“(East) Asia” as a Platform for Debate: Grouping and Bioethics

ABSTRACT

This article examines the use of the notions of Asian and East Asian in definitions of bioethics. Using examples from East Asia, I argue that the verbal Asianisation of bioethics is based on the notion of Asia as a family metaphor and serves as a platform of bioethical debate, networking and political change. I maintain that the use of “Asia” and “East Asia” to shape bioethics is not so much a sign of inward-looking regionalism, but an attempt to build bridges among Asian countries, while putting up a common stance against what educated elites interpret as undesirable global trends of Westernisation through bioethics. Using the notions of “grouping” and “segmentary systems” (Evans-Pritchard 1969) to show the performative nature of characterisations of (East) Asian bioethics, allowing users to mark regional identity, share meanings, take political position, and network. Deploying Peter Haas’s notion of “epistemic communities” (1992), I argue that academic and political elites translate “home” issues into “Asia speak”, while at the same time, introducing and giving shape to “new” bioethical issues. Although the “Asianisms” and group-marking activities of Asian networks of bioethics are ideological, thereby engaging in the politics of in/exclusion, they succeed in putting politically sensitive topics on the agenda.

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the ways in which the use of the notion of Asian bioethics since the 1990s has become a tool for building a platform of debate among East Asian countries. In many ways, the use of “Asian bioethics” is in an effort to counter what is perceived as Western bioethics and characterized by what are regarded as Western tendencies of individualism, rationalism, and modernization. I will argue, however, that, just as any notion of “Western bioethics”, the concept of “Asian bioethics” offers little potential to solve issues of bioethical governance. First, although no doubt the notion of “bioethics” has been and is used hegemonically to push certain agendas, the view that bioethical issues in Asia and in the “West” are
always understood differently should be questioned (Aoki and Saeki 1998; Oshimura 1998), and requires empirical verification. This also applies in the case of bioethics (Morioka 2012). Differences in bioethical views among Asian countries may be greater than the term “Asian bioethics” suggests (De Castro 1999; Buruma and Margalit 2004; Oshimura 1998; Yu 2003). Second, the dynamics of the political aspects of the notion of bioethics is usually ignored. Inspired by Gerd Baumann (2006), I argue that the way in which key actors represent “Asian bioethics” resembles the politics in segmentary political systems as described by anthropologist Evans-Prichard (1969). “Asia” here refers to the apex of a segmentary group of Asian nation-states, where representatives define the stakes, issues and loyalties of groups at a lower political level. This process is reiterated at lower organisational levels, so that groups who are allies at one level may find themselves opponents at other levels. Third, attempts to define “Asian ethics” are usually based on elite representations of the interests and problems involved in bioethical issues, often leaving the voices of the most vulnerable groups underrepresented. The resultant mélange of formulations and interpretations of Asian bioethics makes bioethical governance challenging.

Nevertheless, the concept of “Asian bioethics” is enthusiastically used in debates, meetings, public media, and textbooks, where different stakeholders use the same terminology to express bioethical problems and solutions as they see fit. Among those stakeholders, members of national academic and policy-making communities, the so-called “epistemological communities” (Haas 1992), weave their own views on bioethics into regulatory documents used in bioethical governance. Among epistemic community members that enter transnational partnerships under an “Asian” flag are formal and informal representatives of nation-states, active in the formation of Asian political networks of power, such as ASEAN, and groups opposing nation-state policies that pursue their own aims. These latter groups only marginally share a “resistance” to “globalization” and “the West,” but use the template of Orient versus Occident to put new issues on the agenda, mobilize loyalties, and to normalize their own definitions of “Asian-ness.”

In this paper I argue that, although discussions on Asian bioethics may be increasingly inclusive of diverse views, they often direct attention away from political and economic stakes and inequalities. The analysis of “groupism” and “(East) Asia” as a platform of debate I introduce below are of direct relevance to how debates on bioethics in Asia are held: First, as in the use of “(East) Asia” as a platform of
bioethics debate “(East) Asia” tends to be contrasted with “the West”, its analysis shows how conversations are pre-structured in terms of clusters of polarized notions associated with these terms. Second, it helps us realize that in debates on “(East)Asian” bioethics the notions of “(East) Asia” are used politically and have little to do with the conditions and views of the populations in the demographic areas the concept refers to. Although a similar argument could be made about any use of “Western bioethics”, the notion is used mainly as a foil to “(East) Asian” bioethics. The orientations of such geographical rooting of bioethics tend to adopt, in the social sciences, much criticized approaches of Orientalism and Occidentalism (Said 1986; Buruma & Margalit 2004; Dale 1995; Sleeboom 2004). The use of the notion of “(East) Asia”, if employed as part of an academic argument, would require rigorous and overt analysis of empirical evidence, which it usually does not. Third, the notion of “(East) Asia” among members of interest groups in Asia as a platform of debate has the potential to fruitfully clarify similarities and differences in the positions of interlocutors, and form the basis of positive exchanges among them, but such use is always structured by the pre-existing political frame of “(East) Asia” versus “the West”. This point is augmented by the fact that even the works that seek to overcome the polarizing effects of this kind of framing, such as the work by Professor Renzong Qiu (see below) need to redefine notions associated with “Asia”, “the West” and “the universal” to make their point. Finally, although the functions of “(East) Asia” as a platform of political debate of bioethics allows the creation of new alliances and can introduce important issues of bioethical debate, such networks, as shall be argued below, run the risk of becoming semi-exclusive circles.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This article examines how the notions of Asia and East Asia modulate bioethics or bioethical issues. Because these notions function as vehicles for conveying political messages in the light of bioethical governance, we cannot expect them to be used in an analytically consistent manner. This is why it is not uncommon and not usually remarked upon that the notions of “Asia” and “East Asia” are used interchangeably when defining “(East) Asian bioethics”. The notions are often used to attain certain discursive effects (Fisher 2003) rather than to represent geographical regions on the basis of empirical observation. The notion of “Asia”, then, is often used without reflection on whether it is actually representative of Asia.
What I aim to do in this article is to examine how the notions of Asia and/or East Asia are mobilized in bioethical discourse and to observe their effects. To do this, I use examples of a few widely respected scholars from East Asia. Naturally, these examples do not represent bioethical debate in Asia and East Asia, and do not represent the bioethics of certain countries and regions; they serve to illustrate the deployment and performance of these terms. I have strategically selected examples from experts that use Asia/East Asia in their bioethical discourse: first, they are important, widely-read scholars; second, the scholars use Asia/East Asia in their work to communicate important messages to their audiences; and, third, the chosen examples illustrate the mechanisms of what I call “grouping.”

