Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?*

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Abstract

There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be “tricked” into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience.

Choice requires attention to what options are available, and attention may be imperfect. We study the competition between alternatives that want to be chosen by an imperfectly attentive chooser and select their own salience, namely the factors that lead to being noticed. This structure broadly fits several economic, political and social situations, as exemplified further below.

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If a chooser suffers from cognitive imperfections he will not always pick the best alternative. Even so, for some leading models of choice with errors the probability (or frequency) of choice of an alternative can still be used as an indicator of its quality. For instance, in the popular multinomial logit (or Luce) model, where the true value of an alternative is imperfectly perceived, the resulting probabilities of choice are proportional to utility values.\(^1\) But if instead the source of errors is the imperfect attention paid to alternatives with a given salience, this proportionality might not hold.\(^2\) The most chosen alternatives may simply be the most salient, not the best ones.

What happens when alternatives can set their own salience? Do strategic forces tend to correct choice errors caused by lack of attention? To answer these questions, we present a model of strategic salience that abstracts as much as possible from the specific nature of the alternatives. These could be politicians, producers, sexual partners, and so on. In this way, while we lose the details that colour any specific application, we are able to tease out some general relationships and mechanisms. Broadly speaking, we find that the key to the equilibrium relationship between quality and salience is the type of externalities that own salience has on the visibility of the other alternatives: positive externalities (in a sense to be made precise later) push in favour of the best alternative being also the most salient and the most chosen.

We use the concept of a consideration set (Wright and Barbour 1977, Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011a, 2011b; Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay 2012; Manzini and Mariotti 2014) as a tool to model agents with an imperfect ability or willingness to consider all the objects of choice

\(^1\)The logit model is equivalent to the maximisation of a utility perturbed with i.i.d. Gumbel distributed utility errors, a classical result due to Holman and Marley, as attributed in Luce and Suppes (1965), McFadden (1974) and Yellot (1977).

\(^2\)See e.g. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) and Brady and Rhebeck (2014).
that are physically available.\(^3\) In these models, an agent’s preference is only maximised on the subset of alternatives in the menu that the agent actively considers, or pays attention to, not necessarily on the whole menu. While obviously the consideration set is a theoretical construct that is not directly observable, there is evidence of situations in which the consideration set is strictly smaller than the menu (e.g. Sovinsky Goeree 2008 documents that purchasers of personal computers are typically not aware of all available models when making a choice).\(^4\)

That alternatives can influence the consideration set of the chooser is natural in disparate contexts. A minor politician can make an outrageous statement to get noticed by the media and thus enter the voters’ consideration set, but he will likely incur a cost in terms of credibility. A new product is offered at a discount in its early days. A single person in search of a partner can increase expenditure on hairdressing to get noticed. He may or may not like hairdressing: importantly, both situations will be captured in our model.

These examples also serve to illustrate a focal special case. If the aim of e.g. a political or promotional campaign is merely to generate awareness of say a candidate, outlet or brand (rather than to influence tastes) then it is natural to assume that awareness of one alternative is largely unaffected by the advertising campaigns for, and the awareness of, rival alternatives. Notably, this is a feature of Butters’ (1977) classical ‘mailbox’ model of informative advertising, in which a consumer is informed of a’s existence if a has dropped

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\(^3\)See also Roberts and Lattin (1997) and Shocker et al. (1991).

\(^4\)The failure to seriously consider all alternatives may in fact stem from several sources. It could, for example, be the outcome of a search process, or of ideological prejudice (e.g. Wilson 2008). While in the paper we focus for simplicity on the attention interpretation, the possibility of other interpretations should be borne in mind.
an ad in the agent’s mailbox. The empirical study by van Nierop et al. (2010) does suggest that the probability of being noticed is independent across alternatives.

Assume that while salience is endogenous, the quality of an alternative (its position in the preference ranking of the chooser) is fixed. In this setting, competition for attention between alternatives gives rise to an interesting strategic situation, which we call an attention game. Attention games can have a rich externality structure (unlike e.g. the superficially similar contest games; see section 5 for details), which we exploit in our results.

Proposition 1 shows that if there are no externalities, in the sense that alternatives can fully control the attention they get (though obviously not the probability with which they are chosen), then ‘the showier is the better’: once asymmetries in the technology of salience are netted out, it can never happen that an alternative is strictly more salient in equilibrium than a better alternative. Therefore, because whenever two alternatives are both noticed the inferior one cannot be chosen (recall that the chooser maximises within the consideration set), alternatives of better quality are chosen more often that all those of lower quality. The better and showier is also the more chosen.

In some respects this result holds under quite general conditions. For example, a remarkable fact is that virtually no restrictions are needed on the strategy sets and on the cost structure of salience. Indeed, it is not necessary to assume that increasing salience requires spending additional resources: the result goes through when generating salience is a costless or even rewarding activity (this is another fundamental difference between attention games and contest games), or when there is a mixture of these cases.

Part of this conclusion can be generalised to a larger class of games that have positive ex-
ternalities, in the sense that a weak supermodularity condition on the technology of salience is satisfied, and that alternatives do not damage the visibility of other alternatives by increasing own salience (Proposition 2). A shouting competition to get attention in a market is an example of a situation with negative externalities, while Butters’ (1977) model is an example with no externalities, and an industry in which a firm attracting attention to itself also attracts attention to the whole industry is an example of positive externalities.⁷

When alternatives lack full control on the attention they get and there may be harmful spillovers by rivals, no clear link between equilibrium salience and quality seem to exist. In this case salience may confound the quality ranking (Claim 1), but we also show that with a standard ‘Luce’ technology a the-best-is-the-showiest result is reinstated (Claim 2).

A different route to inferior alternatives being chosen with the highest probability is when salience is not a directional phenomenon but rather is contextual, in the sense that visibility depends on the alternative’s location in a space of characteristics in relation to the location of other alternatives - e.g. dressing in white when the others dress in black (Claim 3).

After introducing attention games (section 1) we present the main results in section 2. Section 3 describes situations with negative externalities, and section 4 situations of contextual salience. Section 5 discusses some related literature. Section 6 summarises and contains additional discussion and reference to the literature.

⁷An interesting example of positive externalities (in our sense) is provided by the idea in de Clippel, Eliaz and Rozen (2014): a market leader’s high salience might induce otherwise passive (inattentive) consumers to give closer scrutiny to the market as a whole. (Note that in their model this is not such good news, for there firms dislike attention!).
1 Attention games

Alternatives in a finite set $A = \{a_1, ..., a_n\}$ wish to be chosen by a chooser with imperfect attention. The chooser evaluates alternatives by means of a strict preference ordering $\succ$ on $A$. The position of an alternative in the ranking is its quality, with $a_i \succ a_j$ iff $i < j$.

