Sarah_Sawyer_Minds_and_Morals_(Academia_version).pdf (270.25 kB)
Minds and morals
In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent’s subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, emerges.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Philosophical IssuesISSN
1533-6077Publisher
Blackwell PublishingExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
24Page range
393-408Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2015-10-16First Open Access (FOA) Date
2016-11-01First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2015-10-16Usage metrics
Categories
No categories selectedKeywords
Licence
Exports
RefWorks
BibTeX
Ref. manager
Endnote
DataCite
NLM
DC