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Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years*

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Abstract

The absence of formal state structures for the conduct of cultural relations until 1938 has led to the assumption that Americans abandoned a noble tradition of liberal cultural exchange in the Cold War, when state and private organizations co-operated in a propaganda battle against the Soviet Union. This article re-examines the realities of American cultural diplomacy in inter-war Europe by focusing on a group of key actors: philanthropic foundations founded by the Rockefeller and the Carnegie families. Far from being apolitical, foundations operated with the tacit approval of the state and reliably furthered American interests abroad but their nongovernmental status also made them vulnerable to foreign intelligence.

‘Winning hearts and minds’; ‘cultural imperialism’; ‘a specialised form of statecraft, concerned with information and value transmission’; or simply ‘goodwill stuff’ – these are all more or less accurate definitions of cultural diplomacy, an area of foreign relations that is currently receiving much attention.¹ When talking about American cultural diplomacy, our thinking almost inevitably turns to the so-called Cultural Cold War. For many historians, the most salient episode here remains the rise and fall of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. Sustained by such intellectual luminaries as Stephen Spender, Melvin Lasky and Raymond Aron, the congress was publicly supported by the Ford Foundation but at the same time covertly financed by the C.I.A. As is well known, the congress underwrote a large number of organizations in various countries, published the influential magazine Encounter and provided a forum for centrist, sometimes left-leaning but always staunchly anti-communist intellectuals. The exposure of covert C.I.A. funding in 1967
caused a public outcry, tarnished the Ford Foundation’s reputation and ultimately led to the demise of the congress.²

Those writing on the Congress for Cultural Freedom generally fall into two camps. Some claim that these scholars and intellectuals who accepted American funding had a large degree of autonomy in what they thought and wrote. The C.I.A. may have paid for publications and plush international conferences but that did not mean that it was able completely to control cultural messages.³ Moreover, as Volker Berghahn has argued, the position of the Ford Foundation was more ambiguous: its president became increasingly uncomfortable about giving a grant to a covertly funded organization and the foundation itself never agreed to act as a financial channel for the C.I.A.⁴

Others writing on the Congress for Cultural Freedom have taken a completely different line. They argue that the Ford Foundation willingly co-operated with the C.I.A. for propaganda purposes and helped it to influence public debate in post-war western Europe. As the Cold War was waged on all fronts, so this argument goes, foundations and the American government alike disregarded the ideal of intellectual freedom – which is what they were supposed to be fighting for in the first place. Even if the aim was to oppose the ‘un-freedom’ of the Soviet Union, and to revive democracy in western Europe, surely the means – covert funding channels and conspiracy – were deeply flawed. As Frances Stonor Saunders, author of the programmatically-titled study Who Paid the Piper?, asks: ‘To what degree was it admissible for another state to covertly intervene in the fundamental processes of organic intellectual growth, of free debate and the uninhibited flow of ideas?’⁵ How could the American government, aided by civil society organizations, take these measures that undermined freedom instead of defending it?

The answer to that question is commonly held to lie in the way that American cultural diplomacy developed before and after the Second World War. Like Stonor Saunders, historians of American cultural diplomacy frame their narratives around an opposition
between those cultural relations which are promoted by private groups, such as philanthropic foundations, and those promoted by the state. Free-flowing, organic intellectual processes are juxtaposed against state control and indoctrination. Private, civil society-based efforts are held to be idealistic, non-political, based on mutual exchange and respect whereas state-led cultural efforts are seen to have a tendency to be one-directional, concerned with short-term objectives and exclusively promoting the national interest. Frank Ninkovich, whose *Diplomacy of Ideas* remains the standard work on the development of American cultural diplomacy from the late nineteen-thirties, tells just such a story: in the nineteen-twenties, cultural relations between the United States and the rest of the world were dominated by civil society groups. These included academic associations, for example the American Library Association or the American Council of Learned Societies, but most importantly a number of privately-funded philanthropic foundations, notably the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie Corporation. The foundations provided the financial backing for projects initiated by the academic associations, and increased scholarly mobility. Thus, these philanthropic foundations created what Ninkovich calls a ‘private institutional system for the conduct of cultural relations’, largely aimed at an academic elite.

