Arab Spring, it is surprising that the effect of corruption perceptions appears to be negative in Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, Beyerle (2014) and Vogl (2012) identify anger and frustration over corruption as the main drivers of the 2011-2012 mass uprisings in both countries. Given that civic action successfully brought down dictators in these countries, one would expect an increase in perceptions of corruption to have a positive correlation with the support for citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts.

The ability to include country-level variables that comes with the use of multilevel models has two advantages. The first one is that simply adding these variables enables researchers to explain the significant cross-national variability of the outcome variable. The second advantage is that by specifying cross-level interactions, researchers can explain the
significant contextual effects of the individual-level predictors (Snijders and Bosker 2012). Model 3 in Table 6.1A controls for the effects of our four country-level variables. First, as intimated previously, the context-level measure of corruption (i.e. CCI) is not statistically significant, even when it is entered as the only country-level covariate. The strength of civil society, mean poverty rate and political clientelism have statistically significant coefficients. In light of the strong effect of individual-level poverty, the highly significant effect of mean poverty rate suggests that poverty has a strong effect both within and across African countries. When the mean poverty rate is added as the only higher-level variable, it explains nine per cent of the cross-national variability in average support for collective action methods of tackling corruption. Together, the four country-level variables explain 22 percent of the cross-national variability.

The cross-level interaction of CCI and perceptions of corruption is negative but non-significant. However, the interaction between perceptions of corruption and state-level clientelism is significantly positive, suggesting that clientelism reduces the corrosive impact of corruption perceptions. Figure 6.4 depicts this interaction. In this graph, the line labelled ‘low corruption perception’ represents the respondents whose corruption perception score falls within the lowest 25 percent on the corruption perceptions scale. The ‘average perception’ category depicts a respondent whose score falls within 50 per cent of all scores. Finally, ‘the high corruption perception’ category represents an individual whose score falls within the highest 10 percent. A respondent who has had the highest perception of corruption has a 20 per cent probability of supporting collective action strategies if she lives in Ghana, where V-DEM experts opine that most of the public spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society (the lowest clientelism score of -4). This probability rises to 28 per cent if the respondent lives in Kenya, where V-DEM experts consider the provision of most public goods to be handled through clientelistic networks (score of -1). Finally, the same respondent has a 34 per cent probability if she lives in Sudan, where almost all public spending is narrowly targeted to specific subnational groups to the exclusion of others (highest clientelism score of 0).

54 Entering country-level variables one at the time helps to identify variables that may be non-significant because the model is unable to detect the effect (i.e. lacks power to detect the genuine effects). This is a common problem in multilevel models with small number of higher level units (i.e. where N<100).
55 The clientelism variable was obtained from the Varieties of Democracy Project. Originally, the score ranges from zero to four. I have reversed the scores so that zero represents more clientelism and -4 represents low clientelism.
Figure 6.4: How political clientelism moderates the effect of popular perceptions of corruption (80% confidence intervals)

*Note:* For ease of interpretation the scale of state-level clientelism variable has been reversed so that higher numbers indicate more clientelism.

Furthermore, the results suggest that in societies where state-level clientelism is perceived to be low (e.g. Ghana, Botswana), respondents with different corruption perception scores have roughly the same probability of supporting citizen-centred methods of tackling corruption. On the other hand, in countries like Kenya and Sudan where clientelism is perceived to be high, those who feel that corruption is rampant are significantly more likely to support collective civic action compared to individuals with low perceptions of corruption.

The interaction between political clientelism and poverty is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that the context of political clientelism may not pacify poor people. Holding other variables at their mean values, in Kenya the poorest people (lowest 25 percent in the LPI measure) have a 28 per cent probability of supporting collective action. This probability drops to 19 per cent when we move to Ghana, where political clientelism is thought to be very low. Taken in conjunction with the results reported in the foregoing paragraphs, we can conclude that the context characterised by non-universalist distribution of public goods increases the propensity to engage in collective action against
corruption among poor people as well as individuals with very high corruption perceptions. These results are consistent with the grievances interpretation. The personal discontent engendered by the divisive nature of political clientelism increases the willingness to support extra-institutional methods of political expression as individual-level poverty as well as perceptions of corruption increase.

Model 5 (in Table 6.1A) shows the cross-level interaction of mean poverty rate and perceptions of corruption and suggests that individuals who think corruption is widespread are more likely to support citizen-centred and collective action methods when they live in poorer countries than their relatively richer counterparts. Respondents with the highest perception of corruption have significantly higher probability of supporting anti-corruption collective action if they live in Liberia (which has the highest mean poverty rate) rather than Mauritius (which has the lowest mean poverty rate). It is important to stress that controlling for this cross-national interaction term makes the main effect of the perception of corruption variable to drop out of significance. This change is consistent across various model specifications. In fact, I removed the interaction between perceptions of corruption and collective efficacy to see whether the large reduction in coefficient size and statistical significance was caused by ‘overloading’ the corruption perceptions’ variable. When this is done, the main effect of the perceptions of corruption variable remains non-significant and negative. This provides very strong evidence that country-level poverty shapes the nature of the relationship between perceptions of corruption and support for anti-corruption civic engagement.

As a robustness check, I tested the moderating effect of country-level economic conditions using per capita GDP instead of the mean poverty rate. The results mirror those obtained when the mean poverty rate is used. An increase in the log of GDP has a strong positive effect on the probability of supporting collective action methods (remember increase in mean poverty rate has a strong negative effect). Although the interaction term is non-significant at 5 per cent level, it has a negative sign which corresponds with the positive sign of the interaction term in model 5.

Overall these results communicate two coherent messages. First, the material condition of a country explains a significant chunk of the variability in support for collective action against corruption. Second, those Africans who perceive high levels of corruption are
more likely to get involved in anti-corruption efforts when their countries’ economic conditions are hard. In this regard, the results are consistent with the grievances interpretation of the effect of the perceptions of corruption. Perceiving high levels of corruption may generate more discontent in countries where most people experience high levels of poverty.

Lastly, it is important to report that the interaction between perceptions of corruption and the strength of civil society is non-significant. This means that country-level differences in associational density do not significantly account for the differential effects of the perceptions of corruption on support for anti-corruption civic engagement. Holding other variables constant, perceptions of corruption are likely to have the same effect in South Africa (very strong civil society) as they do in Madagascar (weak civil society).

6.4.2. The dividend of generalised interpersonal trust

As indicated in previous sections, there is a positive and statistically significant interaction between the perception of corruption and collective efficacy (or generalised interpersonal trust). I interpret this as indicating that those who believe in the ability of ordinary people to make an impact are significantly likely to support anti-corruption collective action when they perceive high levels of corruption. Figure 6.5 represents a plot of the marginal effects of this interaction. For those with the strongest belief in people’s ability to fight corruption, the marginal probability of preferring collective action strategies increases from 0.20 to about 0.85 as corruption perceptions variable changes from lowest to highest values.
These results are sensible from the rational choice perspective. Indeed, rational choice would predict that an individual who trusts others to make a difference would support citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics as her perception of the level of corruption increases. However, the results can also be interpreted in terms of the grievance mechanism. As Klandermans (2015) has argued, while a sense of collective efficacy makes people feel more effective in challenging their collective disadvantage (rational choice mechanism), it also makes them feel angrier (grievance mechanism); hence, “the more efficacious people feel, they angrier they will be; both efficacy and anger will strengthen people’s motivation to take part in collective action” (Klandermans 2015:206).

There is a strong country-to-country variability in the effect of perceived collective efficacy to fight corruption. This shows, in light of this variable’s strong average effect that differences in support for collective action between individuals with different levels of collective efficacy are shaped by both who they are and where they live. It turns out
that an increase in perceived collective efficacy has the strongest impact in countries with a low average support for collective civic action. This means that small increases in the belief that ordinary people can fight corruption can make a large difference in support for collective action against corruption in places where a large majority of people do not consider citizen centred approach as the best solution against corruption (e.g. in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal and Swaziland).

The general context of corruption significantly moderates the relationship between the belief that people can fight corruption and the support for collective action against corruption. **Figure 6.6** provides a further insight into this interaction. As the graph demonstrates, the cross-level interaction is more statistically distinguishable at higher values of the control of corruption indicator (CCI). The line labelled as lowest trusters represents individuals who strongly disagreed that ordinary people can fight corruption. They constitute 22 per cent of the overall sample. The individuals who strongly agreed (24 per cent) are represented by the line labelled ‘highest trusters’. Increase in corruption has a strong corrosive effect on lowest trusters compared to their high trusting counterparts.

**Figure 6.6: Cross-level interaction of control of corruption and the belief that people can fight corruption (with 80% confidence intervals)**

*Note:* For ease of interpretation the scale of the control of corruption indicator has been reversed so that higher numbers indicate more corruption.
Indeed, there is a steep decline in the low trusters’ probability of supporting collective action strategies as we shift from low corruption societies (e.g. Cape Verde and Botswana) to countries with very high CCI scores (e.g. Sudan and Zimbabwe). On the contrary, as the graph demonstrates, high trusters’ support for collective action is largely resilient to the corrosive effects of their countries’ poor corruption control; the line representing this group remains flat as we move from the lowest to the highest values on the control of corruption index. The point that is worth being emphasised is that those who think others have an interest in contributing to the public good of a clean government have a significantly high propensity to support citizen-centred strategies when they live in societies struggling to control corruption.

Given that high trusters are significantly more likely to support collective action when they perceive corruption to be pervasive as shown in Figure 6.5, it would seem appropriate, considering the results shown in Figure 6.6 to refer to them as ‘principled principals’. This is if one defines ‘principled principals’ as those individuals who, embodying public interest, are willing to hold the government accountable regardless of the institutional settings in which they operate. Besides the fact that high trusters support citizens’ efforts against corruption when they perceive the vice to be widespread (see Figure 6.5), their attitudes regarding anti-corruption are not contingent upon their social and political environments as shown in Figure 6.6. These are the individuals who can potentially overcome the co-ordination dilemmas that permeate high corruption societies.

It is important to explain why the strong belief in citizens’ ability to combat corruption is resistant to the corrosive effects of both individual and context-level corruption. One explanation is that the individuals described as high trusters in Figure 6.6 are ‘activists’. As Kuran (1995) contends, activists are idealists and ‘dreamers’. Relative to most people, activists are insensitive to prevailing political dynamics; “they are inclined to speak their minds even at the risk of severe punishment” (Kuran 1995:50). They tend to show greater sense of independence from social norms and the expectations of others. Importantly, most activists believe in political action and in the ability of the ordinary people (like themselves) to take control and make a difference. As a result, they are more likely to over-estimate their ability or that of ordinary people to overcome obstacles. The optimistic character of activists lowers their risk threshold (Kuran 1995). While the views
of activists are more idealistic, the attitudes and behaviours of (the generally far more numerous) non-activists are conditional on the prevailing social and political conditions. Being more sceptical, the pessimistic attitudes of most non-activists often change when others have lowered the cost of collective action “or raised the benefit of participation” (Kuran 1995:51). This interpretation means therefore that in the context in which corruption is systemic, rational choice institutionalism more accurately predicts the attitudes of non-activists towards anti-corruption collective action.

Another explanation entails how we understand generalised interpersonal trust, especially as it relates to collective action and the control of corruption. Many of the scholars who claim that corruption erodes generalised interpersonal trust employ the rational-choice perspective, arguing that trust is linked “to the political conditions of a country” (Graeff and Svendsen 2012:2843). Generalised trust is understood to be a reflection of the personal evaluation of the ability of public institutions (especially law enforcement agencies) to sanction opportunistic or criminal behaviour (Newton 2001, Beugelsdijk 2008, Rothstein 2013, Rothstein 2011b). But, Fukuyama (1995) and Mansbridge (1999) among others, view generalised interpersonal trust from a moralistic perspective.

Uslaner (2002, 2008) makes a sharp distinction between experienced-based (or strategic) trust and altruistic trust (or moralistic trust). The former is based upon “responses to how others have treated you and your interactions with others in your social network and the organisations you join” (Uslaner 2008:290). It fluctuates based on the performance of public institutions. On the contrary, altruistic trust is “a value that we learn early in life and that is largely resistant to bad experiences—or good ones” (Uslaner 2008:290). It is a generally positive view about human nature (Uslaner 2002). “In altruistic trust” Jane Mansbridge (1999:290) argues, “one trusts the other more than is warranted by the available evidence, as a gift, for the good of both the other and the community”. The group of individuals represented by the line labelled ‘high trusters’ in Figure 6.6 could be described as altruistic trusters to the extent that their belief in people’s ability to co-operate is not contingent upon the performance of public institutions. They are likely to maintain a comparatively high propensity to co-operate even when a large number of actors are likely to defect. Indeed, Uslaner (2008:7) maintains that such people are likely to “get involved in their communities, even if they don’t expect reciprocity and even if they have found some people less than trustworthy”.
In line with how moralistic trust works, there is no statistically significant interaction between the strength of civil society and the belief that ordinary people can overcome corruption.\(^{56}\) In other words, being rooted in personal values, a strong belief in the ability of people to contribute to public goods is independent of the assurance process emanating from strong associational density. Indeed, Welzel (2010) has noted that self-expression values, for which generalised interpersonal trust is a major component, is strongly associated with collective action even where civil society is oppressed. As he concludes, this “suggests that when self-expression values are strong, they are so deeply internalised that acting for them is intrinsically valuable, even in the face of repression” (Welzel 2010:171).

