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Contrastive self-knowledge

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journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 13:27 authored by Sarah SawyerSarah Sawyer
In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on).

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Social Epistemology

ISSN

0269-1728

Publisher

Taylor & Francis

Issue

2

Volume

28

Page range

139-152

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2013-03-14

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2013-11-06

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2013-11-06

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