This private, non-political, voluntarist system distinguished the United States from European countries that embraced, according to Ninkovich, a completely different model, namely, *Kulturpolitik*, culture in the service of power politics. This assessment is to some extent correct since the United States was indeed a relative latecomer in terms of establishing a formal infrastructure for the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The French *Service des Œuvres Françaises à l’Etranger* and the *Kulturabteilung* of the German Foreign Ministry, for example, were both established in 1920. Even in Britain, where voluntarist traditions were strong, the Foreign Office set up the British Council in 1934 and engaged it in, according to Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, ‘the finest form of counter propaganda’. 
The American State Department, however, only set up its Division of Cultural Relations in July 1938, mainly as a reaction to Axis cultural propaganda in Latin America. Nevertheless, for the next ten years, the newly created division held up the voluntarist traditions of the private cultural relations establishment. However, in the course of the Second World War, and as international politics became realigned into the bipolar power structures of the Cold War, the United States adopted a ‘European-style’ – *Kulturpolitik* which ultimately led to the hypocrisies of the Cultural Cold War. By 1950, American cultural diplomacy had moved from internationalism to nationalism and from private to public. It had turned international organizations like U.N.E.S.C.O. into a mouthpiece for American policies. Finally, it mobilized independent liberal thinkers for the ideological combat against communism. Intellectual relations became politicized and thus poisoned and the noble American tradition of free cultural exchange was lost.\(^{11}\)

This is the standard account, which, however, betrays its Cold War vantage point. It implies that all those American groups involved in cultural relations before 1938 were really very good internationalists and part of an authentic, free-flowing, cross-cultural exchange into which politics rarely intruded. This, according to Ninkovich, changed because totalitarian regimes forced the United States to embrace European-style cultural policies. By framing the debate in this way, Ninkovich idealizes the unofficial conduct of cultural relations that went on in the inter-war years and leads us towards some intriguing conclusions.

First, Ninkovich seems to imply that private cultural diplomacy, run by non-governmental organizations, is non-political and somehow possesses more democratic legitimacy than cultural diplomacy forged by states. Second, he also imagines a European tradition of *Kulturpolitik* which is supposedly completely different from the American approach. Apart from the fact that Ninkovich’s characterization of European cultural foreign policies is problematic – private groups within the educated bourgeoisie were often at the origin of state policies, in Europe as in the United States\(^ {12}\) – one wonders how the supposedly
voluntarist American approach could have worked if it used the same channels as European state-led organizations. At a basic level, we should challenge the notion that because of the late onset of the governmental management of international cultural relations in the United States ‘The US was a newcomer to culture wars’ in the Cold War, as Tony Judt has claimed.¹³

Thus, it seems necessary to have a closer look at American cultural relations in the inter-war years. Whether we can label these various initiatives and groups as ‘cultural diplomacy’ is up for discussion. Is something only worthy of the label diplomacy if state bureaucrats are directly involved? Or is it more valuable to analyse how cultural programmes actually worked on the ground, and how they were received in other countries? Is the public-private distinction really so important? Can the ‘non-political, private’ status of certain organizations not be part and parcel of official foreign policy? This article will explore these questions by focusing on two prominent philanthropic foundations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation, the major financiers and bridge-builders in the American private cultural relations elite of the inter-war years. It will analyse, first, the rather porous border between state and private in inter-war American cultural relations; second, the values promoted by the foundations in Europe and some of their projects; and third, the way American foundations interacted with intergovernmental and state structures.

Let us start with a few explanatory notes on the foundations. Both the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1910 and 1913 respectively, are examples of the large corporate foundations set up during the progressive era by a number of wealthy families.¹⁴ The Carnegie Endowment was originally rooted in the pre-1914 transatlantic peace movement.¹⁵ The Rockefeller Foundation started out with large-scale programmes in public health, initially in the Americas and Asia. In the course of the First World War, these were
extended into Europe, where the foundation then started to aid academic research in the natural and medical sciences. The social sciences, initially under the smaller Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial also received substantial funding.