The chooser maximises $\succ$ on a consideration set $C(A) \subseteq A$ of alternatives (the set of alternatives the chooser actively considers), which is formed stochastically in the manner explained below. When $C(A)$ is empty, the chooser is assumed to pick a default alternative $a^*$ (e.g. walking away from the shop, remaining without a partner, abstaining from voting).

The probability that an alternative $a_i$ belongs to $C(A)$ depends on a set of variables $\sigma_j \in \mathbb{R}$, $j = 1, ..., n$, one for each alternative. These variables indicate the ability of each alternative to attract attention (and possibly to dampen or increase the attention paid to the other alternatives). The strategy set for each $a_i$ is a subset $S \subset \mathbb{R}$. Unless otherwise specified, we need not assume any additional structure on $S$. We call $\sigma_i \in S$ the salience of $a_i$, and a list $\sigma = (\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_n) \in S^n$ a salience profile. As usual we write $\sigma_{-i}$ to denote the profile $\sigma$ with the $i^{th}$ entry omitted, $(\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_{i-1}, \sigma_{i+1}, ..., \sigma_n)$, and $(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i})$ to denote $\sigma$.

Given two vectors $v, v' \in \mathbb{R}^k$, $k \leq n$, we write $v \geq v'$ to signify $v_i \geq v'_i$ for all $i = 1, ..., k$.

The technology of salience is described by functions $p_i : S^n \to (0, 1)$, $i = 1, ..., n$. Each $p_i$ associates a salience profile with the probability of membership of $C(A)$ for $a_i$: that is, $p_i(\sigma)$ is the probability that $a_i$ is noticed when the salience profile is $\sigma$. We assume that these probabilities are interior, namely there is always an (arbitrarily small) positive probability of being noticed or of not being noticed, independently of salience. The only further assumption we make for the moment on the functions $p_i$ is the following:

**Own Monotonicity:** For all $i$, for all $\sigma \in S^n$: $\sigma_i > \sigma'_i \Rightarrow p_i(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}) > p_i(\sigma'_i, \sigma_{-i})$. 
Own Monotonicity stipulates that increasing one’s own salience strictly increases the probability of being noticed, whatever the salience of the other alternatives. An example of this type of function, which we will consider later in sections 3 and 5, takes the Luce form

\[ p_i(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma_i}{\sigma_1 + \ldots + \sigma_n} \]  

(1)

with the \( \sigma_i \)s chosen on a strictly positive domain.\(^8\) In this example, an increase in salience of an alternative is harmful to its competitors. While this is natural in some contexts, the opposite effect may occur in others. For instance, an alternative \( a_i \) which is similar to, or dominated by, another alternative \( a_j \) may make the latter more prominent, so that an increase in the salience of \( a_i \) also increases \( a_j \)'s visibility (the probability of it getting noticed). These possibilities are well known and documented in marketing science and psychology as the ‘similarity’ and ‘attraction’ effects.

The chooser picks the preferred alternative among those he considers. Therefore, the probability \( \rho_i(\sigma) \) that alternative \( a_i \) is chosen at a salience profile \( \sigma \) is the probability of the compound event that it is considered and that none of the better alternatives is considered, that is

\[ \rho_i(\sigma) = p_i(\sigma) \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k(\sigma)) \]

The payoff to each alternative is the probability of being chosen minus a (possibly negative) cost associated with the salience level that has been selected. An interpretation of this payoff function is that alternatives vie for one single chooser who chooses one alternative, yielding a unit payoff. Another interpretation is that alternatives face a continuum of identical choosers each of whom picks one alternative (the latter interpretation is adopted in Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011 as well as in Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2014).

\(^8\)We call this the Luce form in view of the Luce (1959) stochastic choice rule, popular in econometrics in the multinomial logit version.
The payoff to alternative $a_i$ for a pure strategy profile $\sigma$ is

$$\pi_i(\sigma) = \rho_i(\sigma) - e_i(\sigma_i)$$

where $e_i : S \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$. We make no further assumption on the functions $e_i$. In particular, $e_i$ may be convex or concave or neither, and may not be monotonic increasing. So $e_i$ can represent both costly effort (for example an advertising budget) and elation, when increasing salience is pleasurable at least on some range (for example, hairdressing to become salient in competition for sexual partners).

An attention game is denoted $(A, S, \pi)$, where $\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2, ..., \pi_n)$ with the $\pi_i$ defined above and satisfying Own Monotonicity.

An attention game has absolute salience if it satisfies the following condition:

**Absolute Salience**: for all $\sigma, \sigma'$ and for all $i$: $\sigma_i = \sigma'_i \Rightarrow p_i(\sigma) = p_i(\sigma')$

That is, an attention game with absolute salience is one in which an alternative can decide its own probability of being noticed independently of the salience choices by the other alternatives. Of course, even in this case the strategic situation is not trivial: the payoff of an alternative typically still depends on the salience profile, since it depends on the probability of being chosen which in turns is determined (for all alternatives except the best) by the salience profile. As noted before, the situation captured by absolute salience fits for example the case of when ads for an alternative merely have the function of making the chooser actively aware of the alternative (‘did you know that people who read book A also read book B?; ‘have you considered cycling to work’?). When salience is not absolute it is relative.

We study the pure strategy Nash equilibria of attention games.
2 Does salience reveal quality?

Obviously an alternative that has access to a superior salience technology might produce more salience in equilibrium. The interesting issue is what the intrinsic strategic incentives to become salient are in an attention game once we strip out such technological asymmetries. We exhibit environments where, when alternatives are ex-ante symmetric except for the difference in quality (they have access to the same technology of salience), the best alternative is guaranteed to have a highest salience level in equilibrium. In some of these environment, the stronger property holds that the equilibrium salience order (weakly) correlates with the quality order. In this case, a strictly higher salience is always (not just for the best alternative) diagnostic of strictly higher quality.

An attention game is symmetric when the following holds:

**Symmetry:**

(i) For all $i, j$ and all $x, y \in S$: 

$$p_i (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{i-1}, x, \sigma_{i+1}, \ldots, \sigma_j, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n) = p_j (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{i-1}, y, \sigma_{i+1}, \ldots, \sigma_j, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n)$$

(ii) For all $i$: $e_i = e$ for some $e : S \to \mathcal{R}$.

The first part of Symmetry says that the effectiveness of salience for getting noticed for a given configuration of the other alternatives’ salience is the same for each alternative. More precisely, holding the salience of all alternatives fixed except for $a_i$ and $a_j$, the attention attracted by $a_i$ with a level of salience $x$ when $a_j$ has salience $y$ is the same as the attention attracted by $a_j$ with salience $x$ when $a_i$ has salience $y$. The second part of the condition simply says that achieving any level of salience has the same payoff implications for any two alternatives.
Remarkably, the main characterisation results below require no restriction on the structure of the strategy sets \( S \), nor on that of the cost function \( e \).

