Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

Embrey, Matthew, Mengel, Friederike and Peeters, Ronald (2018) Strategy revision opportunities and collusion. Experimental Economics. ISSN 1386-4157

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Abstract

This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: JEL classification codes C73, C92, D43.
Keywords: strategy revision opportunities · cooperation · repeated games · complements vs. substitutes
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Depositing User: Matthew Embrey
Date Deposited: 11 Jul 2018 12:36
Last Modified: 02 Jul 2019 14:00
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65626

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