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Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola ManziniWe build a simple allernating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players call commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Economics LettersISSN
0165-1765External DOI
Volume
54Page range
15-22Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2017-11-08Usage metrics
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