The reason for this generality is that the argument boils down to a revealed preference one: the proof shows that if it was profitable for one alternative to raise its level of salience from a given level, given the cost, then it would be profitable in the same situation to do so for any better alternative. Because the cost function is common and because of the absolute salience and symmetry assumptions, the 'world' looks the same from the perspectives of two different alternatives, except for the structure of the benefits: the better alternative has a higher benefit from raising salience than an inferior alternative because there are more events in which it is chosen conditionally on being noticed. So the better alternative has overall a stronger incentive to invest in salience.

**Proposition 1.** (The showier is the better) Let \( G \) be a symmetric attention game with absolute salience. Let \( \sigma \) be a pure strategy equilibrium of \( G \). Then, \( \sigma_i > \sigma_j \Rightarrow j > i \).

**Proof:** We use a revealed preference argument. By contradiction, suppose that for some \( i, j \) with \( i < j \) we had \( \sigma_j > \sigma_i \). Since \( \sigma_j \) is optimal for \( j \) at \( \sigma \), it must be in particular:

\[
\pi_j (\sigma) \geq \pi_j (\sigma_i, \sigma_{-j})
\]

\[
\iff p_j (\sigma) \prod_{k < j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) - e (\sigma_j) \geq p_j (\sigma_i, \sigma_{-j}) \prod_{k < j} (1 - p_k (\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_i, \sigma_{j+1}, ..., \sigma_n)) - e (\sigma_i)
\]

(where we have used Symmetry (ii)). Because the game has absolute salience we have

\[
p_k (\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_i, \sigma_{j+1}, ..., \sigma_n) = p_k (\sigma)
\]

and so the above inequality implies:

\[
(p_j (\sigma) - p_j (\sigma_i, \sigma_{-j})) \prod_{k < j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) \geq e (\sigma_j) - e (\sigma_i).
\]
Similarly, from the optimality of $\sigma_i$ we obtain:

$$(p_i(\sigma_j, \sigma_{-i}) - p_i(\sigma)) \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k(\sigma)) \leq e(\sigma_j) - e(\sigma_i).$$

By absolute salience,

$$p_j(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-j}) = p_j(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{i-1}, \sigma_j, \sigma_{i+1}, \ldots, \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_i, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n)$$

and then by Symmetry (i) $p_j(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-j}) = p_i(\sigma)$. Similarly, we have $p_j(\sigma) = p_i(\sigma_j, \sigma_{-i})$.

Moreover, by Own Monotonicity and $\sigma_j > \sigma_i$, $p_i(\sigma_j, \sigma_{-i}) - p_i(\sigma) > 0$. It follows that the above inequalities imply

$$\prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k(\sigma)) \leq \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k(\sigma))$$

which is impossible given the range assumption on the $p_k$.

So, for games of absolute salience, there is a (weak) correlation between equilibrium salience and quality ranking: not only is the best alternative one of those with the highest salience, but also a higher quality implies a higher salience at any level of the quality hierarchy. Observe that the result can still obtain even when salience is attainable for free:

**Example 1.** Consider a simple scenario with two alternatives, $a_1$ and $a_2$, and two possible strategies, high and low, in a symmetric attention game, with $e_i(h) = 0 = e_i(l)$ for $i = 1, 2$.

Let $p$ be as in the Table ??, where each column corresponds to a different strategy profile, and where $\alpha$, $\beta$, $\gamma$ and $\delta$ are real numbers satisfying $\alpha > \gamma$ and $\beta > \delta$ (by Own Monotonicity).

Corresponding payoffs are displayed on the right.

If Absolute Salience holds (the environment of Proposition 1) we also have $\alpha = \beta$ and $\gamma = \delta$, so that $h$ is strictly dominant for both alternatives. However if we drop Absolute Salience, then while $h$ is still dominant for $a_1$, this will also be the case for $a_2$ if and only if
\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{hh} & \text{hl} & \text{lh} & \text{ll} & \text{l} & \text{h} \\
p_1(\sigma) & \alpha & \beta & \gamma & \delta & l & \delta,\delta(1-\delta) & \gamma,\beta(1-\gamma) \\
p_2(\sigma) & \alpha & \gamma & \beta & \delta & h & \beta,\gamma(1-\beta) & \alpha,\alpha(1-\alpha)
\end{array}
\]

Table 1: The functions \( p_1 \) (left) and corresponding payoffs (right) in Example 1

\( \beta > 1 - \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{\gamma} \). Thus in the opposite case even if salience is free we can support \((h,l)\) as an equilibrium outcome.

The the-best-is-the-showiest feature of this result (but not the general weak correlation between quality and salience) is preserved if we weaken absolute salience to “positive externalities”, as expressed by the following conditions:

**Weak Supermodularity:** For all \( i \), all \( \sigma_{-i}, \sigma'_{-i} \in S^{n-1} \) with \( \sigma'_{-i} \geq \sigma_{-i} \), and all \( x, y \in S \) with \( x > y \):

\[
p_i(x,\sigma'_{-i}) - p_i(y,\sigma'_{-i}) \geq p_i(x,\sigma_{-i}) - p_i(y,\sigma_{-i})
\]

**Cross Monotonicity:** For all \( i \), all \( \sigma_{-i}, \sigma'_{-i} \in S^{n-1} \) with \( \sigma'_{-i} \geq \sigma_{-i} \), \( p_i(\sigma_i,\sigma'_{-i}) \geq p_i(\sigma_i,\sigma_{-i}) \).

Both conditions impose positive spillovers of own salience on the rivals, with Weak Supermodularity acting on the first differences of the \( p_i \)s and Cross Monotonicity acting on the absolute levels.

Cross Monotonicity says that an alternative cannot harm the visibility of the rivals by raising its own salience. This is verified in games of absolute salience. Another situation captured by the property is when advertising by an individual (e.g. a firm selling a new type
of product) draws attention to similar individuals (the firms selling similar products) and hence to the whole group (industry).9

Weak Supermodularity says that the effectiveness for getting noticed of an increase in an alternative’s own salience increases with the salience of the other alternatives. Note that this is a condition on the function \( p_i \) only: *the whole payoff function need not be supermodular even when Weak Supermodularity is satisfied*. If salience is absolute then Weak Supermodularity is trivially satisfied. The condition might also be verified in the similarity within an industry example given above: the salience effort of an individual firm in a little known industry is likely to be less effective than when other firms selling similar products are well-known.10

**Proposition 2.** (The best is the showiest). *Let \( \sigma \) be a pure strategy equilibrium of a symmetric attention game which satisfies Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity. Then \( \sigma_1 \geq \sigma_j \) for all \( j > 1 \).*

**Proof:** Suppose by contradiction that \( \sigma_j > \sigma_1 \) for some \( j > 1 \). The optimality condition for

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9Payró and Ülkü (2015) study this kind of similarity-based mistakes in a choice theoretic context.

