Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens born in Somalia, Iran, and Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Research into the mobility of EU citizens has contributed to a better understanding of the social effects of European integration. A growing body of literature highlights that naturalised third-country nationals are also making use of their ‘freedom of movement’. This paper proposes a typology of ‘new EU citizens’ who onward migrate between member states. It draws on relevant statistics and qualitative empirical research carried out with Dutch-Somalis, Swedish-Iranians and German-Nigerians who relocated to the UK. In contrast to research with native-born EU movers, our findings indicate that the majority of naturalised EU citizens onward migrated due to the discrimination and racism they experienced in their previous place of residence. In this paper we conceptualise the interactions of integration and transnationalism as a potential trigger for onward migration. We illustrate how onward migrants are able to complete certain aspects of their integration process in a second member state. Moreover, we show how migrants maintain transnational ties across several destinations and therefore contribute to a broader understanding of transnationalism.

KEYWORDS: EU citizenship; integration; onward migration; racism; third-country nationals; transnationalism.

INTRODUCTION

With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the region of the European Union (EU) has become unique in that any person who holds the nationality of a member state automatically also is regarded as an EU citizen. The most potent cornerstone of EU citizenship is that it provides access to a common space of equal rights and free movement that after several enlargements now encompasses 32 countries (EU, EEA and Switzerland). In 2000, an estimated 6 million European Union citizens were living in a member state other than their nationality; by 2011 the figure had risen to 12.8 million (Eurostat, 2012). Although the number of mobile EU citizens doubled, this has occurred alongside an overall EU population increase due to successive enlargements. The proportion of EU citizens using their ‘freedom of movement’ has not increased. This group is mainly composed of native-born EU citizens who move abroad for study, work, love or retirement (Favell, 2008; King, 2002). However, there is evidence which suggests that the 11.9 million\(^1\) naturalised third-country nationals are also making use of their right to freedom of movement as ‘new EU citizens’ (Van Hear and Lindley, 2007). Until now very little is known about the exact size and the specific characteristics of this category of intra-EU movers; the UK is one of the few member states to have made relevant disaggregated 2011 census data available at this point. Other sources of information on this mobility consist of

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administrative data from municipal authorities, schools, statutory services, local media and community workers. There also are a number of qualitative research studies carried out on this type of intra-EU migration (Kelly, 2013; van Liemt, 2011; Mas Giralt, 2013).

The issue of onward migration is of important theoretical value, because it questions the simplistic mapping of migrant trajectories restricted to two nodes—one located in the origin country, region or place and another node at the destination. Various categorisations of migration processes describe movements that occur in the spaces between origin and destination. ‘Rural-urban migration’ for instance describes an internal migration that greatly increases the odds of an international migration (Malmberg, 1997); whereas ‘transit migration’ (Collyer and de Haas, 2010) and ‘stepwise international migration’ (Paul, 2011) refer to long and fragmented journeys during which migrants stay in a number of entrepôt countries to accumulate the necessary resources to reach their desired final destination. These categorisations help to define the possible intermediary stages of a migration process. Yet all categorisations presuppose that migrants leave their place of origin with a clear idea about the ultimate destination of their journey. This is a limitation that the term ‘onward migration’ addresses, by leaving open the possibility that after settling in one place, migrants may later decide to migrate to another place—or even a number of other places—they had not considered at the start of their journey.

This paper is about third-country nationals, who lived in one EU member state for several years and became naturalised citizens after which they moved to another member state. The comparative evidence assembled and contrasted in this article is drawn from the authors’ own empirical research with migrants from Somalia, Iran and Nigeria, who gained citizenship in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany respectively before deciding to relocate to the UK. This paper argues that these onward moves are the result of a specific interplay between integration and transnationalism. We present our findings in the form of a typology of onward movers, which outlines several motivations for new EU citizens to onward migrate and their subsequent experiences in another member state. First, however, we would like to address how citizenship relates to different migration trajectories.

CITIZENSHIP: LEADING TO SETTLEMENT OR ONWARD MIGRATION?

Citizenship has been described as a transaction of rights and duties that links individuals and the nation state (Bauböck, 1994). According to this static and state-centred line of reasoning it is expected that once migrants obtain citizenship in a country, they will settle there for the foreseeable future—or at least sojourn until they return to their country of origin. How do we make sense of third-country nationals who leave to another destination after having obtained citizenship? Migration and globalisation have resulted in ever more people developing ties to several places. The impact this may have on the concept of citizenship has been the subject of extensive academic debates. Soysal’s (1994) conception of the ‘post-national citizenship’ model is based on global human-rights culture and questions the continued relevance of national citizenship. Kymlicka (1995) suggests that equal citizenship rights can be complemented with different ethnic minority rights, thereby creating a ‘multicultural citizenship’ which is more accommodative to immigrants. Nonetheless for immigrants in most world regions the acquisition of citizenship in their country of residence remains crucial to accessing the rights of citizens. In the context of the EU, upon naturalisation third-country nationals can also invoke their EU citizenship rights in another member state. While these new forms of enacting citizenship across the internal borders of the EU have been researched with native-born EU citizens, they have been largely overlooked in relation to naturalised third-country nationals.