My references to these authors and their works aim to comment on the ways on which the notion of “(East) Asia” frames debate. Naturally, these works must also be understood and appreciated in their original context, in the spirit in which they were written, and on their own terms. Again, the references I make to scholars are meant to exemplify modes of conceptual usage, in this article limited to the notion of “(East) Asian” bioethics; the article neither tries to neither represent nor to comment on the rapidly growing body of academic scholarship in the field of bioethics in Asia.

ASIA AS A PLATFORM OF DEBATE

After the end of the Cold War, and with the realignment of political and economic power in Asia, new global configurations of power have been formed. In this new context, approaches that understand the notion of Asia in terms of reactivity (Huntington 1993; Amako 1998; Mohamad 1999) can no longer capture its political and cultural relevance on a global level. Since the 1990s, the concept of (East) Asian bioethics has increasingly acquired a new function as a platform of debate to discuss bioethical issues. But although debates on Asian values have often seemed to focus on issues of identity-making for a home audience (Hein & Hammond 1995), in the context of bioethics, formulations of East Asian and Asian values are directed at gaining support and stimulate debate at home, as well as extending connection networks across national boundaries.

It is unclear, however, how the formulation of bioethics is managed in interactions between countries with different political and socioeconomic organizations and cultures, such as Japan and China. The question arises as to why and how home discourses are translated into a common language of Asian and East
Asian bioethics when interests at stake seem to be so obviously at odds. In this article, I try to explain this translation using the notion of grouping: the creation and ascription of meaning to what we regard as Us and Other groups. Grouping takes place in reference to any human group unit, including the family, the community, the company, the nation-state, and parts of the world. Whether we make sense in conversation with members of other groups largely depends on whether the communications of our group views resonate. For instance, when a Caucasian European champions harmony and family values in China, this raises questions.

Analyzing notions of Asian and East Asian bioethics, I aim to show some structural features of the theoretical notion of grouping in relation to notions of Asian bioethics, illustrating how the symbolic metaphor of the “Asian” family links racial, cultural, and universalist values to account for larger political and economic changes. As a form of grouping, the notion of (East) Asian bioethics has performative value and multiple functions, including regional identity marking, connecting through shared meanings, political positioning, and group formation through networking. Before discussing these functions, I start with a general example, uttered by a well-known policy-maker *cum* philosopher from Taiwan:

> Unlike Western people, we [Asians] believe the head of the household takes responsibility for the health of the family, as the family is more important than the individual. (Personal communication, July 2004)

This statement signifies identity, expresses shared meaning, and performs political and strategic networking. Emphasizing the performative and the regenerative aspects of contemporary notions of (East) Asia in the context of bioethics, this interpretation shifts attention away from notions of traditional cultures to the politics of identity making, and emphasizes the symbolic and performative aspects of grouping:

1. **Signifiers:** As signifier of symbolic meaning - a geographical area, a particular range of values, an era, such as (East) Asian tradition, modernity, or the (East) Asian twenty-first century;
2. **Family metaphor:** As family metaphor, the notion of (East) Asia may refer and appeal to affect any symbolic values associated with Asian-ness;
3. **A mode of Strategic group positioning:** The definition of “us” groups;
4. A way of structuring networks: As structuring device, it links groups, while generating new organizational networks, ideas, and connections.

I will discuss these aspects of grouping in relation to bioethics in “(East) Asia” to argue that, since the 1990s, the notion of Asia is not so much a mode of (reverse) Orientalist suppression, but a tool for asserting political and social meaning. The notion of (East) Asia has performative, political meaning, while it’s structuring function is mainly self-assertive. When used by leading academics in epistemic knowledge communities (Haas 1992), the notion of (East) Asia expresses “anti-Western” resistance to a globalizing world dominated by “Western” values. Rather than commenting on values in Europe or the USA, “(East)Asian bioethics” uses “the West” as a foil in struggles at home. Although debates framed in terms of “(East) Asian” values may be widely criticized at home, they nevertheless persist as a transnational platform of debate or backdrop that mobilizes support for home causes and ideas on life science strategies on a global level. As platform of debate, “(East) Asia speak” serves the mobilization of support and structuring of bioethical debate through various modes of grouping; as a concept spreading in transnational networks, it facilitates the process of common identity-formation and the building of bridges in a growing political space of East Asian bioethics.

