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Is the EU a Normative Power in the field of Conflict Transformation?
The cases of Cyprus and Kosovo

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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

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Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been, and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of another degree.

Signature:
Acknowledgements

Completing this thesis would not have been possible without the support and guidance I received from many people. I would like to begin with a special thanks to my two supervisors, Dr Adrian Treacher and Dr Kai Oppermann, who have patiently supported me through this journey and have provided valuable feedback and comments. I would also like to thank Professor Jörg Monar for his guidance during the initial stages of this research.

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Last, but not least, I would like to thank Oristis Iliadis for supporting me from the very first day. His patience is greatly appreciated.
The main aim of this dissertation is to test the extent to which the EU is a normative power in the field of conflict transformation. Although much has been written on Normative Power Europe (NPE), the concept is still empirically under-explored. This dissertation, therefore, applies the NPE analytical framework to explore the EU’s role in Cyprus and Kosovo. Specifically, a three-part framework is used which analyses the EU’s goals, means and impact.

The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is twofold. Firstly, the application of the NPE framework offers a fresh theoretical perspective regarding the EU’s role in conflict transformation. Secondly, the empirical focus of this research allows for conclusions to be drawn for the ways norms can be spread in cases of ethnic conflict and for the ways local conditions can potentially hamper the internalisation of norms. The main argument of this thesis is that the EU’s normative power in the field of conflict transformation can be challenged by reference to dichotomies that are important within the NPE analytical framework like, for example, normative interests versus materialistic interests, persuasion versus coercion and genuine internalisation of norms versus instrumental behaviour on the part of local actors.

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Following the introduction, the second chapter discusses the NPE concept and presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. The third chapter provides the historical context of the two conflict cases. Then, the next three chapters focus on applying the NPE framework to the two cases. Each chapter is concerned with one of the three dimensions of the analytical framework (goals, means and impact). Lastly, chapter seven summarises the main argument and reflects on its methodological and theoretical implications.
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List of Abbreviations

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific
AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou)
CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CBC - Cross-Border Cooperation
CBM - Community Building Mitrovica
CEEC - Central and Eastern European Countries
CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE - Council of Europe
CPS - Civil Protection Structure
CSCE - Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO - Civil Society Organisation
CTP - Republican Turkish Party
CYINDEP - Cyprus Island-wide NGO Development Platform
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
DTR - Direct Trade Regulation
EAR - European Agency of Reconstruction
EC - European Community
ECHR - European Court of Human Rights
ECLO - European Commission Liaison Office
EDA - European Defence Agency
EDC/HRE - Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education
EC - European Community
EIDHR - European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Education
EPA - Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC-European Political Cooperation
EP-European Parliament
ERC-Educational Reform Committee
ESDP-European Security and Defence Policy
ESS-European Security Strategy
EUCC-European Union Coordination Centre
EU-European Union
EULEX-European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPM-European Union Police Mission
EUPSO-European Union Programme Support Office
EUPTK-European Union Planning Team Kosovo
EUSR-European Union Special Representative
FAR-Financial Aid Regulation
FES-Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FRY-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAC-General Affairs Council
GAERC-General Affairs and External Relations Council
GAP-Institute for Advanced Studies
GLR-Green Line Regulation
ICJ-International Court of Justice
ICO-International Civilian Office
ICR-International Civilian Representative
IDP-Internally-Displaced Person
INGO-International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPA-Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
KAN-Kosovo Action Network
KCSF-Kosovo Civil Society Foundation
KFOR-Kosovo Force
KFOS-Kosovo Foundation for Open Society
KIPRED-Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development
KLA-Kosovo Liberation Army
KTTO-Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce
KVM-Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK-Democratic League of Kosovo
MEP-Member of the European Parliament
MEST-Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MFA-Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MMA-Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising
MOEC-Ministry of Education and Culture
MTS-Mother Teresa Society
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO-Non-Governmental Organisation
NLM-National Liberation Movement
NPE-Normative Power Europe
OSCE HCNM-Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe-High Commissioner for National Minorities
OSCE-Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PIO-Press and Information Office
PISG-Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
R2P-Responsibility to Protect
RIC-Reconstruction Implementation Commission
RoC-Republic of Cyprus
RRF-Rapid Reaction Force
SAA-Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP-Stability and Association Process
SCORE-Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
SDP-Civic Initiative for Freedom, Democracy, Justice
SEA-Single European Act
SEED-Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
SFRY-Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
STM-Stability and Association Process Tracking Mechanism
TAFKO-Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo
TAIB-Transition and Institution-Building
TRNC “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
UBP-National Unity Party
UK-United Kingdom
UNDP-United Nations Development Program
UNDP-ACT-United Nations Development Program-Action for Cooperation and Trust
UNDP-PFF-United Nations Development Program-Partnership for the Future
UNFICYP-United Nations Forces in Cyprus
UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK-United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC-United Nations Security Council
UNSG-United Nations Secretary General
UN-United Nations
USAID-United States Agency for International Development
USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US-United States
UWE-University of the West of England
WEU-Western European Union
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The emergence of constructivism has shifted the attention of some EU focused research towards considering the importance of norms and values in the Union’s policy making and their possible impact (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Rumelili 2003). Constructivism perceives an actor’s identity as socially built. For constructivists, principles and norms play an important role in the formation of preferences and interests (Wendt 1995, Ruggie 1998). In fact, they regard ideas as constitutive of an actor’s interests (Blyth 2004: 702). In this context, Ian Manners (2002) formed his argument that the EU is a normative power. The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) has, since then, been widely discussed and become the target of extensive criticism.

This thesis rests on a comparative analysis of two conflict cases, namely Kosovo and Cyprus. Its main aim is to test the applicability of the NPE concept in the field of conflict transformation. To this end, the two conflicts were studied in depth in order to increase understanding of whether and why the EU is interested in transforming conflicts, how it acts towards this end and what kind of impact it produces.

This introductory chapter is divided into nine sections. The first places the research into context by discussing the relevant literature. The second outlines the main research questions and the central argument of this thesis. Section three provides some conceptual clarifications to avoid misinterpretation of key terms used in this thesis. The fourth and fifth are concerned with the research design. More specifically, methodological approaches, data sources and data management techniques are discussed. Section six outlines the strategies used to enhance and ensure trustworthiness while section seven explains the rationale for choosing a long timeframe. The eighth identifies the research
limitations and discusses the approaches used to overcome those. Lastly, section nine provides an outline of the thesis chapters.

1.1 PLACING THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT

The study of the international role of the EU, and specifically its conceptualisation as a normative power, has been the subject of investigation for scholars in Political Science, EU Studies and International Relations. In addition, the focus of this research on conflict transformation brings into the discussion scholars in Conflict Studies. The literature on the NPE concept and on the EU’s role in cases of conflict will now be briefly examined with the aim of bringing these strands of literature together. In so doing, a gap in the existing body of literature will be identified; thereby establishing the rationale for the main research question of this thesis, namely whether the EU has been a normative power towards Cyprus and Kosovo in conflict transformation.

Normative Power Europe literature

Since the publication of Manners’ (2002) seminal article, the NPE concept has been widely used in academic literature. Specifically, three main trends emerged. The first encompasses work on NPE and specific sectors/policy areas. Some examples are Lightfoot and Burchell’s (2004, 2005) work on NPE and environmental policy, Lamy and Laïdi’s (2002) on the EU and global governance, Haukkala’s (2008) on European Neighbourhood Policy and Erickson’s (2011) on arms exports.

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1 This literature search concentrated only on articles written in English.
A second trend in the literature is concerned with comparing the normativity of different global actors. One example is Tocci’s (2008) edited volume on the normative foreign policy of the EU, Russia, India and China. One chapter of this volume is concerned with the EU’s policies towards Kosovo from 1999-2007. However, its main focus is not on conflict transformation in terms of improving the relationship between the parties of the conflict. Rather, the author focuses on the EU’s involvement in resolving the issue of Kosovo’s final status. More recently, Kavalski has carried out “a parallel assessment of the normative power of the EU, China and India in Central Asia” (Kavalski 2012: 148).

The third trend in scholarship on NPE is more theoretical and is concerned with particular aspects of the NPE approach. Examples include Diez’s (2005) work on how the NPE discourse leads to the creation of a distinct EU identity by turning third parties into ‘others’ and Bickerton’s (2011) on Normative Power Europe and the issue of legitimacy.

**The EU’s role in conflicts**

Many studies have been devoted to analysing, giving explanations for, and presenting different understandings of the EU’s role in conflicts. One of the main focuses has been the examination of the different tools at the EU’s disposal. Such research mainly focused on the launch of peacekeeping missions and the extent to which these were effective in the reform of institutions, the process of democratisation and the protection of human and minority rights - all of which are considered as important aspects of peacebuilding (Paris 2004: 39).

Furthermore, a substantial part of the literature is concerned with the EU’s role in conflict resolution as part of its wider policies. In this respect, much research has been concerned

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3 The terms ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict transformation’ will be defined in a subsequent section of this chapter.
with the question of how the prospect of EU membership can assist the process towards conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Diez et al. (2006), for example, put forward a framework with four pathways (compulsory, enabling, connective and constructive) through which the EU could affect border conflicts in the process of integration. These pathways are sub-categorised with regards to the EU’s approach and the targeted actors in a given society. More specifically, the authors propose that the EU’s approach towards a conflict could be either actor-driven or structural and that the main target in a conflict society is either the political elites or the wider public. Tocci (2007) has proposed another, similar taxonomy of how the EU could have an impact on conflicts. She spells out three mechanisms, namely conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement. All three, however, do not diverge significantly from the Diez et al. four pathways, as the logic behind them is very similar.

Moreover, Coppotiers et al. (2004) examined the usage of Europeanisation as an instrument of conflict resolution in four secessionist conflicts: Cyprus, Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria. They mainly discuss the ability of the EU to have an impact on conflicts through its multi-level framework and its foreign policy actions using the instruments of conditionality and socialisation.

Directly related to the above discussion is the perception of the EU in many academic studies as an actor interested in transforming conflicts as opposed to simply managing them. Tocci (2008: 875), for example, argues that EU actors, “in stressing their commitment to peace, have meant conflict resolution and transformation, over and above conflict management and settlement”. Also, conflict transformation advocates argued that the integration of divided societies into the EU’s supranational political structures can help transform a conflict (Belloni 2009). In fact, some see European integration as the
only way to ensure the long-term resolution of ethnic conflicts (Delanty 1996, Kearney 1997).

Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation

What is more important for the purposes of this research, however, is to identify the academic scholarship that directly associates ‘Normative Power Europe’ and conflict transformation. Firstly, it should be noted that very few academic publications have linked the NPE literature to the study of conflicts. One notable example is Michelle Pace (2007) who explored how the construction of the EU’s normative power may pose limits on the EU’s role as a global actor. To this end, she draws on the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, only two publications have attempted to link the NPE concept with conflict transformation. The first is an article by Steglich (2012) which examined how the EU’s normative power can lead to conflict transformation in the case of Moldova. However, this article does not utilise the three-dimensional approach proposed by Manners (explained on pp.52-62). Its focus is mostly on how the mechanisms of integration and association might transform the Moldova conflict. Therefore, no concrete conclusions can be reached on the EU’s normativity in conflict transformation.

The second was Diez and Pace’s (2007) work on the NPE concept in conflict transformation in the cases of Cyprus and Israel-Palestine. However, the emphasis of that study is not on the question of whether the EU is a normative power in this field. Rather, their work is concerned with how the EU’s normative self-construction is conceived by the main actors involved in the conflicts. What still has not been done, therefore, is the application of the NPE framework as an analytical tool in the field of conflict transformation.
Original Contribution and Importance of this Research

The above review reveals a gap in the existing literature. This thesis seeks to fill this gap through a comprehensive application of the NPE framework in the field of conflict transformation. It will mainly investigate whether the attribution of the ‘Normative Power’ characteristic to the EU is accurate in relation to its role in this field.

For Manners (2011: 244), the assertion that the EU is advancing and promoting certain principles “is still subject to confirmation”. Of the key principles that Manners (2011: 244) suggested are at work, sustainable peace\(^4\) is seen as the “prime principle” that the EU should be advancing. For this reason, that principle is put at the centre of this particular research.

This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the empirical literature on NPE through the thorough investigation of Cyprus and Kosovo, two under-researched cases from an NPE perspective. Most importantly, however, substantive conclusions will be drawn on the analytical and practical significance of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ approach in the field of conflict transformation.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CENTRAL ARGUMENT

The central research question of this thesis is:

Is the EU a normative power in the field of conflict transformation?

This main question was divided into three sub-questions which reflect the three parts of the analytical framework used in this research, namely EU goals, means and impact (for

\(^4\) This thesis proposes that ‘sustainable peace’ can be achieved through conflict transformation initiatives. The link between the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and conflict transformation approaches will be discussed below.
a more detailed discussion on this framework, see Chapter Two). Specifically, the three sub-questions that are addressed in this dissertation are:

- Has ‘sustainable peace’ become a prime objective of the EU?

- Through what means does the EU diffuse the norms it stands for?

- Has the EU been able to shape conceptions of what counts as normal in conflict cases?

Taking into consideration NPE propositions as well as alternative explanations (see Chapter Two), this thesis argues that the EU’s normative power in the field of conflict transformation can be challenged by reference to dichotomies that are important within the NPE analytical framework. As the cross-case comparative analysis will reveal, the normativity of the EU can be challenged on several grounds. With regards to EU goals, problems arise from the prioritisation of material interests over norms and from the contested nature of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and international law which made possible the development of well-grounded arguments against the EU’s approach. Regarding EU mechanisms, problems arise from the difficulty of drawing the line between persuasion on the one hand and imposition/coercion on the other. Lastly, regarding EU impact, the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm is hindered by deeply entrenched divisions and by the instrumental behaviour of local actors.

1.3 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The first term that needs to be defined in order to avoid any misapprehension is ‘conflict’. The usage of this term in international politics has undergone significant changes. In contemporary research, conflict does not always consist of the use of physical violence (Diez et.al.2006: 6). Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 20) define conflict as the “perception of incompatibility between actors and the range of behaviour associated with such
perceptions”. This definition is similar to the one provided by Diez et al. (2006). Their definition, however, goes deeper and associates conflict with identities. More specifically, they define conflict as “the incompatibility of subject positions”. According to them (Diez et al. 2006: 159), subject positions are “the specific interests and identity” of the conflict parties. This understanding of the term ‘conflict’ is the one adopted in this thesis. Based on this definition, conflict can be conceptualised as a social construction. Hence, this understanding of ‘conflict’ leads to the assumption that it is possible for the EU to shape social constructions of conflict by changing the conflict parties’ subject positions.

Turning to conflict transformation, Diez et al. (2006: 584) perceive the EU as a transformative actor interested in the “re-articulation of subject positions so that they no longer seem incompatible in most respects”. Since subject positions are seen to represent the parties’ identity, transformation is about addressing the structural roots of the conflict (incompatible subject positions). Similar definitions of conflict transformation have also been put forward by other authors. Lederach (2003: 14), for example, noted, “conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships”. Similarly, Miall (2004: 70) argued that conflict transformation is the “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict”. Other authors went a step further and provided a narrower, more demanding definition of conflict transformation that involves the transformation of the identities of the parties involved in a conflict (Smithey 2011: 19, Simonsen 2005). In this research, Diez et al’s understanding of transformation (re-articulation of subject positions) has been adopted. Given the definition of the term
‘conflict’ used in this thesis (incompatibility of subject positions), this definition of conflict transformation is best-suited for the subsequent analysis.

In sharp contrast to conflict transformation approaches, ‘conflict management’ theorists perceive violent conflicts as the outcome of the existence of divergent interests within and between groups of people. For these theorists, transformation of such conflicts is unlikely to happen. Thus, the only thing left to be done is to manage them, and sometimes to find the middle ground in which confrontation will terminate and violence will be laid aside (Hansen 2012: 79-80, Wallensteen 2002: 53).

Conflict management, therefore, in contrast to conflict transformation, deals only with the cessation of violence and containment of conflict but does not address the roots of the conflict. Conversely, conflict transformation aims at long-term, structural, relational and behavioural changes. In other words, conflict transformation is mostly concerned with altering perceptions of normality, thus altering identities. As a result of these differing starting points, conflict management advocates regard interests and identities of conflict parties as exogenously given and thus not susceptible to any alteration. In contrast, conflict transformation approaches are more aligned with the constructivist understanding of identities as socially built ⁵.

Turning to the EU’s role in conflicts, Manners (2008a: 135) argues that it is interested in sustainable peace because it focuses on addressing “both the structural causes and the violent symptoms of conflict”. Elsewhere, he states that sustainable peace involves addressing the structural causes of conflicts and tackling “the roots of inequality” (Manners 2006: 26) in conflict situations. This definition leads to the assumption that a commitment to sustainable peace requires a long-term and deep approach towards

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⁵ As will be discussed in Chapter Two, constructivism has formed the basis of the NPE approach.
conflicts as opposed to short-term approaches addressing only the immediate consequences of a conflict.

This understanding of ‘sustainable peace’ is aligned with conflict transformation as opposed to conflict management approaches\(^6\). This thesis argues that sustainable peace can be achieved only when the relationship, identities and perceptions of the parties involved in the conflict are changed/transformed for the better (Lederach 1995:17, Miall 2004: 4, Mitchell 2002: 20). It follows that the EU, in order to change perceptions of normality with regards to sustainable peace, should aim at transforming the conflicts and not at simply managing them. In this thesis, therefore, ‘sustainable peace’ is perceived as the end-product and conflict transformation as the path to achieve this end.

1.3 ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

It is important to clarify from the outset the ontological and epistemological perspectives adopted. In order to contribute to the understanding of how the EU interacts with key Cypriot and Kosovan\(^7\) actors, this thesis starts out from a relativist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, focusing on norms as constitutive of the EU’s identity, the ways through which the EU diffuses its norms and an interpretation of the EU’s potential impact. Emphasis is therefore placed on historical and cultural aspects that help the development of a more detailed and informed understanding of each case.

However, in addition to the interpretivist analysis, some positivist practices are also used to facilitate the empirical application of the NPE framework. These include the choice of the cases along the more- and less-likely spectrum – the two cases were chosen based on

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\(^6\) Conflict management approaches are more aligned with Manners’ understanding of ‘stable peace’ (Appendix A: 36) which refers to addressing the consequences of a conflict but not its root causes.

\(^7\) In this thesis, Kosovar refers to Kosovo-Albanians while Kosovan refers to all citizens of Kosovo.
the extent to which they were expected to be in line with the NPE argument - and the conduct of cross-case analysis. Therefore, this thesis rests upon different epistemologies in order to turn NPE into a practically applicable analytical tool (Shen 2015).

Taking into consideration the ontological and epistemological positions described above, this research adopts a qualitative methodological approach. Qualitative research can be understood as a research strategy that “emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of the data” (Bryman 2012: 36). The main reason why the thesis employs qualitative methods for investigating the degree of normativity of the EU in conflict transformation is that they are mostly concerned with the meaning, and not the frequency, of phenomena (McNabb 2004:341). In what follows, the specific research methods and case selection criteria are discussed.

The use of case studies to test a theoretical framework

In order to fulfil the key theoretical aim of this research – to test the extent to which the EU is a normative power in the field of conflict transformation – the case study method is used. A case is defined as “an empirical enquiry that investigates contemporary phenomena within real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13).

As Eckstein (1975: 80) argued, “case studies are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, but most valuable at the stage of theory building process where least value is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are tested”. Taking the main purpose of this research into consideration, case studies have been deemed the most appropriate. Firstly, case studies are particularly suitable when attempting to answer the how and why questions that “deal with operational links that need to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies” (Yin 2009: 10). Since a central
The question in this research is how and why NPE works or does not work, a case study approach is the most suitable. Secondly, the case study method was chosen because of its appropriateness in analysis investigating contemporary events in which “the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated” (Yin 2009: 11). Thirdly, case studies are particularly suitable to explore a complex social phenomenon (normativity of an actor in conflict transformation) in its natural setting (societies ridden by ethno-national conflict) (Yin 2009: 11).

Eckstein also proposed certain methods of theory-based case selection. He noted that in testing a theory, it is useful to choose what he termed a ‘crucial case’, which is a case “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein 1975: 118). However, he also stated “history seldom provides clear examples of cases that satisfy the demanding criteria of a crucial case” (Eckstein 1975: 118). As a result, more-likely and less-likely case studies are usually employed in the social sciences because they are considered as the “more relaxed variants of the crucial case study” (Rohlfing 2012: 84). Following Eckstein, the two cases used in this research were chosen on the basis of the extent to which they were expected to be in line with the NPE expectations (the rationale for choosing the particular cases of Cyprus and Kosovo will be explained in the following section). In other words, it is expected that the empirical findings from the more-likely case will be in line with the NPE argument to a great degree. In contrast, the empirical findings from the less-likely case are expected to either not be in line with the NPE expectations or to be in line with them to a much lesser extent than the findings from the more-likely case.
Another typological classification used in the process of selecting the cases for this research is the one proposed by Stake. Stake (2008: 123) described three types of case studies. ‘Intrinsic case studies’ are those that are undertaken because the specific case that is chosen is of interest in itself. The main goal of an intrinsic case study is neither to provide understandings of abstract concepts or general phenomena nor to build a theory. On the contrary, the ‘instrumental case study’ intends to provide further understandings of an issue or to refine a theory. In instrumental case studies, “the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role and it facilitates our understanding of something else” (Stake 2005: 445). The third type, according to Stake (2008: 124), is the collective case study which is merely “an instrumental study extended to several cases”. The interest of the researcher is not on one or more cases, rather, they intend to investigate a phenomenon or a general condition. This research is an example of Stake’s ‘collective case study’. The two cases used in this research were chosen with a view of enhancing the understanding of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ concept.

In this thesis, the two case studies of Cyprus and Kosovo are used to test the validity of ‘Normative Power Europe’ in the field of conflict transformation. These cases will be studied in depth to see “whether events unfold in the manner predicted and whether actors speak and act as the theory predicts” (Van Evera 1997: 29). In other words, the analysis of the extent to which the EU is a normative power will be realised through an examination of each case across a three-part analytical framework (explained on pp.52-62) to see if the EU objectives, actions and impact are in line with the NPE approach. The analysis, therefore, will be replicated across cases and the evidence will be more compelling. This makes possible a more systematic testing of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ concept in the field of conflict transformation. There is no agreement in the literature as to the number of cases that should be included in collective case studies.
However, Yin suggested that with a few cases, possibly two or three, we can still achieve replication (Yin 1984: 57-58) (for a discussion on the transferability of the findings of this research, see section 1.6).

**Selecting the cases**

Having decided to espouse a collective case study approach, it is necessary to choose the cases with great care (Stake 2008: 243). Collective casework requires the cases to be chosen out of a number of potential alternatives. Firstly, the selection of the two cases is based on Manners’ understanding of what the EU’s role should be in the promotion of sustainable peace. For him (Appendix A: 36), the norm of sustainable peace, just like all the norms promoted by the EU, derives from the UN framework and is, thus, a universal norm. The UN should, therefore, work with regional organisations to advance this norm. The EU, as a normative power, should support and promote ‘sustainable peace’ in its own region while the UN should undertake the responsibility of promoting it to other places. Based on this rationale, the cases were chosen based on their geographical location in the EU’s neighbourhood.

Moreover, the cases were selected on the basis of the extent to which they are expected to conform to the NPE expectations, thus providing space for a rigorous test of the NPE framework. As explained earlier in this chapter, Kosovo was chosen as the case that is likely to meet NPE expectations to a much greater extent than the case of Cyprus. Preliminary empirical investigation showed that the level of EU engagement and effort towards Kosovo was significantly larger and deeper in comparison to Cyprus. This was later confirmed by the researcher’s fieldwork and in-depth research.

At first sight, the Cyprus case should be expected to constitute a case that is likely to match the NPE expectations to a great extent. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) joined the
EU in 2004 and, therefore, should have already espoused the EU’s understanding of ‘sustainable peace’\(^8\), thus making it easier for the EU to transform the conflict. However, a preliminary empirical investigation revealed that both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities show very little signs of internalisation\(^9\) of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. The subsequent in-depth research confirmed this. Since Cyprus is already a member, the EU has lost the chance to encourage conflict transformation through enlargement-related initiatives, unlike with Kosovo. This means that the EU faces fewer obstacles in the process of diffusing its norms in Kosovo, thus making it easier to transform that particular conflict. For these reasons, Kosovo is considered as the case that is expected to conform to the NPE expectations to a much greater extent in comparison to Cyprus (George/Bennett 2005: 120-123). By choosing Cyprus as a less-likely case and Kosovo as the more-likely case, a vigorous test of the NPE concept is made possible.

The use of structured, focused comparison and process tracing

The main method used for cross-case analysis is structured, focused comparison. This method allows the researcher to perform a systematic comparison between two in-depth case studies, thus contributing to an “orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question” (George and Bennet 2005: 70). This research explores three questions (see pp.54-64) that reflect the main objective and theoretical focus of this thesis. These three questions were asked of both the Cyprus and Kosovo cases.

\(8\) A central proposition of the NPE approach is that the EU principles are also shared by the member states (Manners 2008: 68).

\(9\) According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 904), a norm is internalised when it achieves “a taken-for-granted quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic”. 
In addition, the within-case analysis benefited from the method of process tracing. George and Bennett (2005: 6) defined this as the method used to investigate intermediate steps to make inferences on how a process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest. The main advantage is the fact that it allows the development of an understanding on “how and what happened” (King et al 1994: 226). Process tracing was firstly used to establish the sequential order of events, which contributed to a better and deeper understanding of the issue at hand. Secondly, in the context of this research and in line with Jacobs (2014: 65-69), it helped trace the origins and evolution of the EU’s principles and norms, establish the pathways of norm diffusion and identify the extent to which domestic change towards the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm came about as a result of EU policies. As Jacobs noted, “process-tracing methods are ideally suited to addressing the challenges of studying ideational causation” (Jacobs 2014: 48).

1.5 SPECIFICATION OF DATA SOURCES AND DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

Five different data sources were used in this thesis – official documentation, speeches, opinion polls, semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. The following paragraphs will expand on the rationale for their use.

The first source of primary data was official documents. In analysing the EU’s approach and policies towards the Cyprus and Kosovo conflicts, the researcher relied on European Council documents (regulations, declarations, statements, Presidency conclusions and Annual Reports), Council of Ministers documents and European Commission communications and policy documents. Particular emphasis was put on projects funded by the Commission. Information on those projects’ objectives, timeframe, stage of implementation and results was obtained through the EC’s own evaluation reports as well
as through NGO reports and academic publications. Primary data was also obtained through European Parliament (EP) documents. The EP played an important role in both cases. Firstly, EP resolutions were examined with regards to both Cyprus and Kosovo. Secondly, EP reports on inter-parliamentary delegations were also examined. In addition, in certain instances, the EU has initiated and implemented projects in collaboration with other organisations like, for example, the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe (CoE). Some of these projects were relevant to the scope of this thesis. As a result, UN and CoE publications and reports on these particular projects were analysed. Also, relevant OSCE reports were examined. Such reports provided complementary information with regards to particular aspects of the Cypriot and Kosovan societies relevant to this research. For example, the OSCE reports on education in Kosovo helped the researcher to gain a more comprehensive view on how education policies and practices may affect the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.

Also, in discussing particular normative changes in the domestic Kosovan and Cypriot environments, data was obtained from documents produced in these two countries. More specifically, such sources included reports and strategic plans published by the Republic of Kosovo’s Ministry of Education, legal documents and reports on the state of play on the implementation of the Brussels agreement\textsuperscript{10}, reports published by the Cyprus Ministry of Education as well as local NGO reports and publications.

Apart from official documents, public speeches were also analysed. These were accessed through the websites of the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the RoC, the Presidential Press Office of the “TRNC” (‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’) and the President of the Republic of Kosovo. Additional data was obtained through the

\textsuperscript{10} ‘Brussels Agreement’ refers to the agreement facilitated by the EU and signed by Serbia and Kosovo on the normalisation of their relations on 19 April 2013.
websites of the foreign ministries of Kosovo, the RoC and the “TRNC”. With particular reference to the Kosovo Serb community, quotations of politicians, as these appeared in the press, were also included in the analysis. Such quotations were accessed through the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) media monitoring unit.\textsuperscript{11}

Also, opinion polls proved a valuable source of information when analysing the normativity of the EU’s impact. They enabled the researcher to juxtapose the results from the analysis of political elite rhetoric with the public views as portrayed in opinion polls in order to identify the general pattern that emerged in both the Cypriot and Kosovan societies.

Another source of primary data were the 52 interviews conducted by the researcher (see Appendices A and B).\textsuperscript{12} The main purpose of interviewing is “to derive interpretations, not facts or laws, from respondent talk” (Warren 2001: 83). The goal is not simply to get answers to questions; rather, it is an “interest to understanding the experience of other people and the meaning they make of their experience” (Shkedi 2005: 59). This method was chosen as it would enable triangulation\textsuperscript{13} of data.

Semi-structured interviewing was adopted (Green 2005: 53) as this would allow flexibility on the part of the interviewer. The researcher was able to discuss issues that were not on the pre-prepared list of questions. Rather, the interviewer had the opportunity to investigate the issue more by asking follow-up questions based on the responses of the interviewee. Also, semi-structured interviewing allowed the researcher to vary the

\textsuperscript{11} All the quotes cited in this thesis are authentic and may therefore contain linguistic errors.

\textsuperscript{12} Appendices A and B contain detailed information on the background of interviewees as well as on the time and place each interview took place. Appendix A includes information on interviewees that agreed to be directly quoted in this thesis. Appendix B contains information on interviewees that chose to remain anonymous.

\textsuperscript{13} For a definition of the term ‘triangulation’, see p.34.
questions according to each interviewee’s position. Lastly, this type of interviewing helped address another issue, namely the unwillingness of elite interviewees “to be put in a straightjacket of closed-ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).

Interviewees were identified using a combination of sampling methods – positional/reputational and the snowballing system. More specifically, potential interviewees were initially identified by their position and involvement in the processes being examined in this thesis. Then, those of them who agreed to be interviewed were asked to suggest other possible interviewees to the researcher (Vogt et al 2012: 129). Lastly, it should be noted that telephone, Skype and email interviews were also used in this research. While these are not as ideal as face-to-face interviewing, they enabled the researcher to conduct a larger number of interviews, thus collecting a larger amount of data.

Data was also retrieved from secondary sources. ‘Secondary data’ refers to data that has already been collected and analysed by others. Such sources ranged from books, articles in academic journals and publications by research centres and institutions.

The reason for collecting data from five different sources was three-fold. Firstly, the combination of data from the aforementioned sources was helpful in establishing the chain of events in both cases. Secondly, this strategy enabled triangulation of the data collected. Lastly, by presenting and analysing the differing views of politicians, EU officials, academics and civil society organisations (CSOs) on specific topics, the researcher avoided the trap of selective data collection in favour of, or against, NPE propositions.

Data Management and Data Analysis
Having outlined the main data sources, this section will explain how the collected data was managed and analysed. Firstly, a literature review was conducted in order to give a detailed account of the different ways in which NPE is conceptualised and understood. It also outlines the criteria used to establish the extent to which the empirical evidence is in line with the NPE argument. Then, the literature review thoroughly discusses the main theoretical debates around the NPE concept to identify the main critiques against it. These critiques provide alternative explanations in the empirical parts of this research in cases where empirical findings do not conform to the NPE argument and criteria. In order to ensure a thorough review of the literature, a comprehensive list of books, book chapters, edited volumes and articles on NPE was created.

Then, to better grasp the conditions in the domestic Cypriot and Kosovan environments with regards to ‘sustainable peace’, an account of the key historical and political developments of both conflicts is provided. Using secondary literature as well as EU documents, the impasses and breakthroughs in Cyprus and Kosovo concerning conflict transformation as well as the EU involvement are discussed.

The data used in the process of applying the three-part analytical framework to the two cases was managed in several ways. In order to identify the main EU objectives, a content analysis of speeches of EU officials and of EU documents was conducted to see whether the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ has been central to the EU’s approach towards, and relations with, the two countries. This analysis was supplemented with data collected from interviews with EU officials and academic experts. Interviews, document analysis and secondary literature were also used to trace the interests and motives of the EU in

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14 Content analysis refers to the process of identifying, extracting and analysing underlying themes (Bryman 2004: 392).
getting involved with the two conflicts as well as its commitment to international law principles.

In assessing the normativity of EU actions, the researcher drew on European Commission reports, CoE and OSCE reports and EP communications with the aim of identifying the main EU projects and actions towards both cases which were then separated into five categories reflecting the five NPE mechanisms discussed in Chapter Two. Then, interviews and official evaluations of certain programmes were used to determine whether these EU policies and actions were in line with the NPE expectations. Interviews proved very valuable in this particular stage of the research as they allowed the researcher to extend the investigation beyond official accounts and narrative (see Tansey 2007: 767). For example, although the EU-brokered dialogue in Kosovo initially seemed to be a good example of how the EU engages in persuasion, interviews revealed that the way the EU implemented the dialogue leaned towards imposition (see Chapter Five).

In assessing the normativity of EU impact, a content analysis of speeches and public addresses by Cypriot and Kosovan politicians was conducted with the aim of identifying whether the ‘sustainable peace’ norm has been internalised by elites. This analysis was supplemented by interviews and document analysis of official reports from Cypriot and Kosovan ministries. Also, the discourse of CSOs was reviewed to see whether any changes emerged from below. Lastly, public opinion polls were reviewed to determine whether any changes occurred within the wider society. In addition, drawing on interviews, NGO reports, publications from research centres and other secondary sources, the researcher traced the evolution of partnership bonds at the level of the elites as well as at the level of civil society and assessed the extent to which local ownership emerged.

1.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF RESEARCH
‘Trustworthiness’ refers to the quality of the research and encompasses several different concepts (Given and Saumure 2008: 895). These include the concepts of credibility, transferability, confirmability and dependability. The remainder of this section will expand on the strategies used in this research to ensure trustworthiness.

Firstly, every qualitative research must be credible in order for it to be taken seriously. The more traditional, positivist understanding of this term is based upon the premise that the findings of a research must accurately reflect the world studied. Another way of conceptualising credibility has been put forward through the constructivist epistemology which is the one adopted in this thesis. More specifically, from a constructivist point of view, credibility refers to “capturing multiple subjective realities than ensuring the portrayal of an objective social reality” (Rubin and Babbie 2010: 232). In this research, a number of strategies have been employed to enhance credibility. Firstly, in order to increase the reliability of data, this thesis uses triangulation (Burnham et al. 2008: 40, Grix 2010: 135-137). In this particular research, triangulation is defined as “capturing and respecting multiple perspectives” (Patton 2002: 546). In this respect, data obtained through official documents and speeches was validated against information provided by interviewees, media articles and secondary sources (books, articles and specialised reports published by NGOs and research centres). In addition, the second strategy used to enhance credibility relates to the use of well-established research methods (Jensen 2008: 138). The researcher conducted a thorough investigation of methodological approaches and research methods that could be used in this research. This led to informed and well-justified decisions on which methods would be adopted and the reasons why they were considered as the most suitable. Also, the careful selection of interviewees was another strategy to enhance credibility. In this research, interviewees were chosen on the basis of their knowledge on the subject and are, thus, credible sources.
Transferability refers to the extent to which a study’s findings and results can be transferred to other settings (Jensen 2008c: 886). In this research, transferability has been enhanced through certain key strategies. The first one relates to the case selection. Selecting the cases along the more- and less-likely spectrum increases the scope for transferring the results to other conflict cases. If both cases conform to the NPE expectations to a great extent, this would provide significant grounds to support the argument that the EU is indeed a normative actor in conflict transformation. If the empirical evidence from the less-likely case are, to a large extent, in line with the NPE argument, this would provide a particularly strong support for NPE. In contrast, if neither of the cases conforms to the NPE expectations, then there is significant cause to doubt whether the EU is a normative power in the promotion of ‘sustainable peace’. In particular, if the empirical findings from the more-likely case are largely not compatible with the NPE argument, then serious doubts are raised as to whether the EU can be a normative power in any case. The other strategy used to enhance transferability is thick description (Jensen 2008: 886) which enables the transfer of the theoretical framework used in this research to other settings. A detailed description of the setting, participants and research design has been provided to enable other researchers to make “their own determinations about transferability” (Jensen 2008: 886).

Confirmability is related to “the degree to which the results of the study are based on the research purpose and not altered due to researcher bias” (Jensen 2008: 112). One possible obstacle to confirmability is the possibility of the researcher having analysed the data according to his/her predispositions. To address this issue, this research was based on data obtained from a variety of different sources. In so doing, the researcher aimed to avoid the trap of selective data collection in favour of, or against, NPE concept. Secondly, formulating alternative explanations and determining whether these are supported by the
data is another way of enhancing confirmability. To this end, in every part of the tripartite NPE framework, possible alternative and/or rival explanations were considered when analysing the data. Thirdly, the provision of a large number of data extracts to support the thesis arguments, should also be stressed as a way of increasing confirmability.

Lastly, dependability refers to the idea that if “similar conditions are applied, a similar explanation for the phenomenon should be found” (Given and Saumure 2008: 896). The main ways to achieve dependability are “triangulation and sequencing of methods and creating a well-articulated rationale for these choices” (Ravitch and Carl 2015: 189). In the context of this particular research, the researcher has provided a detailed account of the theoretical framework and the methodological approaches used to enable others to replicate the research (Jensen 2008b: 209).

1.7 RESEARCH TIMEFRAME

The research for this thesis covers the years between 1993 and 2015. The departing point (1993) of this research is the implementation of the EU’s CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), when the EU explicitly stated for the first time its foreign policy objectives (European Union 1992, Article J.1).

Also, this research covers the period up to September 2015. Regarding the case of Cyprus, this cut-off point enabled the researcher to investigate whether any changes occurred with regards to conflict transformation after the election of Mustafa Akinci as the president of the “TRNC” in April 2015. Akinci is generally regarded as a pro-reconciliation politician and was expected to bring changes to the Cyprus conflict (Hazou 2015). Secondly, in relation to Kosovo, this cut-off point allowed the researcher to include more recent developments linked to the EU-brokered dialogue, such as the agreement on the creation of Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities.
Lastly, as Manners (2011: 244) suggested, the use of a “longitudinal interpretation” is more suitable to address the subject of alteration in the perception of normality. In the context of this research, the EU’s approach towards Cyprus and Kosovo presents several changes over the years. A longer timeframe, therefore, enabled the researcher to avoid falsification due to “momentary fluctuation” (Manners 2009b: 19).

1.8 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The following chapters seek to provide a comprehensive and consistent assessment of the NPE concept. However, the research has some limitations that should be acknowledged.

The first limitation is related to the usage of the term ‘EU’. The EU is not a single, unitary actor but, rather, consists of different institutions performing different tasks and having different decision-making powers. Consequently, the use of such terms like ‘EU goal’, ‘EU policy’, ‘EU activity’ and ‘EU impact’ become somewhat problematic. In order to maintain coherence in the analysis, the term ‘EU’ in this project will refer to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Council and the EU Parliament. The EP, although it has less formal decision-making powers in comparison to other EU institutions, played an important role in both case studies. Its activities should not, therefore, be neglected. In addition, the fact that this thesis concentrates on EU institutions, does not mean that member state politics are considered unimportant and are not being taken into consideration. For example, the impact of some member states decision not to recognise the statehood of Kosovo will be discussed later in this thesis.

The second limitation concerns the difficulty of measuring an actor’s normativity. Although a comprehensive framework of analysis is developed and discussed in Chapter Two, it is still the case that normativity cannot be easily observed, traced and measured. To approximate as much as possible an accurate measurement of the normativity of the
EU, a longitudinal approach was adopted (see section 1.6). Also, all three parts of the NPE framework are divided into sub-parts, thus allowing the presentation of qualitative assessments in the empirical chapters of the thesis.

1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. This introductory chapter will be followed by Chapter Two which discusses the theoretical framework of the research. To this end, the chapter presents a literature review with the aim of presenting a detailed account of the main theoretical debates on NPE. In addition, the literature review presents and explains in detail the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

Chapter Three consists of a brief discussion of the history of the selected conflict-cases. It concentrates on presenting the main historical events as well as the involvement of third actors and their attempts to resolve the conflicts. This chapter is also concerned with the evolution of EU-Cyprus and EU-Kosovo relations.

Chapter Four is concerned with the EU’s goals and intentions - the first part of the three-part analysis of identifying a normative power - in the two cases of Cyprus and Kosovo. This chapter, therefore, deals with the question of whether, how and why the promotion of sustainable peace has become an objective of the EU.

Chapter Five is concerned with the EU’s norm diffusion mechanisms towards the cases chosen, examining whether they were of a normative nature. The criteria to test this will be the ones proposed by Manners (2009), Aggestam (2009) and Forsberg (2011) who suggested that a normative power should, in its external relations, make use of the instruments of persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what is normal, model power and prestige/shaming.
Chapter Six considers the impact of EU goals and policies on the two conflict cases. The main question of this chapter is the extent to which a normative change occurred towards the norm of ‘sustainable peace’. To empirically trace the impact of EU principles, actions and policies, three criteria proposed by Manners (2009) will be used. This chapter, therefore, asks whether ‘sustainable peace’ was internalised by the conflict parties, whether partnership bonds were created between them and whether local ownership emerged.

Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It evaluates the significance of NPE as an analytical approach by discussing the potentials and limitations of the applicability of the NPE framework in the field of conflict transformation. In so doing, the findings from the case studies are compared and contrasted so as to reveal the importance of each of the three parts (objectives, actions, impact) of the analytical framework used in this research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will present and discuss the NPE concept around which the theoretical framework of this thesis has been developed. The first part of the chapter will present the main debates related to the conceptualisation of the EU’s role in world politics, thus setting the scene for introducing the NPE concept. It will proceed by discussing the role of ideational factors in constructivism. The third and fourth parts of this chapter will discuss the EU’s normative basis and main critiques of NPE. In the last part, the discussion will shift from NPE as a theoretical concept to NPE as a tool for analysis. In this respect, it will present the analytical framework used in this thesis to assess the EU’s normativity in conflict transformation.

