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The theory of epistemic justification and the theory of knowledge: a divorce
Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley’s radical suggestion.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
ErkenntnisISSN
0165-0106Publisher
SpringerExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
75Page range
37-43Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
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- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-11-01Usage metrics
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