10It may be interesting to think of ‘mirror’ axioms in which a competitor’s salience generates negative spillovers, i.e. Weak Submodularity and Decreasing Cross Monotonicity. They would imply that given \( i \)'s chosen salience, alternative \( j \) could reduce the probability that \( i \) is noticed by increasing her own salience (for Decreasing Cross Monotonicity), and/or that any change in own salience would be less effective the higher the salience chosen by others (for Weak Submodularity). The latter might capture a ‘trading floor situation’: increasing own visibility is more difficult if everyone is already wearing garish colours/shouting very loudly. The former might apply in ‘comparative campaign’ types of situations, in which each alternative increases own salience by underlying how better than an opponent they have done. A full treatment of negative externalities is non-trivial and it is beyond the scope of this paper - however we hint at some of the consequences of negative externalities and relative salience in sections 3 and 4.
$a_j \text{ at } \sigma$ implies in particular:

$$p_j (\sigma) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) - e_j (\sigma_j) \geq p_j (\sigma_1, \sigma_{-j}) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma_1, \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_1, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n)) - e_j (\sigma_1)$$

By Cross Monotonicity and $\sigma_1 < \sigma_j$ we have

$$p_k (\sigma) \geq p_k (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_1, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n) \text{ for all } k \neq j$$

$$\Rightarrow \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_1, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n)) \geq \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma))$$

and therefore

$$p_j (\sigma) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) - e_j (\sigma_j) \geq p_j (\sigma_1, \sigma_{-j}) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) - e_j (\sigma_1)$$

or

$$(p_j (\sigma) - p_j (\sigma_1, \sigma_{-j})) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) \geq e_j (\sigma_j) - e_j (\sigma_1) \quad (2)$$

To avoid cumbersome notation, denote, for $x, y \in S$,

$$(y, x, \sigma_{-1j}) = (y, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_{j-1}, x, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_n)$$

the profile in which $a_1$ plays $y$, $a_j$ plays $x$ and all other alternatives play as in $\sigma$. By Weak Supermodularity (2) implies

$$(p_j (\sigma_j, \sigma_j, \sigma_{-1j}) - p_j (\sigma_j, \sigma_1, \sigma_{-1j})) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) \geq e_j (\sigma_j) - e_j (\sigma_1).$$

Then, by Symmetry

$$(p_1 (\sigma_j, \sigma_j, \sigma_{-1j}) - p_1 (\sigma_1, \sigma_j, \sigma_{-1j})) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) \geq e (\sigma_j) - e (\sigma_1)$$

or

$$(p_1 (\sigma_j, \sigma_{-1}) - p_1 (\sigma)) \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k (\sigma)) \geq e (\sigma_j) - e (\sigma_1)$$
Since $\sigma_1 < \sigma_j$, by Own Monotonicity we have $p_1(\sigma_j, \sigma_j, \sigma_{-j}) - p_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_j, \sigma_{-j}) > 0$, and by the range assumption on the $p_k$ we have $1 > \prod_{k<j} (1 - p_k(\sigma)) > 0$. We conclude that

\[
(p_1(\sigma_j, \sigma_{-j}) - p_1(\sigma)) > e(\sigma_j) - e(\sigma_1).
\]

But this means that $a_1$ would improve by deviating from $\sigma_1$ to $\sigma_j$ at profile $\sigma$, a contradiction.

Note that the the-best-is-the-showiest result is unrelated to any kind of signalling argument. There is no hidden quality to signal to the chooser via costly investment. The reason why lower quality alternatives never produce more salience in equilibrium does not derive either from lower levels of resources or lower unit costs of salience production, both types of asymmetry having been ruled out: every alternative can choose from exactly the same set at exactly the same cost or benefit. The result is purely a function of the cognitive process postulated for the chooser.

Why do the conditions on $p_i$ turn out to be important for the result? Let’s focus on the incentives to raise own salience. On the one hand, increasing own salience attracts attention to oneself. But - depending on the $p_i$s - there may also be a second effect: that of detracting attention from other alternatives. This second part of the incentive is always stronger for lower quality alternatives. Good alternatives “do not care” whether worse alternatives are noticed or not - their payoff only depends on the probability that even better alternatives are noticed. In the extreme case, the best alternative only cares about its own probability of getting noticed, so that the only incentive it has is of the first type. Thus if the $p_i$s are decreasing in the salience of other alternatives, an increase in own salience tends to be the more profitable the lower the quality of an alternative. Cross Monotonicity removes this.
tendency. Assume now that a worse alternative \( w \) finds it profitable to raise salience from \( l \) to \( h > l \) while a better alternative \( b \) chooses \( l \). Can this be an equilibrium? Suppose that \( b \) is the only other alternative beside \( w \). Note that \( b \)'s gain in visibility when moving from \( l \) to \( h \) would be scaled up compared to that of \( w \), by a factor strictly greater than one, given by the (reciprocal of the) probability that \( b \) is not noticed: only if \( b \) is not noticed, in fact, will \( w \) be picked if noticed. So the only reason why \( b \) might not want to follow \( w \) in raising salience to \( h \) is that raising own salience becomes less effective for becoming more noticeable when the rivals raise \textit{their} salience, which \( w \) has done. Weak supermodularity eliminates precisely this effect. So if it were profitable for the worse alternative \( w \) to raise salience to \( h \), it would be a fortiori profitable for the better alternative \( b \), and therefore the initial configuration could not be an equilibrium.

However, the above reasoning might not hold in the presence of a third alternative \( t \) that is even better than \( b \), and \( b \)'s possible increase in salience was beneficial to \( t \) while \( w \)'s increase in salience was not. In this case, \( b \) might prefer to keep its salience low in order not to draw attention to \( t \), while \( w \) would not face this negative incentive. It is for this reason that, once we move beyond games of absolute salience and allow for positive externalities, \textit{only the top alternative} is sure to produce more salience in equilibrium: the peculiarity of the top alternative is that it is the only one that does not need to worry about the effect of its own salience on the attention paid to the other alternatives. In this sense there is a difference between the way in which the top alternative is better than the second best and that in which the second best is better than the third best. The next example illustrates this fact in a three-player attention game satisfying all the conditions of Proposition 2 and in which the second best alternative is less salient in equilibrium than the third best one.