To make sense of the phenomenon of onward migration we build on recent academic research on the interactions between integration and transnationalism (see Bivand Erdal and Òeppen, 2013), although it is important to point out two key differences. One aspect that differs with regard to onward migration is how the process of integration is envisioned. There are a
multitude of conflicting definitions for the term, but what usually remains unchallenged is that integration has been traditionally confined to the strictures of a single nation state. Migrants can complete their legal integration process in one member state by fulfilling a number of prerequisites that tend to reflect historical differences in member states' citizenship regimes. Even after becoming citizens, however, the degree of immigrants' overall structural incorporation (e.g. access to education, political participation and employment) often remains below that of native-born citizens. Furthermore, immigrants' socio-cultural integration (e.g. their feelings of belonging, opportunities to develop new social networks and practise their culture) can be negatively affected in societies where migrants are treated as racialised others. Therefore onward migration may be considered as a means for naturalised third-country nationals to realise certain aspects of their integration process in another member state.

The second difference to previous studies relates to the direction of the migrants’ transnational practices. Acquisition of citizenship can facilitate return migration, because a stable residence permit allows migrants to make preparatory return visits. This may also hold true for transnationalism directed at new destinations, like in the case of onward migration. The geographic proximity of member states and affordable travel connections allow new EU citizens who are interested in an intra-European onward migration to go through prolonged periods of preparation involving various degrees of transnational mobility and livelihood. This can be fundamental to ensuring a sustainable onward migration and integration at their new destination. We agree with Levitt et al. (2003) that life-stage, human and social capital resources, class, and changes in the origin country and destination countries, can affect migrants' ability and desire to have transnational ties and the type of transnational practices they engage in. The study of onward migration therefore enriches the concept of transnationalism—which has mainly focused on transnational activities of either institutions or individual migrants that connect origin and destination nodes—by exploring other nodes of emplacement.

In this paper we make a unique contribution to the literature by examining the nuances of the thus far under-researched topic of onward migration. With its focus on migrants’ perspectives, our study aims to better understand the complex relationships among integration, transnationalism and citizenship, seeing that research about migrants and citizenship has largely neglected the ways in which migrants themselves enact citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003). We argue that the current period of accelerated and globalised movements of people across borders requires a dynamic perspective on citizenship and identification that captures evolving meanings and practices.

METHODS: THREE CASE STUDIES OF ONWARD MIGRATION TO THE UK

The research for this paper is based on three empirical qualitative case studies that explore the onward migration of naturalised third-country nationals—between an EU member state and the UK. Through our interaction with migrant-focused organisations and the analysis of statistics we learned that England is a particularly attractive destination for onward migrants within the EU. The 2011 census reveals that 207,337 naturalised third-country nationals have relocated to England and most were born in Africa (ONS, 2011). It is important to note that the disaggregated data include many countries of birth which are characterised by economic emigration, meaning that onward migration is not a migration trajectory to be solely associated with former refugees.
Table 1  Onward migrants resident in the UK according to the 2011 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Country of birth’ grouped by region</th>
<th>EU passports holders resident in the UK (excluding British and dual-British)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>82 958</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; Asia</td>
<td>58 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>41 058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe (non-EU)</td>
<td>17 711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>7 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotals</td>
<td>207 337</td>
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</tbody>
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Sources: Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). In Scotland no data were collected on ‘passports held’.

Our three case studies focus on Somali-born migrants leaving the Netherlands, Iranian-origin migrants moving on from Sweden, and Nigerian-born migrants leaving Germany. All three case studies are based on in-depth interviews with individual onward migrants. The researchers recruited their respective participants in similar ways, through personal contacts, community organisations, and at events and places catering to the specific group in question (i.e. grocery stores, internet cafés, churches, mosques, barbershops and restaurants). All participants were asked to give informed consent; their names and some of their personal details were changed in order to ensure anonymity. We interviewed the participants (in some cases multiple times) in a place of their choosing. In all cases, we gave the participants the opportunity to tell their own life stories, from their own point of view. By comparing the narratives of our research participants, we find that the three groups share many similarities with regard to the motivations for their onward migration, as well as key differences. Before discussing our participants’ motivations and experiences of onward migration by way of a typology, we will briefly present each of the three case studies in more detail.

Dutch-Somali Migration to Leicester and London

Due to the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s, many Somalis left their country for new destinations in Africa, North America and Europe. Subsequently Somalis often decided to move on. Although Dutch statistics keep records of the out-migration of residents, there is no record of where these migrants are moving to. Some may return to Somalia, while others may be moving to the USA, Canada or Egypt (Al-Sharmani, 2006). That said, empirical research suggests that the UK is an important destination. One survey estimated that between 1998 and 2002 the Dutch-Somali community in the UK varied between 10,000 and 20,000 (van den Reek and Hussein, 2003). This was equivalent to about 1/3 of the Dutch-Somali total population residing in the Netherlands at that time. Certain British cities such as Leicester, Birmingham, London, Bristol and Sheffield have experienced the largest influx of what they call ‘EU Somalis’.

At the time of the 2011 census there were 99,484 Somali-born migrants living in England (ONS, 2011). The researcher decided to focus on Leicester and London because of the large
Somali population and the differing migration histories of those two cities. London traditionally hosts the largest Somali community, whereas Leicester is a new settlement place for Somali immigrants. In 2008 the Leicester City Council estimated that the total Somali population in Leicester was between 6,000 and 10,000—with the majority having received refugee status in the Netherlands, Denmark or Sweden (Leicester City Council, 2008). This case study is based on in-depth interviews with 17 Dutch-Somalis in Leicester (eight female and nine male) and 16 in London (six female and ten male) which were carried out in 2008. These Somalis spent on average 11 years in the Netherlands (with a minimum of six and maximum of 15 years) before moving to the UK. This allowed them to complete the former lengthy asylum process and fulfil the five year residence requirement for Dutch citizenship—explaining why arrivals in the UK peaked between 2000 and 2002. Other Dutch-Somalis stayed in the Netherlands for longer and then onward migrated due to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments in the Netherlands around 2005.