2.2 CONCEPTUALISING THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

The academic debate about the EU’s international role mainly began in the 1970s. One of the most influential conceptualisations of the then European Community (EC) was that of François Duchêne (1972) who stressed that the EC was a ‘Civilian Power’, “a special international actor whose strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability through economic and political means” (Duchêne 1972: 32). Duchêne (1972: 32) argued that, given the transformation in the nature of global politics and the diminishing value of hard power\textsuperscript{15} capabilities, the EC was likely to grow into a major international actor\textsuperscript{16}. Johan Galtung (1973: 117-149), for his part, described the EC as a Pax Bruxellana. This term was later defined by Richard Whitman (2002: 5) as “an endeavour to construct a

\textsuperscript{15}Hard power refers to the use of military and/or economic means to influence the behaviour of other parties (Nye 2004: 5).

\textsuperscript{16}It should be noted that Duchêne’s argument was formed at a time of détente (period of improved relations between the main rivals during the Cold War).
Eurocentric world centred in Europe and a unicentric Europe centred in the Western half of the continent”. Galtung’s assertion, however, contrasted with that of Duchêne since he characterised the EU as an emerging superpower that would impose Pax Bruxellana on the world (see Whitman 1997: 65-66).

The debate continued with Hedley Bull’s (1982) critique. Bull, writing from a realist perspective, rejected the argument of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ which he characterised as a contradiction in terms because, in his view, there can be no power without military capabilities. Bull’s main point was that without the development of military competencies, the EC could not become an effective actor in international politics (Bull 1982: 151). The fact, however, that Bull formed his arguments at one of the points of highest intensity of the Cold War might provide an explanation as to why he adopted this particular point of view.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when the West no longer had to confront a common enemy, the debate on ‘Civilian Power Europe’ was sustained with the EU stating it would undertake the task of promoting peace and developing and consolidating democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Union 1992, article J.1). At the same time, the issue of the militarisation of the EU gained attention (Zielonka 1998: 229, Whitman 1998: 135) because of the Treaty on European Union signed in 1991. The reference to a defence policy in the CFSP, the launch of ESDP in June 1999 and its subsequent operationalisation have been considered by some scholars as important indicators for a major leaning away from civilian power EU towards military power EU (see for example Smith K. 2000 and 2005). This attention to the militarisation of the EU gained traction at the end of 1999 when a decision was taken for the creation of a 60,000-

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17 The Lisbon Treaty, implemented in 2009, renamed the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) as CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy).
person Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Although the RRF never materialised, the idea of the EU acquiring military potency was criticised by advocates of Civilian Power Europe (Smith K. 2000: 27-28). Another criticism of the EU’s efforts to create a CFSP was put forward by Christopher Hill (1993) who argued that such attempts were severely undermined by a ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’ – a gap between what the EU asserted and what it was actually able to deliver\(^\text{18}\). This links into the realist critique of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ that rested on two main tenets. The first required the EU to develop its military capabilities if it was to become an effective international actor and the second, as had already been argued by Bull, referred to its lack of ability to do so.

Manners’ article “Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” in 2002, renewed the debate by claiming that the EU can usefully be conceived as a catalyst of ‘normalisation’ through the spread of its underlying values. In spite of the way states behave, the EU, he argued, has a unique role in shaping what will pass as normal in international relations (Manners 2002: 238-240). Manners adopted an ideational point of view that comes into sharp contrast with the realist criticism described above.

The debate on the international role of the EU continued with other authors getting involved. Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ referred to the idea of making other actors desiring the same outcomes as you (Nye 2004: 5). Although ‘soft power’ and ‘normative power’ seem to be conceptually similar, this thesis argues that there is one important difference. While an effective soft power will be able to persuade others to support its ideas, normative power goes deeper. While a soft power aims to persuade third actors to follow

\(^{18}\) Asle Toje (2008: 121-141) took Hill’s criticism a step further by arguing that the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ has become a ‘Consensus-Expectations Gap’. For him, the EU acts only in those cases where consensus can be reached between the Member States. Those cases, however, do not necessarily include cases where EU action is mostly needed. Toje mentions the failure to intervene in Darfur as an example.
its goals, a normative power aims to persuade third actors about the merit of its ideas and goals. As a result, third actors will perceive the normative power’s goals to be their own as well (Manners, Appendix A: 36\textsuperscript{19}). Thus, an effective normative power will have the ability to persuade others to fully internalise the norms it stands for.

At a later point, Nye acknowledged that ‘soft power’ was not enough for an effective foreign policy that will result in shaping others’ agendas. He, therefore, coined the term ‘smart power’ which is described as the need to combine soft power and hard power to achieve the goal of effective foreign policy (Armitage & Nye 2008: 3). Mark Leonard (2005: 5), meanwhile, spoke of the ‘power of weakness’ according to which “each element of European weakness is in fact a facet of its extraordinary transformative power”. Lizbeth Aggestam (2008: 3-4), for her part, used the term ‘ethical power’ to describe the EU. Ethical power “looks to justify the decisions made, and actions taken, when exercising power, paying special attention to the intentions and purposes of external action” (Aggestam 2008: 3-4).

As has become evident, a number of characterisations have been introduced to elucidate the EU’s international presence. This research concentrates on Manners’ notion of ‘Normative Power Europe’. Since its inception in 2002, the NPE concept has sparked several debates among scholars and policy-makers. In 2007, the European Union Studies Association “voted Manners’ article ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’ one of the five most significant and influential academic pieces published in the last ten years” (Forsberg 2011: 1).

The development of the NPE concept can be traced to the desire “to move beyond the debate over state-like actorness through an understanding of the EU’s international

\textsuperscript{19} For a discussion on the difference between soft power and normative power, see Kavalski 2012: 4-5.
identity” (Manners 2001: 7). One of the main problems with the concepts of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ and ‘Military Power Europe’ was emphasised in the debates of the 1980s. The emphasis was placed on issues of agency in the international system and the abilities of the then EC to be an actor in world politics. Manners (2002: 239) argued that the problem with this emphasis on actorness, and on the debate of civilian versus military power, was their unhelpful preoccupation with “how much like a state the EU looked”.

The addition of the notion of normative power to the discussion regarding the international role of the EU permitted a new dimension to the discussion over whether the EU is a civilian or military power. Manners proposed that by moving our focus away from the debate about either military or civilian power Europe, it is possible to consider the ideational impact of the EU as a normative power.

Manners’ NPE argument fits well into the ‘social’ turn in IR since the 1990s which focused precisely on the role of norms in international politics. For him, a normative power is one that is able to define “what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Manners 2002: 236). The EU’s power is based on a general acceptance of its aims as ‘normal’. According to Manners, “the concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners 2002: 252). Thus, the concept of NPE refers to the actual essence of the Union. “It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation, that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002: 252). Hence, it is the values of peace, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law that the Union claims to put at the core of its relations with the world (European Union 1997, Article 6). In this respect, norms and values inherent in the Union’s identity, build its
power and reputation in world politics and allow it to execute normative power, that is the ability “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (Manners 2002: 239).

The NPE concept has triggered substantial research. For many (Manners 2002), it has made a significant contribution to conceptualising the unique international role of the EU since it has shed light on previously neglected ideational dimensions of the EU’s role in world politics. However, the NPE concept has also been the subject of strong criticism, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

**2.3 THE ROLE OF IDEATIONAL FACTORS AND NORMS IN CONSTRUCTIVISM**

Political scientists have traditionally neglected the causal or constitutive role of norms and principles (Gofas and Hay 2010: 3) in the analysis of political phenomena. The emergence of the behavioural revolution\(^{20}\) and the strong interest in measurement that accompanied it played a catalytic role in this. Normative phenomena were not easily measurable and thus neglected for practical reasons (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). This tendency to push aside the study of norms was strengthened by the growing focus of political scientists on quantitative methods. “Commitment to positivism in social sciences, scepticism about the epistemological status of value statements and the dominance of the realist paradigm in IR” (Frost 1994:110) were the main reasons for neglecting normative theory. Although, this turn towards rational choice did not

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\(^{20}\) The positivist movement in political science stressed the supremacy of the methods used by the physical sciences. It therefore attempted to apply those methods to the discipline of political science. The ‘scientific methodology’ advanced by positivists refers to a procedure “which starts with the formulation of a hypothesis, followed by empirical verification or experimentation, which leads to falsification or verification of the initial hypothesis” (Barrow 2008: 312). By the 1950s the positivist movement had reached its peak with the ‘behavioural revolution’ which is regarded as a ‘scientific revolution’ because the discipline of political science began to emphasise the behavioural methods of the physical sciences.
necessarily mean a turn towards material ontology, its proponents (including Farber 1994, Woolcock 1999) did not have much interest in analysing normative phenomena.

A reinvigoration of the study of ideational phenomena and normative issues took place in the 1980s (Frost 1994:110). It is important to note, however, that the behavioural revolution contributed to the different path that the study of norms took from this point onwards. It obliged scholars to take more serious consideration of issues like “research design, theoretical clarity, disciplinary cumulation and parsimony” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 890).

Constructivism, the approach that formed the basis of the NPE argument\(^\text{21}\) (see Tilley 2012: 453 and Wiessala 2016: 30), has been based on sociological notions and theories in an attempt to better comprehend the changes of national interests and the perceived meaning of behaviour. For constructivists, norms are vital in forming the objectives and identities of actors, their perceptions of what their interests are and the means they use to accomplish those objectives. As a result, the constructivist approach does not conceptualise interests as externally given. “Their desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation towards the context in which they will have to be realized” (Hay 2006: 63-64).

For constructivists (Wendt 1995, Checkel 1998), since the ability of actors “to take correct strategic decisions is constrained due to limited rationality and to great uncertainty, the

\(^{21}\) As Diez (2005: 616) argued, the normative power argument “focuses on the independent power of norms to influence actors’ behaviour. To the extent that normative power is used as an analytical category to distinguish a particular kind of actor (such as ‘Europe’), it relies on the possibility to trace empirically the impact of norms in contrast to other possible factors”.
behavioural guidance provided by norms is crucial as a cognitive energy-saver and as a clue to successful strategies” (Florini 1996: 366). The realm of plausible behaviour in a particular social structure is normatively determined and it is narrower than the realm of behaviour that is actually possible. This coincides with James March and Johan Olsen’s (2007) understanding of the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of consequences. Actors operating under the logic of consequences demonstrate instrumental behaviour and make their decisions based on rational cost-benefit calculations. Actors operating under the logic of appropriateness, “seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity” (March and Olsen 2007: 3). Empirical research (Tannenwald 1995, Nadelmann 1990) has shown that norms do modify the behaviour of states in ways not understandable merely on the grounds of short-term power maximisation. Such research suggests that material power alone does not explain everything.

From a constructivist angle (Björkdahl 2002: 15), norms are considered as intersubjective understandings and collective expectations concerning the appropriate behaviour of states and other actors, given their identity and the social context. From this viewpoint, norms are “constitutive of actor identity and interests” (Shannon 2000: 294) and “help create new actors, interests, or categories of action” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In this respect, Jeffrey Checkel described norms as “collective understandings that make behavioural claims on actors” (Checkel 1998: 327-328). A narrower definition was offered by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink who argued that a norm is “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Specifically, norms are standards maintaining the systematisation of the behaviour
of actors that have mutual values and principles by permitting certain behaviours and actions while forbidding others. Based on the definition of norms as “standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891), it follows that the adjective ‘normative’ refers to an average or typical level of performance for a person or a group. Pertaining to particular norms is, therefore, the standard level of appropriateness in behaviour.

Turning to the concept of power, it has traditionally been defined as “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004: 2). Power, thus, is defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Swedberg 2005: 205). This definition of power, however, contrasts with the NPE approach and the emphasis it places on local ownership and on socialisation processes. In this thesis, therefore, power is not defined as getting B to do what A wants. Rather, it is defined as making B realise that there is merit in internalising particular ideas and in behaving in certain ways that conform to these ideas, irrespective of A’s involvement (Manners, Appendix A: 36). Manners’ definition of power coincides with Stephen Lukes’ (2005: 27) third face of power. For him, there are different ways through which A may secure B’s compliance. A can exercise power over B through controlling processes of decision-making or through controlling the agenda-setting. However, A can also influence B through controlling interests and perceptions.

These two definitions of norms and power should be conceptualised in a complementary way. A normative power, thus, is one able to make another actor realise the value of internalising a particular norm, in this case the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, regardless of the normative power’s involvement. In this way, “normative power is a power that is able to
shape conceptions of normal” (Manners 2002: 239). From this statement, it follows that normative power is the power of ideas and values. Consequently, the major aim of a normative power is to set the standards of appropriate behaviour through the spread of those norms.

2.4 CRITIQUES OF NPE

The NPE concept has raised a number of questions that subsequently produced several criticisms. Having conducted a comprehensive literature review, this thesis argues that these can be broadly categorised into theoretical critiques of the NPE concept and empirical critiques on the EU’s normativity.

The concept of ‘Normative Power’ in general has been criticised by Hélène Sjursen (2006a: 172) who called it a contradiction in terms because it disregards the widely used definition of power, “which is to make others do what they would otherwise not do”. According to this understanding, power is a matter of incentive and coercion while normativity is a matter of legitimacy. Moreover, Sjursen noted that the concept of normative power lacks explicit criteria on what is normative. She (Sjursen 2006: 236) argued that the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ “lacks precision, particularly in terms of criteria and standards that can be applied for analysing the concept empirically”.

Elisabeth De Zutter (2010) also criticised certain aspects of the NPE concept. She agreed with Manners that a normative power should have the ability to shape conceptions of normal in world politics but disagreed when stating “neither universal norms nor a particular set of instruments can be considered as ontological necessities for normative power” (De Zutter 2010: 1107). A normative power, therefore, may not necessarily rely on soft instruments but can also resort to coercive economic and military means (De Zutter 2010: 1107). For her, this view is reinforced by the diverse forms a normative
power can take. Cosmopolitan and despotic constitute the two polar extremes on a continuum. Soft imperialist power lies in-between the two (De Zutter 2010: 1118).

Another issue that has sparked debate among academics and which is linked to the conceptual point made by De Zutter, is the issue of the EU’s development of military capabilities that was already underway by the time Manners initial NPE article was published. For Karen Smith, for example, the acquirement of military means constituted a threat to the EU’s civilian identity. Penetrating into the assumptions on which the EU’s quest of a defence dimension is based, she argued that it is “giving up too much for too little” (Smith K. 2000: 28). Smith also draws upon David Mitrany whose earlier writings became important in the context of this argument. Mitrany argued that “if the problem of war is the existence of self-interested sovereign states, then effectively creating a larger version of a sovereign state, an armed superpower of sorts, is not the answer and it will only make the problem bigger” (Mitrany 1968 quoted in Smith K. 2005: 12).

However, as Thomas Diez correctly pointed out, the concept of ‘Normative Power’ is not the opposite of ‘Military Power’. In other words, “the fact that an actor possesses and even uses military force does not contradict the idea of normative power if military power is subordinated to the more fundamental normative ethos” (Diez 2007: 187). For him, (Diez 2007: 180), it is plausible to use military means for backing up the diffusion of civilian norms. Other authors supported similar arguments. Stelios Stavridis (2001) argued that military means are a necessary part of an effective civilian power. Jennifer Mitzen (2006: 272) also argued that it is “habits and not capabilities that determine identity. Thus, a militarily powerful Europe will not undermine civilising power Europe because the collective aspirational identities of civilian and civilising are constituted not so much by their relationship to military power but by intra-European routines of multi-
lateral security cooperation”. More recently, Isabel Ferreira-Nunes (2011: 13) argued that militarisation can be justified on both normative and functional grounds since it will “strengthen institutions of global governance and regional cooperation and expand the reach of international law”.

Sjursen (2006: 239) went a step further and argued that the use of non-military means, like economic tools, does not automatically indicate that the actor is normative. Economic sanctions can also be considered a form of hard power, given the definition of hard power as the power to coerce, and they too can lead to unfavourable, disadvantageous results. Manners (2006: 182) stated that “militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power”. With reference to the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, he (2008: 49) noted that “the EU’s growing civilian and military operational capacities also have a sustainable peace mission with a focus on peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. The incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks22 in the Amsterdam Treaty can, thus, be understood as a part of the EU’s strategy towards sustainable peace.

Adrian Hyde-Price (2006: 226-227), writing from a neorealist point of view, also critiqued NPE. He argued that the EU does not constitute a real normative power. Rather, it is manipulated by its member states who want to shape its foreign policy in a way that is favourable to them. For example, in dealing with post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War, “the EU was used by its more influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and

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22 For a discussion on the Petersberg Tasks, see pp. 94-95.
economic interests of its member states” (Hyde-Price 2006:226-227). Similarly, for Michael Smith (2009: 602), “there is still a very substantial inter-governmental component to European foreign policy”.

Likewise, Zielonka (2008: 471) argued that the EU, through the diffusion of its norms, is behaving like an imperial power since it is trying to enforce domestic constraints on other actors through several types of economic and political domination. For him, this can be best observed in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood like, for example, in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the bottom-line of the neorealist critique is that the existence of strategic interests on the part of EU member states contradicts the concept of the EU as a pure normative power.

The NPE concept has also been criticised from a constructivist angle. Diez (2005: 614) argued that the NPE discourse creates a specific identity for the EU by converting third parties to ‘others’ and demonstrating the EU as a positive force in the international arena. He asked for “more reflexivity in the representation of the EU as a normative power” (Diez 2005: 614). As a response to Diez’s critique, Manners (2006: 177-179) acknowledged that in ‘Normative Power Europe’ discourse, practices of ‘othering’ are part of the formation of the EU’s identity. He agreed with Diez on the need to study the power of normative power representations. He further added that there is not just one EU identity. In his view (Manners 2006: 178), “it is the fluid, complex, multiple and relational aspects of the self-other contestations which define the EU as a normative power, rather than the other way around”.

Federica Bicchi (2006: 287) discussed the question of whether the EU is a ‘normative power’ “promoting universal principles or a ‘civilian power’ projecting its own

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23 Similar arguments have also been put forward by Merlingen 2007: 437 and Wood 2009: 128.
understanding of norms on to the rest of the world”. In order to answer this question, she used two criteria for evaluating the normativity of the EU: inclusiveness and reflexivity (Bicchi 2006: 286-203). Inclusiveness refers to the extent to which EU foreign policy makers allow for the involvement of non-members in this process, while reflexivity refers to an anticipation of the effects of EU policies on non-members and to their subsequent alteration. Bicchi concluded that the EU is a civilian power but not a normative power. She argues that the EU tends to reproduce itself in its relations with other states. In the process, the EU projects internal solutions to external issues. EU foreign policy, therefore, follows an ‘our size fits all’ approach. Bicchi (2006: 287) concludes that the EU is frequently “un reflexively Eurocentric”.

Some other scholars argued that the EU demonstrated inconsistency in terms of “discrimination between different external actors and of undermining certain norms from the inside” (Diez 2005:624). For instance, Karen Smith (2001) showed that the EU’s commitment to human rights is inconsistent. As Diez (2005: 624) argued, a probable explanation is that the EU’s policies are intended to realise certain strategic or economic interests. The strong version of the argument is that “interests are cloaked in the mantle of values and norms rhetoric” (Diez 2005: 624). The weaker and more sophisticated version is that normative concerns and strategic interests go together in the EU’s external relations. Richard Youngs (2004: 419-420), meanwhile, suggested that a combination of rationalism and constructivism, two rival approaches in European studies, is necessary in order to assess the respective impact of both of them.

Another critique of NPE is the inconsistency between what the EU is and what it attempts to project. Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse pointed out that what is being projected by the Union is not “the EU as it is but an EU-topia” (Nicolaidis & Howse 2002: 769).
Lastly, another critique of NPE is the deficiency of normative impact (Noutcheva 2009). Directly related to this argument is Mark Langan’s (2012: 245) empirical findings that the EU has used norm-centred narratives and policy frameworks for commercial gain which produced negative material outcomes for its partners, especially in the Global South. More specifically, Langan (2012: 265) argued that the European Commission “appears to be utilising norms in the ‘development branding’ of EPAs\(^{24}\) which close down policy space for genuine economic development in ACP\(^{25}\) countries while simultaneously furthering EU commercial interests”.

Overall, the NPE argument has been criticised from different theoretical angles. Where relevant, some of these NPE criticisms outlined above will be used in this thesis as alternative explanations. More specifically, when discussing the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, the aforementioned criticisms will be considered in those sections where empirical findings do not conform to the NPE propositions.

### 2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE NPE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This section will be concerned with the operationalisation of NPE. It will present the analytical framework that will be used in this thesis for the purposes of assessing the normativity of the EU.

‘Normative Power Europe’ framework of analysis

According to Manners, a normative power is ideational and not material or physical. The conceptualisation of this ideal type of normative power requires a tripartite analysis assessing normativity by associating principles, actions and impact (Manners 2002: 252).

\(^{24}\)EPA refers to the Economic Partnership Agreements.

\(^{25}\)ACP refers to the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states.
A similar three-part analysis associating goals, means and impact was also developed by Tocci (2008:17; See also Forsberg 2011). All three elements collectively constitute a normative foreign policy. As Vicki Birchfield (quoted in Manners 2011: 243) stated, the application of this tripartite framework to empirical cases will result in shifting the normative power approach “from concept to analytical framework to research programme”.

As some scholars (Manners 2011: 244, Martin-Mazé 2015: 1285) observed, the literature on NPE is empirically underexplored. A more systematic empirical focus is therefore needed in order to reach conclusions on how and why normative power does or does not work. To this end, this thesis will apply the three-part framework to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo in order to test the validity of NPE in the field of conflict transformation. Based on secondary literature and an interview with Ian Manners (Appendix A: 36), three sub-questions were formulated reflecting the NPE propositions. However, it should be noted that, within each part of the analytical framework, competing propositions and alternative explanations reflecting the conflicts between norms and interests, coercion and persuasion and other NPE debates were also taken into consideration in the process of analysing the data.

**Question A:** To what extent was the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm by Cypriot and Kosovan actors the main objective of the EU?

The first variable that needs to be examined are the constitutive principles of the EU and how their promotion has become a goal for the EU. Manners considers the EU to be normative because of its sui generis nature. In other words, what the EU *is* has been considered as the main explanation of what it *does*. Manners, therefore, claims that its normative identity is what made the EU to place universal norms at the heart of its functions (Manners 2002: 241).
Three main conclusions can be reached from the above:

**Centrality of ‘sustainable peace’ norm in the EU’s relations with Cyprus and Kosovo:**
The NPE line of argument suggests that the origins of the EU’s normativity can be traced in the historical context of the EU and the nature of its international identity (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006: 305). With particular reference to ‘sustainable peace’, it is Europe’s experience of the Second World War, the emergence of the EU after this war, the evolution of EU law and the progressive increase of supranationalism that have prompted the EU to place such emphasis on this norm. It follows that the EU, as a normative power, must construct its policies and relations based on the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. This norm, therefore, must be central in the EU’s relations and rhetoric with both Cyprus and Kosovo if it truly is a normative power.

**Normative Interests:** From a constructivist point of view, the EU’s normative identity forms the basis for its normative interests. As Asle Toje (2008: 127) argued, “the will to engage in foreign policy activities that are not means/ends oriented but rather a statement of values is a trait that distinguishes the EU from other foreign policy actors”. The EU should, therefore, promote ‘sustainable peace’ because it is a norm on which it places great value (Niemann & De Wekker 2010: 7) and not because it serves other instrumental interests. Diez (2005) and Manners (Appendix A: 36) however, argued that this distinction between norms and interests is not clear-cut. For them, norms are constitutive of interests and interests are constitutive of norms. Moreover, as Sjursen (2007: 71) argued, “strategic considerations do not topple the normative power argument, given that the norms diffused may very well be considered valid and legitimate even though the motives of the EU for diffusing such norms are self-regarding”. What can be concluded here is that, if the NPE argument is correct, then EU ‘interest’ must be closely linked to
norms. In the opposite scenario, however, norms would be outranked by materialistic considerations.

Behaving according to norms: A real normative power is one that not only binds third parties to specific rules and standards, but also binds itself. Therefore, an EU foreign policy which is systematically based on the respect of international and fundamental rights law would indicate a sincere normative commitment (Tocci et al. 2008: 6). Likewise, Sjursen (2006: 245) and Diez (2005) have both argued that it is the EU’s self-binding to international law that makes it a distinctive normative actor in world politics.

Question B: To what extent, in the course of promoting the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, did the EU rely on persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what is normal, model power and attributing prestige/shame?

This second question is focused on the ways through which EU norms are being promoted and diffused. In other words, it is about the nature of the actions taken by the EU in order to promote its norms. The normative form of the diffusion mechanisms is central to the understanding of NPE. A review of the NPE literature suggests that persuasion (Manners 2009: 12, Tocci 2008: 9, Kavalski 2012: 60), norm invocation (Forsberg 2011: 1197), shaping the discourse of what is normal (Aggestam 2009), model power (Forsberg 2011: 1197) and attributing prestige/shaming (Manners 2009: 13), are considered as normative means. In other words, normative power should not be exercised through the wide-ranging use of material incentives (e.g positive/negative conditionality and sanctions) or the use of military means. However, military and economic means are not completely discarded. Some scholars (Börzel & Risse 2009: 8, Sjursen 2006: 239, Diez 2005: 616) advocate their use in cases where they can be justified.
Persuasion: Persuasion is usually defined as being opposed to coercion or imposition. Persuasion is acknowledged in constructivist scholarship as a significant strategy for the diffusion of norms because it aims, by definition, to challenge and, ultimately, to alter existing understandings and preferences. “Argumentation and persuasion play the key role in norm setting” (Majone 1989: 28). Martha Finnemore (1996: 141), meanwhile, stated that “normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive”.

The instrument of persuasion refers to interaction and communication that will result in changed attitudes and, thus, changed preferences (Checkel 2001). Richard Perloff (1993: 14) defined persuasion as “an activity or process in which a communicator attempts to induce a change in the belief, attitude, or behaviour of another person . . . through the transmission of a message in a context in which the persuadee has some degree of free choice”. It therefore follows that persuasion is a form of power since the persuader can make the persuadee(s) do something they would otherwise not do. However, persuasion does not operate through rewards or threats of punishment. Rather, it is directed at influencing an actor’s perceptions. Persuasion can also be linked to what Jürgen Habermas (1990: 163-64) termed as ‘arguing’, referring to situations when two parties engage in communication activities and each one is ready to be persuaded by the better argument. Checkel (2001), working in the field of social psychology and communication, illustrated how international institutions can produce an environment that encourages persuasion and may lead decision makers to alter their policies. He defined persuasion as “a process of convincing someone through argument and principled debate” (Checkel 2001: 562). Manners (2009: 12), for his part, suggested that persuasion includes the “constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations, and multi- and pluri-lateral dialogue between participants”. This thesis suggests that Manners’ proposed
operationalisation of persuasion is in line with the constructivist understanding of the term because of the emphasis he places on interaction, dialogue and debate.

For the purposes of maintaining consistency in the analysis, ‘constructive engagement’ is defined here as “the opposite of confrontation, sanctions or hostility in international relations or, alternatively, as the opposite of refusing to deal with a country or regime” (Fouquet and Lim 2007: 129). ‘Institutionalisation of relations’ is understood as a process whereby relations are well-established and accepted by all parties. Lastly, encouragement of dialogue refers to EU attempts to encourage the parties of a conflict to reach an agreement through dialogue.

Invocation of norms: This mechanism refers to the activation of commitments and to the invocation of international legal obligations (Forsberg 2011: 1197). In other words, the EU can refer to reached and signed agreements each time a party does not fulfil its obligations that stem from such agreements.

One notable example of this instrument being put into practice is the enlargement negotiations that take place between the EU and countries aspiring to become members of the Union (Manners 2002: 244). Activation of commitments that are included in an agreement made between the EU and an aspirant member can be “invoked by one party when they are violated by the other party” (Forsberg 2011: 1197).

Shaping discourses of what is normal: For Manners (2002: 239) and Forsberg (2011: 1197), a normative power has the ability to shape discourses. This mechanism is related to what Manners (2001: 14) terms the ‘cultural filter’ which refers to the espousal or denunciation of certain norms as a consequence of political learning by a country. Although shaping the discourse can be seen as a desired outcome, it is also essential to consider it as a means at the EU’s disposal. As an instrument, shaping the discourse is
intended to grasp discursive alterations via “learning, adaptation or rejection of norms as a result of international norms and political learning by third countries” (Kinnvall 1995: 61-71, see also Manners 2002: 245). Pace’s (2007) discussion on Israel’s adoption of a Mediterranean identity has been identified by Forsberg (2011) as a notable example of how this mechanism works in the context of the NPE.

**Model Power**: According to Manners (2006, 2008), model power is probably the most normative tool at the EU’s disposal since NPE is fundamentally about what the EU is rather than what it does. This means that normative power is the power of example through which the EU simply “stands as a model for others to follow” (Forsberg 2011: 1197) without having to engage into specific policies. Manners (2002: 244) used the term ‘contagion’ for this process. However, as Forsberg (2011:1198) discussed, the term ‘contagion’ is quite vague and could refer to three different things: emulation, group pressure or “influence through structural (inter)dependence than to influence through example” (Drazen 1998 in Forsberg 2011: 1198).

Forsberg (2011: 18) also argues that the EU’s attraction could be its economic power. However, behavioural alterations for material gains do not necessarily lead to norm internalisation. Given the focus of this thesis on conflict transformation, an approach that requires alterations in perception and identity, this thesis argues that, if the mechanism of model power is effective, then third actors should regard EU values as worthy of emulation and show a willingness to work towards their internalisation.

**Attribution of Prestige/Shaming**: According to Manners (2011: 235), “the attribution of prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning”. The attribution of prestige/shaming is a significant form of
norm diffusion that is associated with the idea of being an insider or an outsider to a group of actors. This means that actors might comply with certain norms because they are afraid of being disapproved. Norms are therefore sustained due to the impact a state’s non-compliance might have on its reputation.

The strategy of shaming is regarded by some authors as a coercive form of persuasion (Simons 1976, Risse and Sikkink 1999: 13-14). From a strictly NPE point of view, coercion and imposition are not acceptable mechanisms. However, as discussed earlier, the use of controversial mechanisms like, for example, the use of military means, can be justified if these are “subjected to the most fundamental normative ethos” (Diez 2007: 187). Hence, when discussing this mechanism in relation to the two case studies, attention will be paid to the normative or material EU interests behind making the decision to attribute shaming.

**Question C: To what extent did EU impact on Cyprus and Kosovo include the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local actors, the creation of partnership bonds and local ownership?**

The third part of the analysis is about examining the impact of EU principles and actions. What needs to be investigated here is the extent to which a normative change occurred towards the norms promoted by the Union. According to Manners (2009:3), the normative impact produced from the promotion of principles should include “socialisation, partnership and ownership”. Therefore, if the EU was successful in promoting its norms and in implementing a normative agenda, then these three outcomes should emerge in both Cyprus and Kosovo.

**Socialisation:** For constructivists (Risse et al 1999: 11, Johnston 2001: 494) socialisation is a process through which actors develop an understanding of what is the most
appropriate behaviour which will, ultimately, lead to identity modifications. Socialisation as a form of normative impact translates into an altered perception of normality and, thus, altered standards of appropriateness.

In practical terms, the degree of internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace norm’ is explored at three distinct levels. Firstly, the extent of the internalisation of the norm at the state level is identified. Empirically, this examination rests on public speeches. The researcher is aware that principles affirmed in speeches may not always be systematically pursued by local actors. This problem of strategic communication is not easy to overcome (see Niemann and De Wekker 2010: 11). However, if the norms are being mentioned in a consistent way and in different circumstances, then it is more likely that the norms in question have been internalised. In addition, the degree to which the legislation of the countries concerned was modified and adjusted in terms of the norms promoted is another indicator of internalisation (Checkel 1999: 92, Niemann & De Wekker 2009: 11). With particular reference to the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, such modifications are traced with regards to the sector of education. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, education is crucial in terms of inducing identity modifications and eliminating practices of ‘othering’.

Secondly, the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm is also traced at the level of civil society. The role of civil society has been largely ignored in the NPE literature, despite it being central in socialisation processes. Tracing the EU’s normative impact on civil society allows the thesis to delve deeper into Cyprus and Kosovo’s social fabric. This is especially important for this research since conflict transformation should be traced beyond the level of political elites (Tocci 2007:20 and 2013:30-31).

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26 This thesis focused on analysing primary accounts of the conflict and not interpretations of these accounts. As a result, media accounts were not examined by the researcher. Future research could focus on tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in media accounts of the conflict.
Thirdly, to gain an even fuller understanding of the Cypriot and Kosovan domestic situations, the views of the wider public were looked at through the examination of opinion polls. The main reason why public attitudes were taken into consideration is because conflict transformation approaches suggest that the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm should be traceable to concrete changes at the wider societal level. Opinion polls, therefore, allowed the researcher to juxtapose the results from the analysis of political elite discourse with public views in order to identify the general pattern that emerges in both the Cypriot and Kosovan societies.

**Partnership:** For Manners (2009: 3), “partnership as an impact of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational”. With regards to the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, if its promotion is successful, then the parties of the conflict will become partners for the long term (Manners, Appendix A: 36).

In practical terms, partnership as a result of the promotion of principles can be empirically traced in the development of relationships between the parties of each conflict. In examining whether closer relations emerged, the emphasis will be placed on political state actors as well as on wider societal actors. This approach will enable the investigation of the development of relations both at the elite level and at the level of civil society, thus covering a wide range of relevant actors.

**Ownership:** Local ownership principally refers to the idea of locals agreeing to, accepting and, ultimately, controlling both the design and implementation of political processes (Donais 2009: 120, Nathan 2007: 4). In this respect, the effective realisation of local ownership would ensure the sustainability of the transformed behaviour once the external actor’s operation comes to an end.
In the peacebuilding and conflict resolution literature, however, there exist quite divergent conceptualisations of local ownership with the main disagreement being between liberals and communitarians. Liberals define local ownership as the commitment of local actors to take ownership over a mainly pre-determined plan towards achieving specific ends. In other words, the liberal approach to local ownership emphasises “‘their’ ownership of our ‘ideas’” (Suhrke 2007: 1292). On the other hand, communitarians believe that any policy processes “must be designed, managed, and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.” (Nathan 2007: 4).

At a second stage, it needs to be examined whether any degree of socialisation, partnership and ownership that has occurred was prompted by the EU. It is undeniably true that no organisation or specific project can take full credit for positive changes occurring in societies affected by conflict (Niemann and De Wekker 2010). Influential states like the US and other international organisations like the UN are further potential sources of norm change in Cyprus and Kosovo. To address this issue, this research conducts an in-depth analysis on a case-by-case basis in order to trace the links (Tocci et al. 2008: 11) between the EU’s actions and the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Also, where possible, the causality between EU norms/ EU actions and change in the domestic Cypriot and Kosovan environments is complemented by counterfactual reasoning (Goertz and Levy 2007: 9-47, Fearon 1991). When this reasoning is adopted, it entails that had an EU action not taken place, a particular outcome would not have occurred. The use of this reasoning leads to more accurate conclusions on the exact impact of EU principles and actions.

2.6 CONCLUSION
Acknowledging the importance of the study of norms, this chapter has been concerned with the normative turn in the field of European studies and the conceptualisation of the EU as a ‘Normative Power’. From an academic perspective, the NPE concept has generated significant debate. Partly, this debate has been associated with broader academic discussions in the field of IR about the role of international norms. The concept of NPE has also been the subject of much criticism around issues concerning its formulation and definition.

Based on secondary literature and on an interview with Manners (Appendix A: 36), this chapter has also set out the three-part analytical framework which will be used in this thesis for the purposes of assessing the EU’s normativity. This framework perceives a normative actor as one that has normative goals, pursues normative policies and produces a normative impact. Before proceeding to the application of this framework to the empirical cases, however, a brief discussion on the historical background of the two conflicts is necessary. Chapter Three, therefore, will discuss the main historical events of both conflicts as well as attempts by international actors to solve them.
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will provide a brief overview of the historical contexts of the two conflict cases starting from the 20th century. The term ‘historical context’ refers to the “political, social, environmental, and cultural decisions or events occurring over time that can be described and linked to the situation under study” (Schensul 2008: 392).

This historical context is aimed at developing an understanding of inter-community divisions in the two cases. Secondly, the chapter outlines the efforts of international actors to solve the two conflicts. In so doing, the EU’s role in both conflicts will be discussed with the aim of identifying trends in its involvement in both cases. Thirdly, the comparison between the historical contexts of the two cases will highlight similarities and differences, thus supporting the rationale of choosing Kosovo as the more-likely and Cyprus as the less-likely to largely conform to the NPE expectations case.

3.1 THE HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

3.1.1 Introduction

During the period of Ottoman rule (1571-1878), Cyprus witnessed an inflow of Muslim immigrants who, afterwards, “formed the Turkish Cypriot community” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993:343). Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are the two largest ethnic groups on the island. It is important to note that the two groups speak different languages and have different religions.

3.1.2 1950-1990: the birth of the RoC, the 1974 war and initial efforts to solve the conflict
Cyprus was under British rule from 1878 until 1960 when the island became independent. As Hubert Faustmann (2008: 46) explained, Britain followed a ‘divide and rule’ policy in Cyprus that inflamed the situation between the two communities (see also Evaghorou 2014: 127).

The 1959 Zurich/London Agreements put an end to British rule (Van Koufoudakis 2007: 224) and in 1960 Cyprus became independent. However, as Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis (1993: 343) argued, the 1960 founding Constitution “intensified and institutionalised ethnic/identity differences” (see also Scherer 1997: 18). By 1963, disagreements were emerging over taxation and the formation of distinct municipalities in the main towns as provided for by the Constitution. President Archibishop Makarios proposed 13 constitutional amendments which, however, were immediately rejected by Turkey. As a result of the continuing disagreements, Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from the government and pursued a separatist policy by attempting to set up a parallel administration (Kyriakides 1968: 112-13, An 2015: 24-30).

In the meantime, fighting had erupted between the two communities. During this period, Turkish-Cypriots moved to exclusively Turkish-Cypriot areas that shortly became enclaves. It was at this point that the UNSC ratified a Resolution giving permission to the Secretary-General to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus (UNFICYP), a mission that is still in place today. UNFICYP attempted to realise the goal of peacekeeping through the creation of a buffer zone.

Another important development of this period was the removal of Makarios, then President of Cyprus, from power after a coup d’état organised by the military government in Greece. This provided Turkey with a pretext to invade Cyprus. The invasion took place in two phases and resulted in 38% of the territory of the island being occupied. Following
these developments, most Greek-Cypriots that were residing in the north of the island, were forced to move to the south and became refugees (Kyle 1997: 19). In addition, around 40,000 Turkish-Cypriots moved to the north. Therefore, two distinct ethnic zones were formed on the island of Cyprus (Caloyychos 1998: 8).

In the ensuing years, the UN made several attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict. In 1977, under the auspices of the UN, Makarios, who had returned to power by the end of 1974, and Rauf Denktash, then leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, launched a round of discussions. The result was the four-point High-Level Agreement which provided that a future solution must be based on the principles of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. This was reconfirmed in the 1979 ten-point High-Level Agreement, signed between Spyros Kyprianou, who became President in 1977 after the death of Makarios, and Denktash (see Hannay 2005: 8).

In June 1983, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish-Cypriot community adopted a resolution promoting self-determination (Hoffmeister 2006: 64). Subsequently, Denktash declared the occupied part of the island as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). For him, this move was necessary to exert pressure on the Greek-Cypriots (Denktash 1998: 119). This move was heavily criticised by the international community. The UN condemned the act, stating, in Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), that declaring independence was a “legally invalid” move and it asked all states not to recognise the “TRNC”. In the same vein, the then ten EC members issued a joint declaration disapproving the move and asserting that “they continue to regard the government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate government of the RoC” (Embassy of the RoC in Washington DC 2010). In other words, “the Greek-Cypriot government has been accepted as the de jure government of the island as a whole, even though de facto since 1974 it only controls the south part of the island” (Constantinou &
Papadakis 2001: 128). To this day, no other state apart from Turkey recognises the “TRNC”. This has led the Turkish-Cypriot community to be profoundly dependent on Turkey financially, politically and administratively.

The period of British rule set the basis for the entrenchment of the division and the emergence of hostility between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. The violence that erupted between them in the 1960s led to the creation of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. This geographic separation of the two communities was further consolidated after the 1974 invasion which resulted in the creation of two separate ethnic zones on the island. This geographic separation makes the transformation of the conflict for the better a difficult task. In addition, the declaration of independence of the “TRNC” further complicated the situation.

3.1.3 1990 - 2002: The emergence of the EU as an actor in the Cyprus conflict

The Union became more directly involved in Cyprus in 1990, when the RoC decided to apply for EU membership. Although economic considerations were an important factor behind this decision, the main incentives behind Cyprus submission were political. “With the application for EC membership it was clearly hoped that the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue would put pressure on the least interested, or even intransigent, parties, namely Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, to find a solution and also to involve another key international actor in the equation of resolving the Cyprus issue where the UN had in the past not been successful” (Agathocleous-Yiangou 2002: 31).27

27 Nicosia believed that its position regarding the Cyprus conflict would be reinforced after EU membership. “Given the stand that Cyprus had joined as a united entity and that the TRNC was deemed illegal under Security Council resolutions, the EU was - legally and, at least, officially – entirely on the side of the Cypriot Government in terms of its attempts to repudiate the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership” (Ker-Lindsay 2010: 70-71).
The membership application prompted robust reactions from the Turkish-Cypriots, including threats of non-cooperation with the UN Secretary-General towards a solution to the conflict, an initiative that was supported by the EU since it aspired to reunite Cyprus prior to accession (see Chapter Four). The Turkish-Cypriot leadership supported its arguments “on the grounds that the Government of Cyprus did not represent the whole of the island, and that the application as such was unconstitutional” (Emiliou 1996: 10). The RoC government countered by emphasising the fact that it was the only recognised government, representing the whole island (Emiliou 1996: 10). At the time of the submission of its application, the RoC government called for Turkish-Cypriot cooperation in preparing accession negotiations (Clerides 1998a, see also Hoffmeister 2006: 96). The Turkish-Cypriot community, however, rejected this call (Denktaş 1998).