Example 2. Let \( \sigma_i \in \{l, h\} \) with \( i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \) and \( h > l \). There is a common effort function
\( e \) with \( e(l) = 0 \) and \( e(h) = \frac{3}{32} \). Let \( p_i(\sigma) \) be given by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \sigma )</th>
<th>( hhh )</th>
<th>( hhl )</th>
<th>( hlh )</th>
<th>( hll )</th>
<th>( lhh )</th>
<th>( lhll )</th>
<th>( llh )</th>
<th>( lll )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( p_1(\sigma) )</td>
<td>( \frac{3}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_2(\sigma) )</td>
<td>( \frac{3}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_3(\sigma) )</td>
<td>( \frac{3}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{4} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{5}{8} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{8} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The functions \( p_i \) in Example 2

The profile \( \sigma = (h,l,h) \) is an equilibrium, since we have:

\[
\rho_1(h,l,h) = \frac{17}{32} \geq \frac{1}{8} = \rho_1(l,l,h) \\
\rho_2(h,l,h) = \frac{3}{32} \geq \frac{3}{32} = \rho_2(h,h,h) \\
\rho_3(h,l,h) = \frac{21}{256} \geq \frac{21}{512} = \rho_3(h,l,l)
\]

It is easy to check that Weak Supermodularity and Cross-Monotonicity hold (details available from the authors).

Note in Example 2 that

\[
p_1(h,l,h) - p_1(h,l,l) = \frac{5}{8} - \frac{5}{8} < \frac{3}{4} - \frac{5}{8} = p_1(h,h,h) - p_1(h,l,h)
\]

This means that when the worst alternative \( a_3 \) increases its own salience from \( l \) to \( h \) there is no spillover on the visibility of the best alternative \( a_1 \); but the same increase at \( (h,l,h) \) on the part of the middling alternative \( a_2 \) would have a positive externality on \( a_1 \). This deters \( a_2 \) from raising its own salience up to the level of \( a_1 \).

Observe in passing how effects such as those just discussed make clear the stark difference between All Pay Contests and attention games, to which they might at first sight seem to bear some similarity: in an auction, an increase in one's own bid can only be weakly detrimental
for a rival. Attention games have a richer externality structure. We expand on this point in section 5.

Example 2 also shows that the statements of the propositions cannot be strengthened to obtain a strict correlation between salience and quality. The the-best-is-the-showiest property ensures that if there is an alternative that is uniquely maximally salient in equilibrium, then that alternative must also be the best one; but it does not exclude that alternatives of lower quality tie with the best for salience. However, even if we have to settle for a weak correlation, an immediate but important implication of Proposition 2 is:

**Corollary 1.** (The best gets picked most often) Let $\sigma$ be a pure strategy equilibrium of a symmetric attention game satisfying Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity. Then alternatives of higher quality are chosen with strictly greater probability: $1 < j \Rightarrow \rho_1(\sigma) > \rho_j(\sigma)$.

Corollary 1 can be read from a revealed preference perspective. Suppose that neither the salience of alternatives nor the chooser’s preferences are observable to an outside party, but that this party knows the structure of the game. Then, Corollary 1 implies that the observer could still infer the identity of the best alternative from choice data - provided it suffers no technological disadvantage. However the choice frequencies of other alternatives might not faithfully reveal their quality ranking: quality is revealed by choice only for the top alternative.

A second perspective from which Corollary 1 can be read is as showing circumstances in which competitive forces counterbalance the cognitive limitations of the chooser. Competition pushes the best alternatives to raise their salience sufficiently to overcome the distorsive effects of imperfect attention on the relative popularity of the alternatives.
3 Negative externalities: examples with the Luce form

When salience is relative, and Weak Supermodularity or Cross Monotonicity fail, the neat equilibrium properties obtained in the previous section may break down. Perverse equilibria become possible, in which the worst alternative is selected with the strictly highest probability (‘perverse’ is meant in contrast to the situation that holds for standard models of choice errors, such as the logit).

Claim 1. There are attention games of relative salience with equilibria in which the worst alternative is chosen with the strictly highest probability.

This claim is shown with a two-alternative example in which \( S = \{l, h\} \) with \( h > l \) and the probability of being noticed has the Luce form (1):

\[
p_i(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma_i}{\sigma_i + \sigma_j}
\]

for \( i \neq j \). We impose the following restrictions on the admissible values of \( h \) and \( l \):

\[
h > \frac{9}{32} > l > 0
\]

\[
h + l > \frac{1}{2}
\]

\[
h \in \left[ \frac{3}{8} - l - \frac{1}{8} \sqrt{9 - 32l}, \frac{3}{8} - l + \frac{1}{8} \sqrt{9 - 32l} \right]
\]

Let \( e_i(x) = x \) for \( i = 1, 2 \) and \( x \in \{h, l\} \), so we drop the subscript. Then the profile \( \sigma = (l, h) \) in which the showiest is the strictly worst is a strict Nash equilibrium for all admissible values of \( l \) and \( h \). Not all admissible profiles of this type also have the property that alternative \( a_2 \) is picked with higher probability. Such profiles do exist, however (the simple calculation is available from the authors upon request).

However, at least limited forms of the the-best-is-the-showiest property also hold in some “natural” attention games despite them failing both Weak Supermodularity and Cross Mono-
tonicity. We illustrate the point with another Luce form example in which alternatives can choose any positive level of salience. Even in the two player case, whether or not the supermodularity condition $p_i(x, \sigma_j^i) - p_i(y, \sigma_j^i) \geq p_i(x, \sigma_j^i) - p_i(y, \sigma_j^i)$ holds depends on the sign of $\sigma_j^i \sigma_j - xy$. Moreover, any alternative’s increase in own salience is detrimental to the rivals’ chances of being noticed. Nevertheless, we show that the the-best-is-the-showiest result fully applies in the two-alternative case, or to the two best alternatives in any game with $n > 2$.

**Claim 2.** Let $G = (A, S, \pi)$ be a symmetric attention game with $S = R_+^+$; $p_i(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma_i}{\sigma_1 + \ldots + \sigma_n}$ for all $i$, all $\sigma$; and with $e$ twice differentiable and weakly convex. Then at any equilibrium $\sigma$ of $G$ the salience chosen by the best alternative is never lower than that chosen by the second best alternative; that is, $\sigma_1 \geq \sigma_2$.

**Proof:** Denote $k = \sigma_3 + \ldots + \sigma_n \geq 0$. At any interior equilibrium the FOCs for alternatives 1 and 2 must be satisfied

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma_1} \left( \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 + k} \right) = e'(\sigma_1) \]

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma_2} \left( \frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 + k} \right) = e'(\sigma_2) \]

where $e'$ denotes the first derivative of $e$. Dividing side by side the two equations and simplifying we get

\[ (k + \sigma_2) \frac{k + \sigma_1 + \sigma_2}{k \sigma_1 + k \sigma_2 + 2 \sigma_1 \sigma_2 + k^2} = \frac{e'(\sigma_1)}{e'(\sigma_2)} \quad (3) \]

Suppose by contradiction that $\sigma_2 > \sigma_1$. Then, by the weak convexity of $e$, $\frac{e'(\sigma_1)}{e'(\sigma_2)} \leq 1$. It follows from (3) that

\[ (k + \sigma_2) \frac{k + \sigma_1 + \sigma_2}{k \sigma_1 + k \sigma_2 + 2 \sigma_1 \sigma_2 + k^2} \leq 1 \iff \sigma_1 \geq \sigma_2 + k \]

a contradiction in view of $k \geq 0$. 

\[ \blacksquare \]
The examples in this section suggest that, at least with the Luce form, the possibility of perverse equilibria is related to restrictions in the strategy spaces of the players. When these spaces are sufficiently rich, as shown in Claim 2 the better alternative will always find it profitable to deviate from a profile at which the inferior alternative is more salient. This sensitivity to the domain somehow dampens hopes of finding a nice general condition that is necessary as well as sufficient for a the-best-is-the-showiest result to hold, which remains an open problem.