Officers in both foundations viewed their activity as instrumental in the construction of a stable and peaceful world order. They also held that academic research should ultimately underpin political decisions. Foundations had presided over the increase in expert-led policymaking in the domestic arena, which was a response to the progressive preoccupation with efficiency and good governance – foreign policy was one of the last borders for outside expertise. In Europe and the United States, the foundations promoted the involvement of private citizens in the broader foreign policymaking process in two ways. First, they gave support to institutions that conducted research or teaching in subjects that were relevant to foreign policy, such as history, economics, geography and international law. Some of them were part of national systems of higher education, for example the London School of Economics (L.S.E.). Others were private ‘foreign affairs institutes’. These included the Institut für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg, the American Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House in London. A third category comprised institutions that primarily trained future diplomats, such as the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales at the University of Paris. Second, the foundations promoted the international mobility of scholars. The Rockefeller philanthropies financed an extensive fellowship programme. The Carnegie Endowment also awarded fellowships and established two chairs for visiting lecturers, one in Paris and one in Berlin, and considered establishing more such ‘Carnegie Chairs’ in several European capitals. Finally, the foundations supported institutions that were self-consciously ‘international’. The most prominent example here is the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, which was founded with a substantial Rockefeller grant. It had an international staff – usually including at least one visiting American professor. The Carnegie Endowment, on the other hand, funded the Academy of International Law at the Hague.
But what was the relation of the foundations to American foreign policies? Even before the First World War, the programmes of the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation both supplemented official U.S. foreign policy. The Carnegie Endowment embraced a rather legalistic approach to international relations, being led by international lawyers and elder statesmen such as its first president Elihu Root. One of its major projects was the ongoing development and popularization of international law.\textsuperscript{24} This fitted in with the American government’s championing of international law between 1898 and 1922. A legalistic approach to international affairs and a growing acceptance of international law among European states suited traditional U.S. foreign policy aims towards Europe, which called for isolation in peace and neutrality in war.\textsuperscript{25} The early geographical focus of Rockefeller philanthropy overlapped with American expansion in the western hemisphere where the American military conducted several sanitary campaigns between the eighteen-nineties and the nineteen-tens. Rockefeller campaigns in these areas also relied on personnel recruited among former military and colonial officials. Similar to those of the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller activities dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{26} The Great War changed the environment in which the foundations operated. The outcome of the conflict transformed the global balance of power and, with the establishment of the League of Nations, the international system as such. Historians of social reform movements have seen the Great War as the beginning of the end of unchallenged European leadership in setting the social policy agenda in the north Atlantic. Transatlantic exchanges became less one-sided as Fordism and other elements of the American ‘machine civilization’ travelled eastwards.\textsuperscript{27} The American relief workers who tested progressive models in town-planning, public health and education on war-devastated French civilians were the harbingers of this role reversal.\textsuperscript{28} Foundations were major financiers of American war relief in Europe, co-ordinated by semi-governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross or the American Relief Administration. The Rockefeller Foundation even created its own War
Relief Commission and provided over $19 million to humanitarian and war-related initiatives between 1914 and 1918. The Carnegie Endowment also made contributions to war relief but, most importantly, offered the services of its International Law Division to the State Department during the war and compiled studies in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference.

Many staff members of the foundations served as expert advisers to government agencies during the war or went to the Paris Peace Conference. They include James Brown Scott, George A. Finch and James T. Shotwell of the Carnegie Endowment and Raymond Fosdick, future president of the Rockefeller Foundation, who was a civilian aide to General Pershing. Future foundation officers assumed important roles in the war administration at home and abroad, for instance on the Creel Committee, the Inquiry or the Commission for Training Camp Activities. But they also collected experiences with the semi-official agencies that became so prominent during the war. Tracy B. Kittredge, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation’s assistant director of the Social Sciences Division in the nineteen-thirties, worked for Hoover’s Relief Commission in Belgium. Thus, many later foundation employees served their country either as expert advisers or in a semi-official capacity. In fact, it is hard to find foundation staff of this generation without such a war record. Considering the wartime roles of philanthropic leaders, it is clear that their experiences brought them into closer contact with foreign policymakers. Those involved in the peacemaking process, in particular, realized the extent to which government was willing to rely on outside expertise. Finally, philanthropic leaders now increasingly emphasized that the fulfilment of American foreign policy objectives was a prerequisite to universalist philanthropic aims such as world peace. Patriotic duty had to come before internationalist duty – or, as John D. Rockefeller, Jr. insisted, there were cases ‘where Brotherhood must halt until Right Prevails’.

Of course the end of the Great War saw the rapid abolition of all the wartime agencies that many foundation staff had worked for. Moreover, the United States did not become a
member of the League of Nations, a state of affairs which especially frustrated Raymond Fosdick, a protégé of Woodrow Wilson and briefly under-secretary-general of the league. 

Nevertheless, throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the philanthropic elite of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the State Department, and in American embassies abroad. There was no direction of foundation policies but there were certainly informal consultations without directions. Sometimes, the relationship between diplomats and foundations was marked by ambivalence, as foundation staff were unsure whether having the official backing of their government would be an asset or a liability abroad. The following letter of 1922 from George E. Vincent, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, to Alanson B. Houghton, U.S. ambassador to Germany, illustrates this dilemma:

> We desire to avoid undue publicity. We work with many countries and it is our policy to keep the Foundation and its personnel in the background. It would seriously interfere with our work if it were regarded as a form of nationalistic propaganda. We shall count, therefore, upon your co-operation in helping us to avoid anything which might seem to involve us in international politics or might prove embarrassing to our work throughout the world.

In effect, in this letter Vincent asked for governmental co-operation to produce the appearance of non-co-operation. The unspoken assumption was that some level of state-private co-ordination was expected but should be denied publicly. This is underlined by Vincent’s promise to keep Houghton informed: ‘Our representatives when they go to Berlin will make a point of calling upon you and letting you know how things are going.’