In 1993, the European Commission issued a positive Opinion on Cyprus’ application for membership (European Commission 1993). Although at the beginning a solution to the Cyprus conflict was seen as a prerequisite for the island’s accession to the EU, the 1994 Corfu European Council concluded that Cyprus would be included in the next enlargement round whether or not a solution to the conflict had been found. Three main factors contributed to this outcome: a) the diplomatic achievements of Greece28 (Brewin 1999: 151), b) the remarkable progress of Cyprus in meeting accession conditionality (Nugent 1997: 72) and c) “the continuous intransigence of the then Turkish Cypriot leadership with regard to the Cyprus problem which could hold the Greek Cypriots hostage in the accession process” (Kyrris 2012: 89).

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28 Greece had secured the EU’s pledge to commence accession negotiations with Cyprus after the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 in exchange for having agreed to the Custom Union between Turkey and the EU.
In December 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, the official decision to “include Cyprus in the group of ‘fast track’ candidates, with whom negotiations would be opened the following year” (Verney 2006: 4) was taken. After the opening of accession negotiations in 1998, the next main milestone was the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 which concluded that even though a settlement would be preferred preceding accession, “if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be taken without the above being a precondition” (European Council 1999a: Article 8/b).

As has been discussed, the RoC’s membership application, as well as the EU’s decision to accept it as a member whether or not a solution to the conflict had been found was heavily criticised by the Turkish-Cypriot community. Since then, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, Turkish-Cypriots have regarded the EU as an actor that is more sympathetic to the Greek-Cypriots, especially since the RoC is a part of this organisation.

Also, another conclusion that can be reached is the fact that, during this period, EU involvement in the conflict was mainly based on the accession negotiations. Not many bottom-up initiatives took place. As will be discussed, this made it difficult for the EU to positively transform the conflict.

3.1.4 2002-2004: Opening of checkpoints, the Annan Plan and the RoC’s accession to the EU

One important development of the conflict in this period was Denktaş’ decision to open up a number of checkpoints around the island (BBC 2003). After 30 years of isolation between the two communities, crossing became an option. This development, however, also created intense debates about the future implications of the crossings for Cyprus (see
Dikomitis 2013: 215-232). It should be noted that the Greek-Cypriot public viewed the crossings with suspicion (Webster and Timothy 2006: 162-181, Demetriou 2007a).

It is not easy to determine the exact number of crossings that have taken place since 2003. However, it is estimated that approximately 9 million people crossed between 2003 and 2006 alone (see Hadjipavlou 2007a). In addition, inter-community cooperation through civil society initiatives expanded a lot after the opening of the checkpoints (Harris 2015). Several inter-communal projects were initiated and funded by international organisations like, for example, the UN and the EU. The importance of such projects for the transformation of the Cyprus conflict will be discussed in the following chapters. Based on these facts, one could conclude that relations were developing between the two communities and that interaction was taking place. However, the qualitative data gathered for this research revealed that the reality was more complex.

Apart from the opening of checkpoints, another important development at this time were negotiations about a political solution of the conflict. Talks resumed in 2002 (Asmussen 2004: 4) and UNSG Kofi Annan attempted to develop a plan which was subsequently presented to both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots as well as to the Guarantor Powers. The ‘Annan Plan’ provided for the establishment of the United RoC as “an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek-Cypriot State and the Turkish-Cypriot State” (United Nations 2004). Both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot sides ultimately accepted the ‘Annan Plan’ as the basis for negotiations. The Plan was revised five times, and in April 2004 was put to separate, simultaneous referenda among the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriots rejected the Plan, with 75.83% voting against, while Turkish-Cypriots accepted it, with 64.91% voting in favour (Asmussen 2004: 3).
The dismissal of the Annan Plan resulted in a paradoxical type of EU membership. In 2004, the whole island of Cyprus joined the EU. However, EU legislation was only applied to the RoC and remains suspended in the north until a final solution to the conflict is reached. Also, following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriots, the EU adopted special measures and financial help packages for the Turkish-Cypriots. The latter included several projects aimed at promoting reconciliation that were implemented after 2004. The importance of such projects for the transformation of the conflict will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Two main conclusions can be reached regarding this period. Firstly, some interaction between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots began following the opening of the crossing points. This development, coupled with the civil society projects funded by the EU and other international organisations, created an environment that was more conducive to conflict transformation. However, the quite divergent results on the referenda for the Annan Plan suggest that the two communities still had quite divergent goals regarding the political solution of the conflict.

3.1.5 2005-2015: More recent developments

After the dismissal of the Annan Plan, the leaders of the two communities met several times under UN auspices. In July 2006 the meeting between Tassos Papadopoulos, the Greek-Cypriot leader, and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, resulted in what became known as the ‘July 8 Agreement’ (for further information, see Cyprus News Agency 2006). A new cycle of negotiations commenced in September 2008 between Dimitris Christofias, who was elected as President of the RoC in February 2008, and Talat. However, no progress was made on critical issues such as security and property. In April 2010, Derviş Eroğlu was elected as President of the “TRNC” and in the next month
he joined talks with Christofias. The two of them (Eroğlu, Christofias) met with the UNSG Ban Ki-moon in January 2011 and October 2011. The main aspiration was that these talks would pave the way for an agreement before 1st July 2012 when Cyprus would assume the rotating presidency of the EU. However, no concrete result was achieved.

Turkey repeatedly threatened to boycott the Cyprus EU presidency or to freeze relations with the EU, or to even annex Northern Cyprus if no agreement was reached by 1st July 2012. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish Prime Minister, reportedly stated to Milliyet, a Turkish newspaper, that: “we will not have any discussions with the Cypriot President. Reports with the EU will be frozen” (EUbusiness 2011). The issue resurfaced in March 2012 when Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s then Minister of European Union affairs, stated to a Turkish-Cypriot newspaper that his country would consider the annexation of Northern Cyprus as “one of several outcomes” if the reunification talks proved unsuccessful (EurActiv 2012).

Talks began again in February 2014 with Anastasiades, who was elected as President of the RoC in 2013, and Eroğlu (2014) issuing a joint declaration. The talks that followed, however, were suspended because of a disagreement over the discovery of hydrocarbons off the shores of the island. The Greek-Cypriot community asserted that any sharing of revenues from natural resources could come only after a solution of the wider Cyprus conflict (Christofias 2012). Turkish-Cypriots, for their part, asserted that Greek-Cypriots cannot “legitimately represent the RoC as this would be contrary to the 1959-60 Cyprus Accords and Constitution” (Gürel et al. 2013). Following this line of reasoning, Turkish-Cypriots do not accept any decisions of the RoC concerning the exploitation of hydrocarbons like, for example, the signing of exploration contracts with international firms as well as the authorisation of drilling operations (Özersay 2011, see also International Crisis Group 2012a).
In October 2014, the peace talks were suspended by the Greek-Cypriots in response to the announcement by Turkey that it would follow a separate procedure and search for gas and oil in an area where Cyprus had already approved the commencement of drilling (Reuters 2014). Negotiations recommenced in May 2015 following the election of Mustafa Akinci as the new leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community.\(^{29}\)

Apart from the aforementioned political developments, it is also worth noting that, during this period, the EU and other international organisations, initiated a new round of reconciliation projects. Between 2008 and 2012, the EU’s Civil Society in Action programme, the USAID peacebuilding initiative and the UNDP-ACT implemented a variety of projects aimed at reconciliation and conflict transformation.

The main conclusion that can be reached regarding this 2005-15 period is that the positions of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots towards the conflict remained largely unchanged. Both sides still had quite different interpretations and understandings of the conflict. However, more initiatives at the level of the civil society had been implemented. Whether these were successful in transforming the conflict, will be discussed later in this thesis.

\(^{29}\) At the time of writing, there negotiations were still ongoing.
3.2 THE HISTORY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

3.2.1 Introduction

For historical reasons, both Serbs and Albanians maintain territorial claims on Kosovo. Kosovars\(^{30}\) and Kosovo-Serbs are the two main ethnic groups in Kosovo and it is important to note that, just like with Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, these two ethnic groups speak different languages and have different religions.

3.2.2 20\textsuperscript{th} century: the formation of nationalism and the entrenchment of divisions

The contemporary history of the Kosovo conflict began in 1974 with the introduction of a new Yugoslav Constitution. This reallocated power among the federal units of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was given greater autonomy that equated to de facto self-government within Serbia, but not the status of a distinct constituent republic of the Yugoslav Federation (see Bellamy 2002: 4). Practically, this meant that, although Kosovo was granted a great degree of autonomy, it did not have the right to secede from Yugoslavia.

However, Kosovars were disappointed with their status in Yugoslavia since their goal of independent state was not realised (Malcolm 2008: 330). As a consequence of this dissatisfaction, there was repeated persecution and discrimination against Serbs by Kosovars, resulting in high levels of Serb emigration from Kosovo (Nikolic 2003: 60-61, Malcolm 1998: 331).

In 1981, as a result of the ethnic divisions and general dissatisfaction, Kosovars took to the streets. “The issue was primarily one of status rather than a desire for independence” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 36). The protests were

\(^{30}\) The term ‘Kosovars’ refers to Kosovo-Albanians while the term ‘Kosovans’ refers to all citizens of Kosovo.
violently crushed by police forces implementing the instructions of the Yugoslav authorities (Daskalovski 2003: 20).

Kosovo-Serb discontent also began to grow. On 24 September 1986, extracts from a memorandum prepared by 216 Serb academics were published in Večernje Novosti, a Serbian daily tabloid newspaper. They claimed that Kosovo-Serbs had been exposed to “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide” (SANU Memorandum 1986, see also Judah 2000: 48). Slobodan Milošević, the then leader of the Communist Party, exploited this anger among Kosovo-Serbs for personal political advancement (Perritt 2010: 24, see also Judah 2000: 53). By the end of 1987, he had become president of the Serbian League of Communists. In 1989, he won the Serbian presidency elections and immediately engaged in a strategy of ‘Serbianising’ Kosovo. In that year, Serbia took steps towards directly controlling Kosovo’s “security, judiciary, finance and social planning” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 41). These actions culminated in the annulment of the autonomy of Kosovo in July 1990. On 2 July 1990, three days before the dissolution of the Kosovo Assembly, Kosovar delegates “passed a resolution declaring Kosovo independent within the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)” (Malcolm 1998: 346). The Serbian government reacted by removing Kosovars from government posts. On 7 September 1990, however, the Kosovar members of the Kosovo Parliament proclaimed a new constitution of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’. The self-proclaimed ‘Republic of Kosovo’ was recognised only by Albania (Binet 2016: 113). As a result, dual governmental structures operated between 1991-9. The goal of this Kosovar opposition was total independence for Kosovo. In 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo asserted claims to full sovereignty and independence. In the same year, a referendum took place among Kosovars that resulted in a 99% vote in favour of independence, on a turnout of 87% (Malcolm 1998: 347).
The main conclusion that can be reached is that this period was important for the consolidation of the divisions between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs residing in the country. The two ethnic groups have developed quite divergent goals which led to hostilities committed by both groups. In addition, Milošević’s rule further consolidated ethnic divisions. His strategy of ‘Serbianising’ Kosovo resulted in a high degree of discrimination against Kosovars who reacted by declaring Kosovo independent within the SFRY.

3.2.3 1992-1999: Intensification of violence and the NATO military intervention

From 1989, the movement towards full independence for Kosovo was led by Ibrahim Rugova, a university professor who, in collaboration with other scholars, created the ‘Democratic League of Kosovo’ (LDK) with the aim of gaining Western support for Kosovan independence. The LDK refrained from any confrontation with the authorities but, rather, favoured other means of resistance that showed its denunciation of the legitimacy of rule from Belgrade (notably, refusal to participate in Yugoslav elections and attempts to structure parallel governmental institutions) (Nation 2003: 225).

Rugova’s aim of winning Western support was not realised. Kosovo, preceding 1998, was a marginal issue in international discussions. The United States did use economic sanctions against the Yugoslav government after it declared martial law in Kosovo in 1981. Moreover, the Clinton and Bush Senior administrations issued several warnings to Milošević (Janssens 2015: 60). However, these warnings “were overshadowed by the tendency to treat Milošević as an interlocutor whom the West could not afford to alienate

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31 As Smyser (2003: 159) indicates, Rugova “expected some support from the West, perhaps as part of the general settlement of the Balkans that would follow the end of the Cold War”.

32 Despite the use of nonviolent means, the LDK was not so benign. Judah (quoted in Chomsky 1999: 27) characterised the LDK as a “curious mirror image to Milošević’s SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia)”.
in its efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the regional crisis” (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Paragraph 29).

In the early 1990s, some members of the LPK\textsuperscript{33} created another group to organise armed revolt in Kosovo, “seeking to tie together scattered but largely ineffective pockets of armed resistance to Yugoslav authority in various regions of Kosovo” (Perritt 2010: 32). The ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ (KLA), as it was named, announced itself to the public in 1996 with concurrent bomb attacks on five camps accommodating Serb refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Pavkovic 1997: 189). One of the main reasons for the rise of the KLA during this period was the exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton peace talks in 1995 (Philips 1996: 824-25). After Dayton, it became evident to many Kosovars that, as long as peace was present in Kosovo, the international community would not proceed to any substantive changes (Judah 2008: 75-92, see also Pavkovic 2013: 103).

In 1997, with the collapse of the Albanian government, the only government that formally recognised the ‘Republic of Kosovo’, the situation changed significantly. The simultaneous collapse of the Albanian army resulted in the KLA acquiring many weapons\textsuperscript{34}. From this time onwards, the KLA “embarked on a campaign of violence against the Serbian and FRY authorities and those co-operating with them” (Greenwood 2002: 146). By February 1998, the violent acts on the part of the KLA had reached a peak (Chomsky 1999: 31).

The Serbian army did not immediately respond to this intensification of violence and this helped the KLA, by summer 1998, to gain control of 40\% of Kosovan territory. However,

\textsuperscript{33} The LPK was founded in 1982 with the goal of emancipating Kosovo from the control of Belgrade.

\textsuperscript{34} As Fowkes (2002: 111) explained, in March 1997, following the dissolution of the Albanian army, weapons were available “for a few dollars each”. The KLA, therefore, could be easily armed.
a few months later, the Serb forces used disproportionate retaliation against the KLA and the Kosovar civilian population (Chomsky 1999: 31). As a response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 (UNSC 1998, Resolution 1199) which stated its severe concerns over the disproportionate use of force by the Serbian security forces and the FRY army. Resolution 1199 also stressed the immediate need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe and asked both sides to implement a ceasefire.

However, in spite of the UNSC’s efforts, the situation worsened (Greenwood 2002: 149). In February 1999, a peace conference took place in Rambouillet, near Paris, France. However, the conference did not produce any positive outcomes due to the refusal of the FRY/Serb delegation to sign the final agreement (Hosmer 2001: 12, see also Weller 2008: 15-16). Consequently, on 24 March 1999, NATO commenced its aerial bombing campaign on the FRY. NATO’s operation lasted for 78 days, and on 10 June 1999 a ceasefire was signed.

Overall, therefore, the years of the formation and consolidation of ethnic divisions (discussed in the previous sections of this chapter) resulted in the widespread use of violence, especially following the creation of the KLA. It was evident that the two groups had quite divergent goals. Kosovars wanted total independence for Kosovo while Serbs regarded Kosovo a part of Serbia’s territory. Reaching common ground seemed to be impossible and violent actions did not stop. As a result, NATO conducted an aerial bombing campaign on the FRY.

3.2.4 1999-2008: Kosovo under international supervision

On the same day the ceasefire was agreed, UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and the NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) were established. Kosovo entered an era of international supervision that included collaboration between international institutions
with the aim of achieving post-war reform and development as well as institution building (UN Security Council 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244). Even though the future status of Kosovo was still undecided, UNMIK, after 2001, assigned the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) with governing competencies (Tolksdorf 2007: 6). Furthermore, UNMIK supervised the formation of a multinational police service in Kosovo. It should be noted, however, that Kosovo-Serbs did not recognise UNMIK as a legitimate authority. As a result, in some municipalities in northern Kosovo inhabited mostly by Kosovo-Serbs, parallel structures were established, funded and administered by Serbia (OSCE 2003). These structures have been fully operating until very recently.

In October 2005, the UNSG chose Martti Ahtisaari, a then UN Special Envoy, to direct negotiations on the status of Kosovo. Ahtisaari led talks between February and September 2006. On 2 February 2007, he presented a ‘Comprehensive Proposal’ to Belgrade and Pristina. Supplementary meetings with both sides followed, after which Ahtisaari stated it has not been possible for the two sides to find common ground as they maintained their diametrically opposed positions. For Ahtisaari, therefore, since the two sides of the conflict did not compromise on their original positions, the “only alternative to independence was to maintain the status quo” (Vidmar 2009: 802). The ‘Ahtissari Plan’, which suggested independence supervised by the international community, received widespread support (NATO News: 23 April 2007, Presidency of the European Union-Germany 2007, European Union Council 2007, European Parliament 2007). However, Serbia, with the support of Russia, demanded the negotiations to start anew, arguing that the procedures of negotiations on the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ had been severely flawed. Russia

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35 As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the EU-brokered dialogue resulted in an agreement for dismantling the parallel structures operating in Northern Kosovo.
stated that it would veto any UNSC Resolution in favour of independence for Kosovo (EUobserver 2007a). Consequently, the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ was not approved by the UNSC. Subsequent to these developments, the troika of the EU, the US and Russia was given 120 days to direct talks on Kosovo’s status. However, it soon became evident that Kosovars would not compromise and accept anything less than independence. Regardless of the initial EU statements against a unilateral declaration of independence, US and EU officials started expressing their willingness to recognise Kosovo as an independent state (Bilefsky and Wood 2007). Hence, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 was not a surprise. It had become apparent that the US and the EU decided to put the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ into practice without a UNSC Resolution.

Serbia reacted to the declaration of independence by asking the UN-SRSG (Special Representative to the Secretary-General) to declare the illegitimacy of Kosovo’s independence on the grounds that it did not comply with UNSC Resolution 1244 (Caruso 2008: 20). The EU, for its part, was not able to agree on a joint recognition by all member states because a number of them had reservations. Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain feared that the case of Kosovo would set a precedent for the status of other separatist movements, namely Basque and Catalan movements in Spain, the Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus, the Hungarian minority living in Romania and the Hungarian minority of Slovakia (Vucheva 2008)36. The EU’s official statement was that “member states will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law on their relations with Kosovo” (Council of the EU 2008). As Weller (2008: 74) pointed out, “the

36 It should be noted that the five non-recognisers are not all the same in outlook. Spain has adopted the toughest stance against Kosovo’s independence.
statement only confirmed the inability of the EU to act as a unified entity in the matter of recognition”.

The International Court of Justice, meanwhile, in an advisory opinion requested by the UN General Assembly at Serbia’s insistence\textsuperscript{37}, concluded in 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not breach international law\textsuperscript{38}. At the time of writing this thesis, 112 out of the 193 UN members and 23 out of 28 EU members had recognised Kosovo’s statehood\textsuperscript{39}.

The main conclusion that can be reached is that, during this period, relations between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars did not markedly improve. UNMIK was not accepted by the former. As a result, until very recently, parallel governmental structures funded by Serbia have been operating in Northern Kosovo, an area inhabited mostly by Kosovo-Serbs. However, as will be discussed in the next section, the process of dismantling these parallel structures had commenced by the time research for this thesis had finished. In addition, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion further complicated the conflict. The fact that so many states recognised Kosovo’s statehood was a source of jubilation for Kosovars. However, Serbia’s official position had not changed. Serbia still regarded Kosovo as a part of its territory. In addition, most Kosovo-Serbs residing in Kosovo supported Serbia’s position.

\textbf{3.2.5. 2008 - 2015: The EU’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict}

\textsuperscript{37} The International Court of Justice can offer an Advisory Opinion only if such an opinion is asked by “the Security Council or the General Assembly, or by an organ authorised to do so by the General Assembly” (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 14).

\textsuperscript{38} An intense debate has been created with regards to the Advisory Opinion. For a detailed discussion on several aspects of it, including the ways through which law and politics can affect each other as well as the broader implications of the Court’s decision, see Milanovic, M. and Wood, M. (2015) \textit{The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion}. Oxford: Oxford University Press

\textsuperscript{39} For more information, see http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/
The EU’s direct involvement in Kosovo began in 1999\(^{40}\) with the authorisation of UNSC Resolution 1244 and the establishment of UNMIK. Under UNMIK’s four-pillar structure\(^{41}\), the EU was in charge of reconstruction and economic development. At the same time, the EU engaged in institution building in Kosovo through the SAP (Stability and Association Process). In 2002, it was decided that “Kosovo would be set on a separate route towards EU membership, given the uncertainty surrounding Kosovo’s final status and its unique set of challenges associated with progress towards EU accession” (FRIDE 2007: 2). As a result, the STM (Stability and Association Process Tracking Mechanism) was founded in November that year.

Negotiations over the final status of Kosovo indicated that, after a solution was found, the international community in general, and the EU in particular, should restructure their missions in Kosovo. As the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ provided, following the declaration of independence, UNMIK would be succeeded by an international operation led by the EU.

In July 2006, Javier Solana, then High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, then European Commissioner for Enlargement, issued a report entitled: ‘On the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo’. This report (see European Council and European Commission 2007) provided for three distinct ways through which the EU would get involved in Kosovo. Firstly, an EU Special Representative (EUSR), who would also lead the International Civilian Office (ICO)\(^{42}\), would supervise procedures towards a

\(^{40}\) Prior to 1999, the EU’s involvement in Kosovo was minimal. One notable development was the establishment of the CPN (Conflict Prevention Network) in 1997 by the European Commission which recommended some measures to be taken that would increase the EU’s role in Kosovo (Calic 1997).

\(^{41}\) The four pillars of UNMIK were: “Humanitarian assistance led by UNHCR; Civil Administration under the UN; Democratization and Institution-building led by OSCE; and Reconstruction and Economic Development managed by the EU” (United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo).

\(^{42}\) The ICO was established as part of the Comprehensive Status Settlement (CSS) proposed by Ahtisaari in 2007. Its main aim was to supervise the implementation of the CSS and coordinate the activities of EULEX (see Visoka and Bolton 2011: 193).
settlement. Secondly, another EU mission, EULEX, would support the authorities in Kosovo in implementing the Rule of Law and thirdly, an ECLO (European Commission Liaison Office) would prepare Kosovo for EU accession.

In addition, the EU attempted to persuade Serbia to participate in EU-facilitated talks with Kosovo. These talks, led by CFSP High Representative Catherine Ashton, commenced in March 2011 (International Crisis Group 2012: 1). In its October 2011 report on Serbia’s EU membership perspective, the European Commission stated that Serbia would be given a date to start membership negotiations if it took more steps towards stabilising its relations with Kosovo (see European Commission 2011a: 12). Serbia was duly given the status of an EU membership candidate in March 2012. However, the EU set the improvement of relations between Belgrade and Pristina as a prerequisite for the beginning of accession negotiations (European Council 2011). Between October 2012 and April 2013, several meetings, facilitated by Ashton, took place between Serbian Prime Minister Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. In April 2013, in the tenth round of their EU-mediated dialogue, Dacic and Thaçi “initialled a ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia” (Woehrel 2013: 5). Kosovo’s Parliament and Serbia’s Government ratified the agreement. The European Commission then suggested that the EU give Serbia a date for commencing accession negotiations and start talks with Kosovo for enacting a SAA (Stabilisation and Association Agreement).

Up until the point of writing, several important steps had been achieved by this dialogue. For example, the parallel structures\(^\text{43}\) operating in the Kosovo-Serb municipalities were in the process of being dismantled. This process was well-advanced in the fields of justice

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\(^{43}\) The term ‘parallel structures’ refers to governmental structures funded by Serbia and operating in Northern Kosovo.
and police and was considered to be one of the most important achievements (European Commission 2014, 2015). Also, in August 2015, an agreement was reached for the creation of a Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo (European Commission 2015).

It therefore seems that the EU’s efforts produced some positive results in the case of Kosovo. Although the process has not yet been concluded, this historical review has shown that, through the EU-brokered dialogue, several agreements were reached between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs. A more detailed discussion of the nature of EU actions and their impact in Kosovo will follow in the subsequent chapters.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided the necessary historical context for the subsequent core analysis. More specifically, it has considered two main topics: the history of the Cyprus and Kosovo conflicts and the involvement of international actors. Particular reference has been made to the role of the EU in the two conflicts. Based on the above analysis, certain conclusions can be reached regarding each of the main topics discussed in this chapter. Firstly, comparison between the two cases reveals that both are characterised by deeply entrenched divisions between ethnic groups. In both cases, the conflict is between groups that speak different languages and have different religions. Also, the two sides of both conflicts have developed quite divergent goals. Turkish-Cypriots and Kosovars favour a high degree of autonomy while Greek-Cypriots and Kosovo-Serbs consider Northern Cyprus and Kosovo to be part of Cyprus and Serbia respectively. In addition, the 20th century was important for the consolidation of existing divisions. In both cases, disagreement over constitutional questions led to the further amplification of divisions and to the use of violence. Moreover, in both cases, one of the two groups has been greatly
supported by another state. Turkish-Cypriots are economically dependent on Turkey while Kosovo-Serbs were, until recently, operating parallel governmental structures that were financially supported by Serbia. Lastly, in both cases, a unilateral declaration of independence has taken place. Turkish-Cypriots declared the “TRNC” an independent state in 1983 while Kosovars declared independence in 2008. This brief comparison leads to the conclusion that both conflicts are well-entrenched and that their transformation would be a challenging task for the EU.

However, it is not the aim of this chapter to suggest that the two cases are identical. Firstly, in the case of Cyprus, the secessionist entity has only been recognised by Turkey. By contrast, Kosovo has been recognised by 108 states. Another difference of particular importance for this thesis is the degree of EU involvement. The historical background analysis revealed that the EU was much more directly involved in Kosovo than in Cyprus. In the case of Cyprus, the EU was mainly supporting UN efforts towards a political solution. After 2004, however, more reconciliatory projects and bottom-up initiatives were implemented by the EU as well as by other organisations. In the case of Kosovo, while there was not much EU involvement in the 1990s, in the 2000s the EU was in charge of reconstruction and economic development. Later, it has implemented its own mission and has been the leading actor in facilitating dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, this was one of the reasons why Kosovo was selected as a case that is expected to be, to a large extent, in line with the NPE argument. The historical analysis presented in this chapter has confirmed this rationale. Therefore, if the EU cannot be characterised as a normative actor with regards to its role towards Kosovo, then there are significant grounds to support the argument that the EU cannot be a normative actor in the field of conflict transformation.
CHAPTER FOUR: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU GOALS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The next three chapters will apply the NPE analytical framework (see Chapter Two) to critically explore the EU’s commitment to the promotion of ‘sustainable peace’ and to conflict transformation. This particular chapter is concerned with the goals of the EU, which speaks to the first dimension of the NPE framework. The main question that this chapter aims to discuss is the extent to which the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot and Kosovan actors was the main EU objective. The first section of this chapter discusses the evolution and development of the EU’s approach to conflict. The primary aim of this section is to trace the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in the development of the Union’s instruments and policies. Then, it moves on to the two cases and asks whether and why the promotion and eventual internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot and Kosovan actors became an aim of EU foreign policy. The chapter then looks at the EU’s own commitment to the principles it seeks to promote and its adherence to general principles of international law. This last section is particularly important in assessing the normativity of EU goals. As Sjursen (2006: 245) argued, it is the EU’s practice of binding itself to international and fundamental rights law that makes it a distinctive normative actor in world politics. Therefore, the Union’s commitment to international law principles would be an indicator of its normativity.
4.2 THE EU’S APPROACH TO CONFLICT

This section will provide a comprehensive review of the development of the Union’s approach towards conflict. To this end, secondary literature as well as official EU documentation were scrutinised.

To begin with, peace was one of the main principles that inspired the very emergence of the European Community (EC) (European Community 1957). The first successful move towards the creation of an EC foreign policy framework occurred during The Hague summit of December 1969 when the EC Heads of State and Government agreed to pave the way for “a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission” (quoted in Hill and Smith 2000: 75). As a result, the EPC (European Political Cooperation) was established with the aim of enabling better collaboration between the European Community’s member states on foreign affairs (see Holland 1993: 118 and Stewart 2006: 44-45). The EPC did not initially have a treaty basis and thus functioned outside the official structures and legislative procedures of the EC. In addition, although initially the Member States insisted on the strict separation of the EPC from the EC (Bache at al. 2011: 510-511), progressively they began to use the European Community’s instruments for foreign policy purposes. One example is the imposition of sanctions on the USSR after the imposition of martial law on Poland in 1980 (Smith, M. 2008: 72).

The Single European Act, signed in 1986 and implemented in 1987, gave the EPC a treaty base. According to Article 30, the member states should “inform and consult each other

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44 Earlier plans for the establishment of a federal European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 and for the enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation in 1962 (Fouchet Plan) were not successful (see Hill and Smith 2000: 47; Roy and Kanner 2006: 103).

on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their position and implementation of joint action” (SEA 1987).

The foreign policy aims of the EU were more clearly defined in the 1990s when the EPC was replaced by the CFSP with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. In June 1992, the foreign ministers submitted a report to the Lisbon European Council on possible areas for CFSP actions. It noted that “the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the EU to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises” (European Council 1992). This suggests that, unlike the EPC’s reactive nature (Smith, M. 2004: 178, Stewart 2006: 47), the CFSP aimed at long-term engagements in order to address the structural causes of conflicts and not only their consequences. As has been discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the idea of tackling the root causes of conflicts instead of simply treating their symptoms is of central importance in conflict transformation.

The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, put the development of democracy and the rule of law as well as the promotion of human rights among the EU’s main foreign policy aims (European Union 1992). Among the EU’s actions in this direction were the monitoring of elections in Russia and South Africa, the establishment of support measures to strengthen stability and peace in the CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries) and the Middle East and the provision of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This points towards attempts to transform the structural features that support the perpetuation of conflicts.
The Amsterdam Treaty, implemented in 1999, expanded the scope of the EU’s tasks to include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat in crisis management, including peacemaking” (European Union 1997: Article 17). These Petersberg Tasks, as they had come to be called, derived from the June 1992 Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) at which WEU member states decided to provide military units for such kinds of tasks. In December 1998, the Saint Malo Declaration was signed by the President of France, Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister of the UK, Tony Blair. In this ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence’, they both agreed that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Anglo French Declaration 1998). A few months after this Franco-British Declaration, the EU member states decided to institute the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and to merge the WEU into the EU (European Council 1999a). Subsequently, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council (1999b) declared that the member states were committed to develop the capability to deploy military forces and took decisions regarding the institutional setup of the ESDP. A few years after this decision to establish the ESDP, the EU managed to create the necessary tools for the ESDP, albeit with ongoing capability deficiencies, and declared that it was ready to operate on the full range of the Petersberg Tasks (European Council 2003b). The earliest (2003) official ESDP deployments included a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Smith, M. 2011: 187).

In addition, another tool at the EU’s disposal for addressing the root causes of conflicts were trade and cooperation agreements (European Commission 2001a: 9). The European
Commission stressed that its preferred approach was to constructively engage in conflicts through a “long-term approach, identifying and targeting needs as far “upstream” as possible” (European Commission 2001a: 8-9). In this respect, it became evident that trade and cooperation agreements would help to foster sustainable structural change (see Tocci 2013a: 139) which should, in turn, induce conflict transformation. Some examples include the South East European Cooperation Process, the Stabilisation and Association Process with Western Balkan countries and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Another example is the Stability Pact which was proposed by the EU in 1993 and aimed at addressing minority and border tensions between countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Countries of that region were expected to resolve existing disputes before being allowed to enter into accession negotiations with the Union. As Tocci (2007: 13) noted, “although the Pact was a political and non-legally binding document, its inbuilt incentives promoted agreements between Slovakia and Hungary (1995) and later between Romania and Hungary (1996)”.

Moreover, another important aspect of the EU’s approach towards conflict was the attempt to involve local NGOs. The Commission stressed that NGOs “are often present on the ground in situations where official state structures are absent. They can also function as grass roots mediators as well as reliable and neutral observers in situations where there is no international presence. Mediation activities of specialist NGOs have sometimes proved decisive in a crisis” (European Commission 2001a: 28). This engagement in long-term strategies and the acknowledgement of the importance of NGOs and grass roots mediation are essential components of conflict transformation processes (Lederach 1995 and 1997). Diez et al (2006: 573) referred to the EU’s PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland as examples of cross-community peacebuilding projects.

46 The Stability Pact was passed to the OSCE for implementation.
that might contribute to a reduction of stereotyping and the alteration of inter-group relations for the better. However, they also noted that increased contact between conflict parties is not in itself enough for the transformation of a conflict. Rather, they stated that the establishment of cross-group social networks are necessary as they will lead to long-term identity changes (Diez et al 2006: 573).

Furthermore, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty specified that “preserving peace, preventing conflicts from erupting into violence and strengthening international security” (European Union 2007, Lisbon Treaty: Article 21) are significant elements of the EU’s external policies. More importantly, however, the Treaty, as Tocci (2011: 1) observed, recognised an association between the Union’s internal nature and its external projection. It stated that the EU would be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (European Union 2007, Lisbon Treaty: Article 21).

Lastly, another way of EU involvement in conflicts is through diplomacy. In other words, the EU has been involved in negotiations aimed at helping the conflict parties come to an agreement. One example is the role of the EU High Representative in facilitating negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina (for a more detailed discussion on the EU as a diplomatic actor, see Koops and Macaj 2015).

To conclude, the EU’s approach to conflict has gradually shifted towards the implementation of long-term strategies that aim to address a conflict’s structural causes. Trade and cooperation agreements, for example, are used to foster structural changes. In addition, local NGOs are seen as important actors that must be involved in this process.
Such commitments and activities are in line with the conflict transformation approach and with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.

4.3 THE CASE OF CYPRUS: NORMATIVE EU GOALS?

As discussed in Chapter Two, if the EU is indeed a normative actor, then the ‘sustainable peace’ norm should be central in its rhetoric and engagement with the two conflicts. In this respect, the EU’s approach towards Cyprus will be examined with the aim of identifying whether the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot actors was among the main aims of the EU.

4.3.1 Centrality of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm?

The EU’s official statements on the Cyprus conflict have been constructed along three main themes. Firstly, the EU emphasised the importance of reconciliation and of bringing the two communities closer together. However, examination of EU documents and speeches of important officials revealed a differentiation between the two chronological periods of EU engagement in the conflict (see Chapter Three). During the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, this rested on the idea that the process towards EU membership would be enough to bring peace and reconciliation. After 2004, however, the Union’s official statements emphasised that the economic development of the area administered by Turkish-Cypriots and the development of civil society would help bring the two communities closer together. Secondly, the EU highlighted the importance of adhering to international law principles as a way of creating a positive political climate on the island. Lastly, the EU consistently expressed its support for the UN-led negotiations towards a political solution. These three main themes will be further analysed in the subsequent sections.
The EU became involved in the Cyprus conflict following the RoC’s 1990 application for membership. In this first period (1990-2004), the EU emphasised the catalytic role it could play in reconciling the two main communities in Cyprus. Although there is not one widely accepted definition of reconciliation, most authors who have dealt with this term seem to agree that it refers to breaking down the barriers between the conflict parties and integrating them, thereby changing their relationship for the better (Lederach 2001, Chapman 2002, Kriesberg 2001) which is also one of the main objectives of conflict transformation. Based on a thorough examination of EU documents and speeches of EU officials, it seems that they offer the same reading of reconciliation. A large number of extracts from these sources will be provided in this section to shed light on the EU’s understanding of reconciliation.

To begin with, the European Commission, in its Opinion on the RoC’s membership application, stressed “The Commission is convinced that the result of Cyprus's accession to the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island closer together” (European Commission 1993: paragraph 46). Following the opening of accession negotiations, the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 concluded “the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation” (European Council 1997: 28.). Moreover, in the Agenda 2000, issued in 1997, the European Commission pictured the EU as being able “to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement” (European Commission 1997) of the Cyprus conflict.

Similar intentions were also evident in speeches of leading European Commission officials. Hans van den Broek (1997b), then European Commissioner for External

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47 Agenda 2000 outlined the vision of the Union’s future on the threshold of the 21st century.
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, for example, expressed his conviction that “Cyprus's accession to the Union will reduce tensions between the communities and transform what is at present a zero-sum game, where one side's gain is the other's loss, into a situation offering a brighter future for both sides”. In addition, Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, in a speech to the RoC’s House of Representatives, stated

The European Union exists to put an end to the conflicts of the past and to bring peace, justice and well-being to our peoples. It has achieved this to a remarkable extent over almost half a century. Today, peace, justice and well-being are steadily being spread throughout Europe as preparations for enlargement go ahead. The European Union will bring to Cyprus a model of peace and reconciliation (Prodi 2001).

For Prodi, therefore, the enlargement process would be instrumental in bringing peace, reconciliation and justice in Cyprus (see also Prodi 2001a). Moreover, Günter Verheugen, as European Commissioner for Enlargement, in a speech to the European Parliament in 2003, confirmed that the Commission “will also do all it can to support projects in Cyprus that will help to prevent a further deepening of differences on the island and build trust between the communities” (Verheugen 2003). This idea of ‘building trust’ is also central to conflict transformation. According to Mitchell (2002: 18), conflict transformation should include the passage from mistrustful relationships to trusting ones. It, therefore, becomes evident that during this first phase of EU involvement in Cyprus, the European Commission hoped that the eventual inclusion of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in the Union’s structures would be vital in reconciling the two communities and tackling the roots of the conflict.

The EU’s stated preference of a unified Cyprus and of reconciliation was also evident after the RoC’s accession to the Union and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots (see Chapter Three). In this second period, however, the EU tried to establish a
link between the economic development of the North and reconciliation. More specifically, for European Commission officials (Appendix B: 12, 13), the improvement of the economic situation of the Turkish-Cypriot community would serve to eradicate divisions between the two communities and to build closer relations between them. For example, Rehn, then European Commissioner for Enlargement, referring to the Green Line Regulation (GLR)\(^ {48} \), stated that “building bridges between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community over the Green Line is essential for reconciliation in Cyprus and helpful for creating a positive political climate which would open the way for a comprehensive settlement on the island” (Rehn quoted in European Commission press release 2005). The EU’s Council of Foreign Ministers also expressed its determination to “put an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of the island by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community” (quoted in Cyprus News Agency 2004).

In addition, the EU also stressed the importance of inter-community projects. The European Parliament, for example, stated that “every possible effort should be made to achieve the reunification of Cyprus” and called on the Commission “to strengthen inter-community projects, thus building up the momentum for the resumption of negotiations” (European Parliament 2005). Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy between 2010-2014, during his first official visit to Cyprus and with reference to such projects, stated: “I am happy that European funds could contribute to bring people of both communities closer. It is an encouraging example underlining that where there is a will there is a way” (Füle 2010a).

\(^ {48} \) The GLR aimed to facilitate trade activities between the two communities.
Most importantly, Füle made the commitment that “the EU will also mobilise all resources available to make reunification sustainable for both communities” (Füle 2010b). Also, for Füle, such funding “underlines the commitment and strong support of the European Union to make a difference in the lives of Turkish-Cypriots, to help bring the Turkish-Cypriot community closer to the EU and to pave the way for reconciliation and the reunification of Cyprus” (Füle quoted in European Commission press release 2013a). Moreover, Johannes Hahn, as Commissioner for Regional Policy, reaffirmed that “the European Union is built on reconciliation, both human and political and that the roots of the European Union are a reconciliation project” (Hahn 2011). In the same speech he noted that “the EU will continue to support strongly a settlement and foster reconciliation and confidence building on the island” (Hahn 2011). Similarly, Herman Van Rompuy, as President of the European Council, in a speech to the Parliament of the RoC in 2012, stated that “behind words like ‘solution’ and ‘settlement’ we are ultimately talking about ending a civil war and establishing peace” (Van Rompuy 2012). Such statements indicate a commitment to sustainable reconciliation and conflict transformation.

Moreover, as part of the FAR49, the EU repeatedly called for proposals for the development of Turkish-Cypriot civil society. The main objective was to promote “the role of civil society in the northern part of Cyprus in the development of trust, dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities as an important step towards a solution of the Cyprus problem” (European Commission 2013a). José Manuel Barroso, then European Commission President, stated that it was important “to ensure the involvement of civil society” (Barroso quoted in European Commission Press Release 2013c). The acknowledgement of the importance

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49 FAR is a comprehensive programme of support to the Turkish-Cypriot community. It will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
of civil society in the promotion of reconciliation is another indicator that the EU’s goals were directed towards transforming of the conflict.

Lastly, there emerged a tendency in EU official discourse to compare the reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots with Franco-German relations in the aftermath of WW2. Hans Van den Broek, as European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated:

I ask anyone who doubts the force of peace and prosperity in Europe to consider the remarkable reconciliation between France and Germany. Thanks to European integration, two historic adversaries are now, with their European partners, about to seal their common destiny by introducing a common currency. Membership of the Union is a plus. It takes nothing away from peoples’ sense of identity (and this goes for regional and cultural identity too) or their long standing ties with their neighbours. Rather it offers them opportunities to have a greater influence on international affairs and on their own destiny (Van den Broek 1997a).

This comparison went as far as drawing a parallel between the role of coal and steel as a key factor in the reconciliation between France and Germany and the possibility of gas reserves found in Cypriot waters becoming a key factor in the reconciliation between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Van Rompuy, for example, stated:

now that enormous gas reserves have been discovered in Cypriot waters, could this not be a welcome trigger to turn around the situation? Just like France and Germany 60 years ago came together over coal, could in the case of Cyprus the avenue toward conciliation not be built on sharing and selling gas? (Van Rompuy 2012).

By drawing this parallel between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots and French and Germans, EU officials attempted to create an image of the Union as an organisation that is able to transform relations through the transformation of the interests of the parties in conflict.

Overall, therefore, during the first period of its involvement in Cyprus, the EU promoted reconciliation through putting an emphasis on the catalytic role the accession process could play. After 2004, however, reconciliation was encouraged through the emphasis placed on inter-community projects, on the development of civil society and on the
economic development of the North. Lastly, reconciliation was promoted as a principle upon which the Union was built. By making references to its success in reconciling the French and Germans, the EU tried to create an image of itself as a peace project.

