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Booth, Anthony R (2009) Compatibilism and free belief. Philosophical Papers, 38 (1). pp. 1-12. ISSN 0556-8641
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640902933379
Abstract
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion |
Depositing User: | Anthony Booth |
Date Deposited: | 01 Nov 2012 16:05 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jul 2019 11:40 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41313 |