University of Sussex
Browse

File(s) not publicly available

Compatibilism and free belief

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 12:42 authored by Anthony BoothAnthony Booth
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Philosophical Papers

ISSN

0556-8641

Publisher

Taylor & Francis

Issue

1

Volume

38

Page range

1-12

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2012-11-01

Usage metrics

    University of Sussex (Publications)

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC