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Virtualist representation

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 14:03 authored by Robert W Clowes, Ron ChrisleyRon Chrisley
This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call "presentational virtualism"). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive ("enactive virtualism"). This paper seeks to examine some of the strengths and weaknesses of these virtuality-based positions in order to assist the development of a related, but independent view of experience: virtualist representationalism. Like presentational virtualism, this third view is representational, but like enactive virtualism, it places action centre-stage, and does not require, in accounting for the richness of visual experience, global representational "snapshots" corresponding to the entire visual field to be tokened at any one time.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Submitted version

Journal

International Journal of Machine Consciousness

ISSN

1793-8430

Publisher

World Scientific Publishing

Issue

2

Volume

4

Page range

503-522

Department affiliated with

  • Informatics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2013-03-18

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2012-12-03

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