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Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola Manzini, Marco MariottiWe consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Games and Economic BehaviorISSN
0899-8256Publisher
ElsevierExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
37Page range
170-195Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2017-11-08Usage metrics
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