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Compatibilism and free belief
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Philosophical PapersISSN
0556-8641Publisher
Taylor & FrancisExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
38Page range
1-12Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-11-01Usage metrics
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