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Open-Street CCTV in Australia: The Politics of Resistance and Expansion*

Adam Sutton¹ and Dean Wilson²

Abstract

This paper summarizes the first systematic attempt to document and assess the extent of open-street CCTV systems in Australia. In addition to providing empirical data, this paper argues that it is tempting for Australian scholars, and those elsewhere, to view the UK ‘surveillance revolution’ as the harbinger of inevitable global trends sweeping across jurisdictions. However analysis of the Australian data suggests that the deployment of CCTV in other national contexts may follow substantially divergent patterns. While the Australian CCTV experience follows many trends exhibited in other nations, it is nevertheless significant that the diffusion of CCTV in Australia has been more restrained than in the UK. We suggest that the divergence between the UK and Australian experiences resides in contrasting political structures and the consequent variation in the strength of debate and resistance at the local level.

Introduction

While Australia achieved formal independence from Britain more than a century ago, legacies from our colonial history – reflected not just in a shared language but in political, educational, other cultural and administrative traditions – are considerable. Australian criminologists continue to rely far more on British journals and key texts (e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973; Cohen, 1985; Garland, 1996; 2001) than on theory and research from North America or continental Europe. Our laws, courts, police, corrections and other criminal justice procedures and institutions still bear the imprint of their English progenitors.

The consequence of this lingering influence is a tendency to perceive innovations in Australian crime policy and social control merely as variants of grand narratives being played out in the British context. Nowhere is the temptation greater than in the field of open-street closed circuit television (CCTV). Compared with the United Kingdom, which has seen massive expansion in schemes since the mid-1990s, Australian experience with open-street CCTV is inchoate.

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According to Williams, Johnstone and Goodwin (2000) by the end of 1999 the United Kingdom had at least 530 town centre schemes operating or scheduled for establishment. By contrast, Australian State, Territory and local authorities had implemented just 33 systems by the end of 2002. Australian research is also underdeveloped.

The current paper summarizes the first systematic attempt to document and assess open-street CCTV systems in Australia. Based on site inspections, reviews of documentation and interviews with system managers and other relevant personnel, it aims to understand economic and political forces promoting the spread of this new control technology. It also explores factors that have hindered implementation. Compared with Britain, Australia has been slow to join the ‘surveillance revolution’. We want to explore why this has been the case.

Our starting point is to contest conventional wisdom about reasons for installing open-street CCTV. The ‘official’ rationale is that it is a cost effective way to combat public crime and disorder. Considerable Home Office and other funds have been expended on efforts to demonstrate this. Both Australian and British (Mackay, 2003) experience suggests, however, that reasons for resorting to public space CCTV are more complex. While specific incidents of crime and disorder can be important triggers, less tangible factors such as a general decline in feelings of safety in public in the late-modern era, the tendency for security to be commodified, and competition between and within urban venues to attract and retain consumers (Garland, 2001: 154-165; Zedner, 2000: 208-209; McCahill, 2002: 12-13) are critical in fuelling demands for ‘something to be done’.

Whether this ‘something’ takes the form of closed circuit television depends, however, on crime prevention and community safety mechanisms and cultures in place at the local level and on economic, legislative and other interchanges that may be occurring between these groups and central authorities charged with developing and implementing State- or nation-wide strategies. Australian experience may be revelatory in this respect. In our view, it suggests that the advent and spread of open-street CCTV may be more contingent, and that there may be more scope for individual and collective interventions to try to reshape, resist and ‘manage’ this phenomenon, than readings of British experience seem to allow.

Methodology

Our study involved semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 34 personnel involved in the daily operation of CCTV schemes in 22 locations throughout Australia. In most cases interview subjects were program managers, although in several locations responsibility for CCTV was divided between policy and security divisions of local government (in which case all relevant personnel were approached). Police were also interviewed in many locations. Information on the remaining 11 schemes was gathered via telephone interviews.

The final report (Wilson and Sutton, 2003) provides an overview of Australian open-street CCTV systems and documents the social and governmental context of system installation, administering bodies, funding arrangements, operator training, codes of practice and mechanisms.
of accountability. In this paper we focus on factors leading to the implementation of CCTV. As noted we see this analysis as providing useful insights into the reasons proliferation of CCTV in Australian public spaces has been relatively modest compared with the UK.

**Open-Street CCTV in Australia: An Overview**

As with the UK (Williams, 2003), closed circuit television was first introduced into Australia in the mid 1960s, with use initially restricted to retail environments, sports stadiums and specialised police surveillance operations. The early 1990s saw dramatic reductions in the cost of equipment, and the local CCTV market expanded rapidly (LAACT, 1996: 3). Australia’s first open-street CCTV system commenced operation in Perth, Western Australia, in July 1991. A 1996 national review by the ACT Standing Committee on Legal Affairs identified 13 ‘town centre’ CCTV systems in operation. The number has since expanded to 33, with the Northern Territory being the only Australian jurisdiction without CCTV surveillance in public spaces. While systems were initially located in the town centres of capital cities, there has been a noticeable trend towards public surveillance in regional, rural and suburban locations. It should be noted however that systems are not evenly distributed across Australian States. Open-street CCTV is disproportionately concentrated in New South Wales, which has eleven systems, and its northern neighbour Queensland, which has ten (see Table 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>State or Territory</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
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*Table 1: Number of Australian Open-Street CCTV Systems by State or Territory (As at October 2002)*

Current systems vary in size from small two camera record-only schemes through to Australia’s largest installation in Perth, Western Australia, which consists of 105 cameras monitored by three operators twenty-four hours a day. The complexity of management structures also varies. Larger capital cities – such as Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane – tend to separate day-to-day operations and policy functions. Smaller authorities tend to rely more on the efforts of an individual. Operators are predominately drawn from private security firms, but police, local
government employees and in some locations volunteers are also responsible for camera monitoring (Wilson, forthcoming).

The relatively low number of open-street CCTV systems in Australia is certainly not due to legislative impediments. No specific State or Territory legislation covers CCTV surveillance in public areas. Overt surveillance, of which town centre CCTV systems are one form, has recently been the subject of inquiry by law reform commissions in two Australian States (NSWLRC, 1997; 2001; VLRC, 2001). As a recent New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) report noted: ‘there is very little to fetter the unrestricted use of overt surveillance, other than codes which are adhered to voluntarily and lack sanctions for breach, or a patchwork of common law remedies which are inapplicable in the vast majority of cases’ (NSWLRC, 2001: 150).

Funding for open-street CCTV in Australia predominantly comes from local authorities. Twenty out of Australia’s thirty-three systems were established solely through local government resources. The remaining thirteen were financed through a combination of private sources, State government contributions and local government input. The ongoing operation of CCTV also depends primarily on local government. Twenty-two systems rely exclusively on local authorities for ongoing finance, while ten supplement this with some form of business levy. Three Australian councils (Brisbane, Gold Coast and Logan) fund their operations entirely through a business levy.

Until very recently, State governments have been marginal players in the establishment of CCTV. They have provided funding for specific systems, but without any clear policy rationale. State governments have also boasted little in the way of useful expertise for local governments contemplating CCTV. The Australian situation stands in sharp contrast to that in the UK, where there is strong central government support for CCTV, articulated most clearly through CCTV Challenge competitions and substantial funding – by 1995 78% of the Home Office crime prevention budget (Williams and Johnstone, 2000: 188-189).