People who have high levels of trust infer from their own trustworthiness. They believe that “most people share the same fundamental values, though not necessarily the same ideology and that people are not predisposed to take advantage of others. So, “it makes sense to them that one give others the benefit of the doubt” (Uslaner 2002:79:80). In this regard, their assessment of the ability of ordinary people to fight corruption is based on \textit{who} they are rather than \textit{where} they live. Conversely, low trusters’ assessment is likely to be premised on what their institutional environment looks like. If this interpretation is correct, one would expect the low trusters’ probability to support collective action to be strongly conditional on country-level factors. Indeed, analysing differences between countries as a function of a change in the belief that people can fight corruption offers evidence that is consistent with this proposition. As the trust variable shifts from the lowest to the highest values, the cross-national variability in the likelihood to support collective action decreases. \textbf{Figure 6.7} shows how country-level variance changes as a function of the trust/ collective efficacy variable. Overall, the graph indicates that unobserved country-level factors have a stronger impact on low trusters than on high trusters’ support for anti-corruption collective action.

\(^{56}\) Newton (2001) also found a weak relationship between membership in voluntary associations and trust at the individual level.
Indeed, this graph supports Uslaner’s (2002, 2008) and Mansbridge’s (1999) argument that generalised trust has weak institutional foundations. And the message it communicates is consistent with the conclusions based on Figure 6.6; differences between countries are wider for low trusters than they are for their high trusting counterparts. In other words, regardless of where they live, high (i.e. moralistic) trusters have more similar opinions about the role of citizens in the fight against corruption.

The main implication of these results is that in places where corruption is low, those who lack faith in others are likely to think and behave more like their high trusting counterparts in public goods settings. On the other hand, in highly corrupt settings, people willing to contribute to the public good of anti-corruption are likely to be few. Corruption makes most people in these countries to be “cynical about their own capacities to act on public goods… [it] diminishes the horizons of collective action…” (Warren 2015:45). The large number of individuals willing to contribute to public goods (i.e. experiential and moralistic trusters) is one of the main reasons why studies consistently find that countries with low levels of corruption register higher levels of co-operative norms. Because countries that have a better control of corruption have a relatively large number of people
willing to contribute to public goods (including challenging corruption), they stand a better chance of fighting corruption than countries in which corruption is relatively widespread.

6.4.3. Ethnicity and ethnic diversity

To probe the impact of ethnicity on support for anti-corruption collective action, I add to model 1 shown in Table 6.1A two individual-level variables, namely ethnic identification and ethnic discrimination. I also add Alesina et al’s country-level measure of ethnic diversity, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF). The survey question about the extent to which respondents think their governments discriminate against members of their ethnic groups was not asked in some countries. As a result, the analysis in this section is limited to the 30 countries in which data are available. Table 6.1 shows the parameter estimates of the strength of ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation, the two individual-level corruption variables and the interaction between perceptions of corruption and ethnic marginalisation. The second part of the table shows the cross-level interaction between perceptions of corruption and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. The complete results are shown in Table 6.2A in appendix 4.

Table 6.1: Multilevel complimentary log-log regression model showing the effect of ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation and ethnic diversity at country level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnic group marginalisation</td>
<td>0.142*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.079*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ethnic identification</td>
<td>-0.031** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.031** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
<td>0.120** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.118* * (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions</td>
<td>-0.101** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions x. perceived ethnic marginalisation</td>
<td>-0.040** (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual controls</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variables and cross-level interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-level clientelism</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.037 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.225 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions x. ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.379** (0.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The model suggests that the perception of ethnic discrimination has a strong, positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of supporting collective action against corruption. An increase of one standard deviation in the perception of ethnic group marginalisation increases by 0.014 the probability of supporting anti-corruption collective action. In addition, a change from preferring to be identified only as a member of a larger political community (e.g. Ghanaian, Zambian etc.) to preferring to be identified only with a specific ethnic group (e.g. Ashanti, Bemba etc.) increases the support for collective action. However, the non-significant interaction between these variables suggest that a combination of strong ethnic group identification and the perception of ethnic discrimination may not conspire to increase or decrease support for anti-corruption mobilisation.

This section’s main objective is to examine how ethnicity and ethnic diversity moderate the effect of the exposure to corruption, especially perceptions of corruption. To this end, I examine the interactions between each of the three ethnicity variables and the corruption perceptions variable. The interaction between corruption perceptions and the strength of ethnic affiliation is not significantly different from zero. Before I examine the interaction between ethnic marginalisation and corruption perceptions, it is important to comment on their correlations. This is because one might argue that the perception of ethnic marginalisation and the perception of corruption proxy for the same underlying construct, and that the resulting interaction is meaningless. The low correlation coefficient between the two variables (r= 0.19, p<0.001) provisionally rules out the possibility that both variables are empirically indistinguishable.\(^{57}\) Apart from this, there is a case to be made, 

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57 However, the results could be driven by Swaziland, whose correlation coefficient (r= -0.57). In all countries except, the two variables share positive correlations with values below r= 0.30. I tested the effect of this interaction in models that included and excluded Swaziland and found that the results are identical is strong and negative
as shown in chapter three, that perception of ethnic discrimination and perceptions of corruption may not be measures of the same construct. Not all individuals with high corruption perceptions see corruption as being associated with ethnic marginalisation.

The interaction between the perception of ethnic grievances and the perception of corruption is negative, indicating that on average, an increase in corruption perceptions reduces the positive effect of the perceived ethnic discrimination. As indicated in section 3.1.4 of chapter three, there is an expectation that perceptions of corruption will exacerbate a sense of ethnic exclusion (also see Githongo 2006). In this regard, an intuitive finding would have been a positive interaction between the perceptions of corruption and ethnic-based discrimination.

A graphical display in Figure 6.8 deepens our understanding of this interaction. The graph suggests that individuals who think that their ethnic groups are mistreated have a consistently high probability to support collective civic action regardless of the changes in their perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, those who feel that the state never treats members of their ethnic groups unfairly are most likely to support collective efforts as their perceptions of corruption increase. As the graph shows, at high values of the corruption perceptions variable, those who feel that their ethnic groups are marginalised and those who do not hold such discontents have roughly the same propensity to support collective civic engagement. This means that a sense of discontent that the perception of corruption triggers does not amplify the already strong mobilisation effect of ethnic marginalisation, contrary to the conjecture advanced in chapter three.
As intimated on page 126, most Nigerian citizens express extremely high support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics. A quick descriptive analysis of the ethnic marginalisation variable shows that the majority of Nigerians also feel that the state discriminates against their ethnic group. In this regard, Nigeria is the only country in this data set where more than 70 per cent of the respondents feel that the government discriminates against members of their ethnic group. The second country with most ethnically marginalised citizens is Togo, where 40 per cent of the respondents felt that the state discriminates against their ethnic group members. Since Nigeria occupies extreme values on both dependent and independent variables, it is possible that it is driving the results described in the foregoing paragraphs. When the models shown in Table 6.2A are re-estimated on the data that excludes Nigeria, the ethnic marginalisation variable retains its very strong positive effect. The coefficient of the interaction between corruption perception and ethnic marginalisation remains negative but only marginally significant ($z = -1.90$).

The interaction between ethnic diversity (ELF) and perceptions of corruption is highly significant (even in the sample that excludes Nigeria). The negative sign of the interaction
term suggests that an increase in perceptions of corruption has a more corrosive effect in ethnically diverse societies. This means that in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon (highest ELF scores), individuals who are average on all attributes except their high corruption perception are less likely to support collective action methods. In Burundi, Lesotho and Swaziland (lowest ELF scores), the same type of individuals are expected to have a strong propensity to support anti-corruption collective action.

6.5. Anti-corruption collective action in context: discussions and conclusion

The regression models presented in this chapter confirm what was established in chapter five, namely that bribe payers are significantly more likely to challenge corruption through citizen-centred and collective action strategies. More importantly, the results suggest that when corruption is direct and personal, poor Africans are more likely to prefer collective action as a way of challenging corruption. The inconclusive results concerning the effect of democratic values leaves the grievance model as the strongest explanation for citizens’ willingness to oppose corruption. The impact of the perception of ethnic marginalisation on support for collective action adds more weight to the grievance argument. Without appealing to the grievance model, it is difficult to explain why the perception of corruption makes individuals who never feel that the government unfairly targets their ethnic groups to become just as likely to support collective action as those who harbour such feelings. As the results suggest, the discontent generated by perceiving corruption to be pervasive is likely to make individuals who do not have ethnicity-related complaints to behave like those who do.

Moving on to the contextual effects—the central aim of this chapter—the analysis reveals strong cross-national variability in the effect of corruption perceptions. This makes sense if we consider as outlined in chapter four, that respondents’ evaluation of the levels of corruption in their countries is likely to be strongly linked to contextual factors. Corruption scandals, election campaigns that empathise issues of corruption and the anti-corruption campaigns are some of the factors likely to affect perceptions of the level of corruption (also see, Rose 2015, Klasnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause 2013). The objective experience of bribery is on the other hand largely independent of these changes in national context (Klasnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause 2013). A person who has had a
routine experience with paying bribes is unlikely to change his opinion about what people should do about corruption based on the latest corruption scandal. This partly explains why the effect of the experience of bribery on support for collective action varies a lot between individuals but not so much between societies.

Several studies on collective action emphasise the important role of generalised trust and a sense of collective efficacy on willingness to challenge corruption. As Lieberman, Posner and Tsai (2014:80) observe, “for citizens to act on behalf of change, they must believe either that their own individual actions can make a difference or, if they think that generating real change will require collective action, that others in the community will act with them”. Further to that, according to Mungiu-Pipidi (2013:110), the conundrum facing countries with high levels of corruption is “one of inducing a sense of efficacy that will mobilise individuals in favour of changing the rules of the game, and then building a critical mass of such individuals”. Building on these ideas, this chapter examined the individual- and contextual-level effects of the belief that people can fight corruption. The results show, as expected, that an increase in this belief is associated with stronger support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics, more especially among those who think that corruption levels are high.

But more importantly, the results indicate that a strong sense of perceived collective efficacy is impervious to the corrosive effect of corruption. Individuals who strongly believe that ordinary people can fight corruption are significantly more likely to support collective action as their perceptions of corruption accumulate. Their support for collective action is also less likely to be influenced by the context characterised by poor corruption control. On the other hand, those who strongly disagree that people can fight corruption become increasingly unlikely to support collective action as the country level measure of corruption changes from lowest to highest values. This finding has important theoretical implication. It seems as Ostrom (2000) argued that society has at least two types of actors; those who are more predisposed to contribute to collective action regardless of their institutional settings, and those whose behaviour is conditional upon the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms.

58 My emphasis
In closing, a few practical (or policy-oriented) implications can be distilled from these results and their interpretations. Identifying and involving high trusters in anti-corruption efforts is likely to change the dominant narrative around anti-corruption in high corruption societies. Marwell, Oliver and Prahl (1988:522) have argued that “collective action usually depends on a ‘critical mass’ that behaves differently from typical group members”. This critical mass often bears the largest costs of getting collective action off the ground (Marwell and Oliver 1993, Oliver 1993). Those who believe that citizens can fight corruption even in highly corrupt settings can form part of this ‘critical mass’, whose attitudes and (hopefully) behaviour are likely to change beliefs about what most other actors are likely to do about corruption (see Mungiu-Pipidi 2013, 2016). Indeed, as Ostrom (2000) observes, trusting attitudes and behaviours tend to influence the attitudes of non-trusters, persuading them to co-operate with others in public goods settings. This has the potential to change the equilibrium from the expectation that most people have no interest in anti-corruption to one in which a majority believe in the efficacy of collective resistance.

The fact that the poor people involved in corruption are not as acquiescent as was previously thought suggests that an anti-corruption campaign that specifically targets this section of the population may receive a strong backing among those who have had personal experience with corruption. Apart from that, collective mobilisation against corruption is likely to receive support among individuals who perceive high levels of corruption and live in poor countries whose governments’ provision of public goods occurs in particularistic fashion. Again, the grievances model provides a more plausible interpretation of these results. The grievance generated by perceiving corruption to be widespread is more intense in poor countries or where the government’s infrastructural and social spending is considered to be highly discriminatory.
Chapter Seven

Demanding accountability in clientelistic settings: the case of Nigeria

7.1. Introduction

As mentioned in section 2.2 of chapter two, prominent students of African politics view patron-clientelism (or neo-patrimonialism) as being the core feature of political relations in Africa. Chapter two summarised the literature pointing out the negative effect of neo-patrimonialism on citizens’ propensity to demand political accountability and the rule of law. The discussion in chapter three questioned the veracity of these pessimistic assertions on methodological grounds, and in light of the emerging evidence from more systematic studies of state-society relations in Africa. In particular, the analysis in chapter three noted that democratic norms and values are taking root among African publics. The aim of this chapter is to take this debate further by analysing the role of clientelism in fostering or hindering collective demand for accountability in highly corrupt societies. Due to the complexity of analysing clientelistic relations at individual-level using cross-national data (see Stokes 2009, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), the chapter focuses on the case of Nigeria. This has the advantage of keeping country-level factors constant as the analysis delves into individual-level relationships. Focusing on a single case helps us to gain a deeper understanding of how the phenomenon of clientelism might shape collective action in places where corruption is endemic.

Two major factors motivate the choice of Nigeria as the case for analysis. First, as I shall briefly show in the next section, Nigeria is notorious for being one of the most thoroughly corrupt countries in the world. Yet, it also boasts high levels of collective action, often in the name of tackling corruption. Citing Larry Diamond (1999), William Reno (2002:838) reminds us of the fact that “even under the repressive Abacha regime (1994–98), ‘human rights organisations continued to research, publicise, expose, lobby, and organise, sometimes treading more carefully while still facing arrest and imprisonment’ indicates that there is ‘a vigorous social basis for organising an alternative political programme.’”\(^\text{59}\)

\(^{59}\) My emphasis
Indeed, chapter six of this dissertation demonstrated an exceptionally strong preference for various citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption among the Nigerians (see page 124). I intimated that given the high levels of corruption, Nigerians’ strong preference for the use of collective action methods contradicts the pessimistic view of anti-corruption collective action. Rather, it is consistent with the optimistic view that high levels of corruption can act as a basis for willingness to engage in collective action.