4 Contextual salience

There is a different way in which the the-best-is-the-showiest property may collapse. So far we have assumed (through Own Monotonicity) that salience, whether absolute or relative, is a ‘directional’ attribute for which ‘the more is always the better’: the more commercials you produce, the louder you shout, the glitzier your clothes, the more likely - ceteris paribus - you are to get noticed. In some scenarios, however, alternatives can only control variables whose values are not intrinsically positive or negative for the aim of attracting attention; whether they are depends, for each alternative, on what the other alternatives do. If everybody else dresses in green you will be salient by dressing in yellow, and viceversa. If all other candidates converge on a given political message, you will stand out by deviating from that message. We call this scenario one of contextual salience.

We study a simple stylised class of models of contextual salience that generates the perverse result. Suppose that $\sigma_i \in [0,1]$ is now a ‘position’ selected by alternative $a_i$ in the unit interval. Whether or not the probability that $a_i$ is noticed is increasing in $\sigma_i$ depends on the entire profile $\sigma$: that is, Own Monotonicity may fail. In particular, we assume that
an alternative’s probability of being noticed is conferred by its distance from the ‘average alternative’ (excluding itself):

\[ p_i(\sigma) = \alpha_i \left( v_i - \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} v_j}{n - 1} \right)^2 \in [0, 1] \]

where \( \alpha_i \in (0, 1) \) for all \( i \) can be seen for instance as a psychological parameter indicating how naturally inclined the chooser is to notice any given alternative. Finally assume for simplicity a null effort-elation function so that we can take

\[ \pi_i(\sigma) = p_i(\sigma) \prod_{k<i} \left( 1 - p_k(\sigma) \right) \]

Claim 3. There exist (for some values \( n \) and \( \alpha_1, ..., \alpha_n \)) pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game above in which the worst alternative is chosen with the highest probability.\(^{11}\)

The case of contextual salience we have studied has some superficial similarity with location games à la Hotelling. In that case, too, alternatives can gain by moving away from the nearest neighbour. However, the payoff structure is in fact very different. This results, unlike a location game, in an existence result with three players, as detailed in the proof of Claim 3.

The intuition for the above result is as follows. Consider a situation with three alternatives, in which the two better alternatives \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) are conformist, while \( a_3 \) is non-conformist: in particular, \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) bunch at one extreme position, whereas \( a_3 \) occupies a solitary position at the other extreme. Then, for players \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \), the average position of the other players is \( \frac{1}{2} \). Alternative \( a_1 \) cares only about its own probability of being noticed, and because of the convexity of the \( p_i \) functions this is maximal at maximum distance from the average position \( \frac{1}{2} \), that is at the extremes: so, \( a_1 \) cannot gain by deviating. Alternative

\(^{11}\)The proof is relegated to an Online Appendix.
a$_2$’s probability of being noticed responds exactly like that of a$_1$ to changes in own position, but its probability of being chosen also depends (negatively) on a$_1$’s probability of being noticed. By moving away from position 0, a$_2$ makes a$_1$ more noticeable, and therefore a$_2$ does not gain by deviating either. As for a$_3$, by locating as far away as possible from the rest, it maximises its own probability of being noticed. Of course this also makes the opponents more noticeable, but it is not difficult to find parameter configurations for which the benefits outweigh the costs. This shows that the configuration of positions is a Nash equilibrium, which, for appropriate choices of parameters, has the feature that the worst alternative is chosen with the highest probability.

5 Related literature

The literature that deals with various aspects of attention is getting extensive - here we focus only on a subset of works that is most closely related to ours. For studies of attention within a consideration set (where attention is selectively applied to specific features of the alternatives), see for example the recent approach in Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2014) and the works cited therein. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a and 2011b, henceforth ES) study the strategic aspects of the competition between firms to make products (or the firm’s brand name as a whole) enter the consideration sets of consumers. Beside the broad conceptual relation, the focus of the analysis there is quite different from ours. The heart of the ES models is the mechanism of attracting attention via the choice of offered product menus (or more in general, of marketing strategies) on the part of firms. Firms deploy marketing strategies devoted to attention grabbing, and one main result of the analysis is that in equilibrium firms will include pure attention grabbers in the menu. Our emphasis has been
rather on the relationship between (exogenous) quality on the one hand, and equilibrium salience and its effectiveness (the probability of being chosen) on the other. In order to pose and answer the questions of this paper we need to be able to talk about the degree of salience and the probability of being chosen. These variables are not identifiable as part of the elements of the ES models. Precisely because marketing strategies are more complex objects in ES than in this paper, there is no notion of marketing ‘intensity’ equivalent to our notion of salience. Moreover, the choice model and the description of the chooser’s psychology at the heart of the ES’ work is different from ours, and related to the one axiomatised in an abstract context by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012) using revealed preference techniques. In these models choice is deterministic rather than stochastic. In ES an attention function determines whether other products are paid attention to, depending on a default set of products, but not how much attention is paid to any object. Our device of stochastic attention is the key for obtaining a more nuanced ranking of salience effectiveness. Stochastic choice in a consideration set model has been axiomatised in Manzini and Mariotti (2014): from this perspective, the present work offers a mechanism to endogenise, as equilibrium values, the salience parameters of our previous work.