International Law violations

Another theme that emerged in the EU’s official statements was its emphasis on international law principles as a way to create a positive political climate and conditions conducive to reconciliation. This section will further expand on the specific ways through which the EU emphasised the importance of international law.

The EU opposed the Turkish invasion in Cyprus as well as the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish-Cypriot community. In 1983, for example, the then ten members of the European Community, issued a declaration in which they opposed the secessionist claims of the Turkish-Cypriots and reiterated “their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the RoC” (European Community 1983 cited in Hoffmeister 2006: 84).

During the period under examination in this thesis, the EU placed much emphasis on international law principles that were seen as directly related to reconciliation. The European Parliament, for example, in a resolution adopted in October 1996, called on EU member states “to respond with continued firm pressure on Turkey with the aim of freeing the island of the presence of all Turkish troops, guaranteeing freedom of movement for all citizens and working for a just and peaceful solution to the current Cypriot problem, along the lines of relevant UN Security Council resolutions” and reiterated its “support for the Cypriot Government's proposal to demilitarise the island and calls on Turkey to withdraw the occupying forces and to comply with the UN resolutions on Cyprus” (European Parliament 1996).
After the RoC’s accession to the EU and the rejection of the Annan Plan by the majority of Greek-Cypriot voters in 2004, the EP continued to voice its concerns regarding the political situation in Cyprus and to condemn Turkey’s violations of international law. For example, in a resolution on Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU adopted in 2007, it called upon Turkey to withdraw its military forces from the island and stated that this “would facilitate the negotiation of a settlement” (European Parliament 2007a). Moreover, the EP issued many resolutions calling upon Turkey to open its seaports and airspace to Greek-Cypriot operators (see, for example, European Parliament 2006a). Most importantly, it re-confirmed its commitment to confidence-building measures and also asked Turkey to withdraw its military forces from Cyprus and to transfer the sealed-off area of Famagusta50 to the UN in accordance with UNSC resolution 550 (European Parliament 2010a).

The European Commission (2008: 28, 2009a: 32) for its part, in its yearly reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession, asked Turkey to make progress on the Cyprus question by fully implementing the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement which aimed at extending Turkey’s Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new members of the Union, including Cyprus. Although Turkey signed the Additional Protocol, it also issued a declaration stating “the signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol, does not amount to any form of recognition of the RoC” (Republic of Turkey 2005). Moreover, the European Commission repeatedly asked Turkey to lift its veto on Cyprus’ membership of international organisations and “remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus” (European Commission 2015c: 26, 2014: 19). Lastly, following the discovery of gas

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50 During the 1974 war, Famagusta was captured by the Turkish military and was sealed-off by the Turkish authorities.
reserves in Cypriot waters, the Commission also asked Turkey to respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus including the right to exploit natural resources in its territorial sea (European Commission 2015c: 26).

For EU officials, the condemnation of the violation of international law principles is a way of contributing to reconciliation between the two ethnic groups in Cyprus (Appendix B: 12, 13). As the EP stated, the implementation of the measures mentioned in this section would result in the creation of “a positive climate conducive to the successful resolution of the ongoing reunification negotiations” (European Parliament 2014a). The emphasis on international law principles, therefore, was seen by the EU as contributing to the transformation of the conflict. Notably, some of these measures like, for example, the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from the island would help build trust between the two communities (Appendix B: 13).

Support for the UN’s framework for political resolution

Apart from the discursive themes analysed in the previous sections, the EU has also repeatedly discussed its preferred type of political settlement. In this respect, it was often highlighted that the solution of the Cyprus conflict should be based on the values that have inspired the creation of the EU. The European Council, for example, repeatedly stated that “the EU is ready to accommodate a settlement in line with the principles upon which the EU is founded” (European Council, Presidency Conclusions 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003, 2003a, 2003c, 2004a).

The EU, however, did not aim to create a peace process separate from the one initiated by the UN. Rather, it supported the UN efforts on the island as the only path towards a just and fair political solution. In its yearly reports on Cyprus’ progress towards accession to the EU, the Commission (1998a: 39, 1999: 15, 2000: 96, 2001a: 23) made it clear that
its objective was for a political settlement to be reached in accordance with the UNSC resolutions. Moreover, in its reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the European Commission re-emphasised its support for the UNSG good-offices mission in Cyprus (1998b:21, 1999a:15). The European Parliament (1993, 2001a, 2014b), meanwhile, just like the European Commission and the European Council, repeatedly expressed its support for UN efforts towards a solution of the Cyprus conflict and its conviction that the status quo on the island was not acceptable.

In line, therefore, with its support for the general UN framework, the EU also supported the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the island which was the solution advocated by the UN. For example, in its 1993 Opinion on the RoC’s EU membership application, the Commission noted “the shape of a settlement, establishing a bicommunal and bizonal federation, is well established, and supported by the Union” (European Commision 1993). In 1997, the European Council (1997) declared: “The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with a view to creating a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation”. Given the Union’s firm support of UN efforts and its preference for the accession of a unified Cyprus (European Council 2002c), it is not surprising that the EU supported and promoted the UN Annan Plan, which was based on the principles of consociationalism and federal power sharing (Yakynthou 2009: 25).

The same trend of supporting the UN as the only path towards a political solution to the Cyprus conflict continued after 2004. For example, the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 stated: “The Presidency of the European Union after discussions in the Council expresses its full support for the ongoing efforts of the UNSG to resume the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UN Security
Council resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded” (EU Presidency 2006).

Similarly, following the joint declaration by Anastasiades and Eroğlu (see Chapter Three), the European Commission issued a statement noting: “As previously announced, the European Commission is keen to play its part in supporting the negotiations, conducted under UN auspices and to offer all the support the parties and the UN find most useful” (European Commission 2014).

However, consociationalism and federalism have come to be very controversial topics. Consociational theory is based on a primordialist understanding of national identity$^{51}$ and, hence, is an approach that favours the segregation of communities (Lijphart 1969: 216). More specifically, consociationalism aims to prevent further conflict between the parties involved by reducing contact between them (Horowitz 2000: 256, Wilford and Wilson 2003: 11). Transformationalist approaches, in contrast, favour “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall 2004: 70). With particular reference to the EU’s preferred and advocated institutional designs, most authors seem to agree that the EU usually favours consociational models. Wilkinson (2005: 240), for example, argued that many of the reforms encouraged by the EU in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean “reflect the norms inherent in ‘consociational’ power sharing and emphasise ethnic proportionality, coalition governments, and cultural autonomy for minorities”. Tocci (2011: 3) also observed that the EU usually advocates federal and power-sharing solutions. However, as Lederach (1997: 26) argued, a solution

$^{51}$ Primordialists conceive identities as something given and fixed and therefore, not amenable to change (Dawishaa 2002, Jenkins 1996). Primordialist approaches depict the nation as based upon a natural, organic community, which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it” (Brown 2000: 6).
cannot be "pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimise the conflicting groups' affiliations". According to him, "relationship is both the basis of the conflict and of its long term solution" (Lederach 1997: 26).

With particular reference to the case of Cyprus, as Yakinthou (2009a: 25) noted in discussing the Annan Plan, consociationalism “emphasises conflict resolution by elite cooperation rather than societal cohesion”. In other words, the Annan Plan, although it would have led to a degree of cooperation between the two ethnic groups at the elite level, it would also have given a certain degree of autonomy to ethnic groups, thus institutionalising the differences between them. However, as Manners (Appendix A: 36) explained to the author, “consociationalism could bring ‘stable peace’. This will not be accompanied by a broader sense of democracy and peace. It only works for the short term. However, consociationalism does not have to be the end solution. The EU aims to promote sustainable long-term solutions”. For Manners, therefore, achieving stable peace could be seen as a step towards achieving sustainable peace. Also, the type of solution advocated by the EU was based on the UN’s preferences and on agreements reached by the leaders of both communities (see Chapter Three). The EU was, in this way, conforming to principles advanced by the UN and to the preferences of local actors.

Overall, in the case of Cyprus, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm was central in the EU’s official statements. The EU put much emphasis on reconciliation, stressed the importance of adhering to international law principles as a way towards the creation of a positive political climate on the island and supported the UN’s peace process. The Union’s promotion of consociationalism could be seen as its main weak spot. However, the establishment of consociationalism does not have to be the end point of the Union’s efforts at transforming the conflict. At the point of writing, however, since a consociational model has not been put into work in Cyprus, it is difficult to test whether
the EU would still be interested in promoting ‘sustainable peace’ after the successful promotion of ‘stable peace’.

4.3.2 Normative EU interests in the Cyprus conflict?

From a constructivist point of view, norms are vital in the formation of an actor’s identity and, hence, in the formation of an actor’s interests. As Risse and Sikkink (1999: 9) stated, “what I want depends to a large degree on who I am”. Identities, therefore, determine what kind of interests are possible and appropriate for an actor. In this respect, if ‘sustainable peace’ constitutes an inherent part of the EU’s identity, then the Union’s interests should be in line with the premises of the norm. In the opposite scenario, materialistic considerations will be ranked higher than the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. However, in-between these two extremes, lie possible combinations of normative and materialistic interests. This section argues that the case of Cyprus is particularly pertinent to promoting an understanding of the uneasy co-existence of norms and materialistic interests and of the ways the one can interact with the other.

From 1990-2004, the first period of EU involvement in Cyprus, the EU emphasised the role the accession process could play in transforming the conflict. During this period, however, Member States had their own aims and preferences in relation to Cyprus. As one EU official stated (Appendix B: 13), the EU is not a unitary actor and its members have their own agendas. For example, the Cyprus conflict did not have the same priority for each EU member state. To begin with, Greece has a special interest in Cyprus because of historical ties and because it is a guarantor power for the constitutional and territorial integrity of the island. In the 1990s, Greece played a decisive role in the EU’s decision to de-link the RoC’s accession from the political solution to the Cyprus conflict. More specifically, Greece agreed to lift its veto on the Turkey-EU Customs Union only if
Cyprus was included in the following accession negotiations round (Tocci 2004: 68-71). Greece, therefore, by using its veto power in the Council of Ministers, gradually managed to change the prerequisites for Cyprus’ accession. Towards the end of the decade, Greece achieved another diplomatic success by threatening to veto Turkey’s candidacy status in case the RoC was not granted membership (Tocci 2004: 68-71).

Following Greece’s diplomatic successes, the EU’s main interest was for the conflict to be solved prior to the RoC’s accession because the EU did not want to import the conflict into its structures. For an EC official working in DG Enlargement, “in fact, a lot of our efforts were directed towards realising this goal of resolving the conflict before 2004” (Appendix B: 12). During this period, however, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the EU did not invest in bottom-up conflict transformation initiatives. Its role was limited to supporting the UN-initiated dialogue on a final settlement. It, therefore, did not invest in changing the relationship of the two communities for the better and in altering their identities. In this respect, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, at least prior to RoC’s accession to the EU, was not prioritised. Rather, the EU’s interest of not importing a frozen conflict into the Union as well as some Member States’ preferences determined the EU’s approach towards Cyprus during this period.

Moreover, another factor to be considered is the importance Turkey has for the EU and the related EU’s reluctance to compromise its relations with Turkey (Appendix A: 17, Appendix B: 2). This strategic importance was identified in the Commission reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession (notably European Commission 2014c: 1, 2013: 1, 2012: 4-6). These reports highlighted the importance of Turkey’s economic contribution to the prosperity of the EU as well as the need for enhanced cooperation with Turkey on the issues of migration policy and energy security (European Commission 2014c, see also Verheugen 2013). In addition, the High Representative, in a report on the implementation
of the European Security Strategy, identified Turkey as a possible “transit route providing energy security to the Union” (European Council 2008c). In section C of the same report, Turkey was described as an “important player that will play an increasingly significant role in the region” (European Council 2008c).

Moreover, for the Director of the Cyprus Centre of Studies (Appendix A: 4), an autonomous organisation that promotes multidisciplinary research, Turkey is a major force in the Middle East and a significant market for the EU which cannot afford to challenge Turkey for the sake of Cyprus. Similarly, Nugent (2000: 138) argued that the EU was anxious to improve its relations with Turkey for both economic and political reasons,

The main economic reason is that Turkey is a very important EU trading partner – the sixth largest. The political reasons arise largely from a belief that Turkey is, and can continue to be, an important bridge between west and east – not least because it is an Islamic country with considerable influence in the Balkans, the Middle East, and several states of the former Soviet Union.

What can be concluded is that Turkey is an essential partner for European security and economic prosperity. As a result, the need to ensure Turkey’s cooperation in several fields that are important to the EU has been a factor determining EU’s interest to solve the Cyprus conflict52 53.

Lastly, the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict on EU-NATO relations could be considered as another reason54 why the EU has a major interest in finding a final settlement. In a resolution adopted on 19 February 2009, the EP characterised the Cyprus conflict as another reason why the EU is interested in solving the Cyprus problem.

52 As Ker-Lindsay (2014: 117) also argued, “Even if Turkey is denied membership of the European Union, there are still very good reasons why the European Union would want to maintain cordial and constructive ties with Ankara. Apart from important questions relating to European security, such as the flow of migrants through Turkey to the EU, Turkey’s developing international role means that it will be an important partner on a range of issues. Solving Cyprus would go a long way towards ensuring that the EU and Turkey can have a strong working relationship”.

53 A similar argument has also been made by several interviewees (see, for example, Appendix A: 13, 14).

54 For some interviewees (Appendix A: 4, 17) this is the main reason why the EU is interested in solving the Cyprus problem.
problem as a major complication in EU-NATO relations, “deploring the fact that it continued to badly impair the development of EU-NATO co-operation” (European Parliament 2009). Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated following the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Turkey began to regularly bar Cypriot participation in formal EU-NATO meetings. The European Union, however, refused to take part in formal collaboration with NATO at ministerial level if all its members could not be present (Appendix A: 17). Cyprus, for its part, blocked administrative arrangements between the EDA (European Defence Agency), a CFSP body, and Turkey as well as a security agreement with Turkey. Several interviewees (Appendix A: 8, 12, 17) also stated that the EU’s involvement in Cyprus was guided by the desire to normalise relations with NATO and achieve a deeper and better cooperation between the EU and NATO. Therefore, the Cyprus conflict appeared to impose severe constraints on the normalisation of relations between the EU and NATO (see also Cebeci 2011: 99-100).

Overall, in the case of Cyprus, the Union’s interests were not always aligned with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Rather, normative interests were closely intertwined with materialistic considerations and economic gains.

4.3.3 Behaving according to norms

Eriksen (2006: 252-253) argued that “it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law that an actor can assert its civilianness/normativity”. However, as will be discussed, the fluidity of international law principles made possible the development of well-grounded criticisms of the EU’s approach. Specifically, this section will argue that the complex nature of ethnic conflicts in view of international and fundamental rights law does not allow for the development of a clear-cut assessment of the EU’s self-binding
behaviour as the EU’s commitment to one principle could be criticised by reference to another.

With particular reference to Cyprus, as has already been discussed in a previous section, the EU has always been supporting its territorial integrity as well as the legitimacy of the RoC government while rejecting the statehood of the Turkish-Cypriot administered area. The Accession Treaty of the RoC to the EU is evidence for this. In the course of negotiating the treaty, the RoC Government represented the entire island (although it was de facto controlling only part of it) (see European Union 2003). In addition, Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty provided for the suspension of the acquis “in those areas of the RoC in which the Government of the RoC does not exercise effective control” (European Union 2003). As explained to the author by a RoC official, “Protocol 10 is extremely significant because it mainly states that the whole soil of the island belongs to the RoC. Otherwise, there would be no reason to discuss about the suspension. The EU is, in this way, safeguarding the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus” (Appendix B: 3).

However, the development of closer relations between the EU and Turkish-Cypriots after 2004 was criticised on the grounds that it implied an indirect recognition of the “TRNC”.

For example, the European Commission, based on its Common Commercial Policy with non EU-members, proposed the Direct Trade Regulation (DTR) which, if successfully implemented, would have permitted “the duty-free import of EU goods and the duty-free export of goods wholly obtained or substantially produced in the North of the island” (Tocci et al. 2008: 62). However, for Greek-Cypriots, this regulation would amount to the recognition of the legitimacy of the government of a non-recognised state (Appendix A: 4, 8, 9, 14, Appendix B: 3). Similarly, for a former high-ranked RoC official, “the EU asserts that it only recognises the government of the RoC as the only legitimate government. However, they have an office in Northern Cyprus, they hold meetings with
the ministers there, they make deals. Implicitly, they do recognise them” (Appendix A: 9). For Greek-Cypriots, therefore, the EU shows disrespect to a fundamental principle of international law.

In addition, some Greek-Cypriot elites have also criticised the EU for accepting the Annan Plan that was seen as incompatible with EU principles and fundamental rights law. An analysis of the Annan Plan in light of the provisions of Community law falls beyond the scope of this research. It should be mentioned, however, that the Annan Plan contained a “request for substantial derogations from the acquis relating, inter alia, to property and residency rights” (quoted in Shaelou 2010: 246. For a more detailed discussion on the incompatibility of the Annan Plan with EU law and principles, see Tocci 2006: 337 and Papadopoulos 2004)55. The EU’s support for the Annan Plan, therefore, was conceived as a move away from the principles upon which the EU is founded. For some interviewees, the Act of Adaptation was an attempt to present the EU’s realpolitik as legitimate (Appendix A: 8, 9, 14). In addition, as a Brussels-based European Commission official explained, “in certain circumstances, special arrangements need to be made. The EU law does not contain values that are systematic and consistent everywhere and at every time. The uniform application of EU law and EU principles is not the case on the ground. Special arrangements are in place on many instances on the ground” (Appendix B: 12).

Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, one criticism of the EU’s approach related to its decision to accept the RoC’s membership application. For example, in 1997, Denktaş, in a joint statement with Süleyman Demirel, then President of Turkey, referred to the 1960 London-

55 As Skoutaris (2011: 183) also noted, “the Draft Act of Adaptation that was included in the Annan Plan provides for a good example of the potential incompatibilities of a solution, based on the aforementioned principles, with the acquis”.

Zurich Agreements which explicitly provided that Cyprus cannot join any international organisation unless both Turkey and Greece are members (see Chapter Three). The joint statement went on to argue that “according to the dictates of international law and regional peace and stability, Cyprus can only become a full member of the EU after a settlement which will comprise these principles and once Turkey has become a member as well” (“TRNC” and Turkey 1997).

After the RoC’s accession and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriot arguments against the EU focused on the Union’s non-adherence to basic human rights. For Turkish-Cypriots, there should be a differentiation between collective and individual rights. For them, even if the legitimacy of their state is not recognised by the EU, they should still be able to enjoy the fundamental, basic rights that all EU citizens enjoy. This is reflected in a statement by Akinci (2015), as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, who noted that “the Turkish Cypriots remained outside the international law for many years. We want our community to be a part and a partner of the EU. We want to be a part of the international law and order”. For example, Turkish-Cypriots could not directly engage in trade activities because of the non-implementation of the DTR mentioned above. However, as a senior official of the Turkish-Cypriot MFA noted (Appendix A: 3), free trade and free business conduct for sustainable development are principles that the EU is supporting. Secondly, another set of arguments is related to the right to education. For example, Turkish-Cypriot students cannot participate in the EU’s Erasmus and Socrates exchange programmes because their universities are not recognised. In the words of Çerkez, the President of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO), “as Turkish-Cypriot citizens of the EU, we cannot even benefit from the basic rights of Union citizenship. Our business people cannot trade freely with other

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56 As a substitute, the European Commission has launched a Turkish-Cypriot scholarship programme.
European markets. Our university students cannot participate in the Erasmus project. What does it mean to be an EU citizen without rights?” (Çerkez quoted in KTTO 2013).

Overall, the EU’s self-binding behaviour has been subject to criticism on numerous normative grounds. The complex nature of international and fundamental human rights law has made possible a series of well-developed arguments on the part of Cypriots to counter the EU’s approach.

4.4 THE CASE OF KOSOVO: NORMATIVE EU GOALS?

This section will discuss the EU’s approach towards Kosovo. More specifically, it will address the question of whether the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Kosovan actors was among the main EU aims.

4.4.1 Centrality of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm?

A thorough examination of EU documents and speeches of EU officials revealed that the EU’s communications on Kosovo focused on four main themes. Firstly, during the 1990s, the EU’s official statements concentrated on the extensive use of violence and on human rights violations in Kosovo. After the 1998-99 war and the EU’s involvement in the UNMIK mission, the Union highlighted the importance of addressing the roots of the conflict through the creation of a multi-ethnic society and the establishment of democratic institutions. The term ‘multi-ethnic society’ here refers to the eradication of divisions between ethnic groups as opposed to the acceptance and institutionalisation of those divisions (Hughes 2009: 300). Thirdly, following the opening of the accession prospect for Kosovo, the EU has also been referring to the European destiny of Kosovans. Fourthly, the EU has been discussing decentralisation as the preferred type of political solution to the conflict.

Concerns on the extensive use of violence in Kosovo
During the 1990s, violence and human rights violations in Kosovo were not ignored by the EU. On 11 October 1990, the European Parliament adopted its first resolution on Kosovo expressing its concerns “over the situation of human rights in Kosovo” (quoted in Wolff 2003: 77). Since then, Kosovo was regularly on the EP’s agenda. The European Council, for its part, adopted a similar approach focusing on violations of human rights. The 1992 Lisbon European Council, for example, declared that “with regards to Kosovo, the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from further repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory” (European Council 1992a).

Given the increase of violence in 1996, the EP called on the Council “to bring immediate, strong pressure on the Serbian authorities to make the opening of a previously proposed EU information office in Kosovo possible”. It also reiterated that “the EU should involve itself at the organizational and financial levels in cultural events, which can break down walls and barriers in hearts and heads […]. If that were to happen, civil society would be able to make a great stride towards regional coexistence” (European Parliament 1997).

The General Affairs Council (GAC 1999), for its part, expressed “its strong and continuing support for maximum pressure from the international community on President Milošević and his regime to stop their brutal campaign of forced deportation, torture and murder in Kosovo”. In addition, the 1998 Cardiff European Council “reiterated its deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, and called on all parties concerned to exercise restraint and refrain from all acts of violence to achieve political goals or to suppress the legitimate democratic expression of views” (European Council 1998). It called on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar community to urgently begin a full and constructive dialogue. Moreover, in its 27 October 1998 declaration on a comprehensive approach to Kosovo, the European Council
confirmed that “the EU will consider ways in which it can contribute, under the right conditions, to implementing confidence-building measures among the various communities in Kosovo and to further civil society building” (European Council 1998 cited in Hill and Smith 2000: 391). This idea of building confidence, which was also emphasised in the case of Cyprus, points towards intentions to transform the conflict through the creation of trusting relations between the two communities.

Due to the further increase of violence, NATO commenced its aerial bombing campaign on the FRY (see Chapter Three). Although the EU itself did not get involved in NATO’s operation, several member states participated in the campaign. France and Britain, as members of the Contact Group and of NATO, played a crucial role in the negotiations that preceded NATO’s aerial bombing. Italy was more constrained due to domestic opposition, while Germany encountered a heated internal debate about its first participation in such a coercive military mission since 1945. Despite such worries, the governments of Germany, Italy, France and Britain approved the intervention (see Meyer 2006: 91).

The 1999 Berlin European Council took the view that

On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999, are not repeated. We have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Aggression must not be rewarded. An aggressor must know that he will have to pay a high price. That is the lesson to be learnt from the 20th century (European Council 1999).

The involvement of some EU member states in NATO’s operation, therefore, was justified by the Council on moral and ethical grounds. The military action was described as necessary in order to guarantee fundamental European values.
The end of the 1999 NATO campaign can be seen as a turning point regarding the EU’s role in Kosovo. As discussed in Chapter Three, the EU became responsible for the reconstruction and economic development of Kosovo. A more detailed discussion on the EU’s role after the war will follow in the subsequent sub-sections.

Promoting the creation of a democratic, multi-ethnic society

Another theme that emerged from the examination of EU documents and speeches of EU officials was the EU’s concern over the status of Kosovo and a preference for a multi-ethnic society. As early as 1992, with war having already broken out over much of the wider Yugoslavia, the European Council dealt with Kosovo’s status and reminded the Kosovars “that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia” (European Council 1992a). The December 1992 European Council more explicitly requested that “[t]he autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia must be restored” (European Council 1992b). In addition, shortly before the post-Dayton weakening of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo57, the Council called “with regard to the FRY [for] the granting of a large degree of autonomy within it to Kosovo” (European Council 1996). The need to settle “the status of Kosovo within the borders of the FRY” was also highlighted by the GAC (1997). In addition, during the early 1990s, senior EU officials had already expressed their preference for the establishment of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. Jacques Delors, for example, then President of the European Commission, stated that peace must be restored in former Yugoslavia while also praising the idea of multi-ethnicity (European Commission 1992).

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57 The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton peace talks in 1995 (Philips 1996: 824-25) led to the widespread belief among Kosovars that, as long as there was peace on the ground, the international community would not proceed to any substantive changes. As a result, the use of violence seemed to be the most effective option in order for Kosovars to gain the attention of the West (see Chapter Three).
After the 1998-99 war, the EU became more involved in Kosovo. As noted on the website of the European Union Office in Kosovo, “the European Union has been an integral part of the international effort to build a new future for Kosovo since 1999” (European Union Office in Kosovo). More specifically, the EU took the responsibility of leading Pillar IV of UNMIK which was concerned with Reconstruction and Economic Development (see Chapter Three). The EU saw its involvement in UNMIK as a way to promote reconciliation through democratisation. In May 2001, for example, a declaration of the Swedish EU presidency stated that the Union was willing “to assist in the effort to build a democratic and prosperous society where violence is shunned and genuine reconciliation can be achieved” (European Union Presidency 2001).

Gradually, the EU’s involvement in Kosovo deepened, especially after its involvement in the Vienna negotiations over the final status of a multi-ethnic Kosovo that resulted in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’. Article 1.1 of the Plan, for example, noted that “Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law” (UNSC 2007). The EP, in a resolution adopted on 19 March 2007, expressed its support for “the efforts to establish a viable framework that guarantees stability and protection for all the communities in Kosovo and long-term, self-sustaining economic and social development” (European Parliament 2007). The resolution further stated that the European Parliament “endorses Mr Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement and takes the view that sovereignty supervised by the international community is the best option for securing those objectives” (European Parliament 2007). The European Council also approved the Ahtisaari Plan (European Council 2007). The EU Presidency statement of 26 March 2007 stated that Ahtisaari’s proposal is designed to foster the building of a multi-ethnic, democratic society in Kosovo based on the rule of law. It contains wide-ranging provisions intended to secure the future of all communities in Kosovo, including notably the Kosovo-Serbs. It
lays the foundation for sustainable economic and political development in Kosovo and will enhance stability throughout the region (European Union Presidency 2007).

However, the Kosovar leadership was not ready to accept the Plan. Moreover, regardless of the initial EU statements against a unilateral declaration of independence, US and EU officials started expressing their willingness to recognise Kosovo as an independent state (Bilefsky and Wood 2007). Hence, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 was not a surprise. However, the General Affairs and External Relations Council was not able to agree a common approach to this issue. EU Foreign Ministers, therefore, concluded that “Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo” (GAERC 2008). The EP, however, took a different position and firmly expressed its support for Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Subsequently, the EP issued numerous resolutions asking EU member states to recognise Kosovo (see, notably, European Parliament 2009a, 2010, 2012, 2013).

After the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, EULEX was established. The EU objective of transforming the conflict through the creation of a multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo became more obvious as EULEX had as one of its main aims “to improve and strengthen Kosovo’s judiciary to make it fully multi-ethnic” (EULEX Kosovo). This is also evident in European Council documents. One example is the following: “In Kosovo the best way to move towards European integration is by creating a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo with full respect for the rule of law, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and contributing to regional and European stability” (European Council 2008a: 1). Similarly, a key priority of the European Partnership58 was to promote reconciliation and to create a multi-ethnic society (European Council 2008b).

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58 The European Partnership is an instrument of the Stabilisation and Association Process. It aims to provide help and support to local authorities to realise their country’s European aspirations.
In addition, the European Commission, through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), prioritised the advancement of inter-ethnic tolerance (European Commission 2007a: 14). Moreover, with regards to the FICHE Programme, one of the IPA centralised programmes, the European Commission stated that one of its objectives was “to strengthen inter-ethnic confidence” and “to promote interethnic reconciliation” (ECLO 2009).

Moreover, just like with Cyprus, the importance of civil society actors in the promotion of reconciliation between ethnic communities in Kosovo was recognised by the Union (see ECLO 2010). As a result, part of the EU funding in Kosovo was directed towards supporting CSOs. This was achieved through the IPA, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and through the European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO).

Peter Feith, former European Union Special Representative and International Civilian Representative in Kosovo (for a discussion on the functions of both posts, see pp. 184-186), also acknowledged civil society as a “significant partner in the promotion of peace and reconciliation” (Appendix A: 34). Such statements indicate that the EU acknowledged the significance of civil society actors as a very important element for conflict transformation. However, interviews for this thesis identified a certain degree of pessimism on the part of EU officials as to the role that civil society actors can actually play. An EULEX official, for example, stated that “civil society in Kosovo goes along the ethnic lines. You don’t have any mixed NGOs” (Appendix B: 8). The same problem of the “lack of inter-group civil society actors” (Appendix B: 7) was also identified by an EU official working in the European Commission office in Pristina. Both were sceptical regarding the role civil society can actually play in transforming the conflict.
From 2011, the EU engaged in renewed efforts to facilitate a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina (International Crisis Group 2013: 12). The EU’s intention to transform the Kosovo conflict through the dialogue is evident in statements of important EU officials. Samuel Žbogar, the EU’s Special Representative in Kosovo, noted

Dialogue was and is about relations normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia. It is about relations normalisation between Albanians and Serbs, to set the ground for reconciliation, but it is also about normalization of Kosovo and Serbia itself, to bring normality, which is the way to remove the stumbling blocks and normalize their roads to the EU (EU Office in Kosovo/EUSR in Kosovo 2013).

Overall, therefore, after 1999, the EU emphasised the importance of addressing the roots of the conflict. To this end, the EU’s official communications focused on democratisation and the establishment of multi-ethnicity in Kosovo. Progressively, the Union’s involvement in Kosovo grew deeper. In this respect, the EU was involved in the Vienna negotiations that resulted in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’. In addition, from 2011, the EU assumed the responsibility of facilitating a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Lastly, just like in the case of Cyprus, the EU recognised the importance of involving local NGOs in reconciliation processes.

Kosovo’s European Future

The third discursive trend that can be detected in the Union’s official statements is the tendency to portray Kosovo as a part of Europe. The EU is presented as an area of peace and reconciliation. Hence, since Kosovo is seen as belonging to Europe, the same principles must be extended there as well.

The European perspective for Kosovo became a possibility since the launch of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in 1999. Although the Stability Pact was not an EU instrument, the EU played a leading role (Hill and Smith 2002: 397). More than forty countries and organisations decided to adopt a “comprehensive and coherent approach”
to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe “in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region” (Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe 1999). This pact constituted an important shift in EU thinking about the region because it converted the Western Balkans from a proximate region into a constitutive part of Europe. This shift was evident in the European Council’s statement: “The European Union will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each country, with a perspective of European Union membership” (European Council 1999a). As a Pristina-based European Commission official explained, the prospect of EU accession is “the best recipe for removing the causes of conflicts” (Appendix B: 7). The opening of an accession perspective for the Western Balkans, therefore, can be seen as pointing towards intentions to transform conflicts in that region by addressing their root causes.

The catalytic role the EU could play in promoting peace and reconciliation was reiterated in the 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans where it was noted that “fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are incompatible with the European perspective, which should act as a catalyst for addressing problems in the region” (European Council 2003a). In the same vein, the Commission, in April 2005, stated “the creation of a stable, secure and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo is at the heart of the EU’s political conditionality” (European Commission 2005b). In its 2007 Communication to the Parliament and the Council regarding the enlargement strategy, the European Commission highlighted the need for “more dialogue and a greater spirit of tolerance […] throughout the Western Balkans not least on ethnic-related issues” while, with regards to
Kosovo, it stated that “relations between Albanians and Serbs remain strained” (European Commission 2007).

The same trend of presenting European integration as a catalyst towards the establishment of peace was also evident in speeches of EU officials. Füle, for example, stated: “You have set Kosovo’s course to join the European Union. It is this framework, a framework of European integration, which allows you to address your disagreements in a constructive, and indeed forward-looking manner. To achieve success, it is key that the leaders of all Kosovo’s communities work together to build a shared vision and a common future” (Füle 2012).

It, therefore, seems that the Union described Kosovo as a state that belongs to the EU. As a result, European principles and values must be extended there as well. Just like with Cyprus, the EU hoped that, in the case of Kosovo, the prospect of accession would help eliminate the conflict and foster peace.

Decentralisation and Conflict Transformation

As has become evident, the EU’s discourse is indicative of conflict transformation intentions. As the three previous sections discussed, the EU has been emphasising its concerns over human and minority rights in Kosovo, expressing its commitment to a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo through reconciliation and to the promotion of peace through the process of European integration.

In addition to the aforementioned themes, the EU has also been discussing its preference with regards to the political solution of the conflict. More specifically, the EU favoured ethnic decentralisation in Kosovo which has, in fact, become “the principal strategy of the Kosovo government and the international community for promoting Serb integration” (International Crisis Group 2009: 1). Ethnic decentralisation refers to offering autonomy
to geographically concentrated minorities while maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. In other words, each ethnic community runs its own affairs while accepting the authority of the central state. In Kosovo, decentralisation was promoted as a way to halt the Serb minority’s dependence on the ‘parallel structures’ supported by Serbia (International Crisis Group 2009:10).

Unsurprisingly, academic criticism on decentralisation focused on the fact that it reifies ethnic divisions by strengthening ethnic identities (Kymlicka 2008, Simonsen 2005). Just like the promotion of consociationalism in the case of Cyprus, decentralisation in Kosovo is based on a certain degree of communal separation. This was also acknowledged in several interviews. EU officials interviewed by the author seemed to be pessimistic as to the extent to which the conflict can be transformed through decentralisation. For example, a Commission official working in DG Enlargement stated that “although Serbs in the south are quite willing to cooperate with Albanians, Serbs in the north do not show similar intentions” (Appendix B: 11). The same official went on to refer to European Commission reports that had reached similar conclusions (see European Commission 2011: 4).

Overall, therefore, as EU officials also acknowledged, decentralisation is not the perfect solution. However, as Manners (Appendix A: 36) suggested, this should not be seen as the end solution but, rather, as a step towards more long-term and sustainable solutions. In private, though, EU officials expressed doubts as to the extent to which decentralisation can help transform the conflict. The case of Kosovo, just like the case of Cyprus, therefore, suggests that, although the ‘sustainable peace’ norm has been central in the EU’s statements and engagement, the concurrent promotion of decentralisation weakens the argument that the EU’s main aim was to promote ‘sustainable peace’.

59 Feith (Appendix A: 34), for example, stated that “although decentralisation is not perfect, it is the solution that is more possible to happen”.

4.4.2 Normative EU Interests in the Kosovo conflict?

As discussed in Chapter Two, if sustainable peace is indeed a part of the Union’s identity, then the EU’s interests should be closely linked to the norm. In the opposite scenario, materialistic interests will be prioritised. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, apart from these two extreme scenarios, potential combinations of normative and materialistic interests also exist.

According to an EU official working in Pristina “removing the causes of the conflict is the main EU aim” (Appendix B: 7). However, the same EU official and other interviewees identified a number of attached strings and sub-aims of the EU’s policies in Kosovo.

To begin with, conflicts in the Western Balkans, including Kosovo, cannot be treated in isolation because they are a source of problems for EU member states including instability, immigration and organised crime (Appendix B: 7, 14, 15). “There is an interdependence between dynamics in the Balkans and dynamics in core Europe. The EU, therefore, needs to solve those problems there if it does not want them to knock at its door” (Appendix B: 7).

Secondly, the Kosovo conflict was seen as having the potential to spill over into Albania or Serbia and thereby endangering the stability of the region. As James Ker-Lindsay (Appendix A: 35), a senior researcher at the LSE European Institute specialising on the politics and international relations of South-East Europe, interviewed by the author, stated “the key EU objective in the case of Kosovo was, and continues to be, stability at all costs”. As Javier Solana (2001), when EU High Representative for the CFSP, stated “I make no apology for concentrating on the Balkans. They are on our doorstep. The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans”. Catherine Ashton, his successor, made a similar point when stating “we should step up our engagement in our neighbourhood to
ensure that security and prosperity for our neighbours would also benefit our own citizens by giving them greater security and prosperity” (Ashton 2013).

Thirdly, the Western Balkans were seen as “a test-case for Europe's enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver” (Solana 2001). In the words of the then High Representative, “the experience of the Balkans has been a sobering one for the European Union. But it has I believe also provided us with an opportunity. It is a test of our commitment to the region, to a wider Europe, and to a mature common foreign and security policy” (Solana 2000). Kosovo, therefore, was an opportunity for the EU to test the potentials of its CFSP. Kosovo was a challenge for the EU to demonstrate its ability to get involved in such situations. “The handling of our periphery is essential for our credibility in international politics. The key question is: can we stabilise our own neighbourhood? My answer is: we cannot afford not to. It is where EU foreign policy was born. And while we have been drawn into other regions and issues, our job in the Balkans is not yet over” (Solana 2009).

Lastly, according to a Pristina-based Commission official, “the Dialogue in Kosovo represents the so-called low hanging fruits” (Appendix B: 7). For another Commission official working in DG Enlargement, “it is much easier for the EU to do something positive in Kosovo and improve the image and the standing of the High Representative than for example, Syria” (Appendix B: 14). Creating a positive image of the EU in general and of the High Representative in particular, therefore, was part of the story. The EU used the opportunity to show that it can be an international actor and to build its reputation.

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60 As Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. (2016: 4) stated, “while the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans has evolved over the years, its primary focus has been to maintain security and prevent reactivation of armed violence both within and between states”.
Overall, therefore, apart from addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, the EU also had some instrumental interests to serve in Kosovo. The promotion of these interests, however, does not necessarily compromise the promotion of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Unlike the case of Cyprus, where instrumental interests and Member States’ preferences were prioritised and compromised adherence to sustainable peace, in the case of Kosovo, the promotion of the norm went hand in hand with the promotion of the Union’s instrumental interests. In the case of Kosovo, the EU’s support for multi-ethnicity and for the betterment of inter-ethnic relations was in line with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and, at the same time, fell within the Union’s strategic interests which include, inter alia, stability and security in the region.

4.4.3 Behaving according to norms

As discussed in Chapter Two, an EU foreign policy which is systematically based on respect for international and fundamental rights law would indicate a sincere normative commitment. The discussion on Cyprus earlier in this chapter revealed that the complicated nature of international law enables the formulation of counter-arguments to the EU’s approach. This section will argue that several criticisms can also be put forward with regards to the EU’s approach in Kosovo.

One of the main international law norms that the Kosovo case put into question is the principle of non-intervention. Strictly speaking, the 1999 NATO aerial bombing over Kosovo and Serbia was incompatible with international law since it was unauthorised by the UNSC. Several EU member states, however, took part in this war, sometimes in the face of very strong domestic opposition.

In the aftermath of the war, the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) doctrine gained ground, challenging previous understandings of humanitarian intervention by transferring the
focus from the intervener to the subjects of the intervention. According to the R2P doctrine, when a government proves unable or unwilling to protect its own people, then this responsibility goes to the international community. The EU espoused the R2P doctrine and the ethical and moral reasoning behind it:

The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organizations in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate donor support in the area of conflict prevention (European Parliament, Commission and Council 2006).

It therefore seems that, although the NATO operation was illegal since it was unauthorised by the UNSC, it was nonetheless conceived as legitimate because of ethical and moral considerations. The EU legitimised the stances of some of its member states by referring to moral and humanitarian considerations and to the need to stop the repression of the Kosovar population by the Milošević regime. However, after the end of NATO’s campaign, there was a series of revenge attacks against Kosovo-Serbs in Kosovo (see International Crisis Group 1999: 3-5, Nikolic 2003: 66). As the International Crisis Group (1999: 3) noted

while it is impossible to be certain that the prime motive for attacks by ethnic Albanians upon non-Albanian targets is one of revenge, the level of anger and hatred amongst ethnic Albanians towards the Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups, who allegedly assisted the Yugoslav military and security forces in the recent conflict, cannot be overestimated.

For Kosovo-Serbs, therefore, the international community, although it expressed its support for R2P, failed to protect them from revenge attacks. For them, therefore, the international community was on the side of the Kosovars and ignored their own legitimate concern (Appendix A: 21, 27).

Moreover, as has already been discussed, another issue that sparked big debate was the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Up until the declaration, Kosovo had
the status of a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its succeeding states. Therefore, its independence constituted a breach of the territorial integrity of Serbia. However, the norm of territorial integrity comes into conflict with another norm of international politics, namely the principle of self-determination of peoples (see Ker-Lindsay 2011: 176-179). This principle is also included in many key documents like the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.

The EU’s official position was expressed in the quite vague statement that “member states will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law on their relations with Kosovo” (Council of the EU 2008). The majority of member states favoured Kosovo’s independence over prolonged conflict and over a solution that gave Kosovo the highest possible degree of autonomy while remaining an integral part of Serbia. Only five member states disagreed (see Chapter Three).

However, although for Kosovars independence marked the fulfilment of a national goal (Appendix A: 19, 22. Appendix B: 6), for Kosovo-Serbs, Kosovo is part of Serbia. For them, the declaration of Kosovo’s independence violated Serbia’s territorial integrity. Several prominent Kosovo-Serb figures were reported in local newspapers expressing these ideas. Miodrag Rađivojević, a professor from Zvecan, stated: “they can’t force us to give up Serbia – they can’t” (UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit 2012). Similarly, Krstimir Pantić, the Kosovo-Serb mayor of northern Mitrovica, referring to the Integrated Border Management deal61, stated that the deal is unacceptable because it amounts to official recognition of Kosovo’s statehood (see Balkan Insight 2012). In addition, during the negotiations on the Brussels Agreement, protests were organised in Mitrovica under the slogan ‘North of Kosovo and Metohija Remains Part of Serbia’ (B92 2013).

