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On smiles, winks and handshakes as coordination devices

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola Manzini, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Nicolaas J Vriend
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Economic Journal

ISSN

0013-0133

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Issue

537

Volume

119

Page range

826-854

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2017-11-13

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