**Swedish-Iranian Migration to London**

For the most part, migration from Iran to Sweden occurred between the 1980s and 1990s, following the Iranian Revolution. Swedish statistics suggest that of the 56,000 Iranians who moved to Sweden before 2006, about 10,600 have subsequently left the country. This onward migration is surprising because Iranians are generally perceived to be well integrated into Swedish society. Statistical analysis indicates that Swedish citizens born in Iran are more likely than the average Swedish-born citizen to earn university degrees and many work in highly-skilled occupational fields like dentistry (Statistics Sweden, 2006). Furthermore Swedish-Iranian onward movers tend to be more highly educated than those who choose to stay in Sweden, but they experienced higher levels of unemployment in Sweden (Kelly 2013).

The researcher conducted life history interviews with 18 Swedish-Iranians (nine men and nine women) mainly in London and the surrounding areas between 2010 and 2012. For the majority of the participants the exact timing of their onward migration is difficult to pinpoint given that they frequently moved between the two countries or even temporarily returned back to Sweden (four participants) before settling in the UK. These circular moves are reflected by the fact that two interviews took place in Sweden. Like in the case of the Dutch-Somalis, all were EU citizens and had moved on Swedish passports. The participants were adults, aged between 24 and 55, and all but two were born in Iran. Some of the older participants spent as little as five years in Sweden (just enough time to acquire Swedish citizenship) while several of the younger participants spent 15 or more years in the country before moving on. According to Swedish statistics, the UK is the most popular destination for people with Iranian backgrounds leaving Sweden. Although statistics cannot tell us which British cities people are moving to, interview findings in Sweden and the UK indicate that the primary destination is London, which therefore was selected as the main fieldsite. During fieldwork the researcher also discovered onward migrants in neighbouring towns such as Guildford and Tunbridge Wells.

**German-Nigerian Migration to and from London and Manchester**

The Nigerian case is different to the two studies mentioned above, in that Nigerians came to Europe not only as refugees, but also as economic migrants. From the 1970s Nigerians started migrating to Germany for study, later also for work or family reunification. Some Igbo students applied for asylum in Germany during the Biafran civil war as they were unable to return to Nigeria. The numbers of Nigerian asylum-seekers in Germany soared during the years of brutal military dictatorship, political instability and economic stagnation—although their recognition rate remained low. Meanwhile Germany did agree to receive 10,406 Nigerian UNHCR resettlement refugees between 1996 and 2005 (Mberu and Pongou, 2010). Many other Nigerians overstayed their tourist visa, entered irregularly or were trafficked. In 2011 there
were 35,000 first-generation and second-generation Nigerians registered in Germany (BAMF, 2013). Reforms to German nationality law came into force in 2000—decreasing the residence requirement for third-country nationals to naturalise from fifteen to eight years—which also facilitated the onward migration of German-Nigerians. The 2011 census indicates that there were 188,690 Nigerian-born residents living in England and 5,409 of them were onward migrants with EU citizenship—which included 1,464 German-Nigerians (ONS, 2011). Research participants mentioned that the majority of German-Nigerians moved to London or Manchester, but it is not certain which other cities they moved to.

Between 2011 and 2012 the researcher carried out fieldwork in England and Germany and conducted in-depth interviews with Nigerians who engaged in onward migration. Out of the 19 onward migrants (twelve male and seven female), seven later moved back to Germany and were mostly interviewed after their return. The majority of participants relocated to England between 2001 and 2004 following an average stay of 12 years in Germany (with a minimum of two and maximum of 22 years). The participants were aged between 25 and 64 years. The fieldwork in England and Germany was carried out in regions where national statistics indicated high concentrations of Nigerians. More specifically the research focused on London, Manchester, Cologne, Düsseldorf and Berlin and participants were also recruited in other surrounding cities.

**TOWARDS A TYPOLGY OF ONWARD MIGRATION IN THE EU**

In the next section of this paper, we present our research findings in the form of a typology that explores the different reasons our research participants had for making an intra-EU move to the UK. We decided that it would be useful to deduce a typology, because to date most studies concerning onward migration have addressed the topic as single case studies. With a large amount of empirical qualitative data from our three case studies we felt uniquely placed to advance research on onward migration through a comparative lens. Depending on their main motivation for onward migration, participants made use of different ‘cognitive maps’ to evaluate which EU countries and cities would enable them to fulfil their aspirations, and as we will demonstrate these impressions are not always accurate and also subject to change over time (Malmberg, 1997). We would like to emphasise, however, that the distinction between the different motivations for onward migration are not necessarily as neat as presented in this typology. Our participants often clearly stated their main motivation for relocating and then also mentioned other factors that could be interpreted as an overlap with another type of onward mover. With this typology we want to illustrate the complexity of migration decision-making, as well as highlight the interactions between citizenship, integration and transnationalism.

