Manzini, Paola and Unset (1999) Strategic bargaining with destructive power. Economics Letters, 65 (3). pp. 315-322. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	University of Sussex Business School > Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic theory. Demography > HB0131 Methodology > HB0135 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods Including econometrics, input-output analysis, game theory
Depositing User:	Paola Manzini
Date Deposited:	08 Nov 2017 16:02
Last Modified:	08 Nov 2017 16:02
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71025

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