Hearn, Bruce, Strange, Roger and Piesse, Jenifer (2017) Social elites on the board and executive pay in developing countries: evidence from Africa. Journal of World Business, 52 (2). pp. 230-243. ISSN 1090-9516
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Abstract
This study applies a new multi-focal actor-centered institution-theoretic approach to examine the association between executive pay and the recruitment of social elites to the board of directors in developing countries. We use a sample of 119 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 17 African stock markets to model this relationship. The results suggest that a higher proportion of elites on the board is associated with lower executive pay. This is moderated by institutional quality; that is, lower institutional quality is associated with more directors drawn from social elites and with higher pay, while the opposite is true in higher-institutional-quality environments. Our findings confirm the importance of the social environment within which governance is embedded.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | University of Sussex Business School > Business and Management |
Depositing User: | Joy Blake |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2017 09:52 |
Last Modified: | 19 Mar 2021 15:49 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/66034 |
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