**Career Movers: Overcoming Employment Barriers**

Citizenship does not necessarily lead to employment or even equal opportunities in the labour market. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that our analysis of the three case studies indicates that a major motivation for onward migration is the hope to encounter better labour market opportunities elsewhere. Unemployment faced in their first EU country of residence was a major impetus for many of our participants to relocate. Sometimes the unemployment experienced by these migrants was a result of macro-processes such as increased labour market segmentation; precarity of working conditions; or the oversupply of workers in certain occupational fields. The economic crisis on the whole did not have a bearing on our participants’ onward moves, but other research has highlighted its effect on intra-EU onward migration from Southern Europe (Ahrens, 2013). In the 1990s, however, hundreds of Swedish-trained dentists (with many Iranians among them) moved to the UK after failing to find work in Sweden. Mehdi, a dentist who has been working in the UK for ten years, describes his experience as follows:
I got graduated, I became a dentist. And I just didn’t wait, because I told you on the phone as well, at that time, there was no way to get a job, especially as a foreigner in Sweden, you know. The priority was with Swedish people. Of course I sent an application for one job, and I didn’t wait with the answer because I knew it was no, so I came to London.

(Mehdi, Swedish-Iranian in London, 41, m)

As Mehdi’s quote highlights, the difficulty of securing work commensurate with one's qualifications, is compounded for those with migrant backgrounds. Many research participants expressed frustration over the difficulty to transfer their credentials gained in the country of origin to their first EU country of residence. It is well documented that racism continues to pose a challenge in Europe and that immigrants are affected by both formal and informal discrimination (Bell, 2002). As a result, even those with degrees from their first EU country of residence often encounter difficulties finding work and decide to move on.

Our findings also suggest that onward migration was not only about upward social mobility. While some highly-skilled migrants were able to secure jobs in their field after moving to the UK, for others just having the chance to work was considered an improvement over their previous circumstances. While the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany provided them with unemployment benefits when necessary, this was considered less satisfying than actually being able to participate in the labour market—even if only at the lower-paid end. As a result, some of the onward movers we interviewed in the UK worked long and undesirable hours—as bus drivers, factory workers and shop owners—in order to make ends meet. While this was challenging, it nevertheless provided these migrants with the opportunity to be seen as contributing members of society.

Abdul is a middle-aged Somali man who came to London in 1996 after living in the Netherlands for eight years without a job and not being able to study. He shares his arrival experience:

When I came to London there were plenty of jobs. Much more than when I came to visit for the first time, in 1993. I started working in a Somali restaurant in Whitechapel, and at the same time I worked in security. I had two jobs at the same time. It was hard work, but I was very happy to have a job. And I was finally able to send money home, my brother is now here, and my mother as well and I have found a wife. So everything really settled.

(Abdul, Dutch-Somali in London, 43, m)

As Abdul’s quote illustrates, for some moving on is as much about securing work as it is about developing a sense of self-worth and a sense of belonging. It becomes apparent through his quote that it is difficult to separate the different motivations for onward migration, as even an employment-motivated move may connect to broader needs of being close to family and friends and contributing to both the local community and community in the origin country.

**Student Movers: Transferring their Knowledge and Broadening their Horizons**

Our analysis shows that some participants did not necessarily move on for jobs or labour market opportunities, but nevertheless had their long-term career interests in mind. The pursuit of educational opportunities, especially at the tertiary level, served as an important motivation for onward migration. For our participants, the UK was a particularly attractive destination for those wishing to obtain specialised education that was not available or over-subscribed in their previous EU country of residence. A significant number of our participants moved on to London to enrol in British universities after failing to receive admission to desired programmes in their previous EU country of residence. They felt that there was more competition for some degrees, and in general there were fewer options for higher education despite the tuition-free education offered at Swedish and most German universities and the financial aid available to Dutch
students. For all our participants the wish to study in English was important and certain British 'world class' universities were considered desirable because they offered a more prestigious education than was available in the Netherlands, Sweden or Germany. Onward movers also felt that the credentials they obtained from British universities would be more readily recognised should they choose to return to Somalia, Iran or Nigeria. Taking into account the hike of tuition fees in 2012 that enables English universities to charge up to £9,000 annually, it is possible that the attractiveness of pursuing higher education in the UK will decline.

The following quote is from a young Somali woman, called Zana, whose onward move occurred alongside relocations of other family members. Her father had moved to London one year earlier, but on arrival in Britain she initially lived with her aunt. Her mother, brothers and sisters stayed behind in the Netherlands at first. Zana was the eldest and her siblings were still in secondary school. Her mother went back and forth for a long time and settled in London in 2008. Here Zana recounts how she decided to enrol at a British university:

I wanted to do a law degree, I knew that, so I looked at a couple of universities in Holland. In particular I looked at the modules, because I have an interest in international law and human rights. I soon found out that you have very little options, all the modules in the Netherlands were on national law, in areas I wasn't interested in. I was thinking how am I going to be able to go through all of that before I could do what I wanted? It would add so little to my career in international law that I decided to look in the UK. I think there was more recognition here of areas like human rights than in Holland, which is strange, because in Holland you have the international court [in The Hague]. I still don’t understand that. So then I decided to move to London.

(Zana, Dutch-Somali in London, 23, f)

For Nigerians an additional incentive was that the secondary school qualifications and undergraduate degrees they gained in Nigeria were recognised by British universities, thus the move to the UK enabled Nigerians to pursue further studies. This was not the case in Germany, where they often were told to repeat their previous qualification. Some only stayed for the duration of their higher education degree and later returned to Germany. In the next quote Uchenna compares his experiences in Bonn and London, where he lived for nine years each. During his time in London he pursued undergraduate and postgraduate studies, while also working part-time in a skilled manual job in logistics.

