Embrey2018_Article_StrategyRevisionOpportunitiesA.pdf (1014.59 kB)
Strategy revision opportunities and collusion
Version 2 2023-06-12, 08:34
Version 1 2023-06-09, 04:09
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-12, 08:34 authored by Matthew EmbreyMatthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel, Ronald PeetersThis paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Published version
Journal
Experimental EconomicsISSN
1386-4157Publisher
SpringerExternal DOI
Issue
4Volume
22Page range
834-856Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Notes
JEL classification codes C73, C92, D43.Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2018-07-11First Open Access (FOA) Date
2018-07-11First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2018-07-11Usage metrics
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