GROUPING AND ASIAN BIOETHICS

In this part, I discuss four functional aspects of grouping (signifiers, the family metaphor, strategic group positioning and network structuring), important to processes of bioethical identity formation and bridge building through the mobilization of notions of East Asia and Asia.

1. Signifiers – boundary markers of distance and difference

Societies define themselves through collective notions of those we identify with (Us) and Others. Such notions of Us and Others are continually subject to change as we change allegiances. The use of boundary markers between groups has often been associated with nationalist discourses. For instance, natural and cultural markers between the Japanese and “the West” (Tanaka 1993; Dale 1995; Sleeboom 2004) have been regarded as evidence of an inward-looking attitude and nationalist sentiment.
However, the use of such markers can be flexible, allowing for exceptions and re-interpretation. The signifiers introduced here (natural, cultural and universal markers) indicate degrees of distance and difference, but at the same time, an “Us” identity. But naturalist, culturalist, and universalist markers such as race, language, and science, although usually indicating permanency, malleability, and flexibility of group boundaries (see Table 1), may change in meaning over time.

Table 1: Boundary markers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markers:</th>
<th>Naturalist</th>
<th>Culturalist</th>
<th>Universalist</th>
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<tr>
<td>Boundaries:</td>
<td>rigid</td>
<td>flexible</td>
<td>ambiguous</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>perforated</td>
<td>none</td>
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Distinctions between groups based on what are often perceived as natural markers such as gender, genetics, and race can be rigid, as natural boundaries are thought to be harder to cross than cultural ones. Thus, natural markers, such as genetics, the brain, and blood, are often used to indicate the permanent differences between groups and are chosen for their presumed unalterable nature. Natural markers may provide crude means of delineation, legitimizing and consolidating rigid forms of social division and power distribution in society. When described as “natural” in terms of “milieu,” “race,” “genetic make-up,” and “natural language,” the national “Us” seems to be organically unified and robust. This is exemplified in the work of Umehara Takeshi, founding director of the International Research Centre for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken).1 Umehara argued that the Ainu, who are “indigenous” to Japan, are the carriers of the original essence of the Mongolian race underpinning Asian values: “They can show us the way back to the natural harmony of native forest life” (Umehara and Hanihara 1982). However, Li Shaolian, who subscribes to evolutionary laws of social change, when speaking of the Chinese, regards the differentiation between ethnic groups as an advantageous condition for the merger between the races: the “national coherent force” [ningjuli] at work in Chinese civilization (Li 1990).

1 Nichibunken is widely seen as a vehicle for nationalist debate. The research institute was founded in 1987 by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture with the support of former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.
Modes of culturalist grouping assign a shared identity to the inhabitants of nations (or world parts) on the basis of spiritual and cognitive factors, using cultural markers, such as shared history, customs, language, cultural knowledge, group psyche, and family organization. As exemplified below, these features trace back to an ancient cultural source, or may be thought to be inherent to language, cultural genes, and collective subconscious. Some culturalist classifications become “natural” by combining categories, such as in discourses on the “cultural gene,” or views of language as honed in the brain, affecting social behavior. Such discursive boundaries between social groups mark insurmountable difference. Thus, philosopher Liu Changlin summarized the Chinese mode of traditional thought as the ten aspects of the “cultural gene” (wenhuajiyin). According to Liu, Chinese traditional culture forms a holistic unity and is clearly characterized by a tendency toward Yin (the feminine) (Liu 1990, 578-81). Culturalist classifications generally presume that designated groups are capable of crossing boundaries. But despite this relative flexibility, small cultural differences, too, can escalate into major conflicts, fuelled by disputes over language, sociocultural belonging, sacred symbols, territorial rights, and the infringement of sovereign rights.

Universalist markers indicate the absence of group boundaries for ideological reasons. Such markers are ambiguous, as universal criteria may hide cultural norms. Universalist markers of civilization, modernization, struggle, class, field, global religion, science, wisdom, art and bioethics advertise their universal validity and objectivity, but are ultimately rooted in specific national tradition. Thus, Kenichi Ohmae, in his *The Borderless World* (1994), adopted a view of the world based on self-organization and network relations, while attributing a holistic tendency for spontaneous self-organization to Japanese society. Underlying universalist notions about progress, development and modernization is the presumption that all sources needed for attaining happiness and prosperity are potentially available to all peoples under the right conditions and by applying the right methods. Similarly, ‘universal’ notions of bioethics that presume the disposal of resources that are only available to some falsely indicate the absence of group boundaries.

In brief, this section showed the use of culture, nature and universal boundary markers, and demonstrated how grouping can create distance between groups variously, depending on the use of the group markers.
2. The Family Metaphor: Grouping and Building Group Identity in Asian Bioethics

In this section, I show how the family metaphor is mobilized in attempts to overcome the marked discursive differences among (East) Asian countries in the semantic construction of (East) Asia. Here, a distinction between the notions of the Other (Fabian 1983) and Them draws attention to the different referents in Orientalism and Occidentalist (Buruma and Margalit 2004).