While the picture has generally been that CCTV has been championed from the local level, there are indications that the Australian scene is transforming and entering a period of increased State government involvement. In the lead up to the 1999 Victorian election Steve Bracks, then leader of the Labor opposition and now State Premier, pledged to boost the number of surveillance cameras in Melbourne as part of a ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ platform (Herald Sun, 7/04/99: 15). In NSW a promised five million dollars towards the funding of CCTV for towns in the west of the State was a key element of the opposition National Party’s election platform in 2002 (Weekend Liberal, 20/07/02: 3). Even representatives of the security industry have noted ‘the increasing willingness of politicians using the implementation of surveillance cameras as election carrots’ (Dolahenty, 1999: 16-17). However bold statements by State politicians at election times have generally not yet resulted in policies of concerted and sustained support for CCTV. Despite rhetorical flourishes, Queensland is the only Australian State government to have emerged as an unabashed promoter of CCTV through a system of ongoing funding comparable to that operated by the UK Home Office.
In Queensland, state funding for CCTV in public space is becoming increasingly common. Since 1999 the Queensland State Government’s Department of Local Government and Planning has administered a Security Improvement Program (SIP) offering funding for local government security initiatives. The Queensland Premier’s Department has also recently released guidelines for councils considering the installation of CCTV (2002). The SIP initiative is located within the Queensland Government’s statewide crime prevention strategy Building Safer Communities. SIP grants offer councils up to 50% funding for the establishment of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) projects, and application guidelines specifically mention ‘surveillance equipment in malls and other public places’ (QDLGP, 2002: 6). While incentives under the Queensland system are not nearly as lucrative as in Britain, councils are taking advantage of the program. Three new systems – Cairns, Rockhampton and Logan – have been established with the aid of State government funding. Additional systems aided by the funding scheme are planned (ABC Regional News, 2003). Clearly, the Queensland State Government is beginning to exert a measure of influence over the nature of local CCTV systems and is playing a very active role in promoting future growth.

Australia’s most populous State, New South Wales, is also exhibiting increasing interest in locally based surveillance systems. In contrast to Queensland, however, it has been wary about making a general commitment to direct funding. Its main role has been to provide guidelines and other forms of indirect supervision. As early as 1996 the NSW Police Service prepared guidelines outlining community consultation procedures for the establishment of CCTV (NSWLRC, 1997). In 1999 the NSW Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention established an Inter-Departmental Committee on Closed Circuit Television (IDCCCTV). The Committee included representatives of the Departments of Local Government, Transport, Urban Affairs and Planning, Attorney General’s and the NSW Police Service. The specific intention was to exert a greater degree of central control over the operation of CCTV (interview with Policy Coordinator, NSW Police Service, 7 June 2002). The Committee oversaw the development of State government guidelines, released in 2000 and subsequently evaluated by private consultants.3 The NSW Police Service has also released its own policy stipulating that police are neither to ‘fund nor operate equipment’ (NSWPS, 2002).

In jurisdictions other than Queensland, central governments have tended to commit funds to local CCTV surveillance on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, in instances where perceived crime and disorder are attracting intense media and public attention. In 1996, for example, the New South Wales government contributed fifty percent of the installation cost ($A325,000) of a fourteen camera CCTV system in the South West Sydney suburb of Cabramatta, as part of police attempts to combat high profile street trafficking in heroin. Cabramatta had, and to some extent retains, the reputation of Australia’s ‘heroin capital’. The area has been the subject of concentrated law enforcement initiatives and sustained media attention, much of it negative. In the mid 1990s,  

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Cabramatta became the subject of a moral panic over ‘Asian criminality’ that fed into broader political debates surrounding immigration and multiculturalism. Cabramatta thus became the symbolic locus of State political efforts to combat a street heroin trade linked through media reporting to ‘Asian Organized Crime’. These perceptions differed considerably from the social reality of an ethnically heterogenous suburb (Maher et al., 1997: 3). Nevertheless the system has subsequently been expanded to 23 cameras, and is monitored 24 hours a day, seven days a week, by a private security contractor. Vision is also transmitted to the Cabramatta Police Station (Fairfield City Council, 2001).

In Western Australia the State Government provided $A150 000 for the installation of a system of nine cameras in the central area of the Perth suburb of Claremont, as part of ongoing WA Police investigations of several high profile abductions and murders of young women. In 2000 the Police Task Force investigating these crimes informed the municipality that the cameras were no longer required for its work. However the Town of Claremont opted to continue to fund the system (Wilson and Sutton, 2003: 24). In May 2001 the Australian Capital Territory government provided funds for a fifteen-camera system in the Civic area, one of Canberra’s main entertainment precincts, after widespread media and public concerns about vandalism, harassment, assaults, drunkenness, drug dealing and offensive behaviour. Cameras were installed as a final element of a Safer City campaign that also included an increased police presence and CPTED projects to improve natural surveillance. In 1995 the South Australian government contributed a third of the $A530 000 installation cost of a twelve-camera system to monitor behaviour in Rundle Mall: a notorious ‘hotspot’ for antisocial behaviour in the State’s capital city. Subsequent years have seen significant expansion in the size (now 33 cameras) and geographical reach of this system. The Tasmanian government also has provided support for three town centre systems – in Hobart, Launceston and Devonport – after concerns had been expressed about crime and disorder (Wilson and Sutton, 2003: 26-29).