Not all foundation officers were so cautious, notably Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of the Carnegie Endowment from 1925. His ventures into European capitals, often connected with a sumptuous banquet in his honour and a lengthy speech, came dangerously close to private diplomacy and American diplomats shuddered whenever he embarked on one of his annual sojourns. S. Pinkney Tuck, from the American legation in Budapest, recalls a 1931 visit of Butler’s to receive honorary degrees from the universities of Budapest and
Szeged. Butler delivered two public addresses, greeted by apprehension from the American diplomat: ‘for both subjects he selected were capable of interpretation and development along lines which might render my official presence distinctly embarrassing.’ Thankfully, Butler’s speeches were vetted by the organizers of the trip and did not cause a diplomatic éclat. To Tuck’s relief, neither did they cause too much publicity in Hungary: ‘The local press contented itself with brief but flattering comments on Dr. Butler’s position in public life in the United States and the real pleasure with which the Hungarian Government welcomed him to Budapest.’

In Hungary, Butler was seen as a representative of the American political establishment. He was there in a private capacity but his speeches contained the potential for diplomatic ruptures, at least in the opinion of the American legation.

Nevertheless, no American foundation representative was ever threatened with being charged under the Logan Act, which prohibits private citizens from conducting American foreign policy. This had almost happened to Herbert Hoover, for his food distribution programme in the aftermath of the First World War.

The Rockefeller and the Carnegie Endowment were cautious enough to steer clear of such dangers and the Rockefeller Foundation in particular succeeded in carefully cultivating an image of impartiality and independence in its dealings abroad – with the approval of the American State Department.

What were the attitudes of the foundations towards Europe? What were they hoping to achieve through their expensive programmes and how did they go about it? One chief feature of inter-war foundation policy is that it was relatively decentralized. Both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment maintained European branch offices in Paris which had considerable autonomy, both in terms of policy and grant-making. These offices were an integral part of the large American community in Paris – in the voice of an ex-pat: ‘We have American bars in Paris, an American Hospital in Paris, American Jazz-Bands, American
Newspapers, American Crooks, Philanthropists, Barbers, Dentists, Doctors, and American Undertakers in Paris. The Carnegie Endowment’s European office had some French staff and its in-house journal, *L'Esprit International*, was also regarded as a French publication, edited by the young Pierre Renouvin. *L'Esprit International* offered mostly articles on current affairs, international law and European federation. Its editorial line was liberal and anti-communist, its authors were well-known public intellectuals, such as Butler himself, Count Carlo Sforza, William Rappard, and the occasional monarchist. The directors of the Carnegie Endowment’s European office aimed to turn the journal into ‘one of the leaders of public opinion in international tasks and problems in all European Countries’, a European version of *Foreign Affairs*. The Rockefeller Foundation did not engage in such publicity activities. Its European branch office was staffed almost exclusively by Americans but it kept its grant-giving policies decentralized by employing national fellowship advisers, or committees of advisers. These personnel pre-selected candidates for fellowships and commented on institutional grant applications. American foundations appreciated the local intellectual capital that they were able to tap into for their European operations, and rewarded their foreign collaborators with generous invitations to the United States.

In general, American foundation officers had much respect for European scholarship and also for European culture. Unlike later Cold Warriors who tried to counter European cultural anti-Americanism by emphasizing the value of American achievements such as jazz, the foundations were more interested in transferring American scientific advances across the Atlantic. In cultural terms, they were less self-confident. Raymond Fosdick, for example, suffered from a cultural inferiority complex well into the nineteen-twenties. Quoting André Siegfried, a French observer of American civilization, Fosdick diagnosed a worrying level of intellectual, cultural and artistic impoverishment in his homeland.

What American foundation representatives were confident about, however, were their political institutions and their moral superiority. As Nicholas Murray Butler put it in 1914, the
Great War had confirmed the United States’ ‘right to be appealed to on questions of national and international morality’. Butler also suggested that Europe adopt the American principle of federation. The federal structure of the United States was for many foundation officers something that would inevitably spread to the rest of the world. Reminding Americans of how long it took to consolidate federal authority in the United States, Raymond Fosdick concluded that ‘The League of Nations must [now] inevitably go through the same process’. In the Cold War, this emphasis shifted to the creation of an Atlantic community of norms and values, but in the inter-war years, American foundation officers were advocates of a European regionalism. Remarkably, the movement for European integration in Europe itself was very receptive to their ideas. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the aristocratic leader of the small but influential Pan-European Union, wrote in his 1925 book *Pan-Europe* – Nicholas Murray Butler provided the preface to the American edition – that the United States was really at the vanguard for peaceful federation and that Europe should follow: ‘It is characteristic that the part of the world which is technically the most advanced – America – was likewise the first to try the new method of political organization: namely, a system of peaceful federations, culminating in the Pan-American Union and in the idea of a League of Nations’.