The nation-state in many Asian countries has long been symbolized by the metaphor of the family, rooted in images of the patrilineal household. The rooting of the cultural notion of the household into the “natural” family contributes to the perception of cultural symbols as stable and everlasting (Hattori 2003; Fan 1997; Lee and Ho 2007). Quasi-kinship ties easily link the cultural with the natural, and are endowed with robust stability expressed in notions of lineage, natural affinity, intuitive understanding, and a native knowledge of linguistic and behavioral codes (Sleeboom 2004). In other words, the “natural closeness” of blood ties and the shared social experiences of family members yields a strong symbolic image.

The family metaphor allows for the flexible expression of family identity and family resemblance. For instance, the use of “we” in Japan may refer to we Japanese, we of this company, and we friends, and its use in China may refer to we Chinese, we members of this work unit or we from this village. When individuals from different Asian countries meet, “We” can also refer to “Us Asians” to authoritatively exert political pressure on common opponents or group members. In this context “the West” is usually regarded as a powerful referent. Here, I make a distinction between “the Other” and “Them.” In Orientalist discourses, which have defined “the West” using polarized contrasts with the Orient (Fabian 1983; Said 1979), “the Other” expresses the unequal relationship from a top-down perspective, based on the temporalization of “the primitive Other” contrasted with the “contemporary Self.” I employ the term “Them” here from the point of view of Occidentalist, using a bottom-up perspective, to refer to a powerful referent group personalized as a modern, rationalist authority, here “the West.” The presence of “Them” reminds the Us-group that “Them” is needed to forge a distinct Asian self. In the discursive Asianisation of bioethics, discursive constructs of Western bioethics are contrasted with multiple home-grown notions of bioethics that exist by virtue of being different from “Western” bioethics experienced as powerful and hegemonic.
The family metaphor is rooted in a combination of naturalist (family lineage), culturalist (traditional ethos) and universalist (expansionist) markers. This is illustrated by some notions of East Asian bioethics in the work of Professor Hyakudai Sakamoto (co-founder with Professor Renzung Qiu of the East Asian Association for Bioethics [EAAB]). Sakamoto explained that:

East Asian bioethics represents an effort not only to deny the European ideal of individual autonomy, but also [to] harmonize it with the new holistic paternalism of our own East Asian traditional ethos (Sakamoto 1995, 30, cited in Robertson 2005).

This formulation defines Us in contrast with a European referent on the basis of “East Asian” notions rooted in time and in hierarchical family structures. The formulation harbors a plan to neutralize a European ideal by internalizing it into “our” traditional ethos. This civilizing effort is expressed in Sakamoto’s views on human rights, eugenics, and paternalism in the context of genetic engineering.

The state, here, is closely associated with family structures, indicating close cultural and biological ties. In the case of Japan, Jennifer Robertson has scrutinized its links with expansionist and eugenic state policies from a historical perspective (Robertson 2005). But Sakamoto’s proposed notion of harmonious activity, based on the progress of science and technology, is explicit about its political orientation:

This way of thinking might lead to a new sort of communitarianism or, dare I say, perhaps even paternalism and eugenics, which have long been rejected in the Western world as involving the violation of human rights. We have to restrain ourselves from insisting on human rights too much. A philosophy of this new kind of communitarianism or paternalism will be backed up by many Asian traditional thoughts, for instance, by the Confucian ethical idea of putting a higher value on harmony and social benevolence than on human rights (Sakamoto 2012, 141).

Sakamoto gives an example:

The one-child policy in China would be an apparent violation of fundamental
human rights from a Western perspective. However, it would be acceptable from a communitarian viewpoint, because it will prevent overpopulation in China, or even in the world (Sakamoto 2012, 139).

Sakamoto here expresses alliance with China as fellow-Asian. Claiming to speak for Oriental or Asian mentalities, Sakamoto asks:

Are the concepts of “person” and “human rights” not fictitious constructs, which are applicable only in Western societies? For us to survive, substantial justification for human dignity should not come from the fiction of human rights, but from the scientific fact that we are now living in nature. (140)

Sakamoto prefers “the possibility of harmonious holism,” which assigns a higher value to total and social order than to individual interests or individual rights and dignity, and this order is accomplished by the proper assignment of social roles and the fulfillment of corresponding responsibilities by individuals, groups, or classes (Sakamoto 2012, 142).

Although the language of paternalism, eugenics, and communitarianism is reminiscent of Japanese expansionist policies of the 1930s and 1940s (Robertson 2005; Hein and Hammond 1995; Hamano 1997), this trend, in my view, is not a prelude to the next Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere or an attempt at the global expansionism of Asian bioethics. Despite the regionalist rhetoric, Sakamoto expresses a political identity, which is directed against policies on the life sciences at home. In his view, these “Western” policies favor life science innovation rather than “nature”, and are supported by proponents of universal human rights, rather than Eastern views of nature (Sakamoto 2012). The next two sections discuss how grouping in bioethics serves politics at home and strategic positioning on the world stage.

3. Strategic Group Positioning: “(East) Asian” Bioethics and the “Absentees” in Epistemic Communities

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2 Sakamoto clearly does not realize that his co-founder of the EAAB, Qiu, does not espouse notions of eugenics in the sense of valuing some humans above others.
“(East) Asian bioethics” performs at the interface between life science, government, and societies, and, as a communicative network, links global life science discussions between nation-states with diverging political interests and standards of wealth. In this section I discuss the notion of grouping in Asian bioethics as a segmentary system, using Peter Haas’s concept of epistemic communities, and introduce the notion of The Absentees, referring to un- or misrepresented groups in Asian bioethics. My discussion of the relationship between (East) Asia speak and of the conditions in which bioethical guidelines are created shows how “(East) Asian” bioethics escapes wider discussion at the same time as it serves it.

