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Seth, Anil K and Barrett, Adam B (2010) Neural theories need to account for, not discount, introspection and behavior. Cognitive Neuroscience, 1 (3). pp. 227-228. ISSN 1758-8936
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2010.496533
Abstract
A satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties. While pursuing this project may challenge our intuitions about what we are conscious of, evidence from behavior and introspection should not be discounted. All three lines of evidence need to be integrated in order to naturalize phenomenal experience.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | School of Engineering and Informatics > Informatics |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF0311 Consciousness. Cognition |
Depositing User: | Marianne Cole |
Date Deposited: | 03 Sep 2015 07:23 |
Last Modified: | 03 Sep 2015 07:23 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/56497 |