Nigeria is indeed an excellent case with which to examine further the nuts and bolts of the nexus between corruption and collective demand for accountability in places where corruption is endemic. The other reason for choosing Nigeria is that it embodies several characteristics of a typical African society. These features, which are central to the analysis of governance and development in Africa, include religious and ethnic heterogeneity, ubiquitous clientelism, widespread poverty and overall institutional weakness (see Hoffman and Patel 2017, Reno 2002). Accordingly, an in-depth analysis of Nigeria can offer important insights into the complex relationship between clientelism and collective demand for accountability in the African setting.

This chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of corruption and collective demand for accountability in Nigeria. It then goes on to demonstrate how Nigeria’s strong collectivist culture — marked by high in-group solidarity, affective loyalty and hierarchy — nurtures clientelistic relations, which underpin the propensity for reproducing corruption and engaging in collective civic action against ‘corruption’. Because clientelistic relations are marked by bonds of dependence and control, patrons can mobilise their clients to take part in various collective endeavours that have nothing to do with public interests. Furthermore, Nigeria’s collectivist culture enables elites to trump up grievances against which collective action can then be used to advance particularistic interests.

With these ideas in mind, the analysis draws on Afrobarometer data to show why high propensity for collective civic engagement in highly corrupt societies should be cautiously interpreted. Statistical analysis shows that holding everything else constant, those Nigerians who have the highest likelihood of taking part in collective action can be described as clients rather than democratic citizens. Despite having the highest likelihood
to take part in protests and demonstrations, individuals identified as ‘clients’ consistently reject the idea that citizens should be involved in efforts to hold their government accountable. On the other hand, respondents that are classified as democrats are significantly more likely to take part in collective action and also express unconditional support for the idea that the government ought to be accountable to citizens.

The conclusion is that clientelism explains a large part of the willingness to take part in collective civic engagement that can be observed in Nigeria. As a result, some of the collective activities directed at the state may not qualify as representing the potential for demanding a system of governance based on ‘impartiality’, which is what anti-corruption scholars have in mind when they talk about demand-side accountability. Nevertheless, the fact that those who are likely to be acting in public interests are also likely to take part in collective action suggests that the situation is much more complex. Collective civic action in Nigeria is neither purely clientelistic nor exclusively representative of a genuine demand for political accountability. The analysis juxtaposes the academic literature on Nigeria, official reports and media sources before drawing upon rounds five and six of the Afrobarometer surveys.

7.2. A bird’s eye-view of corruption and collective action in Nigeria

On the 18th May 2006 the United States’ House of Representatives’ sub-committee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations held a hearing entitled ‘Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption’. In that meeting, George Ayittey, an eminent scholar of Africa’s political economy described Nigeria as a truculent African tragedy, which instead of becoming “Africa’s giant and the answer to South Korea” was “reduced to a comatose midget” due to its “kamikaze plunder by military bandits” (Ayittey 2006:51). Ten years later, on the eve of the international anti-corruption summit in London, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, was caught on camera describing Nigeria and Afghanistan as ‘fantastically corrupt’ and ‘possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world’ (Asthana and Grierson 2016). The notion that corruption is rampant in Nigeria is not peddled exclusively by Western governments and scholars based in Western universities. It precedes the global obsession with corruption, which can be traced to the birth of Transparency International in 1993 and James Wolfensohn’s
cancer of corruption speech in 1996. Indeed, a quick review of official documents suggests that Nigerian leaders considered corruption as being endemic as far back as the 1970s, and made some (largely fruitless) efforts to combat it. Olusegun Obasanjo had this in mind when he noted in his presidential inauguration speech in 1999:

Government and all its agencies became thoroughly corrupt and reckless. Members of the public had to bribe their way through in ministries and parastatals to get attention and one government agency had to bribe another government agency to obtain the release of their statutory allocations of funds. The impact of official corruption is so rampant and has earned Nigeria a very bad image at home and abroad.

Ten years ago, conservative estimations were that more than 400 billion US dollars had been looted since Nigeria got its independence in 1960 (Young 2012, Ayittey 2006). It is also estimated that General Sani Abacha stole more than 3 billion US Dollars within his five-year military dictatorship (Ayittey 2006, Young 2012). More recently, Sambo Dasuki, a security adviser to the former president, Goodluck Jonathan, was charged with stealing a huge chunk (about 60 million US dollars) of the money earmarked for buying military equipment essential for fighting Islamic terrorism. Further to that, according to the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria — who was fired after repeatedly raising concerns about missing oil revenue — corruption cost Nigeria an average of one billion US dollars per month during Jonathan’s presidency.

Petty corruption is equally rife in Nigeria. The report compiled by Human Rights Watch (HRW) reveals shocking details of impunity by members of the Nigerian police force. The report shows that apart from demanding bribes to investigate a crime, Nigerian police can often round up and place random people under arrest only to release them, without

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60 James Wolfensohn was the president of the World Bank. In the speech delivered at the annual meeting of World Bank and the IMF in 1996, Wolfensohn announced that countries needed to deal with the cancer of corruption to achieve growth and reduce poverty. The speech marked the turning point in the Bank’s approach to corruption, which hitherto was seen as being too political to form the core of the World Bank strategy on poverty reduction. The Bank has since committed itself to the fight against corruption.

61 For example, General Murtala Mohammed’s ‘Operation Purge the Nation’ saw more than 10,000 high ranking civil servants removed on account of corruption (Aina 1982). In 1979, Nigeria adopted an anti-corruption revolution under the aegis of ‘ethical revolution’. In subsequent years, various military administrations launched a flurry of clean-up campaigns including General Buhari’s War against Indiscipline (WAI) and Abacha’s War against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC).

62 See the full transcript of the speech here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/356065.stm Accessed 26 July 2017


charge, when a bribe has been negotiated (HRW 2010). Refusal to pay bribes at a police checkpoint can quickly escalate, resulting in the police officer shooting uncooperative motorists (HRW 2010). On one occasion, “Nkechi Obidigwe, a 22-year-old student was allegedly shot and killed by a stray bullet fired by a police officer at a motorist who refused to pay a bribe” (HRW 2010:52).

Ordinary Nigerians see grand corruption as being pervasive. The popular concept of a ‘Nigerian factor’ was coined by Nigerians themselves to describe the embedded nature of corruption into every fabric of social, economic, and political life. As Femi Omotoso observes, when Nigerians use the term ‘Nigerian factor’, they are talking about the pervasive, “improper ways of doing things, which puts sectional interest, political considerations, elite interest, pecuniary considerations, and wealth accumulation over and above public service” (Omotoso 2014:118). A local informant once remarked that, “if you don’t understand the ‘Nigerian factor’” you do not understand anything about Nigerian politics and society (Smith 2010:8). Nigerians also often use the colloquial expression of ‘national cake’ to refer to their country’s resources of which all Nigerians deserve a share (Hoffman and Patel 2017).

As intimated, Nigeria’s endemic graft co-exists with a strong propensity for collective political action that goes back to the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and the labour movements that defied the high-handed military dictatorships from the 1960s to the 1980s (Kew 2016). Nigeria’s collective action capacity also manifested itself in the anti-government uprisings at the height of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 1993. These protests forced President Ibrahim Babangida to end his military dictatorship and hand power over to an interim civilian authority (Kew 2016, Branch and Mampilly 2016). The Occupy protests of 2012 — one of the largest anti-government uprisings since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule — forced President Goodluck Jonathan to reconsider the removal of a fuel subsidy and ultimately, reduce the fuel price by 70 per cent. Complaints about corruption and marginalisation featured prominently in many of these and other large-scale protests, strikes and riots (Branch and Mampilly 2015).

The presidential election of 2015 could also be regarded as one example of a collective response to Nigeria’s egregious vice. The election marked the first time the incumbent lost a presidential election in this country. Pre-election polls showed that the need to
tackle corruption was among the top three individual motivations to vote (IFES Nigeria Pre-Election Survey 2014). These polls also showed that most Nigerians preferred a president who would prioritise the fight against corruption (IFES Nigeria Pre-Election Survey 2014). This strong anti-corruption sentiment is one of the main reasons why Muhammadu Buhari’s election campaign honed in on the fight against corruption. Buhari tapped into pre-existing corruption-related discontent that reached its peak during the final years of Jonathan’s administration when, among other things, he eulogised and pardoned the convicted fraudster, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the former governor of Bayelsa state.

Other examples of collective dissent linked to corruption include the deadly Boko Haram’s insurgency in the northern part of the country (Smith 2014). Indeed, as Branch and Mampilly (2015:105) remind us, many analysts of Nigeria see the rise of Boko Haram as “the rural expression of the same structural forces that give rise to urban protests”. As the argument goes, Boko Haram uses corruption-related socio-economic and political grievances that are felt at the individual level to inspire anti-state collective violence.

7.3. Social identity and collectivist culture as the basis for corruption and anti-corruption in Nigeria

According to Geert Hofstede, collectivism arises in “a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede 2001:225). Nigeria’s very high collectivism score on Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism dimension of culture suggests that most individuals think of themselves, primarily, as members of social groups and perceive loyalty to that group as of paramount importance. The role of culture in shaping attitudes that promote corruption in Nigeria and indeed, in other parts of Africa was highlighted in chapter two (also see for example

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65 Boko Haram is an Islamist terror group aiming to replace secular institutions with Islamic Laws, including Sharia Law. Its name translates as “western education is forbidden”. It has carried out a series of bombings and kidnappings in the Northern part of Nigeria. In 2014, Boko Haram made international news after its militants kidnapped the approximately 300 school-girls in the small town of Chibok.

66 Hofstede developed the famous cultural dimensions theory to describe the role of culture in people’s values, attitudes and behaviours in the workplace. These cultural dimensions are equality versus inequality and hierarchy; collectivism vs. individualism; uncertainty avoidance vs. uncertainty tolerance; masculinity vs. femininity), temporal orientation and indulgence vs. restraint and; power distance.

The foregoing can seem to project collectivist culture as being exclusively in favour of abuses of power for private gain. Quite to the contrary, Smith is quick to point out that “to the extent that it is reasonable to talk at all about a ‘Nigerian culture’ (a country as vast and diverse as Nigeria is, of course, characterised by considerable cultural heterogeneity), it is as much a ‘culture against corruption’ as it is a ‘culture of corruption’” (Smith 2008:7).67 Analysing the role of social identity (especially ethnic identification) in Nigerian society sheds more light on the contradictions that Smith describes. Basically, Nigerians are likely to challenge corruption when it is perpetuated by members of other ethnic groups while tolerating corrupt actions of members of their own ethnic groups.

Because of the strong social group identification, regard for the ‘collective’ often manifests as a chain of emotional bonds between individuals of the same social group. The principles that underpin solidarity, loyalty and reciprocity, thereby reproducing corruption and willingness to engage in collective political endeavours, operate within ethnic, religious and regional groups (Smith 2008). As intimated in chapter three, in ethnically divided societies such as Nigeria, taking part in corrupt exchanges or defending those who do can often be justified as standing with your own people.

Apart from ethnicity, region and religion also act as important sources of social and political identity for a majority of Nigerians. The country has an approximately equal number of Muslims and Christians. There is also a strong relationship between ethnicity and religion, more especially among the three largest ethnic groups; the Igbo, Yoruba

67 Emphasis in original
and the Hausa-Fulani. For instance, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group tends to be predominantly Muslim while the Igbos are predominantly Christian (Kew 2016). This explains the political salience of ethnicity as well as Christian-Muslim identities at both national and state levels in Nigeria. A strong evidence of the political saliency of social identity in Nigeria is perhaps the tacit understanding among Nigerian leaders that presidential and vice-presidential positions ought to rotate between Muslims and Christians.\(^6\) Referred to as zoning, this informal agreement has been enforced since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democracy after four decades of military rule.

As intimated in chapter three, anti-corruption collective action can arise among ethnic group members who feel that the particularistic logic that underpins highly corrupt societies puts their ethnic group at a disadvantage. The on-going nationalist agitation by the Igbo, one of Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups, is facilitated by a sense of exclusion and corruption associated with the production of oil in the Biafra region. Smith (2014:788) captures this as follows:

> Ethnic nationalist rhetoric builds on and stokes anger and discontent over the very system of corruption itself. Ordinary Igbo who support or at least sympathise with the idea of independence from Nigeria express both the desire for a bigger share of the patronage pie and the aspiration for a less corrupt society.

Anti-corruption riots and protests by less prominent ethnic groups have also occurred in other oil-producing regions, including the Delta state and Rivers state. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group that demands the Niger Delta gets a greater share of oil sales, recruits from the Ijaw — one of Nigeria’s smaller ethnic groups. The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and the newly formed New Delta Avengers lay claim to a more accountable and less corrupt society. They contest the fact that despite being the backbone of Nigeria’s oil industry, Niger Delta remains one of the most unequal and poorest regions, with shabby infrastructure and lack of basic amenities. Making the situation even worse, the oil operations in the region have destroyed the fishing industry that sustained the livelihoods of the majority of the poor.

These are some of the conditions that facilitate the creation of numerous anti-corruption movements in Nigeria. They form the basis for anti-state mobilisation through the

\(^6\) If the president is Muslim, a Muslim becomes the vice president and vice versa.
language of anti-corruption. But, to what extent does this anti-corruption mobilisation represent a genuine demand for political accountability as understood in anti-corruption scholarship? Are participants driven by the desire to have a more impartial, rule-bound and accountable system? What is the role of the elites in generating corruption-related grievances and using anti-corruption mobilisation to further their own private interests? The next section explores these issues.

