Compatibilism and free belief

Booth, Anthony R (2009) Compatibilism and free belief. Philosophical Papers, 38 (1). pp. 1-12. ISSN 0556-8641

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Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Depositing User: Anthony Booth
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2012 16:05
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2019 11:40
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