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Myopic selection
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 19:26 authored by P A Geroski, M MazzucatoThe severity of selection mechanisms and the myopia of selection are explored through a duopoly model where one firm tries to move down a learning curve in which costs are initially higher than its rival's but ultimately much lower. A trade-off is found between catch-up time and asymptotic market share: the more severe are selection pressures, the less likely is it that the learning technology will survive; however, if it does survive, the learning technology will in the limit be more competitive the more severe are selection pressures. We explore the dynamics of the model under unit cost and strategic pricing and find that the optimal pricing rule depends on the parameters governing firm learning and market selection.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
MetroeconomicaISSN
0026-1386Publisher
WileyExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
53Page range
181-199Department affiliated with
- SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2015-01-06Usage metrics
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