**The Local Politics of CCTV**

Whilst the preceding discussion has emphasized that while Australian governments have played some role in funding CCTV systems, this has tended to be more on the basis of political expediency than a UK-style coordinated central policy. In jurisdictions other than Queensland, whether or not a system is installed has depended very much on local contingencies. From our interviews alone, the nature of these contingencies was not always apparent. When asked why their centres had opted for CCTV, most system managers commented that it was to combat loosely defined ‘anti-social behaviour’. Closer analysis of documentation and other relevant materials suggested however that in Australia, as in Britain, its installation has been inextricably linked to attempts to rejuvenate town centres, stimulate local commerce and attract investment (Reeve, 1998; Coleman and Sim, 1998; 2000).

The need to attract investment and visitors, and arrest decline, is clearly articulated in the Perth
CCTV Information Kit (2000). It provides the following background to the system:

The Central Business District was suffering a retail decline in the mid 1980s and the best efforts of the Council to rejuvenate the area were often offset by emotional stories in the media which generated an undesirable image of the city.

The formation of crime-control partnerships between local government and business to install CCTV systems dovetails with broader neo-liberal strategies of responsibilisation (O’Malley, 1997; Garland, 2001). Economics also helps explain the critical role local business has played in underwriting the installation and maintenance of many systems. Lismore, a northern New South Wales coastal town with a population of 43 000 whose economy depends in part on tourism, is a classic example. The main push for surveillance cameras emanated from the local Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber’s concern was that perceptions of rampant crime in the central commercial area were keeping shoppers away and damaging retail businesses. Even prior to the City Council’s giving serious consideration to the issue, the Chamber of Commerce and the local Rotary Club began a drive to raise funds for CCTV cameras. The Chamber remained actively involved in the planning process, and when cameras were finally installed in 1999 it contributed $A60 000: one-third of the total installation cost. Rotary West met a further third of installation costs. Local businesses continue to support the ongoing funding of CCTV through a levy imposed on properties (Interview with Building Manager, Lismore City Council, 28/08/02).

Lismore also demonstrates the ways business and politics tend to overlap in Australian local government. Pursuit by councillors of vested economic interests often translates into a ‘law and order’ impulse to exclude marginalized individuals or groups whose presence might undermine their region’s capacity to attract consumers and investors. ‘Law and order’ rhetoric has reverberated through the past decade of Australian politics (Hogg and Brown, 1998). This has been no less true for local government politicians than their State and Federal counterparts. To promise ratepayers a CCTV system is to demonstrate that Council is ‘tough on crime’. The clearest example of this was the installation of the Brisbane’s CCTV system in 1992. In the run up to mayoral elections, one candidate stood on a ‘law and order’ platform. CCTV formed part of the candidate’s election promise and, following a successful campaign, it was implemented with no examination of potential alternatives (Wilson and Sutton, 2003: 20).

Most Australian systems have been established with some level of political motivation, if less overt than was the case in Brisbane. CCTV systems are a powerful indication to communities that local government is doing something about crime. The political motivation to install CCTV also results from competitiveness between towns. It is clear that for some regions of Australia, having a CCTV system is now a symbol of municipal success. This is most notable in Queensland, where town centre systems have spread up the coast, and there is clearly a strong ‘me too’ factor at play. In regional areas, a CCTV system can serve as a statement of the community’s commitment to sustainability and growth, in the face of the ‘drift to the cities’ and the ongoing discourse of rural decline in Australian politics (McManus and Pritchard, 2000: 4-5).