The idea that technological advances would have a role to play in new schemes for world organization was also shared among foundation officers, and lay at the root of their strong support for the social sciences. Raymond Fosdick, for example, had been convinced by his wartime experience that, while humanity had the technological capacity for immense destruction, it lacked the social tools to deal with these scientific advances: ‘This divergence between the natural sciences and the social sciences, between machinery and control … this is where the hazard lies’. In Fosdick’s opinion, modern life was adversely affected by an antiquated form of social organization. Optimism about the applicability of social scientific knowledge and the potential for the scientific planning of societal developments was common in American academia at the time. The nineteen-twenties were boom years for the social
sciences and American foundation officers were keen to spread American knowledge and methods to Europe.

However, they also expected that supporting more research in the social sciences in Europe itself would help Europeans to see the light. Abraham Flexner, another influential voice within the Rockefeller philanthropies, hoped that such research would be conducive to [SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]the improvement of economic conditions in Europe … Suppose, however, that by comparative study and actual experiment Europe can be led to see that through economic and other policies which disregard political boundaries, hitherto largely the cause and consequence of war, it will be helped out of its present economic and social distress.51

The Carnegie Endowment, even though it still advocated principally the development of international law, also started to rely on the social sciences by commissioning the 132-volume *Economic and Social History of the World War*. This represented an acknowledgment that social scientific knowledge would play a role in the development of peaceful international relations.52

In the mind of Beardsley Ruml, director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, a ‘cross-fertilization of ideas’ between the United States and Europe was called for and ‘effective steps should be taken to secure that in London at least and also if possible in two or more cities on the European continent there shall be a thoroughly representative collection of American books, periodicals and other publications in the field of social science.’53

Accordingly, early Rockefeller social science programmes in nineteen-twenties Europe concentrated on the provision of scientific literature and of specialist libraries. A host of academic libraries received large amounts of funds – notably that of the L.S.E.54 The Carnegie Endowment rebuilt libraries destroyed in the war, for example in Louvain and in Belgrade.55

There were also instances where the foundations co-operated with the foreign activities of the American Library Association. The American Library in Paris was such a case in point. It had been founded during the Great War by an American volunteer group, the American Committee for Devastated France. It served as the headquarters for the Library War
Service with the American Expeditionary Forces and was converted to a permanent institution in 1920. Apart from offering American books to interested readers, the library also ran a school for those who wanted to learn about American methods of librarianship. The school’s student body comprised twenty-three different nationalities and in a letter of the library to its American constituents, the potential impact of this spreading of American librarianship was highlighted:

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In art, in literature, in drama, America has followed foreign models; in formal education she has built on Continental systems; but in library service the nations of the world are looking to America for leadership. Because of this, public library service has come to be regarded as a prime factor in the establishment of international harmony.\[57\]

In the mid nineteen-twenties, the Carnegie Endowment planned to integrate its own operations with that of the library, and to transform it into a major cultural centre for American culture on the Left Bank, which would be, according to Earle Babcock, head of the Endowment’s European office and president of the library’s board, ‘a focal point for the spread of American cultural influence not only in France but throughout Europe’.\[58\] In its own pamphlets, the library used the softer language of goodwill and mutual understanding between nations, describing its purpose as follows: ‘to assist towards a better understanding of American life, literature, and habits of thought and to promote mutual comprehension and good-will.’ The fact that it was privately-run also received a special mention: ‘The money necessary to maintain the Service comes for the most part from individual Americans who are desirous of assisting in promoting international understanding and believe this to be the most effective way of doing it.’\[59\]

As a result of a lack of funds, the Carnegie Endowment’s plans for the library were shelved but the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial supported it on a smaller scale from 1923. The feature in which the memorial was most interested was the library’s Research Service on International Affairs. This reference service published a journal, the *European Economic and Political Survey*. On its list of subscribers were various American banks,
universities and embassies, but also institutions like the L.S.E. and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. However, because of internal squabbles, the library declined throughout the nineteen-twenties. The memorial started to doubt whether it had enough local support and made its grants dependent on the library’s ability to raise local funds. This practice was extensively commented on in the French press, which identified the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial with John D. Rockefeller, Sr. himself, the ‘Napoléon du petrole’ – even though he was not involved in the running of the foundation at all. ‘His maxim that only those who can help themselves are worthy of aid’, L’Impartial Français wrote in 1927, ‘is extremely representative of the American character. For him, generosity has to generate a certain energy’. Thus, the American library shaped the image which Europeans had of the United States, not just with the reading materials offered on its shelves, but also through the way it was funded. The construction of American foundation philanthropy as an activity sustained by individual generosity and spontaneous enterprise – and not the professional staff and complex bureaucratic structures which, in reality, were essential to the running of most foundations – was not uncommon in Europe, and certainly not actively contradicted by the foundations themselves. Nevertheless, despite several desperate appeals the American Library in Paris lost its Rockefeller funding in the mid nineteen-thirties, partly because a lot of the American community had left Paris by then.