There is of course a vast literature specific to advertising competition in retail markets, and some forms of informative advertising can be interpreted as placing a product in the consideration set. Our model is more stylised than the models in this literature (we refer the reader to Bagwell, 2007 for an extensive survey), where the issue of ‘attracting attention’ is intertwined with that of pricing strategies and other features of the market, and where different questions from the ones we have posed are addressed. We illustrate this with the advertising model which is conceptually the closest, namely Butters (1977). In this model, there are many sellers and buyers. Producers of a homogeneous good can pay a fixed cost
to inform a random number of buyers of their price and location. If a (potential) buyer is not informed, he cannot buy the product: in this sense, Butters’ can be seen as a model based on consideration sets. The focus is the limit equilibrium price distribution (as the number of buyers and sellers grows to infinity). A first major difference between Butters’ and our analysis is that the latter, but not the former, fits situations where there is only a single chooser: this is because the probability of noticing an alternative is a feature of the psychology of the individual chooser, whereas the statistical attention effects in models à la Butters depend on a ‘mailbox’ model of information transmission, in which $k$ out of $n$ agents are randomly informed. There is no information processing by an individual agent: if he gets the ad in the mailbox he is informed, otherwise not. Aside from this, the relationship between quality and salience, on which we have focused, cannot be studied in Butters’ model, because what is being traded is a single homogeneous good for which all buyers have the same willingness to pay (which in terms of our model can be interpreted as an assumption that alternatives are not differentiated by quality). In a conceivable variation in which producers sell products differentiated by quality, price would remain a key strategic variable: what this class of models addresses is the trade-off between the price and the information variables, whereas we have sought to study an equilibrium relationship between salience and quality that holds also in environments in which prices are not relevant, such as political competition (as noted by ES, who also eschew prices, this may apply even in some market contexts, such as media markets).

While motivated very differently, it may be worth noting that attention games bear some superficial structural similarity with (separable) ‘All-Pay Contests’ (henceforth APCs, see Siegel, 2009 for a very general treatment). In a separable APC, the payoff function has the form $u_i(\sigma) = P_i(\sigma) V_i - c_i(\sigma_i)$, where $\sigma = (\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_n)$ is interpreted as a ‘score’ (e.g. lobbying
intensity) profile, $P_i$ is the probability of winning for player $i$ at profile $\sigma$, $V_i$ is the value of the prize for $i$, and $c_i$ captures the (increasing) cost of a score. However, the ‘benefit’ part of this expression does not include that of attention games, since in an APC $P_i(\sigma) = 1$ if $i$ is one of the $m$ agents with the highest score, and $P_i(\sigma) = 0$ if it is not. In particular, increasing one’s own score can only have negative spillovers on the rivals. Moreover, in attention games the $c_i$ functions are essentially unrestricted, whereas it is a defining feature of APCs that increases in the probability of winning come at a cost. So there is in fact almost no relation between attention games and APC, and our results are independent of the existing results in the theory of APCs.

Differential attention to alternatives is not necessarily tied to a consideration set interpretation. One interesting example is the recent work by Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid (2013) (henceforth EST), who study a Luce-type (Luce, 1959) model of stochastic choice in which the perception of alternatives by the decision maker is hierarchical. An alternative can only be chosen if the alternatives that precede it in a perception priority ranking is (randomly) not chosen. Given that in our setting the set of alternatives is fixed, it turns out that our model is also consistent with the EST interpretation. More precisely, in a slightly simplified version of their choice model, the primitives are a utility function $u : A \to \mathcal{R}$ and a perception ordering $\succ_p$. The probability that $a \in A$ is chosen is

$$u(a) \frac{\prod_{c \in A : c \succ_p a} \left(1 - \frac{u(c)}{\sum_{b \in A} u(b) + u(A)}\right)}{\sum_{b \in A} u(b) + u(A)}$$

where $u(A)$ is the (menu dependent) value of choosing some default option. Defining

$$\mu(a, A) = \frac{u(a)}{\sum_{b \in A} u(b) + u(A)}$$

12 In the general version the perception ordering is a weak order, rather than a strict order, thus allowing for “perception ties”.

26
for all $a \in A$, this choice model falls within the class of choice models we are considering. To see this, set $\succ \succ p$ and set $\sigma_i = u(a_i)$, so that $p_i(\sigma) = \mu(a_i, A)$. In this interpretation, we assume that alternatives cannot change the perception ranking, just as in the consideration set interpretation we assumed that they cannot change the quality ranking. However, they can compete by striving to raise their quality (utility) and thus increase the probability of being selected in the event that no alternative that is higher ranked in the perception ordering is itself selected. Observe that $\mu(a_i, A)$ is increasing in the utility of $a_i$ and decreasing in the utility of the other alternatives, so that Own Monotonicity for an attention game is satisfied. The model is not one of absolute salience, and it fails Weak Supermodularity. However, as implied by Claim 2, in the two alternative version the the-best-is-the-showiest feature holds under mild assumptions on the cost function.

6 Concluding remarks

While in many models of choice with errors (such as the logit) the choice frequency of an alternative is an indicator of its quality, this is not necessarily the case when the source of error is imperfect attention. We have shown however that, when salience is set through a competitive process rather than being a given, there are plausible circumstances in which the best is the showiest and the most chosen.

This result is especially interesting in light of some recent laboratory evidence suggesting that, when strategic aspects are absent, there is a lack of correlation between alternatives’ quality and the probability of being noticed (Reutskaya et al., 2011, Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). In our previous work (2014) on individual decision making we also made no assumption of correlation between quality and visibility. Our current result indicates that when
strategic factors do operate, they might induce a sharp departure from this baseline. This is particularly relevant in a context such as supermarket choice, which is the environment that Reutskaya et al. (2011) replicate experimentally. This study supports the hypothesis of our model that consumers optimise within the consideration set (called there the “seen set”). However it also shows that consumers appear to search randomly with respect to product quality. High quality products are not more likely to be considered. Because in real supermarkets producers invest heavily to increase the salience of their products, it is hard to assume that strategic forces do not operate, and thus our model suggests the possibility that the lack of correlation observed in the experiment might not continue to hold in the market, or that it may be due to yet unspecified countervailing factors.

More generally, we have highlighted several features of mechanisms for attracting attention. Roughly speaking we have identified the key variables at work as the existence and the nature of *externalities* in the technology of salience. Increases in own salience may or may not have spillovers on the attention grabbed by rivals. And such spillovers when they exist may or may not be benign, that is, increasing own salience may (i) increase or decrease the attention devoted to others, and (ii) increase or decrease the effectiveness of others’ salience for getting noticed. It is only the situation with non-benign spillovers (in either of the two senses (i) and (ii)) in which it *may* happen that the worst alternative strictly attracts the most attention and is the most chosen. Otherwise, equilibrium forces always push the best alternative to attain weakly more salience; its identity is revealed by the frequency of choice; and if no externalities occur then frequencies of choice perfectly correlate with quality.

While endogenising salience, we have considered quality as a fixed characteristic of the alternatives. Also, we have assumed that the chooser responds to salience in an unsophisticated way, rather than actively thinking through the consequences of any information contained in
the alternatives’ salience. Finally, we have ignored the issue of multiproduct firms, assuming implicitly that each alternative corresponds to a single producer. These issues should be addressed in future research.