In principle, strong allegiance could turn into Asian regionalism, but such potential unification is constrained at home by the pressures of political legitimacy, discursive credibility, and academic debate, which usually require reasoned (though not necessarily logical) arguments and, at least outwardly, loyalty to established conventions. Although “Asia speak” sails under an Asian flag, it carries nation-state cargo. Identities are both changeable and multiple. In his famous book on the segmentary political systems of the Sudan (1969), anthropologist Evans-Prichard showed how group identities are situational and dependent on one’s position at a certain point in time. Belonging to one group, one opposes a group on one level; while belonging to another group, one opposes a group on a different level, perhaps even supporting a former opponent. In a similar fashion, when deciding to set up the EAAB, local loyalties were temporarily put aside in favor of establishing bioethics on a higher organizational level. An example of Us/Them switching is when the EAAB members come together to talk about a shared (our) (East) Asian/Confucian background in relation to bioethics. At home, Chinese bioethicists may well switch back to socialist and free-market notions, while Japanese bioethicists may revert to human rights, or nativist notions of bioethics. Thus, code-switching was called for when Sino-Japanese agreement was presented on the joint furthering of Asian communitarian values. Sensitive discussions, such as on Japanese human experimentation in Unit 731 in Northeast China, are delegated to other audiences and formats, such as the Asian Bioethics Association (ABA) Country Reports (cf. Zhai 2004).

The molding of bioethics serves more than ethical and cultural purposes. Discussing international governance, Salter and Qiu point out (2009, 47-8) that the governance of knowledge shapes the progress of the bioeconomy. They argue that the
interaction between the state and global levels of governance is critical in determining the position of emerging economies, like China, in the world economy. The question arises, then, how to combine influencing global governance with loyalties toward (East) Asian values, at the same time as determining the national agenda. The concept of epistemic communities, introduced by Peter Haas, proceeds from the idea that it is increasingly difficult for national decision-makers to deal with information pertaining to the many different issues and areas they need to keep up with. For this reason, experts in certain areas are consulted as political advisors to decision-makers, briefing them on complex issues. Haas explains:

An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area (Haas 1992, 3).

As experts meet colleagues from other countries at conferences, symposia, and meetings, knowledge is generated through discussion and exchanges shared by the epistemic community. This transnational knowledge is largely shared, but may be translated by advisor-experts as they see fit:

Members of trans-national epistemic communities can influence state interests either by directly identifying them for decision-makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests (Haas 1992, 4).

Bioethics experts are faced with the complexities inherent to their multiple roles as expert/advisor/regulator and the dilemmas of representing both Chinese and East Asian bioethics. This requires honed skills of diplomatic code-switching, catering to various audiences, and awareness of political sensitivities. For instance, Renzong Qiu at the Asian Association for Bioethics (AAB) explains the importance of Asian bioethics to both the national and Asian stakeholders involved in the pharmaceutical industry. In a publication, Qiu relates how, after nine years of debate among Chinese scientists, bioethicists, and policy-makers, China’s Ministry of Health (MOH) finally approved the country’s first general regulations on ethical review of
biomedical research involving human subjects (Qiu 2007). As if socialist principles never existed, Qiu points out that:

The Ministry has had to grapple with two principal questions. Is regulation in China necessary - or even desirable? And if it is, should guidelines be based on Chinese cultural characteristics like Confucian principles, or on the international guidelines that have been mostly developed by western ethicists (Qiu 2007)?

After pointing out the danger of having no regulation, illustrated by the scandals around scientists Woo-Suk Hwang and Jin Chen, Qiu provides the answer:

As to incorporating Chinese values into ethical regulations - respecting a unique cultural context is no excuse for rejecting the general applicability of international ethical guidelines. Such guidelines are a result of communication and debate among experts from different countries and cultures across the world, including China. As Confucius said, “human nature is similar, practice made them apart.” Basic values, such as respect, non-maleficence and justice are shared by western and eastern cultures alike (Qiu 2007). [Italics by the author.]

Here, Confucianism, rather than a vehicle for an inward-looking family metaphor with culturalist and naturalist markers, has become a universalist marker combined with the socialist message of learning through practice, even though it supports the national cause of China in global life science competition. As the vice-president of the MOH’s ethics committee, Qiu was involved in regulatory practice:

Much should - and is - being done to help China succeed. The Ministry of Health’s ethics committee is busy drafting key documents such as the constitutions of the proposed ethics committees and application forms for principal investigators to use when seeking ethical approval that can be used nationwide. Existing institutional ethics committees are also being monitored by the ministry and provincial health care administrations to assess how and if they work, and to consider where they need re-organizing or re-establishing
Qiu, who edited the book *Bioethics: Asian Perspectives. A Quest for Moral Diversity*, supports the proliferation of perspectives, and makes clear it supports scientific progress. By contrast, the contributing authors of the book do not seem to believe in “universal” (often associated with “Western”) regulation; they reject it. Nevertheless, by advocating moral diversity in the cause of scientific progress and quoting Confucianism as both champion of Chinese culture and universalism, Qiu can generate support for adopting international regulation that fits in with state policies on the life sciences. In fact, Qiu turns the tables when quoting a Confucian classic:

“Do no harm, it is the art of *ren* [benevolence]” (Mencius), “The person with *ren* [benevolence] must respect person” (Xun Zi). How can you say the principle of non-maleficence or beneficence is exclusively originated from the West? (Diniz & Qiu 2005)

This sentence reads as if “the West” advocates “benevolence” as particularly Western, an erroneous notion put straight by returning it to its Asian home. Nevertheless, by leaving colleagues to their “Asian” perspectives, and by interpreting Confucius as an internationalist, Qiu deftly weaves the international and cultural together. Thus, it would be difficult to find anyone who disagrees with Qiu’s definition of a Chinese perspective on bioethics:

For Chinese the concept of person is a relational one: Person is not so independent as *some* Western scholars argued and is *not just* a bearer of the right, *person is in relation or in a personal network* in which persons are interdependent and mutual supportive. This relational concept of personhood entails other particularities, such as in addressing bioethical issues the *balance between individual interest and family/societal interest* and the *balance between rights and responsibilities* have to be weighed, and *the specific context has to be considered* (Diniz & Qiu 2005)
Whereas Qiu knows how to translate “(East) Asian” values into a vehicle that can cater to what he believes are Chinese interests, those that define bioethics in terms of (East) Asian values, the (East) Asian community, usually confine themselves to notions of culture, morality, and values. Nevertheless, Asia speak here has, at least on a nominal level, facilitated unification.

“Asia speak” ascribes to (East) Asia and the West diverging bioethical attitudes toward the relation between family and individual, body and mind, nature and culture. This translates into different values used in debates on the embryo, brain-death, reproduction, population planning, and so on (Lee and Ho 2007, 7; Qiu 2004). In this idealized account of East Asian bioethics, foiled against an individualist, capitalist “Them” (hegemonic powers), the concrete socioeconomic interests of science and nation-state do not seem to figure. This one-sided focus on abstract notions of (East) Asian values and culture shows little attention for the socioeconomic circumstances in which bioethical issues are embodied and enacted.

In discussions on (East) Asian values and bioethics, it is hard to find references to dissenters or socioeconomic groups that do not comfortably fit in with the status quo of “Asia speak.” I call these groups the Absentees. In discussions on Asian values, the problems of political dissidents, outcasts, and dropouts clearly tend to be unrepresented or misrepresented. Be it the poor, ethnic minorities, the sick, the unemployed, victims of organ theft, or political prisoners, as Absentees they have in common that they do not fit the current notion of We. The bioethics of the Absentees, including topics ranging from the Ainu in Japan, the aboriginal peoples in Taiwan, organ trade and political prisoners to HIV-contaminated blood scandals in Henan, AIDS, and those suffering after forced abortion in China are hard to discuss under the heading of Asian bioethics. Indeed, the notion of “Asian” tends to make discussion regarding issues related to Absentees politically painful. By contrast, in Asia speak, the Absentees of “Western” nations, or Them, such as American poverty, gun-crime, AIDS, and discrimination, are noted frequently and form a counterexample to “(East) Asian” bioethics.

Nevertheless, some politicians and academics do try to discuss Absentee problems under the Asian umbrella term, such as research into AIDS in China. Such pioneers may even gain sympathy from the wider public. In other cases such pioneering leads to politically sensitive debate. Such pioneers may even gain sympathy from the wider public. In other cases such pioneering leads to politically
sensitive debate. For instance, opponents of state policies in China cite the victims of drug trafficking, trade in human organs, GMOs and forced abortion. But bioethical issues are discussed more safely if they focus on exploited groups from or challenges in the “West” or “Them.” Thus, “Asianised” discussion on topics such as brain death, human cloning, and clinical trials can be discussed as (typically) “Western” before discussing the extent to which it can be regarded as “Our” problem, and finding “Our” solution. Where certain sociopolitical topics are regarded as politically sensitive, the national and international networks of Asian bioethics can facilitate debate. Thus, discussions on human cloning, embryonic stem cell research, informed consent, abortion, and SARS have gained considerable attention in East Asian countries due to their inclusion in “(East) Asian” bioethics.

4. Network Structuring: Epistemic Communities or Networks of Asian Bioethics?

Proponents of Asian bioethics are often members of transnational associations and academic institutions, which have been associated with epistemic communities as described in Section 3 as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3). In this section, I question that proponents of “(East) Asian bioethics” belong to a transnational epistemic community in the sense of Haas’s original definition (Haas 1992, 4). Although proponents may be professionals with recognized expertise and competence, they do not have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, and usually do not systematically attempt to solve problems academically. Rather, they engage in defining and spreading particular notions of Asian-ness in relation to the particular bioethical issues they have concerns about. Here, I make a distinction between those who recognize and analyze what are regarded as phenomena particular to Asia, and those who define and prescribe “(East) Asian” bioethical values. The former may well belong to the epistemic community of bioethics, while the latter belong to what I call “networks of (East) Asian bioethics.” Emphasizing the performative and regenerative aspects of contemporary notions of Asia in the context of “(East) Asian” bioethics, I contend that approaches that treat Asia as a cultural region and empire tend to blind us to the politics of identity, business, and life sciences, and lead us away from considering the voices of the Absentees who may be confronted with urgent bioethical issues.
I here explain why the fundamental difference between the observation of family behavior and the moral prescription of bioethics in “Asia speak” requires attention. Philosopher-ethicist Xiaomei Zhai observed that fixed cultural categories of the family exist in China, and points out that they vary within China and even more so within Asia. She also points out that some of these fixed family categories became salient when international ethical guidelines on biomedical and health research involving human participants emerged in China: “Both in a clinical context and in a research context the elements of disclosure of information and comprehension of it were affected by a difference in cultural understanding” (Zhai 2004). Zhai explains that to disclose information framed in scientific language to human participants who may only know the language of yin-yang and the five agents\(^3\) requires cultural translation. Similarly, “a close relationship between family members and between the family and the community has implications for the extent to which informed consent can be applied” (Zhai 2004). For this author, the interdependence of family members is based on an empirical observation of family and community life. Here, family dependence is a mode of living conducive to the continuation of family life in the community. Such dependence on family and community may also privilege traditional knowledge at the expense of other forms, make some members vulnerable to power abuse and discrimination, and preclude the understanding of national bioethical guidelines. These isolated communities are likely to have little access to health care and may be easy targets of medical experimentation. Relying on the application of state bioethical guidelines alone, for this reason, would not offer sufficient protection. Zhai’s empirical observations, then, help to generate insight into how bioethics needs to be informed by knowledge of particular traditions and practices.