The interest of American foundations in libraries did not just revolve around the kind of knowledge that such repositories would provide to European readers but also around the way knowledge was stored, organized and displayed. The problem with American library methods, notably the system of open stacks, however, was that it was much more costly than European alternatives. It was for this reason that the League of Nations, which had had an American library since its foundation, was compelled to reconsider this arrangement and to sack its librarian, Florence Wilson, in 1926. Florence Wilson had also attended the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919, where she organized the archive of the American delegation, and ended up in Geneva after that.64

Again, American foundations, notably the Carnegie Corporation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, were called to the rescue, this time by Arthur Sweetser, an American friend of Raymond Fosdick and member of the league’s Information Section. Sweetser warned of

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[SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]Terminating the American Library System in this central point of world diplomacy … You could not buy the demonstration value of this installation for thousands of dollars. It threw our system of open shelves, cheery surroundings, and efficient service before the eyes of diplomats, scholars and journalists from all countries.65

Despite the United States’ non-membership in the league, Sweetser felt that in this matter ‘We want the right to vote. We have not that right at present and don’t deserve it. But, if we put something into the Library, it would be accorded to us as gladly as in matters of health it is accorded to the Rockefeller Foundation’.66 Sweetser alluded, of course, to the large contributions that the Rockefeller Foundation made to the league’s Health Organization. As for the league library, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial did indeed support it with a grant of $30,000 which was, however, channelled through the American Library Association. The memorial’s name was not to be mentioned.67 Apparently, a professional association of librarians was deemed to be the most appropriate sponsor for the League of Nations Library. This was not the first time that the American Library Association had channelled Rockefeller funds to Europe68 – the advantage of this was that the money only showed up as a grant to an American professional organization in the memorial’s annual report and not as a grant to the league, which could have stirred up controversy at home. The obscuring of the exact provenance of grants was therefore not a Cold War phenomenon, though admittedly the memorial was not quite the C.I.A. The practice as such, however, was well established.
The last part of this article will focus on the functions that foundations assumed in an international context. This means evaluating their relationship with the League of Nations as well as their dealings with foreign governments. Finally, it will comment briefly on the most overtly political work of the foundations in the nineteen-thirties, the International Studies Conference.

The League of Nations, where most of the international collaboration between technical experts was taking place in the inter-war years, was not surprisingly a focus for much of the work of the foundations. It is not an exaggeration to say that through the cooperation of foundations and private American initiatives there was an American presence in Geneva that amounted to quasi-membership, at least with regards to technical collaboration. In the nineteen-thirties, as governmental contributions to the League of Nations dwindled, American foundations increasingly became important donors to the league, and succeeded in ensuring that Americans had a part in the creation of international norms and standards which, as league historians such as Susan Pedersen claim, was a crucial and lasting outcome of the league’s existence. The large contributions of the Rockefeller Foundation to the league’s health work and its Financial Section complemented numerous personal gifts of the Rockefeller family. The founding of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva with a Rockefeller grant can be interpreted as the creation of a university for the league. The smaller Geneva Research Center, funded by both philanthropies from 1930, was mainly designed to provide Americans with information about the world organization, although it also served as a personal research service for officers of the Carnegie Endowment in its early years. Finally, Rockefeller and Carnegie money also financed the American National Committee on Intellectual Co-operation which was affiliated with the Geneva-based International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation in Paris (the precursor of today’s U.N.E.S.C.O.). The American National Committee was fully integrated in the league apparatus of technical co-operation. It
had considerable influence and successfully pushed the Committee on Intellectual Co-
operation to give increased prominence to the social and political sciences from the early
nineteen-thirties.\textsuperscript{73} The league bodies concerned with intellectual co-operation were keen to
work with American philanthropists. In his dealings with the Carnegie Endowment, Julien
Luchaire, head of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, played down the
intergovernmental underpinnings of his institute and maintained that it did not matter whether
participating organizations came from member countries of the League of Nations or not.
‘Our coordinating operations’, Luchaire explained, ‘do not take place between governments
but between interested institutions and milieux in all countries’.\textsuperscript{74}

Foreign diplomats completely recognized that American foundations were the crucial
players in cultural relations between the United States and the rest of the world. As such they
had the potential to become partners of foreign governments that intended to generate
goodwill for their own country in the United States. In the case of Germany, this was
recognized from the mid nineteen-twenties. Information about the foundations was passed on
to the Foreign Ministry by German members of the philanthropic network. A report on the
Rockefeller Foundation found in the personal papers of the head of the semi-governmental
\textit{Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft} (Emergency Association for German Science)
includes detailed biographical information on all those trustees of the foundation who were
‘kulturpolitisch bedeutsam’ – relevant in terms of cultural diplomacy. The report specifies
where they had studied (very often in Germany), whether they had held government office,
whether they were influential in the American press, and who their spouses and friends
were.\textsuperscript{75} This information was most likely also known to the German Foreign Ministry’s
\textit{Kulturabteilung}, which regularly conferred with foundation fellowship advisers.\textsuperscript{76} There were
several instances when German government bureaucrats used philanthropic networks for their
own advantage, including effective government censorship of volumes which were written for
the Carnegie history of the world war as well as the successful removal of German pacifists from the Carnegie Endowment’s European organization.

