Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons : Sussex Research Online

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Booth, Anthony Robert (2014) Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 1933-1592

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x

Abstract

In this paper I discuss two claims; the ﬁrst is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justiﬁed, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justiﬁes a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Depositing User:	Anthony Booth
Date Deposited:	06 Mar 2013 15:46
Last Modified:	03 Jul 2019 01:48
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41107

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