By contrast, in “(East) Asia speak” the notions of family dependence and hierarchic family relations serve more as imperatives, indicating a desirable condition associated with ‘cultural tradition’, rather than based on empirical research of socio-cultural and economic conditions. Popular notions of the family household and community life, experts of Asian bioethics defend as prescriptive norms of “(East) Asian” family life, satisfying the political ideals of educated elites. As members of epistemic networks, experts of bioethics enjoy an openness and wealth of information.

\(^3\) The Five Agents refer to the fundamental ingredients of the universe. The agents are abstract categories named after the substances wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.
unimaginable to the men and women in the closed communities described by Zhai, but in these transnational epistemic networks, “(East) Asian” bioethics is shaped through “Asia speak” rather than by the voices of these closed communities.

Un-Jong Pak’s notion of the communicative ethics of Oriental feminism is an example of bioethical prescription. Pak defines bioethics in Asia as mainly beneficence-oriented, and as very different from Western principles of autonomy, informed consent, and truth-telling. Pak’s “communicative ethics of Oriental feminism” emphasizes communication of the patient with family members rather than with the physician. According to “communicative ethics,” the patient must seriously consider non-medical factors such as financial burden, quality of life, or family impact, rather than medical concerns (Pak 2004). Similarly, the introduction of the volume “The Family, Medical Decision-Making, and Biotechnology”, edited by Professor Shui-Chuen Lee (2007) - founding member and President of the Taiwan Bioethics Association (2006-2008), vice-President of the Asian Ethics Association (2012-2014) and involved in various of its international conferences and projects informing political decision-makers - concludes that the family is important in East Asian medicine in contrast with the situation in “individualist” Western medical institutions. Even though Lee and co-author Justin Ho acknowledge the importance of the individual in East Asia, “familism”, they argue, “should play a key role in shaping our medical institutions and practices” and “the family ought to be included in the medical decision-making process and the family should consent to genetic information collection and research” (Lee & Ho 2007: 13).

Discussions on bioethics in relation to the family initiated in “the West” are not mentioned, and little attention is paid to observations of the different shapes and sizes of families within Asia or East Asia, access to health care (if available), and the cultural values of the most vulnerable groups for which one assumes bioethics may be essential. In fact, bioethics here is not about the availability of medical care for rural families in isolated communities. Rather, it is about dealing with new developments in biomedical technologies that challenge particular ways of modern life. Similarly, the volume entitled “Family-Oriented Informed Consent: East Asian and American Perspectives”, edited by Professor Ruiping Fan (2015), Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, attempts “to defend the merits of the family-oriented model of informed consent in East Asian healthcare contexts.” Here, Fan makes a sharp distinction between notions of East Asian traditional extended families and
looser definitions of the family in “contemporary Western countries”. Rather than trying to understand the important socio-cultural, political and economic issues accompanying the clinical application of new biomedical technologies, which cannot be addressed by inappropriate and much-criticized notions of informed consent, Fan seems to be holding a straw-man competition between “East Asian” family-oriented and “Western” individual-oriented consent.

The problems encountered in the application of bioethical notions – be it individual or family-oriented - differ starkly from those that experts of “(East)Asian” bioethics face when battling with “Western” bioethics. The former is about the challenges related to the inappropriate application of bioethical guidelines to local practices, while the latter is about foiling a stereotyped (East) Asian bioethics against Western bioethics to define new political positions. A characteristic of this latter approach to bioethics is that it presumes Asian unity where there is none, and that it disregards empirical reality when it is clearly called for. Nevertheless, the fact that we now find diversity in the bioethics literature among experts of “(East) Asian” bioethics is a sign of increasingly open debate and an increase in the diversity of binaries used. This is recognized clearly in the edited collection Bioethics: Asian Perspectives. A quest for moral diversity (Qiu 2004). However, the diversification in bioethical perspectives continues to invoke the presumption of Asia as a basso continuo; “Asia” here is a platform of debate. Thus, in “(East) Asian” bioethical discussions on end-of-life issues we find incommensurable views:

**Edwin Hui:** To extend filial piety, the notion of the futility of medical intervention may not be accepted: life should be extended by all means (Hui 2004);