The reports on clandestine German rearmament written by one of them, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, to the Endowment’s trustees in the United States had, in particular, been noticed in a negative way by a German diplomat posted in Washington, who complained about their impact: ‘You cannot imagine the effect of these reports. One carries them to the President, to Congress, to the Administration and takes them to be the gospel.’ Thus, it was in Germany’s interest to nudge Foerster out of the Carnegie network, so that the endowment’s links could be more fruitfully used for Germany’s own cultural diplomacy. The German government did not protest officially against the endowment’s activities in Germany – that would have been counterproductive. Instead, it successfully sought to convince Nicholas Murray Butler in personal meetings and through the endowment’s German representative that there was no room for overly critical foreign members in his organization. After all, he wanted to have cordial relations with government circles and the Great and the Good of Europe in general. This strategy worked. The Rockefeller Foundation, with its stronger emphasis on academic research, was not as susceptible to such manipulations, but in the field of international relations, one of its main programmes in the nineteen-thirties, its ambitions to forge a transnational academic consensus on certain international problems were also frustrated.

In the nineteen-thirties, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace gave considerable financial support to the International Studies Conference, a series of annual conferences on international affairs under the auspices of the League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. They provided an international forum for the contemporary intellectual elite involved in international studies. Delegates included Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Wolfers, Arnold Toynbee and E. H. Carr. There were also quite a few liberal economists, some of whom later founded the Mont Pèlerin
Society; and there were some whose political careers still largely lay ahead of them, for example the future secretary of state John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, of C.I.A. fame and one of the main protagonists of the Cultural Cold War.

There were also delegates from the dictatorships that left the league in the course of the nineteen-thirties – Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, it would be accurate to describe the International Studies Conference as a major site of the intellectual battle between the liberal democracies and the dictatorships. One of the most vocal participants in this struggle was a German delegate, an international lawyer called Fritz Berber. Berber worked for the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the liaison office between the German Foreign Ministry and Hitler, and headed a Nazi foreign affairs brain trust. In fact, there is evidence in German archives that Ribbentrop specifically sent Berber to the conferences and to preparatory meetings to use them as a propaganda platform. The American foundations not only accepted Berber’s presence at the International Studies Conferences, some of their officers actively encouraged it in a misguided attempt to strengthen so-called ‘moderate elements’ in Germany.

As for the conferences themselves, under the direction of the foundations they were completely transformed between 1928 and 1931 from an annual meeting where academics discussed mostly technical matters, into para-diplomatic conferences with a common theme, designed to ‘focus the attention of the various governments of Europe’, as one Rockefeller officer remarked. For the Rockefeller Foundation this also represented an opportunity to institutionalize research networks between the foreign affairs institutes it had started to support in the nineteen-twenties. The foundation intervened in numerous ways in the running of the International Studies Conference, wresting control away from the institute in Paris and thereby weakening the intergovernmental foundations of the conference. The intention behind this was to convene a pan-European body of experts which could also include scholars from states that had withdrawn from the league. In reality, though, scholars from dictatorships, such as Berber, found it easy to penetrate these nongovernmental structures – he simply posed as a
private scholar even though in reality he was a Nazi spy. After the fall of France, Berber was put in charge of the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation in Paris, where he presided over the theft and subsequent transfer to Germany of many of the institute’s files relating to the International Studies Conference.

When it came to cultural relations, American foundations wanted to have their cake and eat it. They benefited from the comparative flexibility, nimbleness and prestige that international nongovernmental organizations were able to claim for themselves but they also enjoyed the honours that came with being de facto in charge of American cultural diplomacy. The salient example here is Nicholas Murray Butler who rather relished being treated like an American cultural attaché all over Europe. It is undeniable, though, that the foundations’ ambiguous position made them vulnerable targets for the cultural diplomacy or intelligence work of other countries. Were the foundations really paragons of a fine American tradition of free-flowing cultural exchange? This is questionable. Foundations had political ambitions and also interfered with so-called authentic national cultures, though, it must be admitted, with the frequent result of strengthening liberal forces. Their dealings, however, were not always completely transparent and they also channelled funds through other organizations. Ultimately, American foundations in the inter-war years aspired to achieve what any practitioner of cultural diplomacy during that time purported to do: spreading the achievements of their own civilization for the benefit of the world. As in the Cold War, challenges to this noble aim might have been met with the answer ‘and whatever is wrong with that?’
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3 Broadly speaking, the following scholars emphasize the degree of individual autonomy that was possible in the Cultural Cold War: Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Volker Berghahn and Hugh Wilford. Critics of this view include Frances Stonor Saunders, W. Scott Lucas and Giles Scott-Smith. For an overview on different interpretations of the Congress for Cultural Freedom see The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–60, ed. H. Krabbendam and G. Scott-Smith, Intelligence and National Security, xviii (2003).


