Seth, Anil K and Barrett, Adam B (2010) Neural theories need to account for, not discount, introspection and behavior. Cognitive Neuroscience, 1 (3). pp. 227-228. ISSN 1758-8936

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

A satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties. While pursuing this project may challenge our intuitions about what we are conscious of, evidence from behavior and introspection should not be discounted. All three lines of evidence need to be integrated in order to naturalize phenomenal experience.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of Engineering and Informatics > Informatics
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF0311 Consciousness. Cognition
Depositing User:	Marianne Cole
Date Deposited:	03 Sep 2015 07:23
Last Modified:	03 Sep 2015 07:23
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/56497

📧 Request an update