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61 The agreement was reached in the framework of the EU-facilitated talks and provides for Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate in the management of their border crossings.
Lastly, specific EU policies were seen by Kosovars as moves against Kosovo’s sovereignty. One example was the revision of the legal basis of EULEX in June 2008. The new EULEX mandate was substantially different from the one proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan. The EU, the UN and Serbia agreed that EULEX would now “perform an enhanced operational role in the area of rule of law under the framework of resolution 1244 (1999) and the overall authority of the United Nations” (UNSG 2008). This meant that EULEX was now mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244 which supported the territorial integrity of Serbia. In addition, this new deal gave wide-ranging rights to Serbia to control customs, justice, border and transport in Northern Kosovo. Kosovars, however, up until that point, had conceived EULEX authority as deriving from the terms of the Ahtisaari Plan that provided for the independence of Kosovo and for the termination of international administration. The new EULEX mandate, therefore, was interpreted as disrespecting the sovereignty and statehood of Kosovo. In the words of Thaçi, then Kosovo’s Prime Minister,

\[\text{EULEX will be established in Kosovo as was anticipated in the Kosovar Constitution and in the Ahtisaari Plan. UNMIK will have no executive role, but simply a facilitating role for the establishment of EULEX. Any other suggestion is considered to be a breach of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and a violation of our national sovereignty. United Nations resolution 1244 is entirely irrelevant and meaningless in our sovereign state. As such, Kosovo’s institutions have no legal obligation to give consideration to it (Thaçi 2008).}\]

Overall, therefore, a series of well-grounded arguments were developed against the EU’s approach towards Kosovo. Kosovo-Serb criticisms focused on the selective application of the R2P principle and respect for the principle of the territorial integrity of states. Kosovar criticisms focused on EU policies that were interpreted as attempts to compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty.

\[\text{62 This new deal, entitled 'Six-Point Plan', was proposed by UNSG Ban Ki Moon and provided for UNMIK’s reconfiguration (Stefanova 2011: 155).}\]
4.5 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

This chapter was concerned with the first dimension of the NPE framework, namely the normativity of EU objectives. It aimed to address the questions of whether the ‘sustainable peace’ norm was at the heart of the EU’s official communications and engagement in Cyprus and Kosovo and whether the norm was promoted as a principle to which the EU ascribed special significance. In addition, this chapter addressed the question of whether the EU engaged in self-binding practice, an important indicator of normativity (Sjursen 2006: 245).

To begin with, in both cases, the EU put ‘sustainable peace’ at the centre of its official statements. In the case of Cyprus, the EU emphasised the importance of reconciliation and of building trust and confidence between the conflict parties and highlighted the role civil society can play in any endeavours to bring the communities closer together. In addition, the EU condemned international law violations and repeatedly asked the relevant actors to show commitment to international law principles as a way to create a climate conducive to reconciliation. In addition, as concerns Kosovo, the Union initially focused on human rights and condemned the use of excessive violence. After the 1999 NATO campaign, the EU assumed the responsibility of Pillar IV of UNMIK concerned with economic development and reconstruction. During this period, the EU expressed its support for reconciliation through the establishment of a democratic, multi-ethnic society. Gradually, its involvement grew deeper when the EU got involved in the negotiations over Kosovo’s status. In addition, the EU referred to Kosovo as a country that belongs to Europe and that should, therefore, endorse EU principles.

In addition, with regards to the political solution of the two conflicts, the EU favoured consociationalism in Cyprus and decentralisation in Kosovo. Although both these
approaches have been criticised in the literature because they reify ethnic divisions (see Cooley 2013), according to Manners (Appendix A: 36), they should not be seen as the end solution but, rather as a step towards more sustainable solutions. With regards to Cyprus, it is not possible to make an assessment as to whether the EU would attempt to foster more sustainable solutions following the initial establishment of consociationalism. However, in the case of Kosovo, decentralisation is an ongoing process. As discussed in the previous section, EU officials expressed doubts regarding the potential of the decentralisation process resulting in increased cooperation between the two communities and, hence, in transformed identities.

Moreover, what also challenges the EU’s normative power is the fact that normative interests were, on certain instances, outranked by materialistic considerations. The NPE framework suggests that the EU’s normative identity lays the foundation for its normative interests. The EU’s main interest, therefore, should be the promotion of a principle to which the EU ascribes special significance. The empirical data presented above reveals that, in the case of Cyprus, the EU had certain strategic interests that were also at play. In the case of Kosovo, however, the Union’s strategic interests went hand-in-hand with the premises of the norm. The EU’s strong desire for stability and security in the region did not compromise the promotion of the norm.

Lastly, the EU’s normative power is also challenged on grounds related to the ambiguity of its own commitment to the principles it seeks to promote and to general principles of international law. For Greek-Cypriots, the development of closer relations between the EU and the Turkish-Cypriots amounted to an indirect recognition of a non-legitimate state. In addition, the fact that the EU was willing to accept derogations from some fundamental freedoms like, for example, the freedom of movement, created another line of criticism against the EU. For Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand, the inability of the
EU to implement certain regulations, like the DTR, deprived them of basic rights that they believed they should be able to enjoy. In the case of Kosovo, debates emerged over issues of state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention as well as on the issue of the legitimacy of self-declared states.

Overall, the normativity of EU goals is challenged by both the more- and the less-likely cases. In both cases, the EU’s commitment to ‘sustainable peace’ could be compromised by the concurrent promotion of consociational principles and decentralisation. A difference is, however, observed, regarding EU interests. Whilst in the case of Cyprus the EU’s normative interest was compromised by strategic and economic considerations, in the case of Kosovo, the EU’s strategic interests did not necessarily undermine its normative interest. In other words, the ‘sustainable peace’ norm can, at the same time, serve the Union’s interests and be consistent with its values (Diez 2005: 625). Lastly, in both cases, the EU’s normative power is challenged by its own disrespect of fundamental international law principles. In both cases, the complex nature of international law made possible the development of well-grounded criticisms of the EU’s approach.
CHAPTER FIVE: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU MEANS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with the second part of the three-part NPE analytical framework, namely the EU mechanisms to promote normative goals. In other words, the main question that this chapter aims to answer is whether the EU takes actions that are aimed at changing normality and are in line with NPE expectations.

A central assumption of the NPE literature is that a normative power works through ideas (Aggestam 2009: 31). This requires a unique form of engagement in world politics. Manners (2008: 77) and other scholars such as Forsberg (2011: 1195-1198) and Aggestam (2009: 31) have identified five diffusion mechanisms which are considered to be in line with NPE and which will be subsequently discussed in relation to the two cases. These five mechanisms are persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what is normal, model power and attribution of prestige/shaming.

5.2 THE CASE OF CYPRUS

5.2.1 Persuasion

The main aim of this section is to test whether and how the EU employed the instrument of persuasion in Cyprus. For analytical purposes, Manners’ definition of persuasion as a process that involves “constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations and encouragement of multi-lateral dialogue between participants” (Manners 2009: 12) will be employed.

Constructive Engagement
Research conducted for this thesis revealed that, in the case of Cyprus, the EU’s constructive engagement took the form of confidence building measures and support to CSOs through the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) and attempts to establish contacts between the two communities through the Green Line Regulation (GLR) and the Direct Trade Regulation (DTR). In what follows, these three regulations will be analysed in more detail.

**Promoting contacts between the two communities**

After the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots and the subsequent accession of Cyprus to the EU, although EU policies remained the same on the macro level (namely, supporting UN efforts to resolve the conflict), measures were adopted on the micro level which could be seen as aiming at transforming local structures and, therefore, the conflict. According to Brussels-based European Commission interviewees, the main EU rationale was that improved contacts between the two communities would lead to reconciliation (Appendix B: 12, 13).

Firstly, the EU adopted the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) in 2006. Its overall objective was to “facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the development of the Turkish-Cypriot community, with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island, on improving contacts between the two communities and with the EU, and on preparation of the implementation of EU law in case of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem” (European Council 2006). The Regulation subsequently listed all its specific objectives, notably reconciliation through the promotion of contacts between the two communities (European Council 2006).

There are different ways through which the EU tried to promote reconciliation via the FAR. The first of them was its support of the Committee on Missing Persons that had
been established in 1981 with the mandate to establish the fate of missing persons without attributing any responsibility for the cause of death (European Commission 2012a). Through this process, the Committee attempted to help the development of a better understanding of the mutual concerns and to foster cooperation between the two communities. The European Commission, since 2006, provided financial support to the activities of this Committee, including in March 2015. Secondly, the FAR was also directed towards activities of demining the buffer zone. This second project was successfully completed in 2012. Thirdly, the EU employed a programme for the protection of the cultural heritage in Cyprus as a way to promote reconciliation. According to the European Commission in 2013, “Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot members of the Technical Committee are carrying out together cultural heritage preservation projects that are setting a positive example of successful collaboration between both communities in Cyprus” (European Commission 2013b). Lastly, the FAR aimed at strengthening civil society in Cyprus. The association between a thriving civil society and reconciliation was indicative of the EU’s commitment to use its instruments towards transforming the Cyprus conflict. The EU’s aim was twofold. Firstly, it wanted to support pro-reconciliation civil society groups (Tocci 2010: 159). Secondly, it looked to enhance the dialogue between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot civil society groups as a way of promoting reconciliation (Appendix B: 12). The main EU scheme to pursue these aims was ‘Cyprus Civil Society in Action’. Its overall objective was to strengthen the role of civil society in the Turkish-Cypriot Community and to promote the development of a conducive environment for the further development of trust, dialogue, cooperation and closer relationship between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities as an important step towards a solution to the Cyprus problem (European Commission 2013a). Specifically, the ways through which this scheme helped the process of reconciliation was through supporting NGOs that promote reconciliation and through the provision of
funds for civil society projects aimed at increasing the co-operation between the two communities. In addition, the EU Civil Society Support Team was established in 2008 to help the capacity building of civil society through the organisation of training sessions and campaigns (Civil Society Support Team 2009). The EU, therefore, encouraged the engagement of civil society, thus allowing for more voices to be heard and increasing the venues for constructive exchanges of ideas.

*Policies Aimed at Enhancing the Economic Development of the Turkish-Cypriot Community*

After the two simultaneous referendae of 2004 and the subsequent accession of Cyprus to the Union, the EU put emphasis on the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community. According to Brussels-based European Commission officials (Appendix B: 12, 13), the rationale behind this was that the initiation of trade activities between the two communities would enhance contacts between them and would, hence, encourage reconciliation.

The first policy in this direction was the Green Line Regulation (GLR) which was approved by the Council of EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (2004) and which aimed to control the movement of goods and persons and facilitate trade activities between the two communities. Regarding movement of persons, there were a considerable number of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots crossing the Green Line every day. However, the idea of promoting contacts between the two communities did not widely resonate with the target audience. Trade between the two sides remained insignificant (European Commission 2014:6, 2015b: 6). One probable explanation for this was that Greek-Cypriots had not wanted to widely engage in such activities with Turkish-Cypriots as this would suggest an indirect recognition of the “TRNC”. Research for this thesis
revealed that the main argument employed by Greek-Cypriots was that international law principles did not justify any moves that could imply recognition of the “TRNC” (Appendix A: 4, 14, 15). From their perspective, this was the main norm to be respected and advanced. It might, therefore, be the case that the GLR actually reinforced the conflicting interests and hence the division between the two communities instead of contributing to its elimination.

Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, certain problems were identified as concerns the GLR. According to a senior official of the Turkish-Cypriot MFA, “the EU has engaged the wrong interlocutors from the Turkish-Cypriot community in activities emerging from the GLR” (Appendix A: 3). The Turkish-Cypriot community had to embark on a series of duties, such as monitoring trade and issuing accompanying documents for the goods traded. Normally, such duties would have been undertaken by ministerial authorities. However, given the fact that the Turkish-Cypriot administration is not recognised, the EU chose not to engage governmental institutions in these activities (Appendix A: 2, 15, 16). Instead, the European Commission delegated these tasks to the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (European Commission 2004a). For, Sözen, Northern Cyprus, since the acquis is suspended here, is treated as something outside the EU. That’s why they have custom officers right after the check points who do not want to call themselves custom officers. These people are the guardians of the GLR and are checking whether whatever passes from an EU border is good enough to enter the EU (Appendix A: 15).

Secondly, the European Commission proposed the establishment of direct trade between the EU and Northern Cyprus. Based on its Common Commercial Policy with non EU-members, it proposed the DTR which, if successfully implemented, would permit “the duty-free import of EU goods and the duty-free export of goods wholly obtained or substantially produced in Northern Cyprus” (Tocci et al. 2008: 62). The Commission recommended that certificates of origin issued by the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of
Commerce would be accepted on the grounds that the Chamber had been legitimately established under the 1960 arrangements.

According to Commission interviewees working in DG Enlargement (Appendix B: 12, 13), the establishment of direct trade would help the Turkish-Cypriots to develop their economy more easily. As explained earlier in this chapter, this would make it easier to solve the Cyprus conflict. However, the European Council Legal Service adopted a different approach and issued an opinion on this regulation which supported the Greek-Cypriot position (see Skoutaris 2011: 147) and, as a result, the DTR was not adopted. The European Commission, based on the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty requiring the European Parliament to act on international trade provisions, then resurrected the proposal on direct trade between the EU and Northern Cyprus and asked the EP to reconsider it. In October 2010, however, the Legal Service of the European Parliament agreed with the Legal Service of the Council (European Parliament Legal Service 2010).

Although the Commission’s underlying rationale for establishing the DTR was the integration of the island, the main and immediate consequence would likely be the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This fact created conflictual interpretations of the DTR. Greek-Cypriots strongly opposed its implementation. The reasoning was explained in detail by a RoC official:

The DTR will only help the Turkish-Cypriots to operate normally and have all the advantages of being in the EU without having to solve the Cyprus issue. Their ports and airports will operate normally. This will turn the north into a kind of Taiwan which exists for decades without recognition by many states but is, nonetheless, functioning with no problem and experiencing great economic development. Taiwan will never decide to reunify with China. Our goal, however, is a unified Cyprus and such actions, like the DTR are contrary to this goal (Appendix B: 3).

For Turkish-Cypriots, however, the successful implementation of the DTR would help them overcome their international isolation. Interviews for this thesis indicated that the
fact that this Regulation was not implemented created an atmosphere of mistrust towards the EU among Turkish-Cypriots and fostered the view that the EU was not delivering on what it proposed (Appendix A: 3, 5, 13).

Overall, therefore, the EU constructively engaged in the conflict in two main ways. Firstly, it tried to promote further contacts between the two communities through the FAR and through support for CSOs. Secondly, it tried to establish relations between the two communities and to augment the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community through the GLR and the DTR. However, these two regulations led to a series of criticisms against the EU related to the implications of indirectly recognising a self-declared state and to the issue of the international isolation of Turkish-Cypriots. Overall, therefore, it seems that the EU was unable to constructively engage in the conflict in a way acceptable to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots.

Institutionalisation of relations

In the case of Cyprus, institutional links were initially established only between the EU and the RoC. After 2004, however, attempts were made by the EU to establish relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community as well.

Prior to 2004, the EU established closer relations with the RoC through the accession negotiations. At the beginning, Turkish-Cypriots did not participate in the accession process initiated and conducted by the RoC. However, in 1998, Clerides, then Greek-Cypriot president, invited the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Denktaş, to participate in the talks. Denktaş, however, refused because the terms of participation were not specified (see Republic of Turkey MFA 1998).

From 2004 onwards, the EU tried to institutionalise relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community. The first move came from the EP which established the High Level Contact
Group in 2005 with the aim of strengthening ties with the Turkish-Cypriots. Over the ensuing years, the Group met many times with people from Turkish-Cypriot civil society and with Turkish-Cypriot politicians. It supported the Turkish-Cypriots and repeatedly called for an end to their isolation (see, for example, Cyprus PIO 2006). The Group also espoused the view that “Turkish should be adopted as an official EU language and Turkish Cypriots should be invited to send their own representatives to the European Parliament” (Cyprus 44). However, there soon emerged divisions between socialist and right-wing members of the Group (EUobserver 2007) over several issues like, for example, using Turkish as an official language in the EP. As a result, when Françoise Grossetête (European People’s Party) became its Head in 2012, the Group changed its approach and was not very willing to communicate and conduct meetings with Turkish-Cypriots. For example, during its visit to Cyprus in 2012, the Group refused to cross into the Turkish-Cypriot administered area (Cyprus News Agency 2012). The Group dissolved before the end of 2012.

Secondly, relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community were institutionalised through the establishment of the European Union Programme Support Office (EUPSO) in Northern Cyprus that aimed at overseeing the implementation of the FAR. Although this office has no political jurisdiction (Beyatli 2011: 146), EUPSO officials meet regularly with Turkish-Cypriot authorities to discuss the distribution of the FAR financial assistance and the progress made through FAR projects (Appendix A: 3).

Overall, the EU’s attempts to institutionalise relations with the Turkish-Cypriots produced mixed results. The High Level Contact Group, for example, although it initially represented a constructive forum for dialogue, changed its approach in 2012. EUSPO, on the other hand, although its jurisdiction was constrained, established close relations with Turkish-Cypriot authorities.
Encouragement of multilateral dialogue between participants

A key way through which the EU tried to encourage dialogue between the two communities on the reunification of Cyprus was the appointment of observers and representatives, as well as through the Steering Group. In what follows, their role will be examined.

EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict strengthened after the June 1994 European Council in Corfu which concluded that a final solution to the conflict should not be a prerequisite for the island’s accession to the Union (European Council 1994). The EU, however, strongly favoured reaching a solution to the conflict prior to Cyprus’ accession. In February 1994, therefore, the European Council appointed Serge Abou, a senior EU official, as observer in Cyprus. His mandate involved following closely any developments on the Cyprus issue and reporting on any progress. Abou submitted three reports that highlighted the lack of any substantial progress (see, for example, European Observer’s report on Cyprus 1995).

As relations between Cyprus and the EU advanced, EU involvement in attempts to encourage and facilitate dialogue between the two communities became greater. A number of Presidencies of the EU Council appointed representatives for the conflict to follow the progress of the talks and to facilitate dialogue towards a solution. In January 1996, the European Council appointed a representative from its Italian Presidency, Federico di Roberto, to monitor developments regarding the peace process in Cyprus. Following the end of the Italian Presidency six months later, he had nothing new to report. Irish ambassador Kester Heaslip took his place and served as the envoy of the Presidencies of Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The UK and Austrian Presidencies then appointed Sir David Hannay to this position. Although the European
Council Presidencies appointed representatives to closely monitor developments in Cyprus, they did not appoint an EU Special Representative to the island. In the words of Heaslip,

If the EU were to appoint a special representative for Cyprus, this would build up expectations in Cyprus and would suggest to both sides that the EU is taking up a separate initiative. Such expectations at this stage would be inevitably disappointing because such a representative would be expected to be able to tell you about concrete plans he has formed and the ideas he has put to the parties and their reaction and we have not reached that stage (Cyprus News Agency 1996).

The enactment of new efforts to find a solution to the conflict in 2008 (see Chapter Three) prompted Barroso, then President of the European Commission, to employ a personal representative to the Good Offices Mission of the United Nations in Cyprus. Between 2008 and 2015, three people held this position, namely Leopold Maurer, Jorge César das Neves and Pieter van Nuffel. In July 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, reappointed Van Nuffel as his personal representative (European Commission 2015a). Moreover, in 2009, Barroso established the Cyprus Steering Group as a means for the European Commission to support the settlement talks and coordinate positions on EU related aspects of a settlement. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the EU’s role in the peace talks was quite minimal. In practice, the EU acknowledged that the UN is the principal actor that facilitates the negotiations. The Steering Group meets on a regular basis to discuss developments in the negotiation process and, after every meeting, it issues an official statement asking the leaders to support the efforts of the UN Mission (see, for example, European Commission 2014a).

Overall, although the very fact of appointing personal representatives and establishing the Steering Group showed the EU’s support for the UN efforts, it is nonetheless difficult to conclude that these played an important role in encouraging dialogue. Although they did support the dialogue and participated in the process of persuading the two parties of the
conflict to find common ground, their role was nonetheless minimal since they only complemented UN efforts.

Combining all the forms the instrument of persuasion took, two main conclusions can be reached. Firstly, the EU tried to employ the instrument of persuasion in Cyprus but its success was limited due to the RoC reactions who perceived EU policies as indirect recognition of the “TRNC”. Secondly, as a consequence of this, through some of the aforementioned measures, the EU unintentionally cemented existing divisions between the two communities instead of eliminating them and transforming the conflict.

5.2.2 Invocation of norms

In the case of Cyprus, the invocation of norms, the second of the NPE mechanisms, was mostly directed towards Turkey and, more specifically, at convincing Turkey to respect international law and fulfil its obligations towards the Cyprus conflict. When Turkey failed to adhere to its commitments, this mechanism was used by the EU since it raised Turkey’s violations of its international law obligations.

To begin with, the RoC submitted four Interstate Applications against Turkey to the ECHR (Loucaides 2007: 250) which concluded that Turkey was guilty of continuing severe human rights violations and that it had failed to effectively investigate the fate of missing persons following the 1974 war in Cyprus. The EU mechanism of norm invocation took the form of EP resolutions and speeches of important EU officials. For example, in a resolution adopted on 9 March 2011, the EP encouraged Turkey “to intensify its support for the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, in particular by facilitating its access to military zones and archives, and to take all other appropriate

63 According to the ECHR (2014: 6), “most applications before the Court are individual applications lodged by private persons. A State may also lodge an application against another State Party to the Convention; this is called an inter-State application”.
action, in accordance with the findings of the European Court of Human Rights, on the humanitarian issue of missing persons” (European Parliament 2011). Moreover, the EU Commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, called upon Turkey to fulfil its obligations stemming from the ECHR’s Fourth Interstate Application of Cyprus versus Turkey on the humanitarian issue of missing persons. “Turkey is obliged to ensure conditions for the effective investigation into the fate of Greek Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances” (Rehn 2009).

Another example of the EU using this mechanism were its calls on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to show respect for certain provisions of international law. The EP, for example, called on Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots “to address the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the island, in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the principles of the International Law” (European Parliament 2011). As Hoffmeister explained (2006: 57) “the deliberate transfer of own population to an occupied territory violates Article 49 (6) of the fourth Geneva Convention which is still applicable to the international conflict between Cyprus and Turkey”. In addition, the EP asked Turkey to withdraw its military forces from Cyprus and to respect UNSC Resolution 550 (1984) and transfer the area of Famagusta to the UN (European Parliament 2014).

Moreover, the EU, through EP resolutions, European Council conclusions and speeches of important EU officials, repeatedly urged Turkey to ensure the implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Association Agreement. The European Commission, in its 2007 report on Turkey’s progress towards accession stated

Following Turkey’s non-fulfilment of its obligation of full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, in December 2006 the Council decided that accession negotiations will not be opened on eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restrictions regarding the Republic of Cyprus and that no chapter will be provisionally closed until the Commission
confirms that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments (European Commission 2007b: 24). In its 2015 report, the Commission noted that Turkey had not yet fulfilled this commitment (European Commission 2015d: 26). Moreover, Rehn, during the EP debate on Turkey on 26 September 2006, stated “Turkey should remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, including those on means of transport, which are in breach of the Association Agreement. Hence, Turkey should open its ports to vessels under flag of all member states, including the RoC” (Rehn 2006, for another example see Barroso 2008).

Overall, therefore, the way the norm invocation mechanism was implemented in the case of Cyprus points towards attempts to address certain international law violations that had an impact on the conflict. More specifically, Turkey’s non-compliance with international law principles activated this EU mechanism.

5.2.3 Shaping the discourse of what is normal

According to Forsberg (2011: 1197), “in contrast to persuasion, the power to shape discourses is an indirect, but not therefore a lesser, form of power”. The employment of this third NPE mechanism was reflected in EU policies aiming to alter the two parties’ understanding of the conflict. This means that conflict parties should ascribe to EU norms which will then be taken as a given. Since this thesis is focused on the norm of ‘sustainable peace’, it will now discuss three specific EU projects which can be seen as attempts to achieve structural changes and transforming the conflict by changing what is considered to be normal.

The first project in this direction was the ‘New Trends in History Teaching’ project conducted in close collaboration with the Council of Europe. However, although the European Commission signed the contract in July 2007, the CoE postponed the counter-signing because of concerns expressed by the RoC authorities. Consequently, the project
was cancelled (B&S EUROPE and PROMAN 2013: 108). Since the project was not implemented, the NPE expectation of structural changes was not met.

Secondly, the ‘Academy of Political Studies’ project concentrated on the development of “a common understanding among young Cypriot leaders on key issues for the future of the island within an integrated Europe” (European Commission 2010a). Young leaders from both communities were chosen to participate in three seminars. However, although the project was believed to be valuable enough to initiate a project to continue the forum, this was not successful. The forum was a one-off initiative and was not institutionalised. As a result, “the project objectives have not been sustainable” (B&S EUROPE and PROMAN 2013: 117).

Another project that can be considered as an example of EU attempts to shape the discourse of what counts as normal was the ‘Education for a Culture of Peace as a Vehicle for Reconciliation in Cyprus’ initiated in July 2014. This project was funded by the European Commission and the FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), a German political NGO linked to the Social Democratic Party, and intended to use education as a departing point “to bring structural changes in society” (E4cp 2014). However, this project cannot be further analysed as, at the time of writing, there have been no reports outlining its specific activities and/or impact.

The ‘shaping of discourse’ would ideally lead to identity modifications through changing the discourse of what the two sides of the conflict consider as normal. In the case of Cyprus, however, the projects launched towards this direction were short-lived and failed to create any substantial impact. It might be the case, though, that the third project mentioned in this section will create a more substantial impact.

5.2.4 Model Power
As explained in Chapter Two, model power refers to the idea of the EU standing “as a model for others to follow” (Forsberg 2011: 1197). In order to examine whether model power was at work in Cyprus, this chapter will now discuss whether Greek and Turkish-Cypriots considered the EU as an example, or model, to follow and the Union’s ideas as worthy of emulation.

**Turkish-Cypriots**

As explained in the previous chapter, the decision of the EU to accept the RoC’s membership application and the subsequent decision to delink the RoC’s accession from a solution to the Cyprus conflict, was heavily criticised by Turkish-Cypriots. During the 1990s, Rauf Denktaş, then leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, was deeply critical of the EU. He did not conceive the EU as a force for good but, rather, as a one-sided actor that favoured the Greek-Cypriot positions. He stated “they [the EU] seek to give to the Greek Cypriots the rights taken away from us and then call this peace” (BBC 2002). On another occasion, in a letter to the UNSG, he argued that

> the Greek Cypriot party, encouraged particularly by the European Union’s one-sided and misplaced approach to the issue, turned its back on the concept of a bi-zonal settlement. The Greek Cypriot side started talking about a “German-style federation” in which there could be no limits or regulations on the freedom of movement, settlement and the right to property. (Denktaş 2001).

However, Denktaş nationalistic approach was not supported by pro-EU and pro-reconciliation civil society groups who saw his close relations with Turkey as the cause of the Turkish-Cypriot subordination (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012: 16-40). Nevertheless, such CSOs remained quite marginal in the “TRNC” until the EU became more involved in the resolution of the conflict by promising membership through reunification (Appendix A: 6, 15).
The possibility of joining the EU triggered major changes within the Turkish-Cypriot community. Firstly, the prospect of EU membership gave a boost to Turkish-Cypriot pro-EU and pro-reconciliation CSOs who believed that EU accession would make Northern Cyprus politically and economically independent from Turkey. In July 2001, for example, 41 groups (associations, NGOs and trade unions) organised a rally under the slogan “This Country is Ours!” The protestors declared their dissatisfaction with the status quo and with the Turkish-Cypriot community’s dependency on Turkey. They also called for a change in attitudes towards the EU (see, for example, Cyprus PIO 2002).

In addition, apart from civil society, the possibility of joining the EU led to support of more moderate political voices in Northern Cyprus. In the 2003 general election, for example, the pro-EU and pro-reconciliation CTP (Republican Turkish Party) won the majority of the vote while in 2005, the leader of CTP, Mehmet Ali Talat, was elected President of the “TRNC”.

However, the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, the subsequent accession of the RoC to the EU as well as the Union’s inability to deliver on its promises (for example the non-implementation of the Direct Trade Regulation) created discontent among Turkish-Cypriots. As Talat (Appendix A: 16) explained to the author, the widespread belief in the immediate aftermath of the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan was that the EU’s commitment to establish closer relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community and to put an end to their international isolation would eventually lead to a recognition of the “TRNC”’s statehood. However, when this did not happen, the EU was criticised as being one-sided. In Talat’s words: “we do not want any mediation or political interference by the EU. We have not made such a demand, because the Greek Cypriot side and Greece are EU members and we know that the EU could not be impartial” (Talat 2008b).
These factors, combined with Talat’s inability to achieve any successes in the negotiations on the Cyprus conflict as well as other political and economic issues, resulted in the nationalistic UBP and Derviş Eroğlu coming to power (see Akşit 2014: 6). Eroğlu was also very critical of the EU. He declared that the EU’s approach to the Cyprus problem was “far from being unbiased” (Eroğlu 2011d). On another occasion, he said

And then I would like to call to the EU. Why don’t you keep your promises? What happened to promises to the Turkish Cypriots? [........] The Greek Administration has taken over the EU term presidency. We struggle to minimise the negative effects of the presidency on the negotiations. However, I would like to say that a fair and permanent peace in Cyprus gets harder due to the EU term presidency64 (Eroğlu 2012a)

On other occasions, the perceived EU bias was expressed with reference to what Turkish-Cypriots described as unjust rewards by the EU to the Greek-Cypriots. Eroğlu (2011a), for example, stated “It is a shame that, while the Turkish side which has always approached the negotiations with a positive attitude is penalised, the Greek Cypriot side who is trying to submit Cyprus to Greek dominion is rewarded with EU membership”. The EU, therefore, was not perceived by elites as a normative actor that promotes universal values. Rather, it was perceived as a one-sided actor in the process of promoting peace which severely undermined its normativity in the eyes of Turkish-Cypriots.

In 2015, however, the moderate and pro-reconciliation Mustafa Akıncı won the presidential election. As Bozkurt (2015) explained, “both the UBP and the CTP-BG had created disappointment in many people for not standing up to the constant interventions of Turkey. Indeed, this was one of the main dynamics behind Akıncı’s electoral victory. Akıncı is well known in the Turkish Cypriot public opinion precisely for standing up to Turkey”.

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64 In this quote, Eroğlu refers to the fact that the RoC assumed the EU Council Presidency between July and December 2012.
Overall, therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot community adopted a more moderate approach at the beginning of the 2000s largely due to instrumental reasons. Their main incentives were economic (overcoming isolation). For civil society and some political parties, however, political reasons (freedom from Turkey’s influence) were also important. Apart from that period though, when the EU’s policies did not result in tangible benefits and material gains, the community’s leadership strongly criticised the EU. The EU was, therefore, to a large extent, perceived in instrumental terms. This makes it difficult to conclude that the EU was seen as a model to follow.

Greek-Cypriots

Turning to the Greek-Cypriots, this section argues that, just like the Turkish-Cypriots, they did not regard the EU as an example to follow. Rather, EU accession was likewise perceived mainly in instrumental terms. More specifically, EU accession would help ensure that the solution to the Cyprus conflict would be in line with Greek-Cypriot interests.

The RoC’s decision to apply for EU membership was inextricably linked to the Cyprus conflict. As George Vassiliou, the former President of the RoC who initiated the RoC’s EU accession process, noted

For the Greek Cypriots the accession was undoubtedly the most important event since the establishment of the Republic. For the reasons explained, for the first time since the invasion, the prospect of a solution is a realistic option. Furthermore, until the solution and the reunification of the island could become a reality, their feeling of safety and security would be dramatically improved (Vassiliou 2004).

Glafkos Clerides, RoC President between 1993-2003, expressed similar views. In 1998, for example, he stated: “Our accession to the big European family will be Cyprus’ greatest achievement since the declaration of the Cyprus Republic. Beyond economic, social and political benefits that it will bring to the people of Cyprus, accession will give a new
dimension to the security of Cyprus” (Clerides 1998). In 2003, he stated: “We must continue to make careful steps to complete our accession to the EU. We do not have the luxury to experiment and make mistakes. Because mistakes could delay our European integration” (Clerides 2003). Overall, therefore, between 1990-2004, the RoC leadership perceived the EU as a path towards instrumental gains like, for example, security and economic benefits.

President Papadopoulos, elected right before the referenda on the Annan Plan, adopted a similar line. However, since EU membership had already been secured, Papadopoulos also identified certain contradictions between EU law, EU practice and the Annan Plan. In his famous speech in which he urged the Greek-Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan, Papadopoulos stated that

The Annan Plan does not lead to the reunification of the two communities but on the contrary promotes the permanent division with restrictions on movement, settlement, the right to acquire property, the exercise of political rights and other divisive elements…With the transformation of the divisive provisions of the Plan into the European Union’s primary law, even the slightest hope for the solution to develop and improve in the future, has vanished (Papadopoulos 2004).

Following accession to the Union, the RoC government emphasised the importance of adhering to EU values and principles among others, in the negotiations for a solution of the conflict. For the RoC leadership, any solution to the Cyprus conflict must be in accordance with EU values and EU law. Christofias (2008a), for example, stated: “The solution must be based on the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and be compatible with international and EU law as well as with international conventions on human rights. We demand that the solution will restore and safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Cyprus”.

Similarly, Anastasiades (2014) stated that his vision was “a re-united Cyprus, free from occupation troops, fully respecting the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all its
citizens and fulfilling the aspirations of all Cypriots to live and thrive within our European family”. On another occasion, he stated that his aim was a solution that will allow Cypriots “to live and thrive together in a modern and efficient EU member state that respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its legal citizens and the principles upon which the EU is founded” (Anastasiades 2014a).

Such statements could be interpreted as indicating a substantial leverage attached to EU law and to universal principles that are also supported by the EU. However, a more careful reading of the evidence suggests that Greek-Cypriots did not necessarily regard the EU as a model to follow. It therefore seems that the extensive references to EU law and principles did not indicate an acceptance of the EU as a model power but, rather, a way to promote the community’s interests through the EU. The Greek-Cypriot side asked for an upgrade of the role of the EU in the negotiation process (Anastasiades 2014a, 2014c). However, as the RoC is an EU member, this decision could be merely based on a cost-benefit calculation rather than on the perception and acceptance of the EU as a normative actor that promotes universal values. The Greek-Cypriot leadership perceived its own understanding of federalism as the only one being compatible with EU principles. Hence, an upgrade of the EU’s role in the negotiations would help Greek-Cypriots to promote this understanding (Appendix A: 9, 12, 14).

If the EU was regarded as an example to follow, then local actors should perceive its principles as worthy of emulation (Manners 2009a: 3; Aggestam 2009: 49). However, what can be observed in the case of Cyprus, is only a degree of discursive adaptation for instrumental reasons across both communities. As Forsberg (2011: 1198) also noted, typically, “the norms that the EU advocates, appeal most to those who already share them”.


In the case of Cyprus, before 2004, the mechanism of shaming was mostly directed by the EU at Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots while prestige was attributed to Greek-Cypriots. However, after 2004 and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, the blame shifted towards the Greek-Cypriots while prestige was attributed to Turkish-Cypriots.

Initially, the mechanism of shaming was linked to the certificates required under EC Law for the import of goods from Cyprus. The European Court of Justice, in July 1994, ruled that such certificates should be issued by the RoC. In this respect, certificates issued by the “TRNC” could not be accepted by EU members since the “TRNC” had not been recognised either by the EU or by its member states (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004: 94). The EU Commission informed the member states that the ECJ’s ruling was binding on all community organs and the member states (Appendix B: 13). Although this ruling did not amount to a formal imposition of an embargo, the EU’s disapproval of the “TRNC”’s non-alignment with international law principles was evident. This, among other things, also had a signalling aspect. It was a way for the EU to express dissatisfaction and disapproval.

Simultaneous with the ECJ ruling, the EU accepted Cyprus’ application for membership of the Union thereby conferring prestige to the RoC. At the same time, speeches of EU officials indicated that Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership were perceived as the main obstacle towards a lasting solution to the Cyprus conflict. Nicole Fontaine, for example, then President of the European Parliament, during her first official visit to Cyprus, expressed the hope that Cyprus’ EU accession would be “a catalyst” for unblocking the path to a political settlement, but stressed that “under no circumstances” would the absence of a settlement prevent the accession of Cyprus. She also appealed to
the Turkish-Cypriots to “make some gesture” and warned that the policy of blocking a settlement was not in their interests (quoted in Nostos 2001). This rationale was also adopted by the Commission (1997) in its Agenda 2000 which noted that “if progress towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government of the RoC, as the only authority recognised by international law”. It therefore seems that Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots were seen as the main actors to blame and were publicly shamed through speeches of EU officials.

However, from 2004 onwards the blame shifted to the Greek-Cypriots. After the Greek-Cypriot disapproval of the Annan Plan, Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen and Pat Cox (quoted in Turkey MFA 2004), then President of the European Parliament, heavily criticised Greek-Cypriot President Papadopoulos for hijacking the EU accession process and for wanting to use EU membership to pressure the Turkish side to cave in to Greek-Cypriot wishes. Verheugen accused the Greek-Cypriot leadership of having “cheated” him and of having “taken him for a ride” when appearing willing to support the Annan Plan and thus to allow a united Cyprus to join the EU (Independent 2004). Since the main objective of shaming is to change behaviour through expressing disapproval of an action, this kind of criticism falls squarely into this category.

At the same time, Verheugen called for an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots. As the Commission stated, “as the Turkish-Cypriot Community expressed overwhelming support for the UN plan to reunify Cyprus, it would be unfair, to say the least, to leave it out in the cold…” (European Commission 2004). This conferral of prestige to Turkish-Cypriots through the offer of economic help was also evident in other statements. For example, Javier Solana, then EU High Representative for the CFSP, expressed his deep regrets that “Greek-Cypriots have missed the opportunity to solve the problem that has
been with them for too many years, and that the Turkish-Cypriots have made in contrast a courageous choice by voting ‘yes’” (Cyprus PIO 2004).

Conferral of prestige/shaming aims to promote adherence to norms through exposing the (in)consistencies between a state’s behaviour and the EU’s values. In the case of Cyprus, this instrument took different forms and different directions over time. Initially, shaming was directed towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community. However, after 2004, the EU started conferring prestige to the Turkish-Cypriot community and shaming the Greek-Cypriot community.

5.3 THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Following the method of structured, focused comparison, the same questions that were asked in the section on the Cyprus case will also be asked for Kosovo. This will make possible a systematic comparison of the findings on the two cases.

5.3.1 Persuasion

Just like in the analysis of Cyprus, the three aspects of persuasion (constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations and encouragement of multilateral dialogue) will be discussed.

Constructive engagement

In the case of Kosovo, the EU’s constructive engagement took different forms over time. Following the 1998-9 war, the EU was mostly concerned with reconstruction. Progressively, however, the development of civil society and the creation of a multi-ethnic society were included as priorities. In what follows, the ways through which the EU tried to constructively engage with the conflict will be further analysed.
During the 1990s, the EC was involved in the Western Balkans through the Phare and OBNOVA programmes. Receiving help through these programmes was dependent upon the economic and political development of a country. The European Commission concluded that the FRY could not benefit from Phare due to its “lack of respect for the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights” (European Commission 1998: 4). The FRY, however, was eligible to receive help from OBNOVA that focused on economic development, development of civil society and establishment of cooperation among the Republics of Former Yugoslavia (European Commission 1996a).

In the immediate aftermath of the 1998-9 war, the main issues that had to be faced included the re-building of houses and roads and assisting people return to, and re-integrate in, their communities. In this respect, the EU established a Task Force (TAFKO) for the reconstruction of Kosovo. TAFKO was operational from July 1999 until February 2000 when it was replaced by the EAR (European Agency for Reconstruction).

Between 2000-6, when Kosovo was under the interim administration of UNMIK, the main objective of the EU towards the Western Balkans was the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) (Appendix B: 11). CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) was the main EU financial instrument used. CARDS assistance was, however, conditional upon certain political and economic developments (European Council 2000a, European Council 2002). CARDS was also applied to Kosovo with programmes implemented mainly by the EAR which aimed to ensure the full and speedy implementation of EU aid programmes on the ground. Such programmes were initially concerned with emergency reconstruction. Gradually,

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65 Phare is one of the three pre-accession instruments used by the EU to help countries of the Central and Eastern Europe in the process of acceding to the Union. The other two are the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession (ISPA) and Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD).

66 The OBNOVA programme provides financial aid to war-affected countries.
however, the EAR began to focus on economic development and on the development of civil society that it regarded as a key-actor in the process of establishing a democratic multi-ethnic society (see EAR 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).

Between 2007-13\(^6\), IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) was the main EU instrument for providing financial assistance to candidate countries and to potential candidate countries like Kosovo. IPA funds in Kosovo were managed by the Commission Liaison Office. IPA comprised five components covering different priorities. These were support for transition and institution-building (TAIB), cross-border cooperation (CBC), regional development, human resources development and rural development. Kosovo, as a potential candidate country, could benefit only from the first two components. The first component (TAIB) aimed, among other things, to “foster stabilisation, reconstruction and reconciliation and promote social and economic development throughout the Western Balkans” (European Commission 2008b: 10). In this respect, a number of projects were implemented by the EU in Kosovo aiming at the creation of a stable multi-ethnic society, promotion of inter-ethnic tolerance, improvement of inter-ethnic trust and promotion of human and minority rights (Ecorys 2013). One example was a project entitled ‘Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo’ which aimed to “assist the Kosovo Serb leaders in building self-confidence and to help Kosovo’s Serb and Albanian leaders to identify issues of mutual interest with the goal of improving the interethnic trust” (Ecorys 2013: 92). Further examples were the ‘Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo’ and the ‘Support to the Promotion of Cultural Diversity in Kosovo’. Both projects aimed to use cultural heritage as a tool towards reconciliation (see Ecorys 2013: 92).