**Un-Jong Pak:** Considering financial burden and family before medical treatment is acceptable (Pak 2004);

**Shi and Yu:** Euthanasia should be legalized (People’s Republic of China) (Shi and Yu 2004);

**Ming-Xian Shen:** We need to support the ideal of a Good Death — human body, skin and hair are given by the parents and must not be hurt (Shen 2004);

**Ping Dong and Xiaoyan Wang:** One must merge oneself with Tao or Nature – passive euthanasia or withholding treatment is acceptable (Dong and Wang 2004).
Illustrating that bioethical discussion on end-of-life issues is facilitated by using “Their” bioethical problems as point of departure, bioethical values in each case are defined as being very different from those in the West, even though the views of authors vary starkly. The quoted authors use the template of Asian versus Western bioethics to express their views, mobilize loyalty, and struggle to normalize their definitions of “Asian-ness” at home. As no attempt is made to empirically explore issues of bioethics in their context, the question arises whether proponents of Asian bioethics can be regarded as members of an epistemic community. Nevertheless, such discussions put on the agenda bioethical issues that otherwise may not be discussion, and display a diversity that should be lauded in a region of such great socio-cultural and political diversity.

DISCUSSION

Building on Annelise Riles’ discussion on networks (2001), I argue that under certain conditions Asian bioethics should be regarded as members of “networks of Asian bioethics” rather than of epistemic communities. A main feature of a network, according to Riles, is that it has a dual quality as both a means to an end and an end in itself (Riles 2001, 50-51). This means that a network may have stated aims, and programs to reach those aims, but also that it can start leading a life of its own. Under certain conditions, a network of Asian bioethics communities could turn into a semi-exclusive, or semi-closed, circle. Thus, if networking activities focus on the “(East) Asian” aspects of bioethics, rather than addressing the bioethical problems of Absentees, such meetings can become self-generating networks of communitarian information sharing (Riles 2001, 53) instead of occasions for debate and problem sharing/solving.

A strong focus on Asia by leaders in the field of bioethics may have far-reaching consequences, as they would deal with bioethical challenges related to “Them” rather than to challenges faced by Absentees. Such bioethics discussion would avoid attracting reports about vulnerable groups among isolated communities, ethnic minorities, patients, and women that do not fit whatever is regarded as an Asian problematic. This would require a closing of the circle from critical journalists, scientists, and regulators to stop the flow of information, resources, and commitments
from leading to undesirable conflict. “Asia” here would serve as a discursive tool in guiding diversity within limits, building “Asian” bridges in the field of bioethics, and as a backdrop of policy-making at home. An epistemological community of bioethics in Asia, however, would courageously face even the most sensitive bioethical issues in Asia, exactly because they often involve some of the most vulnerable people in society. Following attempts in this direction by the Asian Ethics Review (AER), such a community would have to face uncomfortable debate, take political risk, and insist on peaceful debate despite its scathing challenges.

CONCLUSION

The notion of bioethics is controversial, and the evolution of its meaning should be critically understood. It is questionable, however, if and to what extent this can be done through regional boundary marking. The family metaphor of “Asia” enables educated elites to exchange views on bioethics, and creates an “Asian” agenda. The many conferences and meetings on Asian bioethics form a network that helps reproduce “(East) Asian bioethics” brands by means of well-established techniques of replication: papers, speeches, reports, conference proceedings, and feedback to universities and government departments. Such networks function politically as a segmentary system, where politics and loyalties determine the nature and scope of information exchange. Stakes and loyalties at one level of organization, e.g., nationally, are reformulated on a higher level (transnationally). In such transnational networks, the use of boundary markers helps giving political direction to debate. Here, natural markers establish firm boundaries between social groups, cultural markers create transcendable boundaries (unless historically or naturally determined as absolutes), and universalist boundaries function as ethnocentric markers of expansionist civilization. These grouping tools facilitate the shaping of bioethical identities within and among Asian countries through specific cultural, scientific or natural notions of life. Naturally, group-identities could not be shaped without boundary markers, and the meaning of life for many would be impoverished and unbearable. But using them in academic discussions on bioethics would entail an exclusion of other, essential voices: those of the absentees.

This is important, as, apart from supporting exchanges among Asian experts, bioethical networks serve political agendas at home. Thus, EAAB co-founder
Sakamoto put forward views on Asian bioethics that served a political stance at home, which excluded the views of absentee feminists, ethnic minorities, and activists, and which omitted issues sensitive to Asian confrères. We also saw how the other EAAB co-founder, Renzong Qiu, encouraged the publication of diverse voices on “Asian bioethics,” while negotiating international regulation and his position as policy-advisor at the same time. As such, the notion of “Asia” enables the segmentary networks to develop along politically acceptable lines at home.

Critique of “(East) Asian bioethics” as a sign of revisionism and of expansionism is of limited value, as it does not sufficiently appreciate the notion as a platform for transnational debate, the mobilization of home support, and as a vehicle for translating “new” biotech issues into a manageable forms. The question is whether meetings on “(East) Asian” bioethics constitute semi-closed political networks or an epistemic community for sharing expertise. As a semi-closed political platform of debate, it creates bioethics bridges in Asia; and, although it avoids the problems of Absentees, it introduces urgent issues that can be illustrated and solved through projection onto “Them” – topics that otherwise remain external to mainstream political discussions. As epistemic community, by contrast, meetings can form an open platform of debate prepared to deal with issues of the Absentees head-on, and through a myriad of perspectives.

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