I contrasted the facilities, the amenities, the behaviour of the people, and the cleanliness and for these areas. Germany comes out tops, in my opinion. But when it comes to opportunities to improve yourself, Britain was and it still is easier for me and some other Africans who wanted to improve themselves. After working here for one year, I applied to study and I got so much encouragement. I was being begged to improve myself... any office I went to, like UCAS or the Citizens Advice Bureau. Also if you want to open a business or go to the bank the emphasis is on you per se, not on your skin colour. In Germany I would love to say... well it's my country, I love the way it is. But at the same time the institutions and the way things work there, will make you feel excluded. Since I've lived in UK, I applied to so many things I couldn’t have dreamt of doing in Germany. But let me put it this way, my body is in the UK and my soul is in Germany. I don't know, I just don't know. I cannot say I am comfortable here. I like it here, but I'm not comfortable here. The lifestyle or the life I have here does not suit my concept of the life I would like to live. I want 8 hours, I rest, I bath... I believe those facilities are here, but I cannot avail myself of them or enjoy them. Sometimes I have to work 14 or 15 hours a day and then also go to [university].

(Uchenna, German-Nigerian in London, 44, m)
Uchenna was not the only one to express ambivalent feelings of belonging. Our participants’ often maintained ties to friends and relatives who lived in different places through frequent communication and visits. During the course of his stay in London, Uchenna, for example, sent daily text messages to his daughter who had stayed in Germany with his ex-partner, as well as visiting her in Bonn once a month. Nearly all Nigerians who returned to Germany after an onward migration had left close family members behind and were shuttling back and forth to maintain these family ties. Even though onward movers were able to accomplish their educational goals in the UK, they did not always think it represented the preferred choice for other aspects of their life. The fact that onward migration often gave rise to the formation of multi-local households also shows that relocation had to be negotiated amongst family members taking into account their different needs according to life-stage. In fact, we have even classified some of our participants as family movers because they were able to reconcile the needs of different family members and onward migrate together.

**Family Movers: Improving the Future of the next Generation**

Onward migrants not only relocate for their own benefit, a considerable number also take this decision to enhance their children’s future. Our participants see it as a means to improve the prospects of the next generation, since they think it can pave the way for better opportunities in both higher education and the labour market. This has been substantiated with comparative research of member states; the results indicate that the UK shows the strongest commitment to implement intercultural education and facilitates a significantly higher participation in tertiary education for migrant children (Eurostat, 2011: 128–129). In addition, providing children with an English-language education is also seen as something positive by our participants—several parents had sent their children to British international schools while still living in Sweden and Germany. Parents believed that by cultivating the English language skills of their children, in the long-term the next generation would be able to make the most of opportunities and transnational ties in various countries. More generally all participants believed that in the UK there were more visible positive role models from their own ethnic group, who could raise their children’s aspirations in life. The following quote from Arash, an Iranian man in his thirties, who was temporarily back in Sweden after living in London helps to illustrate this:

> I am being seen as a second-class citizen. This feeling doesn’t really encourage you to live here [in Sweden], basically. More than that, I don’t want my child or my children one day having that feeling. I don’t want them to feel that. Me, moving here, immigrating here, fine. But I don’t want that for my children. I want—obviously every parent wants the best for their kids. I want to create for them something better than I had to go through.

*(Arash, Swedish-Iranian in London, 32, m)*

Other parents also mentioned that the family’s onward migration was motivated by the wish to protect their children from experiencing the discrimination they had suffered in their previous EU country of residence. In the next quote Vanessa explains why she thinks her children will have more opportunities in Manchester. After living in the German Ruhr region for 14 years and repeatedly dealing with racism, she suggested to her husband to move to Britain following the birth of their children:

> The main reason we left [Germany] was because of the children, I don’t want mine to pass through the stress. [In Germany] they make the children scared of school. Most of the Black children there do not have the mind to go forward... I don’t want my children to end up going for *Ausbildung* [apprenticeship] and do stylist or whatever. I want them to go further and do what they want to do in their life... I met a friend here, her girl is doing well now. The family came from Germany because [the school] told her she should go and do
Ausbildung for hairdressing. Her mom said: “Over my dead body, I know my daughter is bright enough to be whatever she wants to be.” Today she is a medical doctor in London. Just imagine... Germany was taking her where her destiny is not.  
(Vanessa, German-Nigerian in Manchester, 39, f)

This extract reflects the high aspirations immigrant parents have for their children and was typical amongst family movers. Despite this, parents also acknowledged that there were trade-offs to make. Many felt that their children had been safer in their previous country of residence, and that, in for example the Swedish case, more money was invested in pre-school daycare and primary school education than in the UK. Furthermore, the second-generation at times challenged their parents’ decision to onward migrate because the children were rarely involved in the decision-making process. Especially at the beginning children longed for their former country of residence, which some considered their ‘home’ because they also had been born there and never visited their ancestral homeland.

