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Embrey, Matthew, Mengel, Friederike and Peeters, Ronald (2019) Strategy revision opportunities and collusion. Experimental Economics, 22 (4). pp. 834-856. ISSN 1386-4157
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
Abstract
This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | JEL classification codes C73, C92, D43. |
Keywords: | strategy revision opportunities, cooperation, repeated games, complements vs. substitutes |
Schools and Departments: | University of Sussex Business School > Economics |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | Matthew Embrey |
Date Deposited: | 11 Jul 2018 12:36 |
Last Modified: | 04 Sep 2020 14:45 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65626 |
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