\(^6\) Since 2014, IPA II became the main EU financial instrument in Kosovo.
In addition, during the fourth round of the EU-mediated dialogue, it was decided that a part of the IPA funds would be allocated for the development of Northern Kosovo (European Commission Press Release 2013b). However, the North Fund was criticised by Kosovars. Agron Demi from the Institute for Advanced Studies ‘GAP’, an impartial think tank established in 2007 in Kosovo, characterised this fund as unnecessary: “The government of Kosovo has constantly allocated funds for that part, which means that a special development fund is not necessary. The northern part of Kosovo is not any different in terms of development from the southern part, also considering the fact that the inhabitants of this part have benefited funds from both the budget of Kosovo and that of Serbia for many years” (Independent Balkan News Agency 2013).

Moreover, a central component of EU involvement in Kosovo was its support of civil society as a way to promote reconciliation between the two communities (Appendix B: 7, 8). The 2014 renewed IPA programme for Kosovo reiterated the importance placed on the development of civil society (European Commission 2014b). However, EU officials appeared sceptical in private about the role civil society can play towards reconciliation. The main reason for this, as an EULEX official explained to the author, is that civil society in Kosovo is still built along ethnic lines (Appendix B: 8).

Overall, therefore, in the case of Kosovo, constructive engagement took the form of attaching development funds to certain conditions conducive to reconciliation. Removing causes of conflict was always part of EU assistance in Kosovo. According to Pristina-based and Brussels-based European Commission and EULEX officials (Appendix B: 7, 8, 13), the EU builds upon an incremental system of policies which is aimed at producing long term effects and sustainable transformation. In this respect, reconstruction and development funds were always attached to EU values. In addition, constructive engagement also took the form of promoting the development of Northern Kosovo.
However, this latter strategy was criticised by Kosovars who considered the allocation of these funds unnecessary.

**Institutionalisation of relations**

EU attempts to institutionalise relations with Kosovo took place after the mid-2000s. In 2005, the European Council asked Solana and Rehn, in their roles as CFSP High Representative and Commissioner for Enlargement respectively, to investigate possible ways of more EU involvement in Kosovo. The pair issued four reports in which they noted that the EU could play a principal role (see, for example, Solana and Rehn 2005). After the EU Planning Team (EUPT), which had been sent to Kosovo in May 2006, provided its insights, Solana and Rehn “pointed to the imperative of the EU becoming the driving force behind the international presence in Kosovo” (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 755-56). They decided that the way to achieve this was through the establishment of a civilian mission managed by the ICR (International Civilian Representative), who would also take the position of the EU Special Representative. Moreover, they decided to establish a ESDP rule-of-law mission. The ICR and the rule-of-law mission would work towards the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and would help the Kosovan state to uphold the rule of law. The European Commission, for its part, would “focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective” (European Council and European Commission 2007). In addition, apart from these three forms of EU presence in Kosovo, closer relations were established between the EP and the Kosovan Parliament. In what follows, these four ways of institutionalising relations with Kosovo will be further discussed.

*EUSR/ICR*
As provided by the Ahtisaari Plan, the EU appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) who also served as the head of the ICO (International Civilian Office). The ICR (International Civilian Representative)/EUSR was therefore a double-hatted institution.

In February 2008, Pieter Feith became first in post. Under his ICR hat, Feith was mandated to supervise and ensure the successful implementation of the Ahtisaari plan (see Chapter Three). With his EUSR hat on, he would follow the policy objectives of the EU in Kosovo (Appendix A: 34) which included

> to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in implementing a settlement defining Kosovo’s future status, with the aim of a stable, viable, peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo, contributing to regional cooperation and stability, on the basis of good neighbourly relations (European Council 2008).

In order to achieve these goals, the EUSR should give advice and support to local institutions, promote EU coordination, human rights and fundamental freedoms (Appendix A: 34). While the ICR recognised the independence of Kosovo, the EUSR was status-neutral because of the internal EU division on this issue. These divisions kept the EUSR from being a visible actor in Kosovo. The ICR, on the other hand, was far more visible. Although the ICO/ICR are not EU actors since their mandate derives from the ISG (International Steering Group), their role has been very significant since they have been supported by the 23 EU member states that recognise the independent statehood of Kosovo. The ICO was mostly focused on the implementation of the CSP (Comprehensive Settlement Proposal – Ahtisaari Plan). It was, therefore, concentrated on regulating and diminishing the tensions between the two communities and ensuring a protective environment for minorities. For example, under the direct control of the ICR, new Serb-majority municipalities were established.

Gradually, it became evident that this double-hatted arrangement was not very functional (Appendix A: 34). As a result, the EUSR post was split off from that of the ICR in 2012.
(Appendix A: 34). Feith took the position of the ICR and Fernando Gentilini became the EUSR (Collaku 2011). In September 2012, the International Civilian Office that had been led by Feith was closed, since the Ahtisaari Plan was judged to have been substantially implemented (International Crisis Group 2012: 3).

*European Commission Liaison Office*

As a result of the five non-recognisers of Kosovo’s independence, the EU’s approach towards Kosovo has been based on “diversity on recognition, but unity in engagement” (European Commission 2009: 4). Although European Commission and EULEX officials (Appendix B: 7, 8, 11) stated that the issue of the five non-recognisers had not impeded their policies in Kosovo, the recognition issue had constrained the possibilities for EU engagement. For example, the EU was not able to establish a Delegation to Kosovo after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. As an alternative, a European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO) was established in Kosovo, which performed only some of the tasks of EU Delegations in other places. Specifically, ECLO was responsible for overseeing the progress of Kosovo with regards to the objectives set by the Stabilisation and Association Dialogue and to manage the implementation of the IPA programmes (Appendix B: 7). In February 2012, the EUSR was amalgamated with ECLO and, as a result, an EU Office was established in Kosovo. This office, however, is not called a Delegation since this would indicate diplomatic recognition (Gross and Rotta 2011: 6).

*EULEX*

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68 According to the website of the European External Action Service, “the EU Delegations play a key role in presenting, explaining and implementing EU’s foreign policies. They also analyse and report on the policies and developments of their host countries and conduct negotiations in accordance with given mandates” (EEAS website).
In parallel, in 2008, EULEX, a rule of law mission, was established in Kosovo (see Chapter Three) adopting many of the functions that were previously performed by UNMIK. In addition, in 2010, the Commission established an ‘EU House’ in Mitrovica to strengthen the Union’s presence in northern Kosovo. As Füle (2010) stated, this EU House “is the EU’s way of extending a hand to the local community”.

EULEX aimed at assisting Kosovan institutions in establishing and preserving the rule of law in the fields of police, justice and customs and it tried to institutionalise relations with local authorities. In fact, EULEX’s work in Kosovo was based on an MMA (Monitoring-Mentoring-Advising) approach. As the 2010 EULEX programme report noted

In practice this has meant that the final responsibility for translating each recommendation into a MMA Action has rested with the relevant institutions of Kosovo’s rule of law. In this way, the EULEX programmatic approach is designed to help Kosovo’s rule of law bodies to make the changes themselves, rather than rely upon an international presence to do it for them (EULEX 2010: 6).

As has become evident, central in EULEX’s attempts to realise its three-fold aim (MMA tasks), was its desire to establish close coordination with local authorities. In this respect, a joint rule of law coordination board, co-chaired by the Head of EULEX and the Kosovan Deputy Prime Minister, was established. The fact that this joint body met on a regular basis showed EULEX’s attempts to consult and engage with local authorities at the highest level (Appendix B: 8).

The way EULEX operated, however, received much criticism. For example, in March 2011, the Kosovan government openly attacked EULEX because of the arrest of a former member of the KLA. According to KIPRED, an independent non-governmental, non-profit organisation, (2013: 16–17), Thaçi, then Kosovo’s Prime Minister, described EULEX’s action as “arresting ‘war heroes behind our backs,’ and that ‘this was not justice but shame’”. KIPRED (2013: 16-17) also noted that the Chair of the Kosovan Parliament, Jakup Krasniqi, called EULEX’s action “a massacre of justice.”
Criticism of EULEX also came from political researchers and analysts. For example, Fisnik Korenica, a researcher for the Group of Legal and Political Studies, an independent and non-profit organisation, stated that “although EULEX had the support from the people, local ownership was not encouraged. The way EULEX acted in Kosovo left the impression that it was not produced locally.” (Appendix A: 23). The occurrence of local ownership as a result of EU involvement in Kosovo is a topic that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Kosovo-Serbs, for their part, were also very critical of EULEX. They accused it of infringing UNSC Resolution 1244 (see Chapter Three) and of sponsoring Kosovo’s independence by helping it build its institutions (see Vucheva 2008a). For them, therefore, EULEX was a one-sided actor that helped Kosovars achieve their aim of independent Kosovo, an aim that was contrary to Kosovo-Serb goals. In addition, Kosovo-Serbs criticised EULEX for its coercive behaviour. For Radenko Nedeljković, the head of the Mitrovica district, for example, EULEX was forcibly trying to integrate Kosovo-Serbs into Kosovar institutions. He, therefore, called on the Kosovo-Serbs to “not respond to such provocations” (B92 2012b, see also B92 2012c).

*European Parliament-Kosovo Inter-Parliamentary Meetings*

In December 2002, the EP decided to establish informal inter-parliamentary relations with Kosovo (see Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for European Integration website). In 2008, when Kosovo declared independence, these meetings were formalised. The first meeting after Kosovo’s independence took place in May 2008 with Kosovo’s flag next to that of the EU at the EP building in Brussels (see B92 2008). The joint statement noted

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69 It should be noted that several interviewees (Appendix A: 27, Appendix B: 8, 16) drew a distinction between Serbs residing in northern Kosovo and those residing in the south part of Kosovo. Kosovo-Serb national goal of uniting with Serbia is much more prevalent in northern Kosovo.

70 For a more detailed discussion on the EP’s role in Kosovo, see Redei, L. (2015).
that “reconciliation, respect of the rights of all Kosovo communities and their members and restoration of mutual trust and confidence are absolute priorities” (European Parliament- Kosovo Parliament 2008)

In the subsequent meetings, several topics were discussed including, among others, the situation of the Serb community in Kosovo (European Parliament 2009a: 20, European Parliament - Kosovo Parliament 2010, European Parliament - Kosovo Parliament 2012), “the standards of a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo” (European Parliament 2009a:21) and “the boycott of parliament by the Serb members and the situation of minorities in Kosovo” (European Parliament 2009a: 21). In addition, after the enactment of the EU-brokered dialogue, these meetings focused on discussing its progress. For example, following the fifth meeting in March 2012, the two delegations issued a joint statement stressing the importance of continuing the dialogue with Belgrade and of implementing the agreement for improving the everyday lives of citizens on both sides (European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2012). Also, the October 2013 meeting welcomed the progress in the dialogue but called for more “transparency in communicating the outcomes” (European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2013).

These meetings ended up drafting a joint statement of the EP and the Kosovo Parliament in which some principles that should guide Kosovo’s actions were identified and agreed by both parties. The respect of the rights of every community in Kosovo (European Parliament 2009a: 22) and the restoration of mutual trust and confidence were identified as the main priorities (European Parliament-Kosovo Parliament 2005). It seems that those meetings, although informal, gave an opportunity for dialogue between the two sides in order to decide and agree on what was the best way forward. Those inter-parliamentary meetings constituted, therefore, a forum for constructive dialogue.
Overall, the EU institutionalised relations with Kosovo through the EUSR/ICR, ECLO, EULEX and through the establishment of closer relations between the EP and the Kosovan Parliament. However, as the above analysis showed, institutionalisation of relations, a central element of NPE, was compromised by certain limitations. For example, the functions of the EUSR remained somewhat limited because of the five non-recognisers. For the same reason, the functions of ECLO remained mostly technical. In addition, EULEX’s MMA approach rested on the involvement of local authorities. However, the way EULEX was deployed on the ground became a target for severe criticism by both Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs. Relations with EULEX were, therefore, not well-established. In contrast, the development of closer relations between the EP and the Kosovan Parliament led to the creation of a forum for constructive dialogue.

Encouragement of multilateral dialogue between participants

The EU encouraged dialogue through its involvement in the troika that tried to resolve the problem of Kosovo’s status and through a recent EU-brokered dialogue. These two ways of encouraging dialogue will now be discussed in more detail.

Firstly, in 2007, the EU was part of the troika (consisting of the EU, the US and Russia) that undertook the task of organising talks with Serbian and Kosovar representatives with the aim of getting them to agree on a solution regarding Kosovo’s status. With this in mind, the troika noted that “while the Ahtisaari Settlement was still on the table, we would be prepared to endorse any agreement the parties might be able to reach” (UNSC 2007: 2-3). The EU representative in these talks was Wolfgang Ischinger, a German diplomat, who encouraged the parties to also discuss practical issues in addition to the status issue (Weller 2008: 1227). Despite the fact that these talks did not produce any concrete results, the troika noted that the two parties agreed “on the need to promote and protect mult-
ethnic societies and address difficult issues holding back reconciliation, particularly the fate of missing persons and the return of displaced persons” (UNSC 2007: 4).

Secondly, from March 2011, the EU has been facilitating a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina led by Catherine Ashton, the EU’s then High Representative. These talks initially focused on technical issues, in the hope that “solving practical issues would build confidence and familiarity and pave the way toward a more substantial, political rapprochement” (International Crisis Group 2013: 1). The stated aims of this technical dialogue were “to remove obstacles that have a negative impact on people’s daily lives, to improve cooperation, and to achieve progress on the path to Europe” (European Union Press Statement 2011).

Gradually, these talks began to yield results on the freedom of movement of persons and vehicles, on the mutual recognition of university diplomas, on customs stamps, and on the integrated management of the ‘border/boundary’ crossings, as well as on regional cooperation. Other results achieved included “the agreement on setting liaison arrangements and the agreement on the improvement of protection of religious and cultural heritage sites (creation of special/multi-ethnic police unit in Kosovo)” (European Commission 2013c: 6).

Since January 2013, the meetings between the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, apart from the technical issues, also focused on Northern Kosovo and on delivering structures which would “meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up in Kosovo” (European Commission 2013c: 6). The discussions on Northern Kosovo and the Kosovo-Serb community’s concerns were concluded on 19 April 2013 with the initialling...
of a ‘First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations’ (see EEAS 2013). At the time of writing, the latest development was the agreement on the creation of an Association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo (Mogherini 2015). The 2015 European Commission report noted that both Kosovo and Serbia “have remained engaged in the dialogue and committed to the implementation of the April 2013 agreement and other agreements reached in the dialogue” (European Commission 2015: 30).

The EU-facilitated dialogue revealed the EU’s desire to promote its principles through a process of persuasion. However, as interviews conducted for this research revealed, the dialogue was not always carried out in the most effective way. In the process of trying to improve relations between the two communities, there was a lot of arm-twisting. For a Pristina-based senior EU official, “the normative power model has to be filtered into the system in the long term. There are dozens of examples in this respect” (Appendix B: 7).

For example, the agreement provided that the Serb-dominated north would be participating in the elections. However, as the same Commission official stated, there were some things that Pristina was not ready to accept like, for example, the abandonment of status-related symbols. However, the EU demanded they did abandon such symbols (Appendix B: 7). For another Commission official working in DG Enlargement “There is a lot of politics which sometimes is more coercive than persuasive. The ideal is to convince the two parties to adopt some measures but this was never an easy process” (Appendix B: 11).

In addition, persuasion was also undermined by the EU’s inability to engage Kosovo-Serbs in the dialogue. As a Pristina-based senior EU official explained to the author, “engaging with Kosovo-Serbs is very difficult. They do not want to hear the message we want to deliver. So, the EU adopted a hands-off approach towards Kosovo-Serbs and
conducted most discussions with Belgrade. Our role in the North is really very limited” (Appendix B: 7).

Lastly, the Kosovo government’s engagement in the dialogue was, to a large extent, instrumental. Progress was possible only because of the EU’s promise of an SAA for Kosovo and the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia. According to Dempsey (2014), Dačić and Thaçi “immediately acknowledged that without any perspective of joining the EU, they would not have made the huge jump to the negotiating table in Brussels”. The same was stated by EU officials during interviews conducted for this thesis. For a Pristina-based European Commission official, “Kosovo has to make some concessions with regards to the dialogue which I don’t think they would have done if we hadn’t deliberately used the SAA agreement” (Appendix B: 7).

Therefore, the means by which the EU tried to encourage dialogue in Kosovo was through its involvement in the troika that undertook the responsibility for solving the problem of Kosovo’s status and through the enactment of the recent EU-brokered dialogue. However, although persuasion was employed quite extensively in the case of Kosovo, it should be noted that, in some instances, it leaned towards imposition. In addition, the employment of persuasion was undermined by the EU’s inability to engage with the Kosovo-Serb community.

5.3.2 Norm Invocation

In the case of Kosovo, the EU tried to invoke the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by demanding the implementation of commitments to which Kosovo has agreed in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). An SAP for Kosovo was first proposed in 1999. Its main aim was to support the country’s progress towards the EU, promote peace
and stability and support reconciliation and greater regional cooperation (see Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. 2016: 5). Kosovo participated in the SAP from 2002.

The SAP was carried out through the European Partnership that set the “priorities for action in supporting efforts to move closer to the European Union while serving as a checklist to measure progress” (European Council 2004). In other words, in the case of Kosovo, this EU mechanism took the form of activating the commitments Kosovo had entered into by subscribing to the European Partnership. In June 2004, the EU adopted the first European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. In January 2006 and February 2008, new partnerships were adopted in order to reflect the progress made by Kosovo and also to identify new priorities. In all cases, Kosovan institutions had to formulate an Action Plan for the implementation of the European Partnerships’ priorities.

Among the key priorities of the European Partnerships for Kosovo was to “create a climate for reconciliation, inter-ethnic tolerance and sustainable multi-ethnicity which is conducive to the return of displaced persons”, to “ensure the respect, security, freedom of movement and participation of all communities”, to “explicitly condemn all manifestations of anti-minority sentiment and to “vigorously prosecute all inter-ethnic crime” (European Council 2008b: 61). Therefore, the EU aim of promoting reconciliation and multi-ethnicity in Kosovo (see Chapter Four) was reflected in the European Partnerships and was put forward as a prerequisite for Kosovo’s future EU membership.

With the European Partnerships, the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ was invoked through the Commission reports on Kosovo’s progress in several fields. For example, one problem identified early on was the issue of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (European Commission 2005: 21-22, 2006: 15). In reference to the Serb community, it was noted
that they still faced harassment and discrimination. Although some progress was identified over time as a decrease in inter-ethnic incidents was observed, the Commission also stressed that inter-community tensions impeded a thorough reconciliation and integration process (European Commission 2010: 20).

Secondly, the Commission noted an increase of damage to cultural and religious sites (European Commission 2005: 21-22, 2006: 15, European Commission 2013c). In its 2015 report, it acknowledged that “protection of cultural heritage, including cooperation between the Serbian Orthodox and Kosovo authorities, remains problematic” (European Commission 2015: 21).

Thirdly, regarding the return of displaced persons, the 2005 report noted there still existed significant obstacles with security concerns and the return of property being among them (European Commission 2005: 22). The 2010 report, however, acknowledged that there was a “sharp increase” in the number of returns although problems like delayed property restitution proceedings and scarcity of economic opportunities continued to exist (European Commission 2010: 20). The 2013 report, meanwhile, observed that “the sustainability of the returns process is undermined by real and perceived security threats (both in Albanian and Serb majority communities). It is further exacerbated by ongoing incidents affecting returnees and their properties, as well as religious and cultural heritage sites” (European Commission 2013c: 18). The 2015 report claimed that “authorities at local and central level did not do enough to facilitate return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)” (European Commission 2015: 26). Overall, therefore, the European Commission, through its progress reports, sought to identify the areas to which Kosovan authorities needed to devote more attention with the overall aim of meeting the key priorities of reconciliation and sustainable multi-ethnicity.
Overall, therefore, the implementation of the norm invocation mechanism in the case of Kosovo was directly related to the country’s progress towards EU membership. The EU, through the Commission’s progress reports, highlighted the areas on which Kosovo needed to work in order to meet its commitments.

**5.3.3 Shaping the discourse of what is normal**

The ability to shape discourses of what is considered normal is another important element of the NPE approach (Forsberg 2011: 1197) and is directly related to identity modifications. The implementation of this mechanism can be reflected in projects aiming to induce changes to the two parties’ understanding of the conflict and, hence, to their identities. As with the case of Cyprus, projects related to education will be given special attention here.

Firstly, it should be noted that, just like in Cyprus, there are two distinct education systems currently operating in Kosovo. The Kosovar education system operates in Southern Kosovo while the Serbian education system operates in Northern Kosovo and in the Serbian enclaves. As an education specialist (Appendix A: 30) explained to the author, the EU, up until now, did not invest in creating a unified education system in Kosovo.

Nonetheless, one project that can be described as aiming at identity modifications was titled ‘Inter-culturalism and the Bologna Process’ and was funded through the IPA and implemented by the Council of Europe. The main aim of this project was to create the necessary conditions for a sustainable intercultural understanding among all communities in Kosovo. It focused on providing assistance in drafting education legislation and training of curriculum developers, textbook authors and teachers in EDC/HRE (Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education). These groups of people also
received training in history and multiculturalism teaching and language policies (see CoE and EU Joint Programmes website cited in the bibliography).

In terms of direct output, the project resulted in more than 3500 teachers and NGO activists participating in the training sessions. Also, another outcome was the drafting of a manual titled ‘History Teaching Today-Approaches and Methods’ (CoE 2011: 7). This manual highlighted the importance of multiperspectivity. According to its author, “in order to give students an understanding of the world they live in, history teaching needs to be inclusive – needs to include different perspectives” (Black 2011: 15). According to Black (2011: 16), multiperspectivity will lead to the long-term consequence of “educating generations for peace, tolerance and democracy” (Black 2011: 16). This manual was subsequently translated and adapted for use in Kovovo’s schools (CoE 2011: 7). As the aforementioned education specialist confirmed (Appendix A: 30), multiperspectivity in history teaching in general as well as the aforementioned materials in particular, were being used by some schools and teachers in Kosovo.

The ‘shaping of discourses’ mechanism, if successfully implemented, should have resulted in altered identities of the parties involved in a conflict by shaping their perceptions of what counts as normal. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that this mechanism resulted in more sustainable outcomes in Kosovo than in Cyprus. In Kosovo, the EU was able to induce some changes to the conflict, notably in relation to history teaching.

**5.3.4 Model Power**

In the context of EU-Kosovo relations, Kosovo’s aspiration for membership and the EU’s model power are interrelated. In order to examine whether model power was at work in
Kosovo, this section will discuss whether Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs considered the EU as an example to follow.

Kosovars

At the state level, Kosovar officials clearly admitted the leverage they attach to the EU. “We need a European Kosovo, a European Serbia” (Thaçi 2014). Moreover, official statements revealed an admiration for EU values. Atifete Jahjaga, then President of Kosovo, during a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Franco-German reconciliation, noted that:

Not only did they [French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer] change the future of their respective countries, but upon the ruins of wars and the state of perpetual insecurity, they laid the foundation of a united Europe. A Europe in peace and prosperity, where sovereign and independent states- sworn enemies until the very yesterday- would commit themselves to a common European vision… This reflection upon an event of such historic gravity becomes even more familiar today, during this period of developments in Balkans, when we are vigorously trying to change the course of history, to leave hatred behind us, together with the loss and suffering that have touched the lives of many of us (Jahjaga 2013a).

Similarly, Thaçi, former Kosovar Prime Minister, stated: “Kosovo belongs to everyone and it is the homeland of all of its citizens. Therefore, Kosovo needs to be united in its diversity towards including all communities in our society and putting aside our differences” (Thaçi 2010). Another indicative example came from Thaçi after the signing of the first agreement between Kosovo and Serbia: “Both our countries need stability and peace. I know that both peoples have been committed in hating each other. This Agreement will be something new, a new momentum, a new psychology. This is a new era of cooperation” (European Council TV Newsroom).

Kosovar officials, therefore, showed a quite high degree of admiration for EU values and a willingness to work towards their full internalisation. However, as Marc Weller (2008a: 681, 2009), the legal adviser to the Kosovo delegation at the Vienna negotiations,
demonstrated, since the early days of these negotiations, Kosovar politicians understood that the desire for independence would only be realised by committing to EU values (i.e. equal rights to all communities irrespective of ethnicity) and, hence, had to publicly proclaim their support for these values (see also Noutcheva 2009: 1080-81). Similarly, two high-ranked Kosovo officials (Appendix B: 5, 6) explained to the author that Kosovo’s discourse needed to reflect the European values since Kosovo aspired to join the EU.

Moreover, concerning the EU-facilitated dialogue, as discussed earlier in this chapter, progress was possible only because of the EU promise of an SAA and the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia. According to a senior Commission official working in DG Enlargement, “the priority of most Kosovar politicians is to get the country closer to the EU. This means that they have to abide by EU values” (Appendix B: 13). In addition, a Pristina-based Commission official (Appendix B: 7) explained to the author that it was very reluctantly that the Kosovar leadership accepted some of the EU’s requests (i.e. to abandon the use of status-related symbols) and that without the prospect of EU accession, the situation in Kosovo would be very different (see also Weller 2009). Similarly, a European Commission official working in the Directorate General for Enlargement, stated that Kosovans “would not have compromised if there was not a reward at the end of this. It is very clear that they want to progress on the EU path and that’s why they make compromises” (Appendix B: 11). It therefore becomes increasingly clear that Kosovar leaders viewed the EU membership as a path towards instrumental gains.

In addition, a Pristina-based Commission official (Appendix B: 7) stated: “We are witnessing a sort of wake-up calls which are revealing that adherence to EU values is superficial”. This rhetorical adherence to EU values for instrumental reasons was also
reflected in some statements of Kosovar officials. Thaçi, for example, seemingly out of exasperation for the non-implementation of visa liberalisation, threatened Kosovo’s unification with Albania (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2013c). Therefore, the lack of any tangible benefits from the EU, led Kosovar officials to prioritise principles different from the ones promoted by the EU. In this case, Thaçi prioritised the value of ethnicity that was contrary to the principles of multi-ethnicity and reconciliation promoted by the EU (see also Narten 2010: 273).

It, therefore, becomes evident that Kosovar officials abided by EU principles mainly because they wanted to progress towards EU accession. However, CSOs and think tanks were very sceptical towards the potential of Kosovo’s accession to the EU. For many of them, the membership promise held no credibility because of the five non-recognisers. According to the Group for Legal and Political Studies, for example, “In the past consensus within the EU was achieved at the cost of Kosovo’s statehood. Until there are guarantees that this will not be the case in the future, the trust towards Brussels will be limited in Pristina” (Group for Legal and Political Studies 2013: 18. For another example, see KIPRED 2012). According to a Kosovar researcher at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), “the government is doing all the work but membership is not on the table. There are two ways for Kosovo to join the EU. Either the five non-recognisers will recognise Kosovo or the Treaty of the European Union will change. None of these is going to happen though” (Appendix A: 32). It seems therefore that the EU has drawn negative attention in its dealings with the Kosovo conflict that stems from its inability to deliver on its promises. From this perspective, the credibility of membership is, therefore, compromised and the EU’s power of attraction gradually loses its pull.

**Kosovo-Serbs**
Turning to the Kosovo-Serbs, this section argues that, just like the Kosovars, they did not regard the EU as an example to follow. To begin with, support for EU accession was very low among Kosovo-Serbs. The majority had a negative attitude towards Kosovo’s EU integration mostly due to disbelief that EU accession could benefit their community (KFOS 2012: 28). Also, most Kosovo-Serbs did not believe that the Brussels agreement had a positive impact on them (Platform for Analysis and Research 2015: 9).

In addition, Kosovo-Serbs prioritised values different from the ones promoted by the EU. More specifically, they attached more value to the principles of ethnicity rather than multiethnicity. For example, in 2012, a referendum in Northern Kosovo rejected ethnic Albanian rule of the territory. According to the BBC (2012), “99.7 per cent of voters in the referendum said no to recognising the Kosovo government”. For Dragisa Milovic, then Serb mayor of the Northern Kosovan municipality of Zvecan, “We want to be part of Serbia - nothing more, nothing less. If the international community gave Albanians their own country, why should they not listen to us? It is the reality - this area is still Serbia” (BBC 2011).

Kosovo-Serb criticisms were also directed against EULEX that was characterised as one-sided. According to Goran Rakic, the mayor of North Mitrovica, “prosecution and the courts must be independent in their work and we do not want to influence their work, but we ask that Serbs have the same rights as other defendants who are often treated leniently and even forgiven when they escape from the detention facility” (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2014). Similarly, Dragan Jablanović, Mayor of Leposavic and member of the management team for the implementation of the Brussels Agreement, stated “The way in which the EULEX is functioning and the way in which it behaves towards the Serbs is

72 A turnout of 75.28% was reported by B92 (2012).
totally incomprehensible and unacceptable. It is far away from the law and justice and looks more like a market” (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2014a). Lastly, it should also be noted that several protests were organised by Kosovo-Serb citizens of North Mitrovica against EULEX to express their dissatisfaction towards the mission (see, for example, UNMIK Media Monitoring 2014b and Vucheva 2008a).

Overall, therefore, it is difficult to conclude that Kosovo-Serbs regarded the EU as an example to follow. The fact that the EU promoted the integration of Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovan state - which meant that Kosovo-Serbs could not be part of Serbia - and the fact that EULEX, according to them, behaved in a discriminatory and unlawful manner, created a very negative perception of the EU among Kosovo-Serbs. As a result, Kosovo-Serbs held generally negative views towards anything that came from the EU (Appendix A: 21). Also, Kosovo-Serbs prioritised ethnicity rather than the multiethnicity promoted by the EU. For example, their leadership talked about integration with Serbia rather than with the Kosovar structures.

To conclude, it seems that material incentives were the main driving force behind Kosovo’s behavioural adaptation. The EU’s power of attraction led to a degree of discursive and behavioural adaptation. However, the EU’s power of example was not at play. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 290-292) suggested that “exogenous material inducements lead over time to the internalisation of norms once adopted for instrumental reasons … In the long run, admission to the EU club can have a constitutive effect on a state’s identity leading to shared cognitive understandings with the rest of the EU members”. Whilst this might prove to be true, it is still the case that, during the period under examination in this thesis, the Kosovars did not regard the EU as an example to follow but rather as a way towards material advantages. Kosovo-Serbs, for their part, did
not show such discursive adaptation as they tended to reject the EU mission on the ground as well as EU values.

5.3.5 Attribution of Prestige/Shaming

This mechanism took different forms over time in Kosovo. At the beginning of the 1990s, when tensions became evident (see Chapter Three), the EU imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. However, from 1998 onwards, when violence increased dramatically in Kosovo (see Chapter Three), the EU imposed four other types of sanctions. These included a visa ban that forbade entry to the EU to senior FRY representatives, several types of financial sanctions, a commercial flight ban and a ban on the supply and sale of petroleum and petroleum products to the FRY. Exemptions to the oil embargo were made on humanitarian grounds. Another exemption was made for supplies to international forces within the FRY so that NATO would be able to carry on its operations (see Portela 2010: 63).

The importance of the aforementioned sanctions in the context of this research becomes more evident when considering how they were linked to the norm under question. Giumelli (2013: 19) highlighted the importance of the signalling aspect of sanctions which, according to him, highlights “the importance of a norm in international relations and stigmatises non-compliance with that norm”. According to the same author, travel ban sanctions are mostly associated with ‘naming and shaming’ as they mainly aim to signal dissatisfaction with particular individuals. Arms embargoes also have a strong signalling effect on audiences (Giumelli 2013).

Andrighetto and Villatoro, meanwhile, made a distinction between sanctions and punishment. According to them (Andrighetto and Villatoro 2011: 2), punishment “influences the instrumental mind of the individual by shaping his material payoffs”.
Sanctions, however, “aim at influencing both the instrumental and the normative mind of the wrongdoer”. This means that the wrongdoer, in deciding on his/her future behaviour, will not only take into account the material costs but also the norm. In relation to the sanctions imposed on the Milošević regime, the EU made it clear that sanctions were imposed because of gross human rights violations (European Council 1999). More specifically, the 1999 Berlin European Council stated

Our policy is neither directed against the Yugoslav or Serb population nor against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia. It is directed against the irresponsible Yugoslav leadership under President Milošević. It is directed against security forces cynically and brutally fighting a part of their own population. We want to put an end to these outrages. President Milošević must stop Serb aggression in Kosovo and sign the Rambouillet Accords, which include a NATO-led implementation force to provide stability (European Council 1999).

The European Council concluded

We underline that it is not our aim to keep the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its self-imposed isolation in Europe and the world. On the contrary, we would like to end the isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Europe. But for this to happen, Milošević must choose the path of peace in Kosovo and the path of reform and democratisation, including freedom of the media in the whole of Yugoslavia (European Council 1999).

The establishment of a link between the sanctions and human rights violations does not point towards efforts to punish but rather towards efforts to shift attention to the violated norm.

After the 1998-9 war, and after the development of a closer relationship between the EU and Kosovo, the EU started conferring prestige on Kosovo because of its decision to re-engage in a dialogue with Serbia and, most importantly, because of the visible improvements in the relationship between the two countries. In this respect, on 28 June 2013, the European Council authorised the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo (European Council 2013). The EU, thus, rewarded Kosovo for the steps it had taken to normalise relations with Serbia. In the words of Štefan
Füle: “You have made impressive progress in your relations with Serbia, and you have made substantial progress in meeting the priorities of our feasibility study. The start of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union is your well-deserved reward” (European Commission 2013c).

However, it should be noted that, after the 1998-99 war, shaming was also at play. In this period, it took the form of pinpointing individual cases that were perceived as violating fundamental principles of the EU which Kosovo should be respecting. For example, this was the case with the violence in Mitrovica during the November 2013 local elections. These elections were part of the EU-facilitated deal reached between Kosovo and Serbia and were the first elections that involved the participation of Kosovo-Serbs. They were, therefore, significant in terms of the reconciliation. Violence, however, occurred in a polling station in the city. The head of the EU’s election observation mission, Roberto Gualtieri, characterised it as “an attack on fundamental human rights” (Deutsche Welle 2013). Catherine Ashton’s spokesperson was also critical “because they have disrupted an otherwise very orderly run electoral process in the rest of Kosovo” (Reuters 2013).

Overall, therefore, the instrument of prestige/shaming took different forms over time. Firstly, shaming strategies through the imposition of sanctions were directed towards the Milošević regime. However, after the establishment of closer relations with Serbia, the EU started conferring prestige on Kosovo. However, shaming continued to be implemented through the condemnation of individual cases that were seen as violating EU principles.

5.4 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

On persuasion, this comparative assessment identifies certain differences between the two cases. In the case of Cyprus, persuasion was implemented through certain regulations
aimed at creating further contacts between the two communities, support for the UN negotiation process and institutionalisation of relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community after 2004. Ideally, the aforementioned policies could have led to changed perceptions of normality on both sides of the conflict. However, certain policies like, for example, the EU’s proposed Direct Trade Regulation was strongly criticised by Greek-Cypriots and, as a result, was not implemented. Encouragement of dialogue materialised through EU envoys and personal representatives in Cyprus and through the Steering Group. Their contribution, however, was minimal. Lastly, institutional links were established with the RoC through the accession process. Institutionalisation of relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community occurred after 2004 and was implemented through the establishment of the European Parliament’s High Level Contact Group and the European Union Programme Support Office in Northern Cyprus. However, institutionalised relations between the EP and the Turkish-Cypriot community came to an end after the change of attitude of the High Level Contact Group. In the case of Kosovo, constructive engagement took the form of reconstruction and development funds. Encouragement of dialogue materialised through the initiation of a dialogue on the technical issues affecting reconciliation and on the future status of Kosovo. However, there was a lot of arm-twisting, a lack of transparency and a failure to engage the Kosovo-Serbs. Lastly, relations between Kosovo and the EU were institutionalised through the EUSR, the ECLO and EULEX. In addition, it should be noted that the EP-Kosovo Parliament meetings constituted a constructive forum where opinions were exchanged and scope for agreement identified. Overall, persuasion was employed more in Kosovo than in Cyprus. In Kosovo, the EU was the leading actor facilitating the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and also established its own mission on the ground. In addition, EP relations with the Kosovo Parliament were well established. On the contrary, in Cyprus,
persuasion was not so extensively employed by the EU. The EU’s efforts to encourage dialogue were quite minimal in comparison to Kosovo. In addition, the EU’s proposed DTR was not implemented due to local reactions. Lastly, formal relations between the EP and the Turkish-Cypriot community came to an end in 2012.

Invoking norms is an instrument related to the activation of commitments. In the case of Kosovo, this mechanism took the form of invoking Kosovo’s commitments through successive European Partnerships. However, in the case of Cyprus, the EU did not have the choice to implement this tool in a similar fashion. As a result, this tool took a different form. It was mostly directed at convincing Turkey to show respect for international law and fulfil its obligations to the Cyprus conflict.

With regards to the implementation of the ‘shaping of the discourse of what is normal’ mechanism, differences can be observed between the two cases. In the case of Cyprus, this third NPE mechanism was not implemented rigorously enough for NPE standards. This chapter identified and discussed three projects that could have led to changes in the narrative of what is normal. However, these projects did not resonate with the target audience. The ‘New Trends in History teaching’ project, for example, met the resistance of the RoC authorities. In 2014, the latter of the three projects was launched. However, its implementation and effectiveness cannot be analysed further due to the lack of relevant sources of information. In the case of Kosovo, however, this mechanism was implemented to a greater extent and led to certain changes in the education sector. The ‘Interculturalism and the Bologna process’ project resulted in the drafting of a manual on history teaching that was used by some schools in Kosovo.

Model power was not at play as both cases confirm that the EU was mostly seen as a path towards instrumental gains. In the case of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriot adherence to EU
values was directly related to political and economic benefits. Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, seemed willing to adhere to EU law and EU practice. However, a more careful reading of the evidence suggests that Greek-Cypriots also had instrumental purposes, like the need to get the EU’s support in the discussions for a political solution of the conflict. With regards to Kosovo, Kosovars showed a high degree of adherence to EU values, albeit for instrumental reasons since it was the only way for their country to join the EU. Kosovo-Serbs, however, did not adopt such discursive adaptations as they did not believe that the EU could help them with their situation.

Lastly, attribution of prestige/shaming was at play in both cases. In Cyprus, shaming was initially directed towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots for their intransigent stance. However, after 2004 and the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, shaming was directed towards Greek-Cypriots who were seen as the main actors to blame for the non-resolution of the conflict. In the case of Kosovo, shaming the Milošević regime became a popular tactic through the imposition of sanctions. However, the development of closer relations with Serbia led the EU to start conferring prestige to Kosovo by initiating an SAA agreement. The EU, however, continued to use shaming strategies through the condemnation of specific incidents that were seen as violating EU principles.

Overall, therefore, the comparative assessment of the two cases revealed that the EU attempted to promote the ‘sustainable peace’ norm mostly through persuasion, norm invocation and attribution of prestige/shaming. These instruments were employed more extensively in the case of Kosovo than in Cyprus. However, not all of them were always implemented in a normative fashion and in line with NPE expectations. Persuasion, for instance, tended to take the form of imposition (see also Noutcheva 2009: 1081). In addition, the shaping of discourses mechanism was not rigorously implemented in Cyprus. However, in the case of Kosovo, the implementation of this mechanism induced
some changes, especially with regards to history teaching. Lastly, model power was not at play in either case. This could potentially have important implications on the third aspect of the NPE framework, namely the EU’s normative impact. The findings of that section could lead to the conclusion that EU policies had limited impact on identity modification and, hence, on conflict transformation. However, this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX: TESTING THE NORMATIVITY OF EU IMPACT

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The two previous chapters assessed the normativity of the EU’s objectives and policies towards Cyprus and Kosovo. Turning to the third stage of the tripartite analysis (see Chapter 2), this chapter aims to evaluate the impact of EU policies towards the two cases. What needs to be examined is whether any changes occurred in Cyprus and Kosovo towards the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ as a result of EU policies and programmes.

Normative change, however, is not easy to measure. As Niemann and de Wekker (2009: 10) noted, “normative change can only be approximated”. Nevertheless, according to Manners (2009: 3), the normative impact produced from the promotion of principles should include “socialisation, partnership and ownership”. Therefore, if the EU was successful in promoting its norms and in implementing a normative agenda, then these three outcomes should emerge. In what follows, this chapter will discuss the three aspects of normative impact in relation to the two cases of Cyprus and Kosovo.

6.2 THE CASE OF CYPRUS

The subsequent analysis assesses the extent to which normative change occurred in Cyprus as a result of EU practices. A successful promotion of the norm of ‘sustainable peace’ through normative means aiming at conflict transformation should produce certain empirically observable results at the domestic level.

6.2.1 Socialisation

The main aim of this section is to assess the extent to which socialisation into the ‘sustainable peace’ norm emerged in Cyprus as a result of EU policies. As Tocci (2007:
20) noted, “conflict transformation calls for deep-rooted changes in public attitudes and positions”. In this respect, an indicator of conflict transformation and the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm would be changed attitudes of a wide range of political and societal actors from both communities. Principled ideas held by the EU should be internalised by local Cypriot actors and should become “collective understandings about appropriate behaviour which will lead to changes in identity, interests and behaviour” (Risse et al. 1999: 11). As Manners (Appendix A: 36) stated, “On the one end of the spectrum is the fixed and given while on the other is the fluid. The EU, therefore, should turn notions of conflict into more fluid notions of peace. Part of conflict transformation is about changing the language used”. In what follows, this sub-section traces the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by examining the discourse of political elites, the alternative narratives offered by Cypriot civil society and public attitudes.

Official Statements

The importance of language and discourse in conflict settings is widely acknowledged. Language can encourage and maintain conflict just as it can encourage and maintain peace (Kelly 2012: 242, Wenden 1999: 20). Conflict is usually sustained by what Gutierrez et al called a ‘transcended script’ that refers to “dominant forms of knowledge generally valued as legitimate by both the local culture and the larger society” (1995: 448). It, therefore, follows that if the EU was successful in promoting the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, these dominant forms of knowledge should be in line with the premises of the norm. More specifically, if internalisation of the norm has occurred, then language practices should reflect reconciliation and willingness for reintegration. In the opposite scenario, a divisive discourse will be dominant. In this case, although alternative discourses might exist, these will remain largely marginalised in the wider society (see Bar-Tal 2007: 1435-1436).
With regards to the Cypriot context, the analysis of speeches by political elites revealed that the official account of the conflict perpetuated the division between the two communities.