7.4. Clientelistic perversion of collective action in Nigeria

Apart from the ethnic-religious dimension of collective action, much of what Smith describes as ‘Nigeria’s collective action capacity is demonstrated by the numerous voluntary associations that exist across the country (Smith 2006). As Kew observes, “regardless of ethnic grouping, economic class, religion, age, gender, or other major social cleavage, most Nigerians typically belong to several different civil society groups, and often partake in creating more” (Kew 2016:72). But, Nigerian scholars make a point that many of these so-called civil society organisations (CSOs) were formed for purposes of furthering the financial and political interests of the elites, sometimes in ways that clash with the principles of good governance (Smith 2010). Even those local associations that have an appearance of ‘civicness’ “eventually serve as veritable means of gaining the attention of patrons and the political class” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:468). Indeed, as Smith (2010) demonstrates, in Nigeria, “the facade of civil society is frequently manipulated as a ruse to carry out corruption and consolidate the social positions of the powerful” (Smith 2010:250).

Omobowale and Olutayo (2010) present an excellent expose of the ways in which patron-clientelism arises and dominates local level civil society groups in Nigeria. Nigeria’s state institutions do not always provide public goods and services based on universalistic criteria (see Reno 2002). This creates a need for citizens to form associations through which to leverage their influence and effectively compete for access to public goods in the form of political patronage. In other words, forming associations and appointing ‘a patron’ enables local people to gain indirect access to state resources they are unable to obtain through formal structures. The authors emphasise that civic associations enable
citizens to have more clout with patrons and, by extension, more influence in the decisions of the politicians in the centre (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:455). 69

Usually a wealthy individual, an association’s patron 70 is a true problem solver, who offers financial assistance and acts as a conduit through which the association can address local-level problems through political patronage. But his role does not end there; apart from influencing leadership positions within the association, the patron uses his influence to get members to support certain community projects for which he is likely to secure funding from politicians. Of course, a patron’s legitimacy is not built on his ability to provide funding and act as a link between the centre and the periphery; it is sourced from the perception that he is part of the community and that he understands the needs of the community. As Stokes (2009) has argued, patronage brokers (such as these CSOs’ patrons) rely on bonds of friendship and feelings of gratitude to build support for higher-level patrons.

Indeed, Omobowale and Olutayo point out that “once association members yield their support to particular patrons and politicians, they informally campaign and solicit the support of friends, family members and other close associates for support of a particular politician or party during election periods” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:470). Between elections, clients can be easily mobilised to support collective efforts that serve the narrow interests of these elites. The solidarity rallies demanding the release from prison of prominent politicians incarcerated on charges of corruption illustrate this point. In 2002 for instance, hundreds of Nigerians fiercely protested the detention on corruption charges of Mohammed Abacha, the son of Nigeria’s most corrupt dictator, Sani Abacha. Although Abacha’s family had agreed to return one billion US dollars of Abacha’s loot to the Nigerian Government, Mohammed, who had occupied a prominent position in his father’s extremely corrupt regime was facing separate corruption and money laundering

69 Omobowale and Olutayo’s analysis corresponds with the findings of Auyero, Lapegna and Pana (2009:23) who, based on ethnographic research in Latin America, conclude that patron-client networks “can act as those indigenous organizations or associational networks that followers of the political process model in the study of social movements have long emphasized as a key presence in the emergence of collective action.”
70 Although this individual is referred to as the association’s patron, his role is more similar to that of a (patronage) broker who acts as a link between politicians and citizens. The local contacts and knowledge at the brokers’ disposal make them particularly well placed to service patron-client relationships.
charges. The Nigerian government eventually bowed to the civic and other pressures to drop all charges against Mohammed and his family.

In yet another incidence, when James Ibori, the former governor of Delta state was arrested and charged for money laundering, hundreds of people from his home-town took to the streets, “with some women going nude for his release” (Bamidele, Olaniyan and Oyadele 2016:118). In some instances, protesters were unequivocal that their anger was directed specifically at the Nigerian anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), for witch-hunting their son (Amaize and Ige 2010)\(^71\). Nigerian courts acquitted Ibori of all charges only for him to be arrested, tried and sentenced in London for stealing more than $200 million of public funds. His recent return from the British jail was widely celebrated in his home-town, with hundreds of young men clad in t-shirts printed ‘Ibori Boys’. Likewise, the early release from prison of the late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the disgraced former governor of Bayelsa state, was met with jubilant celebrations by residents of his home-town (Bamidele, Olaniyan and Oyadele 2016).\(^72\) During his colourful welcome party, speakers from his church and ethnic group eulogised and declared him non-corrupt, and a victim of a political conspiracy. This is despite that he had pleaded guilty, during the trial, to some of the corruption and money laundering charges for which he was imprisoned (Bamidele, Olaniyan and Oyadele 2016).

While the foregoing casts regional, religious and ethnic solidarity as key mobilising factors, there are also instances where direct monetary benefits were alleged to have been used to mobilise Nigerians for protest action. There are strong allegations that the election campaign team of former President Goodluck Jonathan used material inducements to mobilise protesters against his challenger, Muhammadu Buhari. In one internal memo leaked to the Nigerian press, one of the senior figures in Jonathan’s campaign team proposed $20,000 to be used for a protest rally during Buhari’s speech at Chatham House in London. The memo offered details of how the protest would be ‘staged’, including when and for how long protesters would chant anti-Buhari slogans. This anti-Buhari protest did occur outside Chatham House on 26th February 2015. Despite hoisting anti-

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\(^72\) Majority of people in this town are the Ijaw. This is the ethnic group of Alamieyeseigha.
Buhari banners, some of the interviewed protesters had no idea why they were taking part in this event. When interviewed on camera, a female participant appeared not to know exactly why she was protesting, telling the reporter in no uncertain terms that she was neither against Buhari nor President Jonathan. Others said they did not know much about both candidates but that they were told that Buhari’s presidency would be bad for Nigeria.

Allegations on social media were that protesters received money in exchange for showing up. Wobbly video footage appeared to show a woman admitting that Jonathan’s campaign team paid her to ‘buy’ protesters. In the video clip, she can be heard saying:

That’s what I do. I can give you my contact. I can arrange for crowd anywhere (sic). Today we are supporting Jonathan, tomorrow we may support Buhari. I can arrange hundred (sic). We rented a bus to come here. I can do Maryland, anywhere… [But] Buhari can’t spend the kind of money Jonathan spends.

It is difficult to independently verify the authenticity of the people in these YouTube videos. The interviewees may as well have been planted by supporters of Buhari to discredit a genuine protest against his candidacy, before being interviewed by a bogus journalist. Be that as it may, the claim that the crowd was rented corresponds with the now common phenomenon of paying poor Nigerians to participate in protests and demonstrations. Indeed, there are strong allegations that recent demonstrators at the Amnesty International offices in Abuja were financially rewarded (Uzodinma 2017). The Premium Times newspaper published pictures appearing to show protesters receiving cash after barricading the office of Amnesty International and calling for it to leave the country within 24 hours. Writing for the BBC, Adaubi Nwaubani (2017) makes a telling statement about this and other protests and demonstrations in Nigeria: “in Nigeria, gathering a crowd to cause a stir on one's behalf is only a matter of cash…”

According to Beeskers and van Gool (2012) and Smith (2007), some of the most politically active (and violent) individuals in Nigeria are okada (motorcycle taxi) riders.

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73 This Youtube video contains some of the interviews conducted with the anti-Buhari protesters at the Chatham House in London. The interviewees appear to have been contacted at random. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XL-gZHOCPRM https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDAtLpywijA accessed 13 March 2017


As Smith (2007) eloquently demonstrates okada drivers are also the most vocal and well-organised supporters of the Igbo nationalist movement. However, they have often been recruited to advance political courses that appear to clash with the Igbo nationalist agitation or with the core interests of the taxi industry (Smith 2007). As Beeskers and van Gool (2012) and Smith (2007) observe, clientelism plays a major role in these contradictory political behaviours of the Okada drivers. Because of their poor economic conditions, they easily fall prey to clientelistic capture by powerful patrons. Indeed, many Okada drivers are believed to have received their motorcycles “from politicians or state governors, in return for public demonstrations of support or for acting as paid muscle in conflicts with political adversaries” (Beeskers and van Gool 2012:26).

The phenomenon just described is consistent with what Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) describe as ‘a mobilised’ form of collective action — a progeny of poverty and patron-clientelism that characterise Nigerian society. Mobilised or clientelist-collective action is orchestrated by political patrons and their brokers as opposed to being driven autonomously by ordinary citizens in pursuit of their political convictions or public interests (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In clientelist-collective action, citizens take part in collective action partly out of loyalty to the patron or simply because they were paid to do so. Some attend due to the threats of negative sanctions by the patron and his/her brokers, not necessarily to express their own political views or demand political accountability. ‘Clientelist-collective action’ explains why, as Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi discovered in their analysis of twelve African countries, people who are least informed about current affairs, and “do not know the identities of key political leaders (from local government councillors to national vice president) are likely to show up in protests” (Bratton et al 2005:301).

The foregoing raises questions as to whether Nigeria’s high propensity for collective civic action is a true reflection of collective demand for accountability in that country. The alleged intermediation of state representatives in influencing and setting up ‘protests’ strips these events of their true purpose. Similarly, the domination of civic association’s agenda by ‘patrons’ undermines civil society as an engine of collective demand for accountability at grass-roots level. Overall, the narrative is consistent with the idea that where corruption is endemic, and people have a high propensity to act in concert, collective political action may be harnessed to serve particularistic interests. To the extent
that it is not designed to defend the interests of broad categories of citizens, clientelist collective action, including protests, may not qualify as an instance of collective demand for accountability.

Nevertheless, it is important not to give an impression that all public protests, and other forms of collective civic action in Nigeria are inherently clientelistic. Indeed, field research by Scacco suggests that ordinary Nigerians do often organise independently of elites. One example is the riots taking place in the rural parts of Nigeria and catching the local elites by surprise, thereby indicating a more independent initiative by the rank and file (Scacco 2016). This means that clientelistic tendencies and a genuine demand for good governance may be simultaneously responsible for collective civic engagement in Nigeria. It is important to determine which of these two bases for collective action dominates in contemporary Nigeria. However, it difficult to use qualitative secondary data to make this determination. In the sections that follow, I carefully analyse rounds five and six of Afrobarometer surveys to establish the extent to which the propensity to undertake collective civic action in Nigeria represents a genuine demand for accountability.

7.5. Clientelism and collective demand for accountability in Nigeria: Evidence from Afrobarometer

The narrative in the previous section is that the patron-client relations that feed corruption can also produce the high propensity to participate in collective civic action. This section evaluates the role of clientelism in motivating individuals to undertake collective civic action. I use self-reported participation in protests and demonstrations as the first dependent variable (see page 84). I have noted in chapter three that protests are increasingly being considered, in the emerging social accountability studies, as a form of popular demand for accountability especially in high corruption settings where more institutionalised forms of civic engagement are likely to be ineffective (see Beyerle 2014, Fox 2015, Williams 2000). There is a presumption in the bottom-up approaches to anti-corruption that the act of protesting represents a demand for a more impartial and accountable government. In other words, protests tend to be automatically associated with democratic accountability. Nevertheless, based on anecdotal evidence, the previous section has raised some doubts about the tenability of these assumptions in highly corrupt
and clientelistic societies, where elite interests are likely to dominate the civic engagement agenda.

One way to test the role of clientelism in collective action is to ascertain whether individuals who attend protests and demonstrations also express strong support for citizens’ involvement in efforts to exert influence on the decision-making processes of the state. To test this proposition, I use the following survey item as the second dependent variable in the model in which protest attendance acts as an independent variable: Which of the following statements is closest to your view: choose statement 1 or statement 2.

- Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.
- Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.

Because of the phrase ‘even if it makes decisions more slowly’, respondents who agreed and strongly agreed with statement two — 40 per cent of the entire sample — display an unconditional support for the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes of the state. I call this group democratic citizens. Descriptive analysis shows that most Nigerians (60%) prefer a government that gets things done to one that is accountable to citizens. To some respondents, the phrase ‘a government that gets things done’ could mean one that effectively delivers public goods, while others probably had more particularised benefits in mind. Either way, seeking accountability is clearly not a priority for these respondents, and they should not be regarded as democratic citizens. Their attitude fits Michael Bratton’s description of ‘clients’ as those who “simply seek patronage rather than a role in political decision-making” (Bratton 2013:4).

In both models, I use two proxies of clientelism; one attitudinal and another behavioural. The attitudinal proxy is based on the question asked for the first time in the sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys as follows:

Please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose: request personal assistance like help with school fees or funeral expenses from elected leaders.

I refer to this variable as ‘support for clientelism’. The italicised phrase ‘personal assistance’ gets to the core of patron-clientelism as it supposedly occurs in Nigeria. I indicated in chapter two that clientelism in the African context proceeds as a provision of
private goods by a high-status person in return for *personal* loyalty (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Descriptive analysis suggests a moderate to strong support for patron-clientelism. Approximately one third of Nigerians (31%) feel that citizens should always request personal assistance from elected leaders. A further 41 per cent support this practice on *condition* that the individual asking MPs for help with personal problems has no problem doing so. As **Figure 7.1** illustrates, only 28 per cent of the respondents disapprove unconditionally.