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**References**


Online Appendix: Proof of Claim 3

We consider the case of three alternatives and show that the position profile \( \sigma^* = (0, 0, 1) \) is a Nash Equilibrium with the desired property. For a generic profile \( \sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3) \), the choice probabilities are given by

\[
\pi_1 (\sigma) = \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \\
\pi_2 (\sigma) = \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \right) \\
\pi_3 (\sigma) = \left( \sigma_3 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_3 \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \right) \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_2 \right)
\]

so that

\[
\pi_1 (0, 0, 1) = \frac{1}{4} \alpha_1 \\
\pi_2 (0, 0, 1) = \frac{1}{4} \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \frac{1}{4} \alpha_1 \right) \\
\pi_3 (0, 0, 1) = \alpha_3 \left( 1 - \frac{1}{4} \alpha_1 \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{4} \alpha_2 \right)
\]

and thus

\[
\pi_3 (\sigma^*) > \pi_2 (\sigma^*) > \pi_1 (\sigma^*)
\]

(4)

for suitable values of \( \alpha_i \), e.g. provided that \( \alpha_3 > \min \left\{ \frac{\alpha_2}{4 - \alpha_2}, \frac{4 \alpha_1}{(4 - \alpha_1)(4 - \alpha_2)} \right\} \in (0, 1) \). To check that the above is an equilibrium, observe that first derivatives of the payoff functions with respect to own salience are:

\[
\frac{\partial (\pi_1 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_1} = (2 \sigma_1 - (\sigma_2 + \sigma_3)) \alpha_1 \\
\frac{\partial (\pi_2 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_2} = (2 \sigma_2 - (\sigma_1 + \sigma_3)) \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \right) + \alpha_1 \alpha_2 \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right) \\
\frac{\partial (\pi_3 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_3} = \alpha_3 \left( 2 \sigma_3 - (\sigma_1 + \sigma_2) \right) \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \right) \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_2 \right) \\
+ \alpha_1 \alpha_3 \left( \sigma_3 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2}{2} \right)^2 \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right) \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_2 \right) \\
+ \alpha_2 \alpha_3 \left( \sigma_3 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_2}{2} \right)^2 \left( 1 - \left( \sigma_1 - \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)^2 \alpha_1 \right) \left( \sigma_2 - \frac{\sigma_1 + \sigma_3}{2} \right)
\]

It is seen immediately that, with \( \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \in [0, 1] \) being a minimum for \( \pi_1 (\sigma) \), alternative 1’s best reply is a corner solution, i.e. either \( \sigma_1 = 1 \) (if \( \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \)) or \( \sigma_1 = 0 \) (if \( \frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} \geq \frac{1}{2} \)).
the candidate equilibrium $\frac{\sigma_2 + \sigma_3}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$, so that alternative 1 cannot improve on its payoff by switching from $\sigma_1 = 0$ to $\sigma_1 = 1$. Turning now to alternative 2, we see that

$$\frac{\partial (\pi_2 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_2} \bigg|_{\substack{\sigma_1 = 0 \\ \sigma_3 = 1}} = \frac{1}{8} \alpha_2 (2\sigma_2 - 1) \left( 8 - 4\alpha_1 \sigma_2^2 - \alpha_1 - 5\alpha_1 \sigma_2 \right)$$

with three roots,\(^{13}\)

$$r_1 = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$r_2 = \frac{1}{8\alpha_1} \left( -5\alpha_1 + \sqrt{128\alpha_1 + 9\alpha_1^2} \right) \geq r_1$$

$$r_3 = \frac{1}{8\alpha_1} \left( 5\alpha_1 + \sqrt{128\alpha_1 + 9\alpha_1^2} \right) < 0$$

There are two candidate best replies\(^{14}\) at $\sigma_2 = 0$ and $\sigma_2 = \min \{1, r_2\}$. Letting $\alpha_1 \in (0, \frac{4}{5})$ ensures that $\sigma_2 = r_2$ is not a best reply.\(^{15}\) The choice probabilities corresponding to the two remaining candidate best replies are:

$$\pi_2 (0, 0, 1) = \frac{1}{4} \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \frac{1}{4} \alpha_1 \right)$$

$$\pi_2 (0, 1, 1) = \frac{1}{4} \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \alpha_1 \right) < \frac{1}{4} \alpha_2 \left( 1 - \frac{1}{4} \alpha_1 \right)$$

so that, regardless of the size of $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$, alternative 2 cannot profitably deviate from $\sigma^*$. Finally consider alternative 3:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_3 (\sigma)}{\partial \sigma_3} \bigg|_{\substack{\sigma_1 = 0 \\ \sigma_2 = 0}} = \frac{1}{8} \alpha_3 \left( -8\alpha_1 \sigma_3^2 - 8\alpha_2 \sigma_3^2 + 3\alpha_1 \alpha_2 \sigma_3^4 + 16 \right)$$

\(^{13}\)To check $r_2 \geq r_1$ observe that

$$\frac{1}{8\alpha_1} \left( -5\alpha_1 + \sqrt{128\alpha_1 + 9\alpha_1^2} \right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \iff \frac{128}{\alpha_1^2} \geq 1$$

which holds true always.

\(^{14}\)This holds because $\frac{\partial (\pi_2 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_2} \bigg|_{\sigma_1 = 0} < 0$ if $\sigma_2 \in \left[0, \frac{1}{2}\right)$ and $\frac{\partial (\pi_2 (\sigma))}{\partial \sigma_2} \bigg|_{\sigma_1 = 1} > 0$ if $\sigma_2 \in \left(\frac{1}{2}, \min \{1, r_2\}\right]$.

\(^{15}\)Observe that $r_2 > 1$ if and only if $\alpha_1 \in (0, \frac{4}{5})$.  

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Of the three distinct roots of the polynomial, one is negative, one is larger than unity and one is $\sigma_3 = 0$, with \( \frac{\partial \pi_3(\sigma)}{\partial \sigma_3} \bigg|_{\sigma_1=0, \sigma_2=0} > 0 \) for $\sigma_3 \in (0, 1)$. It follows that $\pi_3(0, 0, \sigma_3)$ is maximised for $\sigma_3 = 1$, with corresponding choice probability

$$\pi_3(\sigma^*) = \alpha_3 \left(1 - \frac{1}{4\alpha_1}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{4\alpha_2}\right) > 0 = \pi_3(0, 0, 0)$$

Then $\sigma^* = (0, 0, 1)$ is a Nash equilibrium in which, provided that $\alpha_1 \in \left(0, \frac{4}{5}\right)$ and $\alpha_3 > \min \left\{ \frac{\alpha_2}{4-\alpha_2}, \frac{4\alpha_1}{(4-\alpha_1)(4-\alpha_2)} \right\}$, condition (4) holds, so that the worst alternative has the highest probability of being chosen.

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16 The roots are $0$ and $\pm 1.154 7 \sqrt{\frac{1}{\alpha_1\alpha_2} \left(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 - \sqrt{\alpha_1^2 - \alpha_1\alpha_2 + \alpha_2^2}\right)}$, where the non-zero roots are double roots.