The starting point is that both communities developed their own narratives with regards to the conflict and their own normative frameworks for what they considered the ‘right’ solution. Having examined a large number of speeches of both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot officials, this chapter argues that no major changes occurred with regards to these narratives and frameworks. On the contrary, the conflict was perpetuated in the political discourse. First of all, the two sides used a different interpretation of the events that led to the division of the island (see also Chapter Three). In all speeches examined, Greek-Cypriots referred to the 1974 events as a war and as an invasion by Turkey (see, for example, Anastasiades 2014a). Meanwhile, Turkish-Cypriots described the 1974 events with the term ‘peace operation’ conducted by Turkey to save Turkish-Cypriots (see, for example, Eroğlu 2012).

Moreover, a common element in speeches was the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy which led to the presentation of ‘us’ as the victims and the ‘other’ as the main source of the conflict. Mehmet Ali Talat, Eroğlu’s predecessor, expressed this idea in a number of speeches, such as:

> Of course there are two peoples. May be, in time a single Cyprus people, speaking two different languages, will be formed. However, today two peoples exist, with different languages, religion, joy, sorrow and everything. Their area is different; their economy is different. When the one feels happy, the other is sad. There are two peoples who could have the same feelings only during an airplane accident or an earthquake (Talat 2008a).

The same dichotomy was also evident in the speeches of Eroğlu. In one speech, he identified Greek-Cypriots as the main source of the “TRNC”’s problems: “The goal of our southern neighbours – the Greek-Cypriot side – is our economic downfall, or at least
preventing our development. Remember that the Direct Trade Charter\textsuperscript{73} promised by the EU after the 2004 Annan referendum could not be implemented due to Greek Cypriot obstruction” (Eroğlu 2011b).

Greek-Cypriot leaders, for their part, also engaged in a blame game. However, in contrast to Turkish-Cypriot political elites, they mostly used positive self-presentation rather than negative other-presentation. However, it should be noted that, in some instances, negative presentations of the ‘other’ were also used by Greek-Cypriot elites. For example, Anastasiades, the RoC President, stated: “I want to make clear that, if there is a side that is interested in the earliest possible solution of the Cyprus problem, it is neither Turkey nor the Turkish Cypriot leadership [...] (Anastasiades 2014e. For another example, see Anastasiades 2014a).

Furthermore, the words used to characterise the parties involved in the conflict are also important in this context. Eroğlu, for example, mostly addressed the Greek-Cypriots as neighbours (see, for example Eroğlu 2015 and Eroğlu 2011b). On the other hand, Anastasiades referred to Turkish-Cypriots as compatriots (see, for example, Anastasiades 2014b and Christofias 2008).

The use of such characterisations was directly related to another binary opposition related to the type of political solution each community envisaged. Turkish-Cypriot political leaders have been advocating the creation of a partnership of two constituent states. For example, Denktaş was favouring an independence policy for the “TRNC”. In his own words, “after having established the ‘republic’, it is impossible to eradicate it…” (Cyprus PIO 1995, see also Talat 2008, Eroğlu 2010, Eroğlu 2011). According to Eroğlu: “the Turkish Cypriots do not wish to end their self-governance system, bi-nationality, and the

\textsuperscript{73} For a more detailed discussion on the Direct Trade Regulation, see pp. 141-143.
actual and active guarantee of Turkey” (Eroğlu 2012a; for another example, see Eroğlu 2011). He justified this preference by stating: “If we have not worked and succeed, we would not be able to live in these territories with our national and religious identity, and would disappear in other nation’s domination” (Eroğlu 2013). However, this is in opposition to the solution preferred by Greek-Cypriots. Clerides (1999), for example, talked about a solution based on federation rather than on confederation that, according to him, was what Turkey desires. Also, both Christofias (2012) and his successor, Anastasiades, advocated the creation of a state with “one and single sovereignty, one and single international personality, one and single citizenship” (Anastasiades 2014) in which Greek and Turkish-Cypriots would be compatriots.

The Turkish-Cypriot side interpreted the solution preferred by Greek-Cypriots as an attempt to dominate the island (see Eroğlu 2011c). Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, believed that the partnership state proposed by Turkish-Cypriots would “jeopardise the future of the people of Cyprus, the prospect of a viable and durable settlement, the absolute priority of restoring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots…” (Anastasiades 2014a).

What can be concluded from the above analysis is that the conflict became institutionalised in the language used by both Greek and Turkish-Cypriot political elites. An observable difference, however, is that while Greek-Cypriots mostly engaged in positive self-presentation, Turkish-Cypriots utilised positive self-presentation as well as negative other-presentation. Therefore, at least at the level of political elites, an internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm did not occur.

In addition, as has also been discussed in the previous chapter, Cypriot political actors did not view the EU as a model to follow. Turkish-Cypriots perceived the EU in negative terms because of its inability to initiate certain regulations like, for example, the DTR.
On the other hand, Greek-Cypriots, already EU citizens, were asking for an upgraded role for the EU in the negotiations. It seems, therefore, that in accordance with the ‘logic of consequences’, EU principles and EU policies were evaluated by Cypriot actors largely in terms of cost/benefit calculations.

Change of History Textbooks

Directly related to the above analysis are the school textbooks on history which are believed to be reflecting dominant ideologies (Crawford 2003: 5), to be important in the formation of identities (Hutton and Mehlinger 1987: 141, Baranovic 2001: 24) and in conveying a particular image of the ‘other’ (Podeh 2002: 27-28). It follows that a significant change in history textbooks would reveal a change in perception. This is important in the context of this research since a change in the history textbooks towards sustainable peace would be an indicator and a catalyst of the internalisation of the norm.

As the RoC’s accession date was approaching, attempts were made to change the history textbooks. In 2003, for example, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) appointed an Educational Reform Committee (ERC). Following EU guidelines, this committee prepared a report that proposed a revision of history teaching. The report, with a title of ‘Democratic and humanistic education in the Euro-Cypriot State: potential for reform and modernisation’ (MoEC 2004) was indicative of the value attached to the EU.

This report mainly proposed an alteration of the education system based on the pluralist framework suggested by the EU. More specifically, the report proposed the elimination of the narrow ethnocentric elements of the Cypriot education system and its realignment towards inter-culturalism and multi-culturalism with specific reference made to the Turkish-Cypriot community.

With regards to history education, the aforementioned report proposed the introduction of new history textbooks written by Greek and Turkish-Cypriot experts. Moreover, the
committee recommended “a more systematic teaching of history through programs and
textbooks which are in accordance with the contemporary European standards (peaceful
coexistence, multiculturalism, respect of difference and abolition of chauvinism,
intolerance and interracial hatred” (Educational Reform Committee 2004: 157). However, the aforementioned proposal fuelled a heated debate among Greek-Cypriots.
Political parties and public opinion were divided between those favouring a Cyprocentric
approach and those favouring a Hellenocentric approach74 (Perikleous 2013: 47; see also
Philippou 2009: 217). As a result of the strong opposition to the aforementioned
proposals, attempts to introduce new history textbooks failed.

The issue reappeared in 2008 when the MOEC stated that reconciliation and
rapprochement would be the main learning objective for the upcoming school year
(MOEC 2008: 1). Although the Ministry did not explicitly refer to history education, it
argued that the past should be approached in ways which support the aims of peaceful
coexistence, mutual recognition of each other’s past injustices and emphasis on the
aspects of the past that unite the two communities (MoEC 2008: 2). This change,
however, met strong public resistance because it was perceived as an attempt by the newly
elected leftist government to politically manipulate education (Philippou 2009).

Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, high school history textbooks were revised in 2003–04.
The content and presentation of historical facts in these new textbooks, in circulation from
September 2004, were directed towards the goals of reconciliation and reunification of

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74 According to Perikleous (2013: 45), “this was not merely a confrontation between classical and
vocational education, but more importantly a confrontation about the orientation of Greek Cypriot
education in relation to Greece. In a more general level, this was essentially a collision between the idea
of Cyprus as part of Greece and the one of Cyprus as a distinct entity”.
the island\textsuperscript{75}. For Demetriou (2008: 89), these new textbooks showed “the profound impact that the EU can have on border conflicts in terms of promoting a ‘change of scripts’”.

However, in 2009, the history textbooks were again revised when the rightist UBP (National Unity Party) won the election. The new books moved away from EU values and reflected more nationalistic ideology; they were more similar to the originals rather than the revised ones of 2004 (Trmikliniotis and Demetriou 2011: 14).

Overall, concerning the Greek-Cypriots, although there were some voices in favour of reconciliation, these originated from left-wing political parties, like AKEL, which had always been following this line of thought. With regards to the Turkish-Cypriots, some changes occurred in 2003-04 when there was still the possibility of acceding to the Union. For example, during that period, history textbooks were revised. However, in 2009, when EU accession was no longer on the table, history textbooks were changed again and reflected more nationalistic ideology. This suggests a lack of internalisation of the norm in question. Taking into account the above analysis of political elite rhetoric, it becomes evident that the sustainable peace norm has not been internalised either by the Greek or Turkish-Cypriots.

Transformation from below: tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in civil society

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the process of transforming conflicts requires the involvement of a variety of local actors. Having discussed the official discourse of Cypriot political elites, this section will now move on to trace the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by CSOs. Such organisations convey a different narrative of the conflict in comparison to the one offered by political elites.

\textsuperscript{75} For a discussion on the main differences between the old and new textbooks, see Vural and Özuyanık (2008).
With regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community, CSOs developed an EU-framed narrative to promote reconciliation. For example, in 2000, the ‘This Country is Ours’ scheme was created by several organisations including trade unions and CSOs. As discussed in the previous chapter, this scheme was quite important as more than 40 groups got involved. The scheme strongly advocated a negotiated solution to the conflict and membership of the EU. Also, one of the main aims of this scheme was to promote self-governance for the Turkish-Cypriots and to oppose Turkey’s interference in the “TRNC”’s administration.76

Another initiative was the drafting of the ‘Common Vision of the Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society’ under the leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in 2002. More than 90 organisations signed this document which highlighted the importance of solving the conflict prior to the RoC’s accession to the EU. The founding declaration of the organisation illustrated the value attached to the EU: “we need a transformation. The name of this transformation is solution and European Union membership” (The Common Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society 2002).

Turning to the Greek-Cypriot side, civil society mobilisation was not so widespread. In 2002, the ‘Citizens’ movement for re-unification and co-existence’ was created. The founding declaration noted that one of the main aims was:

> to contribute towards the development and propagation of the culture of peaceful co-existence between Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the other ethnic groups in Cyprus. In a broader sense, to contribute towards the development and propagation of the culture and principles of understanding and co-existence between people, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religion, gender, colour and difference of opinion, within the context of the European Union (Citizens’ Movement for Cooperation and Co-existence 2002)

76 The scheme was created mostly as a response to the austerity measures that Turkey wanted to implement in Northern Cyprus in 2001 (Hoffmeister 2006: 125).
Also, since 2009, most bi-communal CSOs and initiatives were placed under the umbrella organisation ‘Bi-communal Peace Initiative - United Cyprus’. In its founding declaration, the organisation noted “a lasting solution and peace on our island will only be realised by the joining together of the communities, and through their collaboration in social, cultural, economic and political life. Our priority must be to fight the separatist, fascist and racist forces that have been instrumental in the division of our island as well as in the rise of chauvinism and enmity” (Bi-communal Peace Initiative - United Cyprus).

Also, in order to have a complete picture of Greek-Cypriot civil society, it should be noted that, while the aforementioned organisations seemed to agree with the EU’s principles and accepted the Annan Plan, some organisations followed a different line of thought. One such example was the Greek Orthodox Church which adamantly opposed the Annan Plan on the grounds that it was not consistent with international law and human rights principles (International Crisis Group 2006; Kanol 2010: 39). It must be noted that the Greek Orthodox Church is the most trusted institution in the Greek-Cypriot community (‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2009) and, therefore, has a significant role to play in shaping political perceptions of the public.

Interviews with people involved in bi-communal CSOs (Appendix A: 2, 6, 15) demonstrated that these organisations’ aims and agendas were compatible with the EU’s normative framework. Many of these organisations favoured the development of closer relations between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots and accepted the EU-supported federation model as the best political solution to the conflict. However, most of the organisations that joined these schemes and platforms appeared to have formed their agenda prior to the EU’s active involvement in sustainable peace promotion in Cyprus. The idea of EU membership might have been the main driver behind the formation of the aforementioned civil society platforms and the creation of more organisations in the period 2002-2005.
However, most of the pre-existing organisations that joined these platforms had already been advocating these principles in the 1990s, before the EU started engaging with civil society on the island. It is, therefore, difficult to see the promotion of the principle of reconciliation by these groups as a direct impact of the EU. However, what can be concluded is that the prospect of EU accession boosted the activities of such organisations and led to the creation of wider platforms like the ‘This Country is Ours’.

Overall, therefore, civil society demonstrates a different picture in comparison to political elites. Turkish-Cypriot organisations were largely in favour of the EU and its ideas. However, the above analysis revealed that the Greek-Cypriot civil society demonstrated a mixed picture. Although there are some actors that support the EU’s principles, the Church, the most trusted institution in the community, followed a different line of thought.

Public Attitudes

This section will shift the focus to the wider public because conflict transformation approaches suggest that the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm should be observable in concrete changes at the broader societal level. In what follows, public attitudes will be examined by discussing some themes that emerged in interviews conducted by the author and by examining opinion polls on the topic of inter-communal relations in Cyprus. The reason why these opinion polls are important for this thesis is the fact that different opinion polls in different years yielded similar results. This is an indication that perceptions of the other community remained largely unchanged.

First of all, a survey conducted by the University of the West of England (UWE) suggested that the Cyprus conflict was a major public concern in both communities (Flynn et al. 2012). This concurred with surveys conducted in Cyprus that showed that the conflict was the most important determinant of voting behaviour (Ant1 2010, Ant1 2011).
In addition, several opinion polls indicated that both communities shared the views of their political elites. For example, Greek-Cypriots describe the Cyprus conflict as primarily an invasion conducted by a foreign power (Turkey) while Turkish-Cypriots see it as the problem of co-existence between two communities (Flynn et al. 2012: 31). Moreover, the vast majority of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were discontent with the status quo (Tocci et al 2008: 9, ‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2009). This revealed a public desire for changes regarding the political situation on the island and was supported by the fact that both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were in favour of a mutually acceptable solution being reached through the peace process (Tocci et al. 2008). However, Greek-Cypriots’ first preference was the creation of a unitary state with a central government for the whole of Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriots first choice, on the other hand, was the creation of two separate and internationally recognised states (Tocci et al. 2008: 30-33). Interviews showed that Greek-Cypriots feared the possibility of the extensive involvement of Turkey in the affairs of Cyprus while Turkish-Cypriots were worried about a central government dominated by Greek-Cypriots (Appendix A: 5, 6, 8, 17, Appendix B:1).

Also, a prominent theme in opinion polls was the lack of trust between the two communities. For example, one conducted by UNFICYP in 2007 revealed a continuing absence of trust between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots (UNFICYP 2007). Also, the 2010 UNSG report noted that: “Polls indicate […] distrust on both sides that if a settlement were to be reached, the other side would have any serious intention of honouring it” (UNSG 2010). However, another opinion poll conducted by Georgiades (2007) in the same year provided different conclusions. His research demonstrated that only 20% of Greek-Cypriot respondents reported mistrust towards Turkish-Cypriots while even less were pessimistic about peaceful co-existence with them. However, 43% of respondents felt that Greek-Cypriots, as a community, were not yet prepared to coexist with Turkish-
Cypriots. This discrepancy can be explained by reference to another survey. The opinion polls conducted for the purposes of a project launched by CEPS (Tocci et al 2008: 24) revealed that Greek-Cypriots trusted the Turkish-Cypriots (61%) while Turkish-Cypriots (72%) mistrusted Greek-Cypriots. However, Greek-Cypriots mistrusted Turkish political institutions like the army and the government as well as the Turkish-Cypriot political actors who were believed to be following the political line of Ankara (Tocci et al 2008: 24). Taking into consideration the fact that Greek-Cypriots perceived Turkey as being the master of the internal affairs of the “TRNC” (Appendix A: 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 14. Appendix B: 1, 2), the conclusion that levels of trust between the two communities had increased would be mistaken. A more recent survey conducted by UWE revealed that about two-thirds from both samples did not trust the other community. The same survey also revealed that both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots believed that the majority of the other side still distrusted them (Flynn et al. 2012: 57-58).

Also, with regards to the relationship between the two communities, a critical juncture in the development of closer relations between them was the April 2003 decision to open a number of border crossing points. The Green Line Regulation introduced in 2003 provided a legal framework for the free movement of Cypriots. The opening of those crossing points seemed to have been helpful in the process of internalising the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Before 2003, the de facto separation and the lack of any communication had created conditions conducive to negative stereotyping and social categorisation. However, the opening of the crossings, as interviews with experts on the issue (Appendix A: 1, 14, 15, 35) revealed, served to demystify the ‘other’ and to challenge taboos. As Sitas et al (2007) also demonstrated, both communities’ impressions of the ‘other side’ in 2007, four years after the opening of the crossing points, were generally positive (48.1% of Greek-Cypriots, 30.5% of Turkish-Cypriots). As Sözen also argued, “a level of civility
and safety has been created” (Appendix A: 15). This, however, does not necessarily indicate identity modifications. Given the lack of trust between the two communities discussed in the previous paragraph, it is difficult to conclude that development of a more positive impression of the ‘other side’, indicated internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.

Moreover, the preparedness to develop closer relations was addressed in a survey conducted by the Cyprus 2015 initiative that focused on the willingness of the two communities to share the same neighbourhood and to work together. The polling data revealed that Greek-Cypriots were more open than Turkish-Cypriots to live in mixed neighbourhoods. However, a significant percentage (33%) of Greek-Cypriots opposed this idea while 15% were neutral. Turning to the Turkish-Cypriots, 34% of the participants would agree to live in the same neighbourhood with Greek-Cypriots, 35% of them would not while 28% were neutral (‘Cyprus 2015 Initiative’ 2011). Also, the UWE survey (Flynn et al 2012: 59-60) revealed that majorities in the Greek-Cypriot (59.7%) and Turkish-Cypriot (63.8%) communities found it unacceptable to be working under the leadership of a person from the other community.

In addition, the UWE survey also revealed that both communities believed that they are qualitatively different from each other (Flynn et al 2012). These findings were supported by the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) index results. The SCORE Index, developed by the UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT), the Centre of Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) and USAID, is a tool to measure peace in multi-ethnic post-conflict societies. In Cyprus, SCORE was implemented in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The main findings indicated that Greek and Turkish-Cypriots were growing further apart. For example, as noted in the report summarising the results, Turkish-Cypriots demonstrated decreased propensity for reconciliation while for Greek-
Cypriots, cultural distance between the two communities became greater. More significantly, both communities perceived that “they are in fact culturally different” (SCORE 2014).

The empirical data presented above demonstrates that the attitudes of the two communities towards each other did not show significant changes over time. Although, some interaction did indeed take place as a result of the crossings, opinion polls revealed a lack of trust between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots as well as a lack of willingness to intensify contacts thereby hindering progress towards an eventual internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. Comparing the results from opinion polls with the rhetoric of political elites, it seems that the same fears and arguments presented by each side’s political elites were espoused by the public and constitute the foundation of their attitudes. Overall, therefore, in the case of Cyprus, the EU was not successful in inducing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local actors.

6.2.2 Partnership

Partnership as a result of the promotion of principles can be empirically traced in the development of relationships between two parties, in this case between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. In what follows, the development of partnership bonds will be examined at the level of the elites as well as the level of civil society.

Also, what needs to be examined is the extent to which partnerships occurred as a result of EU policies, of the policies of other organisations such as the UN or of the changing internal dynamics. Process tracing will, therefore, be used to determine if and how X (EU initiatives promoting cooperation between the two communities) led to Y (effectiveness of such programmes). Effectiveness, in the context of this research, refers to building sustainable relationships between two parties. In what follows, it will be examined if “(1) a specific event or process took place, (2) a different event or process occurred after the
initial event or process, and (3) the former was a cause of the latter” (Mahoney 2012: 571).

Partnership as a result of specific EU projects

As discussed in the previous chapter, the EU attempted to create further contacts between the two communities through the FAR regulation. This section will discuss whether the projects implemented under these regulations were effective in creating partnership bonds. Following Diez et al (2006), an indicator for the transformation of the conflict would be not only the increased contact between the conflict parties but also the establishment of cross-group social networks.

With particular reference to the role of the EU in creating partnership bonds between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, the ‘Partnership for the Future’ (PFF) needs to be discussed. PFF was funded by the EU through the FAR (see pp.138-140) and implemented by the UNDP. The UNDP-PFF website stated that the “PFF aims at contributing to the peace-building process in Cyprus through different levels of intervention ranging from urban infrastructure rehabilitation to assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the de-mining of the Buffer Zone” (UNDP-PFF). The effectiveness of the projects implemented under UNDP-PFF towards promoting partnership will now be analysed.

One project considered successful by the UND was the ‘New Nicosia Waste Water Treatment Plant’. The project stood as an example of cooperation as the new bi-communal treatment plant was to be jointly managed by the two communities of Nicosia.

77 A large number of bi-communal activities were initiated, funded or implemented by other organisations like the UNDP or the US Embassy. One such programme was ENGAGE which was included in UNESCO’s list of the best projects in the area of reconciliation in 2010 (UNDP-ACT, News). The activities of these organisations fall beyond the scope of this research.
In the context of the project, therefore, technical cooperation emerged between the Municipality of Nicosia [north] and Sewage Board of Nicosia [south] (UNDP 2011:40).

Another significant project was the opening of more crossing points. The Limnitis-Kato Pyrgos road improvement project was implemented between January and October 2010. This specific road had not been used since 1974 and was in poor condition. Improvement of the road was urgent because of a decision by the leaders of the two communities to open a crossing point there. The UNDP-PFF “contracted a joint venture, comprising Greek and Turkish-Cypriot companies, to prepare the designs, which were finalised in January 2010” (UNDP-PFF 2011: 30). A joint venture was also contracted “to supervise the works. This included an Italian company, a Greek-Cypriot company and a Turkish-Cypriot company. The UNDP-PFF undertook intensive facilitation and mediation throughout the project in order to ensure that the crossing point could be opened on time” (UNDP 2011: 39).

In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, cultural heritage activities are considered important by the European Council for confidence building, since, in the past, “the two sides criticised each other for misusing and, often, even destroying, each other’s cultural heritage” (European Council cited in Ackermann 2012: 19). In 2008, following a call from the EP, the European Commission carried out a study on the conditions of the cultural heritage in the northern part of Cyprus (European Commission 2013). A Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage was established in 2008. In 2009, both Cypriot communities agreed to establish an ‘Advisory Board for the Preservation, Physical Protection and Restoration of the Immovable Cultural Heritage of Cyprus’ (PIO, RoC). According to the UNDP-PFF evaluation report, this produced “much impact in terms of reconciliation” (UNDP 2011: 41) as this was one of the few UNDP-PFF projects that involved both sides working together towards achieving a common goal. At the time of
writing, this board is still operational and works on the preservation of several cultural heritage sites. A senior member of this committee confirmed that cooperation between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots had been effective (Appendix A: 18).

**Partnership at the level of civil society**

Following the 1974 invasion, civil society in Cyprus was de facto separated and divided by the Green Line. This led to the development of two distinct civil societies and created a physical obstacle to the development of a unified movement for peace. Nevertheless, over the years, and especially after the opening of the crossing points, there had been relative freedom of movement between the two parts of the island leading to cooperation between CSOs and NGOs across the two sides (Appendix A: 6, 15). In what follows, this section will attempt to trace the extent to which this cooperation emerged as a result of EU policies.

The 1990s saw the founding of some bi-communal groups that placed particular emphasis on the benefits of EU membership. For example, the All Cyprus Union Forum was created in January 1995 with the aim of addressing trade and labour issues in relation to peace and the prospect of EU membership. In 1997, it organised a conference to discuss how the future accession of Cyprus to the European Union could benefit the working class. At the end of the conference, the participant organisations signed a declaration reaffirming their belief that EU accession “will benefit both the economy, the workers and the people of Cyprus as a whole” while they also declared their willingness to “broaden the content of their future contacts and enlarge their cooperation to include the exchange of information on social and labour matters in Europe and to consider ways and means to enter joint activities with the aim of preparing to meet the challenges of being part of the European Union” (All Cyprus Trade Union Forum 1997). The European Commission
expressed its support to these Greek and Turkish-Cypriot trade unionists (van den Broek 1997).

Another example is the Bi-communal Business Forum that was facilitated by Richard Holbrook, then an envoy for US President Clinton. In their meetings, businessmen and women identified some problems and obstacles to the emergence of mutual benefits. More specifically, during that period, the Bi-communal Business Forum was particularly worried about security issues and the lack of stability needed for joint business projects. It also perceived the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s opposition to the RoC’s accession to the EU as an obstacle to moving forward (Hadjipavlou 2007). Thirdly, the EU Federation study group of 1995-6 focused on discussing advantages and disadvantages of possible membership of the EU, and it also examined different models of federation (Wolleh 2000).

Between 1999-2004, with the prospect of entering the EU and with the Annan Plan on the table, a particular kind of citizen-led bi-communal activity was established. Especially in the period 2003-2004, between the opening of the Ledra Palace crossing point in April 2003 and the referendum on the Annan Plan in April 2004 (see Chapter Three), the island experienced an unparalleled emergence of civil society efforts to promote reconciliation. Such activities involved cooperation across the divide, but focused on politically ‘safe’ thematic interests (notably the environment and public health) rather than peacebuilding per se (Appendix A: 2, 6, 15). This was also the main characteristic of EU-induced activities on the island. The EU’s effectiveness in inducing partnership bonds between CSOs on relatively uncontested issues can be best exemplified with regards to CYINDEP, a platform established in 2009 after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Greek-Cypriot NGDO Platform ‘The Development’ and the Turkish-Cypriot Platform Cyprus NGO Network. It was an umbrella organisation of several NGOs from
both communities and received EU funding for several projects related to issues of international development and global citizenship.

Overall, therefore, the most sustainable social networks were established at the level of civil society. During the 1990s, the prospect of EU membership led to the creation of bi-communal groups with particular interest in EU benefits. From 2000 onwards, more social networks were established involving CSOs from both communities. These networks were directly supported by the EU through the receipt of funding for several projects. In addition, partnership emerged as a result of the projects implemented by the UNDP-PFF. The project on the preservation of cultural heritage, for example, resulted in the establishment of a bi-communal advisory committee.

6.2.3 Local Ownership

Local ownership is increasingly being seen as instrumental in peace processes (Reich 2006, Nathan 2007a). According to existing scholarship (Richmond 2011, Nathan 2007a), the views of locals should not only be taken into account by external actors but should become the key drivers of the peace process. From an NPE point of view, as discussed in Chapter Two, a successful implementation of the EU’s normative agenda should lead to local actors designing and implementing policy processes that are in line with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.

Firstly, the negotiation processes that took place in Cyprus were traditionally led by a small number of elites from both communities who justified this elite-centred negotiating approach on the grounds that it allowed them to be more flexible and open to compromise (Appendix A: 3, 6, 12, 14. See also Kaymak et al. 2008:3). However, for any peace process to be locally owned, a variety of political and social actors need to be involved. There is a gradually increasing demand on the part of the wider public for more inclusion
in the peace process. This is evidenced in the results of a survey conducted by the UNDP in 2012 which revealed that the vast majority of both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots believed that their leaders took no notice of their opinion regarding the negotiation processes despite their desire to be consulted (UNDP 2012).

With regards to civil society, several projects (see Chapter 5) were initiated to “strengthen the role of civil society in the Turkish-Cypriot Community and to promote the development of a conducive environment for the further development of trust, dialogue, cooperation and closer relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities as an important step towards a solution to the Cyprus problem” (European Commission 2013b). Especially after 2004, civil society initiatives involving both communities considerably increased due to direct EU involvement and due to the activities of other actors like the UNDP and USAID. Through the creation of a space for communication, the EU aimed to involve local CSOs in the peace process. However, at the time of writing, there has still been no coordination between Track I activities and civil society that reveals a lack of engagement with the local population in the peace process.

However, civil society in Cyprus was rather weak in terms of promoting reconciliation. Bi-communal cooperation, as well as citizen participation in bi-communal events, was very limited (Intrac 2011). The main reason was because bi-communal projects, organised and implemented either by the EU or the UN, were taking place among the usual suspects (Appendix A: 6, 15). In other words, the actors who participate in such bi-communal events are the same NGOs that have always been taking part in such activities. The idea of reconciliation did not spread outside of these spheres (Appendix A: 6, 15).
Overall, therefore, the EU managed to create a space for the voices of CSOs to be heard and for their involvement in bi-communal initiatives and in building trust between the two communities. However, CSOs were not very effective in promoting reconciliation because their activities took place among the usual suspects. This means that the wider public was still not involved in such processes. In addition, there was still not any coordination between negotiations at the elite level with CSO initiatives revealing a lack of engagement with the population.

6.3 THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Since this thesis follows the method of structured, focused comparison, the same questions that were asked in the section on Cyprus will also be asked for Kosovo. This will allow a systematic comparison of the findings of the two cases and reveal whether the EU has produced a normative impact.

6.3.1 Socialisation

This section will address the question of whether the sustainable peace norm was internalised by local actors in Kosovo as a result of EU policies. Just as with Cyprus, the statements of political elites, CSOs as well as public attitudes will be examined to allow for conclusions to be drawn on Kosovan society as a whole.

Official Statements

The norms projected by the EU were extensively referred to in the Kosovar political statements. Kosovar elites, at least in their rhetoric, showed signs of internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by favouring all-inclusiveness and emphasising the need for leaving the past behind.
President Rugova, for example, in a speech to the Kosovo Parliament in 2004, stated he would protect the people’s unity and work for the well-being of all citizens (Rugova 2004). Fatmir Sejdiu, President of Kosovo between 2006 and 2010, engaged in a narrative even more indicative of the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm. He consistently referred to the creation of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Kosovo. For example, in a 2010 lecture at Harvard University, he talked about the importance of civic equality (Sejdiu 2010). Also, at the UNSC, he stated that “it is the overwhelming wish of Kosovo’s people to build a multi-ethnic society with a representative government. The desire to establish institutions, laws and norms which build, protect and maintain a multi-ethnic society is the heart of the government’s work” (Sejdiu 2006).

In addition, Atifete Jahjaga, President of Kosovo between 2011 and 2016, engaged in a similar kind of narrative. Analysing her speeches in different contexts, it becomes evident that she showed a commitment to the maintenance and promotion of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. More specifically, she consistently referred to the principles of all-inclusiveness, democratic multi-ethnic society and reconciliation. She particularly emphasised the need for integration of Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovar structures. The progress on the EU-brokered dialogue was also much welcomed.

In practice our vision of inclusiveness means non-favoring of any ethnic group against any other group. On the contrary, clear and strong legal dispositions are foreseen in protection of the communities […] Although reconciliation is a long process, we seek integration and full participation of communities in the institutional life of central and local level (Jahjaga 2011)

Jahjaga also put emphasis on the need to leave the past behind. One example is the following statement:

Our countries have gone through a painful history, with difficult consequences for all. Drawing lessons from the past, we support the principle that all the countries and all the peoples are equal. Regardless of their size or territory, we all make a contribution in the preservation of peace and stability, leaving forever behind the
politics of hegemony, of threats of use of violence and of historical revisions and ideologies of hate (Jahjaga 2011a, for another example see Jahjaga 2014).

However, the vision of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, as well as progress on the EU-induced dialogue, were often associated with other concrete benefits. For example, sometimes it was explicitly stated that these reforms were taking place because they would lead to EU membership that would bring economic prosperity.

Good neighbourly relations is one of the key conditions for membership into the European Union and the support for the dialogue was based on the principle that the solutions that come out of it must be European solutions. These solutions must be based on the best practices of the EU countries, without which we can neither begin nor conclude the process of membership into the European Union (Jahjaga 2011b)

In addition, as was discussed in Chapter Five, Kosovar officials tended to prioritise and put forward the value of ethnicity when they did not receive any concrete benefits from the EU such as visa liberalisation. This did not reflect a complete internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm but, rather, an adherence to EU values for instrumental reasons.

Turning to Kosovo-Serbs, through the examination of official statements accessed through the UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit, it became evident that they followed a different direction. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Four, following the end of the NATO intervention, Kosovo-Serbs accused Kosovars of attempting ethnic cleansing and the international community for not helping them. As a result, Kosovo-Serbs were negative towards the international community in general (Appendix A: 21, 27).

Kosovo-Serb elite discourse focused on the need for greater political rights and for a better quality of life for their community. As Milovanovic, a Mitrovica-based activist, and a Belgrade-based researcher (Appendix A: 27, Appendix B: 4) explained to the author, Kosovo-Serbs saw Serbia as the guardian that would guarantee their safety and the survival of their ethnic identity, both of which were seen to be threatened by Kosovar domination. This was also evidenced in quotes of political elites. For example,
Nedeljković stated “the Serbian community in the north does not want integration. We believe that integration means lower standards and loss of jobs and it was proven south of the Ibar River. The citizens cannot accept the loss of their identity” (B92 2012b)\textsuperscript{78}. In addition, with regards to the creation of the Serb municipalities, the Executive Director of the municipal administration in North Mitrovica, Adriana Hozić, stated that “the aim of the formation of the A/CSM is the creation of a body that will defend the national interests of the Serbian community in Kosovo” (UNMIK Media Monitoring 2016). Similarly, Nebojša Jović (quoted in Aliu 2011), President of the Serbian National Council for Northern Kosovo, stated: “There are two options. The first is that we are allowed to live inside Serbia, separated from independent Kosovo. The second is that someone expels us from here, which believe me, is hard to achieve”.

To conclude, the analysis of the political statements of elites from both communities showed that Kosovar elite statements were in line with EU principles and values. However, it seems that, to a large extent, the rhetorical abiding to EU ideas was perceived as the only way to further Kosovo’s interests. Kosovo-Serb politicians, on the other hand, were highly critical of the EU and its ideas. For them, the idea of integration with the rest of Kosovo stood in contradiction with their goal of joining Serbia and safeguarding their survival and identity as an ethnic community. This indicates that the EU’s principled idea of multi-ethnicity was not espoused by Kosovo-Serbs who continued to place emphasis on safeguarding their own ethnic identity.

**Education**

Just like in the case study on Cyprus, history education will be discussed here as an indicator of dominant ideologies and perceptions. Different perceptions of past events are

\textsuperscript{78} Similar arguments have been put forward by Krstimir Pantić. See B92, 2011.
one of the major obstacles to conflict transformation and sustainable peace. In Kosovo, these different perceptions were sustained and sometimes exacerbated by the fact that Kosovar and Kosovo-Serb children were taught in separate education systems as a result of the parallel structures in Northern Kosovo (see OSCE 2015: 17). Kosovar children were taught the Kosovo curriculum while Kosovo-Serb children were taught the Serbian curriculum in schools managed by the Serbian state (Appendix A: 30).

In 2009, the OSCE published a report entitled ‘Kosovo non-majority communities within the primary and secondary educational systems’ (OSCE 2009). This report stressed that the existence of two separate school systems was not conducive “to the creation of a system of inter-cultural education where the identity of each group is preserved, the identity of other groups is learned and acknowledged, and mutual understanding, acceptance and tolerance is promoted” (OSCE 2009: 18). Moreover, the report stated that the textbooks used by both Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs “tend to present a slanted and one-sided view of history” (OSCE 2009: 18).

In April 2010, the government of Kosovo published the second draft of the ‘Curriculum for pre-school, primary, secondary and post-secondary education’ that appeared to be more aligned with the norms promoted by the EU. Specifically, one of the main aims of education, according to this report, was to educate young people on democratic citizenship

with specific attention to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of Kosovo society, so as to enable students to deal constructively and positively with issues of diversity and differences; and to cultivate and respect their own rights and the rights of others, regardless of their ethnicity, language, culture, religion, gender, age, social and educational background and economic situation (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 2010).

Following this report, an Independent Commission for the Review of Serbian Language Teaching Materials was appointed by the MEST - following consultation with the ICR -
to review the materials in the Serbian language and to identify any content that was not in line with the constitution of Kosovo. In its comprehensive report, the Commission stated that the main problematic issues in the books used by schools in Kosovo following the Serbian curriculum were “maps indicating Kosovo being still part of Serbia” (Independent Commission for the review of Serbian Language Teaching Materials 2010: 17). It went on to propose that “considering that it is not feasible to address textbook producers in Serbia to publish revised versions of the existing books, the MEST (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology) distributes and instructs schools to visibly place maps of Kosovo in all schools and classrooms where students are taught with Serbian curriculum and textbooks brought in from Serbia” (Independent Commission for the review of Serbian Language Teaching Materials 2010: 17).

Regarding history textbooks, the Commission’s main finding was that “textbooks developed by the Republic of Serbia describe a history of the Serbian people, rather than a history of the territory of modern day Serbia and Kosovo” (Independent Commission for the review of Serbian language teaching materials 2010: 16). The Commission continued by highlighting the importance of peaceful relations being developed among the communities living in Kosovo and the importance of the development of a history curriculum reflecting the cultural diversity of Kosovo. To this end, the Commission proposed that MEST develop a complete Serb-language curriculum and textbooks that treated historical topics in a manner that is in line with Kosovo’s constitution and the Kosovo Curriculum Framework (Independent Commission for the review of Serbian language teaching materials 2010: 16-17).

MEST’s comprehensive education plan for 2011-2016 was evidence that some of the Commission’s proposals had been espoused. One of the main goals was “to promote social inclusion as an overarching concept which encompasses the full participation by
all people, irrespective of their social differences (such as gender, ethnicity, social class and disability), in economic, social and cultural life” (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 2011). With the support of the OSCE High-Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), a textbook was developed and published in 2011 for the learning of Albanian as a second language by students of non-Albanian communities. However, at the time of writing, similar intentions and plans for the Serbian language have not been announced by MEST. However, the November 2015 OSCE report noted that “the existence of two school systems with separate textbooks and curricula, including conflicting historical representations, continues to hamper the development of a multi-ethnic society and requires commitment and action by both Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade institutions” (OSCE 2015: 19-20).

Overall, therefore, although the MEST included the principle of reconciliation in its educational plans, the different education systems and the different interpretations of history taught in schools exacerbated the divisions and were not conducive to the eventual internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.

Transformation from below: tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in civil society

Having analysed the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by political elites, this section will move on to trace the norm with regards to civil society. This will enable a more complete picture of Kosovan society relating to the question at hand.

Firstly, it should be noted that the majority of Kosovar CSOs and think tanks were largely in favour of EU integration. Senior staff of several Pristina-based organisations (Appendix A: 20, 23, 24, 28, 31. Appendix B: 10) interviewed by the author identified EU integration as the most important goal for Kosovo, the realisation of which would
greatly enhance the country’s political and economic situation. Although all of them did identify certain limitations and drawbacks to the EU’s approach, they nonetheless strongly supported Kosovo’s European orientation.

However, there were sources of alternative discourses. The most important one was Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination) created in June 2005. According to Kelmendi (2012: 47), “Vetëvendosje has been, by far, the most successful Kosovan CSO in mobilizing activism, organizing protests, and pressuring authorities in Kosovo”. Vetëvendosje’s rhetoric emphasised Albanian nationalism as opposed to Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character. Characteristically, Vetëvendosje argued for a referendum for Kosovo to join Albania79 (Kosova Press 2010). In addition, Vetëvendosje rejected the multi-ethnic symbols of the Kosovan state. As noted in the organisation’s political programme, “Vetëvendosje is committed to the constitutional definition of Kosova as a state of Albanians and all citizens of Kosova. Vetëvendosje is also committed to returning the national Albanian symbols to the state of Kosova” (Vetëvendosje 2013). It also promoted certain exclusionary practices towards minorities. In stark contrast with the Kosovan government’s declared aim of all-inclusiveness, Vetëvendosje held the view that seats in the parliament for minorities should be eliminated (Vetëvendosje newsletter 2013). Moreover, the movement was very critical of the EU. It argued, for example, that the EU was biased in favour of Kosovo-Serbs who had been “transformed into a super-minority […] They are less than 5% of the population, and are gradually strengthening their control in about 20% of the territory […] This contrast, this asymmetry, is intolerable. Super-minorities and sub-minorities are concepts that challenge equality and reciprocity”

79 For Vetëvendosje, the will of Kosovars should be respected as they constitute the majority within Kosovo. In this respect, the movement rejects positive discrimination (Kurti 2011: 96).
Overall, Vetëvendosje advocated principles that were contrary to the ones promoted by the EU.

In the case of Kosovo, such alternative discourses became quite popular. Vetëvendosje became a political party in 2010 and participated in elections ever since. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, it won 12.69% of the vote while in 2014 it won 13.59% (Election Guide website). Vetëvendosje became, in 2010, the third political party in Kosovo. Therefore, a considerable percentage of the Kosovar population seemed to attach value on principles different from the ones the EU was promoting.

Turning to the Kosovo-Serb community, as already discussed, political elites held largely negative views of the EU and its principles. The main question here is whether the ‘sustainable peace’ norm was internalised by civil society. As a 2010 USAID report noted, leaders of CSOs in Northern Kosovo are perceived as not advocating for the good of the people and as tools of the international community. Their image within their communities is poor, and their activities are mostly focused on community work and issues of general concern for their areas. On several occasions, civil society leaders from the Kosovo Serbian community have been subjected to threats and intimidation, and there have even been attempts on their lives (USAID 2010: 2).

Kosovo-Serb interviewees involved in CSOs confirmed that their image within their community was not very positive (Appendix A: 21, 27).

Nonetheless, there were some NGOs whose mission and activities seemed to be in line with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. One example was the CBM (Community Building Mitrovica), a local grass roots organisation aiming, inter alia, to advance inter-ethnic dialogue. CBM completed several projects in Mitrovica, including a project called ‘Bridging the Divide’ which aimed to overcome ethnic divisions, several youth projects that brought together people from different ethnic backgrounds, multi-ethnic programmes for women as well as a pilot project entitled ‘Human Rights School’
which aimed to provide training on human rights issues (Istrifi and Indezi 2012: 64-75). According to Valdete Idrizi, a strategic advisor at CBM and Remzije Istrefi, a lecturer at the University of Pristina and project manager at CBM, “Through its activities, CBM managed not only to reconstruct human relationships between different ethnic communities of Mitrovica but also to bring communities closer to respective authorities in order to be heard and to change the policies towards solutions aiming at bringing normality in this part of Kosovo” (Istrifi and Indezi 2012: 77).

