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Motivating epistemic reasons for action
Rowbottom (2008) has recently challenged my definition of epistemic reasons for action and has offered an alternative account. In this paper, I argue that less than giving an 'alternative' definition, Rowbottom has offered an additional condition to my original account. I argue, further, that such an extra condition is unnecessary, i.e. that the arguments designed to motivate it do not go through.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Grazer Philosophische StudienISSN
0165-9227Publisher
RodopiVolume
78Page range
265-271Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
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- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-10-22Usage metrics
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