**Figure 7.1: Attitudes towards citizens’ requests for personal assistance from elected leaders**

I label those who agreed that people should always seek personal support from MPs as *unconditional* supporters of patron-clientelism, and those who said, “only if they choose”, as *conditional* supporters. In line with the logic of clientelistic collective action, I expect unconditional supporters to have the highest probability of turning up for protests but offer no support for the idea that ordinary people should participate in holding the government accountable.

Patron-client relations require face-to-face contact (Scott 1972). Partly for this reason, Young (2009) uses a survey question about the reasons for contacting leaders and considers contacting to discuss personal problems as a proxy for clientelism. I improve on this measure by multiplying it with an item asking whether respondents contacted leaders alone or with a group. The main reason for doing this is to accommodate the
possibility, based on the literature on Nigeria that in some instances, clients relate to patrons as groups rather than individuals (see pages 157-158). Multiplying the two items creates an index measure of contact that consists of the following categories of actors; no contact, contacted alone to discuss personal problems, contacted alone to discuss community problems, contacted with a group to discuss a personal problem and finally, contacted with a group to discuss community problems.

I label as ‘collective clients’ those who contacted leaders with a group to discuss personal problems, and as ‘individual clients’, those who contacted alone to do the same. Those who went to discuss community issues represent democratic citizens to the extent that they were acting in the interest of the public. Nonetheless, it is only the individuals who joined forces with other people to promote community interests who truly represent the concept of ‘collective demand for accountability’. Close to half of the respondents (48%) did not contact leaders. As shown in Figure 7.2, a plurality (20%) of those who contacted were accompanied by other people to discuss community problems; 16 per cent of those who went alone discussed personal problems; 10 per cent went with others to discuss a personal problem while seven per cent went alone to discuss problems affecting the community.

Figure 7.2: Reasons for contacting leaders alone or with others
Although the two survey items forming this index do not specify the size of the group with which a respondent contacted leaders, it is sensible to assume that when they want to discuss personal matters, people would rather contact with a group of acquaintances. It is easier to talk about personal matters in the presence of neighbours, relatives, friends and fellow club members than it is in the presence of more distant others. In this regard, it is conceivable that those who felt comfortable enough to talk to leaders about a personal matter were accompanied by people they knew very well. Unlike a larger group, a small group of individuals asking for personal favours is also more vulnerable to clientelistic appeals, and as a result, more likely to support the patron and attend a protest that serves his interests. It is also possible that those who talked to leaders about personal problems were already part of the leader’s clientelist network in which personal favours were regularly being offered in return for loyalty. The point here is that in the political environment characterised by high levels of clientelism, cultivating personal relationships with leaders puts one at the risk of clientelistic capture. Following the logic of clientelist collective action as has been described, I expect those who went to discuss personal problems (either alone or in a group) to have a higher probability of taking part in protests and demonstrations. However, the same individuals should reject the idea that citizens should be involved in efforts to hold the government accountable.

Regarding control variables, the models presented in the next section adjust for the effects of most of the variables used in the protest model presented in chapter five, which are: associational membership, institutionalised trust, lived poverty, relative living conditions, age, gender, education, urban-rural status (i.e. residence), and finally, perception of corruption and the experience of bribery. Section two (see pages 97-98) of chapter five offered a summary of the literature regarding the potential effects of these variables on protest participation. There is no need to rehash that discussion here. Due in part to the important role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics and society, as alluded in previous sections, the models also control for the effects of ethnic identification and perceived ethnic marginalisation.

7.5.1. The protest action model

The control variables of age, education, urban-rural status, and gender do not exert a statistically significant influence on the probability to have joined protests in the last 12
months. In line with the model shown in section 5.5 of chapter five, membership in community groups and lived poverty have significantly positive coefficients. Importantly, an increase in the frequency of paying bribes has a positive effect on likelihood to take part in protests and demonstration. Institutional trust and perceptions of corruption have non-significant effects. These results are strikingly similar to those presented in section 5.5.2 of chapter five, which were based on pooled Afrobarometer round three data from 18 countries. The specification test (i.e. linktest) of the full model shown in Table 7.1 is not significant, suggesting that this model is correctly specified.

Table 7.1: Complimentary log-log model of protest participation in Nigeria

|                          | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------------------|-------|------------------|-------|------|----------------------|
| **Clientelism variables**|       |                  |       |      |                      |
| Attitude toward clientelism |      |                  |       |      |                      |
| Ask only if they choose | 0.065 | 0.138            | 0.470 | 0.637 | -0.205 -0.336        |
| Always ask for help     | -0.094| 0.150            | -0.630| 0.530 | -0.388 0.200         |
| **Contact leaders & reasons** |      |                  |       |      |                      |
| Alone_community         | 0.226 | 0.256            | 0.880 | 0.378 | -0.276 0.728         |
| Group_personal          | 0.970 | 0.178            | 5.450 | 0.000 | 0.621 1.318          |
| Alone_Personal          | 0.597 | 0.163            | 3.660 | 0.000 | 0.277 0.916          |
| Group_community         | 0.635 | 0.163            | 3.890 | 0.000 | 0.315 0.955          |
| **Control variables**   |       |                  |       |      |                      |
| Perceptions of corruption | 0.109 | 0.098            | 1.110 | 0.266 | -0.084 0.302         |
| Experience of bribery   | 0.606 | 0.243            | 2.490 | 0.013 | 0.129 1.082          |
| Quadratic term of bribery | -0.050 | 0.124          | -0.400| 0.687 | -0.293 0.193         |
| Institutional trust     | -0.072| 0.079            | -0.900| 0.366 | -0.227 0.084         |
| Education               | -0.002| 0.028            | -0.080| 0.935 | -0.058 0.053         |
| Organisational membership | 0.367 | 0.057            | 6.450 | 0.000 | 0.256 0.479          |
| Rural                   | 0.124 | 0.120            | 1.040 | 0.300 | -0.111 0.360         |
| gender                  | 0.019 | 0.115            | 0.160 | 0.870 | -0.206 0.244         |
| Ethnic marginalisation   | 0.069 | 0.060            | 1.160 | 0.246 | -0.048 0.186         |
| Strength of ethnic identification | 0.153 | 0.050        | 3.070 | 0.002 | 0.055 0.251         |
| Lived Poverty Index     | 0.206 | 0.062            | 3.340 | 0.001 | 0.085 0.328          |
| Relative living cond.   | -0.095| 0.063            | -1.500| 0.133 | -0.218 0.029         |
| Political interest      | 0.088 | 0.057            | 1.54  | 0.125 | -0.024 0.200         |
| Intercept               | -3.372| 0.431            | -7.810| 0.000 | -4.218 -2.526        |

**Notes**

The binary dependent variable is Protest attendance.

Standard errors are robust.
Regarding the first main predictor variable, support for clientelism, the results suggest that there is no difference in the probability of protest participation between the individuals who agreed with the statement that citizens should always ask MPs for help with personal problems and those who said citizens should never do this. Turning to the behavioural proxy for clientelism, the contact index, the model suggests that compared to not contacting at all, having contacted leaders increases the chances of taking part in protests and demonstrations. Table 7.2 shows probability differences between the nine contrasts of the contact factor variable.

Table 7.2: Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of contacting leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise contrasts</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone community vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs group personal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs group personal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations = 1934

Compared to not contacting at all, those who contacted leaders in a group to discuss personal problems (i.e. collective clients) had the largest probability of being involved in protests. The results also suggest that, on average, a change from collective clientelism to individual clientelism (i.e. contacting leaders alone to discuss personal matters) decreases the probability of protest participation from 0.27 to 0.19 on average. In other words, individual clients are significantly less likely to take part in protests than collective clients. Notably, compared to individual democratic citizenship (i.e. alone to discuss community-related problems), collective clientelism increases by 0.13 the probability of taking part in protests. Finally, compared to collective democratic citizenship (i.e. contacting leaders in a group to discuss community problems), collective clientelism increases the probability of protest by 0.061. The verdict is therefore that, compared to
everyone else, collective clients have a higher probability of showing up in protests and demonstrations.

Quantitative measures of clientelism are always controversial (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). For this reason, it is important to address the potential criticisms that can be levelled against interpreting these results as indicating the effect of patron clientelism on collective civic action. First, one might argue that the most important mechanism behind the relationship between this contact variable and protest participation is personal grievances, rather than clientelism per se. The argument could be that citizens who rely on some form of collective action when contacting leaders have intense personal grievances, and that they need the influence of a group to gain audience with leaders. The same intense personal grievances that drive these individuals to use collective action to address personal problems could also underline their very high probability to take part in protests and demonstrations. Both contacting for personal interest and taking part in protests would then be regarded as indicating the presence of intense personal grievances. For this argument to hold, one would have to assume that across the board, those who contacted leaders to discuss community problems have less intense grievances compared to those who contacted leaders to discuss personal matters. The predicted probability of protest action would then be higher, first, for individuals who used collective action to pursue personal interests and second, those who contacted alone to discuss the same. As the results have shown, this is not the case. Instead, it is the respondents who contacted leaders to discuss community-related issues — and whose actions we assume were not being propelled by intense grievances — who have the second largest probability of taking part in protests and demonstrations.

Further to that, the strong effect of collective clientelism does not disappear when we adjust for the effects of the variables that capture socio-economic and political grievances (e.g. relative living conditions, poverty, perceptions of corruption and personal experience with bribery). This means that this contact variable is picking a phenomenon other than (or in addition to) grievances as a driver of the propensity to take part in anti-corruption collective action. As I argue, this phenomenon is the direct experience with clientelism.
The second criticism could be that the two contact variables that comprise this index lack content validity as the measure of political clientelism because they do not specify that ‘political leaders’ were contacted. Contacting a religious leader to discuss a personal matter may not have the same implications for accountability as contacting a political party official. This is unless the religious leaders being contacted also act as patronage brokers in a long chain of patron-clientelism, as is sometimes the case in Nigeria. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that people will contact religious leaders for more personal matters. It is however problematic for principal-agent relations when citizens contact local government or political party leaders to help with personal problems, which as we have noted can include asking for help with school fees, completing a house or burials.

To address these concerns, I introduce a condition such that the response categories of the contact index comprise only the respondents who contacted at least one of the following political officials: members of parliament, local government councillors and political party officials. Besides an obvious reduction in the number of observations (from n=1934 to n=1513), this modification does not change much of the narrative already presented. However, the four coefficients of the contact factor variable increase in size (see Table 7.3). For instance, the probability change from ‘no contact’ to ‘contact with a group for personal interests’ is now 0.215 (p<0.001) as opposed to the 0.156 (p<0.001) reported in Table 7.2. It could well be that the measure is more sensitive to the data, but as I have noted, this does not alter the conclusions drawn from the results in Table 7.2.

Table 7.3: Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of contacting political officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contrast</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone community vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs. no contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs alone community</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs group personal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs group personal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs alone personal</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall the results support the idea that at least part of the collective civic action in Nigeria is due to clientelism, especially collective clientelism. Although the collective clientelism variable has the largest effect on the probability of protest participation, the consistently positive effect of having contacted with a group to discuss community issues implies that clientelism is only part of a complex story of civic engagement in Nigeria. Assuming that the type of people who attend protests and demonstrations tell us whether the event represents demand-side accountability, these results would lead us to conclude that in some instances, Nigeria’s collective initiatives represent a genuine demand for good governance while there are instances where this is not the case. This does not mean that an individual client never exercises agency; it means that they have a higher risk of attending events that undermine democratic agency. In the same way, while democrats may attend ‘uncivil’ public protests and demonstrations, they are less likely to do this than the clients.

The third criticism could be that this index is a proxy for community of ‘constituency service’ rather than clientelism. Making the effort to tell political leaders about personal matters may not always translate into an attempt to gain personalised favours. This is a fair criticism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that scholars who are more familiar with political relations in Africa frequently use these Afrobarometer’s contact items to make inferences about patron-clientelism in Africa. For instance, Bratton (2008) considers the high propensity of ordinary Africans to contact local leaders (e.g. local councillors, etc) rather than government officials when they need solutions to personal problems as an indicator of their embeddedness in patron-client relations.

Further to that, we can assume based on our knowledge of Nigeria as a highly clientelistic society (see Joseph 1991, Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, Smith 2006) that those who went to discuss personal problems were most at risk of being roped in as clients if they were not clients already.\(^76\) We can also posit that the leader being contacted to offer

\(^76\) Also, consider that Lindberg (2009) found that in Ghana constituency service also doubles as an avenue for clientelistic favours. If political relations in Ghana are considered far less clientelistic than in Nigeria as the V-DEM data suggest, we can expect that the pattern Lindberg observed in Ghana could be worse in Nigeria.
solutions to personal problems often obliged with a culturally-informed expectation that the recipient will reciprocate with loyalty when called upon to do so (see Hyden 2013, Young 2012, Schatzberg 2001, Stokes 2009, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco 2013). As Lauth has argued, culturally-informed exchanges between patrons and clients do not always occur simultaneously, “neither do they require synchronicity to a large extent like the market logic. Instead, obligations may and will be in general satisfied only with a time lag” (Lauth 2004: 209, cited in Muno 2013:42). Further to that, according to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007:7), “one problem both clients and patrons face is that the clientelistic exchange between principals [i.e. citizens] and agents [e.g. politicians] is not usually simultaneous but takes place over time.”

7.5.2. Clients versus democratic citizens: Who demands democratic accountability?

As I have noted, the logic of clientelistic collective action leads us to expect respondents identified as clients to actively participate in protests but reject the view that citizens must be involved in efforts to hold the government accountable. Democratic citizens on the other hand, should take part in protests and express unconditional support for citizens’ right to be involved in the decision-making processes of the state. The foregoing section has provided evidence consistent with the first set of expectations. The evidence presented in this section shows that the second set of assumptions is also tenable. This leads to a single coherent message, namely that collective action involving respondents identified as clients in the previous section is motivated largely by particularistic considerations.