Another example is NGO-Aktiv, an organisation founded in 2009 in Mitrovica, which aimed to promote inter-ethnic and inter-community cooperation. More specifically, as noted on their website, “We strive to bring about the multilateral interdependence of communities in Kosovo resulting in stable, respectful and non-discriminatory interethnic relations, and foresee inter-ethnic cooperation as being a crucial step in this direction” (NGOAktiv 2009).

To conclude, with regards to Kosovar civil society, although the majority of CSOs favoured European integration and EU values, Vetëvendosje, an organisation that attracted considerable support, was advocating principles and practices contrary to the ones promoted by the EU and advocated by the Kosovan government. Kosovo-Serb civil society also advocated principles opposite to the ones promoted by Kosovo-Serb elites. Some movements like CBM, for example, were advocating inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation.

Public Attitudes

Just like in the case study on Cyprus, this section will trace “deep-rooted changes in publics’ attitudes and positions” (Tocci 2007: 20). Several opinion polls drawn from the
UNDP and USAID’s Early Warning Reports and Public Pulse reports, and from local Kosovar sources are used to offer insights into public attitudes and perceptions.

With regards to transitional justice, opinion polls revealed a notable consensus in both communities to establish the truth about missing persons regardless of their nationality and about war crimes committed in the past, while they also linked this to prospects for reconciliation (UNDP 2007, 2012, 2014). However, both the 2007 and the 2012 polls showed that Kosovars believed that their community had not committed war crimes. In contrast, regarding Kosovo-Serbs, in 2007 the majority believed that they had committed war crimes. However, in 2012 the majority reported that they had not. The 2014 survey (USAID/UNDP 2014) also showed that neither the Kosovars nor the Kosovo-Serbs believed that they had committed war crimes. It, therefore, seems that both communities’ willingness to proceed with war crimes investigations was mostly related to their belief that their community would not be found guilty.

Moreover, the 2012 UNDP survey in Mitrovica revealed there existed considerable ‘ethnic distance’ (the extent of understanding and familiarity between members of different ethnic groups) in the city since the non-interaction between the two communities was persisting. An overwhelming majority of Kosovar respondents (73.6%) reported to not have had any contact with people of non-Albanian ethnic background. This applied for the Kosovo-Serb respondents, too, though to a lesser degree (41.9%) (UNDP 2012: 15)

In addition, several surveys addressed the issue of the development of closer relations between the two communities. Unsurprisingly, a comparison of the results of the Public Pulse surveys conducted in Kosovo since 2005 showed no major changes through the years. Since September 2007, the percentage of Kosovo-Serbs willing to live in the same
town with Kosovars was between 30-40% while the percentage of those willing to live in the same street with Kosovars was much lower (approximately 20% since 2007). The percentage of Kosovo-Serbs willing to work with Kosovars ranged from 30% to 48% since 2007. Lastly, Kosovo-Serbs showed no willingness to engage in marital relations with Kosovars who, for their part, showed the same unwillingness towards Kosovo-Serbs. However, Kosovars were more open towards living in the same town and/or street and working together with Kosovo-Serbs (35% and 28.5% respectively in April 2013).

Combining the responses of Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars outlined above, social acceptance measures were calculated by USAID and UNDP (2013) for both ethnic groups. These measures indicated that there was an increase of Kosovar social acceptance towards the Kosovo-Serb community between October 2012 and April 2013. On the other hand, for the same period, Kosovo-Serb social acceptance of Kosovars decreased (USAID and UNDP 2013). Lastly, a survey conducted by the Platform for Analysis and Research in Northern Kosovo between May and July 2015 confirmed that the ethnic gap between the two communities was not closing (Platform for Analysis and Research 2015: 10).

Overall, therefore, Kosovar perceptions of the ‘other’ became slightly more positive. However, the same is not true for the Kosovo-Serb community that showed less signs of perception modifications. However, it is difficult to conclude that sustainable peace had been internalised by the public. The discussion in this section shows that willingness to develop further interethnic relations was very limited.

6.3.2 Partnership

This section aims to trace the development of partnerships between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars as a result of the promotion of principles by the EU. To this end, it will firstly
focus on the development of relations between elite actors. Then, it will trace the development of partnership bonds as a result of some IPA projects. Lastly, this section will assess the extent to which partnership emerged in civil society. Just like the section on partnership development in Cyprus, the method of process tracing will be employed.

**Partnership between elite actors**

The main way through which the EU tried to create partnership bonds between political actors was the EU-brokered dialogue that resulted in the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. In what follows, the main provisions of this agreement aiming to promote cooperation between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovars will be briefly analysed.

According to reports (see Republic of Kosovo 2014 and 2015) submitted by the Kosovan government to the European External Action Service, the implementation of the provisions of the Brussels Agreement aiming to integrate Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovar structures had produced mixed results. This agreement required, for example, that police in Serb-populated Northern Kosovo should be integrated into the Pristina institutions. The 2014 European Commission report on Kosovo noted that some progress had been made on dismantling the Serb police structures. It was noted that integration had been completed as concerns police officers (European Commission 2014, Government of the Republic of Kosovo 2015).

According to Pristina and Brussels-based Commission officials as well as EULEX officials (Appendix B: 7, 8, 14, 15), the Kosovan police force was generally considered a success story since the Serb minority was relatively well represented. More precisely, by the end of 2013, around 11.49% of the Kosovan police staff were Serb, including both uniformed and civilian staff (Emini, 2013: 15). However, the situation in the north continued to constitute a big challenge. Although the integration of police stations might
have been completed in principle, in reality, many problems continued. Police stations in the north were mainly staffed with Kosovo-Serbs and had very limited communication with headquarters in Pristina (Appendix B: 6, Appendix A: 25, Group for legal and political studies 2013).

Secondly, in February 2015, the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia signed an agreement on the judiciary (Hajdani and Andric 2015). The 2015 report on the implementation of the Brussels agreement noted that during the first implementation phase (May-September 2013) an agreement was reached on the termination of parallel Serb structures of justice in Kosovo. In the second phase (December 2013 to February 2015), there was agreement on the establishment of Kosovo’s legal structures in the northern part as well as the integration of Serb individuals (judges and prosecutors) in the Kosovan justice institutions. At the time of writing, the process of establishing a unitary justice system is underway (Republic of Kosovo 2015: 14-15).

However, a substantial number of agreements faced several impediments in the implementation phase. For example, this was observed with the issue of customs because Serbia had not yet abolished its parallel customs structures in Northern Kosovo. In addition, at the time of writing, the energy, telecom and recognition of university diplomas agreements have not yet been implemented. Lastly, the implementation of the Association of Serb majority municipalities agreement has not yet started (European Commission 2015). Moreover, another provision of the agreement was the removal of the barricade from Mitrovica Bridge as a way to facilitate freedom of movement. At the time of writing, the restoration of the Mitrovica Bridge had not yet started (Republic of Kosovo 2015: 15).
Overall, therefore, a degree of cooperation between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs could be observed in some areas like, for example, the police. However, the non-dismantling of the parallel Serb structures in Northern Kosovo (Republic of Kosovo 2015: 11-12) had become the main obstacle for the development of further partnership bonds between the two communities at the elite level.

**Partnership as a result of IPA Projects**

Since 2007, Kosovo was receiving IPA funds from the EU. In what follows, two of the projects implemented by the IPA will be analysed in order to assess their effectiveness towards the establishment of partnership bonds between Kosovars and Kosovo-Serbs.

One of the IPA projects was concerned with ‘Cultural Heritage’. Its main aim was to provide support for the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed cultural heritage sites. The project was implemented by the RIC (Reconstruction Implementation Commission), an ad hoc management mechanism involving Kosovan and Serb institutions. The RIC was successful in reconstructing the most damaged cultural heritage sites (mainly Serb Orthodox churches) (ECORYS 2013). It seems, therefore, that some partnership bonds did emerge in the process of the implementation of this project.

Secondly, a small IPA project implemented by the NGO ‘Project in Ethnic Relations’ (PER) focused on “improving confidence of local Serbian leaders and improving Albanian-Serbian relations” (ECORYS 2013: 30). The project succeeded in initiating a Kosovar-Serbian dialogue through the organisation of several round-table meetings where approximately 200 Serbs and Kosovars participated. However, the project did not manage to establish a permanent Forum for Dialogue as it had initially desired (ECORYS 2013).

**Partnership at the level of civil society**
In the years prior to the 1998–9 war, civil society was divided and constructed along ethnic lines (KIPRED 2005: 5). Under the Milošević regime, and confronted with the possibility of total marginalisation and non-inclusion in the political, social and economic life, Kosovars developed a parallel socio-economic system. This system was largely coordinated by a government in exile. Its organisation, however, was carried out by a small number of civil society actors (Sterland 2006: 12-14). A prominent role was played by the Mother Teresa Society (MTS), a humanitarian NGO. Although the vast majority of the Kosovar CSOs were focused on service-provision, “they were strongly politicised and nationally oriented as they embodied the goals of the Kosovar nationalist struggle and were a means of peaceful resistance to the Serbian regime” (Sterland 2006: 13).

Turning to the Serbian civil society in Kosovo, it was relatively inactive and only represented by small numbers of traditional government-sponsored community and interest groups (Civicus 2011, Fagan 2006, Fagan 2011).

In the aftermath of the 1998–9 war, relief efforts, although they were coordinated by the UNHCR, were undertaken by a large number of international organisations and INGOs (see Kastrati 2015: 10-11). Aiming to access local communities, and also to strengthen civil society, these international organisations gave large amounts of donor funds to Kosovar local organisations for undertaking short-term, localised projects. This approach encouraged the mushrooming of a large number of NGOs and CSOs, “with the number of locally registered organisations rising from 45 to 400 in the first twelve months alone after the end of hostilities” (Sterland 2006: 18). The origins of a majority of Kosovar CSOs that emerged in the 2000s can thus be traced to direct INGO intervention (Sterland 2006: 20, KCSF 2011)

However, interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that civil society in Kosovo was still largely constructed along ethnic lines. As senior staff working in different CSOs
argued (Appendix A: 21, 23, 28. Appendix B: 10), given the social and territorial division of Kosovo’s society along ethnic lines, Kosovan CSOs were mainly ethnically exclusive. The same was exemplified in the European Commission’s “Kosovo* Civil Society Facility 2014-2015” report which noted that active CSOs in Kosovo were mainly ethnically exclusive and that there was very little cooperation between ethnically divided NGOs (European Commission 2015). The same conclusion was also reached by some reports prepared by Kosovar CSOs. Specifically, a report published by KIPRED (2012) noted that most CSOs were mono-ethnic and only a very small number of them had members from different communities.

However, as Milovanovic (Appendix A: 27) explained to the author, some cooperation between Kosovar and Kosovo-Serb CSOs had emerged, albeit to a quite limited extent. Such cooperation emerged between organisations that shared similar goals (Appendix A: 27). Examples included the ‘Kosovo Women Network’ and ‘Democracy in Action’, two networks comprising local CSOs from different communities (see KCSF 2011: 22).

Overall, at the level of elites, some partnership bonds were created as a result of the implementation of several agreements reached in the framework of the EU-brokered dialogue. However, the existence of Serbian parallel structures in Northern Kosovo was the main obstacle towards the creation of closer partnerships. Moreover, some degree of collaboration emerged as a result of IPA projects, albeit to a limited extent. Lastly, although civil society was constructed along ethnic lines, some partnership bonds emerged between organisations that shared similar values and goals.

**6.3.3 Local Ownership**
As with Cyprus, this section will evaluate the EU’s impact with reference to the extent to which it was successful in encouraging local involvement in the peace process. Specific reference will be made to EULEX and to the EU-brokered dialogue.

Concerning EULEX, in most of its documents and communications, the mission emphasised the importance of local ownership. Yves de Kermabon, the first head of EULEX, for example, stressed that the whole reform process belongs to Kosovans. Specifically, he pledged that “Kosovo authorities will be in the driver’s seat” (quoted in EU Institute for Security Studies 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the central aim of the mission was to assist and support the Kosovan authorities in the rule of law area through an MMA (monitoring, mentoring and advising) approach whilst retaining some executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence, such as war crimes, organised crime and high-level corruption, as well as property and privatisation cases (European Union External Action 2014).

However, according to several interviewees (Appendix A: 20, 21, 23, 26, 28. Appendix B: 10), the agenda-setting process was a top-down one, since it had been EULEX-driven rather than based on priorities that were set and planned locally. This idea was evident in a speech given by Sejdiu, President of Kosovo between 2008-2010, on the process towards Kosovo’s independence. In this speech, Sejdiu stated that everything will be decided by the UN, the EU and NATO in high-level diplomatic meetings (Sejdiu quoted in UNMIK Media Monitoring Unit 2008). The same was also confirmed by an EULEX official interviewed by the author who stated that EULEX tries to consult with local institutions and local CSOs as much as possible. But, in the end, it is “us who make the decisions” (Appendix B: 8) (see also Keukeleire et al. 2011a: 193).
With particular reference to civil society, EULEX has, from the beginning of its involvement, considered it as an important actor (Appendix B: 8). As Steve Smith (quoted in EULEX 2009), the Deputy Head of EULEX’s Programme Office, stated in a speech to civil society representatives “We need your views, your input and your perspective on the rule of law situation in Kosovo. It is only with your involvement that we can build a comprehensive picture”. However, Kosovan CSOs believed that EULEX was not living up to its declared objective to include them in its decision-making process and activities. For them, EULEX was only trying to advertise itself and did not take their insights into consideration (Appendix A: 20, 23. Appendix B: 10). Also, as an EULEX official (Appendix B: 8) explained to the author, “in the past, we used to communicate more with CSOs. But now, many of them do not want to cooperate with us. So, we only cooperate with the ones that are more positive towards EULEX”.

Secondly, with regards to the EU-brokered dialogue, interviews (Appendix A: 21, 23, 24. Appendix B: 10), revealed that it was not very transparent and, as a result, did not have popular backing. “The idea of normalisation of relations was perceived as something people were instructed to do.” (Appendix B: 10). Closely related is the issue of the involvement of the Kosovo-Serb community. For local ownership to emerge, all minority groups in a given country must be involved in the process of decision-making. For any progress on the ground to be locally owned, it must be inclusive. In the case of Kosovo, however, Kosovo-Serbs were not included in such processes. This relates specifically to the Kosovo-Serbs living in Northern Kosovo who refused to participate within Kosovo’s judicial and administrative institutional framework (Appendix A: 21, 27). European Commission officials interviewed by the author, stated that the EU found it a very difficult task to engage Kosovo-Serbs. So, in the words of a Pristina-based Commission official,
they “adopted a hands-off approach to Kosovo-Serbs and conducted all communication with Belgrade” (Appendix B: 7).

To conclude, local ownership did not widely emerge in Kosovo. EULEX was functioning in a top-down way that did not engage in consultations with local authorities and CSOs. In addition, the EU-brokered dialogue was also implemented in a top-down way while Kosovo-Serbs were not included in the process.

6.4 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

In this third part of the NPE framework, the main aim was to identify and evaluate the normativity of the impact that emerged from EU policies towards the two cases under examination. The main focus of this chapter, therefore, was the ability/inability of the EU to induce change in situations of conflict and to diminish the structural obstacles to the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm.

Firstly, socialisation emerged to a greater degree in Kosovo than in Cyprus. The analysis of the data presented above revealed that the internalisation of the sustainable peace norm emerged only to a very limited degree in the case of Cyprus. The discourse of the elites showed that fears and concerns were quite prevalent. Although some alternative discourses did exist, these remain marginalised and are internalised mainly by left-wing CSOs. The fact that the Orthodox Church, which is among the most trusted organisations in Cyprus, followed a discourse of separation was indicative of the marginalisation of alternative discourses. With particular reference to the Turkish-Cypriot community, revisions of the Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks revealed that when EU membership was on the table, some changes towards sustainable peace occurred. However, things took a step backwards after the RoC’s accession to the EU. Moreover, interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that some positive changes occurred in terms of social
categorisation. However, at the level of the public, mistrust and un-willingness for further contacts still existed between the two communities.

Turning to the case of Kosovo, socialisation emerged to a greater degree compared to Cyprus. However, although the elite discourse was in line with EU values and principles, in certain instances, adherence to EU values was presented as the only way towards achieving EU membership. In addition, the political discourse of the Kosovo-Serbs followed a different direction and was not aligned with EU principles. As a second step towards tracing the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm, this chapter looked at the level of civil society. It found that, in the case of Kosovars, the most important civil society groups advanced principles different from the ones promoted by the EU and adopted by the Kosovan government. In the case of Kosovo-Serbs, however, CSOs, like, for example, the CBM, were advocating reconciliation. Lastly, public attitudes did not reveal any concrete changes over the years.

With regards to the EU’s (in)ability to create partnership bonds between the conflict parties, an important difference was observed between the two cases. In Cyprus, partnership emerged mostly at the civil society level. In the case of Kosovo, civil society continued to be constructed along ethnic lines. Some cooperation, however, emerged on such issues like women rights and democracy. Partnership in the case of Kosovo emerged mostly at the level of elites as a result of the agreements reached during the EU-facilitated dialogue.

Lastly, the comparison between Cyprus and Kosovo revealed that local ownership did not emerge in either case. In Cyprus, CSOs had not yet participated in any official negotiation process. For Kosovo, the top-down approach adopted by the EU did not create an environment conducive to local ownership. EULEX was perceived by Kosovars as
employing a top-down approach. Moreover, with regards to the EU-brokered dialogue, interviews revealed that the EU followed a top-down approach and failed to engage the Kosovo-Serb community.

To conclude, the comparative assessment between the two cases demonstrated that the EU was slightly more successful in creating a normative impact in Kosovo than in Cyprus. In particular, socialisation into the ‘sustainable peace’ norm emerged more in Kosovo than in Cyprus. However, the examination of elite discourses leads to the conclusion that cost/benefit calculations might have been the main driver behind this. In addition, partnership bonds were created in both cases. However, in the case of Kosovo, partnership emerged mostly at the elite level as a result of the EU-brokered dialogue while in Cyprus it emerged mostly at the level of civil society. Lastly, in both cases, the EU was not able to encourage local ownership of the peace process, mostly as a result of the top-down approach it followed.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ has attracted much attention in academic research. However, as the literature review in Chapter One illustrated, EU efforts to promote sustainable peace, one of the core EU norms, as Manners (2008: 135) pointed out, have been largely neglected in the resultant literature. Diez and Pace (2011) did, admittedly, examine the normative power of the EU in the field of conflict transformation. However, their main focus was on how the EU’s normative self-construction was conceived by the main actors involved in a conflict. What has not been done, however, is a systematic application of the NPE three-part framework to conflict cases and an assessment of whether the EU is indeed able to transform conflicts and change perceptions of normality with regards to sustainable peace.

In addressing the aforementioned gap, this thesis makes a twofold contribution. Firstly, it applies the NPE framework to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, offering a comprehensive view on the EU’s role in transforming those conflicts. Secondly, it provides some theoretical and methodological insights into the applicability of the NPE framework in the field of conflict transformation more generally.

These aims have been realised by a thorough analysis and comparison of two cases that have been selected on the basis of the extent to which they are expected to conform to the NPE expectations (see Chapter One). This concluding chapter will discuss the contributions of this research to the literature by summarising the main findings on the questions posed in Chapter One and revisiting methodological issues.
7.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Chapter One set out the main research question that guided this thesis as follows: Is the EU a normative power in the field of conflict transformation? This main question was then divided into three sub-questions that correspond to the three parts of the NPE framework: 1) Has ‘sustainable peace’ been an EU objective for Cyprus and Kosovo? 2) Has the EU engaged in these conflicts through persuasion, norm invocation, shaping the discourse of what is normal, attribution of prestige/shaming and/or through model power? 3) Have the EU policies towards Cyprus and Kosovo produced socialisation, partnership and local ownership? In other words, has the EU been able to shape conceptions of what counts as normal?

To address these questions, this research, based on secondary literature, developed an analytical framework with the aim to apply it to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo. Through this analytical tool, the EU’s role in the field of conflict transformation was conceptualised, analysed and judged. However, this framework is not specific to the conflict transformation field. Rather, it can also be used for the purposes of analysing the EU’s normativity in other fields like, for example, human rights and environmental policies.

In addition, this thesis also contributes to the literature by applying this framework to two empirical cases. As several authors noted (Manners 2011: 244, Martin-Mazé 2015: 1285), the NPE concept remains empirically underexplored. This thesis sought to address this research gap and put ‘sustainable peace’, the main norm that the EU should be promoting (Manners 2008: 135), at the centre of the analysis. The application of the NPE framework

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80 For example, a similar framework associating intent, process and impact has been used by Niemann and De Wekker (2010) to analyse the EU’s promotion of democracy and good governance in Moldova.
to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo has led to important empirical insights, both for the EU and with regards to the two case studies.

To begin with, the first question that this thesis sought to address was the extent to which the EU’s main goal was the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm by local Cypriot and Kosovan actors. As Chapter Four demonstrated, this ‘sustainable peace’ norm was central in the EU’s official statements in both cases. EU institutions and officials repeatedly emphasised the importance of reconciliation, multi-ethnicity and the establishment of trust between the conflict parties. In addition, the EU’s preferences for the political solution of the two conflicts could be seen as a step towards ‘sustainable peace’ rather than as a way to institutionalise the conflicts. However, this is still subject to confirmation as a political solution has not yet been implemented in Cyprus. Also, with regards to Kosovo, interviews revealed that Commission officials have reservations about the possibility of decentralisation leading to the betterment of inter-ethnic relations.

In addition, important conclusions were drawn on the EU’s interests. Here, a differentiation was observed between the two cases. The findings on the more-likely case of Kosovo confirmed Diez’s (2005: 625) argument that commitment to a norm can, at the same time, serve the Union’s interests and be consistent with its values. However, this argument was not confirmed by the case of Cyprus where the Union’s interests were not always in line with the premises of the sustainable peace norm. The less-likely case of Cyprus therefore confirmed Merlingen’s (2007: 437) argument that materialistic considerations are often prioritised over the EU’s normative agenda (see Chapter Two).

Thirdly, in both cases, the EU’s normative power and commitment to international law and to the principle of sustainable peace has also been criticised with reference to self-determination and ethnic minority rights. In both cases, the complex nature of
international law has made possible the development of well-grounded criticisms of the EU’s approach. In the case of Cyprus, the development of closer relations between the EU and the Turkish-Cypriots was strongly criticised by Greek-Cypriots as a move that indicated indirect recognition of a self-proclaimed state. For Turkish-Cypriots, on the other hand, the inability of the EU to implement such regulations, like the Direct Trade Regulation, deprived them of basic rights that they believed they should be able to enjoy. Turning to the case of Kosovo, Kosovo-Serb criticisms focused on the selective application of the R2P principle and respect for the principle of the territorial integrity of states. Kosovar criticisms concentrated on EU policies that were interpreted as attempts to compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty.

Regarding the second sub-question, this research contributes to the literature by discussing five NPE mechanisms (see Chapter Two) in relation to the two case studies. The comparative assessment of the two cases revealed that the EU attempted to promote the ‘sustainable peace’ norm mostly through persuasion, norm invocation and shaming. These mechanisms were implemented more extensively in the case of Kosovo, the more-likely case, than in Cyprus, the less-likely case. However, not all of them were always implemented in a normative fashion and in line with NPE expectations. For example, the empirical investigation of the EU’s role in Kosovo demonstrated that its policies, instead of being persuasive, tended to shift towards imposition. In addition, important conclusions have been drawn with regards to the ‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’ mechanism and model power. In the case of Cyprus, most EU projects that aimed to induce such discursive changes were not effectively and efficiently implemented. In the case of Kosovo, some tangible results can be observed. However, these were quite minimal. Lastly, model power was not at play as both cases confirmed that the EU was mostly seen as a path towards instrumental gains. In the case of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots
adopted a more moderate approach at the beginning of the 2000s mostly for economic and political reasons while Greek-Cypriots tried to promote their interests through the EU instead of internalising the EU values because they perceived them as worthy of emulation. As for Kosovo, Kosovars showed a high degree of adherence to EU values, albeit for the instrumental reason that doing so would lead to EU accession. Kosovo-Serbs, however, did not proceed to such discursive adaptations as they do not believe that the EU could help them with their situation.

Concerning the third sub-question, another contribution of this research to existing scholarship is the examination of the EU’s ability to shape conceptions of normality. The sixth chapter of the thesis shifted the focus from the agency of the EU to local conditions on the ground. The comparative assessment between the two cases revealed that the EU has been largely unable to induce identity modifications and shape conceptions of normality in the field of conflict transformation. In the case of Cyprus, no tangible changes have been observed over the years as a result of EU policies and actions. In the case of Kosovo, some changes (political rhetoric and policy practices) were observed. However, these took place mostly due to the prospect of EU accession and to the expected economic gains that would come as a result. Deep-rooted identity modifications had not taken place in either case. As the previous chapters demonstrated, one of the main reasons why the EU was unable to shape normality was because Cypriot and Kosovan actors viewed the EU largely in instrumental terms. In this respect, EU values and principles were not necessarily internalised by local actors. Rather, they were being used by them as a way towards materialistic gains. In other words, the instrumental reasoning and behaviour of Cypriot and Kosovan actors during the chronological period under examination was an impediment towards the internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm.
In addition, another aim of the analysis of the normativity of EU impact was to trace the partnership bonds created between opposing sides in both cases. In the case of Kosovo, partnership emerged mostly at the elite level as a result of the EU-brokered dialogue. For example, progress has been noted with regards to the integration of the police force operating in Northern Kosovo with the one based in Pristina. In the case of Cyprus, partnership emerged mostly at the level of civil society as a result of specific projects or as a result of the value attached to EU principles. However, a similar pattern was not observed concerning the leadership of the two communities.

Lastly, as discussed in Chapter Two which sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis, the participation of local actors in the peace process is considered an important normative outcome as it leads to a sense of ownership and responsibility. However, although the EU has attempted to create channels for local participation in both Cyprus and Kosovo, these were not always effective enough in encouraging local ownership because the EU tended to follow a top-down approach. In the case of Kosovo, for example, EULEX followed, in principle, an MMA approach (see Chapter Six). It established close collaboration with the Kosovan government as well as with the civil society. However, in reality, civil society did not have much agency in initiating any changes as its inputs were not always being taken into consideration. The same has also been observed with regards to the Kosovo-Serb community which was not represented in the EU-brokered dialogue. In Cyprus, on the other hand, as explained in Chapter Five, the EU had a much less direct involvement. This means that there existed less opportunities for local participation in EU-related peace initiatives and, hence, less opportunities for the emergence of local ownership.

Overall, it becomes evident that the applicability of the NPE framework to conflict transformation is challenged on several grounds in all three stages of analysis. Taking
into consideration the selection of the two cases along the more- and less-likely to be in line with the NPE expectations spectrum, certain cross-case conclusions can be drawn. Regarding the NPE objectives, the empirical findings confirmed that the ‘sustainable peace’ norm was central to the EU’s rhetoric and engagement in both cases. However, the EU’s commitment to the norm was compromised in the less-likely case of Cyprus due to the prioritisation of other strategic interests. In addition, the EU’s self-binding practice has been criticised in both cases from a variety of different angles. This can be understood by reference to the fluidity in defining such terms like ‘justice’ as well as to the ambiguous nature of international law that made possible the development of such criticisms. Concerning EU mechanisms, empirical findings suggest that these were more rigorously implemented in Kosovo, the more-likely case. However, even in this more-likely case, EU actions tended to become coercive, thus moving away from NPE expectations. Lastly, regarding EU impact, the instrumental behaviour of Cypriot and Kosovan actors as well as the fact that, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897) noted, “norms do not occur in an ideological vacuum”, posed limitations to the complete internalisation of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm in both cases. Cypriot (e.g political elites) and Kosovan (e.g Kosovo-Serb elites) actors continued to attach more value on principles different to the ones promoted by the EU like, for example, ethnicity.

To conclude, as explained in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the two cases were selected based on the extent to which they were expected to conform to the NPE expectations. This research design was chosen as it would facilitate the generalisability of the research results. This thesis concluded that the EU’s normative power is challenged by both the more- and the less-likely cases. As a result, the empirical findings presented in this research do not support the argument that the EU is a normative power in the field of conflict transformation.
7.3 THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

The main empirical findings presented in the previous section bring into focus some of the main NPE criticisms outlined in Chapter Two. When discussing the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, these criticisms were considered in the sections where empirical findings did not conform to the NPE propositions. This section will focus on the criticisms that were relevant in supporting the main argument of this thesis, namely that the EU cannot be characterised as a normative power in the field of conflict transformation.

With regards to the first stage of analysis, namely EU goals, the main criticism in the literature concerns the motives of the EU behind the promotion of particular norms. For several authors (Merlingen 2007, Wood 2009), the EU promotes certain norms in order to advance its own strategic and economic interests. In the case of Cyprus, for example, strategic considerations (such as the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict on EU-NATO relations) were closely intertwined with the EU’s normative interests. In addition, as Hyde-Price (2006: 226-227) argued, the EU is often used by its member states who want to shape its foreign policy in a way that is favourable to them. This argument becomes relevant in the case of Cyprus where, in certain instances, member state preferences were prioritised over the ‘sustainable peace’ norm. This conclusion, however, was not supported by the case of Kosovo. This research showed that, here, the EU efforts towards the betterment of interethnic relations were in line with the premises of the ‘sustainable peace’ norm and, at the same time, fell within the Union’s strategic interests. This conclusion supports Youngs’ (2004: 419-420) argument that normative concerns and strategic interests go together in the EU’s external relations.

As concerns the second stage of the empirical analysis, namely EU means, the NPE approach puts much emphasis on the importance of dialogue and constructive
engagement. As Keukeleire et al. (2009: 152), whose writings on structural diplomacy\(^{81}\) become relevant in this context, argued

the ‘stronger’ part of diplomacy needs to be accompanied by a dimension of dialogue. This dialogue has to precede and support negotiations, as this is crucial for understanding the endogenous processes and preferences of the target country, society or region and to understand how the structures promoted through structural diplomacy can take these into account (Keukeleire et al. 2009: 152).

However, several authors (Zielonka 2008: 471, see also Jørgensen 2006: 39-40) criticised the EU for the use of coercive means and hard power tools. Some of the empirical findings presented in this research support this criticism. As Chapter Five showed, in several instances, persuasion tended to shift towards imposition. This became more evident in the case of Kosovo where the EU’s involvement was more substantial in comparison to Cyprus. One example was the request, on the part of the EU, for the abandonment of status-related symbols in Kosovo elections (see section 5.2.1).

Lastly, the third stage of the analysis was concerned with the normativity of EU impact which should include socialisation, partnership and local ownership. As Keukeleire (2009: 147) stated, the main purpose of dialogue and constructive engagement “is not simply to shape or influence structures, but to shape or influence structures in such a way that these structures obtain an enduring character and become relatively permanent”. In this third stage of the analysis, the main criticism related to the deficiency of normative impact (Noutcheva 2009: 1081). The empirical findings of this research support this argument since, as Chapter Six demonstrated, the EU has been largely unable to induce identity modifications and to create extensive partnership bonds between opposing sides in both cases. The main reason for this is the instrumental behaviour of local actors and

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\(^{81}\) The concept of structural diplomacy “refers to the process of dialogue and negotiation by which actors in the international system seek to influence or shape sustainable external political, legal, economic, social and security structures at different relevant levels in a given geographic space [from the level of the individual and society, to the state, regional and global levels]” (Keukeleire et al. 2009: 143)
the fact that divisions in both cases are deeply entrenched. In addition, as discussed in Chapter Two, an important aspect of a normative power’s impact is local ownership. The emergence of local ownership would ensure the sustainability of the transformed behaviour once the external actor’s operation come to an end. The empirical findings presented in Chapter Six, however, demonstrate that local ownership did not emerge as a result of EU policies in either of the cases. This can be explained by reference to the top-down approach followed by the EU in Kosovo and to the fact that the EU did not extensively engage with a variety of local actors in Cyprus.

Overall, therefore, some of the criticisms of the NPE argument become relevant in supporting the main argument of this thesis and in explaining why the EU cannot be characterised as a normative power in the field of conflict transformation. In all three stages of analysis, critiques of the EU, as these were put forward in the literature, were used in order to further facilitate an understanding of why NPE works or does not work.

7.4 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

A central element of this research is the extent to which the EU can shape conceptions of normality in cases of conflict. To apply this analytical dimension of NPE to the conflict transformation field, specific questions were posed which have been answered through empirical analysis. In the process, this research made some theoretical and methodological contributions to the state of the art in the field.

Firstly, with regards to the normativity of EU objectives, a challenge arose when attempting to understand whether it was norms or instrumental interests that drove the EU’s behaviour. Manners (Appendix A: 36) referred to the difficulty of distinguishing norms from interests. This thesis, in line with the constructivist understanding, attempted to see norms as constitutive of interests. In implementing this in the empirical analysis,
the researcher was, therefore, guided by the question of whether EU interests and principles can co-exist or whether one refutes the other. If, for example, a norm could not co-exist with the Union’s interests and the EU followed its interests rather than promoting the norm, then this is a strong indicator that the EU is prioritising instrumental interests over values. Also, this research showed that ‘behaving according to norms’ as an indicator of normativity can become largely irrelevant when applying the NPE framework to the field of conflict transformation. As the empirical analysis showed, the contested nature of international law as well as the existence of conflicting, yet equally valid-principles (e.g. self-determination versus territorial integrity of states), led to the development of well-grounded criticisms against the EU’s approach by all relevant actors. This is not to suggest that this indicator should be discarded but, rather, that its applicability in ethnic conflict transformation is problematic. ‘Sustainable peace’ is not so clear-cut as a norm and, especially in cases of ethnic conflict, it is often associated with a number of international law principles and debates. As a result, the assessment of the EU’s self-binding behaviour depends on the viewpoint of each of the relevant actors and how these actors understand ‘justice’, ‘fairness’ and ‘peace’.

Secondly, another methodological contribution of this research has been the operationalisation of the five NPE mechanisms in relation to conflict transformation. In the case of some of these mechanisms, this presented several challenges. For example, norm invocation was particularly difficult as regards the case of Cyprus. In the case of Kosovo, this mechanism was applied through the European Partnerships that required for specific measures to be taken in related fields such as combating ethnic discrimination. In the case of Cyprus, however, the EU did not directly link the island’s accession with conflict transformation. As a result, norm invocation could not be easily detected in enlargement-related activities and policies. A careful reading of empirical evidence,
however, revealed that this mechanism took a different form in Cyprus. Specifically, it was translated into the EU pressing Turkey to show respect for international law. In addition, a methodological contribution was made through the operationalisation of the ‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’ and ‘model power’ mechanisms. A review of the literature has shown that education is important in conflict situations with regards to changing perceptions of ‘the other’. Therefore, the ‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’ mechanism was translated into education-related projects designed to induce long-term identity modifications. Also, model power was translated into local actors’ perception of the EU’s ideas and practices as worthy of emulation. In different contexts, model power could be translated into governments ratifying agreements or changing legislation based on EU practices. As concerns conflict transformation though, an approach that advocates identity changes, model power requires a deeper investigation and is better captured by looking at the value attached by local actors to the principles of reconciliation and multi-ethnicity and at their willingness to modify their behaviour and align it with these values.

Lastly, some methodological problems occurred in attempting to measure the normativity of EU impact. First of all, it has been difficult to determine whether domestic developments emanated from EU policies or from the changing internal environment. Secondly, both Cyprus and Kosovo also engaged with other actors in dialogues and programmes aimed at conflict transformation. Thus, there occurred a methodological problem when attempting to distinguish the EU’s normative impact from that of other actors. Where possible, this research made use of counterfactual reasoning to overcome this problem82.

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82 For a more detailed discussion on the idea of many causes leading to the same outcome, see George and Bennet 2005: 10.
7.5 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Four possible avenues for future research look particularly promising. Firstly, the NPE theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two was applied to the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo which were chosen based on the extent to which they were expected to conform to the NPE expectations. However, the application of this framework to other cases of ethnic conflict would greatly enhance the conclusions drawn in this research. It could, for example, be applied to the cases of Israel-Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Secondly, it may also be useful to consider cases of conflicts that are not ethnic, so as to explore whether results would differ. The EU’s role in the conflicts that emerged in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ could provide insights in this regard.

Thirdly, another possible avenue for future research is to delve deeper into some of the aspects of the NPE theoretical framework. For example, empirical analysis could concentrate on the main factors that inhibited the emergence of local ownership in both Cyprus and Kosovo. This research could also highlight differences and similarities between state actors and civil society actors in both cases.

Lastly, although the NPE theoretical framework was specifically developed with the EU in mind, it could also be used to assess the normativity of other actors. For example, a comparison of the normativity of different actors in a case study (e.g. comparison of the normativity of the EU and the UN in the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo) could lead to the development of interesting conclusions and insights.

Overall, a key task for the NPE research agenda is the systematic operationalisation of key concepts and the conduct of more comparative empirical analysis. This research has made an important contribution by operationalising key indicators of normativity and by
providing a comparative analysis of two cases using the NPE framework. In this way, this thesis has prepared the ground for further research on ‘Normative Power Europe’ in conflict transformation as well as in other fields.
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Anastasiades, N. (2014c) President Anastasiades replies to questions during the press conference on the Cyprus problem, 13/02/2014.

Anastasiades, N. (2014d) President Anastasiades speech at the bipartisan anti-occupation event for the black anniversaries of the coup and the Turkish invasion, 20/07/2014.

Anastasiades, N. (2014e) Address by the President of the Republic Mr Nicos Anastasiades at the Stelios Bi-Communal Business Awards 2014, 14/10/2014.

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Appendix A

List of Interviews Conducted

Cyprus

1. Antoniadou, Praksoulla, President of the United Democrats Party, Nicosia, 18.3.2014

2. Elcil, Şener, Secretary General of TC Teachers Union (KTÖS), Nicosia, 22.7.2014

3. Erchin, Erhan, Under-Secretary of the Turkish Cypriot MFA, Nicosia, 23.7.2014

4. Iakovou, Christos, Director of the Cyprus Centre of Studies, Nicosia, 16.3.2014

5. Izcan, Izzet, Founder of the Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi (Cyprus United Party), Nicosia, 4.7.2014


8. Koutsou, Nikos, one of the founders of the Movement for Europe (1989), founding member and Vice-president (since 1996) of the European Democratic Party (EDP), Founding member and Deputy President of the European Party since 2005, member of the National Council, the supreme advisory body to the President of the Republic on the Cyprus problem, since 1996, Nicosia, 26.03.2014

9. Lillikas, George, Former minister of foreign affairs, one of the founders of the Movement for Europe, Nicosia, 27.03.2014

10. Lyssaridis, Vasos, one of the founding members of EDEK (Socialist party), participant in the 1959 London Conference for Cyprus independence, Nicosia, 28.03.2014

11. Neofitou, Averof, Vice President of the political party DISI, Nicosia, 20.3.2014

12. Omirou, Giannakis, President of the House of Representatives and President of the Movement of Social Democrats EDEK, Nicosia, 20.3.2014

13. Ozsogan, Muhittin Tolga, Faculty Member of the Near East University TRNC, Nicosia, 16.7.2014

14. Perdikis, Giorgos, Member of the House of Representatives and President of the Cyprus Green Party, Nicosia, 23.3.2014

15. Sözen, Ahmet Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Eastern Mediterranean University, TRNC, 7.7.2014

17. Tsielepis, Toumazos, Advisor of the former President of the RoC, Nicosia, 19.03.2014

18. Xatzigeorgiou, Takis, Former MEP, Nicosia 20.03.2014

**Kosovo**

19. Baliqi, Bekim, Professor of the political sciences Faculty and prominent Kosovar analyst, Pristina, 28. 2. 2014

20. Director of a research Centre, Pristina, 04.03.2014

21. Dimitrijevic, Pavle, Executive Director of Bureau for Social research (BIRODI), 18.09.2015

22. Haxholli, Fatmir, Political Analyst, Pristina, 3. 3. 2014


24. Director of a Research Institute, Pristina, 05.03.2014

25. Lama, Alma, Member of Kosova Parliament, Pristina, 26. 2. 2014

26. Luzha, Besa, Programme Co-ordinator at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Prishtina Office, Pristina, 3. 3. 2014

27. Milovanovic, Dina, Researcher at the Centre for Peace and Tolerance, 01.09.2016

28. Director of a Research Centre, Pristina 27.02.2014

29. Nesovic, Branislav, Former Program Director, NGO Aktiv, Mitrovica, 11.09.16

30. Pupovci, Dukagjin, Education Specialist, Kosova Centre for Education, 10.08.16

31. Senior Researcher, Pristina, 25. 2. 2014

32. Shahini, Besa, Senior Analyst with ESI (European Stability Initiative), Pristina, 6.3.2014

33. Wechsler, William, Professor at the American University in Kosovo, Pristina, 25. 2. 2014

**Brussels**

34. Feith, Pieter, Former European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and International Civilian Representative in Kosovo, skype interview, 17.08.2014
Academic Experts

35. Ker-Lindsay, James, Eurobank Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe, London, 8. 4. 2014

36. Manners, Ian, Professor at the University of Copenhagen and formulator of the Normative Power Europe concept, 02.09.2015
Appendix B

List of interviewees that asked not to be identified in this thesis

Cyprus

1. Professor of Political Sciences, Nicosia, 12.06.2014
2. Professor at the European University Cyprus, Nicosia, 17.3.2014

Kosovo

4. Senior Researcher, Belgrade, Serbia, Skype Interview, 29.08.2015
5. Senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pristina, 3.3.2014
7. Senior official, EU Office in Kosovo, Pristina, 28.2.2014
8. Senior official, EULEX, 5.3.2014
10. Senior member of a civil society organisation, Pristina, 27.02.2014

Brussels

12. Official, European Commission, telephone interview, 22.08.2014
14. Official, European Commission, telephone interview, 08.08.2014
15. Official, DG Enlargement, email interview, 27.08.2014