5 Stonor Saunders, p. 5.


7 Ninkovich, p. 22.

8 Ninkovich, p. 23.


12 See, e.g., E. Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1923–60 (Munich, 2005), pp. 11–12.


17 M. Bulmer and J. Bulmer, ‘Philanthropy and social science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922–9,’ Minerva, xix (1981), 347-407. It is estimated that between 1924 and 1941 European research institutions in the social sciences received c.$10 million ($100 million in 2005 U.S.D.) from Rockefeller funds (C. Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen: zur Erfindung der empirischen Sozialforschung (Frankfurt, 2007), p. 124). On top of that, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, amalgamated with the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929, initiated a comprehensive fellowship programme.

18 Consider the following note, authored by Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial trustee Raymond Fosdick: ‘The basis of any intellectual judgment and action in the science of
government is facts. Long ago it was recognized that the problem of municipal government could not adequately be met by the ordinary political machinery … The time has now come, I believe, for a similar development in the international field. The same compelling necessity which justified the research bureaus in local and national government exists in this wide phase of human relationships’ (Geneva, United Nations Library, Archives of the League of Nations, Paul Mantoux Papers, box 154, folder 11, R. Fosdick, ‘A proposal to establish an Institute of International Research’, n.d. (c. spring 1926)).


26 As has been observed in P. Collier and D. Horowitz, The Rockefellers: an American Dynasty (1976), p. 104; L. Tournès, ‘La Fondation Rockefeller et la naissance de


31 Sleepy Hollow, Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter R.F.), Tracy B. Kittredge biographical file.


34 See, e.g., a request from the State Department whether a ‘responsible head’ of the Rockefeller Foundation would be available in Europe for consultation (College Park, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter N.A.R.A.), record group 59, central decimal file, 811.43 Rockefeller Foundation/2, W. R. Castle to Rockefeller Foundation, 16 Jan. 1928.


41 C.E.I.P.C.E., box 114, folder 6, Joseph Redlich to Earle Babcock, 14 Dec. 1925.

The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, for example, allotted $10,000 to enable its Austrian fellowship adviser to take up a guest professorship at Harvard (L.S.R.M., III.6, box 54, folder 575, Beardsley Ruml to Lawrence Lowell, 19 Apr. 1927).

Guy Stanton Ford, an academic and one-time employee of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, surveyed the prospects for philanthropic social science programmes in Germany in 1924. He felt that ‘America had something to teach even the Germans’ (‘The Reminiscences of Guy Stanton Ford (1954/5)’, Columbia University Oral History Collection, iii. 497).


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57 R.F., RG 1.1, ser. 500, box 16, folder 161, funding appeal, Apr. 1928.


60 L.S.R.M., III.6, box 48, folder 505, ‘List of subscribers to the European Economic and Political Survey as of December 31, 1927’.

61 ‘Sa maxime (elle est extrêmement représentative du caractère américain) est que ceux qui s’aident méritent seuls d’être aidés. Pour lui, la générosité doit être génératrice d’énergie’ (‘La Bibliothèque américaine de Paris: N’aider que ceux qui s’aident’, *L’Impartial Francais*, 11 Jan. 1927).


65 L.S.R.M., III.6, box 48, folder 503, letter to Keppel, 7 March 1926.

66 L.S.R.M., III.6, box 48, folder 503, letter to Keppel, 7 March 1926.


68 Between 1923 and 1926 the A.L.A. also received tens of thousands of dollars from the memorial for the purpose of aiding foreign research libraries to purchase American publications (L.S.R.M., III.6, box 48, folder 501, *passim*).


See, e.g., the correspondence between Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, the Carnegie Endowment’s representative in Germany, and the Kulturabteilung between 1925 and 1936 in Berlin, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (German Foreign Ministry Archives) (hereafter P.A.A.A.), R 65804 and R 65805; and with Friedrich Schmitt-Ott in R 65521.


See P.A.A.A., R 65804, reel 7859, VIB 2747, report by Dieckhoff on meeting with Butler, 17 Nov. 1925.


They included J. B. Condliffe, L. von Mises and W. Röpke. On the role of the Mont Pèlerin Society and neo-liberalism, see R. Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the*