To probe this second set of expectations, I estimate two binary logit models based on rounds five and six of the Afrobarometer surveys. In both models, support for citizens’ involvement in efforts to hold officials accountable is used as an outcome variable. The set of controls used in the model presented in Table 7.1 is retained in both models. In the model based on round six, the key predictor variable is the measure of clientelism that combines reasons for contacting political representatives (i.e. public or personal reasons) with the mode of contacting (alone or with a group). Table 7.4 only shows the predicted probabilities associated with this contact factor variable.

Table 7.4: Probability change in the effect of clientelism (using the contact variable) on support for demand-side accountability variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone community vs. no contact</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. no contact</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. no contact</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs. no contact</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group personal vs. alone community</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs. alone community</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs alone community</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone personal vs group personal</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs group personal</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group community vs alone personal</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations = 1934

Note: These results are based on the analysis of round six data. Significant contrasts highlighted.

The results shown in Table 7.4 suggest that clients (those who contact leaders to advance personal interests) are unlikely to approve the statement that it is important for citizens to be able to hold the government accountable. On the other hand, democratic citizens (i.e. those who act on behalf of the community) express unconditional approval of citizens’ involvement in the decision-making processes of the state. Compared to not contacting at all, those who contacted leaders to discuss community-related problems (either alone or with a group) were significantly more likely to opine that it is more important for citizens to be able to hold the government accountable, even if this derails decision-making processes. The coefficients of contacting leaders to discuss personal matters — either alone or with a group — are both highly non-significant. Further analysis suggests that for individuals who are average on all attributes, the probability of supporting citizens’ involvement in mechanisms of accountability will rise from 0.389 when they shift from contacting political leaders with a group for personal interests, to 0.527 when contacting them with a group to advance public interests. This represents a substantial probability change of 0.128.

In the fifth round of its surveys, Afrobarometer posed two questions that scholars have used as measures of clientelism. The first of such questions reads as follows:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.

Statement 1: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community first.
Statement 2: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group over others.

Bratton (2007) uses this item to capture the concept of clientelism and classifies as clients those who agree and very strongly agree with statement 1. The second question reads as follows:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.
Statement 1: The government is like a parent. It should decide what is good for us.
Statement 2: The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should tell government what to do

Those who agreed with statement 1 are regarded as more inclined to support clientelism while those who chose statement 2 are deemed to have attitudes consistent with democratic citizenship (Mattes 2014). When we use these two variables as indicators of clientelism, the results suggest that clients are less likely to support the involvement of citizens in efforts to hold the government accountable. As shown in Table 7.5, the belief that leaders should not elevate the interests of their own social group over public interests increases by 0.10 the probability of supporting citizens’ involvement in mechanisms of accountability. Similarly, shifting from the position that the government should act like a parent and single-handedly decide what is good for citizens, to the position that people are the bosses of the government, increases by 0.063 the probability of supporting citizens’ involvement in mechanisms of democratic accountability.

Table 7.5: Change in probabilities and associated p values for the contrast between clients and democratic citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>P-values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders obliged to help their home community vs. leaders should not favour their own family or group.</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are the children of the government vs. People are the bosses of the government</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These results are based on the analysis of round five data.

The results displayed in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 concur that clients are less likely to support a genuine citizen-driven demand for good governance. However, as the previous section has shown, these individuals will not shy away from joining protests and demonstrations. On the bright side, the fact that a high corruption society such as Nigeria has individuals who are likely to be genuinely seeking accountability is a promising sign for anti-
corruption. In fact, it is consistent with the findings of Smith (2009) — an expert on corruption in Nigeria— who noted that Nigeria has individuals and organisations that continue to resist corruption despite being surrounded by its pervasiveness. As he concludes in this regard, understanding the “social currents that push against corruption is as important as explaining those that facilitate corruption” in Nigeria (Smith 2009:306). Unfortunately, a majority of studies have focused on the social and political dynamics that reproduce high levels of corruption, not why some people are willing to fight it. I hope this section provides a basis for more systematic studies in this area.

7.6. Conclusions

Nigeria’s rampant corruption and very high propensity for collective action presents an excellent opportunity to advance our understanding of the nexus between corruption and collective demand for accountability in places where corruption is seen as a rule rather than exception. Using the literature on Nigeria as well as news media material, this chapter demonstrated that Nigeria’s strong collectivist culture partly explains its high level of corruption as well as exceptionally strong propensity for collective civic action, often against ‘corruption’. Moving on, the chapter delved into the role of clientelism, an off-shoot of collectivist culture, on the propensity to engage in collective civic action. This analysis demonstrated, in line with the pessimistic view of anti-corruption civic engagement, that patron-clientelism does pervert the accountability relationship of citizens as principals and political elites as their agents.

The quantitative analysis suggests that respondents who can be described as ‘clients’ are significantly more likely to show up in protests than those who fit the definition of democratic citizens. Nevertheless, clients are far less likely to support the idea that exercising voice is always important, suggesting that they are more at risk of being involved in protests that have nothing to do with accountability and good governance. Those classified as democratic citizens, on the other hand, are likely to both take part in protests and demonstrations and support the view that citizens’ involvement in demand-side accountability should never be sacrificed. Overall, the analysis confirms that Nigeria’s high propensity for collective civic action is rooted both in genuine demand for accountability and clientelistic relations. Indeed, in his analysis of clientelism in Nigeria, Reno (2002:856) has cautioned that studies on Nigerian should be aware of the duality
“between governance and pretences to governance”, and to recognise “that the former does not always coincide with the latter”. That is, not every collective civic engagement conducted in the name of ‘accountability’ seeks to attain procedural impartiality or ethical universalism as a governance norm.

Better measurements of clientelism permitting, future studies would do well to unpack this duality and enhance our understanding of the type (and motives) of the individuals who are likely to use collective action to demand accountability in highly clientelistic societies. Additionally, and again data permitting, it could be informative to analyse the extent to which client-based collective action can lead to political accountability and the rule of law. In this regard, the work of Michael Johnston (2014) offers a good starting point as it shows that, historically, good governance institutions emerged from conditions that approximate what this chapter has described—individuals motivated by private interests rather than democratic ideas. Institutions of accountability and rule of law emerged from the group-based contestations, triggered by corruption and exclusion. It remains to be seen whether Johnston’s ideas can be applied in places where clientelism is as ubiquitous as it is in Nigeria.
Chapter eight

The prospect for grassroots anti-corruption movement in Africa: summaries and conclusions

8.1. Introduction

Africa is home to many countries where corruption is viewed as being a rule rather than exception. The recent iteration of principal-agent analysis of anti-corruption has emphasised the importance of involving citizens in efforts to put this type of corruption under control. Central to this citizen-focused (or bottom-up) approach is the assumption that ordinary people, especially the poor, have a straightforward interest in anti-corruption efforts as they are the greatest victims of malfeasance. One of the main advantages of a citizen-focused approach is the ability to inspire and sustain political will—a lynchpin of successful institutional reform. These advantages notwithstanding, citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts have been subjected to growing scrutiny from studies anchored in collective action theory. These studies have put forward two arguments. First, where corruption is pervasive, anti-corruption efforts confront an assurance problem to the extent that corruption erodes the mechanisms that promote co-operation among individuals, including generalised interpersonal trust. Secondly, as a public good, anti-corruption efforts confront a free-rider problem, which erodes the propensity to view collective civic action as a viable solution for systemic corruption.

This study set out to examine the impact of corruption on individual-level propensity to support collective action against it. Although an increasing number of studies examine the consequences of corruption, very few have looked, specifically, at the influence that corruption has on likelihood to get involved in anti-corruption efforts. Further to that, none of these (very few) studies delineate the differential impacts of personal experience of bribery and subjective perceptions of corruption, as well as the contextual effects of these forms of corruption across the African continent. This intellectual neglect has created an impression that subjective perceptions and direct experience of corruption affect attitudes and behaviour in the same way within and across nations.

This concluding chapter summarises this study’s main findings, highlighting its contributions to knowledge on (anti-)corruption as well as associated practical
implications. Most of the findings are consistent with the predictions based on the grievance model of collective action, to the extent that individuals seem to be willing to challenge corruption when they incur personal losses from it or when their perceptions and experiences of corruption coincide with pre-existing socio-economic grievances.

It is worth repeating that this study is the first to use survey data on two-thirds of the African countries to analyse the attitudinal impact of corruption. Importantly, the data on which these conclusions are based truly represent the African continent, having been drawn from countries located in the continent’s major regions. It is also worth stressing the point that this is the first study to employ multilevel regression modelling to investigate the conditional effects of corruption in Africa. This analytical approach considers simultaneously, the impact of observed and unobserved institutional factors on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the study also concentrated on a single case of Nigeria to offer a more nuanced account of how clientelism might shape citizens’ demand for accountability—a missing detail in studies on bottom-up approaches to anti-corruption in Africa where clientelism is thought to be a core feature of political relations. I believe that using different designs and analytical techniques has allowed me to provide a richer account of the complex relationship between corruption and citizens’ demand for accountability in Africa, and beyond.

8.2. Grievances and the mobilising potential of the exposure to corruption

One of the major findings of this dissertation, which survives various empirical conditions, is that individuals with the highest experience of bribery have the lowest propensity to report corruption. This finding is in line with the idea that individuals who regularly participate in bribery are unlikely to report, as they may feel that “it is meaningless to report corruption since this will not make any difference [as] it is simply the way ‘things work’” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013:458). Despite their reluctance to report corruption, frequent bribers display the highest propensity to utilise civic action tactics available to them to address corruption. These include joining protests targeting corruption, raising awareness about corruption and voting for anti-corruption champions.
One theoretical implication of these results is that, as far as participants in corruption are concerned, the lack of willingness to report corruption should not be confused with the lack of willingness to punish corruption. Contrary to the postulates of collective action thinking, bribers’ unwillingness to report is unlikely to be related to the view that ordinary people are unwilling to punish corruption. Rather, it seems to be a consequence of bribers’ lack of trust in the ability of the government to address corruption (Cho and Kirwan 2007). This explains why frequent bribers are more attracted to extra-institutional and citizen-centred methods of taking control. Indeed, the results based on round three data (in chapter five) show that an increasing trust in public institutions increases the likelihood to report allegations of corruption while decreasing the propensity to support anti-corruption protests and demonstrations.

It is also important to highlight the fact that if presented with the choice between refusing to pay a bribe and attending anti-corruption protests and demonstrations as a strategy to combat corruption, bribers are significantly more likely to choose the latter. They are also more likely to prefer to raise awareness about corruption, vote for clean candidates or sign petitions calling for tougher sanctions than refuse to pay bribes. What this means is that bribers understand that acting alone (e.g. by refusing to pay a bribe) cannot effectively help combat corruption where it is endemic. An effective anti-corruption tactic is one that involves a concerted and co-ordinated effort. This finding also implies that bribers are likely to continue paying bribes when they are demanded while actively supporting anti-corruption efforts based on civic action. Anti-corruption scholars and practitioners should be aware of these nuances. The same individuals who pay bribes and are unlikely to stop doing so in future could stand ready to support citizen-centred means of tackling corruption when that opportunity arises.

One of the main weaknesses of the mainstream literature on Africa is the tendency to make broad generalisations based on single case analysis or comparisons of few countries (see Alence 2012, Briggs 2017). As far as the analysis of corruption outcomes is concerned, these studies tend to emphasise the similarities between African countries rather than their differences. Furthermore, there is an intellectual wilderness regarding the impact of country-specific features on the relationship between corruption and mass political behaviour in the African continent. The sixth chapter of this dissertation attempted to fill this lacuna by employing multilevel regression techniques. As the results
indicate, bribers are likely to express support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption, irrespective of their country of residence. In this regard, we can be confident that bribe payers, especially those who are poor, can act as an important constituency for anti-corruption mobilisation, even in highly corrupt societies. Given the consistency of the positive effect of bribery, it is surprising as Cohen and Navot point out that Rose and Peiffer’s (2015) *Global Guide to Grass-roots Corruption* ignores “strengthening the individuals fighting the practice in their countries as a strategy for reducing corruption” (Cohen and Navot 2016:566).

Moving on, the multilevel analysis suggests that an increase in the perception of corruption works differently in different contexts, igniting the support for collective action in some highly corrupt countries and eroding this in others. As this finding suggests, although observed and unobserved country-level factors account for the differential impact of corruption within countries, country-level corruption is not one of these factors. Indeed, the non-significant impact of the interaction between subjective perceptions of corruption and the control of corruption (CCI) measure confirms that the propensity to support anti-corruption mobilisation is likely to be different in, for example, Uganda and Kenya even though both countries are seen as “arguably typically thoroughly corrupt” and have been used (on the basis of this feature) in comparative analysis of the impact of corruption (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2015:450).

What explains the strong cross-national variability of the perceptions of corruption is the material conditions. High corruption perception has greater potential to encourage the support for anti-corruption collective action in very poor African countries more than it does in their richer counterparts. Despite that Burkina Faso and Niger share a border, key institutional attributes and demographics (e.g. French, Fulfude languages are widely spoken in both countries), the mobilising effect of perceptions of corruption is stronger in Niger due to its higher rate of poverty. In terms of theoretical implications, this finding corresponds to the effect of the positive interaction between the frequency of bribery payments and individual level poverty. The difference though is that between individuals, poor bribers are more likely to support anti-corruption collective action; between countries however, those who perceive corruption to be widespread (regardless of their objective economic status) are more likely to support anti-corruption collective action as
country-level poverty increases. In other words, in poor countries, the perception of corruption is likely to draw fighters across different economic classes.