Inter-regional competition, CCTV’s role as a signifier of progress and security, and the need for
public mall and street-based retailers to vie for customers with large enclosed shopping centres and other forms of ‘mass private space’ (Davis, 1990; White and Sutton, 1995) all provide strong impetus for the expansion of systems. We should note however, that even our research, which was based on the documentation of established schemes, disclosed evidence of resistance to these trends. In several locations, authorities have rejected plans for CCTV. In 1999, a feasibility study commissioned by Sydney’s Manly Council and the local Chamber of Commerce recommended against CCTV on the basis that such a system would not effectively address alcohol related offending – the predominant concern in the area.\(^5\) Another Sydney suburban council, Waverly, rejected a proposal on the grounds of expense and the need to investigate alternative strategies.\(^6\) In Newcastle a scheme that had been mooted for at least five years was shelved in favour of increased lighting and police presence. Such measures were suggested to be more cost effective than a camera scheme anticipated to cost $A500,000 (Newcastle Herald, 30/08/03: 8).

Ostensibly all of these rejections were for technical and financial reasons. However we suspect that sentiments about CCTV go much deeper. To some extent this has been confirmed by debates that followed the release of our summary report. One of our university media units decided to accompany it with a press release provocatively headlined ‘Cameras Fail To Reduce Crime’.\(^7\) This attracted concerted attention from local, State and national print and broadcast media (eg Daily Telegraph, 10/5/03: 12; Herald Sun, 10/5/03: 17), and feedback from many interested parties. A senior bureaucrat from a State crime prevention unit immediately contacted one of us to protest about the release. An agreement that the authors would help draft guidelines for open-street CCTV in Victoria was subsequently shelved as ‘the situation had changed’. Against this, however, there was an enthusiastic response from many local government based crime prevention and community safety officers. Numerous email and telephone requests for copies of the report were received. Many of these officers were delighted to hear about alleged problems with CCTV. This was because, as one commented, ‘we are getting a lot of pressure from police and traders here for cameras’. There were also requests to address councillors considering installing systems, presumably to help dissuade them from doing so.\(^8\)

What such feedback – and subsequent experience of one of the authors in conducting a feasibility study for the Northern Territory town of Alice Springs – expose is the contested nature of this phenomenon. Most officers charged with coordinating crime prevention and community safety at the local level are drawn from community development and welfare backgrounds. They are generally dedicated to programs that they see as attacking ‘root causes’

\(^7\) The media release is available online http://www.pso.adm.monash.edu.au/news/Story.asp?ID=980&SOrType=4. The original headline was changed at the request of one of the authors as it misrepresented the findings of the report, which was that available evidence failed to establish that cameras reduced crime, rather than conclusively establishing that they did not.
\(^8\) Private telephone and email communications with the author.
– for example deficits in education, welfare support and housing – and see video surveillance as either irrelevant or unhelpful.

The request for the Alice Springs study came in a context where a group of retailers in the town had been demanding the installation of security cameras in the central area, Todd Mall, for several years (Centralian Advocate, 25/1/02: 5). The town itself has a population of just 27,092, of whom a significant percentage (15%) are relatively disadvantaged indigenous Australians (Alice Springs Town Council, 2000: 70). The Town Council had initially resisted calls for cameras, arguing they would prove prohibitively expensive and that problems of security would be better addressed through improved lighting and police presence (Centralian Advocate, 8/1/02: 1). Following continued pressure from several retailers however, the Council had finally agreed to commission a feasibility study (Centralian Advocate, 25/1/02: 2).

During the consultancy local divisions over the CCTV issue became very apparent. Traders were far from united, although several were extremely vocal and had cultivated a close relationship with the major local newspaper, the Centralian Advocate. The NT Police in Alice Springs were unenthusiastic. Elected councillors were divided. Amongst council staff there was little support, as a lighting strategy had recently been implemented and its effects were to still to be determined. Moreover several were drawn from social and community work backgrounds, and objected to the CCTV proposal on the grounds that it would discriminate against disadvantaged members of the community and drain resources from social programs. The feasibility study found CCTV would be expensive and alternative measures would be more appropriate. The proposal was subsequently defeated (Centralian Advocate, 18/07/03: 1).

