Booth, Anthony Robert (2014) Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 1933-1592
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Abstract
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion |
Depositing User: | Anthony Booth |
Date Deposited: | 06 Mar 2013 15:46 |
Last Modified: | 03 Jul 2019 01:48 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41107 |
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