8.2.1. Ethnic grievances

Another strand of the grievance-based explanation considers the interplay between perceptions of ethnic marginalisation and subjective perceptions of corruption. Individuals who believe that the state always treats their ethnic groups unfairly have a higher propensity to support anti-corruption collective action regardless of the changes in their perceptions of corruption. However, those who never feel this way are more likely to support collective action as their perceptions of corruption increase. Importantly, the analysis suggests that at high levels of corruption perceptions, individuals with a strong sense of ethnic discrimination and those without such feelings will have the same likelihood of supporting citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts. Overall, the perception of corruption does not modify the effect of ethnicity-related grievances on anti-corruption collective action in a significant way.

The practical implication of these results is that individuals who harbour ethnicity-related grievances and those aggrieved by pervasive corruption may unite behind an anti-corruption drive. But, they will be drawing inspiration from entirely different sources. Indeed, Orjuela (2013) cites a couple of studies showing that in deeply divided societies corruption can help forge new alliances and indeed a new identity of ‘victims of corruption’. This identity can be used to mobilise people across ethnic and religious fault lines to rally behind anti-corruption efforts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, protesters of different ethnic and religious formations used a “slogan ‘You are all disgusting, no matter what ethnicity you belong to’, directed at the ruling elite” instead of the ethnic other (Orjuela 2013:764).

The foregoing constitutes the positive aspect of these findings. The potentially negative aspect in the African context where ethnicity is politically salient is that those who are inspired by a perception of ethnic discrimination may hijack an anti-corruption coalition (that includes people without these grievances) to push through an agenda that seeks to

77 Bosnia-Herzegovina is regarded as one of the most ethnically polarised countries (see Mungiu-Pipidi 2016)
supplant a particularised order with another one. When this happens, an anti-corruption drive can lose credibility, and indeed be dismissed as a ploy to advance the narrow interests of certain ethnic groups. But, as I have shown, perceptions of corruption can also dominate this broad-based anti-corruption coalition, gradually de-emphasising ethnicity as the key motive for an anti-corruption effort.

This analysis provides a window into the broad-based, messy and complex nature of an anti-corruption mobilisation. In practice, citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts are likely to be characterised by multiple incentives and sometimes irreconcilable goals. Johnston (2014:46) alludes to this when he notes that anti-corruption coalitions are likely to comprise “groups with partially overlapping agendas, pursuing what are likely to be less coherent but mutually agreeable changes”. Indeed, such “coalitions can be a delicate balancing act among people who may not completely trust each other, and who agree more about what they oppose than about what they want in its place” (Johnston 2014:46).

8.3. Clientelism and clientelistic collective action

Research on ordinary Africans’ reactions to corruption would not be complete without a critical assessment of the role of clientelism in fostering both corruption and collective action against it. The first attempt at this is found in chapter six where I introduced a context-level variable measuring the extent to which the country’s social and infrastructural spending is narrowly targeted at a specific social group, region, party or set of constituents. The analysis reveals that an increase in the non-universalist distribution of public goods increases the effect of subjective perceptions of corruption. That is, societies characterised by high levels of state-level clientelism are likely to experience high rates of anti-corruption collective action as citizens’ perceptions of corruption increase. This is in line with the proposition that particularistic policies and programmes that define national-level clientelism generate intense grievances among excluded citizens.

Because state-level clientelism deepens social and political divisions and creates the incentive for political entrepreneurs to mobilise along these lines, there is a danger that the anti-graft collective political action that occurs in high clientelism societies does not represent a genuine demand for accountability. Reflecting the clientelistic character of
society and the state, ‘anti-corruption’ collective action can be a ruse to perpetuate the existing particularistic order or replace it with another one. Seized with these conjectures, chapter seven examined the extent to which clientelism, measured at the individual-level, influences collective action in Nigeria — one of Africa’s highly corrupt societies with strong support for anti-corruption collective action among citizens. Indeed, notions of anti-corruption feature predominantly in the majority of Nigeria’s violent and non-violent forms of civic engagement. Focusing on Nigeria enabled the analysis to keep the context-level clientelism and other country-level factors constant while exploring variations at individual level. The analysis confirms that individual-level clientelism plays a significant role in collective mobilisation. Clients have a higher propensity to engage in collective action compared to individuals described as democratic citizens. But, the analysis also shows that the propensity to engage in collective action in highly clientelistic settings cannot be entirely attributed to clientelism — pervasive as it may be. While clientelism is a more powerful predictor of collective action, concerns about public goods are also important drivers of the propensity to engage in collective action.

The tone in chapter seven gives an impression that clientelistic collective action is harmful to the ultimate goal of anti-corruption civic engagement, which is to establish impartiality as a governing principle. This may be true. Indeed, Mungiu-Pipiddi (2016) identifies clientelism as one of the biggest challenges facing bottom-up approaches. Likewise, as Beeskers and van Gool (2012:29) argue, “the social and political initiatives that ‘ordinary’ citizens develop in response to …neo-patrimonial neglect do not necessarily correspond to the ideals of ‘good governance’”. Nevertheless, it is possible that when it produces a strong propensity to defend interests through collective civic engagement (as it does in Nigeria), clientelism could provide a critical building block towards ultimately controlling abuses of power, even though it is likely to increase corruption in the interim.

Indeed, Johnston’s (2015) historical analysis suggests that ideas about accountability gained traction when organised interests sought to assert limits on political power. In particular, Johnston makes a point that initially, notions of ‘public goods’ and accountability were not part of the vocabulary of the groups challenging entrenched particularism and abuses of power. These ideas only became central at a later stage as by-products of political settlements. If support for impartiality as a governing principle is borne out of particularistic political contention, dismissing clientelistic collective action
might be akin to throwing the baby out with the bath water. Indeed, one might argue that in deeply divided and highly corrupt societies, clientelistic collective action represents what Johnston (2015) calls a half-way house towards deep democratization as an antidote for systemic corruption.

To the extent that this analysis is sound, it calls for an anti-corruption reform that goes with the proverbial grain rather than against it. In practice, this may involve organising an anti-corruption drive in line with the motivating forces of collective political action at local level, and importantly, changing the language of anti-corruption reform from its current emphasis on notions of ‘good governance’ “and a brighter future for all” to one that engages self-interest (Johnston 2015:648).

8.4. Principled principals? The resilience of collective efficacy to the corrosive impact of corruption

One of the recurring themes in collective action analysis of corruption is interpersonal trust, reciprocity and solidarity. As Bauhr and Grimes noted, “a key ingredient, perhaps the lynchpin, of a group’s ability to solve a social dilemma is the expectation that other actors are also willing and able to collaborate” (Bauhr and Grimes 2014:310). Part of chapter six examined how individual and context-level corruption influenced the belief in citizens’ ability to address corruption (i.e. anti-corruption collective efficacy). The results suggest, first, that an increase in the belief that citizens can fight corruption has a strong impact on support for anti-corruption mobilisation. Second, and more importantly, an increase in perceptions of corruption has a strong positive effect among individuals with a strong sense of collective efficacy to tackle corruption. Curiously, regardless of the level of corruption in their countries, those who strongly believe that people can fight corruption have a higher propensity to support citizens’ efforts. The context characterised by high levels of corruption erodes the propensity of low-trust/efficacy individuals to support collective action tactics. Thus, the gap in propensity to support collective action between low-trust individuals and their high trusting counterparts gets wider as context-level corruption increases.

Further analysis confirms that institutional characteristics of countries have the strongest effect among those with the lowest belief in the ability of ordinary people to tackle
corruption. This is why high trust individuals have roughly the same propensity to support collective civic engagement regardless of where they live while the opposite is true for low trust individuals. Overall, these results indicate that rational choice institutionalism, on which collective action analysis is premised only accounts for how low trusting individuals are likely to behave in both high-corruption societies and their low-corruption counterparts. This study is the first to articulate these findings using public opinion data on Africa.

Nevertheless, these results are broadly consistent with the findings of Habyriamana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2009). These authors’ laboratory experiments in Uganda show that individuals who possess strong other-regarding attitudes are significantly more likely to co-operate compared to non-altruistic individuals. This difference in propensity to co-operate in public-goods settings was not significant when the context was altered by introducing an enforcer in subsequent prisoner dilemma games. An enforcer’s presence increased, substantially, the propensity of non-altruistic people to co-operate in public goods’ provision. On the contrary, this possibility of punishment had a very weak effect on the propensity of the altruistic group to co-operate. Indeed, quite in line with the results of this dissertation, “once punishment was permitted within the game, the difference in co-operation rates between egoists and non-egoists almost completely disappeared”, suggesting that “expectations of sanctioning contribute substantially to co-operation among subjects, especially egoists” (Habyriamana et al 2009:114).

The practical implication of these findings is that low trusters are more likely to join anti-corruption collective action where corruption is less of a problem. This increases the number of people willing to take a stand against corruption, which in turn, sets in motion the virtuous cycle of trust, co-operation and regard for public interest that characterise low corruption societies. Although the proportion of individuals willing to fight corruption is smaller in high-corruption settings, the situation is not hopeless. Since the attitudes of low trusters are more malleable and indeed strongly influenced by contextual factors, political leaders’ show of commitment to institutional reforms can create the assurance that low trusters need before committing themselves to anti-corruption efforts. An information revealing genuine efforts of the government to fight corruption can change the views of low trust individuals, significantly increasing the number of people in society who are willing to work with others to tackle corruption. But, most importantly,
individuals are more likely to be motivated by beliefs and behavioural examples of other ordinary people. For this reason, it is important that high trust/efficacy individuals are given a platform to instil the belief in the ability of ordinary people to challenge corruption (Hoffman and Patel 2017).

8.5. Directions for future research

The mobilising effect of the experience of bribery and the strong positive effect of corruption perceptions in poor countries suggest that a grass-roots anti-corruption drive is most likely to receive support in Africa’s poorest societies. What future studies can help us establish is whether this willingness to support a grass-roots anti-corruption drive can act as an effective anti-dote against systematic and systemic abuses of power. In particular, future studies could shed light on the contextual conditions under which bottom-up approaches can be sustained and eventually succeed to change the ‘corrupt’ institutional equilibrium to a non-corrupt one. They could examine whether the initial contextual conditions (e.g. economic development) that provoke the willingness to support anti-corruption collective action also act to sustain it.

Apart from that, future studies should examine whether the propensity for anti-corruption support varies significantly by the type of public institution. Results of that analysis will be more useful for targeted anti-corruption mobilisation. For instance, if it is found that paying bribes to police officers is more annoying than paying extra to get a passport or permit, it would be better for anti-corruption campaigns to put more emphasis on police services. Similarly, future studies could examine whether perceiving widespread corruption in the policy implementation institutions (police, judiciary and government officials) has a different mobilisation impact to the perception of corruption in policy-making institutions (MPs, local councillors and political parties). Are people annoyed more by corruption in the service delivery/policy implementation institutions than other institutions of the state? Furthermore, studies can also examine the effect of the specific types of corruption (e.g. election fraud) as well as the impact of the onset of major corruption scandals on willingness to engage in anti-corruption collective action.

This study has noted that individuals who perceive high levels of corruption are consistently more likely to say that there is nothing people can do about corruption. On
the other hand, bribers are consistently more likely to reject this statement. Researchers can explore in more details the empirical manifestation of ‘resignation’, including providing a full profile of the individual most likely to feel fatalistic as a result of corruption. It is important to examine whether fatalism manifests in a similar way across socio-economic classes. Finally, studies can also look into the relationship between a sense of resignation and propensity to adopt what Alam (1995) described as evasive countervailing action (Alam 1995) or what Hirschman (1970) called the exit option — a strategy that is often adopted by educated people living in high corrupt societies. Do those who exit (e.g. leave the city, country, organisation etc) feel nothing can be done about corruption?
186