Political Movers: Voting with their Feet

For some of our research participants, the decision to move on was an expression of their dissatisfaction with changing integration policies and public discourses in their previous EU country of residence. Persistent and increasing racism against immigrants—especially Muslim immigrants—affect their sense of belonging in a country they considered ‘home’. In the past Dutch integration policies were associated with multiculturalism, but more recently the state adopted more policies of assimilation. In Sweden growing support for Sverige Demokraterna, a nationalist political party with blatant anti-immigrant views, has sent the message that immigrants are not welcome in Swedish society. Germany’s lack of integration policies due to decades of denying its status as an immigration country, as well as the institutional and everyday racism people of colour experienced compelled immigrants to leave. Our participants’ desire to move to a place more acceptant of diversity—where they could feel free, practise their religion and express their political views—was an important factor in their decision-making. Participants acknowledged that discrimination and racism also existed in the UK, but they felt the racism there was not as overt and anti-discrimination laws were enforced more vigorously. This can be explained with the fact that the UK was one of the first European countries to introduce strong anti-discrimination and equality policies. By the time the Race Directive and Race and Employment Directive of 2000 were adopted, anti-discrimination laws in Sweden and the Netherlands were fairly comprehensive (Bell 2002), while other member states had not made earnest efforts in this regard. Here we hear again from Vanessa, who moved with her children:

I know that there is discrimination everywhere, but there are places that are worse. In this place because of the human rights here [in the UK], you can stand up for yourself and then they will judge it. While in other places it’s not like that, you don’t have as much power there. […] When someone is giving you attitude or racism here you can take the person to court and then the judge will discipline him or her...  
(Vanessa, German-Nigerian in Manchester, 39, f)

The following extract helps to further explain this politically motivated type of onward migration. Nimo is a Somali woman in her thirties, who came to the Netherlands as a small girl. After finishing university, Nimo started working for the local council. She described herself as happy with her life in the Netherlands; she had a good social life and a Dutch boyfriend. She actively participated in radio and TV debates and felt she was contributing to the Dutch multicultural society. When the Dutch political climate changed dramatically— following the cases of Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali—she no longer felt welcome in the
People felt I was doing well, I had a good job, I participated in public debates. They saw me on the television. But I could no longer take it. I couldn’t sleep, I couldn’t eat. I just felt I didn't want to be part of the Dutch society anymore. The worst thing for me was my friends’ reactions. When I told them I wanted to move to the UK, you try to explain how you feel and then people they start to rationalise it. They told me I should not take it personally and that I was different than the other Muslims. That really hurt me even more. You know I’m a Muslim too. The debate, it was just mean and I felt insulted. You know in Holland it’s just impossible to have a different background. That is the biggest problem of that society and that’s why I moved.

(Nimo, Dutch-Somali in London, 33, f)

Nimo went to London and is now very active in the Somali community in London. Being part of larger political interest groups and participating in the Somali community in London, has brought a new meaning to her life. It is fortunate that Nimo finds her community-level political participation most rewarding, seeing that as an intra-EU mover she is only allowed to stand and vote in municipal and European elections in the UK. She cannot participate in the British national elections and cannot vote from abroad in the Dutch national elections—this disenfranchisement of mobile EU citizens is common. Nimo’s story also shows that political reasons not only play a role in international migrations towards Europe, but also in the regional migrations within Europe. Furthermore, this case highlights how integration is not a unidirectional process. The onus to integrate is often placed on immigrants, but this needs to be complemented in equal measure by efforts of the destination countries and societies.

**Diaspora Movers: Regrouping with Relatives, Friends and Communities**

For diaspora movers their main motive for the relocation is socio-cultural, because they want to be closer to family and friends in another country and miss a ‘Somali’, ‘Iranian’ or ‘Nigerian’ way of life. The specific characteristics of their migration process also play an important role in their decision to onward migrate. The classical meaning of ‘diaspora’ implies the scattering of a population, caused by some forced or traumatic historical event. The participants who came as refugees often have experienced a migration process towards Europe that has resulted in their families being scattered across several countries with not everyone ending up where they initially preferred to migrate. Furthermore, the dispersal policies for asylum-seekers within destination countries may reinforce the feeling of isolation, because refugees from the same country of origin might be placed in different cities (Robinson et al., 2003). Due to the increasingly selective EU immigration policies, others who come as labour migrants or students by no means are free to choose their destination. The need to take advantage of particular entry visas or scholarships, can have a similar effect of scattering. For some the onward move to the UK can therefore be understood as facilitating a reunification with friends and relatives.

The summary of Ayaan's story below demonstrates the practical support that family members can offer. Furthermore participants extolled the virtues of being able to better maintain their culture and religion in the UK. Although given that all three research projects focused on areas with large concentrations of the respective migrant groups, the samples are likely to over-represent onward movers who actively sought these (re)connections with their fellow diasporans and ‘home’ culture:

Ayaan is a Somali mother who moved to Leicester to be close to Somali friends and family, to have Somali shops on her street, eat Somali food, speak the language, to be able to dress the way she wants and to give her children a religious upbringing. She said there was no
mosque in the Dutch village where she lived and she constantly felt guilty that she was not giving her children a good upbringing. Now they have a mosque close by. When asked why she did not move to a close city in the Netherlands with a mosque she said she thought that city was too big. She did not want her children to grow up in a big city. For her it was easier to move to Leicester from a small Dutch village than to move 20 miles within the Netherlands. Besides, family members in Leicester now help Ayaan keep an eye on her 11 children. This clearly shows the importance of transnational diasporic networks and how they can shape migration processes.