**Conclusion**

The politics of CCTV in Australia has, by and large, remained embedded in localised concerns about crime and disorder. This is not to say that the stories of Australia’s CCTV systems do not reflect global patterns. As Girling, Loader and Sparks note ‘crime resonates in both terms of the local/global dialectic’ (2000: 9). So too has the spread of CCTV in Australia been a combination of global and local concerns. Australian examples – Perth, Brisbane, Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney – could easily form the locus of discussions about surveillance and the ‘stranger society’, CCTV and the risk society or the securitisation and commodification of urban space. The politics of law and order too, is intimately imbricated with the spread of CCTV in Australia. Nevertheless local contingencies continue to restrain the unbridled proliferation of CCTV and its extension into a ‘fifth utility’ (Graham, 1998) along the lines of the English model.

Data in this paper confirm, then, that one level the expansion of open-street CCTV has been underpinned by broad social transformations affecting late modern societies, and giving rise to

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what Lyon (1994; 2001) has termed ‘surveillance societies’. As Garland (1996; 2001) and O’Malley (1999) point out, late modern societies, and Australia is no exception, now embrace two seemingly contradictory models of crime control. On the one hand a new set of symbols has emerged that evoke punitive and exclusionary emotions and which have an instinctive appeal to many in a culture infused with insecurity. On the other hand a managerialist ethos based upon economic reasoning and continual auditing and monitoring to ensure efficiency remains strong. This ethos seeks to establish ‘what works’ and then uniformly apply these techniques (Garland, 2001: 188-190). The appeal of CCTV – with its promise of ever closer scrutiny of ‘the other’ and its capacity to generate almost infinite volumes of data – is that it straddles these seemingly contradictory strands of late modern crime control. Despite all this, however, the spread of open-street CCTV has been far less rapid in Australia than in the UK. We attribute this to two interrelated factors.

The first is Australia’s federalist system of government. Because responsibility for police, courts and corrections has been with States and Territories rather than with the national government, the impetus for prevention has also tended to emanate from this ‘second tier’ (Sutton and Cherney, 2002: 327). By definition this has reduced the capacity for the centre to promote implementation of open-street CCTV in a highly coordinated way. With the possible exception of Queensland, State and Territory funding for CCTV has been ad hoc and in response to special circumstances.

The second is that this more dispersed and fragmented system of politics and administration seems to have provided greater opportunities for resistance to closed circuit television. Such resistance is by no means unique to Australia. As Norris and Armstrong (1999: 35) point out, in the 1980s many UK local authorities remained either ideologically or financially opposed to CCTV. Confronted with a Conservative administration committed to curbing public expenditure, CCTV was an expense few local government authorities contemplated. This only changed in the UK with the announcement of the CCTV Challenge Competition, which stimulated demand for CCTV well beyond the number of schemes actually funded (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 36-37). In Australia however the scene at the local level continues to be reminiscent of the UK in the 1980s. Within local contexts CCTV continues to be contested with some success.

Much of the resistance comes from what Skogan (1988: 42-43), in his excellent review of community based crime prevention in the US in the 70s and 80s, has termed the ‘insurgent’ approach to prevention. Local activists who embrace ‘insurgent’ philosophies tend to see the causes of crime as lying in economic and social inequality. They strive to address it by changing current distributions. Skogan contrasts them with what he terms ‘preservationists’: long term residents, home owners, small business and others with an interest in preserving the status quo and excluding any who might disrupt it.

The period of US history Skogan reviewed predated the widespread availability of open-street CCTV technology. From Australian experience it seems clear, however, that such surveillance techniques are likely to be favoured by ‘preservationists’. Up until now many local authorities have tended to reject CCTV largely, we suspect, because employees responsible for coordinating their crime prevention and community safety plans come from social and community
development backgrounds, and are likely to favour more ‘insurgent’ approaches (Sutton, 1997). Nevertheless, there are signs the Australian environment may be moving closer to a UK model of CCTV incentives distributed from the political centre. Queensland has followed this direction, and the State Premier has been quick to gain electoral mileage from funding CCTV, proclaiming offenders will be caught and punished with ‘the full force of the law’ (Sunday Mail, 23/02/03: 10). If other Australian jurisdictions adopt similar funding models the balance of power would be tipped decisively in favour of ‘preservationists’, who favour hard technical measures. The significance of local contexts, where CCTV is contested and alternative measures currently gain momentum, would likely be eroded. The ‘surveillance revolution’ of the UK is not an inevitable Australian future, however coordinated funding from the centre would make it probable.

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