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Variables used in the study

Table A3: Variables used in the study

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Exact wording</th>
<th>Variable construction information and supplementary notes</th>
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| Preferred action against suspected acts of corruption (Round three) | What, if anything, would you do to try to resolve each of the following situations: You suspected a school or clinic official of stealing?  
1= Don’t worry, things will be resolved given enough time, 2= Lodge a complaint through proper channels or procedures, 3= Use connections with influential people, 4= Offer a tip or bribe, 5= Join in public protest, 7=Nothing, because nothing can be done. | | |
| Most effective action against corruption by an ordinary person | What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to help combat corruption in this country?  
[Interviewer: Do not read options. Code from response.]  
0= Nothing / Ordinary people cannot do anything  
1= Refuse to pay bribes  
2= Report corruption when you see or experience it  
3= Vote for clean candidates or parties or for parties that promise to fight corruption  
4= Speak out about the problem, for example, by calling a radio program or writing a letter  
5= Talk to friends and relatives about the problem  
6= Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight against corruption  
7= Join or support an organization that is fighting corruption | |
| Bribe paid index | In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials to: A) Get a Document or a permit? B) Get a child into school? C) Get a household service (like piped water, electricity or phone)? D) Get medicine or medical attention? E) Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)? 0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice, 2 = A few times, 3 = Often | Maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.70 for both rounds three and six. |
| Corruption perception index | How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A) The president and officials in his office? B) Members of Parliament? C) Elected local government councillors? D) National Government Officials? E) Local government officials? F) Police? G) Tax officials? H) Judges and magistrates? 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2 = Most of them, 3 = All of them | Maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.80 for both rounds three and six |
| Lived Poverty Index (LPI) | Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: A) Enough food to eat? B) Enough clean water for home use? C) Medicines or medical treatment? D) Enough fuel to cook your food? E) A cash income? Never= 0, Just once or twice=1, Several times=2, many times=3, Always=4 | Maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value of more than 0.75 for both rounds three and six |
| Relative living conditions | In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared with those of other countrymen? | |
| Education | What is the highest level of education you have completed? | |
| Organisational membership | Please tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an | |
| Support for investigative media | Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.  
**[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or agree very strongly?]**  
Statement 1: The news media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption.  
Statement 2: Too much reporting on negative events, like government mistakes and corruption, only harms the country.  
Agree Very Strongly With Statement 1  
Agree with Statement 1  
Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2  
Agree with Statement 2 |

| Support for citizens’ involvement in political accountability | Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.  
**[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or agree very strongly?]**  
Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.  
Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.  
Agree Very Strongly With Statement 1  
Agree with Statement 1  
Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2  
Agree with Statement 2 |
| Support for democracy | Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?  
STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  
STATEMENT 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.  
STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. |  
| Institutional trust index | How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? The president; Parliament; The National electoral commission; Tax department; The army; The police; Elected local government officials; Courts of law.  
0 = Not at all, 1 = Just a little, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = A lot | Maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation extracted one solution with a scale reliability of 0.89 |  
| Protest attendance | Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year: Attended a demonstration or protest march? |  
| Political interest | How interested would you say you are in public affairs? |  
| News media use | How often do you get news from the Radio? |  
| Internet use | How often do you use the internet? |  
| Generalized interpersonal trust | *Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?*  
1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 = You must be very careful | Only asked in round three |  
| Corruption tolerance index | For each of the following, please indicate whether you think the act is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable.  
A. A government official gives a job to someone | These questions were only asked in round three.  
Scale reliability = 0.67 |
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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<td>from his family who does not have adequate qualifications</td>
<td>B. A government official demands a favour or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. A public official decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters lived</td>
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| Support for citizens’ right to complain | For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose.:
|                                        | Complain to government officials when public services are of poor quality: |
|                                        | 0=Never do |
|                                        | 1= Do if they choose |
|                                        | 2= Always do |

| Perceived ethnic marginalisation       | How often, if ever, are ___________s [Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government? [Read out options] [If respondent did not identify any group on Q87– that is, IF they REFUSED to answer (9998), DIDN’T KNOW (9999), or said “Zambian only” (9990) – then circle 7 = Not Applicable for questions Q88A and Q88B and continue to question Q89.] |
|                                      | 0= Never |
|                                      | 1= Sometimes |
|                                      | 2= Often |
|                                      | 3= Always |

| Ethnic identification                 | Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Motswana and being a ________ [R’s ETHNIC GROUP]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? [If respondent did not identify any group on Q87 – that is, IF they REFUSED to answer (9998), DIDN’T KNOW (9999), or said “Motswana only” (9990) – then circle 7 = Not Applicable for questions 88A and 88B and continue to question 89.] |
|                                      | 5= I feel only Motswana |
4= I feel more Motswana than 
__________ [insert R’s ethnic group]  
3= I feel equally Motswana and 
__________ [insert R’s ethnic group]  
2= I feel more _________ [insert R’s 
ethnic group] than Motswana  
1= I feel only _________ [insert R’s 
etnic group]  
7= Not applicable [Do not read]  
9= Don’t know [Do not read]  

| Assessment of government performance index | How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]  
| A. Managing the economy |  
| B. Creating jobs |  
| C. Keeping prices stable |  
| D. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor |  
| E. Reducing crime |  
| F. Improving basic health services |  
| G. Addressing educational needs |  
| H. Delivering household water |  
| I. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat |  
| J. Fighting corruption in government |  
| K. Combating HIV/AIDS |  
| 1= Very Badly |  
| 2= Fairly Badly |  
| 3= Fairly Well |  
| 4= Very Well |  

| Assessment of government’s anti-corruption effort | How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]  
| Fighting corruption in government |  

### Clientelism variables from round six data for chapter seven

#### Contact index  
Q24. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [Read out options]  
A. A local government councillor  
B. A Member of Parliament  
C. An official of a government agency  
D. A political party official  
E. Traditional leaders  
F. Religious leaders  

Multiply 25(A) and 25 (B) as explained in chapter.
Q25. Thinking of the last time you contacted any of these leaders. Did you go: [If respondent answered 0=Never for ALL PARTS of Q24, i.e. they NEVER contacted any of these leaders, circle code 7=Not applicable in both parts of Q25]
A. Alone or with a group?
   1= Alone
   2= with a group
   7= Not applicable
   9= Don’t know
B. To discuss a community problem or a personal problem?
   1= Community problem
   2= Personal problem
   7= Not applicable
   9= Don’t know

| Support for clientelism variable | 26. For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose. Request personal assistance like help with school fees or funeral expenses from elected leaders
   0=Never do
   1= Do if they choose
   2= Always do |
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<tr>
<td>Only asked in round six</td>
<td><strong>Clientelism variables from round five for chapter seven</strong></td>
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| **Support for clientelism 1 (round 5 survey)** | Statement 2: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group over others.  
   1= Agree very strongly with statement 1  
   2= Agree with statement 1  
   3= Agree very strongly with statement 2  
   4= Agree with statement 2 |
| **Support for clientelism 2 (round 5 survey)** | Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.  
   Statement 1: The government is like a parent. It should decide what is good for us.  
   Statement 2: The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should tell government what to do  
   1= Agree very strongly with statement 1  
   2= Agree with statement 1  
   Responses 1 and 2 were combined to form a single category as were responses 3 and 4 |
### Measure of political clientelism from Varieties of democracy (V-DEM) data set

**Question:**
Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national Budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures?

**Clarification:**
Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork,” “clientelistic,” or “private goods.” Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

**Responses:**
0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is public-goods.
2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) is particularistic.
4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

V-DEM data Version 6.2 and codebook are available at:

### Measure of civil Society robustness (Core civil society index) (V-DEM)

This core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

This index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtctpt). The original index ranges from 0 to 1.

V-DEM data and codebook are available at:
### Appendix 2: Regression tables for the robustness checks in chapter five

Table 5.1A: Generalised ordered logit regression model of preferred action against corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>Robust Std. Err.</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>P values</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Acquiescents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>-0.177  0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perceptions</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>-0.029  0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational membership</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>2.180</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.005   0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.990</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>-0.082  0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for corruption</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>2.930</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.083   0.418</td>
</tr>
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<td>Persons living conditions</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-1.450</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.114  0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative living condition</td>
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<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>-0.064  0.068</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.890</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.135   0.315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
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<td>0.020</td>
<td>4.820</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.059   0.139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>-0.003  0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-4.460</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.247  -0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised trust</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>-0.123  0.251</td>
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<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.076   0.175</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>-0.051  0.051</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.629</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>18.360</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.455   1.803</td>
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<td><strong>Carefree</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
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<td>0.080</td>
<td>-0.440</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>-0.193  0.122</td>
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<td>0.051</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>-0.029  0.170</td>
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<td>0.020</td>
<td>3.380</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.028   0.104</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.990</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>-0.082  0.027</td>
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<td>Tolerance for corruption</td>
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<td>0.075</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.266   0.559</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.162   0.325</td>
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<td>t-Value</td>
<td>p-Value</td>
<td>Lower CI</td>
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<td>-4.460</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
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<td>4.980</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.988</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.390</td>
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<td>-0.029</td>
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<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.990</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.706</td>
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<td>-0.760</td>
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<td>0.762</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Std. Err.</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
<td>z</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.098</td>
<td>4.840</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>3.780</td>
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<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>-0.133 - 0.121</td>
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<td>0.111</td>
<td>-1.680</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.404 - 0.031</td>
</tr>
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<td>-1.190</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>-0.169 - 0.041</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.430</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.028 - 0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-2.050</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.291 - 0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>-0.050 - 0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>-2.950</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.021 - 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>-0.155 - 0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised trust</td>
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<td>0.123</td>
<td>2.840</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.108 - 0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>3.960</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.114 - 0.339</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.127</td>
<td>2.110</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.019 - 0.518</td>
</tr>
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<td>-12.910</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-3.323 - 2.447</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Dependent variable is ‘prefer anti-corruption protests’. Country fixed effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table.

Table 5.3A: Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferred action against corruption (Round six data)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative living condition</th>
<th>0.054** (0.02)</th>
<th>0.084*** (0.02)</th>
<th>0.039 (0.03)</th>
<th>0.128*** (0.03)</th>
<th>0.091** (0.03)</th>
<th>0.053 (0.04)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal living conditions</td>
<td>0.067*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.062*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.021 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.084*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived poverty</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.017*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.024*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.018** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education attainment</td>
<td>0.084*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.096*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.063*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.037** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.076*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.064** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.046 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.084** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.128** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.127* (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.161 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.003* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.005** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.004* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.011*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.097*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.115*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.141*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.097*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.078** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.119** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership</td>
<td>0.051** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.101*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.070* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.151*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.156** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.145** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.267*** (0.14)**</td>
<td>0.096 (0.12)</td>
<td>-1.858*** (0.19)</td>
<td>-1.616*** (0.18)</td>
<td>0.229** (0.09)</td>
<td>-2.640*** (0.34)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Country fixed effects</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Dependent variable: preferred action against corruption
*= Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%
Country dummies included in regression but omitted from the table
### Appendix 3: Full regression tables for chapter six

Table 6.1A: Multilevel complimentary log-log regression predicting support for collective action against corruption

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
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**Country-level variables and cross-level interactions**

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## Intercept

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## Variance of the intercept

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## Variance of perceptions of corruption

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## Variance of bribery experience

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## Variance of collective efficacy

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### Model statistics

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### Notes:

Dependent variable is support for anti-corruption collective action
Standard errors in parentheses

*** = p< 0.01, ** = p<0.05
p<0.1 (considered for country-level variables and cross-level interactions only)
Table 6.2A. Full multilevel complimentary log-log regression showing the effect of ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation and ethnic diversity at country level

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<td>Relative ling cond.</td>
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<td>Associational membership</td>
<td>0.032*</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnic group marginalisation</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ethnic identification</td>
<td>-0.031**</td>
<td>-0.031**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: Supplemental tables for chapter seven

Table 7.1A. Logistic regression model of support for citizens’ involvement in governance processes (based on round six data set)

|                                | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------------------------|-------|------------------|-------|-----|----------------------|
| **Clientelism variables**      |       |                  |       |     |                      |
| Contact Political leaders & reasons |       |                  |       |     |                      |
| Alone_community                | 0.501 | 0.238            | 2.110 | 0.035 | 0.035 - 0.967        |
| Group_personal                 | 0.037 | 0.234            | 0.160 | 0.873 | -0.421 - 0.495       |
| Alone Personal                 | 0.020 | 0.150            | 0.130 | 0.894 | -0.273 - 0.314       |
| Group_community                | 0.613 | 0.213            | 2.880 | 0.004 | 0.195 - 1.031        |
| Attitude toward clientelism    |       |                  |       |     |                      |
| Control variables                          | Coef.  | Robust Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|   | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|------------------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| Ask only if they choose                   | 0.193  | 0.137            | 1.410 | 0.159 | -0.076               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.463                |
| Always ask for help                       | 0.043  | 0.145            | 0.300 | 0.767 | -0.241               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.327                |
| Perceptions of corruption                 | 0.224  | 0.095            | 2.360 | 0.018 | 0.038                |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.410                |
| Experience of bribery                     | 0.248  | 0.291            | 0.850 | 0.394 | -0.322               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.818                |
| Quadratic term of bribery                 | -0.126 | 0.157            | -0.800| 0.421 | -0.433               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.181                |
| Institutional trust                       | 0.197  | 0.084            | 2.360 | 0.018 | 0.033                |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.361                |
| Education                                 | 0.012  | 0.030            | 0.410 | 0.683 | -0.047               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.072                |
| Organisational membership                | -0.120 | 0.063            | -1.910| 0.056 | -0.243               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.003                |
| Rural                                     | -0.065 | 0.115            | -0.560| 0.574 | -0.291               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.161                |
| gender                                    | -0.327 | 0.112            | -2.910| 0.004 | -0.548               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | -0.107               |
| Ethnic marginalisation                    | -0.168 | 0.059            | -2.870| 0.004 | -0.283               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | -0.053               |
| Strength of ethnic identification         | -0.119 | 0.044            | -2.670| 0.008 | -0.206               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | -0.032               |
| Lived Poverty Index                      | -0.153 | 0.062            | -2.460| 0.014 | -0.275               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | -0.031               |
| Relative living cond.                    | 0.080  | 0.055            | 1.440 | 0.150 | -0.029               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.189                |
| Political interest                       | -0.120 | 0.058            | -2.070| 0.038 | -0.234               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | -0.007               |
| Attended protest                          | -0.273 | 0.155            | -1.760| 0.078 | -0.576               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 0.031                |
| Intercept                                | 0.651  | 0.400            | 1.630 | 0.104 | -0.133               |
|                                           |        |                  |       |       | 1.434                |

**Notes**

The binary dependent variable is support for citizens’ involvement in governance processes.

Coded:

0= It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.

1= It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.

Standard errors are robust.

Table 7.2A. Logistic regression model of support for citizens’ involvement in governance processes (based on round five data set)
People are the bosses and should tell government what to do vs. Govt is like a parent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables</th>
<th>0.267</th>
<th>0.099</th>
<th>2.70</th>
<th>0.007</th>
<th>0.073</th>
<th>0.461</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of corruption</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.463</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of bribery</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational membership</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic marginalisation</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ethnic identification</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Poverty Index</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative living cond.</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attended protests</td>
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<td>0.173</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.835</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.150</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>-2.39</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-2.092</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
The binary dependent variable is support for citizens’ involvement in efforts to hold officials accountable.
Coded:
0= It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.
1= It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.

Standard errors are robust.