(Ayaan, Dutch-Somali in Leicester, 43, f)

It is important to note here that space and place not only are of significance for the individual migrant, but that the respective diasporas add another layer of meanings. All over the world diaspora hubs of varying sizes have become implanted. These are often the result of successive phases of diasporisation, like in the case of Somali seafarers who settled in England and Wales as early as the mid-1800s. Although orientation towards the homeland was long seen as a defining feature of diasporas, it has been conceded that even for members of the ‘classic’ Jewish diaspora, their Jewish identity is now experienced in the diaspora and a ‘return’ to Israel is rarely contemplated. Especially when conditions for such a return are unfavourable or problematic, relocating to a place with vibrant ethnic enclaves that reproduce most elements of the ‘home culture’ can appear like a good substitute or make a return unnecessary (Vickerman 2002).

When considering where to move our participants often weighed up their diasporas’ favoured destinations against their personal preferences and circumstances. For our participants the onward migration to the UK at times was a compromise: the Somali diaspora favoured destinations like Minneapolis, Toronto, Cairo, Dubai or Nairobi; members of the Iranian diaspora overall preferred cities in the United States, especially Los Angeles (affectionately referred to as ”Irangeles”); and the Nigerian diasporans in general rated United States and Canada more highly. These locations also offered opportunities to be part of wider kinship networks and established Black or Muslim communities. In Adébáyò’s case, he and his partner needed to find a location that fitted in with both their career needs and wider family and transnational ties:

I left [Germany] because I was getting married. We knew each other in Nigeria, we went to the same primary school... we bumped into each other at a party in London... [...] Actually at that point I was contemplating moving to Nigeria because my parents were also returning [...] My wife she is a solicitor and it would have been a lot harder for her to move out and come to Germany, because she doesn’t speak the language and because of the qualifications. Whereas I have an IT background and I already spoke English... There also is a bigger Nigerian concentration in and around London and that’s why it was a great fit [...] Six months ago my work transferred me to Switzerland. Well I work there during the week and I fly home [to London] during weekends... Now I could go back to Germany, but I might also move elsewhere. My wife wants to move back to the US, she’s a dual British-American citizen... she’s a third-generation Nigerian, born in the UK and who moved to the US for a while. She’s tired of the UK and she wants to move back to the US.

(Adébáyò, German-Nigerian in Basel and London, 31, m)

These diasporic landscapes are subject to change over time and in our participants’ narratives we found continuous re-evaluations of their ‘cognitive maps’ (Malmberg, 1997). Participants often used their transnational ties to gain information and compare the circumstances in their previous and current place of residence, while also contemplating new destinations and the option of returning to their country of origin.

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Cosmopolitan Movers: Becoming Global Citizens

In contrast to the previous types, the next group does not feel compelled to move on due to the pressures of unemployment, shortages of educational opportunities or in order to foster their ethnic ties. In fact, some excelled academically and professionally in their previous EU country of residence. Due to their high ambitions, their preference for multicultural environments, or simply their own personal curiosity, these migrants decided to onward migrate to further improve their careers and lifestyles. We have therefore called them cosmopolitan movers. Given London’s status as a ‘global city’, it is part of a network through which capital and highly-paid migrants are said to move without much interference of states (Sassen 2001). Multi-national companies with head offices in London are likely to recruit onward migrants with relevant professional skills, because they also possess a unique set of language skills that the local British workforce tends to lack. As we saw in Adébáyô’s earlier extract, he left an IT job in Germany and secured a highly-paid position within a week of his arrival in London, this city thus propelled him into a global talent circuit which resulted in him becoming a posted worker in Switzerland. His story was unique amongst the German-Nigerian participants, at the time not many had the opportunity to pursue higher education and then obtain a job in their field in Germany. Adébáyô was keen to emphasise, however, that his experience was still part of a wider phenomenon—out of his around 30 university friends of African-origin only two stayed in Germany, all others onward migrated to look for work in the UK and US, as well as Francophone countries like Belgium and France.

The multicultural image associated with London as a ‘world city’ also plays an important role in attracting cosmopolitan movers (Conradson and Latham, 2005). This closely relates to the British history as a colonising nation where many post-colonial migrants decided to settle. Furthermore London’s population in particular is said to be characterised by ‘super-diversity’ due to the dynamic interplay of variables such as country of origin, migration channel, legal status, migrants’ human capital and locality (Vertovec, 2007). London’s international character was considered very appealing for some of our participants, who wanted to escape the relative homogeneity they perceived in other EU countries. Leila, a young Swedish-Iranian in her early twenties moved to London in order to find change. She had experienced racism in her small town, and perceived Sweden to be a rigid, conformist society where people were expected to behave, dress and live in a similar way. After moving to London, she felt how her own attitudes started changing:

Yeah, a definite positive thing is you get much more open-minded. I think obviously I’ve never been a racist or anything, clearly with my background but, you know, coming here, you’re going to open up to so many more cultures or ethnicities and whatever... You learn a lot about different parts of the world, and just different walks of life—whether it’s you know, ethnicity or different sexual preferences.

(Leila, Swedish-Iranian in London, 25, f)

The next quote from Zana, similarly illustrates how her initial motivation of coming to London for the purpose of study, enabled her to discover this multicultural and cosmopolitan city:

I think my home is predominantly London now. I would not like to live anywhere else in the UK. It is a great opportunity to be here, work related, education related, there are just such fantastic opportunities. If you see the opportunities, you have to be able to see them, but then you can have such a fantastic life here... I really see the difference with my friends who stayed behind in Holland. They live in the same area, still have the same job, same routine. But here it is really different. You come across so many inspirational people, the real role models and you are just stimulated every day.

(Zana, Dutch-Somali in London, 23, f)
This group of onward migrants at first glance therefore is similar to the native-born Europeans, who engage in mobility to explore opportunities in other parts of the EU (Favell, 2008). On account of having experienced life in more than one cultural context, these onward migrants may already have adopted cosmopolitan outlooks even prior to moving on. As the quotes from Leila and Zana illustrate, a multicultural city like London thus enables them to feel more at ease with their identity. They have the freedom to be who they are and to develop themselves further, without feeling the pressure to adopt the dominant lifestyle or shared national values prevalent in their first EU country of residence.

Amongst the total number of participants interviewed, however, there were only very few cosmopolitan movers, even though this type appears to dominate in research with native-born Europeans who engage in mobility. Furthermore, for our participants, moving towards a more multicultural environment in which diversity tended to be celebrated was as much about moving away from constraints (like racism and discrimination) as it was about moving toward opportunities in the labour market and cultural realm. We did find significant differences between our case studies, however, with Iranians being the most inclined toward this type of mobility. This probably reflects the middle-class background of many diasporic Iranians, and their desire to retain this middle-class lifestyle (McAuliffe, 2008; Kelly, 2013).

CONCLUSIONS

The relationship among citizenship, integration and transnationalism is complex, and as we have aimed to illustrate, integration does not necessarily occur in narrowly defined nation state contexts, and may instead happen across multiple countries and places. Our findings highlight the importance of adopting a broader perspective on integration than is normally taken up in migration studies. We also contribute to the under-standing of transnationalism, which is generally concerned only with nodes – one located in the origin country and one located in the destination country – by including transnational activities and migration trajectories directed at other destinations. The idea that citizenship entitles migrants with rights and binds them to a nation state is clearly challenged by our participants, who use their EU citizenship to achieve their integration aspirations across time and space.

By adopting a migrant-centred approach we explored some of the specific motivations underlying onward moves, and consequently how onward migrants enact citizenship in different ways. Importantly, none of the three migrant groups under study in this paper were completely free to choose their first country of residence due to the selective EU immigration policies. Somalis and Iranians entered the EU most often as refugees, while Nigerians also made use of other restricted migration channels. On the one hand, onward migration can therefore be interpreted as a way to address dissatisfaction with the outcome of their initial migration process. Certainly migration to the first country of residence increases the information about the circumstances in previously unconsidered or unreachable regions, in turn enabling migrants to re-draw their ‘cognitive maps’ of the EU. On the other hand, onward migrants may also want to rectify what they themselves perceive as actual or potential unsatisfactory integration outcomes and in this sense the motivations of student, career and family movers are very similar.

Discrimination in their previous country of residence featured prominently amongst the factors that influenced our participants’ decision to onward migrate. Changes in state policies and civil society attitudes can make migrants feel excluded, which ultimately may result in them losing their sense of home and belonging in the country where they gained EU citizenship. Political movers feel unable to practise their culture and may consider relocating to a country where they think minority rights are respected and they can rely on the enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation. When only a shorter timeframe is considered, onward migration may appear as a new form of ‘reactive transnationalism’ (Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002), where discrimination in the first EU country of residence leads to an intensification of transnational ties directed at new destinations. Analysing onward migration in a wider timeframe, as we have
done in this paper, however, reveals that onward migration also allows for a ‘synergetic interaction’ or ‘additive interaction’ of the two social processes, whereby more transnationalism can lead to further integration in a second member state (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013).

We found that migrants’ transnational ties to other member states, are further layers that mediate the decisions to onward migrate. For diaspora movers their social integration is not only about intra-ethnic friendships and relations, it may be equally important to be close to co-ethnics, family and friends. London has a special draw due to its large concentration of different diasporic groups that settled there because it is the former metropole of the British empire; the destination of previous labour migrations; and maintained important trade links with other countries. Those moving on to the UK as cosmopolitan movers were often more successful (in terms of education and career achievement) in their first EU country of residence than other onward migrants. However, even these migrants were similarly attracted by what they perceived to be a higher level of openness to cultural diversity in the UK.

Despite the fact that political and academic discourses focus on intra-EU mobility as a white middle-class desire to experience cosmopolitan lifestyles, cultures and languages, we found that this does not reflect the lived experiences of naturalised EU citizens. The three migrant groups discussed in this paper show a far greater propensity to engage in intra-EU mobility than the average European population. However, the majority of foreign-born EU citizens interviewed as part of our research decided to onward migrate in order to escape discrimination and racism in their previous country of residence. ‘Free’ movement within the EU can only occur when there are no other constraints impeding or forcing the movement; a point that is not stressed enough in studies of transnationalism. Therefore it is necessary to develop a more differentiated understanding of who engages in mobility and why. Then further measures need to be taken to ensure that naturalised third-country nationals can de facto enjoy their equal rights as EU citizens.

ENDNOTE

1. The figure of 11.9 million third-country nationals with EU citizenship is equivalent to 2.3% of the total EU population in 2011. It is the gross difference between the 32.4 million residents who were born outside the EU and the 20.5 million third-country nationals residing in the EU (Eurostat 2012).

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